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2017, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies vol. 21
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59 pages
1 file
JOURNAL OF INDIAN AND BUDDHIST STUDIES (INDOGAKU BUKKYOGAKU KENKYU), 2002
In his pramanaviniscaya, Dharmakirti added the qualifier 'non-erroneous' (abhranta, Q2) to Dignaga's definition of perception, "being free from conception" (kalpanapodha, Q1), in order to rule out sensory illusions from perception. As Funayama (1999) has already clarified, among Dharmakirti's followers, Vinitadeva and Kamalasila interpreted Q2 in the sense of 'non-deceptive'(avisamvddaka) because they held a common view that the definition of perception was made from the standpoint of both the Sautrantika and Yogacara schools. But Prajnakaragupta's approach to the definition of perception is different from theirs. Concerning Dignaga's definition of perception, as Hattori (1968: 92) has already pointed
The rescent rediscovery of two epistemological treatises composed by the famous Tibetan thinker Phy(w)a pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109?-1169) 1 (hereafter: Phya pa) -a commentary on the Pramāṇaviniścaya ('Od zer) and a Summary of epistemology (Mun sel) -is a very fortunate event for those of us working on the Tibetan interpretations of Dharmakīrti's thought. The name of Phya pa is associated with a number of original positions reflected in the epistemological writings of bKa' gdams pa authors belonging to the 12th-14th centuries, and to a certain extent in later dGe lugs pa interpretations. As is well known, many of these positions are rather controversial in view of the original dharmakirtian treatises, and Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan (1182-1251) (hereafter: Sa paṇ) denounces them in the Rigs gter as being the result of inventions and misunderstandings. This paper inquires into Phya pa's views on the topic of perception (pratyakṣa, Tib. mngon sum), which receives its share of objections in Sa paṇ's Rigs gter and the commentaries thereupon. Tibetan thinkers in general, and Phya pa and his disciples in particular, are criticized for 1) introducing a distinction between 'perception' (mngon sum) and 'valid cognition which is a perception' (mngon sum tshad ma), hereafter translated as 'valid perception,' and 2) attributing to the latter the capacity to eliminate superimpositions (sgro 'dogs gcod pa, *samāropavyavaccheda). 2 Sa paṇ objects, rightly, that no such distinction occurs in Dharmakīrti's texts, and ar-* I wish to thank Mrs Danielle Feller for kindly correcting my English.
Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2020
This dissertation examines the theory of perceptual cognition laid out by the 7th century Buddhist scholar, Dharmakīrti, in his magnum opus, the Pramāṇavārttika. Like most theories of perception, both ancient and modern, the sensory cognition of ordinary objects is a topic of primary concern. Unlike other theorists, however, Dharmakīrti advances a technical definition of “perception” as a cognition which is both nonconceptual and non-erroneous. Dharmakīrti’s definition of perception is thereby deliberately inclusive of three additional types of “perceptual” cognition, in addition to veridical sensory awareness: the nonconceptual mental apprehension of an immediately-preceding cognition (“mental perception”), the vivid appearance of soteriologically efficacious objects of contemplative practice (“yogic perception”), and the sheer unmediated presence of the contents of cognition—whatever these might be—to the cognizing mind (“reflexive awareness”). Through the logical examination of what it means to be aware of an object, Dharmakīrti demonstrates that the awareness of an object is just the awareness of a phenomenal form or cognitive image produced by that object. Pursuing this analysis further, however, Dharmakīrti argues that the very notion of an object of cognition that exists “externally” or outside the mind is incoherent. Additionally, Dharmakīrti maintains that the phenomenological structure of subject and object—that is, the “first-personal” sense of one’s own cognitions as pertaining to oneself (“for-me-ness”), together with the inseparably concomitant sense that the objects of cognition exist “out there” in an extramental world—is strictly a form of cognitive error. Therefore, because ordinary sensory cognition is inherently structured by this subject-object duality, ordinary sensory cognition must in the final analysis be understood as erroneous. According to Dharmakīrti, in other words, ultimately only the nondual “luminosity” of reflexive awareness is genuinely perceptual, because only reflexive awareness is undistorted by nature. In this way, Dharmakīrti’s epistemology provides a theoretical foundation for the advanced nondual contemplative practices of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, particularly Mahāmudrā and rDzogs chen.
Proceedings of the 5th International Dharmakīrti Conference. S.McClintock, H. Lasic, P. McAllister and B. Kellner (eds.)
Buddhist conceptions of non-cognition (anupalabdhi) of a property as a type of evidence employable to infer the absence of another property have received the detailed attention of scholars in the past years. In contrast, Jain conceptions on this subject are still to be studied. What is more, Jain philosophers did dialogue with Buddhists on what counts as correct evidence within an inference and, as such, their conceptions on this matter can be seen as a relevant part of the studies on Buddhist philosophy of knowledge and argumentation. The aim of this paper is to present and compare the way non-cognition can serve to draw an inference according to Buddhist and to Jain philosophers, as well as to indicate the philosophical relevance of the main divergences between the two conceptions. In doing so, I will especially analyse the reasons why a given form of inference with non-cognition in its premises is accepted and another one denied, and I will show how in this process of acceptation and denial more epistemological and more formal concerns coexist. I will present Dharmakīrti's view as it is found in his Pramāṇa-vārttikasvavṛtti and Nyāya-bindu. As for the Jain view, I will focus on Akalaṅka's Laghīyas-traya and on Māṇikyanandi's Parīkṣā-mukham.
Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu)
3. What is the object of a conceptual cognition and a word?
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