The Transhumanist Movement 1

Francesco Paolo Adorno The Transhumanist Movement Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 The Transhumanist Movement 2.1 The Word 2.2 The People 2.3 The Organisations 2.4 Declarations 2.5 The Definitions of Transhumanism References 13 13 15 26 30 33 37 3 Transhumanism Between Humanism and the Posthuman 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Humanism 3.3 The Theories of the Posthuman 3.4 Is Transhumanism a Form of the Posthuman? 3.5 Is Transhumanism a Form of Humanism? References 41 41 45 48 52 55 65 v vi Contents 4 Theory and Practice of Transhumanism 4.1 Enhancement 4.2 The Aims of Enhancement 4.3 What Needs to Be Enhanced? 4.4 Body Enhancement 4.5 Cognitive Enhancement 4.6 Moral Enhancement 4.7 The Search for Immortality References 67 67 74 80 82 85 91 101 114 5 Problems of Transhumanism 5.1 Criticism of Enhancement 5.2 Therapy vs Enhancement 5.3 Medicine and Transhumanism 5.4 The Instrumentalisation of the Body 5.5 An Anthropology of Disability 5.6 Becoming a Cyborg 5.7 Legitimacy of Becoming a Cyborg 5.8 The Morality of Technology References 121 121 129 136 141 146 153 158 165 170 6 Transhumanism and Biopolitics 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Biopolitics and Transhumanism 6.3 Biopolitics as Life Economics 6.4 The Economics, Morality and Politics of Enhancement 6.5 Wellbeing Between Medicine and Politics 6.6 Enhancing to Manage and Govern References 175 175 179 184 187 190 194 200 Bibliography 203 1 Introduction As stated in the title, this book deals with the transhumanist movement. It offers the reader not only a description of transhumanism but also and above all an assessment of its underlying theory. In order to achieve this, several notional choices have been made. First, transhumanism is considered as a movement underpinned by the concepts and theories expounded to a greater or a lesser extent by all the authors discussed. Like every choice, this entailed a process of selection and elimination: certain concepts were selected as the primary focus while others were partially or totally excluded. This in turn meant selecting the material to analyse, which was not restricted to concepts and theories but also involved the elimination of some concrete facts. As a result, the map of transhumanism presented in Chapter 2 is far from complete. Transhumanism now encompasses such a spatially and temporally vast array of names, organisations, movements, trends, groups, newspapers, fanzines, publications, conferences and meetings that it would be impossible to take them all into account. This is not intended as an apology but rather as an acknowledgement of responsibility for a choice that is partly justified by the fact that, despite the limitless © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. P. Adorno, The Transhumanist Movement, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-82423-5_1 1 2 F. P. Adorno material to study or summarise, most of the works on and from transhumanism are boringly repetitive and redundant. Whether it is Californian biohackers working out of garages, Australian bio-artists, Oxford university researchers, Italian neo-futurists or French techno-socialists, the basic ideas are broadly the same. Second, it is worth recalling how in reality transhumanism acts on two levels: a first level regards the direct enhancement of the human body through the use of all kinds of prostheses that allow for a better control of individual biological processes. The second level of development of transhumanism relates to an indirect enhancement of the human body through a substantially uncontrollable increase in human intelligence which, according to its theorists, will lead to its replacement with a still indefinable form of artificial intelligence. It is argued that the pace of technological progress is so rapid that we will soon enter a phase defined as “singularity” in which this acceleration, originating from weak human capacities, will be such as to transform human nature in an irreversible and fundamentally unpredictable way. The brain, powerful as it is, is limited in the same way that other parts of the human body are, so despite all the creativity it possesses, it seems to have reached its maximum expansion. Notwithstanding this, it has had the ability to initiate a movement of technological progress that seems unstoppable and that, above all, can transcend the biological limits of the human organ, which it still is, creating higher forms of intelligence. Before the end of the twenty-first century, our intelligence will be implemented on a non-biological support billions of billions of times more powerful than the biological support offered by neuronal matter, with consequences that are completely inconceivable at the present stage of our knowledge. This second-level transhumanism presents a difference, along with an analogy, with first-level transhumanism that explains why we will not deal with it directly. The difference is that, on the one hand, singularity is a largely predictive theory that focuses on the long-term effects of progress in artificial intelligence and that, at least in the terms in which it is presented, are far in the future. On the other hand, the problems posed by the development of artificial intelligence go far beyond what has been discussed in a specifically transhumanist context. The analogy is the particularly negative representation of human biology, proposed by both 1 Introduction 3 these groups of transhumanists, even though they can be distinguished and isolated. At the bottom of all the branches of transhumanism, there is the belief that human biological processes—the living as such, not to mention natural life—have too many limitations, too many obstacles, that make no sense and that can now be eliminated without any difficulty. Starting from this common diagnosis, “biological” and “singular” transhumanists focus on two different but parallel ways of achieving the same goal which consists of imagining the humanity of the future. That means that the issues discussed are essentially the same, but the means on which to act to produce and think of a posthuman humanity are diverging. For “biological” transhumanists, it is the human body in its diversity and materiality; for “singular” transhumanists, it is the brain that has the evident characteristic of being a biological part of the human body, but it also has the specificity of producing intangible objects such as thoughts, emotions and feelings. The reasons why I prefer to avoid discussing issues related to singularity starting from artificial intelligence are, hopefully, understandable: from the more concretely biological perspective, focusing on singularity would have been redundant with respect to our problems; from the more specifically cognitive perspective, such a focus would have led us to discuss problems that are largely beyond the transhumanist perspective. With virtually no facts, few names and a great deal of theory, the assessment of a movement cannot be a mere repetition of the almost identical claims its authors make all around the globe. It must not be limited to merely highlighting the implicitly introduced and employed concepts, the more or less implicit justification strategies and the more or less skilfully exploited historical references in order to gain the reader’s approval. Instead, it must also shift through all the theoretical material, evaluate it and point out any inconsistencies, issues, logical and theoretical errors, inaccuracies, misstatements and the more or less questionable approximations that it allegedly identifies in its theoretical corpus and, above all, it must consider any resulting practical and theoretical consequences. Despite an equidistance in principle, this book is far from proposing an apology for transhumanism, which the shelves of bookstores and libraries are full of. On the contrary, after a first reading, it will appear as excessively negative and critical of transhumanism. The 4 F. P. Adorno fact is that the author is a philosopher who is convinced that the role of his discipline is above all to criticise, to problematise and to show the more or less evident implications of concepts, theories and movements to eliminate unreasonable prejudices, while also offering readers some arguments to rationally justify a choice for or against the theses of the transhumanists. Consequently, a point of view was chosen which is this: a comprehensive critique of transhumanism will be developed through the analysis and articulation of a series of arguments that tend, as mentioned, to highlight the shortcomings and criticalities of the topic; if the reader considers that these arguments are valid then his or her rejection of transhumanism will be justified by a solid and substantial reasoning and not only by the dread of transformations and changes, the fear of the new, or by a prejudice favourable to the status quo. If, on the other hand, these arguments are considered weak, inconsistent, inconclusive or useless, the reader will be reinforced in his or her positive conception of transhumanism. Chapter 4 sets out a detailed overview of the concepts and practices of transhumanism, starting from what appears to be its pivotal concept: enhancement. This is a word used frequently and inaccurately in everyday language, as indicated by the existence of various synonyms, and whose scope indicates such embedded practices that there seems no point in further analysing its meaning. After all, who does not work or act to improve themselves? Who does not seek to better themselves from every point of view? Trivialising enhancement in this way—unintentionally perhaps but certainly without sparing a second thought—obviously means that it can be excluded ipso facto from any kind of debate or, worse, delegitimised. What sense would it make to criticise the enhancement proposed by transhumanists if almost all human actions aim at self-improvement? All this would achieve is a paradoxical questioning of human history. Yet things may not be as clear-cut as they first appear, because transhumanist enhancement differs somewhat from humanity’s thirst for improvement and gives rise to concerns that have never been raised before. Concentrating on the purpose of human actions, which are always invariably geared towards improving an individual’s condition, distracts attention from the means by which these are to be achieved and hinders the proper assessment of their validity because it reduces the gap 1 Introduction 5 between the traditional and biotechnological enhancement proposed by transhumanists. The use of biotechnology is legitimised by novel assumptions and could produce revolutionary effects, such as the achievement of immortality. It remains to be seen just how desirable this and the other enhancements proposed and propagated by transhumanism are and whether the enhancement of certain faculties or the creation of new capabilities can be considered truly positive achievements. Indeed, as transhumanism’s promises are fulfilled, doubts arise over enhancement in general as a practice involving biotechnological means as well as its specific applications in the search for clear results. However, it is not only this allegedly extraordinary biotechnological enhancement that is problematic, but also the desire to remove it from procedures of moral legitimation, which should be all the more necessary when their effects appear at first sight so outlandish. Intuitively, apart from the specific arguments used to explain, justify and support the various forms of enhancement, transhumanism employs a specific strategy to legitimise its theories, affirming the full consistency and continuity of its proposals with movements, knowledge, beliefs and concepts traditionally rooted in the theoretical framework of modernity. Basically, transhumanists claim that they are the worthy and orthodox continuation of all the humanists, enlighteners and scientists who have worked for the advancement of humanity. Transhumanism is not an innovative project but one that aims only to accept the consequences of the very movement of modernity through technological progress. Its insistent reference to such notions as progress, humanity and humanism, and even the very name of the movement itself, rightly restores the meaning of this continuity. Transhumanism claims to be nothing other than the orthodox extension of humanism with a view to becoming its crowning achievement: a group of theories and ideas to explain the very premise of the historical self-narration of our world of material progress. However, the narrative proposed by transhumanism is too smooth, too flat, to be accepted without detailed analysis. Chapter 3 will investigate its alleged continuity with humanism, a claim that transhumanists frequently make in order to take their “rightful” place among the various schools of thought engaging more or less critically with different forms of 6 F. P. Adorno humanism. This has resulted in a somewhat problematic image of transhumanism: while it may initially seem fallacious to establish a continuity with humanism, in reality there are certainly valid reasons for considering transhumanism as its fulfilment. This conclusion, which is not devoid of ambiguity, can also be attributed to difficulties in defining the key concepts of humanism present in all the authors, thinkers, philosophers and scientists who consider themselves to be humanists. Notwithstanding the uncertainties shrouding the issue, the fact remains that the transhumanists’ claim that they are the continuers and heirs of enlightenment and humanism does have a certain legitimacy. Chapter 5 delves further into the essential principles of transhumanism and assesses its legitimation on the basis of its continuity with traditional practices and theories in order to focus on one of its fundamental features. Transhumanism argues that, as there is no fundamental difference between enhancement practices and medical therapies aiming to restore good health, the rejection of biotechnological enhancement should paradoxically lead to the same attitude being adopted towards medical therapies. Since such a conclusion is literally inconceivable, transhumanists then argue that just as therapeutic interventions are regarded as essential, the same should hold for enhancement interventions. Here too, an excessively linear and superficial rationale fuels the suspicion that such inconsistent and discontinuous reasoning should somehow be exposed, first by making this analogy between the aims of therapy and enhancement less straightforward, and second by pointing out the consequences it might have on people’s daily lives. If every therapy is basically an enhancement and if every enhancement has a therapeutic aim, the dissemination and pervasiveness of enhancement could be symptomatic of a view of human life as not simply a succession of illnesses and diseases but as a disease itself; one might then wonder if survival might not lie in pathologising everyday existence. It seems clear that a line must somehow be drawn to separate health from illness and enhancement from therapy in order to define the limits of normal existence, although this is no simple task. Normality and health are those human conditions that do not need treatment and could certainly be modified through enhancement, although this would differ 1 Introduction 7 considerably from therapy. Other arguments legitimising such enhancement interventions would then have to be defined, since they could no longer be justified by therapeutic necessity. The alleged continuity between therapy and enhancement, which is also justified by historical processes that have progressively modified the means and aims of medicine, has an “ideological” impact with deleterious consequences, as is pointed out in the final chapter. The problematic nature of the transhumanists’ “continuist” strategy also emerges clearly when discussing their anthropology. The central figure of transhumanism is, of course, the cyborg: a being that is stronger, more powerful and better than a “normal” human being from every point of view because it has been hybridised with artificial systems that perform the functions of worn out or inadequate organs or replace them, as in the case of RoboCop or the Terminator. The cyborg is an extremely problematic figure as it seems to portray a new human being which, in the eyes of transhumanism’s critics, deserves nothing but ruthless condemnation. Transhumanists and their supporters respond to this by stating that person has always been a cyborg. Critics of the cyborgisation of humanity do not accept that the human race has always been fundamentally hybrid, impure and naturally “contaminated” by the environment in which it evolves and by the tools it conceives and creates. The transhumanists once again claim this should not be wondered at and that no justification or legitimation is warranted: the human being becoming a cyborg does not mark a discontinuity with the evolution of its true nature because we are born cyborgs. Denying a discontinuity in the evolution of humanity aims once again to avoid all criticism of the human enhancement that transhumanism supports, by normalising something utterly outlandish. But exactly what is outlandish in the human being that transhumanism proposes to create? What makes it appear so utterly innovative? A first answer to this question can be found in the means that are to be used for this purpose: biotechnologies. While the impact of the biotechnological manipulation of humanity cannot be predicted, there are at least two implications of the analyses conducted in Chapter 5 that deserve to be highlighted. The first implication is that technology is not itself neutral towards the consequences it produces. The use of new technologies in the field 8 F. P. Adorno of biology, medicine and elsewhere has the power to change the relationship that people have with themselves, with other people, with their environment and with the world. The problem thus shifts, and it is up to the transhumanists to provide a fuller depiction of the type of world that biotechnologies are likely to design. However, it is clearly not a question of explaining whether or not human nature will be modified, and in what way; for example whether we will have wings or whether devices will be integrated into our bodies to allow us to breathe under water or to survive in the vacuum of space. Instead, what is required of transhumanists is that they explain how everyday activities, however insignificant, will change as a result of humanity becoming a cyborg, and what undesirable but inevitable effects there might be. Rather than on the enhancement of human beings as such, it is on these alterations that the discussion should focus. A useful example is provided by the world of sport: there are widespread appeals for anti-doping legislation to be withdrawn because performance enhancement is allegedly within every sportsperson’s reach and has been in use ever since competitive sport was invented. Enforcing penalties for doping is like trying to empty the ocean with a spoon: futile, costly and counter-productive. Transhumanists put forward the same argument in this context as that used elsewhere: since doping has always existed, no justification is warranted because it would be like justifying the very existence of competitive sport. At the very least, the burden of proof should fall on those who oppose these centuries-old practices. One might object, however, that the intentional or unintentional effects of biotechnological or gene doping make it totally different from “traditional” doping based on corticoids, amphetamines and hormones. The former intervenes directly, definitively and in depth, acting on the athlete at a submolecular level. The transhumanists retort that even if this were the case, the difference between the two doping techniques is quantitative, not qualitative. Clearly, the debate is far from over. One way out of this impasse might be to introduce another aspect that could be defined as practical assessment. Biotechnological doping alters more than just the sportsperson’s performance and not only raises issues of fair play but also and above all changes the way in which sport is perceived and played. An Olympic Games 100-m final contested by athletes with physical 1 Introduction 9 or chemical prosthetics and by genetically modified or cloned athletes would call into question the current concept of “the Olympic 100-m final”. Given the above forms of doping, it is probably the variations of this concept and others of the same type and not those concerning doping and its effects that need to be properly evaluated. The second implication that deserves scrutiny is the unintentional shift in outlook on human nature that the spread of enhancement interventions will inevitably produce. The trivialisation of enhancement, which is nothing more than the trivialisation of improvement therapies, will produce a pathologisation of existence (as will be discussed in Chapter 6) with absolutely unprecedented moral and political consequences. It would be reductive to see transhumanist anthropology as being entirely centred on the cyborg or, rather, it would be a mistake to view the cyborg as the image of an augmented, upgraded human. Indeed, there is another side to the cyborg, for example in the case of the athlete Oscar Pistorius, who is a fragile, vulnerable, diminished and disabled man. It is because human beings are deficient or impaired that they need enhancement. Under the triumphant optimism of transhumanist technophilia there lies the sad and compassionate image of a man constantly in need of care and therapy, improvements and support without which his existence would be considerably worse than it is. Contrary to popular belief, transhumanism treats people as if they were disabled and in need of improvement therapies throughout their lives. It proposes a generalised therapeutic solution, whose explicit aim is to restore or attribute faculties capable of improving individual wellbeing through increased freedom of movement and greater control over our body. However, the view that humanity is fundamentally inadequate or in a state of virtual deficiency risks triggering a pathologisation of existence: a process in which all the imperfections of the human body become defects to be eliminated, disabilities to be remedied and diseases to be treated. The moral and political consequences of transhumanist anthropology and of the equivalence between therapies and enhancement are detailed in Chapter 6. This final chapter follows a theoretical argument based on an assumption external to transhumanism in order to abandon the sterile discussions on the possible negative (or positive) effects of enhancement. 10 F. P. Adorno These typically prove fruitless and ultimately hinder an overall assessment of transhumanism not only as a movement promoting individualism and competitiveness in the Western world and thereby revolutionising individual lives, but also as a theory producing more concrete and direct effects. The assumption on which transhumanism is here interpreted is that contemporary politics is centred on the biological life of human beings, which has been the mainstay of power since the seventeenth century. This means that the government of individuals, that is all those practices that aim to make individuals perform a certain type of action and adopt specific behaviour patterns with a view to ensuring adherence to a certain vision of morality, is nowadays achieved through life processes. From the purely moral point of view, transhumanist imperatives pressure individuals into taking responsibility for their own health and activity, establishing a moral code entirely centred on their behaviour and attitudes. Politically, this would result in a deconstruction of traditional political thought, which would then be entirely modelled on biopolitical imperatives that in no way resemble traditional ones. In other words, this diminished and vulnerable conception of the human being would task politics with the management, strengthening and improvement of people’s biological life, the consequences of which would be just as important as those previously mentioned with regard to enhancement. Contemporary biopolitics eliminates the gap between the biological processes supporting mere individual existence and the way in which people try to live their lives, inspired by values, concepts and moral and political judgements. The result achieved by confusing these and reducing the one to the other is the power to manage and govern people’s lives through the orientation imposed on the management of life processes. In other words, the life of individuals is governed through the control and management of human biological needs. Biopolitics thus comprises two factors: the governance and the manipulation of human biology, that is the framework within which the creation of individual life must necessarily take place. More precisely, by establishing itself in relation to this biological element, the lifestyle of individuals would be completely managed 1 Introduction 11 and controlled by external forces and thus hetero-directed. If transhumanism were internal to this strategy of government, which adopts and updates its working procedures, then our view of these theories and their proposed enhancement would change completely. Transhumanism, which comes across as a theory that promotes and seeks to fulfil even the most repressed and undeclared human desires, would merely supply yet another means of dominating individual lives to those who seek and know how to use it. Beneath the liberation of bodily forces lurks the danger of an even more ruthless and direct control of people through their bodies.