Recruiting European Judges in the Age of Judicial Self-­- Government

Articles   Recruiting  European  Judges  in  the  Age  of  Judicial  Self-­‐   Government     By  Samuel  Spáč*         Abstract     Through   the   recruitment   of   judges   –   their   selection   and   subsequent   appointment   –   powerful   actors   control   who   enters   the   judicial   ranks   and   under   what   circumstances.   In   this  paper  I  address  how  are   European  judges  recruited  using  examples  from  ten  European   countries,  while  paying  special  attention  to  the  role  of  the  judicial  self-­‐government  in  these   processes.  Indeed,  there  are  differences  between  recruitment  processes  across  Europe.  In   some   countries,   a   central   role   in   the   judicial   recruitment   is   played   by   judicial   schools;   elsewhere   crucial   powers   belong   to   judicial   councils   and/or   other   bodies   of   judicial   self-­‐ government;   in   the   UK   or   Ireland   some   of   these   powers   were   vested   in   the   hands   of   specialized   bodies;   whereas   in   other   countries   the   process   remains   less   formal   with   crucial   powers   resting   in   the   hands   of   court   presidents.   Despite   these   differences,   I   choose   to   emphasize   similarities   recruitment   processes   share.   They   operate   as   funnels   where   the   pool   of   candidates   gradually   decreases   until   only   one   (or   few)   remains   and   is   eventually   appointed.  In  order  to  assume  judicial  office  one  usually  must  (a)  meet  eligibility  criteria,   (b)  get  on  selector’s  radar  to  be  actively  considered  for  the  position,  (c)  get  shortlisted  for   the   position,   (d)   get   selected,   and   (e)   eventually   appointed.   Dividing   the   recruitment   process  into  these  stages,  while  paying  attention  to  motivations  of  all  involved  actors,  can   help   deepen   our   understanding   of   how   judicial   recruitment   actually   works   and   how   formal   and  informal  rules  together  shape  the  composition  of  judiciaries.     *    Samuel  Spáč  is  a  senior  researcher  at  the  Judicial  Studies  Institute  (JUSTIN),  Masaryk  University,  and  a  researcher   at   the   Department   of   Political   Science,   Comenius   University.   Email:   [email protected].   I   am   grateful   to   Chris  Hanretty  for  discussions  that  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  ideas  presented  in  this  paper,  and  for  all  the  comments   to   participants   of   JUSTIN   research   meetings.   The   research   leading   to   this   article   has   received   funding   from   the   European   Research   Council   (ERC)   under   the   European   Union’s   Horizon   2020   research   and   innovation   programme   (grant  no.  678375-­‐JUDI-­‐ARCH-­‐ERC-­‐2015-­‐STG).   2 0 7 8   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07   A.  Introduction     Through   the   recruitment   of   judges   –   their   selection   and   subsequent   appointment   –   powerful   actors   control   who   enters   the   judicial   ranks   and   under   what   circumstances.   A   1 vast   literature   has   been   dedicated   to   this   topic,   mainly   in   common   law   countries,   2 3 4 Constitutional  courts  around  the  world,  or  international  courts.  Scholarly  attention  paid   to   judicial   recruitment   in   ordinary   judiciaries   has   mainly   focused   on   the   procedures   and   5 formal   bodies   involved   in   the   process.   Nevertheless,   the   question   of   how   the   process   actually   translates   into   the   composition   of   the   judiciary   certainly   has   consequences   for   the   6 expertise   and   quality   of   the   bench,   while   it   also   affects   such   issues   as   diversity   and   representativeness   of   the   judiciary,   which   are   important   from   the   perspective   of   7 representative   democracy.   In   addition,   as   recruitment   establishes   a   link   between   the   selector  and  the  judge,  it  can  be  linked  with  the  independence  of  individual  judges  as  well   8 as  judiciaries  in  collective  terms.  Once  the  judges  are  appointed,  their  performance  affects   public   attitudes   towards   judicial   institutions,   as   well   as   political   institutions   in   a   broader   1  E.g.  Judith  Resnik,  Judicial  Selection  and  Democratic  Theory:  Demand,  Supply,  and  Life  Tenure,  26  CARDOZO   L.R.   597  (2015);  Lee  Epstein  &  Jack  Knight  &  Olga  Shevtsova,  Comparing  Judicial  Selection  Systems,  10  WILLIAM  &  MARY   7   (2007);   Kate   Malleson,   Rethinking   the   Merit   Principle   in   Judicial   Selection,   33   JOURNAL   OF   LAW   &   SOCIETY   126   (2006);  JAN   VAN   ZYL   SMIT,   THE   APPOINTMENT,   TENURE   AND   REMOVAL   OF   JUDGES   UNDER   COMMONWEALTH   PRINCIPLES   (2015);   DEBATING  JUDICIAL  APPOINTMENTS  IN  THE  AGE  OF  DIVERSITY  (Graham  Gee  &  Erika  Rackley  eds.,  2018).   2   E.g.   Charles   Manga   Fombad,   Appointment   of   constitutional   adjudicators   in   Africa:   some   perspectives   on   how   different   systems   yield   similar   outcomes,   46   THE   JOURNAL   OF   LEGAL   PLURALISM   AND   UNOFFICIAL   LAW   249   (2014);   TOM   GINSBURG,  JUDICIAL  REVIEW  IN  NEW  DEMOCRACIES:  CONSTITUTIONAL  COURTS  IN  ASIAN  CASES  (2003);  RULE  BY  LAW:  THE  POLITICS   OF  COURTS  IN  AUTHORITARIAN  REGIMES  (Tom  Ginsburg  &  Tamir  Moustafa  eds.,  2008).   3   Erik   Voeten,   The   Politics   of   International   Judicial   Appointments:   Evidence   from   the   European   Court   of   Human   Rights,   61   INTERNATIONAL   ORGANIZATION   669   (2007);   MICHAL   BOBEK,   SELECTING   EUROPE’S   JUDGES:   A   CRITICAL   REVIEW   OF   THE   APPOINTMENT  PROCEDURES  TO  THE  EUROPEAN  COURTS  (OUP  2015).   4   It   needs   to   be   admitted   that   in   my   research   I  am   limited   to   the   literature   written   in   English,   Slovak   or   Czech,   hence  there  is  a  possibility  that  a  considerable  amount  of  research  written  in  other  languages  is  omitted.   5  E.g.  Carlo  Guarnieri,  Appointment  and  career  of  judges  in  continental  Europe:  the  rise  of  judicial  self-­‐government,   24   LEGAL   STUDIES   169   (2004);   JOHN   BELL,   JUDICIARIES   WITHIN   EUROPE.   A   COMPARATIVE   REVIEW   (2006);   RECRUITMENT,   PROFESSIONAL  EVALUATION  AND  CAREER  OF  JUDGES  AND  PROSECUTORS  IN  EUROPE  (Giuseppe  Di  Federico  ed.,  2005);  or  some   chapters  in  APPOINTING  JUDGES  IN  AN  AGE  OF  JUDICIAL  POWER  (Kate  Malleson  &  Peter  H.  Russell  eds.,  2006).   6  E.g.  Michael  R.  Dimino,  The  Futile  Quest  for  a  System  of  Judicial  “Merit”  Selection,  67  ALBANY  L.R.  803  (2004).   7  E.g.  Bell,  supra  note  5,  regularly  addresses  the  representation  of  women;  Malleson,  supra  note  1;  Kate  Malleson,   The   Disruptive   Potential   of   Ceiling   Quotas   in   Addressing   the   Over-­‐Representation   in   the   Judiciary,   in   DEBATING   JUDICIAL   APPOINTMENTS  IN  THE   AGE  OF   DIVERSITY   259   (Graham   Gee   &   Erika   Rackley   eds.,   2018);   Erika   Rackley,   Women,   Judging  and  the  judiciary:  from  difference  to  diversity  (2013);  and  even  CEPEJ  reports  address  the  share  of  women   in   European   judiciaries,   see   for   instance:   Council   of   Europe,   European   Commission   for   the   Efficiency   of   Justice,   European  judicial  systems:  Efficiency  and  quality  of  justice  97-­‐101  (2016).   8   Charles   G.   Geyh,   The   Endless   Judicial   Selection   Debate   and   Why   It   Matters   for   Judicial   Independence,   21   THE   GEORGETOWN  JOURNAL  OF  LEGAL  ETHICS  1259  (2008).   2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             9 2079   10 sense,   the   state   of   the   rule   of   law,   and   can   be   even   connected   to   economic   11 performance.     Over   the   last   couple   of   decades,   the   world   has   observed   an   undeniable   increase   of   judicial   12 power  and  a  growing  involvement  of  judges  in  the  administration  of  judiciaries.  Judicial   recruitment  was  one  of  the  central  issues  in  the  debates  surrounding  it.  In  Europe,  these   changes  were  supported  and  encouraged  by  a  variety  of  international  documents,  mainly   13 backed   by   the   European   Commission   and   the   Council   of   Europe.   As   early   as   in   the   1980s,   the   ECtHR   case   law   developed   criteria   for   the   assessment   of   independence   of   a   tribunal;   14 the   manner   through   which   members   of   such   a   body   are   appointed   was   one   of   them.   Judgments   remained   rather   vague   as   to   what   a   proper   mechanism   is   for   appointment   that   would   meet   these   criteria,   therefore   a   variety   of   ‘soft   law’   documents   provided   more   15 guidance  in  the  following  years.  As  these  recommendations  were  usually  created  by  an   international  network  of  judges,  perhaps  ‘it  is  not  surprising  that  [they]  are  based  on  the   9  E.g.  Marc  Bühlmann  &  Ruth  Kunz,  Confidence  in  the  Judiciary:  Comparing  the  Independence  and  Legitimacy  of   Judicial   Systems,   34   WEST   EUROPEAN   POLITICS   317   (2011);   or   for   an   overview   see   Marína   Urbániková   &   Katarína   Šipulová,  The  Failed  Expectations:  Does  the  Establishment  of  Judicial  Councils  Enhance  Confidence  in  Courts?  (in   this  special  issue).   10  E.g.  Maria  Popova,  POLITICIZED  JUSTICE  IN  EMERGING  DEMOCRACIES:  A  STUDY  OF  COURTS  IN  RUSSIA  AND  UKRAINE  (2012).   11  E.g.  Mathieu  Chemin,  Do  judiciaries  matter  for  development?  Evidence  from  India,  37  JOURNAL   OF   COMPARATIVE   ECONOMICS   230   (2009);   Stefan   Voigt,   Jerg   Gutmann   &   Lars   Feld,   Economic   growth   and   judicial   independence,   a  dozen   years   on:   Cross-­‐country   evidence   using   an   updated   Set   of   indicators,   38   EUROPEAN   JOURNAL   OF   POLITICAL   ECONOMY   197   (2015);   or   J.   Anthony   Cookson,   Economic   Consequences   of   Judicial   Institutions:   Evidence   from   a   Natural  Experiment  (2014),  available  at:  https://extranet.sioe.org/uploads/isnie2014/cookson.pdf.   12  See  Nuno  Garoupa  &  Tom  Ginsburg,  Guarding  the  Guardians:  Judicial  Councils  and  Judicial  Independence  in  57   THE   AMERICAN   JOURNAL   OF   COMPARATIVE   LAW   103   (2009)   at   123;   Daniel   Smilov,   EU   Enlargement   and   the   Constitutional  Principle  of  Judicial  Independence  in  Wojciech  Sadurski,  Adam  Czarnota  &  Martin  Krygier,  SPREADING   DEMOCRACY   AND   THE   RULE   OF   LAW?   THE   IMPACT   OF   EU   ENLARGEMENT   FOR   THE   RULE   OF   LAW   313   (2006);   or   David   Kosař,   Beyond  Judicial  Councils:  Forms,  Rationales  and  Impact  of  Judicial  Self-­‐Governance  in  Europe  (in  this  special  issue).   13   See   Smilov,   supra   note   12;   Cristina   E.   Parau,   The   Drive   for   Judicial   Supremacy,   in   JUDICIAL   INDEPENDENCE   IN   TRANSITION   619   (Anja   Seibert-­‐Fohr   ed.,   2012);   or   David   Kosař,   PERILS   OF   JUDICIAL   SELF-­‐GOVERNMENT   IN   TRANSITIONAL   SOCIETIES  121-­‐135  (2016).   14   For   an   overview   see   Ann   Power,   Judicial   Independence   and   the   Democratic   Process:   Some   Case   Law   of   the   European   Court   of   Human   Rights   (International   Bar   Association   Conference   2012).   See   also:   ECtHR,   23   June   1981,   Le  Compte,  Van  Leuven  and  De  Meyere  v.  Belgium,  no.  6878/75;  7238/75;  ECtHR,  28  June  1984,  Campbell  and  Fell   v.  The  United  Kingdom,  no.  7819/77;  7878/77;  ECtHR,  22  June  1989,  Lanbgorger  v.  Sweden,  no.  11179/84,  §  32.   15   See   Committee   of   Ministers   of   Council   of   Europe,   Recommendation   No.   R   (94)   12   on   the   Independence,   Efficiency  and  the  Role  of  Judges,  particularly  Principle  I,  Art.  2,  par.  C;  Council  of  Europe,  European  Charter  on  the   Statute  for  Judges,  particularly  Art.  1.3.;  International  Association  of  Judges,  The  Universal  Charter  of  the  Judge,   particularly  Art.  9.  For  more  on  the  effect  of  ‘soft  law’  on  EctHR  case  law  affecting  judicial  reforms  in  Europe  see   David   Kosař,   Nudging   Domestic   Judicial   Reforms   from   Strasbourg:   How   the   European   Court   of   Human   Rights   shapes  domestic  judicial  design  in  13  UTRECHT  L.R.  112  (2017).   2 0 8 0   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07   16 belief   that   the   rule   of   law   is   best   served   by   judicial   autonomy.’   There   are   two   main   conclusions  that  can  be  drawn  from  these  documents  with  regard  to  judicial  recruitment.   First,  they  posit  that  the  process  of  recruiting  judges  should  be  conducted  by  a  body  with   substantial  judicial  representation  that  is  independent  of  political  branches.  Second,  they   hold  a  belief  that  this  should  serve  the  idea  of  recruitment  based  on  merit,  hence  on  the   basis  of  qualification,  integrity,  ability,  and  efficiency  of  candidates.       Initially,  these  recommendations  were  meant  to  apply  mainly  to  post-­‐communist  countries   in   need   of   reforming   their   judicial   systems.   The   1994   Recommendation   adopted   by   the   Committee   of   Ministers   of   the   Council   of   Europe   allowed   for   different   arrangements,   if   these  tasks  were  traditionally  conducted  by  the  government  leaving  old  democracies  in  the   clear.   A   later   recommendation   adopted   in   2010   has   not   been   as   understanding.   The   document   prescribes   that   if   decisions   about   judicial   careers   are   carried   out   by   political   authorities,   these   powers   should   be   transferred   to   ‘an   independent   and   competent   17 authority  drawn  in  substantial  part  from  the  judiciary’,  which  should  be  authorized  to  at   least  make  recommendations  or  express  opinions  that  relevant  authorities  should  follow.   This  shift  towards  a  greater  involvement  of  judges  in  the  administration  of  judicial  careers   has   several   common   themes.   First,   it   is   based   on   a   distrust   towards   political   elites,   18 conceiving  insulation  and  de-­‐politicization  of  the  judiciary  as  a  solution.  Second,  there  is  a   belief  that  decisions  about  careers  –  and  recruitment  of  judges  in  particular  –  establishes  a   connection  between  selectors  and  prospective  judges,  which  motivates  selectors  to  choose   19 candidates   who   would   not   act   contradictorily   to   their   preferences.   Third,   it   is   based   on   the   conviction   that   judges   are   on   the   one   hand   less   dangerous   than   those   in   other   branches,  and  on  the  other  hand,  that  judges  are  more  capable  of  securing  continuity  than   20 changing  governments  or  parliamentary  majorities.     In   this   paper   I   address   two   interconnected   questions.   First,   how   are   judges   in   European   countries   recruited,   and   second,   what   is   the   role   of   judicial   self-­‐government   in   these   processes   given   the   rise   of   power   of   judges   observable   in   recent   decades?   There   is   no   16  Michal  Bobek  &  David  Kosař,  Global  Solutions,  Local  Damages:  A  Critical  Study  in  Judicial  Councils  in  Central  and   Eastern  Europe  in  15  GERMAN  L.J.  1257  (2014),  at  1262;  Parau,  supra  note  13,  at  646-­‐647.   17   Committee   of   Ministers   of   Council   of   Europe,   Recommendation   CM/Rec(2010)12   on   Judges:   independence,   efficiency  and  responsibilities,  Art.  47.   18   E.g.   Parau,   supra   note   13,   at   621;   or   Franck   Emmert,   The   Independence   of   Judges   –   A  Concept   Often   Misuderstood  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  3  EUROPEAN  JOURNAL  OF  LAW  REFORM  405  (2001).   19  Not  necessarily  would  a  selector  be  ever  willing  to  utilize  such  capacity.  For  more  on  ‘willingness’  and  ‘capacity’   to  pressure  courts  see  Popova,  supra  note  10.   20  For  the  discussion  on  factors  that  play  in  favor  of  judges  in  this  context  see  Alan  Paterson,  Power  and  Judicial   Appointment:  Squaring  the  Impossible  Circle  in  Gee  &  Rackley,  supra  note  1,  particularly  at  49  et  seq.  In  terms  of   controlling  access  to  a  particular  profession,  judges  are  not  that  unique.  See  Keith  M.  MacDonald,  The  sociology  of   professions  (1995).   2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             2081   doubt   there   are   differences   between   these   processes   in   different   countries   –   from   the   formal   criteria   one   must   meet   to   become   a   judge,   to   actors   deciding   about   who   gets   to   enter   the   judicial   ranks.   However,   I   choose   to   emphasize   similarities   between   these   processes.   Judicial   recruitment   operates   like   a   funnel   where   candidates   are   gradually   eliminated  until  only  one  –  or  a  few  –  remain.  To  become  a  judge,  candidates  need  to  meet   certain  eligibility  criteria,  they  need  to  ‘get  on  the  selectors’  radar’;  to  be  considered  for  a   position,   they   need   to   meet   the   selectors’   expectations   to   be   shortlisted   and   eventually   selected   for   the   job;   and   finally,   they   need   to   assume   the   office   through   some   formal   21 appointment  procedure.  By  highlighting  similarities  in  the  process  of  recruiting  judges,  I   aim  to  propose  a  framework  that  is  applicable  beyond  the  countries  analyzed  in  this  paper.       In  addition,  I  argue  that  the  recruitment  process  is  –  despite  any  merit-­‐oriented  efforts  –   far   from   a   perfect   competition.   Everyone   involved   has   specific   interests   and   preferences   regarding   who   should   become   a   judge,   and   this   skews   the   process.   Indeed,   these   interests   should  not  be  necessarily  perceived  with  a  negative  connotation,  they  may  be  absolutely   legitimate,   even   virtuous.   Nevertheless,   they   shape   the   process   in   such   a   way   that   increases   chances   of   some   candidates   at   the   expense   of   others   –   be   it   on   the   basis   of   gender,   race,   or   any   other   characteristic.   Contrary   to   belief   entrenched   in   the   numerous   international  documents  discussed  earlier,  I  contend  that  judges  are  as  fallible  as  any  other   actor   when   it   comes   to   recruiting   new   judges.   As   some   research   shows,   their   interests   can   22 be  aligned  with  the  ruling  elite;  they  can  have  their  own  distinct  interests  stemming  from   23 the   bureaucratic   nature   of   the   job,   or   from   the   genuine   belief   only   they   can   properly   24 exercise  this  task.       In   summary,   in   order   to   analyze   judicial   recruitment   and   its   consequences   we   not   only   need   to   identify   the   actors   involved   in   the   process,   but   also   study   their   preferences   and   pay   attention   to   the   stages   of   the   process   in   which   they   shape   the   recruitment.   As   the   recruitment   process   operates   like   a   funnel   where   candidates   are   gradually   eliminated,   some  attention  needs  to  be  paid  particularly  to  the  question  of  what  type  of  candidates  do   not   have   real   chances   of   making   it   through   the   whole   process.   For   instance,   if   judicial   actors   involved   in   the   selection   know   that   a   certain   type   of   candidate   will   eventually   be   vetoed   by   political   actors,   they   may   eliminate   a   candidate   themselves.   By   contrast,   if   judges   manage   to   ensure   that   only   a   specific   type   of   candidate   makes   it   through   the   21   For   a   somewhat   similar   analogy   see   Mary   L.   Volcansek,   Appointing   Judges   the   European   Way,   34   FORDHAM   URB.   L.J.  (2007).   22   E.g.   Marc   J.   Ramseyer   &   Eric   B.   Rasmusen,   Why   Are   Japanese   Judges   so   Conservative   in   Politically   Charged   Cases?,  95  THE  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  REVIEW  331  (2001).   23   On   the   bureaucratic   nature   of   judicial   careers   in   some   judicial   systems   see   for   instance:   CARLO   GUARNIERI   &   PATRICIA  PEDERZOLI,  THE  POWER  OF  JUDGES  (2002).   24  E.g.  Paterson,  supra  note  20.   2 0 8 2   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07   process,   they   may   effectively   constrain   political   actors’   formal   powers.   Either   way,   it   is   not   only  important  who  is  involved  in  the  process,  but  also  at  what  stage.     The   paper   proceeds   as   follows.   In   Part   B,   I   discuss   judicial   recruitment   in   the   broader   context  of  the  literature  on  judicial  careers  literature,  with  a  focus  on  different  models  of   judicial  selection  practices.  Part  C  analyzes  models  of  judicial  recruitment  found  in  Europe   with  special  attention  paid  to  the  openness  and  competitiveness  of  judicial  recruitment,  as   well  as  the  actors  playing  a  central  role  in  these  processes.  Four  models  are  identified  and   analyzed  in  this  part,  with  a  specific  focus  on  the  structure  of  the  process  and  the  gradual   decrease   of   the   number   of   potential   candidates   competing   for   the   position.   In   Part   D,   I   highlight   the   need   to   address   not   only   how   these   processes   work   formally,   but   also   how   the   motivations   and   incentives   of   the   involved   actors   translate   into   the   composition   of   judiciaries  and  their  diversity.  Part  E  concludes.     B.  Judicial  Recruitment  in  a  Broader  Perspective     The   way   in   which   judges   are   recruited   is   often   perceived   as   an   inherent   feature   of   a   particular   model   of   judicial   careers.   In   the   bureaucratic   model   of   the   judiciary,   judges   traditionally  enter  the  judicial  system  at  the  lowest  level  at  a  very  young  age  and  remain   there   for   most   of   the   remainder   of   their   careers.   In   the   professional   model,   judges   are   recruited  after  a  relatively  successful  career  in  other  legal  profession,  hence  at  a  relatively   higher  age.  Scholarly  literature  generally  seems  to  highlight  differences  between  models  of   judicial   careers   and   models   of   judicial   selection.   In   this   paper   I   contend   that   in   Europe   these  differences  seem  to  be  gradually  vanishing,  and  that  despite  some  differences  there   are  notable  similarities  between  seemingly  distinct  processes.  In  this  Part  I  first  present  a   brief  overview  of  the  literature  focusing  on  the  ideal-­‐types  of  judicial  careers,  followed  by   an  overview  of  different  models  of  judicial  recruitment.     I.  Models  of  Judicial  careers   There   are   two   ideal-­‐types   of   judicial   careers   described   by   the   scholarly   literature.   A   25 26 bureaucratic  model  of  judicial  career,  also  referred  to  as  a  ‘career  model’,  resembles  a   27 career  path  typically  found  in  civil-­‐service,  and  is  typically  found  in  countries  with  civil  law   28 tradition.   According   to   Guarnieri   and   Pederzoli,   judges   in   this   model   are   usually   recruited   25   See   Guarnieri   &   Pederzoli,   supra   note   23;   or   Graham   Gee,   The   Persistent   Politics   of   Judicial   Selection:   A   Comparative  Analysis,  in  JUDICIAL  INDEPENDENCE  IN  TRANSITION  121  (Anja  Seibert-­‐Fohr  ed.,  2012).   26  Nuno  Garoupa  &  Tom  Ginsburg,  Hybrid  Judicial  Career  Structures:  Reputation  versus  Legal  Tradition,  3  JOURNAL   OF  LEGAL  ANALYSIS  411  (2011).   27  See  for  instance:  Volcansek,  supra  note  21;  or  Guarnieri,  supra  note  5.   28  See  Guarnieri  &  Pederzoli,  supra  note  23,  at  66-­‐67;  or  Gee,  supra  note  25.   2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             2083   directly   from   universities,   without   much   emphasis   on   their   previous   experiences.   Consequently,  to  ensure  they  have  all  the  necessary  skills,  they  are  trained  and  socialized   29 in  the  system  –  often  in  ‘pre-­‐judicial’  positions  as  law  clerks,  so-­‐called  ‘junior  judges’,  or   30 Rechtspflegers.  Judges  in  bureaucratic  judiciaries  enter  at  the  lowest  rank  and  can  work   their   way   up   the   hierarchy,   while   their   career   prospects   are   dependent   on   superior   or   senior  judges.  Also,  judges  are  usually  generalists  without  expertise  in  any  particular  area   of  law,  enabling  them  to  perform  satisfactorily  anywhere  the  system  needs  them  to.  As  a   result,  judges  in  bureaucratic  judiciaries  are  to  a  large  extent  shaped  by  their  superiors  or   more   senior   judges,   which   can   lead   to   a   self-­‐perpetuation   of   attitudes,   beliefs   and   31 practices   within   the   judiciary,   while   ‘it   also   helps   to   forge   a   common   sense   of   identity   32 within   the   judiciary.’   Additionally,   the   fact   that   judges’   career   prospects   are   dependent   on   their   superiors   can   threaten   their   internal   independence   as   they   can   be   motivated   to   act  loyally  in  order  to  be  rewarded.     In   common   law   judiciaries,   becoming   a   judge   is   not   simply   a   career   choice   but   rather   a   33 ‘kind  of  crowning  achievement’  achieved  relatively  later  in  professional  life  as  a  reward   for  a  successful  career  in  another  legal  profession.  That  is  why  these  judiciaries  are  labelled   34 35 as   recognition   judiciaries,   or   judiciaries   with   a   professional   model   of   judicial   careers.   Judges   in   this   system   are   thereofre   usually   trained   and   socialized   outside   of   the   judicial   system,  and  they  are  more  often  experts  in  a  particular  legal  field  rather  than  generalists.   Unlike   in   a   bureaucratic   model,   in   recognition   judiciaries   judges   do   cannot   reasonably   expect  to  be  promoted  by  their  superiors,  but  their  career  prospects  are  rather  dependent   on   political   support.   This   makes   them   in   theory   more   vulnerable   to   external   pressures;   36 which  are  counterbalanced  through  other  mechanisms,  such  as  life  tenure.   29  By  junior  judges  I  mean,  for  the  purposes  of  this  analysis,  positions  found  for  instance  in  Czechia  or  Slovakia,   which  refer  to  a  specific  type  of  apprenticeship  during  which  junior  judges  spend  some  time  in  a  different  division   of  the  judicial  system  in  order  to  become  familiar  with  its  inner  workings.  See  for  instance,  Kosař,  supra  note  13,   at  189,  who  refers  to  them  as  ‘judicial  candidates’,  however  it  may  be  confusing  to  use  this  term  in  this  context.   30  Court  officials  with  certain  judicial  powers  in  German  speaking  countries  or  countries  influenced  by  the  German   legal  culture.  For  instance,  CEPEJ  reports,  supra  note  7,  use  this  term  as  well.   31  See  for  instance:  Michal  Bobek,  The  Fortress  of  Judicial  Independence  and  the  Mental  Transition  of  the  Central   European  Judiciaries,  14  EUROPEAN  PUBLIC  LAW  99  (2008).   32  Gee,  supra  note  25,  at  124.   33   JOHN   H.   MERRYMAN,   THE   CIVIL   LAW   TRADITION:   AN   INTRODUCTION   TO   THE   LEGAL   SYSTEM   OF   WESTERN   EUROPE   AND   LATIN   AMERICA  34  (Stanford  University  Press,  1990).   34  E.g.:  Garoupa  &  Ginsburg,  supra  note  26.   35  Guarnieri  &  Pederzoli,  supra  note  23;  and  Gee,  supra  note  25.   36   John   Ferejohn,   Independent   Judges,   Dependent   Judiciary:   Explaining   Judicial   Independence,   72   SOUTHERN   CALIFORNIA  L.R.  353  (1998).   2 0 8 4   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07     Theory  suggests  that  bureaucratic  judges  should  be  recruited  through  competitive  process,   whereas   vacancies   in   recognition   judiciaries   are   filled   through   executive   appointments,   where   candidate’s   past   achievements   help   a   selector   to   justify   their   recruitment   to   the   public.  Yet,  this  distinction  has  only  limited  applicability  in  the  real  world,  as  both  models   37 often   coexist   along   each   other.   According   to   Garoupa   and   Ginsburg,   the   choice   of   a   model  of  judicial  careers  is  determined  rather  by  importance  of  reputation  for  a  particular   38 position,  and  not  by  a  legal  tradition  dominant  in  any  given  jurisdiction.  Consequently,  we   can   observe   trends   that   are   contradictory   to   expectations   raised   by   the   two   ideal-­‐types.   The   lateral   entry   becomes   more   common   for   traditionally   bureaucratic   judiciaries   as   an   attempt   to   prevent   corporatist   tendencies,   such   as   reserved   positions   for   judges   socialized   39 outside   of   the   judiciary   as   it   is   in   France   or   Spain.   An   opposite   trend   can   be   found   in   common   law   countries   where   judicial   recruitment   has   traditionally   been   executive   prerogative,   but   judges   have   become   increasingly   involved   in   the   process   of   judicial   40 recruitment;   and   even   promotions   are   not   that   uncommon,   as   e.g.   majority   of   current   41 Justices  at  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  previously  served  on  lower  courts.     II.  Differentiating  between  models  of  judicial  recruitment     The  fact  that  several  models  of  judicial  recruitment  can  occur  in  a  single  judiciary  makes  it   particularly   difficult   to   propose   a   sufficiently   complex   typology   of   different   recruitment   procedures.  Even  if  we  limit  the  scope  of  such  an  inquiry  only  to  EU  countries  we  can  see  a   great   variance.   Indeed,   several   such   attempts   can   be   found.   Volcansek   focuses   on   the   process   through   which   judges   are   recruited,   and   differentiates   between   the   civil   service   model  of  judicial  recruitment,  shared  appointment  and  shared  appointment  with  partisan   42 quotas.  In  their  bi-­‐annual  analysis  of  European  judicial  systems,  the  CEPEJ  focuses  on  four   37  A  similar  point  can  be  found  in  Bell,  supra  note  5,  at  17.   38   Garoupa   &   Ginsburg,   supra   note   26;   or   NUNO   GAROUPA   &   TOM   GINSBURG,   JUDICIAL   REPUTATION:   A   COMPARATIVE   THEORY  (2015).   39  Guarnieri,  supra  note  5,  at  171.  See  also  discussion  throughout  Part  C.   40   See   Van   Zyl   Smit,   supra   note   1;   or   Jan   van   Zyl   Smit,   ‘Opening   up’   Commonwealth   Judicial   Appointments   to   Diversity?   The   Growing   Role   of   Judicial   Commissions,   in   DEBATING   JUDICIAL   APPOINTMENTS   IN   AN   AGE   OF   DIVERSITY   70   (Graham   Gee  &  Erika  Rackley  eds.,  2017).  Also,  the  statement  that  81%  of  Commonwealth  countries  have  some   kind   of   Commission   playing   a  role   in   the   selection   of   judges   can   be   found   in:   Graham   Gee   &   Erika   Rackley,   Introduction:   Diversity   and   the   JAC’s   First   Decade,   in   DEBATING   JUDICIAL   APPOINTMENTS   IN   AN   AGE   OF   DIVERSITY   1   (Graham  Gee  &  Erika  Rackley  eds.,  2017).   41  See  for  instance:  Denise  Lu,  Alicia  Parlapiano  &  Karen  Yourish,  Kavanaugh  Followed  the  Narrow,  Elite  Path  of   Supreme  Court  Justices  in  NEW  YORK  TIMES,  10  July  2018,  available  at:  https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/   07/10/us/politics/supreme-­‐court-­‐path-­‐kavanaugh.html.   42  See  Volcansek,  supra  note  21.  It  needs  to  be  noted  that  in  her  analysis  Volcansek  does  not  separate  ordinary   judiciaries  from  apex  and/or  constitutional  courts.   2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             2085   factors:  decisive  authorities  in  the  process,  the  presence  or  absence  of  compulsory  initial   training   for   judges,   the   competitiveness   of   the   process,   and   whether   there   is   an   43 established  procedure  for  other  legal  professionals.  Oberto  highlights  actors  deciding  in   the   process,   differentiating   between   executive   nominations,   recruitment   through   public   elections,   co-­‐option   by   the   judiciary,   and   through   the   committee-­‐centered   competitive   44 process   with   the   involvement   of   judges   or   academics.   Finally,   Garoupa   and   Ginsburg   45 focus   on   the   role   of   judicial   councils   in   the   process   of   recruiting   judges.   In   addition,   specifically   for   common   law   countries,   MacNeill   identifies   three   distinct   models   which   all   share   nominations   by   the   executive,   but   differ   as   regards   the   body   empowered   to   select   judges   who   are   eventually   appointed.   According   to   this   typology,   this   power   can   be   exercised   by   the   executive   itself,   it   may   require   the   approval   of   the   legislature,   or   it   can   be   46 decided  by  an  independent  judicial  screening  commission.     As  can  be  seen,  there  are  different  factors  that  can  be  highlighted  when  one  looks  at  the   process  of  judicial  recruitment.  When  focusing  on  actors,  Oberto’s  typology  perhaps  covers   all  known  possibilities  from  a  decisive  say  of  the  political  branches,  through  involvement  of   the  judiciary  –  by  itself  or  through  a  specialized  committee,  to  the  selection  of  judges  by   the  public.  There  are  still  several  nuances  that  can  be  added.  Oberto  highlights  the  role  of   the   executive   among   political   branches,   but   there   were   examples   when   the   power   of   selecting   new   judges   has   belonged   to   the   parliament.   In   Slovenia,   the   National   Assembly   makes  the  final  call  upon  the  nomination  of  the  Judicial  Council.  In  Slovakia,  until  2002,  it   was   also   the   parliament   that   played   a   crucial   role   in   the   appointment   of   new   judges.   Importantly,  in  Czechia,  although  ministers  hold  formal  powers  over  judicial  appointments,   47 it  is  court  presidents  who  are  perhaps  the  most  crucial  gatekeepers.  Consequently,  it  is   formally   a   system   with   executive   appointments,   but   in   fact,   it   more   resembles   a   system   where   new   judges   are   co-­‐opted   by   the   judiciary.   Furthermore,   even   when   the   process   is   48 governed  by  judges,  the  co-­‐optation  can  happen  in  a  variety  of  ways.  In  France,  Spain  or   Portugal  it  is  judicial  schools  which  effectively  control  who  gets  the  opportunity  to  have  the   training  necessary  to  hold  judicial  office.  In  the  Netherlands,  Slovakia  or  Poland,  the  role  of   gatekeeper   is   practically   vested   in   judicial   councils.   Elsewhere,   e.g.   in   Ireland,   although   43  See  for  instance:  CEPEJ,  supra  note  7,  at  81-­‐112.   44  See  GIACOMO  OBERTO,  RECRUTEMENT  ET  FORMATION  DES  MAGISTRATS  EN  EUROPE.  ETUDE  COMPARATIVE  13  (2003)  as  cited  in   Bell,  supra  note  5.   45  Garoupa  &  Ginsburg,  supra  note  12,  at  119-­‐120.   46   See   for   instance   the   case   of   Ireland   in   JENNIFER   CARROLL   MACNEILL,   THE   POLITICS   OF   JUDICIAL   SELECTION   IN   IRELAND   (2016);   or   Patrick   O’Brien,   Never   Let   a   Crisis   Go   to   Waste:   Politics,   Personality   and   Judicial   Self-­‐Government   in   Ireland  (in  this  special  issue).   47  E.g.  Adam  Blisa,  Tereza  Papoušková  &  Marína  Urbániková,  Judicial  Self-­‐Government  in  Czechia:  Europe’s  Black   Sheep?  (in  this  special  issue).   48  See  the  discussion  in  Part  C.   2 0 8 6   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07   judges   formally   have   a   substantial   say   in   the   process,   the   final   decision   is   left   to   the   49 executive.       There   are   several   reasons   why   we   should   pay   attention   to   the   processes   through   which   judges   are   recruited.   First,   following   the   logic   found   in   international   recommendations,   selection  of  a  particular  candidate  can  create  certain  ties  between  involved  parties,  hence   threaten   the   judicial   independence.   Knowing   whether   it   is   the   executive,   a   judicial   body,   their   combination,   or   any   other   body   can   help   us   identify   any   potential   threats.   Second,   compulsory  training  and  socialization  in  the  judiciary  can  ensure  imprinting  values,  beliefs,   attitudes,   and   practices   on   new   judges.   On   the   one   hand,   this   can   secure   the   effective   transfer  of  knowledge  from  senior  to  junior  members  of  the  judiciary;  on  the  other,  it  can   prevent  judiciaries  from  any  new  ideas  and  can  protect  the  survival  of  habits  not  conducive   to   efficient   and   accountable   justice   systems.   All   in   all,   the   ways   in   which   the   judges   are   recruited  can  have  numerous  implications  on  the  actual  performance  of  judicial  systems.     C.  Structure  of  the  process  of  judicial  recruitment     How   strong   particular   actors   are   in   the   recruitment   process   is   not   simply   determined   by   their   involvement   in   the   process,   but   also   by   the   stage   of   the   process   in   which   they   are   involved.   Despite   many   differences   between   models   of   judicial   recruitment,   they   also   share   certain   features.   First   and   foremost,   in   the   end,   the   process   needs   to   separate   winners  and  losers  –  those  who  are  selected  and  appointed  to  the  judicial  office,  and  those   who   are   not,   despite   their   interest.   Every   recruitment   process   involves   a   number   of   potential  candidates  that  gradually  decreases  –  through  their  interaction  with  the  selector   –   until   only   one   (or   possibly   few)   remain   and   are   eventually   appointed.   In   essence,   the   process   operates   as   a   funnel,   as   once   it   starts   the   number   of   candidates   only   reduces,   and   50 no  one  can  enter  the  process  from  the  outside.   This   analogy   aims   to   help   us   identify   and   better   understand   critical   junctions   in   the   recruitment   process   where   selector’s   preferences   determine   who   remains   in   the   competition   for   the   judicial   position,   and   similarly  importantly,  who  is  eliminated.     I   propose   dividing   the   process   of   recruitment   into   five   different   stages.   First,   in   order   to   become   a   judge,   one   must   meet   the   prescribed   criteria   to   hold   such   an   office,   hence   be   eligible  for  a  given  position.  Second,  candidates  need  to  be  considered  for  the  position  by  a   selector,  they  need  to  ‘get  on  the  radar,’  to  be  given  a  chance  to  compete  for  the  position.   Third,   candidates   need   to   meet   certain   criteria   –   both   formal   and   informal   –   to   be   49 50  See  particularly  Part  C.III.     A   similar   analogy   was   previously   used   by   Volcansek,   supra   note   21,   at   364.   Volcansek   identified   three   stages   of   the   process:   a)   certification,   which   ‘derives   a   person’s   status   in   the   structure   of   political   opportunity,   his   opportunity   costs,   and   political   socialization;’   b)   selection,   in   which   candidates   and   the   selecting   body   interact;   and  c)  role  assignment,  which  gives  legitimacy  when  a  candidate  formally  assumes  the  office.   2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             2087   shortlisted  for  the  position  by  the  selector.  Only  afterward  does  a  selector  make  the  final   call  and  selects  the  best  fit  candidate  for  the  judicial  office.  Finally,  this  person  eventually   assumes   the   office   through   a   formal   process   of   appointment.   Indeed,   not   always   are   these   stages   easily   distinguishable,   and   at   times   they   even   blend,   but   generally   in   order   to   become  a  judge,  one  must  ‘survive’  all  these  critical  junctions.       In   the   following   sections,   I   identify   and   discuss   these   stages   in   four   models   of   judicial   recruitment  found  in  Europe.  These  models  were  identified  on  the  basis  of  two  factors.  The   first  is  the  formal  openness  of  competition,  i.e.  dependency  of  the  participation  of  any  one   candidate   on   the   will   of   the   selector.   Czechia   and   Slovenia   serve   as   examples   for   the   ‘closed’   model   of   recruitment,   as   in   these   countries   judges   are   picked   seemingly   ‘out   of   thin  air’  by  court  presidents,  and  only  afterwards  they  need  to  complete  a  formal  process   culminating  in  a  successful  appointment.  Among  open  and  competitive  models  I  identified   three  distinct  paths  to  the  judiciary  that  can  be  found  in  more  than  one  country.  France,   Spain   and   Romania   serve   here   as   examples   for   the   model   with   a   crucial   role   played   by   judicial   schools.   In   the   second   model,   central   role   is   played   by   judicial   councils   –   along   other  judicial  self-­‐government  bodies.  Such  a  model  can  be  found  in  Slovakia,  Poland  and   the   Netherlands.   The   third   model   includes   a   specialized   body   empowered   to   select   most   suitable  candidates,  e.g.  those  found  in  Ireland  or  the  United  Kingdom.  Indeed,  these  four   models   certainly   do   not   exhaust   the   variations   found   in   Europe,   yet   they   show   that   51 commonly  found  models  of  judicial  recruitment  share  certain  similar  features.  It  needs  to   be  noted,  I  focus  only  on  primary  paths  to  the  judiciary,  hence  the  most  common  ways  of   becoming   a   judge.   As   was   discussed   above,   it   is   not   uncommon   to   find   several   different   recruitment   models   within   one   judicial   system.   Possibilities   for   lateral   entry   will   be   therefore  discussed  rather  as  a  complement  to  the  typical  ways  in  which  judges  in  different   52 jurisdictions  are  recruited.             51  For  instance,  Germany  offers  a  completely  different  model  where  the  crucial  moment  separating  those  who  can   eventually   become   judges   and   those   who   cannot   takes   place   at   state   exams   at   the   end   of   law   graduates‘   university   studies.   See   Fabian   Wittreck,   Judicial   Self-­‐Government   in   Germany:   Resistance   and   the   Roots   of   Counter-­‐Resistance   (in   this   special   issue);   Johannes   Riedel,   Recruitment,   Professional   Evaluation   and   Career   of   Judges  and  Prosecutors  in  Germany,  in  RECRUITMENT,  PROFESSIONAL  EVALUATION  AND  CAREER  OF  JUDGES  AND  PROSECUTORS   IN  EUROPE  69  (Giuseppe  Di  Federico  ed.,  2005);  or  Bell,  supra  note  5,  at  108-­‐173.   52  For  instance,  in  France  there  are  numerous  ways  in  which  one  may  enter  the  judiciary.  See  Roger  Errera,  The   Recruitment,   Training,   Career   and   Accountability   of   Members   of   the   Judiciary   in   France   in   Di   Federico,   supra   note   4  at  49-­‐50;  Bell,  supra  note  5,  at  52-­‐53.       2 0 8 8   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07   I.  Entering  the  judiciary  through  judicial  schools       A  prototype  of  a  system  of  recruitment  of  judges  through  judicial  schools  can  be  found  in   France,  where  the  École  nationale  de  la  magistrature  (ENM)  was  founded  more  than  half  a   53 century   ago.   It   is   based   on   the   idea   that   the   judicial   profession   is   unique   and   requires   specific   training.   At   the   same   time,   by   preparing   judges   for   their   role   in   a   particular   environment  it  ensures  the  transfer  of  beliefs,  attitudes  and  practices  that  help  to  build  a   54 certain  common  identity.  The  typical  judicial  career  in  this  model  starts  practically  right   after  the  graduation  when  candidates  pass  a  difficult  competitive  examination  in  order  to   complete   a   thorough   education   at   the   judicial   school.   Only   afterward   they   can   be   appointed  to  a  judicial  position.     Eligibility   criteria   in   this   model   are   usually   rather   minimal.   Candidates   must   hold   a   55 university  degree,  be  of  a  certain  age  and  be  able  to  meet  other  formal  criteria,  such  as   holding  a  particular  nationality,  having  a  good  moral  character,  and  being  physically  able  to   work  as  a  judge.  Anyone  meeting  these  prescribed  criteria  who  aspires  to  work  as  a  judge   can  apply  and  be  considered  for  the  position.  To  be  accepted  in  the  program,  candidates   53  Antoine  Vauchez,  The  Ever  Protracted  Rise  of  Judicial  Self-­‐Government  in  France  (in  this  special  issue).   54  Errera,  supra  note  52,  at  51-­‐52.   55   To   apply   to   the  French   judicial   school,   ENM,   candidates   need   to   have   any  4-­‐year   university   degree   in   any   subject,  not  necessarily  a  law  degree.  See  Errera,  supra  note  52,  at  45.   2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             2089   need   to   pass   a   difficult   nation-­‐wide   examination   aimed   at   thoroughly   testing   their   56 knowledge  and  capabilities.  The  examination  consists  of  written  and  oral  parts.  In  Spain   57 58 and   Romania,   candidates   need   to   pass   a   test;   in   France,   the   written   part   includes   drafting   papers   on   a   variety   of   legal   topics   covering   different   branches   of   law.   Oral   examinations   are   also   used   differently   among   the   analyzed   countries.   In   Spain,   the   emphasis  is  placed  on  hard  knowledge,  and  candidates  are  expected  to  “sing”  or  “recite”   59 their   answers.   Consequently,   such   an   examination   raises   a   concern   that   the   procedure   does   not   favor   those   who   are   intellectually   or   analytically   best   fit   for   the   position,   but   60 rather   candidates   who   excel   at   memorizing.   In   France   and   in   Romania   the   oral   exam   is   designed   to   address   candidates’   motivations,   as   well   as   their   moral   fitness   to   serve   as   judges.       Differences  can  be  also  found  between  bodies  deciding  in  the  process  of  admission  to  the   school.   Whereas   in   France   it   is   decided   by   the   Board   of   the   ENM,   dominated   by   the   61 62 63 judges,  in  Romania  and  Spain  this  task  is  conducted  by  a  special  admissions  board  or   by  tribunals,  respectively,  both  controlled  by  their  respective  judicial  councils  consisting  of   judicial   members   with   representation   from   academia,   law   practitioners,   court   staff   or   representatives  of  the  trainees  at  the  school.  Passing  the  examination  is  a  difficult  task.  In   64 France,   it   was   reported   that   only   about   10%   of   candidates   manage   to   be   successful.   In   Spain  only  about  5%  of  applicants  are  eventually  selected  as  the  preparation  takes   up   to   65 four   years   and   is   extremely   demanding.   Training   at   the   judicial   schools   also   differs   between  the  countries.  In  Spain,  candidates  must  undergo  a  6-­‐month  training  concerned   56   Maria   Poblet   &   Pompeu   Casanovas,   Recruitment,   Professional   Evaluation   and   Career   of   Judges   and   Prosecutors   in   Spain   in   Johannes   Riedel,   Recruitment,   Professional   Evaluation   and   Career   of   Judges   and   Prosecutors   in   Germany,  in  RECRUITMENT,   PROFESSIONAL   EVALUATION  AND   CAREER  OF   JUDGES  AND   PROSECUTORS  IN   EUROPE   193  (Giuseppe   Di  Federico  ed.,  2005).   57   Ramona   Coman   &   Cristina   Dallara,   Judicial   Independence   in   Romania,   in   JUDICIAL   INDEPENDENCE   IN   TRANSITION   835,   848  (Anja  Seibert-­‐Fohr  ed.,  2012).   58  Errera,  supra  note  52,  at  48.   59  Poblet  &  Casanovas,  supra  note  56,  at  193.   60   Aida   Torres   Pérez,   Judicial   self-­‐government   and   judicial   independence:   the   political   capture   of   the   General   Council  of  the  Judiciary  in  Spain  (in  this  special  issue).   61  Errera,  supra  note  52,  at  52.   62  See  Bianca  Selejan-­‐Gutan,  Romania:  Perils  of  a  ‘Perfect  Euro-­‐Model’  of  Judicial  Council  (in  this  special  issue).   63  Poblet  &  Casanovas,  supra  note  56,  at  194.   64  Errera,  supra  note  52,  at  45.   65  Poblet  &  Casanovas,  supra  note  56,  at  194.   2 0 9 0   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07   66 with  theoretical  and  practical  skills,  followed  by  a  training  period  working  at  a  court.  In   France,   candidates   for   judicial   offices   go   through   complex   training   consisting   not   only   of   courses   and   seminars   at   the   school   and   1-­‐year   internships   at   the   courts   but   also   of   internships  with  non-­‐judicial  institutions  and  barristers.  In  Romania,  candidates  must  first   complete  a  2-­‐year  complex  training  at  the  school  before  being  appointed  by  the  Romanian   judicial   council   for   a   6-­‐year   training   period   to   work   as   ‘junior   judges’   or   ‘junior   prosecutors’.     Even   the   successful   completion   of   all   mandatory   training   does   not   secure   a   judicial   position.  French  as  well  as  Romanian  judges  first  need  to  pass  another  examination  that,   together   with   their   evaluations   from   their   internships   or   probationary   periods,   respectively,  determine  their  final  ranking.  In  France,  this  examination  is  controlled  by  an   67 68 independent   panel   appointed   by   the   Ministry   of   Justice,   and   only   few   fail   to   pass   it.   Afterward,  successful  candidates  are  nominated  by  the  French  judicial  council,  first  for  a  4-­‐ month  probationary  period  at  a  different  court  in  order  to  be  eventually  appointed  by  the   president  of  the  country  to  the  judicial  office.  In  Romania,  the  judicial  council  also  plays  a   role,   as   it   nominates,   in   a   non-­‐discretionary   process,   candidates   for   appointment   by   the   69 president.   In   Spain,   the   appointment   powers   are   vested   to   the   Plenary   of   the   Council,   which   is   argued   to   pose   a   risk   of   arbitrary   decision-­‐making   based   on   ideological   70 considerations  rather  than  candidates’  abilities.     There   seems   to   be   several   regularities   in   the   model   of   judicial   recruitment   through   judicial   schools.   First,   the   most   important   step   for   a   candidate   is   to   successfully   pass   the   entry   examination   to   the   judicial   school,   hence   move   from   being   actively   considered   to   a   shortlist  of  candidates  actually  lucky  enough  to  obtain  the  necessary  training.  Second,  even   though  the  model  has  a  strong  preference  for  selection  based  on  candidates’  capacity  and   merit,   the   requirements   of   the   process   which   is   difficult,   time-­‐consuming   and   with   uncertain  results  may  favor  candidates  with  certain  socio-­‐economic  characteristics  and  not   necessarily  those  best  equipped  to  work  as  judges.  Interestingly,  in  all  three  jurisdictions,   71 the  majority  of  judges  are  women,  who  may  be  more  willing  to  endure  this  uncertainty   because   of   their   stronger   preference   for   work-­‐life   balance   eventually   offered   by   the   66  Torres-­‐Pérez,  supra  note  60.   67  Errera,  supra  note  52,  at  53.   68  Errera,  supra  note  52,  at  54,  Table  2-­‐4.   69  Coman  &  Dallara,  supra  note  57,  at  850.   70  Torres-­‐Pérez,  supra  note  60.   71  As  of  2014,  the  share  of  women  in  the  judiciary  in  Romania  was  at  74%,  in  France  62%  and  in  Spain  52%.  See   CEPEJ,  supra  note  7.   2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             2091   72 judicial   position.   In   addition,   in   France   the   process   led   to   an   over-­‐representation   of   73 74 middle-­‐class   candidates,   at   times   with   family   ties   in   the   judiciary.   Third,   although   judicial   councils   do   not   play   central   roles   in   these   processes,   they   exercise   at   least   some   control   over   who   enters   the   judiciary.   And   finally,   as   the   extensive   education   and   socialization   among   judges   provide   a   fertile   ground   for   the   rise   of   corporatist   attitudes,   they   are   sometimes   counter-­‐balanced   by   promoting   paths   for   lateral   entry   to   other   legal   75 professionals.   In   Spain,   about   25%   of   magistrate   seats   are   reserved   for   lawyers   with   at   76 least  10  years  of  experience;  in  France  the  education  at  the  ENM  is  open  to  civil  servants,   those  who  served  as  elected  members  of  local  councils,  as  well  as  those  with  a  doctorate  in   77 law  or  research  and  teaching  experience  at  the  university.     II.  Recruitment  controlled  by  judicial  self-­‐government  bodies     The   model   of   judicial   recruitment   where   the   crucial   role   is   played   by   bodies   of   judicial   self-­‐ government   often   shares   similarities   with   the   model   with   the   central   role   of   the   judicial   school.  Often  these  procedures  are  competitive,  as  they  are  in  Slovakia  or  the  Netherlands;   often  they  come  with  mandatory  training  at  a  specific  institution,  as  it  is  in  Poland  or  the   Netherlands.  Though,  it  needs  to  be  noted,  the  access  to  mandatory  training  is  controlled   not   by   judicial   schools   nor   any   national   authority,   but   rather   to   judicial   self-­‐government   bodies   on   the   level   of   individual   courts.   In   addition,   decisions   made   at   a   non-­‐national   level   are  later  reviewed  by  judicial  councils  which  effectively  serve  as  crucial  gatekeepers.     In   the   three   countries   analyzed   in   this   section,   the   eligibility   criteria   slightly   differ.   Slovakia   has   the   simplest   rules.   Candidates   for   judicial   office   need   to   be   30   years   old,   meet   the   usual  criteria  such  as  nationality  and  clear  police  records,  need  to  have  a  law  degree  and   78 have  passed  an  exam  authorizing  them  to  exercise  the  legal  profession.  Poland  and  the   72  E.g.  Madlena  Duarte,  Paula  Fernando,  Conceiçãcao  Gomes  &  Ana  Oliveira,  The  Feminization  of  the  Judiciary  in   Portugal:  Dilemmas  and  Paradoxes,  10  UTRECHT  LAW  REVIEW  29  (2014).   73  For  France  see  Doris  Marie  Provine  &  Antoine  Garapon,  The  Selection  of  Judges  in  France:  Searching  for  a  New   Legitimacy,   in   Malleson   &   Russell,   supra   note   5.   For   Spain   see   for   instance:   Bell,   supra   note   5,   at   190,   where   candidates   from   less   prosperous   regions   with   fewer   professional   opportunities   were   also   particularly   over-­‐ represented.   74  Bell,  supra  note  5,  at  53.   75   In   France,   entering   the   judiciary   right   after   university   remains   the  most   common   path,   however   there   have   been   efforts   to   promote   alternative   paths.   See   Antoine   Garapon   &   Harold   Epineuse,   Judicial   Independence   in   France,  in  JUDICIAL  INDEPENDENCE  IN  TRANSITION  273,  281  (Anja  Seibert-­‐Fohr  ed.,  2012).   76  Poblet  &  Casanovas,  supra  note  56,  at  195.   77  Errera,  supra  note  52,  at  47-­‐48.   78  For  the  purpose  of  participation  in  the  judicial  selection  procedure,  judicial,  advocate’s,  prosecutor’s  or  notary   exam  all  count  as  equal.   2 0 9 2   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07   Netherlands  adds  to  the  criteria  the  requirement  related  to  previous  professional  training.   Polish  judges  need  to  be  at  least  29  years  old,  have  a  law  degree,  plus,  they  need  to  have   completed  a  traineeship  at  the  judicial  school  and/or  served  as  probationary  judges  for  at   least  3  years.  Recruitment  from  the  positions  of  probationary  judges  has  recently  been  the   79 most   common   path   to   judicial   office.   In   the   Netherlands,   the   first   phase   of   a   judge’s   career   very   much   resembles   careers   in   systems   with   judicial   schools.   After   graduation,   80 candidates  apply  to  serve  as  a  ‘judicial  public  servant  in  training’,  they  need  to  pass  a  test   on  intelligence,  a  psychological  examination  and  an  oral  exam  with  the  National  Selection   81 Committee,   which   consists   of   22   members   appointed   by   the   Dutch   judicial   council.   Reports   suggest   the   process   may   be   skewed   in   favor   of   candidates   with   particular   82 characteristics,  as  minority  candidates  have  greater  problems  to  pass  the  written  exams.   Candidates  who  manage  to  pass  need  then  to  complete  a  6-­‐year  training  consisting  of  38   months  of  training  at  the  court,  10  months  of  in-­‐depth  education  at  the  Training  and  Study   83 Center  for  the  Judiciary  (SSR),  followed  by  a  2-­‐year  internship  outside  of  the  judiciary.     To  be  considered  for  a  judicial  position,  candidates  need  to  apply  to  the  process.  In  both   Poland   and   the   Netherlands   judges   apply   directly   to   the   court   where   there   is   a   vacant   position.   In   Poland,   the   court   president   administering   applications   passes   them   to   the   college   of   the   court   for   the   assessment   of   their   qualifications.   Subsequently,   the   list   of   candidates   is   considered   by   the   assembly   of   the   court,   which   takes   a   vote   and   hence   creates   a   shortlist   of   possible   candidates.   In   the   Netherlands,   candidates   are   interviewed   84 by  judges  of  the  court  to  determine  whether  candidates  fit  in  the  organization.  After  that,   the  management  of  the  court,  possibly  with  advice  from  the  court’s  assembly,  prepares  a   ranked  list  of  3  candidates  for  appointment,  which  is  sent  to  the  judicial  council.       In  Slovakia,  until  2017,  candidates  similarly  applied  directly  to  courts.  As  this  practice  was   on   the   one   hand   rather   slow,   leaving   courts   with   vacant   positions   for   a   considerable   amount  of  time,  and  on  the  other  produced  results  that  favored  candidates  who  previously   85 served   at   particular   courts,   these   rules   were   changed.   Since   then,   selection   procedures   79   See   Anna   Śledzińska-­‐Simon,   The   Rise   and   Fall   of   Judicial   Self-­‐Governement   in   Poland:   On   Judicial   Reform   Reversing  Transition  (in  this  special  issue).   80   Philip   M.   Langbroek,   Recruitment,   Professional   Evaluation   and   Career   of   Judges   and   Prosecutors   in   the   Netherlands  in  Di  Federico,  supra  note  5,  at  164.   81  See  Elaine  Mak,  Judicial  Self-­‐Government  in  the  Netherlands:  Demarcating  Autonomy  (in  this  special  issue).   82  Roel  De  Lange,  Judicial  Independence  in  the  Netherlands,  in  JUDICIAL   INDEPENDENCE   IN   TRANSITION  231,  243  (Anja   Seibert-­‐Fohr  ed.,  2012).   83  Langbroek,  supra  note  80,  at  168.   84  Id.  at  168.   85   SAMUEL   SPÁČ,   BY   THE   JUDGES,   FOR   THE   JUDGES:   THE   STUDY   OF   JUDICIAL   SELECTION   IN   SLOVAKIA   (Dissertation   Thesis,   Comenius  University,  2017).   2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             2093   are   administered   at   the   level   of   second-­‐instance   courts,   are   held   once   a   year,   and   are   86 intended  to  fill  all  expected  vacancies  in  the  region.  Five-­‐member  committees  appointed   by  the  president  of  the  Slovak  judicial  council  are  in  charge  of  the  selection.  They  consist  of   two  members  nominated  by  the  judicial  council,  two  members  nominated  by  the  Minister   of  Justice,  and  one  member  elected  by  the  college  of  presidents  of  councils  of  judges  in  the   given   region.   The   procedure   consists   of   a   series   of   written   exercises,   psychological   evaluation  and  the  interview  with  the  committee,  which  decides  about  its  content.  In  order   to  pass  all  the  requirements,  candidates  need  to  score  at  least  60%  in  each  phase  of  the   process.  The  final  ranking  of  the  candidates  is  then  created  by  totaling  the  grades  from  all   87 phases  of  the  procedure.     In   the   final   stages   of   these   processes   in   all   three   countries,   successful   candidates   are   considered   by   judicial   councils,   which   nominate   them   for   appointment   to   the   executive   branch.   The   Dutch   council   receives   a   ranked   list   of   three   candidates   and   passes   it   to   the   government   which   appoints   the   highest   ranked   candidate.   In   Poland   and   Slovakia,   although   councils   interfere   with   the   nomination   process   rather   rarely,   there   have   been   88 some  controversies.  In  addition,  both  the  Polish  and  the  Slovak  council  consider  security   screenings   prepared   by   the   executive   branch   checking   for   candidates’   ‘immaculate   89 character.’   The   appointment   process   in   both   countries   has   seen   some   controversies.   In   2014,   Slovak   President   Andrej   Kiska   initially   refused   to   appoint   a   candidate   because   of   concerns   about   the   fairness   of   the   selection   procedure   and   asked   the   council   to   reconsider.  Yet,  when  the  council  nominated  the  candidate  again,  Kiska  appointed  her  to   90 office.  Unlike  in  Slovakia,  Polish  presidents  have  managed  to  refuse  the  appointment  of   nominated  judges  despite  the  will  of  the  council.  In  2008,  President  Lech  Kaczynski  refused   91 to   appoint   10   judges   without   any   justification;   and   the   same   happened   in   2016   when   92 President   Andrzej   Duda   refused   to   appoint   another   10   candidates.   As   neither   council   can   actually  overrule  president’s  decision,  the  observed  difference  cannot  be  easily  explained   by  different  institutional  setting  and  is  rather  a  consequence  of  different  factors.   86  There  are  eight  regional  courts  in  Slovakia.  In  each  of  the  regions  there  are  five  to  eight  district  courts.   87  For  more  detailed  description  of  all  phases  see  Spáč,  supra  note  85,  at  92-­‐94.   88  For  more  see  Samuel  Spáč,  Kariérny  postup  na  vyššie  súdy:  pod  kontrolou  predsedov  súdov,  in  NEDOTKNUTEĽNÍ?   POLITIKA   SUDCOVSKÝCH   KARIÉR   NA   SLOVENSKU   V   ROKOCH   1993-­‐2015   121   (Erik   Láštic   &   Samuel   Spáč   eds.,   2017);   Adam   Bodnar   &   Lukasz   Bojarski,   Judicial   Independence   in   Poland,   in   JUDICIAL   INDEPENDENCE   IN   TRANSITION   667,   686   (Anja   Seibert-­‐Fohr  ed.,  2012).   89  For  more  see  Erik  Láštic  and  Samuel  Spáč,  Slovakia  /  Slovaquie  in  26  EUROPEAN  REVIEW  OF  PUBLIC  LAW  1201  (2014);   or   Samuel   Spáč,   Katarína   Šipulová   &   Marína   Urbániková,   Capturing   the   Judiciary   from   Inside:   The   Story   of   Judicial   Self-­‐Government  in  Slovakia  (in  this  special  issue);  and  Bodnar  &  Bojarski,  supra  note  88,  at  679-­‐680.   90  For  more  see  Spáč,  supra  note  85,  at  94.   91  For  more  see  Bodnar  &  Bojarski,  supra  note  88,  at  687,  690-­‐693;  Śledzińska-­‐Simon,  supra  note  79.   92  See  Sledzinska-­‐Simon,  supra  note  79.   2 0 9 4   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07     The   systems   of   judicial   recruitment   analyzed   in   this   section   share   several   features.   Most   importantly,   the   process   of   selection   involves   three   actors.   First,   there   is   a   selection   procedure  at  a  non-­‐national  level,  either  at  individual  courts  or  at  the  regional  level,  as  it  is   in   Slovakia.   Second,   a   shortlist   of   successful   candidates   is   passed   to   the   judicial   council,   which   rarely   interfere.   Finally,   the   appointment   rests   in   the   hands   of   the   executive   intervening   in   the   process   only   sporadically,   leaving   the   major   responsibility   at   the   non-­‐ national   level.   As   a   consequence,   even   though   all   analyzed   systems   offer   possibilities   of   lateral   entry,   they   seem   to   be   rather   marginal.   In   Poland,   it   was   estimated   that   only   15-­‐ 93 20%   of   new   judges   come   from   outside   of   the   judiciary,   and   judicial   recruitment   practices   94 in  Slovakia  also  showed  a  strong  preference  for  candidates  socialized  in  the  system.       III.  Recruitment  of  judges  through  specialized  bodies     The  introduction  of  specialized  bodies  empowered  to  recruit  judges  in  the  United  Kingdom   and   Ireland   may   be   one   of   the   strongest   indicators   of   the   rise   of   judicial   self-­‐governance   in   Europe   and   around   the   world.   Ireland   created   its   Judicial   Appointments   Advisory   Board   (JAAB)   in   1995.   It   consists   of   11   members,   six   of   whom   are   judges,   securing   a   narrow   95 96 judicial  majority  in  the  body.  The  UK’s  Judicial  Appointments  Commission  (JAC)  started   functioning  a  decade  later,  in  2006.  It  consists  of  15  members  of  whom  only  six  are  judges,   and   only   eight   all   together   are   lawyers.   Additionally,   not   only   are   judges   in   the   minority,   the  JAC  is  chaired  by  one  of  its  lay  members.  Importantly,  despite  seeming  similarity,  the   two   bodies   serve   considerably   different   roles,   which   may   be   traced   to   rationales   of   their   respective   establishments.   The   Irish   JAAB   was   ‘not   a   product   of   policy   preferences,   but   97 rather  a  reaction  to  political  crisis’  spurred  by  a  political  disagreement  over  appointments   of  two  senior  judges  causing  the  reform  to  fail  to  diminish  political  control  over  the  process   of  judicial  recruitment.  In  the  UK,  the  executive  gave  up  its  powers  on  the  basis  of  genuine   93  See  Sledzinska-­‐Simon,  supra  note  79.   94  Spáč,  supra  note  85.   95  For  composition  see  MacNeill,  supra  note  46.   96   When   refering   only   to   the   Judicial   Appointments   Commission   responsible   for   appointments   in   England   and   Wales,   I  purposefuly   omit   the   Northern   Ireland   Judicial   Appointments   Commission   (NIJAC)   and   the   Judicial   Appointments   Board   for   Scotland   (JABS)   that   fulfill   the   same   task   in   other   parts   of   the   UK.   Also,   it   needs   to   be   noted   that   the   JAC   is   responsible   only   for   appointments   to   the   Court   of   Appeal   and   High   Court,   while   the   appointments  to  the  UK  Supreme  Court  happen  in  a  different  regime.  See  van  Zyl  Smit,  supra  note  1,  at  206-­‐207.   97  MacNeill,  supra  note  46,  at  88.   2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             2095   98 belief  that  weakening  of  the  political  influence  would  help  to  improve  the  judiciary  and   99 increase  diversity  of  the  judicial  bench.     The   introduction   of   specialized   bodies   fundamentally   altered   the   process   of   judicial   recruitment   in   both   countries.   Judges   in   the   UK   were   in   the   past   selected   through   such   nontransparent   procedures   that   even   the   persons   being   considered   for   judicial   positions   100 did  not  know  they  were  being  talked  about.  Currently,  to  get  on  selector’s  radar  in  the   UK,  candidates  need  to  apply  and  demonstrate  their  interests  in  working  in  the  judiciary.   As  both  countries  are  still  recognition  judiciaries,  eligibility  criteria  are  considerably  higher   than  in  continental  Europe.  Candidates  in  Ireland  must  be  practicing  lawyers  for  at  least  10   101 years,  in  the  UK  it  is  required  to  have  at  least  5  or  7  years  of  professional  experience  in   102 the  legal  field.       After   the   application   the   crucial   stages   of   the   recruitment   process   are   administered   by   these   specialized   bodies,   however   their   respective   roles   differ.   While   in   Ireland   the   JAAB   only   prepares   a   shortlist   of   candidates   and   the   actual   selection   rests   in   the   hands   of   political   actors,   the   JAC   operating   in   England   and   Wales   is   in   fact   responsible   for   picking   those   who   are   appointed.   The   Irish   JAAB   assesses   candidates’   general   suitability   on   the   basis  of  their  applications,  including  information  regarding  their  education,  qualifications,   and   professional   experiences.   It   then   presents   a   list   of   the   seven   candidates   it   perceives   to   be   fit   for   the   office   to   the   Minister   of   Justice.   In   the   past,   the   body   played   a   rather   passive   role,   serving   more   as   a   screening   body   than   a   genuine   gatekeeper,   presenting   not   only   103 seven  candidates  but  all  those  who  were  not  deemed  ‘suitable.’  Recently  the  body  has   started   to   play   a   more   substantive   role,   recommending   fewer   candidates   for   the   judicial   104 105 office,  or  even  none,  as  was  reported  to  have  happened  on  one  occasion  in  2016.  In   the   UK,   after   the   application   the   JAC   sifts   candidates   based   of   their   provided   self-­‐ assessments,  as  well  as  on  two  reference  letters  focusing  on  their  professional,  personal  or   judicial  qualifications.  For  larger  selection  procedures,  candidates  may  also  need  to  take  a   98   Although   the   process   was   perceived   as   de-­‐politicized   and   merit-­‐based,   political   considerations   seemed   to   matter.  See  Chris  Hanretty,  The  Appointment  of  Judges  By  Ministers:  Political  Preferment  in  England,  1880-­‐2005  in   3  JOURNAL  OF  LAW  AND  COURTS  305  (2015).   99  See  van  Zyl  Smit,  supra  note  1,  at  14.   100  For  more  on  these  practices  see  van  Zyl  Smit,  supra  note  1,  at  13.   101  For  more  information  see  https://aji.ie/the-­‐judiciary/appointment-­‐to-­‐judicial-­‐office/.   102  For  more  information  see  https://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/eligibility-­‐legally-­‐qualified-­‐candidates.   103  MacNeill,  supra  note  46,  at  89,  127-­‐128.   104  MacNeill,  supra  note  46,  at  98.   105  See  O’Brien,  supra  note  46.   2 0 9 6   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07   qualifying  test  and  have  a  telephone  interview.  Those  who  successfully  get  ‘shortlisted’  are   invited   for   a   ‘Selection   Day’   consisting   of   an   interview   with   a   3-­‐member   committee   106 examining  the  candidates’  performance  in  hypothetical  scenarios  or  role  plays.     The   selection   of   judges   in   the   UK   from   the   shortlist   of   candidates   is   determined   in   consultation   with   the   person   who   previously   held   the   vacant   position   or   with   someone   107 who  is  considered  to  have  ‘other  relevant  experience’.  Final  decisions  are  made  by  the   Selection  and  Character  Committee,  which  consists  of  JAC  members  who  take  into  account   all   the   accumulated   assessments   before   selecting   one   candidate   for   each   vacancy.   Interestingly,   since   2013,   in   case   of   a   tie   between   two   or   more   candidates   in   terms   of     108 merit,  the  JAC  should  select  a  candidate  to  enhance  the  diversity  of  the  judicial  bench.   In   Ireland,   the   final   selection   does   not   happen   in   the   specialized   body,   but   as   aforementioned   it   is   the   Minister   who,   after   a   discussion   with   the   Attorney   General   and   the   Prime   Minister   (Taoiseach),   presents   the   selected   name   to   the   Cabinet   for   formal   approval.  Although  the  government  is  not  obliged  to  select  any  candidate  from  the  list,  it   usually   does   so.   When   in   1998   the   government   wanted   to   appoint   a   candidate   that   the   JAAB  deemed  unsuitable,  members  of  the  JAAB  threatened  to  resign,  effectively  protecting   109 the  significance  of  the  body  in  the  process  of  recruiting  judges.  The  appointment  rests  in   the   hands   of   political   bodies  –   in   Ireland   judges   are   eventually   appointed   by   the   President,   in   the   UK   by   the   Lord   Chancellor,   who   can   reject   a   recommendation   and   as   the   JAC   to   reconsider,  but  must  provide  written  reasons  for  such  action.     In   summary,   judicial   recruitment   through   specialized   bodies   have   managed   to   curtail   traditional   political   influence   over   the   process   and   have   allowed   judicial   actors   to   effectively   control   entrance   to   the   judiciary.   Nevertheless,   in   Ireland   the   merit   principle   seems  to  be  undermined  by  the  fact  that  greater  chances  of  success  in  the  process  have   110 candidates   who   are   known   by   crucial   decision-­‐makers.   In   addition,   the   reformed   processes   have   so   far   failed   to   curb   other   traditional   biases   or   create   more   diverse   and   representative   benches.   As   of   2014   only   about   30%   of   judges   in   both   judiciaries   were   111 female.   Also,   reports   confirm   that   in   the   UK   the   same   applies   to   ethnic   or   racial   106   For   more   information   about   the   process   see   https://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/overview-­‐selection-­‐ process.   107  For  more  information  see  https://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/statutory-­‐consultation.   108  For  more  see  https://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk/equal-­‐merit-­‐provision.   109  O’Brien,  supra  note  46.   110  MacNeill,  supra  note  46,  at  151.   111  CEPEJ,  supra  note  7,  at  101.   2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             2097   112 minorities,   urging   some   scholars   to   call   for   quotas   to   balance   the   bias   favoring   113 candidates  from  dominant  identity  groups.     IV.  Recruiting  judges  out  of  sight     In   Czechia   and   Slovenia,   the   process   of   judicial   recruitment   is   much   less   visible   and   less   structured  than  in  the  previously  described  cases.  Paradoxically,  this  eventually  serves  for   the   benefit   of   judicial   self-­‐governance   bodies,   because   it   is   court   presidents   who   are   the   most   crucial   actors   in   the   process.   This   happens   because   the   political   bodies   –   the   president   in   Czechia   and   the   parliament   in   Slovenia   –   who   are   empowered   to   appoint   judges   traditionally   act   more   as   notaries   confirming   decisions   made   elsewhere   than   as   actual   gatekeepers.   Consequently,   as   crucial   decisions   are   made   out   of   sight,   to   obtain   a   proper  understanding  of  these  recruitment  processes  it  may  be  necessary  to  have  access   to   information   about   their   informal   parts.   Otherwise,   it   may   be   impossible   to   identify   candidates   considered   for   the   job,   as   well   as   to   recognize   how   they   are   eventually   selected.     The   eligibility   criteria   in   both   countries   described   in   this   section   are   fairly   similar.   Candidates  need  to  have  obtained  a  law  degree,  must  be  30  years  of  age  and  must  meet   some   common   criteria,   such   as   nationality   or   ‘good   character.’   Slovenian   judges   114 additionally  need  to  have  at  least  3  years  of  professional  experience  in  law,  while  Czech   115 judges  need  to  have  passed  a  special  judicial  exam  or  the  equivalent.    In  the  following   stages,   it   is   the   court   presidents   who   are   the   most   important   actors.   In   Slovenia,   court   presidents  make  a  preliminary  reasoned  selection  of  candidates,  which  they  submit  to  the   Judicial  Council.  The  criteria  that  judges  use  to  draw  up  a  shortlist  or  determine  who  the   116 candidates  are  seem  to  be  hidden  from  the  public  eye.  Czech  court  presidents  also  enjoy   a   great   amount   of   discretion   in   the   process.   There   are   no   national   criteria   for   the   selection   procedures,  hence  they  may  differ  from  one  court  to  another.  At  some  courts  it  seems  that   court   presidents   hand-­‐pick   new   judges,   elsewhere   court   presidents   have   opted   for   117 selection  procedures  based  on  tests  conducted  by  the  Judicial  Academy.       112  See  https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-­‐content/uploads/2018/07/judicial-­‐diversity-­‐statistics-­‐2018-­‐1.pdf.   113  Malleson,  supra  note  7,  at  281.   114   Cristina   Dallara,   Judicial   Reforms   in   Transition:   Legacies   of   the   past   and   dominant   political   actors   in   post-­‐ communist  countries,  1  IRSIG-­‐CNR  WORKING  PAPER  10  (2007).   115  For  the  purpose  of  consideration  for  a  judicial  position,  candidates  can  have  passed  exams  authorizing  them  to   work  in  different  legal  professions,  such  as  advocates,  notaries  or  executors.   116  See  Matej  Avbelj,  Contextual  Analysis  of  Judicial  Governance  in  Slovenia  (in  this  special  issue).   117  Blisa,  Papoušková  &  Urbániková,  supra  note  47.   2 0 9 8   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07   The  process  of  appointment  is  also  fairly  similar  in  both  countries.  In  Czechia,  the  minister   formally  nominates  candidates  for  judicial  offices  on  behalf  of  the  government  but  does  so   upon  request  from  the  court  president.  Eventually,  judges  are  appointed  by  the  president   of   the   country.   Slovenian   judges   are   nominated   for   their   offices   by   the   judicial   council,   which   does   so   based   on   criteria   adopted   together   with   the   Ministry   of   Justice.   Appointment   rests   in   the   hands   of   the   parliament,   which   usually   confirms   proposed   candidates   without   any   substantive   discussion.   This   suggests   ‘a   certain   balance’   between   118 the   judicial   and   the   political   body.   Although,   there   have   been   few   instances   reported   when   the   National   Assembly   declined   to   appoint   proposed   candidates   despite   criticism   from   experts   and   the   general   public,   in   at   least   one   of   these   cases   the   unsuccessful   candidate   had   served   as   an   attorney,   and   hence   aimed   to   enter   the   judiciary   from   the   119 outside.     In   summary,   in   this   model   judicial   self-­‐governance   bodies   seem   to   enjoy   considerable   discretion   despite   the   fact   that   formal   powers   belong   to   politicians.   Because   the   recruitment   process   happens   in   a   rather   nontransparent   way,   judicial   bodies   can   greatly   benefit   from   the   information   asymmetry   they   have   vis-­‐à-­‐vis   political   bodies.   The   model   provides  a  fertile  ground  for  favoritism  and  selection  based  on  criteria  other  than  merit,  as   court   presidents   serve   as   de   facto   unrestrained   gatekeepers.   Whether   they   opt   to   concentrate   such   powers   in   their   own   hands,   or   whether   they   employ   competitive   procedures   or   make   their   decisions   in   consultation   with   other   judges   of   the   court   is   largely   dependent   on   their   will.   The   same   applies   to   the   openness   of   the   judiciary   to   legal   professionals  working  in  other  fields.  In  both  countries,  eligibility  criteria  suggest  there  is   an   option   of   recruiting   judges   laterally,   however   the   actual   openness   is   once   again   dependent   on   individual   actors.   Based   on   this,   it   can   be   reasonably   hypothesized   that   candidates   working   in   the   judiciary   as   law   clerks   or   ‘junior   judges’   may   have   greater   chances  of  being  appointed,  hence  the  crucial  moment  in  judges’  careers  may  happen  at   earlier  stages  of  their  careers  –  when  they  are  recruited  for  junior  positions,  or  when  they   120 are   taking   the   required   judicial   exam.   Paradoxically,   the   Slovenian   example   also   shows   that  politicians  may  at  times  protect  the  judiciary  from  outsiders,  even  when  the  judiciary   itself  proposes  such  a  candidate.     118   Cristina   Dallara,   Smoother   Judicial   Reforms   in   Slovenia   and   Croatia:   Does   the   Legacy   of   the   Past   Matter?,   in   DEMOCRACY  AND   JUDICIAL   REFORMS  IN   SOUTH-­‐EAST   EUROPE:   BETWEEN  THE   EU  AND  THE   LEGACIES  OF  THE   PAST  31,  39  (Cristina   Dallara  ed.,  2014).   119 120  Dallara,  supra  note  118,  at  38-­‐39;  Avbelj,  supra  note  116.     For   more   on   ‘junior   judges’   and   their   chances   to   become   judges   in   the   Czech   system   see   Kosař,   supra   note   13,   at  189.     2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             2099   D.  Analyzing  judicial  recruitment:  taking  actors  and  their  motivations  into  account     The  discussion  in  the  previous  Part  showed  that  different  systems  tend  to  favor  different   candidates.  While  the  recruitment  through  judicial  schools  leads  to  over-­‐representation  of   women  and  middle-­‐class  candidates,  models  where  a  crucial  role  is  played  by  judicial  self-­‐ government   bodies   at   non-­‐national   level   tend   to   favor   those   with   ties   in   the   given   environment.   Traditional   recognition   judiciaries   have,   on   the   other   hand,   suffered   from   being   elitist   and   unrepresentative   of   their   societies.   The   particular   composition   of   the   judicial   bench   is   a   consequence   of   the   interplay   between   motivations   of   selectors   (who   they   search   for),   and   candidates   (who   seek   a   judicial   job)   in   the   context   of   a   specific   institutional  design  (who  decides  in  what  stage  and  how  much  discretion  they  enjoy).     I   argued   that   judicial   recruitment   operates   as   a   funnel   where   the   number   of   candidates   gradually  decreases  until  only  one  (or  few)  remain  in  the  competition  and  are  eventually   appointed  to  the  judicial  office.  This  process  has  several  critical  junctions  –  eligibility,  active   consideration,   shortlisting,   selection   and   appointment   –   which   effectively   shape   the   outcome  of  the  judicial  recruitment  process.  Because  of  that  it  is  important  to  look  beyond   institutions   and   the   legal   framework   and   take   into   consideration   the   motivations   of   involved   actors.   For   instance,   if   eligibility   criteria   invite   candidates   from   other   legal   professions,  yet  their  chances  of  ‘surviving’  the  competition  would  be  considerably  small,   as  they  may  not  meet  the  informal  criteria  set  out  by  a  selector,  a  fairly  small  number  of   candidates  for  lateral  entry  may  be  misunderstood  as  a  lack  of  interest  of  such  candidates   for  judicial  positions.  Similarly,  participation  in  the  recruitment  process  may  be  too  costly   for   certain   groups   of   candidates   causing   over-­‐representation   of   particular   parts   of   the   society  on  the  judicial  bench.  In  addition,  even  if  the  process  of  recruitment  was  a  perfect   121 rank-­‐order  tournament  in  which  candidate  compete  against  one  another,  their  chances   may   be   skewed   because   selection   criteria   may   hold   latent   bias   favoring   some   groups   of   candidates   at   the   expense   of   others,   incorrectly   suggesting   differences   between   them   while  disregarding  possible  benefits  of  a  more  diverse  judiciary.     In  an  ideal  case,  and  in  line  with  the  merit-­‐principle  emphasized  in  ‘soft  law’  standards,  an   output   of   the   recruitment   process   should   be   a   result   of   a   ‘concern   for   correctly   122 ascertaining   the   competence.’   In   general,   at   each   of   the   critical   junctions,   candidates   need  to  persuade  selecting  bodies  they  are  better  fit  than  their  competitors  to  perform  the   judicial   function.   Yet,   competence   may   be   only   one   of   the   many   considerations   selectors   121  E.g.  Hanretty,  supra  note  98;  Stephen  Choi  &  Mitu  Gulati,  A  Tournament  of  Judges?  In  92  CALIFORNIA   L.R.  299   (2004);  Jordi  Blanes  I.  Vidal  &  Clare  Leaver,   Are  Tenured  Judges  Insulated  from  Political  Pressure?  In  95  JOURNAL  OF   PUBLIC   ECONOMICS   570   (2011);   or   Martin   R.   Schneider,   Judicial   Career   Incentives   and   Court   Performance:   An   Empirical  Study  of  the  German  Labour  Courts,  20  EUROPEAN  JOURNAL  OF  LAW  AND  ECONOMICS  127  (2005).   122   Karen   J.   Alter,   Agents   or   Trustees?   International   Courts   in   their   Political   Context   in   14   EUROPEAN   JOURNAL   OF   INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  33,  42  (2008).   2 1 0 0   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07   make.   To   put   it   differently,   selectors   always   have   some   preferences,   from   normatively   desirable  through  those  less  legitimate  to  possibly  latent  ones.  Selectors  may  pay  attention   123 to   candidates’   ideological   positioning  in   order   to   secure   certain   political   influence   over   124 the   courts;   or   they   can   pursue   other   objectives   such   as   diversity   and   representativeness   125 126 127 of  the  bench,    particularistic  interests,  or  partisan  considerations.     The   assumption   that   selectors   always   have   motivations   is   particularly   important   for   a   proper   understanding   of   how   judicial   recruitment   works   in   the   age   of   judicial   self-­‐ 128 government.   Whether   recruiting   powers   belong   to   political   branches   or   the   judiciary,   the   process   in   which   selectors   equip   new   judges   with   considerable   powers   establishes   a   129 certain   connection   between   them.   There   are   several   reasons   why   the   danger   of   transferring   these   powers   to   the   hands   of   judges   should   not   be   underestimated.   Judges,   just  like  any  other  group  of  actors,  can  have  shared  interests  which  can  be  translated  into   the   composition   of   the   judiciary.   Indeed,   they   are   not   inevitably   harmful   –   they   may   be   based   on   reasonable,   even   virtuous,   expectations   about   the   role   of   the   judiciary.   Nevertheless,   there   is   a   substantial   amount   of   evidence   suggesting   that   actors   within   judiciaries   may   prove   to   be   as   dangerous   as   political   actors,   although   their   interests   may   123   E.g.   Hanretty,   supra   note   98;   Jeffrey   A.   Segal   &   Harold   J.   Spaeth,   The   Supreme   Court   and   the   Attitudinal   Model   Revisited  (2002).   124   See   particularly   ‘government   control   regime’   in   Rachel   E.   Bowen,   Judicial   Autonomy   in   Central   America:   A   Typological  Approach  in  66  POLITICAL   RESEARCH   QUARTERLY  831  (2013).  For  current  developments  in  Central  Europe   see   Adam   Bodnar,   Europe   can   save   Poland   from   darkness   in   POLITICO,   9   April   2018,   available   at:   https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-­‐judiciary-­‐rule-­‐of-­‐law-­‐europe-­‐must-­‐intervene/;   David   Kosař   &   Katarína   Šipulová,  The  Strasbourg  Court  Meets  Abusive  Constitutionalism:  Baka  v.  Hungary  and  the  Rule  of  Law  in  10  HAGUE   JOURNAL  ON  THE   RULE  OF   LAW  83  (2018);  or  Bojan  Bugaric  &  Tom  Ginsburg,  The  Assault  on  Postcommunist  Courts  in   27  JOURNAL   OF   DEMOCRACY  69  (2016).  For  other  parts  of  world  see  Raul  A.  Sanchez-­‐Urribarri,  The  Politicization  of   Latin   American   Judiciary   via   Informal   Connections,   in   LEGITIMACY,  DEVELOPMENT  AND  CHANGE:  LAW  AND  MODERNIZATION   RECONSIDERED   307   (David   K.   Linnan,   ed.,   2012);   Fombad,   supra   note   2;   Alexander   Stroh,   Consequences   of   Appointment   Policies   for   Court   Legitimacy   in   Benin:   A   Network   Analysis   Approach,   281   GIGA   WORKING   PAPER     (2016);  or  Voeten,  supra  note  3.   125  E.g.  Malleson,  supra  note  1;  Jeffrey  D.  Jackson,  Beyond  Quality:  First  Principles  in  Judicial  Selection  and  their   Application  to  a  Commission-­‐Based  Selection  System  in  34  FORDHAM  URBAN  L.J.  125  (2007).   126  Spáč,  Šipulová  &  Urbániková,  supra  note  89.   127   See   Simone   Benvenuti   &   David   Paris,   Judicial   Self-­‐Government   in   Italy:   Merits,   Limits   and   the   Reality   of   an   Export   Model   (in   this   special   issue);   Başak   Çalı   &   Betül   Dürmuş,   Judicial   Self-­‐Government   as   Experimental   Constitutional  Politics:  The  Case  of  Turkey  (in  this  special  issue).   128 129  Kosař,  supra  note  12.     Such   relationships   can   be   framed   within   Principal-­‐Agent   theory.   See   Voeten,   supra   note   3.   Although   for   the   study  of  judges  some  authors  recommend  rather  the  idea  of  ‚trustees‘  as  they  are  entrusted  with  power  and  have   freedom  to  act  autonomously  on  behalf  of  the  principal.  See  Alter,  supra  note  122,  at  38-­‐44.   2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             2101   130 manifest   in   different   ways.   Importantly,   if   the   power   to   recruit   judges   belongs   predominantly   to   the   judges   themselves,   the   inherent   information   asymmetry   between   them,   political   branches   and   the   general   public,   may   easily   give   rise   to   particularistic   interests.     Although   it   is   selectors   who   shape   the   process   the   most,   their   choices   are   bound   by   the   pool  of  candidates  from  which  they  are  choosing  future  judges.  To  reasonably  identify  who   is  actually  interested  in  judicial  positions,  researchers  could  greatly  benefit  from  high  levels   of   transparency   that   would   allow   them   to   learn   about   their   characteristics   in   order   to   131 properly   analyze   them.   In   addition,   to   understand   who   even   gets   to   the   pool   of   candidates,  it  is  important  to  pay  attention  to  motivations  of  prospective  judges  to  seek  a   132 judicial   position.   Building   on   Posner,   I   believe   that   in   order   for   an   individual   to   seek   a   judicial  position,  the  utility  of  being  a  judge  must  outweigh  the  utility  of  working  in  another   legal   profession,   and   they   must   understand   the   costs   of   participating   in   the   recruitment   process  as  being  reasonable  and  subjectively  bearable,  while  also  perceiving  a  reasonable   chance  to  succeed  in  the  process.       As  for  the  utility  of  being  a  judge,  candidates  consider  expected  time  devoted  to  judging,   and  time  devoted  to  other  activities.  The  reasonable  balance  between  the  two,  which  the   work  in  the  judiciary  seems  to  offer,  is  particularly  important  to  female  judges  who  prefer   133 to   have   enough   time   for   their   families   more   often   than   men.   Reputation   and   income   stemming   from   the   judicial   position   may   be   among   other   factors   determining   one’s   willingness  to  become  a  judge.  Indeed,  perceived  and  expected  enjoyment  of  a  particular   130   E.g.   J.   Mark   Ramseyer   &   Eric   B.   Rasmusen,   Judicial   Independence   in   a  Civil   Law   Regime:   The   Evidence   from   Japan  in  13  THE   JOURNAL  OF   LAW,   ECONOMICS  AND   ORGANIZATION  259  (1997);  Ramseyer  &  Rasmusen,  supra  note  22;   David  M.  O’Brien  &  Yasuo  Ohkoshi,   Stifling  Judicial  Independence  from  Within:  ,  in  JUDICIAL  INDEPENDENCE  IN  THE  AGE   OF  DEMOCRACY  37  (Peter  H.  Russell  &  David  M.  O’Brien  eds.,  2001);  Bobek  &  Kosař,  supra  note  16;  Kosař,  supra  note   13;   Bogdan   Iancu,   Perils   of   Sloganised   Constitutional   Concepts.   Notably   that   of   ‘Judicial   Independence’,   13   EUROPEAN   CONSTITUTIONAL   L.R.   582   (2017);   Coman   &   Dallara,   supra   note   57;   Lukasz   Bojarski   &   Werner   Stemker   Köster,  The  Slovak  judiciary:  its  current  state  and  challenges  (Open  Society  Foundation  2012);  Maria  Popova,  Be   Careful  What  You  Wish  For:  A  Cautionary  Tale  of  Post-­‐Communist  Judicial  Empowerment,  18  DEMOKRATIZATSIYA  56   (2010);   Maria   Popova,   Why   Doesn’t   the   Bulgarian   Judiciary   Prosecute   Corruption?,   59   PROBLEMS   OF   POST-­‐ COMMUNISM   35   (2012);   Lydia   F.   Müller,   Judicial   Administration   in   Eastern   Countries,   in   JUDICIAL   INDEPENDENCE   IN   TRANSITION  937  (Anja  Seibert-­‐Fohr  ed.,  2012).   131   Several   authors   studied   judicial   selection   using   statistical   analyses,   e.g.:   Vidal   &   Leaver,   supra   note   121;   Hanretty,  supra  note  98;  Spáč,  supra  note  85.  Another  possibility  is  employing  network  analytcal  approach,  for  an   overview   see   Björn   Dressel,   Raul   Sanchez-­‐Urribarri   &   Alexander   Stroh,   The   Informal   Dimension   of   Judicial   Politics,   13  ANNUAL  REVIEW  OF  LAW  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE  413  (2017).   132  Richard  A.  Posner,  What  Do  Judges  and  Justices  Maximize?  (The  Same  Thing  Everybody  Else  Does),  3  SUPREME   COURT  ECONOMIC  REVIEW  1,  31-­‐39(1993).   133   E.g.   Duarte   et   al.,   supra   note   72;   or   Matej   Uhlík   &   Samuel   Spáč,   Príčiny   a   dôsledky   nadreprezentácie   žien   v   slovenskom  súdnictve,  in  NEDOTKNUTEĽNÍ?   POLITIKA  SUDCOVSKÝCH  KARIÉR  NA   SLOVENSKU  V  ROKOCH   1993-­‐2015  (Erik  Láštic   &  Samuel  Spáč  eds.,  2017).   2 1 0 2   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07   job  would  probably  be  a  part  of  the  consideration  of  any  prospective  candidate,  as  well  as,   for   instance   a   feeling   of   personal   contribution   to   the   well-­‐being   of   society   or   even   the   idea   of   ‘justice.’   Although,   candidates   may   not   only   by   motivated   by   virtue,   but   also   can   seek   fulfilment   of   their   personal   interests,   such   as   being   able   to   exert   influence   in   particular   134 cases   or   even   benefiting   from   participation   in   a   system   of   corruption.   As   regards   the   costs  of  participation  in  the  recruitment  process,  prospective  judges  may  consider  the  time   and   energy   necessary   to   ensure   a   reasonable   chance   for   success   in   the   process.   For   instance,   if   in   Spain   it   is   known   that   preparation   for   entry   exams   takes   couple   of   years   and   is   extremely   demanding,   it   can   easily   discourage   large   number   of   potential   candidates.   Similarly,  if  prospective  judges  in  Slovakia  know  that  to  succeed  they  need  connections  in   the  judicial  system,  it  may  prevent  them  from  even  seeking  active  consideration.  Last  but   not   least,   as   Alemanno   warns   with   regard   to   CJEU   and   ECtHR,   the   transparency   of   the   process   may   pose   a   threat   to   the   integrity   of   candidates   who   might   be   subject   to   public   135 scrutiny  and  can  actually  hurt  their  reputation.     All  in  all,  the  recruitment  process  is  not  a  perfect  competition  where  only  the  best  fit  for   the   office   succeed.   It   is   rather   a   consequence   of   the   interplay   between   motivations   and   interests   of   selectors   and   potential   candidates   for   the   judicial   office   in   the   context   of   a   particular  institutional  design.  Recruitment  process  translates  into  the  composition  of  the   bench,   which   in   turn   affects   how   the   judiciary   is   performing.   Taking   these   motivations   into   consideration  hence  may  be  in  fact  as  important  for  the  study  of  the  judicial  recruitment   and   its   effects   on   the   actual   performance   of   the   judiciary   as   is   identifying   crucial   gatekeepers  and  critical  junctions  shaping  the  process.       E.  Conclusion     The   rise   of   judicial   self-­‐governance   is   clearly   visible   when   it   comes   to   the   recruitment   of   new   judges   in   Europe.   This   can   be   stated   with   confidence,   not   only   with   regard   to   the   136 countries  analyzed  in  this  paper,  but  even  in  cases  that  were  omitted  here.  Transferring   these   powers   into   the   hands   of   judges   seems   to   be   a   cure   for   a   variety   of   diseases.   In   Ireland,  a  greater  involvement  of  judges  in  judicial  recruitment  was  a  response  to  a  political   134  E.g.  Daniel  J.  Beers,  Understanding  Corruption  in  the  Post-­‐Communist  Courts:  Attitudinal  Data  from  Romania   th and   Czech   Republic   (11   Annual   International   Researchers   Conference   “Post-­‐Communist   Corruption:   Causes,   Manifestations,  Consequences  2012).   135  Alberto  Alemanno,  How  Transparent  is  Transparent  Enough?  Balancing  Access  to  Information  Against  Privacy   in   European   Judicial   Selection,   in   SELECTING   EUROPE’S   JUDGES:   A   CRITICAL   REVIEW  OF  THE   APPOINTMENT   PROCEDURES  TO  THE   EUROPEAN  COURTS  202  (Michal  Bobek  ed.,  2015).   136  See  contributions  on  different  jurisdictions  in  this  issue,  particularly  Germany.  Although  it  is  rarely  considered   an  example  of  strong  judicial  self-­‐governance,  even  there  judges  play  a  substantive  role  in  the  recruitment  of  their   colleagues:  see  Wittreck,  supra  note  51.   2018   Recruiting  European  judges  in  the  age  of  judicial  self-­‐government                             2103   137 crisis.  In  Slovakia,  such  a  change  occurred  due  to  the  unsatisfactory  performance  of  the   138 old   model   much   similar   to   that   found   currently   in   Czechia.   In   the   UK,   the   transfer   of   power  was  a  consequence  of  a  genuine  desire  for  a  better  model  supported  by  concerns   139 for   legitimacy,   and   in   Romania   it   was   a   part   of   larger   reforms   towards   greater   judicial   140 self-­‐governance.   Either   way,   judges   seem   to   have   more   power   than   ever   in   recruiting   their  colleagues  and  successors.     International   documents   have   called   for   the   greater   involvement   of   judges   as   a   tool   for   ensuring  recruitment  based  on  merit,  which  is  intended  to  result  in  candidates’  increased   capacity  to  properly  perform  their  judicial  functions.  Nonetheless,  this  plan  seems  to  have   several  shortcomings.  First  and  foremost,  there  is   no  unified   conception   of   what   it   is   to   be   a   good   judge,   or   what   makes   one   judge   better   than   another,   and   hence   it   is   practically   141 impossible  to  evaluate  whether  a  merit-­‐oriented  process  delivers  what  it  promises.  Even   if   we   allow   that   a   judicial   recruitment   process   controlled   by   judges   delivers   the   best   possible   judges,   there   are   many   examples   that   undermine   this   assumption.   As   was   discussed   in   the   paper,   merit-­‐oriented   processes   tend   to   favor   specific   identity   groups   at   142 143 144 the  expense  of  others,  as  happens  in  France,  the  Netherlands  and  the  UK,  or  they   can  be  skewed  towards  candidates  with  stronger  connections  to  the  judiciary,  as  was  the   145 case   in   Slovakia.   These   examples   suggest   that   no   matter   how   the   process   of   judicial   recruitment   is   designed,   it   is   shaped   by   the   actors   involved   in   it,   and   the   outcome   –   the   selection   and   appointment   of   judges   –   reflects   their   preferences,   whether   they   are   virtuous  or  driven  by  self-­‐interest.     This  is  why  there  is  a  need  for  deeper  study  of  how  judicial  recruitment  models  affect  the   composition  of  the  bench.  As  was  stated  throughout  the  paper,  judges  play  an  indisputable   role  throughout  the  European  systems  of  judicial  recruitment.  Although  attention  is  usually   paid   to   the   formal   rules   and   bodies,   as   well   as   the   actors   and   institutions   interacting   in   the   process,   other   factors   may   be   more   significant   for   our   deep   understanding   of   the   137  MacNeill,  supra  note  46,  at  38-­‐47,  88.   138  Spáč,  supra  note  85.   139  E.g.  Van  Zyl  Smit,  supra  note  1.   140  E.g.  Selejan-­‐Gutan,  supra  note  62;  or  Parau,  supra  note  13.   141  Dimino,  supra  note  6,  at  819.  For  different  approaches  to  the  quality  of  judges  see  also:  JASON   E.   WHITEHEAD,   JUDGING  THE  JUDGES:  VALUES  AND  THE  RULE  OF  LAW  (2014).   142  Provine  &  Garapon,  supra  note  73.   143  De  Lange,  supra  note  82,  at  243.   144  E.g.  Malleson,  supra  note  1;  or  Malleson,  supra  note  7.   145  Spáč,  supra  note  85.   2 1 0 4   G e r m a n   L a w   J o u r n a l     Vol.  19  No.  07   recruitment  of  judges.  In  the  paper,  I  proposed  five  stages  in  which  candidates  for  judicial   office  may  be  eliminated  until  one  or  a  few  remain  and  are  eventually  appointed.  Potential   candidates  must  first  and  foremost  be  willing  to  bear  the  costs  of  the  ambition  to  become   a  judge,  which  at  times  involves  intensive  preparation,  as  it  does  in  Spain,  where  years  of   146 study   are   required,   as   well   as   possibly   useful   connections   in   the   judicial   system.   Then   candidates  need  to  meet  the  eligibility  criteria  for  the  position,  get  on  the  selector’s  radar   to   be   actively   considered,   pass   the   selector’s   requirements   to   get   on   the   shortlist,   and   eventually  be  selected  and  appointed.  What  matters  more  than  whether  judges  play  a  role   in   the   process,   or   through   which   body,   is   how   other   powers   utilize   their   checks   and   balances  and  in  which  stages  of  the  process.  Arguably,  the  Irish  JAAB  enjoys  considerably   less  control  over  who  becomes  a  judge  than  the  Czech  court  presidents  do,  even  though   the  formal  powers  belong  to  the  Czech  political  elites.  Similarly,  political  actors  in  the  UK   and   in   Slovakia   do   not   seem   to   contradict   decisions   made   by   the   bodies   of   judicial   self-­‐ governance,   while   similarly   empowered   political   actors   in   Poland   and   in   Slovenia   have   successfully   constrained   the   discretion   of   judicial   bodies.   All   in   all,   scholarly   attention   should   not   only   focus   on   whether   judges   are   involved   in   judicial   recruitment,   but   rather   at   what  stage  and  with  what  interests,  as  well  as  on  how  their  powers  are  balanced  by  other   actors,   and   how   it   all   translates   into   the   composition   and   performance   of   different   judicial   systems.         146  Poblet  &  Casanovas,  supra  note  56,  at  161.