The Dutch Atlantic, 1600-1800 Expansion Without Empire

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/231760523 The Dutch Atlantic, 1600-1800 Expansion Without Empire Article · July 1999 DOI: 10.1017/S0165115300024761 CITATIONS READS 14 490 1 author: Pieter Emmer Leiden University 146 PUBLICATIONS 228 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects: migration history View project Individual article View project All content following this page was uploaded by Pieter Emmer on 18 April 2014. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. The Dutch Atlantic, 1600–1800 Expansion Without Empire by Piet C. Emmer Abstract. – The history of the Dutch Atlantic seems riddled with failures. Within fifty years of their conquest, the two most important Dutch colonies (in Brazil and in North America) were lost. In addition, the Dutch plantations in the Caribbean suffered severe financial setbacks, bringing the Dutch slave trade to a virtual standstill. In this contribution the author asserts that even without these disasters, the Dutch could not have rivalled the British, as the Dutch did not have sufficient resources or naval power. Only in the tropics were the Dutch able to continue trading and producing cash crops. The resulting high mortality made the Atlantic empire a demographic disaster for the Dutch, while the other European powers saw their overseas populations increase. The successful recruitment of foreigners to serve as soldiers, sailors and planters enabled the Dutch to remain an Atlantic power. A) WHY HAS THE HISTORY OF THE DUTCH EXPANSION IN THE ATLANTIC BEEN NEGLECTED? The Atlantic economy is not a popular object of study among historians of the Low Countries. On the other hand, the history of the early Dutch expansion has witnessed a considerable increase in historical attention during the past twenty years. The discrepancy between these two phenomena is not easily explained. No doubt, the underlying reason behind the negligence in studying their Atlantic past is the fact that the Dutch were not very important in that part of the world. It was in the Atlantic that the Dutch lost their global war with the Iberians reaching a stalemate in West Africa and suffering defeat in South America. In addition, the British cut the Dutch down to size in North America and in the Caribbean by conquering the settlement colony of New Netherland only some fifty years after it had been founded and Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas 38 © Böhlau Verlag Köln/Weimar/Wien 2001 32 Piet C. Emmer by taking away some of the most promising plantation colonies of Dutch Guiana after the Napoleonic Wars. In view of all these defeats in the Atlantic it seemed attractive to concentrate on the history of the Dutch in Asia, where they played a unique role, far more important than their relative modest position among the expanding nations of Europe seemed to have allowed for. For two centuries the Dutch were the single most important traders in Asia, and the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or VOC) had a virtual monopoly in the marketing of a large assortment of Asian goods. The Dutch East India Company in itself was unique both in organisation as well as in size. At times it employed more than 40,000 personnel and could claim to be the largest commercial enterprise in the world. The Company built its own ships, the largest vessels afloat at the time. The demand for manpower was so large that yearly many thousands of young German and Scandinavian men migrated to the Dutch port cities in order to hire themselves out to the Dutch East India Company. The turnover among the Company’s employees at sea or in Asia was very high: between 1600 and 1800 the VOC brought one million men to Asia of whom only one third returned home alive. In the Atlantic the Dutch played a much more modest role. Within 50 years after their first exploits in this region, the Dutch lost their momentum, even before their economic position in Europe itself started to decline. In this the Dutch were not alone as France also experienced a series of setbacks in the Atlantic endeavours albeit a century later. For the U.K., Spain and Portugal the Atlantic remained the main theatre of their respective overseas empires until the period of Modern Imperialism. The divergent developments of the national experiences in the Atlantic have had a direct impact on the historiography. The body of historical literature regarding the Dutch and French expansion in the Atlantic is much more limited both in volume and depth than that regarding the English, Spanish and Portuguese empires in the Atlantic. In fact, there is ample reason to support the contention that over the past thirty years the historiographic developments regarding the English-speaking Atlantic belong to the most dynamic and innovative sectors of the historical field as a whole. There are many reasons for this and it would be impossible to list them all. The most obvious explanation for the historiographic domi- The Dutch Atlantic, 1600–1800 Expansion Without Empire 33 nance of the British Atlantic is the simple fact that the number of professional historians interested in this topic is far larger than those specializing in the French, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch Atlantic. Aside from the sheer number of historical experts there also are a number of economic, social and political arguments that stress the fact that the British compartment of the Atlantic was more dynamic and more important than the others. First of all, it was only in the British Atlantic that settlement colonies were established with rapid economic growth. None of the other settlement colonies in the New World have been able to develop in the same way and this has created the a-historical notion of failure and backwardness in the historiography of the Caribbean and Latin America. The second reason for explaining the exceptional importance of the British Atlantic pertains to the Caribbean. It might be true that most colonial powers of the New World had colonial possessions in the West Indies, but only the British Caribbean could boast a history of uninterrupted economic development. When one region in the British Caribbean showed signs of stagnation, another took over. This resulted in the notion that the British Caribbean had developed a capitalist economy before such an economy could be established in the metropole itself. In all other sections of the Caribbean the economic growth derived from the slavery-cum-plantation economy was not as long lasting. The Spanish Caribbean did not develop a viable plantation sector until the beginning of the 19th century. The plantation sector in the French Caribbean might have boomed during the second half of the 18th century surpassing the British Caribbean in output, but the slave insurrection on Saint-Dominque and the subsequent foundation of Haiti reduced it to relative insignificance in relation to the French economy as a whole. A similar point can be made about the plantations in the Dutch Caribbean where the levels of growth were badly affected by the extremely uneven input of capital by the metropolitan investors to be discussed further on in this contribution. The third reason explaining the importance of the British Atlantic can be found in the fact that Britain became the first industrial nation and it has been assumed that Britain’s successful Atlantic empire constituted an or even the decisive impetus for the Industrial Revolution. It could not be simply a coincidence that after 1750 Britain’s economic growth spurt was more significant than elsewhere and that at the 34 Piet C. Emmer same time its trans-Atlantic economic activities were growing more rapidly than those of any other country in Europe. That growth is neatly reflected in the maritime activities. Until the middle of the 18th century the total tonnage of the Dutch merchant marine was on a par with that of Britain. However in 1786–87 the British fleet counted double the amount of tonnage and in 1800, i.e. within a period of 50 years, British tonnage was more as four times as large as that of the Dutch. The fourth reason for attributing more importance to the British Atlantic than to the Atlantic connections of the other colonial powers is the fact that both the abolition of the slave trade and slave emancipation have been vital to the reform and modernisation of the societies of both Britain and the U.S. In the case of the U.S. slave emancipation constituted one of the elements triggering the Civil War. In France, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands, on the other hand, the public discussions regarding these matters were confirmed to the relatively small group of those, who had some expertise in the matter or had some economic interest in the slave trade or in plantation agriculture. The last and perhaps the most powerful argument for the considerable production of studies regarding the English-speaking Atlantic relates to the position of the blacks in the U.S. After World War II the relatively inferior social and economic position of this group came under closer scrutiny than before, as it seemed obvious that the “melting pot” policies had had little or no effect on the integration of blacks into the society of North America. Could it be true that the process of enslavement in Africa, the infamous “Middle Passage” as the voyage between Africa and America was called, and the ‘peculiar institution’ of slavery itself had created insurmountable barriers to integration? Was the black community robbed of the fruit of their labour during slavery? Had slavery not made the Atlantic economy extremely profitable during the 17th and 18th centuries and had those profits not allowed for the industrialisation of the Western world and thus had laid the basis for the present-day wealth of the West? Such an emotional debate has been absent in the Spanish, French, Dutch and Portuguese Atlantic. First of all, outside the U.S. there were no large black minorities clamouring for equal civil rights. Secondly, the various industrial revolutions outside the U.K. only started after the plantations had lost most of their economic significance and thus the link between the modernisation of continental Western Europe and The Dutch Atlantic, 1600–1800 Expansion Without Empire 35 the abolition of the slave trade and the emancipation of the slaves is virtually absent. As a result of these developments we know more about colonisation, the slave trade, the slave rebellions and the importance of indentured labour in British America than in any other part of the Atlantic. As the British seem to have taken a Sonderweg in history, especially in the Atlantic, it seems useful to look at the more “normal” expansion experience such as that of the Dutch. B) THE DUTCH AND THE ATLANTIC CHALLENGE Why did the Dutch expansion into the Atlantic not result in the creation of a Dutch Atlantic empire? To begin answering this question I will show that the first, dynamic period of the Dutch expansion in the Atlantic between 1580 and 1675 contrasted sharply with the subsequent period of stagnation and decline. A real Dutch Atlantic empire incorporating an integrated set of colonies and trading forts on both sides of the Ocean only existed for a period of fifteen years, between 1630 and 1645. Yet, the Dutch had been almost everywhere in the Atlantic and the view of the Dutch as an important Atlantic power remained popular, particularly among foreign scholars. Yet, as early as 1645 the Dutch Atlantic started to disintegrate and subsequently constituted only a marginal addition to the Dutch metropolitan economy and society. If economic opportunities in the Atlantic were no more than marginal additions to the Dutch trade and investments in Europe and Asia, the demographic consequences of the Dutch expansion in the Atlantic were of no great importance either. There was no Dutch equivalent of the settlement colonies in the British and Iberian New World with their rapidly growing populations. The cultural impact of the Dutch Atlantic expansion was virtually invisible. A large, Dutch speaking community at the other side of the Atlantic never came into existence. The only two exceptions were the short-lived colonies of New Netherland (1609–1664) and Dutch Brazil (1630–1654). Together they housed about 15,000 Europeans of whom not more than 10,000 came from the Netherlands. In North America, the colony of New Netherland always remained a provincial outpost, but during a brief period the Dutch colony in Brazil was fully 36 Piet C. Emmer integrated into the expansive cultural and scientific life of the early Dutch Republic. However, this was a one-time phenomenon and it was never repeated in any of the other Dutch colonies and trading posts in the Atlantic. In fact, the cultural life of Dutch Brazil was the sole creation of an atypical Dutch administrator, Johan Maurits van Nassau Siegen. Dutch business acumen and organisational talents were not the winning factors in the Atlantic as was the case in Asia. In the Atlantic, naval strength was the decisive factor and for that reason the Dutch lost out against the other Atlantic powers, notably against England. However, the naval weakness of the Dutch did not become apparent right away. Their maritime defensive and offensive capacities were adequate during the period between 1600 and 1675 when the Atlantic balance of power was still in the making. During that period the Dutch were able to cash in on their low shipping costs, wide range of trade goods and excellent marketing skills because of the various wars in Europe and internal unrest in Portugal, Spain, France and Great Britain. After 1675, however, the Dutch were only allowed to compete with shippers and traders of other nationalities as the few remaining niches in the Atlantic area had been carefully partitioned between the Atlantic powers. Only the British were able to change the borderlines between the Atlantic empires as they had invested much more in naval power than any other nation. Indeed, the British were so powerful that they could have taken over more of the Spanish and Portuguese possessions in the New World and indeed all of the Dutch and French Atlantic had they wanted to. Only the British succeeded in creating an integrated Atlantic empire. That explains why the term “Atlantic history” has become popular among historians in the U.K. and the U.S. In the case of the Dutch such a concept makes no sense or as much sense as “Dutch Asia” or the “Dutch Mediterranean”. And the same applies to France after the loss of French Canada. It remains to be seen whether the terms “Spanish Atlantic” or “Portuguese Atlantic” are applicable as the internal commercial and demographic cohesion in these two empires were far weaker than in the British Atlantic. The Dutch Atlantic, 1600–1800 Expansion Without Empire C) 37 THE DEMOGRAPHY OF THE DUTCH ATLANTIC The ethnic composition of the people of the Dutch Atlantic was the same as that of the other Atlantic empires: Africans, Amerindians and Europeans. The main difference was the relatively small number of Amerindians and the decreasing number of Africans towards the end of the 18th century. The European component also was unique because of the relatively high number of non-Dutch such as Sephardim and Ashkenazi Jews, Germans and Scandinavians, the extremely low percentage of European women and the high mortality rate and the low birth rate. Let us consider each ethnic group one by one. The Amerindians The Dutch, like the Iberians, encountered the original inhabitants of the New World in the Caribbean, on the mainland of South America as well as in North America. All three encounters were different. In the Caribbean the Amerindians were traders. They seemed to have favoured the Dutch over the Spanish, possibly with the idea of forming an anti-Spanish alliance. During the course of the seventeenth century, the Amerindians in the Caribbean continued their dramatic decline and they were replaced as trading partners by the French and British colonists. In Brazil, the Amerindians were of great military importance to the Dutch in fighting the Portuguese. In total, the Amerindian population of Dutch Brazil has been estimated at about 9,000.1 In order to gain the Amerindians as allies, the Dutch colonial government in Brazil opposed Amerindian slavery. In that the Dutch were unique in South America, as at the time the Portuguese and the Spanish made extensive use of Amerindian slaves. However, the success of the Dutch Amerindian policies was limited. Some Amerindian nations became dedicated allies but they could not save the Dutch from defeat. They acted far too independently and could not really be relied upon in battle. Yet, in the history of the Atlantic no other European power has been so dependent upon Amerindian support as the Dutch. This was not only true in Brazil, but also in West Africa where the Dutch made use of Amerindian soldiers in conquering the Por1 Ernst van den Boogaart, “De Nederlandse expansie in het Atlantische gebied”: E. van den Boogaart et. al., Overzee, Nederlandse koloniale geschiedenis, 1590–1975 (Bussum 1982), pp. 124–125. 38 Piet C. Emmer tuguese stronghold Elmina (São Jorge da Mina) on the Gold Coast and Luanda in Angola. There is every reason to believe that the Dutch attitude towards Amerindians was based on practical considerations and not on some kind of unique racial and cultural ideology. In Brazil the Dutch might have acted differently from the Iberians, in the Guyana’s as well as in North America they pursued policies that were very similar to those of the other European nations.2 The Africans In all Atlantic empires – except for Spanish America – the Africans made up the most important element. Until 1850 the New World was demographically speaking an extension of Africa rather than of Europe. Between 1500 and 1850 more than 12 million Africans were brought to the New World and no more than 2 to 3 million Europeans.3 In the Dutch Atlantic the Africans were even more important than elsewhere because the European component was extremely small, especially after the loss of New Netherland in 1664. That explains why the Dutch moved so quickly into the slave trade during the first half of the seventeenth century. At that stage the economy of Dutch America would have collapsed without slaves, not only sections of it, as would have happened in the Atlantic empires of other nations in the Atlantic. Paradoxically, however, the Dutch slave trade was not an economic success.4 The relatively low profitability of the Dutch slave trade can be partially attributed to the demographic factor because the mortality on Dutch slave ships was relatively high.5 Three explanations can be offered. First, it should be pointed out that each year only a few Dutch ships made a slaving voyage with the exception of two short periods during the 18th century. That meant that most of the time inex- 2 Oliver A. Rink, Holland on the Hudson. An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York (Ithaca/London 1986), pp. 258–259. 3 David Eltis, “Free and Coerced Transatlantic Migrations: Some Comparisons”: American Historical Review 88 (1983), pp. 251–280. 4 Johannes Menne Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1815 (Cambridge 1990), pp. 276–280. 5 Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade (note 4), pp. 248–258 and Herbert S. Klein, The Atlantic Slave Trade (Cambridge 1999), p. 139. The Dutch Atlantic, 1600–1800 Expansion Without Empire 39 perienced crews and surgeons manned these slavers. Moreover, towards the end of the eighteenth century abolitionist pressures had induced Britain to enact several improvements in the trade such as a minimum amount of space per slave aboard ship as well as the compulsory inspection of the diaries of the ship’s surgeons upon their return.6 Such measures were never taken in the Dutch slave trade. Second, the mortality among slaves coming from different sections of the African coast varied widely. The death rate among slaves shipped from the Angolan coast was on average much higher than among slaves from the Senegambia area. Traditionally, Dutch slavers bought their slaves on the Gold coast and Angola and that factor alone suffices to explain why the mortality on Dutch slavers was relatively high.7 The third explanation for the low profitability in the Dutch slave trade was the extension of too much credit to dubious buyers. In the seventeenth century large losses were incurred because the Dutch had sold most of their slaves on credit to the Portuguese colonists in Dutch Brazil. After these colonists had started a rebellion, most of these debts could not be collected. A similar situation occurred more than a century later when the Suriname planters were unable to pay off their debts after a crash on the Amsterdam stock-exchange had put a sudden stop to the flow of mortgages. Again the Dutch slave traders lost substantial amounts of money as the Suriname planters could not pay their debts in addition to which they had virtually no cash to buy new slaves. These factors explain why the Dutch slave trade declined during the last two decades of the 18th century exactly at a time just when the slave trade of all other nations increased dramatically.8 Not only the Dutch slave trade but also the Dutch plantations in the West Indies suffered from inadequate profits. The reason for this was the untimely over- and under investment. Unlike their British and French colleagues, after 1750 planters in the Dutch West Indies were besieged by metropolitan investors offering large loans. Many planters 6 Herbert S. Klein/Stanley L. Engerman, “Long-term Trends in African Mortality in the Transatlantic Slave Trade”: Slavery and Abolition 18, 1 (April 1997), p. 43. 7 Stephen D. Behrendt, “Crew Mortality in the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Eighteenth Century”: Slavery and Abolition 18, 1 (April 1997), p. 63. On the geographical origins of African slaves on Dutch slave ships: Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade (note 4), p. 298. 8 Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade, A Census (Madison 1969), p. 216. 40 Piet C. Emmer could not resist the temptation, went into debt, and by 1775 the income from the yearly sugar and coffee crop no longer was sufficient to pay the interest on these loans, let alone to repay the principle. Many planters were bankrupted and as a consequence, hardly any money was forthcoming when the Caribbean plantations were in need of more investments in order to have access to the new technology available at the end of the 18th century. In the existing historiography, however, the financial disaster of the Suriname plantations is explained as the consequence of the peculiarly bad treatment of the slaves. Several contemporary authors – including Voltaire – considered the Suriname slave regime to be the harshest in the world. However, such extreme treatment would have impacted on the death and birth rates of the slaves and there exists no evidence to that extent. The demography of the slave population in the Dutch colonies in Guyana did not differ substantially from that in other colonies in the Caribbean.9 The only unique feature of the slave population in the largest Dutch plantation colony was the high incidence of young, male slaves running away. During the middle of the eighteenth century, the number of runaway slaves in Suriname was estimated to have been as high as 10 percent of the total slave population. This must have caused severe economic hardship for the planters. However, it could be argued that the ready availability of the “maroon escape hatch” made for a better selection between the slaves who did and those who did not want to work on the plantations. Those remaining would work more efficiently than elsewhere. In the other parts of the Caribbean slave resistance expressed itself in continuous malingering, strikes, insurrections and frequent rebellions. In Suriname, the comparative disadvantage of frequent marronage was offset by the absence of large-scale insurrections and rebellions.10 In sum, the truly unique features of the Africans in the Dutch Atlantic were minor ones and of limited importance. It is striking to note that towards the end the eighteenth century the slave trade in all Atlantic empires with a plantation sector increased. In each case the slave trade declined only after it had been made illegal by law. In the 9 Alex van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast. Roofbouw en overleven in een Caraibische plantagekolonie, 1750–1863 (Leiden 1993), p. 338. 10 Michael Craton, Testing the Chains; Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca 1982). The Dutch Atlantic, 1600–1800 Expansion Without Empire 41 Dutch Atlantic, however, the decline was caused by market forces and not by government intervention. The declining volume of the slave trade and decreasing plantation profits should have stimulated the Dutch to become the first nation to abolish the slave trade and to emancipate their slaves. In reality, however, the Dutch abolished their non-existent slave trade only after British pressure in 1814 and slaves in the Dutch Atlantic colonies were not emancipated until 1863. The Europeans The unique features of the Dutch Atlantic can be situated in the European segment of the population. Until the middle of the 18th century no other European population experienced such high mortality, counted so many men, and so many foreign men. Why was mortality so high? The explanation is a simple one: after the 1660’s the Dutch Atlantic did not include any settlement colony with a benign disease environment. Such settlement colonies were vital in the creation of the other Atlantic empires as the natural growth rates in Spanish, Portuguese, British and French America were much higher than that of any population in Europe. In peopling the settlement colonies in the New World, the number of immigrants was much less important than the growth of the population by autochthonous demographic growth. In the temperate regions of the New World Europeans had much more of a chance of building a future without the ravages of war, epidemics and hunger than in the Old. In the New World it was possible to marry early, to have many children, to own land and to give land to each of the children. As a consequence one generation of immigrants was able to double itself in size within twenty to thirty years. French Canada was an extreme example of this development. Around 1750 about half the population of this colony was under the age of fifteen because the number of surviving children per woman was no less than eight!11 As has been mentioned before, the only Dutch colony where a similar demographic boom could have taken place, New Netherland, was lost to the British in 1667. From that year onward European migrants in the Dutch Atlantic could only go to the West Indies, where the demand for European im- 11 Kenneth G. Davies, The North Atlantic World in the Seventeenth Century (Minneapolis/Oxford 1974), pp. 63–89. 42 Piet C. Emmer migrants was limited (these colonies never housed more than 4,000 to 5,000 Europeans) and to the trading forts on the African coast (with a maximum of about 600 Europeans at any one time). In the Caribbean as well as in West Africa the mortality among the Europeans was usually many times higher than at home while the birth rate was extremely low in view of the virtual absence of European women. In addition to these rather small Dutch communities in Africa and the Caribbean, the Dutch shipboard community in the Atlantic should be added: every year about sixty ships sailed to Suriname, twenty to the three neighbouring Dutch colonies in Guyana and perhaps as many to Curaçao and West Africa. If slave ships are included, we arrive at a maximum of two hundred ships manned by between thirty and forty men each, in total about 6,000 to 8,000 men. If the mortality aboard the Dutch East Indiamen is anything to go by, a mortality rate of at least two hundred per thousand per year can be estimated. That would mean that each year the Dutch Atlantic was in need of 1.400 sailors in addition to the 4,000 sailors needed each year by the Dutch East India Company.12 These figures stress the fact that the Dutch were unique in sending so many young, unmarried men to a destination in the tropics. Only the recruitment of migratory labour from outside the Netherlands enabled the Dutch to exploit their deadly niche in maritime trade. Elsewhere young, migratory men had more choice. After the middle of the seventeenth century North America became the main destination of free migrants as well as of indentured servants from Britain and a similar shift in migration away from the tropical colonies must have taken place within the Portuguese, Spanish and French Atlantic. The loss of New Netherland took this option away from the Dutch. Thus the high mortality aboard Dutch ships and in the Dutch colonies and trading establishments could no longer be compensated by the high growth rates of the settler populations in the temperate zones of the New World. The Dutch Atlantic ate men like no other colonial empire 12 Average number of Dutch ships in the Atlantic: Piet C. Emmer, “Het Atlantische gebied”: Frank J. A. Broeze, Jaap R. Bruijn and Femme S. Gaastra (eds.), Martieme geschiedenis der Nederlanden (Bussum 1977), pp. 300 and 303. On the demand for sailors aboard ships and trading posts of the Dutch East India Company: Femme S. Gaastra, “De V.O.C. in Azië, 1680–1795”: Ernst van den Boogaart et. al., Overzee (note 1), pp. 79–80. The Dutch Atlantic, 1600–1800 Expansion Without Empire 43 with the exception of the French Atlantic after the loss of French Canada. In sum, the Atlantic was a drain on the Dutch population, and certainly not a multiplier as elsewhere in the Atlantic. D) POWER POLITICS IN THE ATLANTIC There are two reasons why the Netherlands were unable to remain an important player in the Atlantic after 1674, the end of the third AngloDutch war. The usual explanation asserts that the Dutch were cut down to size because of internal strife among the politicians of Holland and Zeeland in addition to the gross mismanagement of the Atlantic activities by the Dutch West India Company. The historiography even suggests that the Dutch could have played a different role as demonstrated by the Dutch expansion in Asia, where the Dutch East India Company (VOC) remained profitable for much longer than its Atlantic counterpart and where the Dutch remained one of the major European trading powers in Asia right until the end of the eighteenth century. In comparison, the Dutch Atlantic was an empire killed in its infancy. This traditional view makes little sense as it takes for granted that the Dutch by their very nature somehow were bound to always be powerful players in the non-European world and that any deviation from that position needs to be explained. It makes much more historical sense to reverse the question: why was it that the Dutch were so exceptionally powerful in Asia during such a long period? An analysis of the Dutch in Asia would go beyond the scope of this contribution. However, the two most important factors in explaining the long-lasting Dutch expansion in Asia were: the absence of powerful European or Asian competitors and the near monopoly position of the Dutch in the market for Asian goods in Europe linked to their strong position in the inter-Asian trade. Admittedly, both the Dutch position in Asia as well as the Dutch share in the trade between Europe and Asia declined over time, but the Dutch remained powerful traders in Asia. In Asia the Dutch were able to cash in on their exceptionally strong organisational and financial skills as well as on their large supply of young men from surrounding countries willing to serve as sailors on the Dutch fleet and as soldiers in the tropical trading establishments of the VOC. Having a large, unchallenged monopoly com- 44 Piet C. Emmer pany was an advantage for most of the period between 1600 and 1800. No other European – or Asian – trading organisation could rival the Dutch East India Company. Such corporate policies were of limited use in the Atlantic. In fact, after 1675 an integrated Atlantic market ceased to exist. It was partitioned into five national compartments: a Spanish, Portuguese, French, British and Dutch one. As a result, the Dutch no longer could exploit their superior organisational skills as these could only be used in their own compartment. The size of these compartments in the Atlantic as well as the opportunities to transgress their borders depended on naval power. Before 1675 the British Navy was on a par with that of the Netherlands, but after that year the British Navy strongly increased in size and could defeat any combination of its opponents. The result was that only the British could decide how large a segment of the Atlantic they wanted to claim as their own and how much room they allowed their competitors. In view of the British naval superiority the slow reduction in size and importance of the other Atlantic empires was remarkable. Already at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the British could have annihilated both the Dutch and the French Atlantic. In actual fact this did not happen until the beginning of the nineteenth century with the Louisiana Purchase and the take-over of Dutch Berbice, Essequibo and Demerara. It is even more remarkable that the British hardly challenged the position of the Spanish and Portuguese in the Caribbean and in the South Atlantic.13 In view of this, is seems superfluous to pay much attention to internal strife among the Directors of the Dutch West India Company. Even in case the Dutch had pursued the best of policies in the strictest internal harmony and even if the Dutch West India Company had not gone bankrupt, the Dutch would still have lost out against Britain. 13 Gerald E. Aylmer, “Navy , State, Trade, and Empire”: Nicholas P. Canny (ed.), The Origins of Empire. British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century (Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. I, Oxford 1998), pp. 467–481. The Dutch Atlantic, 1600–1800 Expansion Without Empire 45 E) THE DUTCH WEST INDIA COMPANY: AN OBSTACLE TO ECONOMIC GROWTH? The Dutch West India Company (WIC) would never have been able to provide the Dutch with a prominent place in the Atlantic, yet its faits et gestes continued to divide the merchant community until the very end of the Company’s existence. Several Dutch merchants tried to evade the monopoly of the WIC disguised as foreigners. The best known example is that of Louis de Geer, who founded a Swedish African company in 1647. The Swedish company hampered the WIC operations for more than 10 years and then a Danish African company with many Dutch investors emerged as a bothersome competitor on the African coast. This company remained active and later became a completely Danish institution. In addition, between 1682 and 1718 the WIC was confronted by the Churfürstliche Afrikanisch Brandenburgische Compagnie, founded with the strong participation of some Zeeland merchants. And, finally, in 1718 and 1719, just before the end of the WIC monopoly in the slave trade, several Zeeland merchants participated in a slaving voyages from Ostend. Dutch capital was involved in all of these ventures, in addition to the vital know-how of former WIC employees with experience in the African slave trade. The final debate about the continuation of the WIC-monopoly took place during the year 1730, when the Company’s charter was once more up for renewal. The government took the monopoly away from the WIC forcing it to relinquish all trade and to become a purely administrative body, similar to the British Royal African Company after 1698 when that Company had lost its monopoly in the slave trade.14 Would an earlier abolition of the WIC monopoly have enabled the private Dutch merchants to participate more fully in the dramatic growth of production and shipping in the 18th century Atlantic? There is every reason to assume that without the WIC the volume of Dutch trade in the Atlantic would have increased only marginally. The motor behind the increase in trade and production in the British, French and Portuguese Atlantic empires was plantation agriculture and the Dutch themselves had throttled this motor. As has been pointed out before, 14 Henk den Heijer, Goud, ivoor en slaven: Scheepvaart en Handel van de Tweede Westindische Compagnie op Afrika (Zutphen 1997), pp. 299–314. 46 Piet C. Emmer the main plantation colony of the Dutch, Suriname, suffered from a financial crisis and as a result the production of coffee and sugar in the Dutch Atlantic did not grow as rapidly as elsewhere. By that time the WIC hardly played any role and an earlier dissolution of the Company would not have altered this development.15 Even the existence of protective tariffs could not have altered the history of the Dutch Atlantic. It is true Caribbean planters in both France and the UK enjoyed protection from the world market. At times they received 25% more for their products than the price on the world market would have allowed for. In the Netherlands such protective tariffs were not applied. The Dutch brand of mercantilism excluded non-Dutch shipping from transporting goods between the Dutch West Indies and the Netherlands. Thus the planters in the Dutch West Indies had the worst of two worlds: they were not allowed to profit from a competitive market for shipping services and at the same time they were denied a protective market for their products in Europe. Planters in the British and French plantation colonies, on the other hand, could rely on a protected home market for the sale of at least part of their production. CONCLUSION In what way does this contribution regarding the Dutch Atlantic affect existing ideas about the history of the Atlantic in general? First of all, the history of the Dutch Atlantic shows how important naval power was. Only the British were able to build a navy that not only could protect all of the British possessions in the Atlantic, but that could also harm or reduce the size of the Atlantic possessions of Spain, France and the Netherlands. After the 1670s the Dutch were unable to spend as much money in keeping their navy on a par with Britain because the British internal revenue system was far superior to that of any other country in Europe. The second best option was that the Dutch could try to profit from their neutral position in the Atlantic during the many wars of the eighteenth century. Britain, on the other hand, was able to 15 Piet C. Emmer, The Dutch in the Atlantic Economy: Trade, Slavery and Emancipation (Aldershot 1998), pp. 107–109. The Dutch Atlantic, 1600–1800 Expansion Without Empire 47 damage its competitors in the Atlantic in addition to expanding its empire by annexing some of the most promising plantation colonies such as Guiana and Trinidad at the end of the period under review. A second feature of early Atlantic history, which was uniquely British, is the large supply of young, mobile people willing to work and settle overseas. Only Portugal seems to have matched the British experience in that respect. Without such a supply, the Dutch expansion in the Atlantic took on a different character. Most of the Dutch viewed their stay overseas as a temporary exile, comparable to making an extended voyage on a ship. However, a caveat is in order here. It should be pointed out that the Dutch could command large numbers of foreign men to become sailors and soldiers overseas. Between 1600 and 1800 the Dutch East India Company was able to send more than one million of them to Asia, half of them non-Dutch. Only about forty percent returned alive. These figures indicate that the Dutch excelled in sending men to the tropics on a temporary basis. Their system of recruiting poor, young, unmarried men from Scandinavia, Germany and the North of France was unrivalled. That explains why the Dutch merchants were so keen on exploiting their lethal trade niche with the tropical zones in Asia: they had enough men. To send those men as settlers to North America as Britain did would have been less profitable. A third observation triggered by the Dutch experience in the Atlantic concerns the importance of protection. How much growth would the French and British “darlings of the empire” in the Caribbean, have generated without protective tariffs? In the Dutch experience the plantations colonies were viewed as generators of trade rather than as producers of tropical cash crops. There was no protection of Dutch sugar and coffee on the home market and the major part of the imported coffee and sugar into the Netherlands came from non-Dutch colonies. The Dutch were as keen as all the other Atlantic powers to exclude foreigners from trading with the Dutch Caribbean, but they showed no interest in excluding foreign products from their home market. As a result, the Dutch plantation economy was less dynamic than elsewhere in the Atlantic, where economic growth was in part stimulated by the consumer subsidies for sugar and coffee on the home market. Were the Dutch, for once, ahead of their time? It was not until the middle of the eighteenth century when the privileged position of the West Indian planters in Britain came into 48 Piet C. Emmer question. By that time, however, a comparison between the respective Atlantic activities of Britain and the Netherlands had become increasingly difficult as the industrialisation of the U.K. progressed. The ‘new economy’ was a threat to the Netherlands and made its commercial community defend the existing ways of exploiting the Atlantic, i.e. by slave trading and by using slaves. In Dutch eyes abolitionism was a British trick to damage its commercial rivals in the Atlantic. In Britain, on the other hand, industrialisation, and the opening of new markets in Latin America and Asia stimulated the elite to give in to the demands of the abolitionists and to start imagining new ways of responding to the Atlantic challenge, by abolishing the slave trade and by no longer relying on slave labour in its own colonies, exemplifying the British Sonderweg. View publication stats