Karl Popper’s Falsificationism is untenable

Karl Popper’s Falsificationism is untenable Falsificationism presents a normative theory of scientific methodology; Scientists put forward hypotheses or systems of theories and test them through experience via experimentation (Popper, 2002: 3). Falsifiability for Popper is the criterion for scientific statements to be classed as empirical, while falsification denotes the requirements necessary for a theory to be classed as falsified i.e. if we accept a statement that contradicts the statements of the theory (Popper, 2002: 66). Falsificationism thus identifies normative science and what the limits are to research, and the demarcating line between science and non-science (Ladyman, 2001: 62) (Popper, 2001a: 295). This essay will proceed as follows; (1) firstly, Popper’s Falsificationism’s strengths as a theory of scientific method will be explained and evaluated in comparison to (2) the impact of Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts, (3) Lakatos’ falsificationism (scientific research programmes), and (4) Feyerabends rejection of scientific method. Overall, (1) Popper’s theory falls victim to (2) Kuhn’s account, but the debate thus becomes between (3) Lakatos and the rejection of method via (4) Feyerabend, concluding with an interpretation of falsificationism as succumbing to Feyerabendian considerations. Falsificationism has two central stages and a summation of these stages: a) Scientists put forward theories and predictions – for Popper, there is no methodology for generating new ideas; they could even be a Bergsonian creative spark in which the idea comes to the scientist (Popper, 2002: 8). Scientific theories are never fully justifiable, but are fully testable; as a result, the objective nature of scientific statements is due to their being ‘inter-subjectively’ testable (Popper, 2002: 22). b) The falsification of those theories and predictions using testing (Ladyman, 2001: 7071). Theories can be tested using four different methods; logical comparison of conclusions (testing the internal consistency of the scientific system), investigation into logical form 1 of the theory (is it a tautology or empirical claim(s)), comparison with other theories (is it an advance on prior theories), empirical application of the conclusions which can be derived from it (empirical testing) (Popper, 2002: 9-10). If it cannot account for practical application and its consequences, then it is not an adequate theory (Popper, 2002: 10). If the theory passes these initial tests, then it is able for the time being to be corroborated by empirical experience (i.e. not be discarded) (Popper, 2002: 10). A theory is thus falsifiable if it can pass the test of being able to divide its statements into two classes; statements it rules out (the ‘potential-falsifiers’) and the class it allows for (Popper, 2002: 65-66, 72-73). From this, the theory is falsified if there is an observable, reproducible effect that refutes the theory (Popper, 2002: 66). c) From this, the criterion for attributing scientific status to a theory is its ability to have falsifiability, testability or refutability (Popper, 2001: 298). Einstein’s general-relativity passes this test, psychoanalysis and Marxism do not (Popper, 2001a: 298-300). Marxism and psychoanalysis are considered by Popper as examples of pseudo-sciences (and thus not adequate for (a)) i.e. that the range or breadth of the theory is unfalsifiable, such that there is no data that can show that the theories application is false (Rosenberg, 2005: 122) (Popper, 2001a: 295) (Ladyman, 2001: 66-67). As a result, explanatory power in Popper’s theory is ‘inversed’; falsificationism is concerned with the negative data in (b) (as opposed to confirmation of positive, affirming data) that can show when a theory is false (Ladyman 2001: 67-69). For Popper, two issues plague scientific methodology: d) Hume’s problem – the problem of induction (Russell, 2001: 289-293); e) Kant’s problem – the problem of demarcation (Popper, 2002: 11). 2 Popper’s solution to (d) is to deny that scientific knowledge is generated via induction; science proceeds without induction due to the conditions for falsifying a hypothesis using deductive reasoning (Popper, 2002: 4) (Ladyman, 2001: 69) (Rosenberg, 2005: 121). Popper thinks justifications of (d) that try to base it on experience (Reichenbach and Kant) will lead to an infinite regress in which the justification requires further justification ad infinitum (Popper, 2002: 5). Science for Popper is based on deduction (Popper, 2002: 7). Likewise, inductive logic should be rejected on the basis that it does not provide any adequate solution to (e) (Popper, 2002: 11). Popper views this as his negative solution: his positive solution involves preferring a theory that is more corroborated than one that is less corroborated, i.e. the theory which needs to be preferred will have the highest degree of verisimilitude (Popper, 2002: 281-282). From this, Popper (begrudgingly) ascertains that verisimilitude (and degrees of truth-hood) requires a small metaphysical commitment to Moorean common-sense realism about regularities in nature (Popper, 2002: 282). Falsificationism is thus prefaced on the belief in a low amount of metaphysics regarding the pragmatics of (d) and verisimilitude; Popper is willing to countenance the problem of induction with a pragmatic belief that statements like ‘the sun will rise tomorrow’ have a stronger verisimilitude than statements that oppose this (Popper, 2002: 282). This puts Popper (who holds that there is a strict logic to the development of scientific theories due to higher degrees of verisimilitude) at odds with Feyerabends (2010) radical views that the development of science is not heading in any direction at all, that it is aimless or anarchical (Rosenberg, 2005: 173). Regarding (e), if a theory were not falsifiable via experience, then it is unscientific, i.e. Marxism and psychoanalysis (Ladyman, 2001: 69) (Popper, 2002: 18). As a result, science operates on the basis that it should be falsifying theories, not proving them true – experimental testing and research into the conditions for falsification of a theory – leading to theories being abandoned or subject to future testing, those that remain are retained because they have not been falsified 3 yet (Ladyman, 2001: 70-71). Scientists may put forward unique singular hypotheses in (1) or derive (1) from sources like a dream; for Popper, this is acceptable because conjectures don’t need scientific sources (Ladyman, 2001: 72). As a result, scientists operate on the pursuit of generating theories that are highly falsifiable, while retaining precision and broad content (Ladyman, 2001: 73). However, Popper does not demand that scientific statements be tested before acceptance, only that it has the possibility of being tested (Popper, 2002: 26). Popper must account for claims made by the Duhem (1991)-Quine (1951) thesis that science is holistic, as one cannot falsify a singular hypothesis in isolation (Rosenberg, 2005: 159-160) (Ladyman, 2001: 77-80). Popper interprets Duhem’s view of scientific method as selecting the most simple, elegant system possible as the best one (which he interprets as untenable because it will just select the existing paradigm i.e. the classical view of the time), as a result, Popper rejects this interpretation of scientific method because it does not allow for falsifiability and demarcation to be possible (Popper, 2002: 58-61). Instead, Popper argues we should avoid conventionalist strategies of trying to save a theory at all costs but should be harsher in our rejection of scientific theories that have been saved by conventionalist strategies (Popper, 2002: 60-61). Science is not a form of knowledge for Popper, it is only probable truth (Popper, 2002: 278). In the falsificationist account of the history of scientific development, theories are replaced by those that have a higher testability and corrobability, the nature of scientific development is such that theories gain higher and higher universality or generality (Popper, 2002: 276). It proceeds on the basis that conjectures can be ‘overthrown’ by stronger conjectures, and in this regard science for Popper is always improving and getting a higher verisimilitude (Popper, 2002: 279-280). Kuhn (2012) rejects this; periods of ‘normal science’ are the normative work 4 being done within a ‘paradigm’ and revolutionary change alters this paradigm, thus affecting the normal science being done, i.e. the Newtonian paradigm that lasted around 300 years (Rosenberg, 2005: 148-150). Kuhn’s primary issue with Popper’s account is that it cannot account for (dialectical) scientific revolutions, paradigm-shifts and the operational distinction of ‘normal science’ (Kuhn, 2012: 77-79, 145-146) (Lakatos, 1999: 20). For Kuhn, falsificationism is a ‘naïve’ theory; criticism of the dominant theory and alternative proposals are only eligible in moments of crisis, and these changes fall outside of the operation of normal science and we should consider paradigms and paradigm changes as a distinct enterprise of study (i.e. a sociological, cultural field of study) (Rosenberg, 2005: 156) (Kuhn, 2012: 145146) (Lakatos, 1999: 20). Likewise, Popper does not offer a theory of incommensurability between rival theories, i.e. how can rival paradigms be untenable with each other, such as the incommensurability between phlogiston theory and oxidation theory (Rosenberg, 2005: 152153). In response to Kuhn, Lakatos (1999) offers an account of scientific method that attempts to retain Popper’s approach while accounting for the impact of Kuhn’s theory. Lakatos proposes that scientific theories are smaller components of the larger scientific research programme which includes a hard core which cannot be removed without giving up the entire research programme, and a protective belt of claims that could be removed given the circumstances (Rosenberg, 2005: 163). Lakatos defence of Popper’s logic of scientific discovery is based around the following: f) Poppers weak position; naïve falsificationism is correctly criticised by Kuhn (Lakatos, 1999: 20-22). 5 g) Poppers strong position; sophisticated falsificationism operates on the claim that a theory is better if it adds more corroborated empirical content, i.e. if it has more to offer than a prior theory (Lakatos, 1999: 21). Lakatos argues (g) is a stronger claim because it can account for how theory development works and how progress can be accounted for; in this regard, ‘series of theories’ progress from one another and build on the knowledge had by the prior theory, but the difference between (f) and (g) is now that series of theories can be classed as ‘scientific’, and theories viewed in isolation cannot be classed as scientific (Lakatos, 1999: 21). This is how Lakatos responds to Kuhn’s claim that paradigm changes fall outside the reach of normal science and rejects the Kuhnian view that scientific revolution has no logic to it (only mob psychology and groupconsensus) (Lakatos, 1999: 22). Furthermore, we can consider Lakatos change in the Popperian research programme an improvement on Popper’s falsificationism (Lakatos, 1999: 23). Popper’s theory also accounts for theory cores like Darwin’s theory of evolution differently after the impact of Kuhn and Lakatos; Popper considers Darwinism a metaphysical research programme by which testable scientific theories operate within that we accept as tenable because of its verisimilitude (Popper, 2001b: 302-303). Overall, we can consider this as a deviation between two accounts of falsificationism. The final hurdle that falsificationism as a theory has to overcome is how to account for rejection of scientific methodology, as alluded to earlier by the comparison of Popper and Feyerabend on the development of science; Kuhn’s account of paradigms has the more notable point of showing that nothing can be asserted to be true that is independent of some point of view (or paradigm) and conflict ensues (Rosenberg, 2005: 170). Epistemic relativism is thus a competing account to falsificationism; Popper’s rejection of holism about scientific hypotheses 6 (his rejection of conventionalist views) also aligns him with Feyerabends (2010) ‘methodological anarchy’ that allows for there to be no non-social basis on which to distinguish a theory as better than any other theory (Rosenberg, 2005: 172). On the contrary, Popper would not accept this, as his account is meant to show the logic of how scientific discoveries work, and not offer a rejection of scientific method that Feyerabend does. However, can we not consider falsificationism to assert epistemic relativism about (a); Popper is not worried about the sources of scientific hypotheses, but he would disagree with Feyerabend on the nature of (a) and (b) as being parts of a paradigm (Rosenberg, 2005: 173). Feyerabend is also rejecting Lakatos response to Kuhn’s account of paradigms; for Feyerabend, to understand the nature of science at any given time, we must do some sociological work to understand the social and political forces that shape theory construction and theory acceptance (Rosenberg, 2005: 173). However, it may be objected that at this point Popper and Feyerabend are examining different questions; Feyerabend is asking why a theory was accepted (the institutional aspects of science) and Popper is examining how scientists operate (the methodology of science), but Feyerabend might respond that even Popper’s theory falls victim to the sociological aspects of theory construction, as falsificationism could be considered a theoretical response to the effectiveness of Einstein’s theory, and that we cannot demarcate between institution and methodology in this strict way (Rosenberg, 2005: 173). In conclusion, (1) Popper’s falsificationism (c) attributes scientific status to a theory if it is falsifiable, operating on the denial of (d) the problem of induction and concerning itself with the (e) problem of demarcation between science and non-science. Popper’s account of the history of scientific development and its internal logic was heavily criticised by (2) Kuhn’s account of the distinction between revolutionary change and normal science; thus, leading to a responsive falsificationism in the form of (3) Lakatos scientific research programmes through (g). This shows that Popper’s falsificationism held the weaker claim (f). Furthermore, Popper’s 7 normative theory was susceptible to the rival epistemological relativism of Feyerabend and the failure to account for the implication of how institution plays a role in scientific methodology. Bibliography: Duhem, P., (1991). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Feyerabend, P., (2010). 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