Women and Jihadist Organisations

Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 Women and Jihadist Organisations This essay aims to contribute to the understanding of the role of women in jihadist movements and argues that jihadist organisations employ women mainly for opportunistic reasons. The first section of the essay summarises different approaches that scholars have adopted on the topic, suggesting a more holistic analysis is needed. In light of this, the second section combines anthropological, sociological and political arguments to discuss the role of women in six different jihadist organisations – al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, Hezbollah, Hamas, Boko Haram and the ISIL. The third part of the essay presents a comparative analysis of the results of the precedent section, and engages in a dialogue with the literature. It points out similarities and differences between the organisations and identifies patterns to provide possible explanations to the employment of women in jihad, such as opportunism. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that religious arguments do not sufficiently explain jihadism. There are a multitude of concurrent causes. A MULTIFACETED DEBATE The self-proclaimed caliph and leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, on June 30, 2014 announced the birth of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and called all Muslims to join him in the new conquered territories, stressing how the hijra [migration to Islamic territories] was an obligation and a duty of every Muslim. Many (have) responded to the call from all over the world. Although the phenomenon is not new, the number of women who decided to take part in the hijra and to be involved in jihadist organisations, like the Islamic State, has in recent years increased to unprecedented levels. The evidence that numbers are growing fast suggests that more attention should be dedicated to the analysis of the importance of women in such organisations. Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 Scholars have debated about the nature itself of women, suggesting that ontologically women would be less inclined to violence and more peaceful than men. Yesevi (2014) calls it the “beautiful soul” narrative. In this perspective, women are often described just as victims of terrorism (Reed 2002, Kirk 2002, Joseph 2003, Cubilie 2005). Shirazi (2010:6) suggests in her book that these theories can be considered as shaped by the orientalist approach and therefore strongly biased: “result[ing] in a historicisation of the Muslim woman as either sexually idealised or oppressed”. Gaub & Lisiecka (2016) underline the role of the media in creating and spreading this pattern. Shirazi (2010) together with Sjoberg & Gentry (2011) and other feminist scholars, deconstruct this approach, proposing a more convincing argument. In their perspective, gender is not a determining factor itself, but it becomes decisive when considered in larger and multi-faceted anthropological, social and political context. Hence, Yesevi (2014) suggests that “terrorism and violence are socially constructed”. This constructivist argument opens the way to a broader analysis based on the assumption that women can and should be considered, as suggested by Strømmen (2017) as “full agents rather than feeding the gender-paradigm of ‘men-as-perpetrators’ and ‘women-as-victims’”. Scholars have analysed and categorised the role of women in jihadist organisations and attributed different agency degrees. Nonetheless, Bakker, De Leede and Note (2015) together with Hoyle et al. (2015) and other scholars tend to overlook the role of women suggesting that they are not actively fighting, but only - for example - supporting mujahedeen fighters, mediating marriages, collecting money, spreading the ideology, giving online support. Mietz (2017) argues that “women do not participate in jihad, they are responsible for the next generation of jihadists”. A more holistic approach is provided by Loken & Zelenz (2018) in line with the strong criticism expressed by Huey & Witmer (2016): “while it is the case that we now know more about female involvement in radical Islamist terrorist organizations, much of that same reporting has also tended to oversimply a significantly Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 more complex set of dynamics. In essence, the role of women within these groups is often reduced to a single dismissive term: fan girls”. The debate suggests that a broader, transnational analysis of the role of women in jihadist movements could help to individuate common patterns, uncover overlooked aspects and eventually put a new light on the keyrole played by women in such organisations. The analysis will proceed through the examination of 6 jihadist movements covering different geographical areas (From Africa to Pakistan and Afghanistan and the Middle East), chosen to include a range of different behaviours, organisational structures and strategies, different degrees of politicisation, institutionalisation and nationalism. The chosen degree of diversity will allow a complex, more effective analysis. AL-QAEDA The al-Qaeda group is a transnationally operational organisation with affiliated groups in many areas in the world (27 according to CISAC 2019), including North Africa, the MiddleEast but also Pakistan and Afghanistan; attacks have been perpetrated globally. Traditionally, the attitude of the organisation toward women has been widely conservative, and in line with other jihadist formations, as stated by its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri: "AlQaeda has no women" (SITE 2010); Davis (2017) considers Al-Qaeda indeed as “a very masculine, misogynist group”. Nonetheless, other leaders, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or scholars such as Anwar al-Awlaki are more inclined to consider a more active role of women, a trend unexpectedly observed also among the Taliban in Pakistan (Bloom 2005). Bloom (2011) argues that women are taking on increasingly influent roles on the organisation. Women are online recruiters, fund-raisers, social media managers and they also contribute, in small part to the violent fight. The scholar (ibid.) suggests that a structural change is happening in the role of women in the organisation: “the ‘exploding womb’ has replaced the ‘revolutionary womb’ that produced Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 and supported young extremists as women turn to suicide bombing. […] For the most part, Al-Qaeda and associated groups employ women on an ad hoc basis, regardless of the ideological permissibility”. In fact, the core of al-Qaeda is not big in terms of numbers and probably after the intense counter-terrorism activity experienced by the group after 2001, the organisation has had recruitment problems and consequently been forced to employ women. Davis (2017) argues that the low number of women involved in the fight should be related to social conservatism, especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, actions perpetrated by women ensure a wider media coverage and a better visibility for the organisation. In order to overcome this acceptance problem and make the most of women’s participation, Noor (2011) reports that in Pakistan women are forced by their families to commit suicide bombing attacks because coercion by men is generally more acceptable in highly conservative societies. Al-Qaeda is one of the most conservative and patriarchal based organisations, but data suggest a high level of opportunism. Social acceptance is another important reason as shown by the example of Pakistan. Officially, the presence of women is debated. However, for practical reasons al-Qaeda employs women in many fields with growing importance. The need for active women is driven in this case by an intense counterterrorist activity and the need to spectacularise and mediatise (even more) the actions perpetrated by the group. Indeed, although the organisation is not big in terms of absolute numbers, it has obtained a greater visibility. AL-SHABAAB Al-Shabaab is a jihadist organisation operating in Somalia, with sporadic actions in Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia (Bryden, 2014). Its origins are not known with certainty. Accepted theories suggest that the group was initiated as a special force in the frame of the Islamic Court Union (ICR, 2010). Internationally, the group pledged cooperation with Boko Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 Haram and allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012. In 2015 it publicly proclaimed the support to the Islamic State (Odowa 2015). The role of women in this organisation is debated. There is no report of women in high positions, probably for reasons of social acceptance. Mazurana (2013), Davis (2017) and ICG (2014) suggest reactionary stands towards women, who take care mostly of international fund-raising and logistic support. Davis (ibid.) estimates that less than 5% of women participated in bombing attacks. The ICG (2014), suggests that women act in secondary positions because it would be socially inacceptable in Somalia to support an organisation employing women in an active way. Mazurana (2013:164) relates it rather to the substantial patriarchal structure of al-Shabaab to the situation of Somalia in the ‘90s, when women were the largest part of the workforce in the country. In this view, al-Shabaab would have acted in reaction to the independence and importance of women in society, to re-establish a more primary role for men. Even in this substantially patriarchal context, facts seem to give to women a more important role than expected, especially within the diaspora, which is particularly active in supporting the organisation (ICG 2014). Moreover, other scholars such as Bakker, De Leede and Note (2015), Sterley (2014), Willows (2017) but also Western media (the Guardian, the BBC among others) report the case of Samantha Lewthwaite. She is the widow of one of the bombers of the 2015 London attack and she is supposed to be part of the intelligence unit of al-Shabaab and to lead an army of 200 women, that she also trained. This fact confirms a greater openness of the organisation toward female participation in its activities and a higher level of opportunism. The al-Shabaab case supports the idea of the need for a better understanding and a general re-evaluation of women’s role in jihadist organisations. HEZBOLLAH Hezbollah is a Lebanese organisation operating not only as a militarised group but also as a governmental force. Like other political and religious groups in Lebanon, it also serves as Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 a local welfare provider for the Shi’a community. According to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (Gabrielsen 2014), “the woman is integrated in the Hezbollah’s agenda in every matter”. Fatma al-Smadi, researcher at the Al-Jazeera centre for studies argues that “the woman’s role isn’t limited to supporting fighters, they suffer arrests and even torture” (Kais, 2013). Having said that, the organisation does not employ women extensively in attacks. Davis (2017) suggests that the group does not have recruitment problems and has a reluctance in seeing women combating in the field for cultural and doctrinal reasons. Nevertheless, women support logistical and fund-raising activities. Furthermore, Hezbollah includes divisions called "women's directorates," that take care of culture, education, PRs and communication. Although part of the examined literature reports the absence of women in decision-making positions, the Israeli news website ynetnews.com reports in 2013 passages from an interview to Rima Fakhri, appeared in 2010 on the Kuwaiti newspaper alRai. Rima Fakhri was the first woman nominated in a top position in the political council of the organisation, formed only by men until that moment. Her words help us shed light on the position of Hezbollah towards women fighters: “The women in the group do not participate in the military fight because there’s no need for it. […] The list of women willing to commit suicide attacks in Hezbollah is as long as the men’s. If there’ll be a need for the party’s women to start jihad activities then there’s no obstacle to it, ideologically or organizationally”. Hezbollah shows in this case a quite inclusive face, probably because of cultural and sociological specificities of Lebanon. Davis (2017) defines Lebanon as a modern and broadly secular society, contradicted by Zisser (Kais 2013) that instead tends to underline the traditional conservative structure of the Lebanese society. Even if the traditional element is strong, the idea of a more modern society is more convincing also because as reported by Saboud & Muller (2012) it is not uncommon to see Hezbollah’s women in public without the veil. For this reason, showing a more open and inclusive face towards women could be considered as means to gain legitimisation and support, also in South America – a more Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 inclusive society for women – where the organisation has most of its foreign supporters. In another section of the interview, the same woman suggests the idea of a transnational Muslim sisterhood, related to Hezbollah’s support to the Arab spring movements: “We’re ready to cooperate with sisters in the Arab world by passing on our experience – which will help in establishing institutions and associations which will promote human happiness. Our experience is available to all, and we’ve met with Muslim sisters in Egypt on several conferences before.” According to the available data, women in Hezbollah are extremely active, but they are not employed in suicide bombing attacks. In this case social acceptance of the organisations seems to be a problem for the inclusion of women in military actions. The interview with Rima Fakhri shows how women are otherwise integrated in the establishment of the group, up to the highest positions. This shows a more open approach of Hezbollah towards women, explainable through a sociological argument, the greater integration of women in Lebanese society, but also a more organisational and political one. Indeed, Hezbollah occupies governmental positions in Lebanon and acts in a structured and established way. This is suggested also by the tone of Rima Fakhri, that sounds political – she calls Hezbollah a “party” and considers Hezbollah as a sort of avantgarde that could federate a world Muslim Sisterhood. These two reasons are both connected with the idea of legitimisation and support of the population. Ultimately, Hezbollah shows a high level of political establishment and tends to act not only as a military organisation, but also as a political party, factor that seems to privilege a more inclusive approach towards women. HAMAS Hamas (acronym from the Arabic meaning “Islamic resistance movement”) originates from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The group adopted in 1988 a statute, that clearly expresses an Islamic identity, combined with nationalistic aspirations against Israel. A few Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 passages are also devoted to the role of women: “Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part of the religious creed. […] A woman can go out to fight the enemy without her husband's permission”. Indeed, the organisation was probably the first officially admitting women, primarily as recruiters and logistical and fund-raising supporters (Zedalis 2004:6), but also in the jihadist fight. Hamas was, in fact, the first organisation to claim a women suicide bombing (2002 in Jerusalem). In 2008 Fathi Hammad, a member of Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council, declared: “For the Palestinian people, death has become an industry in which women excel” (Il Foglio 2018) and another former leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, said that “women are like the reserve army, when there is a necessity we use them” (Sixta 2008). Two local factors seem to have encouraged a direct involvement of women in Hamas: the cultural and the political contexts in Palestine. In fact, women in Palestine occupy high professional positions as doctors, teachers, politicians, managers (Davis 2017), fact that suggests a higher degree of social acceptance. In relation to politics, Tzoreff (2006) highlights the key-role played by Israeli military and political pressures, together with its antiterrorism activities that could have stimulated the organisation to look for unconventional solutions to pursue its scopes. Besides the declarations, databases (Davis 2017) report after 2006 only two attacks led by women (with a participation rate of 2.5%), in 2008 and 2014. The diminution of suicide attacks suggests a change in the strategy; indeed Hamas has evolved towards a political governing force and since 2006 women have active political roles. Hamas is a peculiar organisation where nationalist fight is integrated in the religious belief and fight. It appears quite open to the integration of women. Breaking the taboo of women suicide bombers has probably opened the way for other organisations to adopt the same pattern. The context seems to play an important role in the structure of the organisation. Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 Hamas, indeed, occupies governmental positions since 2007, and women are active in the party. The end of the suicide bombing attacks seems to be connected to this political shift. BOKO HARAM The Boko Haram group was born in 2002 and concentrates its activities in West Africa, more precisely in Nigeria and Cameroon, traditionally considered as conservative societies. It was conceived to contrast the Western model of education and establish an Islamic state. It started an affiliation with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in 2015. As reported by “Mapping militant organizations”, initiative based at the Stanford University (CISAC, 2018), the group is well-known for the kidnapping of more than 2000 people since 2014, in majority women and girls (Davis 2017). The activities of the group have included women in “an unprecedented way, setting a new standard” (ibid.) especially in terms of numbers. In fact, many bombing attacks have been realised by women or even teenage girls, as reported by the Guardian (2015). As calculated by Davis (2017), since 2014 Boko Haram women conducted 2.4 attacks per month. The “Long war journal” (Weiss 2015) reported that the organisation had employed at least 47 women as suicide bombers, aged from 9 to 40. Part of them were reported to originate from the intense kidnapping activity of the group, and so to act under coercion, drugs or manipulation (Davis 2017). Nonetheless, a part of them were voluntaries trained in special camps (Weiss 2015). Thanks to the participation of women and young girls, the organisation secured itself tactical surprise, together with a broad media coverage (Davis 2017). In her thorough volume on Boko Haram, Comolli (2015) lists a few reasons that lead men to take part into jihadist actions, the same list can be applied to women: anti-western feelings, aversion for modernization and democracy, revenge for the death of friends, family and loved ones and financial rewards. Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 Although the involvement of women in the action is high, Kitwana (2014) underlines that there is no evidence that women sit in decisional councils or high positions. The role of women in Boko Haram can be considered as fundamental, but within a rigid patriarchal organisation, without any access to decisional levels. In this case, a high level of violence is associated with a high number of women employed in the suicide attacks. The first element seems to justify the second, due to the high number of available recruits. Nonetheless, the process should probably be better understood as result of the interaction between the high level of targeted violence and the wide availability of female recruits. According to the available data, the level of coercion in the participation to the organisation is high, since a high number of women comes from kidnapping operations. Data do not show any support from the Diaspora. ISIL The growing ability of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to recruit and incorporate more and more women into their state and organization is certainly something noticeable in the recent history of jihadism. In comparison with the activity of any other jihadist organization, numbers of women recruits are much higher, especially in relation to the number of Western recruits - more than 700 women, according to Jakupi & Kelmendi (2017). As stated by Davis (2017) “Women have begun to join the group in shocking numbers […] the numbers of women joining ISIL is unprecedented”. It is in a way surprising how such an ultra-conservative terrorist group is able to attract and incorporate such a large and growing number of female recruits from all over the world. The treatments reserved for women include several forms of physical abuses, sexual slavery, detention and even death. Nonetheless, the Islamic State has been capable to attract women (Roy & Schoch 2017) and furthermore, it has also been able to give them roles outside of their family nucleus and their marriage. In fact, according to the detailed analysis carried out by Spencer (2016) on Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 the role of women within the Islamic State, women have increasing responsibilities in the construction of the Caliphate, in particular they cover a myriad of different roles: adequate wives for soldiers, parents of the new generations of jihadists, promoters of the propaganda of the terrorist group through online recruitment, responsibilities for logistic tasks, maintainers of the network of women of the Islamic State – also abroad, scholars of religion, doctors and teachers, up to being executors of violent jihad (Davis 2018). The author concludes that the IS “is fundamentally misogynist and, within its interpretation of Islamism, the role of women is “divinely” limited” (Ibid.). Nonetheless, women appear to be fundamental assets to found and grow the Caliphate, especially according to their political and ideological goals (Kneip 2016). The presence of women is a real strategic advantage for the terrorist group (Sutten 2009), that looks therefore willing to make concessions to its ideology in order to make the most of it. In 2015 members of the al-Khanssaa brigade, a moral police unit composed only by women active in Iraq and Syria, circulated online a “Women in the Islamic State: Manifesto and Case Study”, translated by Winter (2015) for the Quilliam foundation. This document, never officially translated in a Western language by the promoters, reveals indeed a strong emphasis of the role of woman as family support and household, more in line with the official communication of other jihadist organisations. The Islamic State represents a peculiar case. In fact, looking at what the IS perpetrates in terms of violence to women, the documented great appeal for women to join the organisation looks paradoxical. The exposed arguments suggest a great level of opportunism and, accordingly, a crucial role of social acceptance. The organisation has two different attitudes towards women, mirrored in its diverse ways of communication that offer different images according to the targeted female public. Indeed, ideology and doctrinal conservatism do not seem to be major issues for the organisation, that looks more worried to make the most of its human resources and build and defend its structure as pseudo-state. However, women do not occupy decisional positions, even if their importance is clearly reported. Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 COMMON PATTERNS – INSTRUMENTALISATION AND POWER A comparative analysis of our cases helps to identify common patterns and reveal transnational tendencies. First and probably most important of all, religion is one of the reasons explaining the presence of women in jihadist organisations, but it is not sufficient to justify it. All the organisations proclaim a strong and conservative doctrinal background that is internally debated and, in most cases, factually ignored. Scholarship and facts demonstrate how this attitude can be considered as an opportunistic justification generated by the concurrence of factors such as difficult recruitment, change of strategy, strong counterterrorism activities, need for media coverage. This is even reinforced by the consideration of a multiplicity of other elements. The degree of social conservatism does not seem to have an influence on the number of employed women. There are cases of high numbers of women both in predominantly traditional societies, such as in the case of Boko Haram and al-Shabaab, and more inclusive ones, such as in the case of Hamas and Hezbollah. Nonetheless, the social context must not be overlooked. Indeed, the fact that the first women bombing suicides happened in Palestine is not just a case; women in Palestine and Israel are involved in society and politics to higher degrees than in other countries. A higher degree of emancipation of women is in fact related to a higher degree of acceptance of an active involvement of women in jihad. Therefore, organisations operating in such contexts appear to be more likely to risk a higher degree of participation of women in their activities. Social acceptance is an important element to be considered. In fact, these organisations need money and people to be successful and they are subject to counterterrorism activities to oppose them, therefore they need social support to survive. For this, social acceptance is unavoidable. If the involvement of women would cause a large loss of support, then it would be probably abandoned. This is shown not only by the Palestinian case, but also, for example, by the cases of al-Qaeda Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 in Pakistan, that justifies the suicide attacks perpetrated by women through the idea of a coercion imposed by the male part of the families. Another way these organisations use to gain social acceptance and publicity is the media, in their multiple channels. On one hand, media coverage helps the organisation to have international and local recognition. On the other hand, it helps them to recruit people and funds. Again, in this context women play key-roles. Women (and children) are able to receive a greater media coverage. In this perspective, an attack perpetrated by women presents strategical advantages: the publicity of the organisation helps them in gaining support, diffusing their messages and raising money. Another strategical advantage is provided by the tactical surprise, that is the fact that women used to receive less attention when controlled at check points. Again, the opportunistic element is stronger than possible ideological obstacles. This is also confirmed by the fact that social conservatism does not seem to impact substantially either the level of integration per se of women in jihadist organisations, as witnessed by the alKhanssaa brigade of the ISIL and the units trained and led by Samantha Lewthwaite for Boko Haram. However, it does have an impact on the quality of the roles that women can reach. In fact, the highest positions in the hierarchy are reached in organisations operating in more inclusive societies, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, where women serve in high positions and as politicians. The medium levels of the hierarchy are occupied by women in the ISIL and less in al-Shabaab. Low positions are assigned by Boko Haram and al-Qaeda. This can also be related to the level of institutionalisation of the groups. The analysis shows how Hamas, Hezbollah and the ISIL employ a high number of women and have evolved over time towards more politically established or pseudo-state forms and have substantially stopped the attacks perpetrated by women. This suggests that in more institutionalised contexts women have more possibilities to reach higher positions, due to the need of more people to structure the organisations – the case of ISIL - or possibly because in contact with Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 existent official state organisations they undergo a sort of normalisation, such as in the case of Hamas and Hezbollah. Moreover, as expected, lower degrees of integration of women in the organisational structure correspond also to higher levels of coercion in their participation. In other words, organisations that are less welcoming need to force women to take part to their actions in order to realise their objectives; Boko Haram is the most exemplary case. In most organisations, women appear to be devoted in vital activities such as the recruitment of new fighters, locally or internationally, the contacts with the diaspora, when applicable and the education of the future generation of jihadist. These last elements deserve to be considered with more attention. Nelson & Caudhurī (1994:18) talk about “The politics of everyday life... the terrain between state and family that is usually ignored”. If we substitute “state” with “jihadist organisations”, this concept reveals a new understanding of the importance of women. Women occupy and act often in a terrain that is silent and considered as secondary. However, with their work on this middle-ground, women give a fundamental contribution to the development of jihadist actions. Therefore, for a deeper understanding of jihadist organisations, women need to be fully considered as protagonists of these movements. After the attempt to find patterns and explanations, it is appropriate to formulate last remarks about what this analysis revealed about the role of Islam in world politics. Jihadist organisations present a high level of opportunism and instrumentalization of religious matters. Indeed, Islam has a great power to mobilise people to fight, but alone it is not sufficient to explain the jihadist phenomenon that was briefly described in the limitations of this essay. As a matter of fact, jihadist organisations are more devoted to the realisation of their objectives, than to one particular religious interpretation; they are ready to act according to their strategies, justifying (or not) their choices with, in some cases, strong, but in others, weak arguments. The lack of a unique doctrinal interpretation certainly makes this kind of instrumentalization easier. All this suggests that, aiming to explain jihadism, scholars Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 should always consider a multitude of concurrent causes, effects and power logics, engaging in a dialogue with the religious lens that alone is not sufficient. CONCLUSION The essay provided a contribution to the understanding of the role of women in jihadist organisations. After the analysis of six single cases through anthropological, sociological and political perspectives combined, a comparative interpretation of the findings led to the conclusion that opportunism is present in high degrees and that religious arguments are not sufficient to explain the role of women in jihadist organisations. Religion is indeed only one of the multiple reasons that must be considered. The results of this analysis should not be intended as a last word about the topic. In fact, this essay presents limitations in terms of access to data in terms of numbers, reliability and assessment of the available information. Another limitation is represented by the sample size: a smaller and deeper sample could have led to more thorough, reliable but limited (also geographically) results; a bigger sample would have helped to identify possible further transnational patterns. Other perspectives and topics to be investigated include: the acceptance and mobilisation patterns of female jihadis in tribal and modern societies; the role of social dignity in the mobilisation of women; the role of media and the spectacularisation of suicide actions in the recruitment of women; a comparison between the development of organisations that employ women in higher levels and those that do not; a deeper insight in the enabling conditions for women to become part of jihadist organisations. Federico Rinaldi – London School of Economics 2019 BIBLIOGRAPHY ‘Azzam, S. A. 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