Military Pay Chart 2021

The Future of Children, 2013

For military children and their families, the economic news is mostly good. After a period of steady pay increases, James Hosek and Shelley MacDermid Wadsworth write, service members typically earn more than civilians with a comparable level of education. Moreover, they receive many other benefits that civilians often do not, including housing allowances, subsidized child care, tuition assistance, and top-of-the-line comprehensive health care. Of course, service members tend to work longer hours than civilians do, and they are exposed to hazards that civilians rarely, if ever, face. The extra pay they receive when they are deployed to combat zones helps their families cope financially but cannot alleviate the stress.

This report presents an overview of military compensation for active-duty officer and enlisted personnel in 1999. It provides information on the receipt and amount of each type of cash pay, highlighting the patterns by year of service, occupational area, and branch of service. It also quantifies the range of variation in military pay and includes data on private-sector pay variation for comparison. The report should be of interest to policymakers and to researchers concerned with military compensation

The Australian defense expenditures for 2019/20 were 25.2 billion euro (38.3 billion AUD). 9 This makes up 1.94 percent of GDP. In absolute numbers, Australia had the twelfth highest military spending in the world in 2020. 4.10 Spain 4.10.1 Executive summary Spanish defense expenditures were 11.2 billion euro in 2020, representing 1.0 percent of GDP. This is a very low share, ranking twelfth among the twelve countries studied in this report. Personnel expenditures accounted for 62.5 percent of total expenditures, which is a very high share among the studied countries, ranking second. The military workforce is close to 60,000 personnel, and 54 percent of the military workforce work in the Army. Officers account for 50 percent of the military workforce, and other ranks account for 50 percent of the military workforce. The demographics of the military workforce skew very oldonly 17 percent are less than 35 years old. This is the lowest share of the selected countries. Spain has a monetary incentive system with a very strong emphasis on base salary, fixed supplements, pension earnings, and tax exemptions and a moderate emphasis on one-time bonus payments, welfare services and payments, and the coverage of commuting and housing expenses. Spain considers its schemes for fixed supplements to be very complex and, those for irregular supplements to be complex, while the other important compensation categories are considered simple.

I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to testify. I will address my comments to the utility of incentive pays in influencing career decisions of members of the U.S. military. The armed forces share a common foundation of military pay. The foundation includes basic pay, basic allowance for subsistence, basic allowance for housing (or housing in-kind), and a military health benefit for service members and their families. Educational benefits could also be included, as could contributions toward retirement benefits. This foundation of pay performs several functions. It helps to ensure that the services can recruit, retain, and motivate the number and caliber of people they need to meet manpower requirements, produce a flow of capable future leaders within the enlisted and officer ranks, and shape the force so that its experience and grade mix are appropriate to the desired force structure. The health of the volunteer force depends on maintaining an adequate foundation...

2004

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

2015

This thesis analyzes whether the decision to enter the military offers a different investment in human capital as indicated by the civilian earning of veterans. Using seven one month samples from the Current Population Survey, I run three linear regressions to compare the earnings of veterans by gender, the earnings of female veterans and non-veterans, and the earnings of male veterans and non-veterans. It appears that, between 2005 and 2013, veterans enjoyed a wage premium which existed for both male and female veterans. These results suggest that military service acts as a screening device or a bridge to employment in the civilian labor force. Additionally, female veterans earn less than male veterans in the civilian labor force. Even though female veterans are more successful in the civilian labor force than women with no military experience, they still suffer a gender wage gap.

FFI Report, 2023

It is universal in the armed forces that the military workforce and its human capital play a key role in the production of defense and military capabilities. A handful of unusual traits in the armed forces’ personnel and human resources policies – e.g. the recruitment solely of young employees, the provision of military-specific education, the fostering of combat-oriented skills among its workforce, and the risk, hardship, and demands of military tasks – compel military organizations to use a battery of incentives designed to compensate and influence personnel behavior in the desired directions. Some monetary incentives increase the pool of potential recruits; some incentives induce retention and effort, while other incentives reward personnel for taking on high levels of risk or serving in low amenity locations. In this report, we shed light on the monetary incentive systems in the armed forces and selfdefense forces in NATO countries and NATO partner countries. The primary objective of this report is to understand how the ministries of defense, along with the armed forces, in a variety of advanced countries structure their compensation and personnel policies so as to meet the challenges of recruitment, retention, effort, and performance, as well as the separation of personnel. The fundamental research question posed in this report is how the monetary incentive systems used in the armed forces in advanced countries are structured. More specifically, we study i) the uses and magnitudes of various compensation categories for military personnel, ii) the requirements for eligibility for the various monetary incentives, iii) the purposes of each monetary incentive, iv) whether the monetary incentives lead to satisfactory attainment of the purposes, and v) whether any of the monetary incentives have been reformed recently. The report is based on a survey submitted as a Request for Information by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence to the respective ministries of defenses in each country in 2020. The ministry received answers from seven NATO countries, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK, in addition to four NATO partner countries, Australia, Finland, Japan, and Sweden. The report also assesses the compensation system in Norway. Thus, the report concerns the monetary incentive systems in twelve countries. This makes the report, to the best of our knowledge, the first analysis of a broad range of NATO members and NATO partner countries’ monetary incentive systems. Our findings show that these countries differ in how the monetary incentive systems are structured. In all the countries, base salary constitutes a central compensation category. Some countries place a strong emphasis on fixed supplements. In others, irregular supplements play a key role. One-time bonuses and deployment-related payments play small, but significant roles, in several monetary incentive systems. The coverage of commuting and housing expenses are important in countries with military bases in remote and sparsely populated areas. Tax exemptions, welfare services and payments, and the provision of civilian education do not play important roles in the incentive systems. In general, the ministries of defense report that they are satisfied with how the incentives work towards the attainment of the purposes of the incentives.

Analysis of Selected Military Compensation Issues, 1978

This study: (1) compares the costs of maintaining a standing peacetime force with an all volunteer force (AVF) and, alternatively, with a draft, over a range of increased strengths; and (2) estimates the cost implications of selected pay policies, including substantially reduced first term compensation, in several scenarios. Because I cannot figure out how to get metadata for this work to accept the list of co-authors, I give it here: Kenneth A. Goudreau, Richard L. Somers, Jerry Allen, Alexander K Bocast, George Lebovitz, Kenneth D. Midlam, Edward J. Schmitz, Geraldine P. Sica.

PsycEXTRA Dataset, 2000

Attracting and keeping high-quality personnel has been a challenge for the military services during much of the past decade. In response to growing concerns about military readiness and missed recruiting goals, and recognizing that compensation plays an important part in career decisionmaking, Congress recently approved significant increases in military pay.

Military retirement reform has been a central element of the policy debate regarding why and how to restructure the system for compensating members of the U.S. armed forces. Concerns about the compensation system, and the retirement system specifically, include the rising cost of military compensation and the need for greater efficiency in the provision of compensation, the greater need for flexibility to reshape the force as missions change in ways that challenge the current compensation system, and issues related to the equity of military retirement benefits of active versus reserve personnel, junior versus senior personnel, and military personnel versus their civilian counterparts. Active members can claim retirement benefits before reservists can; junior members who leave prior to completing 20 years of service do not qualify for retirement benefits, unlike their more senior counterparts; and the 20-year vesting rule is outside the civilian vesting norm of 5-7 years of service, ...