Madrasas and Extremism: South Asian Perspectives

Madrasas and Extremism South Asian Perspectives Mohmad Waseem Malla Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Madrasa-Extremism Discourse: Overview of Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Madrasas as Socio-Religious Spaces: A Historical Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Overview of South Asian Madrasas: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . “What” and “How” of Madrasa Teaching: The Curriculum and Pedagogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Madrassa and the Discourse on Terrorism: From Afghan Jihad to Present Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3 5 7 10 12 15 16 Abstract The madrasa and extremism interrelationship is a twenty-first-century discourse. It grabbed international limelight after terrorists struck United States on September 11, 2001, in one of the most audacious attacks ever leaving around 3000 people dead. The resultant outrage brought international attention to the Muslim lands with Muslim lives being scrutinized and categorized as the “other.” The Islamic educational institutions like madrasas came under intense international scrutiny being variously accused as perpetuating and nurturing “antiwestern” attitudes among the peoples leading to radicalism in Muslim lands. It was the Taliban fighter holding a Kalashnikov in Afghanistan as United States invaded that country subsequently in October 2001 that became a defining portrait of a Muslim “other” in the western mainstream media. The media trail of the madrasas conveniently overlooked the multiple socio-economic functions that these schools play in a Muslim public sphere by providing impoverished peoples’ basic education and instead created a false imagery of all the madrasas being dens of terrorists, factories of terror along with a host of other accusations. Since M. W. Malla (*) Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] / [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 M. Woodward, R. Lukens-Bull (eds.), Handbook of Contemporary Islam and Muslim Lives, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73653-2_50-1 1 2 M. W. Malla the discourse of putative links between madrasas and extremism started from South Asia towards the end of cold war, this chapter, therefore, makes an attempt to provide a holistic account of these schools by locating them in the socioreligious spaces of Muslims, dissecting what these teach in their curriculum and then deliberate on the interrelationship, if any, between madrasas and extremism. Introduction In January 2018, newspapers in India reported an influential Shia cleric in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh saying that Islamic “madrasas produce terrorists” and should be therefore either shut down or transformed into government controlled “secular” schools. The vilification campaign against madrasas is not new. Madrasas have endured continued vilification and stereotyping as “factories” or “havens” of terrorism, “terror breeding centers” for decades, and more so at the turn of century. The scholarly and governmental attention towards these educational institutions started in 1990s in the aftermath of World Trade Centre (WTC) bombing in 1993 and Taliban takeover of Afghan government but more particularly after September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States of America by Al-Qaeda (AQ) that left nearly 3000 people dead. The subsequent “war-on-terror” initiated by Washington along with its allies across many Muslim majority states especially Afghanistan and Iraq brought intense scrutiny to Muslims lives which were variously categorized as the “other.” As media channels were flooded with commentary on Muslim lives and their “antiwestern” attitudes, their educational institutions became targets of states, intelligentsia, and media alike which were accused of perpetuating and reinforcing these attitudes by propagating a narrow worldview. The images of Kalashnikov holding Taliban as the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to dethrone their government were propagated as the defining portrait of the Muslim “other” in the popular imagination by the media in general and western media in particular. The international attention was particularly intense on the madrasas running along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. These madrasas were accused of providing safe sanctuary to the extremists of various hues, acting as recruiting centers for groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban including its many smaller affiliate groups as well as Al-Qaeda. The imagery of madrasas was portrayed by the international media, western scholars, and political leaderships as nothing short of militant training camps which promote radicalism and propagates non-Muslims as Islam’s adversarial nemesis who are worthy of waging a war against to establish a sharia based Islamic state. Stern (2001) writing in Foreign Affairs accused the Pakistani madrasas of producing thousands of jihadists by mass dissemination of violent propaganda education. Tavernisemay (2009) in The New York Times presented an imagery of madrasa as schools that just make students memorize Quran (rote learning) and narrowing their world views thereby producing a pool of pro-militant graduates with large socio-economic disparities plaguing the states like Pakistan. Madrasas and Extremism 3 The public and media debates regarding madrasas as the heaven of radicalization often overlook their primary roles in the Muslim socio-religious milieus. Therefore, an attempt is made here to locate madrasas in the socio-religious spaces of Muslims, dissect their curriculum, and then deliberate on the existence of interrelationship, if any, between madrasas and extremism which is a primary focus for this chapter. Given the fact that the Muslims are scattered along the wide geographical, social, and cultural expanse of the world and in Muslim majority countries with varied socio-cultural ethos, it would be both difficult to examine this diverse Islamic geography and an injustice to the subject under investigation. Therefore, the debate here is consciously restricted to South Asian geography which has attracted the lion’s share of international attention in the wake of the US-led War on Terror after the September 11 attacks of 2001. Accordingly, the first section of the chapter gives a historical account of socio-religious space that madrasas have occupied in Muslim communities followed by an overview of South Asian madrasas, analyses of their curriculum, and finally a discussion of the debate over madrasa-extremism linkages. Madrasa-Extremism Discourse: Overview of Literature The media trail of madrasas conveniently disregarded the fundamental roles which all madrasas sans a minuscule minority play in Muslim public sphere towards educational upliftment of a significant majority of impoverished Muslims. On the contrary, a false imagery of these madrassa educational institutions as “terror dens,” “terror factories” among a host of other stereotypical representations were created. The post-9/11 rhetoric in media sphere particularly tried to establish an inherent relationship between madrasa curriculum and the religious radicalism aimed at producing mujahideen (holy warriors) to wage a war against infidels (Islam’s enemies) across the world in general and the west in particular. Countless arguments have been forwarded that the pedagogy prevalent in madrasas fans radicalism and bigotry in the minds of its students which becomes a basis for terrorism (Malik 2008). Though Taliban was ousted from power as the USA invaded Afghanistan in 2001, it has been argued that these extremists have survived in part due to the support accorded by militant madrasas of 1980s Afghan war era that are still active across large swathes of Afghanistan-Pakistan border. A number of studies argued that from offering support and safe recruitment sanctuaries (Fair 2008; Noor et al. 2008), inculcating militant values of hate and intolerance in potential recruits (Coulson 2004), these militant madrasas have acted as incubators of extremism (9/11 Commission Report) and played a crucial role in sustaining global terror network (Singer 2001). While a number of the above cited reports and studies could claim otherwise, however, the putative links between madrasas and extremism still remain debatable given the limited number of empirical studies that remain insufficient to credibly establish any relation. While madrasas often stand accused of grooming extremists, limited numbers of empirical studies have shed light on the backgrounds of those who commit terrorist acts in a nuanced manner that could delineate issue wholesomely. Bergen and 4 M. W. Malla Pandey (2005) in their empirical study entitled “The Madrassa Myth” examined educational backgrounds of 75 terrorists involved in five terror attacks including 1993 bombing in World Trade Center, 1998 bombings on US embassies in Kenya and in Tanzania and 9/11 attacks apart from 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia. They observed that of the 75 terrorists, only nine had attended madrasas, while the rest had university or college degrees and concluded that while some madrasas could nurture fundamentalism; however, those schools are never enough to offer military and technical trainings to produce an effective terrorist. The study emphasizes that there are multiple factors that go into the making of terrorists encompassing socioeconomic-political realms. These findings offer a known template for international terrorism that there needs to be a certain degree of sophistication available to the perpetrators like technical education which the study has highlighted. However, these are subjective observations and cannot be applied linearly across different regions. Krueger and Maleckova (2002) examined the casual relation between poverty and/or low education level in relation to participation of individuals in the politically motivated violence or terrorist activities. In investigating the educational and economic background of the groups and individuals involved in the extremist activities like Hezbollah, Palestinian groups and Israelis in Middle East, the study emphasizes that there exists little conclusive evidence and reason which could reveal “that a reduction in poverty or increase in educational attainment will lead to a meaningful reduction in the amount of international terrorism, without other changes.” Moreover, since political involvements require bare “minimum level of interest, expertise, commitment to issues and effort,” it is highly likely that educated persons would be willing to join the extremist groups. (p. 32) Berrebi (2003) in his investigation of the causal relation between the education and economic background and violence among the Palestinian groups of Hamas and Islamic Jihad concludes that there exists a positive correlation between the variables of higher education and standard of living with the politically motivated violence. The study asserts that the level of education matters less as to what is being studied or the subject matter that the people are exposed to in the vulnerable populations. Sageman (2011) in his book Understanding the Terror Networks while investigating the global Salafi jihadists upholds the notions that educational and socio-economic status was positively associated with the participation in the extremist activities. The book has highlighted how educational institutions in Egypt during 1970–1980s offered spaces and environment for the Salafi Islamists to build coalitions with other militant Islamists towards their efforts for the establishment of an Islamic State. However, in a generalized notion, Sageman (p. 77) argues that the data about the educational backgrounds of the investigated terrorist demonstrated that madrasas played hardly any role in brainwashing and radicalization of its students with exception from certain geographies like sub-Saharan Africa where these schools remained only means of education for the poor. The above-cited empirical studies may have presented an ambiguous reality; therefore, it is imperative to contextualize which geographies a particular extremist comes from or any group operates from in order to understand whether the madrasas play any role in fanning radicalization and extremism. Within this context, it Madrasas and Extremism 5 becomes requisite to locate the madrasas in their socio-religious roles in a historical context which is dealt in succeeding section. Madrasas as Socio-Religious Spaces: A Historical Narrative Madrasas have historically played a significant role in the socio-religious sphere of the Muslims across the Islamic geographies. These schools while maintaining a certain distance from the state structures hold special importance for the impoverished sections of the Muslims which increases their significance in a particular social setup. Madrasa (plural madaris), spelled distinctly as madrassa, madrassah, madrasah, is an Arabic word for an educational institution, a school, that includes both religious and modern ones. Within the hierarchy of these educational institutions, maktabs are those schools that offer elementary education, madrasas teach from first grade through tenth, while as those offering eleventh and twelfth standard education are called dar al-ulums, and jamia catering to the university level educational needs of the students (Malik 2008). Of all these institutions, these madrasas like modern schools hold significance since students (called talibs in Arabic) spend most of their formative studying years (minimum eight years) in these schools. Madrassas differ from region to region and exist as part of a wider educational infrastructure in the Muslim countries and as part of Muslim societies and habitations. They either operate as general day schools or residential ones, offering either general modern western oriented curriculum supplemented with religious subjects or purely religious one usually in the mosques’ precincts. All the sectarian denominations of the Muslims have their associated madrasas with the difference that every school of thought provides for its interpretation of the Islamic texts. In the Middle Eastern countries like Egypt or Lebanon, these refers to any school irrespective of what they teach (curriculum) or their mode of control whether private, state-sponsored, or further their ideological orientation be it secular or religious. In the South Asian context, madrasas refer to purely religious schools whether state sponsored or privately operated (Blanchard 2008). In the broader world, the word madrasa has assumed connotations as institutions that exclusively limit their academic curriculum to the Islamic religious teachings which is however not correct. Islamic education system, with its genesis dating to the expansion of Islam and Muslim ruled lands, became an indispensable feature of the Muslim life necessitated by the requirements of teaching this faith to the newly converts in newly acquired territories. With time, madrasas became unfailingly an integral part of Islamic communities mandated to provide education to the Muslim masses (Islam 2010). It was in second half of eleventh century through the efforts Seljuk Vizir Nizam ul Mulk al-Tusi, Grand Vizir from 1080 A.D. onwards, of the Abbasid Caliphate that state level intervention started to formalize the establishment of these madrasas. This led to the emergence of what came to be known as Nizamiyah Madrasas. These became prominent sources of human resource for the ruling regimes throughout the Muslim lands. 6 M. W. Malla By nineteenth century, as Muslim empires including Ottoman Empire and Mughal Empire declined along with encroachments by western colonial powers, the loss of hold over power relegated overall Muslim community to the margins of the social set ups. As the disenchanted intelligentsia pursued Muslim body soul search and consequently called for the reformation, a section of reformers blamed the deviation from the religion as one of the reasons for the marginalization. These therefore pushed madrasas to the private realm of the social sphere so as to correct the religious practices of the impoverished masses. This was paralleled by modern western-oriented educational system making inroads in the Indian subcontinent. Consequently amidst the Muslim stagnancy and western onslaught, two distinct responses emerged from the Muslim intelligentsia with one section pursuing the modernization of educational setup on western ideals. The other section as detailed above perceived western ideals as an affront to the Islamic values and therefore relegated to the private sphere for transforming Muslim society which resuted in the emergence of modern madrasas. Subsequently, madrasas and modern secular schools came to be identified with two different sections of society, respectively: madrasas with impoverished majority and modern schools with rich and affluent (Iqbal and Raza 2015). In Muslim social parlance, madrasas inherently have a dependent relation with the society due to their sustenance on the Islamic endowments (waqf) of zakat (mandatory tax for the Muslims with the wealthy means as per Islamic injunctions) as well as state’s where the governments control zakat funds. Most of the madrasas sustain on their own on mass donations, zakat funds, and charities. The financial independence of the majority of madrasas from state due to their sustenance on the donations from the masses accords the functionaries of these institutions, usually Ulemas, a considerable socio-religio-political influence. This makes states to approach cautiously to the issues of madrasas as any antagonistic interference in their domains could be propagated by the madrasa functionaries as the subjugation of religious rights among the larger populace (Ahmad 2004). In social spaces wherein class differences manifest due to economic disparities across the Muslim societies, madrasas hold special significance. Madrasas usually offer free food, free shelter, as well as free education to its students. This free nature of philanthropic residential education holds significance for millions of socially impoverished people especially in the developing countries of South Asia, for example, for whom the access to the modern western education remains limited due to its unaffordability as well as prevalent systemic structural barriers (Blanchard 2008). Madrasas therefore provide socially marginalized people spaces for their upward social mobility (Park and Niyozov 2008). The madrasa education offers incentives to its graduates like traditional leadership roles in a Muslim society such as leading prayers, giving religious guidance, issuing fatwas, conducting religious functions including marriages among many other things (Ahmad 2004). This accords madrasas as well as their talibs (students) a substantial influence in their respective socio-religious spaces. Madrasas play most crucial function through its dissemination of Islamic education, which propagates Islamic culture and grounds it ideologically, over successive Madrasas and Extremism 7 generations in a society. A number of scholars including Bergen and Panday (2005), Cockcroft et al. (2009), Winthrop and Graff (2010) among others highlight that madrasas play a crucial role which is socially constructive in a society that aims at educating the marginalized peoples and inculcates in them religious, moral and human values that helps curb delinquencies at grassroots in social spaces. It is not being just limited to providing education to its resident students but also to right the religious practices of the illiterate masses by remaining in constant touch with the society. This is significant given the sheer number of impoverished Muslims in South Asia who are either unable to access the state-run educational systems or are kept at distance due to structural discriminations. Overview of South Asian Madrasas: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan In South Asia, the Hanafi School of Islamic thought and tradition is predominant. Within the Hanafi school itself, most of madrasas are of Deobandi persuasion, followed by Barelvi, Jamat-e-Islami, and Ahl-e-Hadith (of indigenous salafi reform movement). Since the majority of the South Asian madrasas are Deobandi, the focus remains these schools only. The influential Deoband madrasa was the largest to be setup in 1867 in the United Province of India. As part of the Muslim reformation within the colonial context, the Deoband madrasa while adopting Dars-e-Nizami (a detailed discussion on curriculum follows) axed much of its rational sciences of logic and philosophy and instead focused on the theological aspects of Islamic education making the prophetic traditions, that is, Hadith as its core element (Alam 2011). This reframing and rebranding of the curriculum came from the soul searching of the intelligentsia and clergy class as they intended to make the Islamic teachings appropriate for the impoverished illiterate masses who, as per their notions, had deviated from the real Islamic teachings due to the local folk influences which contributed to the Muslim stagnancy and which therefore needed to be taught the right Islam. Madrasas were, therefore, to be the social sites of religious orthodoxy to preserve the tradition and help in resuscitating the Islamic consciousness among the Muslims (Ahmad 2004). Most of the madrasas established afterwards, numbering in thousands, followed this tradition and curriculum of Deoband School and are thus called Deobandi madrasas. Other madrasas have also adopted the Deobandi curriculum framework with modifications to its subject matter in order to make it conform to their Islamic interpretations. This is how the Deoband curriculum assumed significance across South Asian geography even to this day. Add to this the feature of management, these schools are mostly working under ulemas and away from the state watch. It was only after the allegations that some of these institutions fanned radicalization among their followers that many governments across different Muslim majority states tried to engage with madrasas. This has resulted in the constitution of madrasa boards to keep these under governmental purview. 8 M. W. Malla Of the South Asian states, Bangladesh has two kinds of madrasas as Alia madrasas which are government supported and Qoumi madrasas which are privately owned and operated. The Qoumi madrasas like most of South Asian madrasas rely on the zakat funds and donations collected from the general population which accords them financial independence from the state and therefore out of governmental purview. A 2015 Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics (BANBEIS) report puts the number of Qoumi madrasas at 13,902 and Aliah madrasas at 9,319 catering to around 1.4 million and 2.4 million students, respectively (Bangladesh Education Statistics 2015). However, independent estimates put the number of these madrasas above 50,000. Most of the Qoumi madrasas are of Deobandi persuasion, whereas the Aliah madrasas follow the Dars-e-Nizami supplemented with modern curriculum that is approved by government. Though the Bangladeshi government has attempted to reform the madrasas in Qoumi sector to bring them closer to the government run schools, the financial independence of these privately owned institutions has allowed its functionaries to resist any interference in their domain. This has translated in the continued influence of the Deoband school in the Qoumi madrasas which have continued its curriculum and resisted any governmental interference to amend the same. On the other, Alia madrasas while offering Dars-e-Nizami curriculum of Deoband mandatorily teach modern subjects of English, Science, social sciences, mathematics, among others. The educational levels offered by these madrasas are categorized as elementary (ibtedai), secondary (dakhil), higher secondary (alim), bachelors (fazil), and masters (kamil) (Ahmad 2004). In case of Pakistan, Riaz (2008, 79) argues that contemporary Pakistani madrasas are defined by their “close connections with political activism, their transformation into institutions of indoctrination from predominantly educational institutions, and their interplay with national and international politics.” In terms of numbers, there lacks any definitive count. But different estimates like International Crisis Group (2002), Stern (2001), and Singer (2001) put the number of madrasas across all sectarian and ideological persuasions to anywhere between 25,000 to 40,000 catering to around 2.5 million students mostly from impoverished sections of the society. Most of these belong to Deobandi persuasion with some reports suggesting that these madrasas account for more than 60% of the total madrasas alone (Iqbal and Raza 2015). However, in terms of enrolment in the madrasas as compared to overall school enrolment in the country, madrasas account for just around 1% and maximum of 7.5% in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan which have been under scrutiny mostly (Andrabi et al. 2006: 3). To bring in some governmental purview into the madrasas Pakistan has over the decades established madrasa boards catering to Deobandi madrasas, Barelvi madrasas, Shia madrasas, and Salafi madrasas even as Jamat-e-Islami has itself established its board to keep track of its schools. What is common however across remains the pattern of education being offered by these madrasas. These are categorized as per the level of education being offered by them as ibtedai (elementary level), vustani (middle level), and fauquani (higher level). In ibtedai madrasas, the students are just taught to memorize the Quran by heart and in vustani (middle level) madrasa, selected texts from the standard Dars-i-Nizami are Madrasas and Extremism 9 taught, whereas in fauquani (higher level) madrasas students get to complete full Dars-i-Nizami curriculum and graduate with knowledge and expertise in tafsir (interpretation), hadith, and fiqh (jurisprudence) (Ahmad 2004). Despite the governmental attempts to keep a broader purview of these madrasas, what remains important is the relative distance of madrasas from the state accorded to these by their financial independence which consequently gives the madrasa administrators, that is ulema, a significant social influence. Like neighboring Pakistan, madrasas are widely spread in war torn Afghanistan tending to the educational needs even in remotest parts of the country. Majority of Afghan Muslims follow Hanafi school of jurisprudence with widespread Deoband influence. It was with the help of Deoband ulema in 1930s that the madrasa curriculum was standardized by Afghan government which put dars-e-nizami at its core component though with local contexts. The Deoband curriculum has maintained centrality ever since despite a number of reforms (Choudhury 2017: 127). Over the years and with changing dynamics within broader Islamic world and in Afghanistan importantly Egyptian salafism through Al-Azhar University and jamat-e-islami influences have found their resonance. The 1980s Afghan “jihad,” detailed in subsequent section, brought Saudi Salafism element into focus which was afterwards pursued by Taliban government from 1996 to 2001 (Choudhury 2017: 131). Post 2001, Afghan government while pushing for modern secular schools also established public madrasas. It is the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs (MOHRA) and Ministry of Education (MOE) that deal with madrasas. In terms of numbers MOHRA in 2017 put the number of registered madrasas along with Quran leaning centers with it at 4033, whereas MOE put the number of both public and private madrasas registered with it at 1200 and 200, respectively (2017 Report on International Religious Freedom: Afghanistan 9). However, the number of privately operated but unregistered madrasas remain highly contested and believed to be far more than the registered ones. In Indian context, as in Pakistani, madrasas offer a means of affordable education to the impoverished Muslim populations which have been facing systemic and structural impediments in accessing modern educational institutions apart from economic unaffordability. Muslims in India are one of the most impoverished sections of the population with dismal socio-economic indicators that includes rampant illiteracy as well as the widespread unemployment. In this scenario, madrasas with its free food, shelter, and education offer a means of basic minimum education as well as living to these penurious people. Most of the madrasas in India as in broader South Asia are of Deobandi persuasion followed by Barelwi and Ahl-eHadith. There is also no definitive account of the number of madrasas operating in India which however various estimates put to be around 40,000. The stages of madrasa education in India can be categorized as Tahtania (primary/elementary) which is of 4 years duration, Wastania (middle or upper primary) which is also of 4 years, Fuqania (high school) which is of 2 years duration, Moulvi (intermediate) which is of 2 years, Alim (bachelor’s degree) of 3 years duration, and Fazil (master’s degree) of 2 years duration (Riaz 2008). 10 M. W. Malla As detailed in this section, there are thousands of madrasas across different states in South Asia which exist mostly in private realm. Significantly these schools enjoy financial independence from the state and survive on the donations from the general populations which keeps these at a distance from the state purview. Also, the fact that these madrasas play an important social role by catering to the educational needs of the poor Muslims accords the administrators of these schools a significant social influence that could be used as a leverage against the state. Additionally, more than the number of madrasas in a particular geographic location, it is the subject matter (curriculum) these institutions disseminate to the children and students which is important and could explicate how any particular education could make people susceptible towards extremist ideologies. The next section therefore aims to deliberate on the curriculum and prevalent pedagogies of the madrasas. “What” and “How” of Madrasa Teaching: The Curriculum and Pedagogy Educational institutions are defined by what they teach to students. More than the existence of madrasas, it is what and how they teach to the students that have come under intense international scrutiny. Their curriculum has been decried as outdated that is narrowly focused and teaches and grooms the students to be fundamentalists and extremists. Equally the pedagogy with predominance of memorization has been criticized as a tool that offers little means of critical and constructive engagements. However, the distinction has to be made as to what kind of madrasas invited skepticism. As already flagged in the preceding section, madrasas that are located mostly in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Middle East and follow Deobandi and Salafi puritanical persuasions in their traditions and curriculum have come under scrutiny. This section apart from providing a historic transformation of the curriculum focuses mainly on Deobandi course because this very madrasa-extremism discourse started with madrasas present along Afghanistan-Pakistan border most of which are of Deobandi persuasion. Madrasas have taught a standard curriculum dating back to eleventh century. Nizamiyah madrasas blended religious curriculum of transmitted sciences (manqulat) covering Quran and Hadith with rational sciences (ma’aqulat) including logic and philosophy. Over the years, however, jurisprudence (Islamic fiqh) took precedence leading to the development of a curriculum dominated by jurisprudence and auxiliary sciences in the study of Islamic law which remains prevalent in the modern madrasas. This was not homogenous across Muslim lands initially like in Indian subcontinent wherein madrasas offered general Islamic education that included Akhlaq (character) and its principles apart from Grammar, rhetoric, tasawwuf (ethics), etc., rather than fiqh and hadith sciences during thirteenth– fourteenth centuries (Ahmed 1995). The standard curriculum taught in South Asian madrasas is based on the Dars-i-Nizami, which in itself was an improved version of Nizamiyah curriculum. Developed first by Mulla Nizam Uddin Sihalvi (d. 1748), an acclaimed scholar of Islamic jurisprudence and philosophy, at Firangi Madrasas and Extremism 11 Mahal Madrasa in Lucknow, it was compiled as a reformative act to arrest the social decay in the declining Mughal Empire (Ahmad 2004). Deoband adopted Dars-i-Nizami in 1867 with a broader thrust on Quranic sciences to make it relevant for the illiterate and impoverished masses (Alam 2011). As highlighted earlier, a section of Muslim intellectuals blamed Muslim stagnancy and loss of Islamic values in the community for the colonial onslaught and loss of political power. To overcome this loss, this section of Muslim intelligentsia believed that it was imperative to bring back Islam in the lives of impoverished and illiterate populations. Riaz (2008) in Faithful Education: Madrassah’s in South Asia argues on similar lines and contends that British rule pushed Muslim Ulema to such a contemplation which was to determine “contours and the content of madrassah education” thereby transforming South Asian madrasas in their “structure, functions, and curriculum.” The ramifications of the colonial onslaught on the Muslim social sphere remain evident to this day through the continued existence of madrasas curriculum, pedagogy, and the manner these are managed in the private realm. The Deoband curated Nizami curriculum broadly consists of 20 subjects which include both Quranic and rational sciences like grammar, rhetoric, Arabic literature, logic, philosophy, medicine, mathematics, polemics, jurisprudence, hadith, Quranic exegesis (tafsir), among others. Even as rational sciences form part of curriculum, however, the over reliance has remained on the centuries old canonical texts like Aqladees’ (Euclid), geometry (Arabic version), and Ibn Sina’s Al-Qanun, among others (Rahman 2008). Likewise, the exegesis of Quran (tafsir) and the fiqh taught in madrasas is of medieval era which have been written as per medievalist prevalent socio-politico-intellectual milieus (Talabani 1996). The standard Nizami course is usually taught for seven to nine years shared by madrasas of all persuasions including deobandis, barelwis, ahl-e-hadiths with relevant modifications as per their doctrinal interpretations. The medieval era, literalist interpretation oriented, and legalist dominated curriculum aiming to protect tradition have been considered both stagnant and irrelevant to the concerns of contemporary modern time which tend to widen modernity-tradition gap instead of engagements (Rahman 2008). This type of the dissemination of Islamic knowledge has teacher in a central role and depends on the orientation of the teachers on how they will connect the medieval era texts to the contemporary concerns of the communities. This is an important marker of how students graduating from madrasas would act in a broader social space even as curriculum manifests plurality with blend of rational and religious sciences (Malik 2008). While it is true that basic curriculum of madrasas remains standard Dars-e-Nizami variant, however, with an ulema or teacher in a central role, what differentiates madrasas is the interpretation that these teachers accord to Islamic texts and the subject matter they use to reinforce their respective interpretations. Herein authority rests with teachers who can spin texts as per their own interest which has a potential of being exploited to propagate extreme interpretations. The lack of constructive engagements with the texts due to the prevalence of a particular pedagogy of memorization further favors the teacher. 12 M. W. Malla The pedagogical characteristics of the madrasas have mostly remained inclined to memorization that plays an important role in the learning of the students. In ibtedahi stages, students are made to memorize Quranic texts, various hadiths, and taught right form of performing salat (obligatory prayers). As student’s engagement with texts increase, they are to not only memorize Quran and hadiths but different tafsirs and dalils (arguments). This aspect of memorization in the teaching pedagogy has often come under scrutiny from the critics of madrasa education which describe it as a mode of indoctrination of young minds. The memorization learning technique has retained its importance in madrasa pedagogy from early Islam firstly as a medium of transmission and preservation of Quran and secondly since madrasa graduates are expected to lead prayers and give religious sermons requiring Quran and hadith recitations and interpretations. What is problematic is when memorization is substituted for comprehension and broader understanding of religion with the end means of rote learning which, however, is not the intended motivation behind memorization technique. As Boyle (2006) contends within Islamic pedagogy, memorization is the first step towards comprehension and not its substitute. . . .memorization of the Qur’anic learning retains ongoing significance to Muslim communities, not only because it is associated with knowledge, understanding, and reason, but because this form of learning has the lasting effect of embodying the revealed knowledge of the Qur’an in the beings of students (Boyle 2006, 489). While the pedagogy of memorization remains debatable with the potential of exploitation by people with vested interests to propagate their narrow worldviews but what is more disadvantageous for the students is the lack of diversity in the contemporaneous subject matter which could limit broadening of critical engagements with the surroundings. Add to it the inability of the madrasas to include modern vocational subjects that could help its graduates with broader employability avenues remains a limitation and so source of critique (Qadri 2018). The putative interrelations between madrasas and extremism, challenges Ahmad (2004), are questionable because had madrasa education been the primary reason, why didn’t these tendencies emerge and manifest prior to 1980s Afghan jihad as the curriculum, primarily pacifist in its orientation, remains unchanged since eighteenth century. The genesis of this nexus between madrasas and extremism is the focus of the next section, which will help in understanding how madrasas got associated with extremism discourse in detail. Madrassa and the Discourse on Terrorism: From Afghan Jihad to Present Day The interrelationship between Madrasas and extremism is a twenty-first-century discourse. As already noted, these schools came under scrutiny with extremist groups carrying out violent acts across different geographies. This section makes an attempt to trace the genesis of this discourse about militant madrasas and Madrasas and Extremism 13 deliberate widely held assumptions surrounding the putative link between madrasas and extremism. For the sake of simplified identification, we define militant madrasa as those that follow a narrow monolithic (mis)interpretation of the Islamic texts by blending political agenda of their patronizers with religious teachings aimed at inculcating values of holy warriors among its students. Before tracing the genesis of the militant madrasas, let us highlight what could allow madrasas be turned into militant centers. From the very beginning and for a long time, as highlighted earlier, modern madrasas in South Asia maintained a steady distance from the state and its different structures. This was allowed by their financial independence from the governments as these survived mostly on Zakat and other donations from the local Muslims communities. The social standing due to religiosity and the financial independence accorded madrasa ulema a significant influence in the social sphere which could potentially be capitalized to pursue vested interests be it political or otherwise. This has made governments take a cautious approach towards madrasas since the madrasa functionaries could propagate any antagonistic interference as the subjugation of religious rights among the larger populace (Ahmad 2004). It is here this void that the extremist elements could capitalize and turn an educational center into an indoctrination place to pursue extremist interests. This militant madrasa discourse emerged in late 1970s in Afghanistan-Pakistan within the cold war context. When Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan in 1979, millions of Afghan refugees were pushed into Pakistan. In the cold war environment, the sliding of Afghanistan into soviet communist fold was seen as a direct threat to the capitalist world and more so to the interests of the United States of America. The United States brought its allies of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf monarchies together to fund and support the Afghan resistance against soviets. For achieving this, hundreds of madrasas were established along Afghanistan-Pakistan border catering to Afghan refugees of whom a majority constituted young men and children. The association of these madrasas with Afghan resistance started here which afterwards resulted into the creation of Taliban in 1990s. These madrasas were essentially militant “training camps” to sustain the Afghan jihad against soviets in 1980s (Ahmad 2004). It was the University of Nebraska at Omaha through United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding which established Education Centre for Afghanistan in Peshawar, Pakistan. The center was run by Afghan “Mujahideen” who also wrote curriculum for these militarized madrasas (Davis 2002). The textbooks laced with political propaganda and reinforced by naked militant imagery were taught at the newly established madrasas which aimed to inculcate militant values in Afghans for fighting soviets. Craig Davis (2002) in his extensive study of Taliban madrasa textbooks observed that these books glorified violence for the sake of Islam across all disciplines be it language, mathematics, or any other. The curriculum emotively glorifying resistance as jihad – Islamic holy war – through vivid imagery for whom alif (A) was meant Allah, be (B) meant Bundook (Gun), jim (J) meant jihad, and ha (Ha) meant hathiyar (arms) and likewise. As illustrated by 14 M. W. Malla Davis (2002, 92–93), such imagery is vivid even in subjects such as mathematics like below: The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second. If a Russian is at a distance of 3,200 meters from a mujahid, and that mujahid aims at the Russian’s head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead. These textbooks were officially banned, and revised texts were introduced in 1990s as the fears of takeover of Kabul government by Taliban which wanted strict enforcement of Islamic sharia loomed large. However, the older versions of these textbooks with powerful propagandistic imagery never fell out of currency in madrasas that continued to be affiliated with Islamic armed groups. These textbooks provided Taliban and other groups, operating out of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, a medium to reinforce their propaganda for conducting jihad against “enemies” of Islam (Davis 2002). The soviet invasion of Afghanistan framed as a communist war on Islam was propagandized across Muslim world to mobilize and recruit thousands of volunteer fighters to Afghanistan-Pakistan border for fighting communist “infidel atheists.” Madrasas established for Afghan refugees became a launching pad for these jihadists. When soviets were defeated and driven out after ten years of relentless fighting in 1989, these trained fighters converged under different banners foremost being Taliban under Mullah Mohammad Omar and Al-Qaeda under Osama Bin Laden (Ahmad 2004). In his book, M Juergensmeyer (2000) Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence argues that post-soviet mismanagement of Afghanistan by the American and its allies was firstly responsible for civil war in Kabul which subsequently brought Taliban to power in 1996 and secondly became a driving factor in the further radicalization of these groups. With communist enemy defeated and gone, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates turned against their very former patronizers and created a new enemy in “western imperialism” while denouncing Muslim allies of west including Gulf monarchies particularly al-Sauds and Egyptian ruling regime as apostates and vehicles of Muslim slavery (Blanchard 2007a, b). Most of the terror attacks happening in Pakistan and Afghanistan are being carried out by the groups like Taliban and dozens of groups active under the banner of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (and most recently Islamic state affiliates which however are former TTP associates). These groups, even though not many in numbers, have emerged from the militant madrasas with their origins in the USSaudi-Pakistani patronization of 1980s during Afghan resistance against soviets. What has been prominent from the different sectarian madrasas in Afghanistan and Pakistan is that more than the terror and other extremist activities, these institutions propagate narrow sectarian worldviews which has been contributing to the sectarian tensions in these states. A cursory search on the video search engine YouTube about madrasa debates in Pakistan throws hundreds of video clips wherein talibs from various madrasas of different persuasions like Deobandi versus Barelwi, Deobandi versus salafi or ahl-e-hadith, salafi versus barelwi among others engaged in incendiary debates that are aimed at belittling others as deviants. This in part could be Madrasas and Extremism 15 reasoned as the basis of sectarian violence being propagated in these states and more so by majority Sunni groups against minority Shia ones. While Taliban and other groups traditionally garnered more attention in South Asian region, in recent years as Islamic State (IS), or more commonly Daesh, made global prominence in the aftermath of failed political transformation in Arab world, the discussion about its penetration in this region remains timely. The scale of violence perpetuated by Daesh once again brought the lens on Muslim social sphere, Islam, and its doctrinal abuse by jihadists for securing their interests. Over the years, Daesh received allegiance from a number of regional militant groups like Lashkar-eJhangvi, Lashkar-e-Islam, Ansar ul Khilafat Wal Jihad, and many factions of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) among others. This prompted Islamic State to announce wilayat-e-khorasan (or Islamic State Khorasan – ISK) for AfghanistanPakistan (Jadoon 2018) and afterwards wilayat-e-Pakistan for Pakistan and wilayate-hind for India, respectively, in 2019 (Zahid 2019). Important fact remains that these groups operate from the very region in Afghanistan-Pakistan border region wherein madrasas have over the years invited scrutiny for their role in fanning extremism in the region. These madrasas also include particularly the Wahhabi Salafi madrasas established over the years in the region significantly during antiSoviet Afghan resistance. Therefore, apart from Deoband madrasas which have been detailed in this chapter, it is the Salafi religious schools patronized by Saudi Arabia over the years across the Muslim world which have invited scrutiny over fanning extremism and sectarianism. However, a detailed discussion over these remains out of scope of the present chapter. Conclusively what one can argue based on the above discussion is that while the majority of the South Asian madrasas identifying with the Deoband School of thought remain grounded in their social roles of offering religious education to the Muslims. These schools are significant for the large number of Muslims especially belonging to the lower strata of the population with very little means to access the public funded or private educational facilities or these madrasas as only available means of education. There, however, remains concern about the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region with typical socio-political environment which has remained contested for the governments and so the madrasas with potential to be used as sources of fanning extremism and sectarianism, which is an exception and not a norm from other thousands of madrasas in the broader South Asia. Conclusion Madrasas are indispensable to the Muslim socio-religious life. These provide basic religious training to people for practicing their faith rightly while also upholding the traditional orthodox Islamic values. Madrasas have been and are playing an important role in providing education to the millions of impoverished people across the world. The label of extremism to the madrasas is a comparatively modern twentyfirst-century discourse. However, there is a need to make distinction between a particular madrasa with radical leanings from others while broaching this sensitive 16 M. W. Malla issue since madrasas are inherently peaceful in their orientation with the mandate of propagation of basic Islamic teachings thereby majorly contributing to the socio-educational life of the social setup in these countries. There is no denying the fact that a number of madrasas have been involved in the propagation of radicalism in some regions like Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, as demonstrated in preceding sections, these militarized madrasas running mostly along Afghanistan-Pakistan border trace their origins to the cold war politics when these were patronized by the United States and its allies including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia among others during 1980s towards fighting against communist Soviet Union which had occupied Afghanistan. It has to be also flagged that the majority of the extremist groups operating in Afghan-Pak region including Taliban as well as global jihadist outfits like Al-Qaeda emerged from the very same Afghan jihad movement of 1980s who were radicalized in the militarized camps disguised as madrasas. Despite substantial steps taken by the states including Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks and subsequent American invasion of Afghanistan to reform these militant madrasas, a full success whether at shutting down or bringing these in the overall state purview is yet to be achieved. 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