The Power of the G20

i The Power of the G20 Can the power of the G20 be legitimate? This book examines the politics surrounding the G20’s efforts to act effectively and legitimately and the problems and challenges involved in this activity. Developing a critical constructivist conceptualisation of the G20, the book considers holistically and practically the ways that the G20 develops various forms of power and influence and acts as an apex form of global governance that seeks to be an overall coordinating forum to address global problems. Assessing how debates about the legitimacy of the G20 shaped its operation, Slaughter argues that the G20’s power can be legitimate despite a range of considerable challenges and limits. The book also explores what measures the G20 could take to be more legitimate in the future. Offering a direct and accessible consideration of the politics of legitimacy with respect to the G20, this book will be of interest to those attempting to understand and analyse the G20 as well as to scholars of IR theory, global political economy, global policy, diplomacy and globalisation. Steven Slaughter is an Associate Professor in International Relations at Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. His main publications are The G20 and International Relations Theory: Perspectives on Global Summitry (solo edited, 2019), Global Democratic Theory: A Critical Introduction (authored with D. Bray, 2015), Democracy and Crisis: Democratising Governance in the TwentyFirst Century (co-edited with B. Isakhan, 2014), Globalisation and Citizenship: The Transnational Challenge (co-edited with Wayne Hudson, 2007) and Liberty Beyond Neo-liberalism: A Republican Critique of Liberal Governance in a Globalising Age (2005). He has authored more than 30 articles and chapters in journals such as the Review of International Studies, Global Policy, Global Constitutionalism and Global Summitry. His research interests focus on globalisation and global governance, with a particular interest in political theory, transnational activism and the G20. Global Governance Series Editor: John J. Kirton University of Toronto, Canada Global governance is growing rapidly to meet the compounding challenges of a globalized 21st-century world. Many issues once dealt with largely at the local, national or regional level are now going global, in the economic, social and political-security domains. In response, new and renewed intergovernmental institutions are arising and adapting, multilevel governance is expanding, and sub-national actors are playing a greater role, and create complex combinations and private-partnerships to this end. This series focuses on the new dynamics of global governance in the 21st century by: • • • • Addressing the changes in the structure, operation and impact of individual intergovernmental institutions, above all their innovative responses to the growing global challenges they confront. Exploring how they affect, are affected by and relate to non-state actors of global relevance and reach. Examining the processes of cooperation, competition and convergence among international institutions and the many global governance gaps where global challenges such as terrorism, transnational crime and energy do not confront powerful international institutions devoted to their control. Dealing with how global institutions govern the links among key issues such as climate change and health. In all cases, it focuses on the central questions of how global governance institutions and processes generate the effective, legitimate, accountable results required to govern today’s interconnected, complex, uncertain and crisis-ridden world. The Politics of Global Tax Governance Henning Schmidtke The Power of the G20 The Politics of Legitimacy in Global Governance Steven Slaughter For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/GlobalGovernance/book-series/ASHSER1420 iii The Power of the G20 The Politics of Legitimacy in Global Governance Steven Slaughter First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business  2020 Steven Slaughter The right of Steven Slaughter to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-367-15174-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-05546-1 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC v Contents Acknowledgments vi Introduction: legitimacy and the G20 1 1 The purpose and power of the G20 16 2 The legitimacy of the G20: international and public concerns 38 3 The G20 and the legitimation of global capitalism 58 4 The G20 and global social problems 78 5 The G20 and global justice and accountability 97 Conclusion 117 Bibliography Index 131 143 Acknowledgments To many people, the title of this book is an oxymoron. Given the high-profile shortcomings of the G20, the idea that it has any form of power or influence seems improbable. However, this book seeks to develop a nuanced account of the forms of power involved in the G20 process since 2008. Writing this book was motivated by the desire to combine theoretical reflection with a practical understanding of what sort of power the G20 has with respect to the operation of contemporary global policy-making. Despite enormous challenges and prominent shortcomings with regards to being effective, the informal role of the G20 is potentially important, as it continues to evolve despite these problems. The book considers the legitimacy of the G20, not as an academic novelty but as a core part of the actual operation and influence of the G20. The activity undertaken by the G20 to legitimate its existence is important to its future effectiveness and to efforts to improve its operation and, hopefully, provide support to efforts to help stabilise globalisation. I hope this book sheds some light on the power and the potential of the G20. I thank Robert Sorsby from Routledge and John Kirton as the series editor for their initial interest in this book. This book has been long in the gestation. I need to acknowledge the use of the text from three previously published articles in this book: “Debating the International Legitimacy of the G20: Global Policymaking and Contemporary International Society” Global Policy Volume 4, Issue 1, 2013: 43–52. This paper forms the basis of Chapter 2. “The G20’s Role in Legitimating Global Capitalism: Beyond Crisis Diplomacy?” Contemporary Politics Volume 21, Issue 4, 2015: 384–398. This paper forms the basis of Chapter 3. “The G20 and Global Justice: The Potential of Transnational Deliberative Democratic Theory” Global Society, Volume 31, Issue 4, 2017: 460–478. This paper forms the basis of Chapter 5. Although these articles have all been significantly elaborated and revised for these chapters, I thank the editors and referees from these journals. I also would like to thank John Bourdouvalis and Andrew Schapper for their help with research assistance at various points and Jenny Lucy for help with vii Acknowledgments vii editing the final draft. I thank Deakin University for providing research leave that was used to write this book, and thank my colleagues David Hundt and Chengxin Pan who helped cover some of my teaching and service roles while I was on leave. Steven 1 Introduction Legitimacy and the G20 The 2008 global financial crisis prompted innovations in the arrangements of global governance that included the formation of the G20 (Group of Twenty) as a forum of world leaders. However, the formation of the G20 in 2008 has been accompanied by widespread debates regarding whether the G20 is a significant form of global governance and whether it is legitimate (Beeson and Bell 2009; Callaghan 2013b; Cammack 2012; Cooper 2010, 2012; Cooper and Pouliot 2015; Cooper and Thakur 2013; Downie 2017; Kharas and Lombardi 2012; Postel-Vinay 2013; Subacchi and Pickford 2011; Wade 2011; Woods 2010). On one hand, there is the question of whether the G20 is an advance from the pre-existing G8 (Group of Eight) leaders’ forum, whether it is able to enhance the cooperation and coordination of the various developed and emerging economies that comprise its membership, and whether it has the capacity to prevent future economic crises. On the other hand, there is the question of whether this form of global governance is deemed legitimate by the states excluded from G20 membership or by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups already sceptical of the benefits of globalisation. In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 crisis there was a widespread belief that the G20 played an effective role in helping develop policy responses to this economic crisis, and while confidence about the G20’s role has vacillated since with a slow global recovery (Luckhurst 2016), questions about the legitimacy of the G20 have continued. Although the G20 was a hastily drawn up but crucial component of a system that “worked” (Drezner 2014), important political questions about the G20’s power and legitimacy persist. The power and legitimacy of the G20 is debated for four primary reasons. First, the G20 is controversial because it involves complex forms of inclusion and exclusion, in that although it is composed of a diverse array of states from the “North” and “South”, this membership excludes smaller, less-developed states. Furthermore, this selective and self-selected membership of economically significant states works outside of the multilateralism of the United Nations (UN) and Bretton Woods system. Second, the power and legitimacy of the G20 is debated because of the changing context of world politics, with emerging economies and agents in transnational civil society influencing what forms of global governance, such as the G20, should do to stabilise globalisation and what standards of 2 Introduction 2 legitimacy should apply to this activity. Third, while there is substantial agreement that the G20 has the potential to address global financial crises and prevent other global problems, there are significant domestic challenges facing the effective operation of the G20, and differing opinions regarding what the G20 needs to do to be effective. Fourth, underlying these questions is the deeper issue that the G20 is a particular form of governance with an unclear standing in world politics because it is not a formal international organisation (IO)/intergovernmental organization and does not create formal international laws. The G20 is an informal arrangement of global governance, created by “an explicitly shared expectation – rather than a formalized agreement”, which possesses no formal membership or mandate and produces no formal agreements (Vabulas and Snidal 2013: 197). Consequently, the power and influence of the G20 is potentially significant but it is difficult to observe and hard to hold to account. While the practice of dominant states creating informal and selective summits is not unprecedented (Mitzen 2013; Vabulas and Snidal 2013), the G20 is more than just an ad hoc diplomatic concert or club of states and is developing as an “apex policy forum” (Baker and Carey 2014: 92). The activity of the G20 allows for various forms of informal and largely voluntary influence that attempt to set the agenda and “cultivate” understandings and policy ideas to influence states within and beyond its membership in order to address global problems (Cooper and Thakur 2013: 113). While these efforts do not always produce effective outputs, the fact that the member states have continued to experiment and elaborate the G20’s processes indicates that the members see the potential and value of this form of summitry. Overall, it is not clear what power the G20 has or what standards of legitimacy should apply to this form of governance. This book considers this issue, and in order to do so this introduction sets out the argument of the whole volume, the general function of the G20, outlines the theoretical stance utilised for this argument and then sets out the organisation of the volume. Argument This book examines the politics surrounding the G20’s efforts to act effectively and legitimately and the problems and challenges involved in this activity. It develops a conceptualisation of the G20 that considers holistically and practically the ways that the G20 develops various forms of power and influence and acts as an apex form of global governance that seeks to be an overall coordinating forum to address global problems. Understanding the power of informal global governance with respect to the G20 is an important issue for the fields of International Relations (IR) and global political economy (GPE). In order to interpret and understand the uncertain power of the G20, this book utilises and seeks to advance the nuanced scholarship of power in world politics developed in recent years with respect to global governance (Avant et al. 2010; Barnett and Duvall 2005; Cooper and Pouliot 2015; Reus-Smit 2007). This book considers the question: what is the relationship between the G20’s power 3 Introduction 3 and legitimacy? In addressing this question, this book is guided by three subsidiary questions: 1 2 3 How can we understand the operation and power of the G20? How have debates about the legitimacy of the G20 shaped its operation? What measures could the G20 undertake to be more legitimate in the future? In addressing these questions this book utilises a critical constructivist approach drawn from IR theory and considers the ways that questions of legitimacy and legitimation with respect to the G20 have theoretical and practical importance. The argument of this book is that the power and the legitimacy of the G20 are mutually dependent and, furthermore, that the leaders and policy-makers associated with the G20 have been aware of questions related to its legitimacy and have been active in attempting to promote the legitimacy of the G20 and its policy activity. As such, the book argues that the G20’s power can be legitimate despite a range of considerable challenges facing its effective operation. These challenges relate to the deliberately informal and voluntary nature of the G20, its diverse membership, which includes different political cultures and levels of development, and the enormity of the multiple domestic and international challenges of attempting to stabilise contemporary globalisation. There are a range of factors that influence the legitimacy of this forum with respect to states and societies of the G20 and those beyond its membership. The most important factors concern whether the selective membership of the G20 can be justified to non-member states, whether its efforts to engage non-member states are considered acceptable and deemed compatible with existing forms of multilateralism and whether the G20 has the power and capacity to influence domestic and global governance to effectively address and prevent global problems – especially those relating to economic and financial problems. Consequently, it is the case that the G20’s legitimacy is important for policy-makers and the publics of member states. There are three main elements of this argument. First, this book contends that the G20 is a specific form of global governance that is best understood as being a limited and informal concert of states involving face-to-face deliberations among world leaders nested within a hub of global policy networks composed of policy-makers from member states and formal IOs. Put simply, the G20 is more than an international summit of world leaders because these policy networks attempt to connect and impart influence and direction on other forms of formal global governance, especially with regards to the IOs of the Bretton Woods system. It is important to identify the leadership role that the G20 plays in responding to global problems by developing new forms of informal global governance, coordinating other forms of global governance and developing and circulating policy ideas and understandings that influence the policy-making of states within and beyond the G20 member states. Consequently, the G20’s power is often gradual and bears upon national governance as well as global governance via the development of these informal and largely voluntary forms of policy 4 Introduction 4 ideas. As such, the power and influence of the G20 operates through states and not over states. Legitimacy is crucial for the G20’s policy determinations to be considered acceptable and for its ideas and priorities to disseminate. Second, the book argues that legitimacy is a key practical driver for how the G20 has developed and functions, and it identifies and interprets the various standpoints and constituencies regarding the G20’s legitimacy. This requires identifying the debates about the legitimacy of the G20 from both state leaders and the attentive publics of member states and beyond, as well as demonstrating that the G20 represents a form of collective leadership that is aware of these contentions and actively tries to legitimate its activity by responding to them. Consequently, the G20’s activity of legitimating its presence and policy activity is important to both its continued existence and its actual influence. From the outset, it is important to consider the ways that the powerful member states designed the G20 to be a limited and informal concert of states meshed with policy networks rather than creating a more robust and formal IO. As such, because the G20’s main outputs are voluntary policy ideas rather than formally negotiated agreements, its operation depends upon its social standing amongst states and societies rather than on legal compulsion As such, the G20 also plays a key role of actively legitimating global capitalism in light of the impact of the global financial crisis, various social problems associated with globalisation, the changing composition of economically significant states and the rising impact of transnational civil society. Consequently, this book accepts the significance of the interests of powerful states in establishing the G20 but contends that various debates about the G20’s legitimacy have led to identifiable efforts by the G20 to legitimate its existence and policy activity by influencing the practices and ideas it has developed. Third, the book contends that the moral and political debates about how the G20 should operate are crucial to understanding the G20’s current and future legitimacy. These debates have played a notable role in the evolution of the G20 and will continue to be pertinent. Questions of how the G20 can promote further accountability for its actions and more deeply consider global justice are crucial for the G20 to be legitimate and effective in the long term. The argument that the G20’s power can be legitimate rests on the observation that there has been considerable activity by the G20 to legitimate its role in its short history as a leaders’ forum, given the way that it involves the qualified inclusion of state and non-state actors. In order to assist the G20’s global and national coordination roles and the impact of its ideas and influence, it has developed various practices to legitimate its existence and role as well as enhance the influence of its policy ideas. In particular, while leaders have avoided creating an ongoing secretariat for the G20, there has been the development of an array of policy networks in the form of G20 working groups on various topics of concern and G20 public outreach groups that attempt to forge productive relationships with business, organised labour, civil society, thinks tanks and other social interests. This book considers whether these practices have the prospects to make the G20 more legitimate and accountable in the longer term. The book contends that further considerations of accountability and global justice will require the G20 to reform its operation to 5 Introduction 5 improve its reflective and deliberative capacity without undermining its informal nature. The G20 and global summitry It is important from the outset to identify the particular nature of the G20. The G20 is an informal forum of leaders that includes 19 countries and the European Union (EU), as well as the executive heads of a range of prominent IOs, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO), and prominent regional IOs. While the meetings involve executive leaders at the annual summits, supported by diplomats referred to as “Sherpas”, they also include government minsters at various ministerial summits held during the year. The G20 is the most recent development in a range of forums that began with the G6 in 1975 and expanded to the G7 the following year with the inclusion of Canada. The G system, beginning with the G6, was initially created to discuss the increasing impact of economic interdependence during the 1970s, especially the macroeconomic impact of oil crises. The development of the G8 in 1997 demonstrated a desire to include and engage Russia in some aspects of the G7’s economic agenda after the Cold War. The development of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (G20 FM/CBG) meetings in 1999 was a reaction to the Asian financial crisis. The eventual elevation of G20 to a forum of leaders of the member states of the G20 FM/CBG in 2008 was a belated recognition of the importance of including emerging economies in efforts to address the 2008 global financial crisis. These various iterations of summits by executive leaders are sometimes referred to as the “GX” or “G system” (Alexandroff 2010). The term G system is used to suggest that the various iterations of G6, G7/8 and G20 are different-sized forms of informal summitry informed by historically developing forms of practice involving leaders of powerful states in response to various problems and contexts. Importantly, the various iterations of the G system have enabled various informal forms of dialogue between world leaders and officials from member states to produce mutually agreed policy priorities that are expressed in a joint communique and are subsequently meant to be enacted by member governments. This development has been referred to as the “rise of the informals”, whereby formal diplomacy and existing IOs are being supplemented by the informal summitry of world leaders and other government officials (Alexandroff and Brean 2015: 9; Vabulas and Snidal 2013; Baker and Carey 2014) and the rising significance of voluntary agreements amongst states (Pisani-Ferry 2018). The central purpose of the G20 is to facilitate informal and flexible intergovernmental cooperation and policy coordination amongst economically significant states that can respond to economic crises and stabilise the global economy (Kharas and Lombardi 2012). Consequently, the G20 is developed outside the usual protocols of international law and has no constitution or treaty, and does not create international legal agreements. The G20 and its precursors also do not have an ongoing secretariat or a dedicated budget, with a rotating host providing the 6 Introduction 6 location and infrastructure for meetings. These elements mean that the G20 has no capacity to act independently of member states. The significance of the G20 and preceding forms of the G system relates to the ability of world leaders of powerful states to meet in an informal context to share perspectives and approaches to world problems that consequently leads to political action by specific IOs or through the development of domestic policy. The G20 FM/CBG and the subsequent leaders’ forum was created by the members of the G7 as “a new mechanism for informal dialogue in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system, to broaden the dialogue on key economic and financial policy issues among systemically significant economies and to promote cooperation to achieve stable and sustainable world growth that benefits all” (G7 1999, para 19). It is important to emphasise that while the G20 was designed to be able to influence and coordinate the formal Bretton Woods institutions, it was also designed to be separate from these institutions. While some leaders called for a “new Bretton Woods” as a response to the 2008 global financial crisis (Winnett 2008), leaders of the G7 states chose to extend the informal nature of the G7 and include a wider range of states in an informal summit rather than a newly empowered formal IO that could intervene in the domestic policy settings of member states. The G20 does not signify that member states wanted to “strengthen international law and abide by it”, but rather they intended to avoid the complications of multilateralism by further developing informal forms of global governance (Pisani-Ferry 2018: 5). The thin nature of the G20 and the subsequent difficulty for the G20 to be consistently effective has led some observers to claim that the current world order is best characterised by a “G zero” situation, where there is an absence of collective agreement or power (Bremmer 2012). Contrary to this view, this book considers that the G20 represents a deliberate collective decision to create a limited and informal forum that avoids the creation of a formal IO and thereby create a rapid and flexible informal response to crises, intended to make existing IOs work more effectively. Both the G20’s power and the limits to its effectiveness stem from this agreement to purposely design an informal and largely voluntary form of global governance. One of the key elements of the G20 is the way it combines being an informal concert of states with an underlying network of policy-making activity. While the G20 is most evident in the annual summits of world leaders, it is important from the outset to acknowledge that, akin to an “iceberg”, there is considerable unseen activity in addition to the activity of leaders (Alexandroff and Brean 2015: 9–10). The G20 can be seen as a form of “global summitry” that involves the broader “architecture, institutions and, most critically, the political and policy behavior of the actors engaged in the influence of outcomes of common concern in the international system” (Alexandroff and Brean 2015: 1–2). This conceptualisation seeks to identify the policy activity behind the scenes that facilitates the meetings of leaders. As such, to draw attention to the ways that the G20 is far more than just an informal meeting of leaders, this book contends that the G20 is a global summitry complex that incorporates a concert of states with a hub of policy networks. It considers the ways that these leaders are supported by various 7 Introduction 7 transgovernmental policy networks of officials and transnational policy networks of experts and advocates outside government. Transgovernmentalism refers to the ministerial and bureaucratic interactions among various levels and agencies of the involved governments and IOs. Such activity has been a significant part of the global financial architecture, comprising the various technical institutions that have been developed to stabilise global financial systems in recent decades (Baker 2009). Transnational policy networks refer to the broader activity of experts and advocates from business and civil society groups that are drawn into the policy-making processes by leaders or where these social interests impose themselves in the policy-making process (Stone 2008). Such networks support the contention that networked governance is a “key feature” of 21stcentury world order (A. Slaughter 2004: 1) and that the G20 is a crucial “hub” of this activity (Kirton 2013: 35). This broader understanding of global summitry is especially pertinent to the G20. Since the late 1990s, there have been mounting efforts by societal interests to influence the G system and increased forms of elaboration and institutionalisation of the policy networks that underpin and inform the work of the G20 FM/ CBG and the G20. This is evident in the development of ministerial meetings and working groups, which are transgovernmental policy networks encompassing regulators and experts drawn from member states that are involved in considering responses to particular policy issues. Furthermore, transnational policy networks are evident in the formation of outreach groups in the form of the Think 20 (think tanks), Labour 20, Business 20, Civil 20 (civil society), Youth 20, Women 20 and Science 20. These outreach groups include representatives from the relevant sectors chosen by the country hosting the G20, who are asked to contribute practical policy proposals to the G20 agenda. Most of these public outreach processes began operating in 2013 and suggest that the G20 has become a more elaborate and institutionalised process of global summitry, significantly removed from leaders having secretive and informal discussions. This development offers further opportunities for public involvement in global governance and indicates that greater transparency and accountability is more possible than in the past. While the idea of global summitry outlines a clearer picture of what the G20 is and how it functions, there is still a range of political questions about the operation of the G20. First and foremost, is the question of whether these summits are significant and effective? Are they simply hot air and a glorified photo opportunity for world leaders? While there have been occasions where the G20 has made a distinct political impression on global politics, such as the coordinated response to the 2008 global financial crisis, the broader story is that the effectiveness and significance of the G20’s informal and voluntary activity has varied considerably. In its history as a leaders’ forum it has demonstrated some capacity to be an effective but reactive “crisis committee”, but doubts remain as to whether the G20 can be a “steering committee” that can act to prevent global economic problems, with some issues of policy deliberation making little or no progress (Cooper 2010). Despite this variable and conditional significance, the G20 still provides an important forum for improving mutual understanding between leaders, as well 8 Introduction 8 as keeping policy dialogue open between various officials and policy-makers, which provides the background for future policy coordination, even if significant outcomes have not resulted from every G20 summit (Kharas and Lombardi 2012). However, in order to be effective, especially as a preventative steering committee, the G20 has to be considered legitimate by those outside its membership in order for its policy deliberations and responses to have broader resonance. This is a crucial challenge facing the G20. Legitimacy and critical constructivism The study of legitimacy in global governance has grown enormously in the last three decades (Brasset and Tsingou 2011; Clark 2003, 2005; Esty 2002; ReusSmit 2007; Symons 2011; Scholte 2011b). This growth is due to the rising profile of global cooperation after the end of the Cold War, intensifying forms of globalisation and the wide diversity in types of global governance. Global governance entails a variety of processes of collaboration by states and non-state actors that develop processes and institutions of cooperation and organisation which do not amount to a centralised global government. Contemporary global governance refers to international and transnational mechanisms that include public forms of activity encompassing formal agreements, which can lead to rules and treaties, international institutions set up by states in the form of IOs, informal agreements between states, as well as informal forms of regulation established by businesses and other non-state actors and the networking of transnational civil society, which influences and creates rules and norms. Furthermore, there are hybrid forms of governance that blur public and private forms of rule setting and transnational policy networks that include private and public actors (Hale and Held 2011; Stone 2008). These processes of governance enable states to address global problems and enable forms of globalisation. While many references to globalisation and the global economy use these terms interchangeably, it is increasingly recognised that globalisation is a multifaceted process that also involves the transnational flow of non-economic dynamics as well. Legitimacy is uncertain in global governance. There are international institutions that have weak legitimacy, where claims to authority are undeveloped, contested or “breached with little or no punishment” – meaning that some aspects of global governance are sometimes not effective (Scholte 2011a: 111). Many of the various forms of governance require voluntary compliance, as they do not generally have the power to compel states or other actors. Consequently, the legitimacy of these forms of governance is crucial for generating compliance with their agenda and purpose and for avoiding a crisis of legitimacy that threatens the existence and operation of these organisations. The G20 is no exception. Indeed, given that the G20 is an informal form of governance with no legal standing, it is especially the case that it needs to be seen as legitimate for its operation to be sanctioned and for its policy ideas to transmit widely and provide effective responses to global problems. However, an important element of legitimacy in global politics is the existence of different social constituencies, as there is no 9 Introduction 9 “single coherent global demo” (Scholte 2011a: 113; Symons 2011). We could speak of the international legitimacy of a form of global governance with respect to member states, or all states more broadly, or public legitimacy with respect to the public of states that create the organisation or to those people around the world affected by the organisation in question, or with respect to the transnational networks of NGOs and social movements. These different constituencies have been an important aspect of debates with regards to the G20. Legitimacy is a crucial concept in political science and it is central to the critical constructivist account of global politics utilised in this book. The constructivist line of argument demonstrates that global governance is not just a strategic outcome of dominant states but is also informed by prevailing normative and political expectations of legitimate political action. According to constructivists, legitimacy is an “inherently social” condition where an authority or institution is considered to have the right to govern and has political support from the relevant constituencies (Reus-Smit 2007: 171). While such a condition is social, in that it involves communication and dialogue, it is indicative of more than public support because it also relates to the political and ethical values that prevail within a given social context. The process of legitimation involves ongoing dialogue and justification between the actors in society and the authority in question. Such dialogue normally refers to political questions in respect to “rightful membership” – with regards to whether the relevant actors are included, as well as “rightful conduct” – that is, does the authority accord with prevailing normative expectations of procedural and substantive action? (Clark 2005: 25). Also relevant are questions about “output legitimacy”, that is, whether the authority is effective in performing and fulfilling its purpose or mandate (Scharpf 1999). Such questions lead to efforts by the authority in question to legitimate its existence and activity, which can lead to changes in its activity to more appropriately respond to concerns about its processes of inclusion, procedure and performance. Consequently, legitimacy is not an abstract opinion of what the relevant actors believe are acceptable forms of political practice and governing. Nor is it a synonym for hegemony, given that legitimacy is about the acceptability and justification of authority, rather than the broader question of how power is normalised and exercised. Legitimacy is a social condition that depends upon prevailing norms and involves communication and dialogue, in the sense that For an actor or institution to be judged legitimate, its identity, interests, or practices must resonate with values considered normative by other actors within their realm of political action. This process of legitimation is inherently political, as it involves the complex interplay of idiographic, purposive, ethical, and instrumental goals and practices. (Reus-Smit 2007: 171–172) As such, legitimation is the political activity which demonstrates what particular agents in positions of authority believe they need to say and do to be legitimate 10 Introduction 10 and thus helps demonstrate what legitimacy means in a specific social context. The process of legitimation in world politics involves ongoing dialogue and justification between the authority and the actors involved, where the authority engages in a “recalibration” of its legitimacy, which can involve changes in its policies and practices (Reus-Smit 2007: 172). Such dialogue by leaders, policy-makers and diplomats normally refers to political, ethical and legal questions of membership and whether the relevant actors are included, whether the authority in question accords with prevailing normative expectations, and whether the authority effectively achieves its declared purpose. Legitimation involves political activities that demonstrate an effort of an actor to justify their activity and adjust their activity and practices to be more legitimate to their relevant constituents. Constructivism contends that legitimacy is a key element of world politics in the sense that the desire to be legitimate is a key driver of the diplomatic and political activity of states and other actors. Constructivism focuses upon the intersubjective dimensions of global social life, emphasising that ideas are important to the social reality of global politics and that this social reality is not pre-given nor drawn purely from material elements (Adler 1997, 2005; Hopf 1998; Price and Reus-Smit 1998; Reus-Smit 1999; Luckhurst 2019). The argument here is that people collectively construct and reproduce social reality through everyday activity. Constructivists also contend that the identities and interests of political actors are fluid, meaning that they therefore produce and reproduce this social activity. This leads them to contend that agents and structures are mutually constituted within this social activity of communication and dialogue. Constructivism therefore contends that agents, through actions and rhetoric, can change structures and international institutions – they are not static objects. Consequently, we can see that constructivists conceive that the fundamental elements of international reality are ideational as well as material and attempt to discern the resulting social structures. The constructivist study of world politics is divided into “conventional” and “critical” constructivism (Hopf 1998: 172). “Conventional” constructivism is animated by a social scientific approach to world politics, but instead of just examining material facts, this approach examines social facts through empirical and historical research. “Critical” constructivism draws from Critical Theory and engages in the empirical work that conventional constructivists undertake but it is informed by attempting to open up possibilities for progressive normative change by identifying inherent political tensions or latent sources of change (see Eckersley 2012; Price and Reus-Smit 1998). The argument in this book develops a critical constructivist approach specifically focused on interpreting and explaining the political significance of the global summitry of the G20. Such an approach is articulated with a focus on the prominent role of ideas, discourse and communication in the operation of the G20. Particular attention is paid to the ways discourse and deliberation occurs as well as to normative questions informed by critical deliberative theory as to how deliberation in global politics could be more inclusive, transparent and reflective (Dryzek 2006, 2010, 2011; Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008; 11 Introduction 11 Eckersley 2012). This approach focuses upon the interpretation of subjective and intersubjective social processes involved in the construction and operation of the G20 as well as the way the legitimacy of the G20 is debated within global politics. This argument is also congruent with what Richard Price and Christian ReusSmit (1998: 269) refer to as an “holistic” approach to constructivism, which treats “domestic and international structures and processes as two faces of a single, global social order”, meaning that domestic politics and international politics mutually affect each other through the transnational transmission of ideas and communication. Furthermore, this holistic account of constructivism allows greater space to treat states as disaggregated actors, with various elements of state governments having different points of interaction and engagement with global politics. This allows a multilayered consideration of the role of world leaders, networks of policy-makers who work within and across national jurisdictions, and the relationships between states with transnational business interests and other societal actors. The formation of the G20 reflects important ways that states and other agents produce and reproduce global governance. Given the fluid, multilayered and deliberately informal and non-legal manner in which the G20 operates, rather than focusing primarily upon concepts such as norms and institutions, the account of critical constructivism in this book also focuses upon interpreting the various diplomatic and policy-making practices that have informed the creation and operation of the G20 and its particular form of governance. Practices are drawn from Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot’s use of Pierre Bourdieu’s focus on performed action, evident at the intersection of agents and structures. Practices are best understood as “competent performances” and “socially meaningful patterns of action” that involve “dynamic material and ideational processes that enable structures to be stable or to evolve, and agents to reproduce or transform structures” (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 4–5; see also Adler 2005; Pouliot 2012). This consideration of performance focuses upon the intentionality of the actors involved and considers the ways that the ideational activity of agents operates within a shared “community of practice” involving diplomats and other policy-makers (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 15–18; Adler 2005). As such, considering these practices requires assuming an interpretivist stance that contextualises the intentions and pronouncements of a wide variety of political agents (see Bevir 2011a, 2013). This conceptualisation enables a broader analysis of the operation of the G20 and is well suited to the fluid and contemporary nature of the G20 and the plurality of different perspectives involved. The primary sources used to identify these practices and declarations are the G20 communiqués and reports of the G20’s outreach processes and the commentary of those observing or involved with the G20. The critical constructivist approach also contends that moral debate and political bargaining are mutually enmeshed and considers the ways normative debate and consideration are crucial to understanding the future legitimacy of the G20. This critical constructivist examination of communication, ideas and practice with respect to the G20 has three important elements crucial to understanding the G20 and pertinent to the field of IR theory and the broader study of global 12 Introduction 12 governance. First, given that the G20 is an especially amorphous form of global governance that stands aside from the formal multilateralism of the UN or other treaty-based IOs, it is necessary to examine various perspectives of its complex and multilayered nature. The critical constructivist approach allows for the examination of the various perspectives in debates about the operation and legitimacy of the G20 because it does not assume that states have predefined interests or are the only important actors in world politics. Second, given that the G20 is an especially new development in global governance, it is important to have some degree of modesty and contingency to the study of this form of global governance. Using the concepts of practice and ideas rather than institutions and norms is driven by uncertainty as to how deep this social activity is and an intent to focus on interpreting the performance and intentionality of the actors involved in contemporary governance, rather than emphasising any deeper political essence. Third, while scholars claim that some forms of contemporary global governance are taking on a “global constitutionalist” tenor, in that there are various forms of institutionalisation of the rules and norms of global cooperation (Wiener et al. 2012; Dunoff and Trachtman 2009), the existence of the G20 suggests that there may be an anti-constitutionalist element, where powerful states attempt to cooperate informally but avoid binding forms of rule setting. Any trend towards the formalisation and institutionalisation of governance may be paralleled by the G20’s purposely informal and disaggregated governance. In addition to these insights, the critical constructivist account also has a strong normative focus on the importance of considering how political structures can better serve human needs and promote human emancipation. The account of critical constructivism developed in this book is anchored in a pragmatic approach that aspires to address political problems and realise the political impediments at play in global governance. As such, it does not ignore realist pronouncements that global governance is heavily shaped by the intentions and capacities of dominant states. However, it does seek to include normative debates and imperatives in order to jointly consider the importance of broadening the moral horizons and possibilities of global governance with the practical need of having a G20 that is able to stabilise the global economy and address global policy problems. It does not envision the possibility of a global economy that transcends all the significant limitations and problems of global capitalism, but it does seek to identify where the G20 can develop practical changes to its political organisation or to the policy ideas it endorses so it can improve the lives of the world’s most vulnerable people. Indeed, the contention in this book is that critical constructivism makes an important contribution to the study of IR as a “practical discourse” (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008: 7), primarily by considering how policy-makers do and could operate with respect to core political questions of power, legitimacy, accountability and justice. The critical constructivist consideration of contingency and plurality helps to reconcile different perspectives with regards to how the G20 operates and the normative possibility of how it could operate in future. 13 Introduction 13 Structure of this book From the outset, it is important to indicate that while this book focuses on legitimacy and engages with the policy debates of the G20, it is not primarily a contribution to the G20 policy literature. Although it uses examples and evidence drawn from G20 activity, it is not a sustained judgement of the policy debate surrounding the G20. While the G20 policy literature is significantly useful to understanding what the G20 should do (see Bery 2018; Callaghan 2013a; Cooper 2012; Kharas and Lombardi 2012; Subacchi and Pickford 2011; Woods 2010), it is often not explicit or specific about what sort of power and influence the G20 possesses. Consequently, this book does not chronologically study the outcomes of G20 meetings or analyse the G20’s response to the 2008 global financial crisis. However, this book is also not a pure consideration of IR or GPE theory. While this book develops a critical constructivist conceptualisation of the G20 in order to consider questions of power and legitimacy, the point here is not to test or prove this theory, but rather to use this approach to develop a practical understanding of how the G20 works and how its activity could be improved. This approach permits analytical consideration of the various perspectives on the operation of the G20 and the normative consideration of how the G20 can be more effective and legitimate in the future. This moves the consideration of the G20 beyond immediate policy debates to the enduring political questions regarding the operation of the G20. This book’s articulation of critical constructivism is an attempt to understand the politics surrounding the formation and operation of the G20 in order to identify the G20’s power and the role that legitimacy and legitimation play in the activity of the G20 and global governance more broadly. This book develops as follows. Chapter 1 outlines the purpose of the G20 and articulates the types of power that the G20 is able to exercise. Doing so requires locating the G20 in a broader context of global governance by outlining the history of informal global summitry in the form of the preceding iterations of the G system. The chapter also outlines the power of the G20 and the ways the G20 exerts political influence within contemporary world politics via various policy networks. Chapter 2 outlines the legitimacy debates evident at the formation and subsequent operation of the G20 forum. First, debates about the G20’s international legitimacy are considered with respect to the narrow membership of the G20 in contrast to contemporary expectations of multilateralism and the UN. Drawing upon the conceptual work of John Ruggie and Miles Kahler, and using diplomatic debates about the formation of the G20, the chapter contends that the G20 is not a clear form of multilateralism, despite involving multiple states. Second, the chapter outlines the primary public concerns about the legitimacy of the G20 emanating from societies of member states and transnational civil society. Chapter 3 outlines the ways the G20’s legitimacy depends on its capacity to achieve its primary purpose to promote coordination that stabilises global capitalism. In so doing, the chapter explains how the G20 undertakes work that builds confidence in global capitalism and legitimises global capitalism. 14 Introduction 14 Consequently, this chapter identifies the key practices developed by the G20 to legitimate itself and global capitalism and identifies some of the prominent policy ideas that have been developed within the G20 policy process in response to global economic problems. Chapter 4 outlines the potential of the G20 to address global social issues. It contends that while promoting the stability of the global economy is crucial, so too is providing leadership within global governance to address key global problems such as food security, global health and climate change, as well as promoting development. The chapter argues that the G20’s legitimacy rests upon it making visible contributions to any type of global policy problems that has not been adequately addressed by other forms of global governance. This increasingly involves the G20 working with the UN to help enact the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This is important for legitimating the G20’s existence and operation with respect to many emerging and less-developed states. Chapter 5 emphasises that addressing global justice and promoting accountability is crucial to the long-term legitimacy of the G20. The chapter demonstrates that the G20 has some capacity to consider the interests of poor and marginalised groups around the world and examines the prospects and problems of the G20’s capacity to promote justice. The chapter also considers the ways that the G20 could be more accountable in promoting justice. It considers the way that transnational deliberative democratic theory could be utilised to reform the G20 so that its discussions are more inclusive of the various perspectives involved in global policy-making and more accountable to people affected by the G20’s influence. The conclusion to this book considers the theoretical and practical significance of legitimacy and legitimation in global governance. The overall position of this book is that the G20’s effectiveness and legitimacy is an important and incomplete process. While there are signs that a common G20 identity is forming amongst G20 member states, with respect to a common responsibility for globalisation, the politics of legitimacy reveal that the substantial progress towards demonstrating this identity is ongoing. From a theoretical perspective it is argued that the fundamental contribution that critical constructivism makes is comprehending the G20 as a multilayered form of global summitry and contributing a more precise understanding of the ways the relationship among legitimacy, justice and power is constantly being recalibrated. From a practical point of view, the book considers the future prospects of the efforts underway by G20 states to legitimate the G20 and open more avenues for including perspectives of various groups without overloading the G20’s agenda. But rather than uncritically accepting the G20’s existence or indicating some superior rationality inherent in the G20 process, the argument here is that the operation of the G20 as a global summitry complex that links a concert of states and hub of policy networks can be seen to be a modest and contingent form of political achievement akin to what the pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty (1999: 273) refers to as an “experimental success” that provides better governance than the alternatives. Despite the G20’s apparent shortcomings and difficulties in achieving progress on various policy issues, member states keep attempting to refine its operation 15 Introduction 15 and improve its legitimacy. 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