The preconscious and psychic change in Fairbairn's model of mind

Int J Psychoanal 2005;86:1–16 The preconscious and psychic change in Fairbairn’s model of mind GRAHAM CLARKE 47 Lord Holland Road, Colchester, CO2 7PS, UK — [email protected] (Final version accepted 21 June 2004) Fairbairn’s mature model of mind was developed over a period of time and was modified significantly as it developed. In contrast to some sympathetic commentators who have suggested changes, the author has been impressed by the untapped potential of the theory. There are two areas that he feels need clarification and explanation, which are the importance of the preconscious, so neglected in our literature, and its role in psychic growth. By looking closely at the topographic categories and the way that Fairbairn uses them, the author has developed a modified version of Fairbairn’s original model, which has a crucial role for a structured preconscious. The preconscious now becomes both a crucial original aspect of the early self and a significant, descriptively unconscious, fulcrum for both psychic change and mature dependence. Keywords: Fairbairn, preconscious, psychic change, creativity, self, structured preconscious, potential space, the third, selfobjects, mature dependence The development of Fairbairn’s mature theory of endopsychic structure, which started in 1940 with his paper on schizoid phenomena, and finished in 1963 with his synopsis of the development of endopsychic structure was, in his own words, ‘not the systematic elaboration of an already established point of view, but the progressive development of a line of thought’ (1952, p. 133). It could be argued that Fairbairn’s early papers on dissociation, libido theory and the superego, made available to us now through the publication of Scharff and Fairbairn Birtles’s invaluable twovolume collection (1994), prepared the ground for his mature theory, a point Rubens has made (1996). All of Fairbairn’s papers between 1940 and 1963 contributed to the development of his theory, whose fullest expression was probably his paper on endopsychic structure (1944). However, this was by no means his final word on the subject as the 1951 addendum to that paper, prepared for the publication of his only book in 1952, attests. Similarly the extended footnote in his paper on hysteria (1954), with its detailed discussion of ambivalence and the internalisation of good and bad objects, makes a significant contribution to the development of his mature structural theory, or ‘psychology of dynamic structure’ as he called it. This means that the fully developed model is never completely stated in any one of Fairbairn’s papers and subsequently there have been a number of papers, by people sympathetic to his work, suggesting modifications to his model (Rubens, 1984; Greenberg, 1991; Padel, 1991; Mitchell, 1994; Scharff and Fairbairn Birtles, 1997; Grotstein, 1998; Skolnick, 1998). By looking at the way these thinkers have suggested the model be changed, I have come to appreciate its strengths. In general I have not been happy to suggest changes to Fairbairn’s model while, in my view, its full potential has yet to be realised. However, through trying to understand and defend the model ©2005 Institute of Psychoanalysis 2 GRAHAM CLARKE against these suggested changes, I have come to feel that there are some problems with the mature theory that do need to be addressed, in particular the process of psychic change and the nature of the unconscious in mature dependence. What follows is an attempt to produce a modified version of Fairbairn’s model of endopsychic structure by considering his use of the topographical categories. Combining Fairbairn’s structural model with Freud’s structural model is impossible since they are based upon such very different underlying presuppositions about energy and structure: Freud’s divorce of energy from structure represents a limitation imposed upon his thought by the general scientific atmosphere of his day … From the standpoint of dynamic structure … ‘instinct’ is not the stimulus to psychic activity, but itself consists in characteristic activity on the part of a psychical structure. Similarly, ‘impulse’ is not … a kick in the pants administered out of the blue to a surprised, and somewhat pained, ego, but a psychical structure in action— a psychical structure doing something to something or somebody (Fairbairn, 1952, p. 151). But, since a satisfactory reconciliation between Freud’s topographical model and his structural model has never been achieved, what I am suggesting is that a reconciliation between Freud’s topographic model and a version of Fairbairn’s structural model can be considered, and this is the principal aim of this paper. My belief is that this new model is consistent with Fairbairn’s original intentions, and consistent with many of the changes suggested by others, and makes much clearer the process of psychic change that is essential to any psychology of dynamic structure. At the end of the paper, I will mention a similar hypothesis from a Winnicottian perspective, which means the changes proposed here could allow for a productive exchange between object-relations theorists as a whole. Fairbairn’s use of the preconscious Fairbairn included Freud’s topographical categories—conscious (Cs.), preconscious (Pcs.) and unconscious (Ucs.) (Sandler et al., 1997)—in his original diagram of endopsychic structure, but never discussed how these categories might be integrated into his mature theory. There is therefore good reason to suppose that Fairbairn did not see the topographical categories as being contradictory to his model in the way that he clearly saw, and explicitly rejected, Freud’s libido theory. At the same time, comments regarding the preconscious do not appear with any regularity in his work and the model does not seem to have an important place for the category except in so far as the ideal object (ego ideal) only exists in the preconscious. Although there is no explicit reference in Fairbairn’s work to the ego ideal being in the preconscious, and his diagram was never amended to locate it there, everything he wrote about the ego ideal after 1941 suggests that it was in the preconscious. In the lists of points he uses to define an object-relations viewpoint (1954, 1963), he explicitly states that the ego ideal isn’t repressed and that the superego is comprised of both the ideal object (ego ideal) and the repressed anti-libidinal ego and object. At the same time, he argues that the ego ideal becomes the repository of good relationships in the moral defence or defence of the superego (1943, p. 66) and that it is an internal object and the source of the desexualised and idealised imagos that the hysteric projects on to the analyst (1944, p. 136). THE PRECONSCIOUS AND PSYCHIC CHANGE IN FAIRBAIRN’S MODEL OF MIND 3 When the exciting and rejecting objects are split off, there remains a nucleus of the original object shorn of its over-exciting and over-frustrating elements; and this nucleus then assumes the status of a desexualised and idealised object which is cathected and retained for itself by the central ego … It will be noticed that the nuclear object in question is an accepted object for the central ego, and is thus not subjected to repression. This is the object which I now regard as providing the nucleus round which the super-ego, as I have come to conceive it, is built up; but, in view of its nature, it would appear appropriate to revive the term ‘ego ideal’ for its designation (1952, pp. 178–9). Fairbairn’s final view of the superego was that it was actually made up of the (preconscious) ego ideal (which needs to become more realistic to achieve maturity) and the (unconscious) anti-libidinal ego and object (which need to be diminished in power and influence). This is the distinction between the ‘positive’ and the ‘punitive’ superego in psychoanalytic theory. In 1929, Fairbairn attended the international conference at Oxford where Ferenczi was also present. In 1928, Ferenczi had produced a paper describing the inner reality of a fully analysed patient in which the distinction between the ego ideal and the (punitive, unconscious) superego played a major role. Fairbairn notes in his papers the importance of the fully analysed patient as a topic of discussion at the 1929 conference (Scharff and Fairbairn Birtles, 1994, vol. 2, pp. 454–61) and I think his idea of mature dependence was influenced by that discussion. I believe that Fairbairn came to know about Ferenczi’s model and used it later, perhaps unconsciously, in his own mature theory. Roheim describes Ferenczi’s argument thus: if we agree to call the destructive ‘ethical’ phase of our psyche the Superego and the libidinal phase the Ego ideal we might say, with reference to a recent paper of Ferenczi’s, that analysis is finished when we have the pure Ego ideal without any traces of the Superego (1930, p. 202). Or, as Ferenczi wrote: In reality my objective was to destroy only that part of the super-ego which had become unconscious and was therefore beyond the range of influence. I have no sort of objection to the retention of a number of positive and negative models in the preconscious of the ordinary individual. In any case he will no longer have to obey his preconscious super-ego so slavishly as he had previously to obey his unconscious parent imago (1928, p. 98). This is totally consistent with Fairbairn’s distinction between a (preconscious) ego ideal and the (repressed, unconscious) superego (anti-libidinal ego and object) and the model developed here. In the original diagram, the central ego, shorn of its internal objects and split-off egos, has Cs., Pcs. and Ucs. components: as regards the relationship of the central ego to the other egos, our most important clue to its nature lies in the fact that, whereas the central ego must be regarded as comprising preconscious and conscious, as well as unconscious, elements, the other egos must equally be regarded as essentially unconscious (Ferenczi, 1928, pp. 104–5). Macmurray (1939) describes one way in which a perfectly acceptable nonpathological unconscious, consistent with the central ego having an unconscious component, may come about from the progressive development of skills and habits 4 GRAHAM CLARKE which themselves underpin the development of more complex skills and habits, for example, correcting a golf swing or tennis stroke, learning to write with your nondominant hand etc. In Fairbairn’s final view, the ideal object is a significant preconscious entity separate from, but associated with, the central ego. The central ego no longer has an explicit unconscious aspect. The (pathological) unconscious in this model is made up of the split-off libidinal and anti-libidinal selves. It is on the basis of this latter model that the idea of mature dependence and the disappearance of the (system) unconscious became associated (Rubens, 1984; Mitchell, 1994; Young, 1998). The dissolution of the repressed sub-selves, as the major process of the move towards mature dependence, leads to their eventual disappearance and the emptying out of the (system) unconscious. In Fairbairn’s model, the original ego is essentially reality oriented and preconscious. This ego becomes split and then subject to dissociation and repression because it is partly constituted by unacceptable object relationships— over-exciting and over-rejecting. Figure 1 – Modified version of Fairbairn’s diagram (1952, p. 105) THE PRECONSCIOUS AND PSYCHIC CHANGE IN FAIRBAIRN’S MODEL OF MIND 5 If we follow Fairbairn, as faithfully as we can, to see what his intention was regarding his model and the topographical categories, we find that he did not explicitly address the question of the relationship between Ucs., Pcs. and Cs. and his model of object relations. His diagram shows a central ego from whose Pcs. the material for a dream he describes issued forth because of a presumed configuration of inner structures—ego and object structures. We have in essence a triangular relationship between the central, libidinal and anti-libidinal selves. It is the conflict between these three structures and the way this waxes and wanes, in response to internal and external circumstances, that determines to some degree the Pcs. and the Ucs. He says, in relation to the patient’s dream, ‘the dreamer’s preconscious attitude towards her husband is ambivalent; and this is the attitude adopted by her central ego towards its external object, as well as towards the internalised representative of this object’ (1952, p. 104). Fairbairn’s ‘difficulties’ over where to place the ‘good object’ serve as an interesting clue to problems with an unconscious part of the central ego. Since Fairbairn (1943) suggested that the good object was only internalised for defensive purposes after the internalisation of bad objects into the unconscious, it follows that the logical place to internalise the good object would be the unconscious part of the central ego. But, to put the good object in the unconscious would contradict his argument about the (defensive) need to internalise bad objects but not good objects. Moreover, he explicitly says that the good object in the form of an ego ideal or ideal object was not repressed and was potentially available to consciousness, namely, was preconscious. As a good Freudian, Fairbairn would have been aware of the fact that the system unconscious was unknowable except through the systems conscious and preconscious. A close reading reveals that Fairbairn sometimes seems to write as if he were describing the unconscious when in fact he is describing an assumed state of affairs internally (including the Ucs.), that Cs. contents, derived from Pcs. contents, appears to indicate. Nevertheless the fact that his model is clearly related to Freud’s model and is a thoroughgoing attempt to describe the whole system in object-relations terms proves much more useful than any of these considerations. That is, Fairbairn’s model has made its way in the world because of the introduction of a thoroughgoing object-relations approach, rather than its offering a way of integrating the topographical categories within a structural model. Fairbairn was only following Freud (1914) when he insisted upon the objectrelations basis of internalised experience. All internalised objects are really complex structures of associated object relationships (Padel, 1985). As already noted Fairbairn’s mature model has a conscious (central) ego, a preconscious (ideal) object and two unconscious (libidinal and anti-libidinal) egos and associated unconscious objects. One question that might be asked is why can’t there be preconscious libidinal and anti-libidinal dynamic structures? The relationship between the conscious ego and its ideal object is represented as if it was similar to the relationship between the other egos and their related objects, that is, the central ego is to the ideal object (ego ideal in Figure 1 key) as the libidinal ego is to the libidinal object (LE is to EO in Figure 1) and the anti-libidinal ego is to the anti-libidinal object (IS is to RO in 6 GRAHAM CLARKE Figure 1), so it might follow that their objects would have a similar nature. If we go back to the origins of the basic endopsychic structure as described by Fairbairn, the three ‘selves’ are initially all constituted by relationships with differentiated objects. This initial internal situation, before defensive dissociation and repression are employed—split object, split ego—can be regarded as a preconscious precursor to the manic defence. The libidinal and anti-libidinal selves become repressed after they are split off from the central self, and at the same time the accepted object becomes its ideal object. In conformity with what seem to have been Fairbairn’s own intentions I will redescribe the constituents of Fairbairn’s model as a central self, a libidinal self and an anti-libidinal self, where each is formed by the object relationships between a part of the ego and a complex object. In this way we might imagine Fairbairn’s original five components being reduced to three. This then raises the question of the ideal object and the part it plays for the central self and its preconscious status. To keep it separate from the central self seems necessary as it is supposed to play an independent role mediating between the central self and the two repressed subsidiary selves. The preconscious plays an important part in creativity and can be seen as the manic-oceanic creative womb that Milner (1987) identifies as central to that process. In his review of Kris’s Psychoanalytic explorations in art, Fairbairn concludes that: the reconciliation upon which the aesthetic value of a work of art depends would appear to be one characteristically effected at a preconscious level, although the artist’s conscious contribution to the moulding of his creation must have an important influence upon its final form; and doubtless in the case of the greatest artists there is a happy combination between conscious and preconscious activity (1953, p. 430). This statement both allows for, and gives considerable importance to, the preconscious. Within Fairbairn’s model, the only preconscious entity is the ideal object or ego ideal. Perhaps at this juncture it is worth noting that the idea that the ego ideal and the ideal object are the same entity only makes sense if the dynamic structure so named has both egoic and object-like aspects, in other words, is a dynamic structure made from object relationships. The nature of the preconscious I have taken the formulation of key features of the preconscious from Chapter 6 ‘The system preconscious’ of Sandler et al.’s (1997) work. Their overall definition of the preconscious is: ‘the area of the mental apparatus in which instinctual wishes are examined, modified, permitted to proceed, or turned back … a system that is descriptively speaking, unconscious’ (p. 85). This, as we shall see, only describes an aspect of the preconscious. We will need to look at the role of the preconscious in dealing with experience in and of the world, too, to get the whole picture. Consistent with Fairbairn’s view of dynamic structures being composed of object relations, Sandler et al. describe the content of each of Freud’s topographical systems as being composed of object relations: ‘thus a repressed sexual wish in the Unconscious would involve content representing both the object of the wish and the activity involved in relation to that object’ (p. 83). THE PRECONSCIOUS AND PSYCHIC CHANGE IN FAIRBAIRN’S MODEL OF MIND 7 When it comes to describing the way an instinctual wish enters the preconscious and the conscious, and the forms such representations take, Sandler et al. comment: In general, a derivative of an instinctual wish may be conscious or unconscious (in the descriptive sense), depending on its topographic location in the apparatus. It is not the original instinctual wish, but a substitute for it, one that can indirectly provide some degree of satisfaction of the instinctual wish from which it has been derived and which, in a sense, it conceals. Instinctual derivatives can take many forms, including dreams, sublimatory activities, daydreams, neurotic symptoms, hallucinations, parapraxes, forms of ‘acting out’, creative productions, play activities, transference manifestations, and the like (p. 83). The wealth and variety of phenomena associated with the activity of the preconscious suggests that the preconscious itself might be structured and that there are very different routes that an ‘instinctual wish’ might take in moving from the Ucs. to the Cs. Sandler et al. argue that the preconscious develops gradually as a result of a person’s experience and give an account of the ways in which the preconscious is formed by experience in the world: Preconscious contents include many diverse elements. In the first place there are those primary process derivatives of the instinctual wishes which are pressing forward for discharge and, by reason of their primary process transformation, have evaded the first level of censorship and have entered the Preconscious … Secondly, the contents of the Preconscious include mental representations that have been formed as the result of past and present interaction with the external world … Thirdly, we must include the products of preconscious imaginative (i.e. phantasy) and cognitive activity (p. 85). In general, then, we find that the preconscious mediates between the inner and the outer world and is formed by its transactions with both: ‘the Preconscious and its contents arise as a consequence of influence from two sides: from the depths of the mental apparatus (Unconscious) and from its surface. In addition, new ideational contents are constantly being formed within the Preconscious itself’ (pp. 85–6). The preconscious is a place where integration can take place in conformity with reality but without entering consciousness: In the work of the Preconscious, a great deal of integration and synthesis occurs … The ‘necessities’, ‘demands’ and ‘limitations’ imposed by the real external world … are taken into account … The Preconscious may make use of its capacity to delay and control the peremptory instinctual wishes arising from the Unconscious that have penetrated into the Preconscious. This implies that the Preconscious has the capacity to examine and scrutinise its own contents without these having to enter the Conscious (p. 86). The world of the preconscious is, properly speaking, a symbolic world with access to language, a creative world of problem-solving and decision-making: ‘much of the activity of the Preconscious can be subsumed under the heading of thinking, and a substantial amount of problem-solving and decision-making is accomplished within the system’ (p. 86); also, ‘it is important to note that the Preconscious is regarded as being able to make use of verbal symbolism’ (p. 89); and whereas the Unconscious is regarded as following the pleasure principle, the Preconscious is influenced by what is known as the reality principle. This refers to the taking into account the realities of the external world … in assessing the consequences of his action (p. 89). 8 GRAHAM CLARKE The reality principle is a major aspect of the preconscious, especially in regard to its role as a second level of censorship between the Pcs. and the Cs.: Immediate gratification of the instinctual wishes or their derivatives is delayed or abandoned if this threatens the self-preservation needs of the individual or his moral and ethical principles. The reality principle plays a major part in the operation of the ‘second censorship’ between the Preconscious and the Conscious, but it can be considered to be the dominant ‘principle’ in the functioning of the Preconscious as a whole (p. 89). The importance of the preconscious as an invaluable core of the most essential aspects of our selves is stressed: The Preconscious is said to function predominantly according to the secondary process, which is, developmentally speaking, the outcome of the influence of the external world on the mental apparatus. This impingement brings about such characteristics as the notion of causality, logic, a sense of time, and an intolerance of ambiguity and contradictory elements. Most important, in the course of development, the Preconscious becomes, together with the Conscious, that part of the mental apparatus in which language can be used as an efficient tool for the manipulation of mental content. The acquisition of verbal symbols for things and for abstract ideas goes parallel with the differentiation between the Unconscious and the Preconscious. Words can be used to harness and to attenuate the force of instinctual wishes (pp. 89–90). While considering the preconscious I want to look briefly at Freud’s description of the movement of experience between the Cs., Pcs. and Ucs. and vice versa, and at the different levels of censorship between Ucs. and Pcs., and Pcs. and Cs. I think these must be seen as operating in both directions. So the preconscious allows material from the Ucs. to enter the Pcs., and it filters Pcs. material into the Ucs. too. Similarly, the Pcs. allows material to enter Cs., and filters Cs. material into the Pcs. Thus, the homogeneous Pcs. of Freud’s theory is carrying out sophisticated filtering and transforming procedures at the boundaries with both the Cs. and the Ucs. This seems to me to raise the question of whether the Pcs. might be structured to deal with these different activities. This does not seem to have been part of psychoanalytic thinking on the preconscious during the period when the topographical model was dominant, despite many examples of the heterogeneous functions attributed to the preconscious. As Freud notes: On the one hand we find that derivatives of the Ucs. become conscious as substitutive formations and symptoms—generally, it is true, after having undergone great distortion as compared with the unconscious, though often retaining many characteristics which call for repression. On the other hand, we find that many preconscious formations remain unconscious, though we should have expected that, from their nature, they might very well have become conscious. Probably in the latter case the stronger attraction of the Ucs. is asserting itself. We are led to look for the more important distinction as lying, not between the conscious and the preconscious, but between the preconscious and the unconscious. The Ucs. is turned back on the frontier of the Pcs. by the censorship, but the derivatives of the Ucs. can circumvent this censorship, achieve a high degree of organisation and reach a certain intensity of cathexis in the Pcs. When, however, this intensity is exceeded and they try to force themselves into consciousness, they are recognised as derivatives of the Ucs. and are repressed afresh at the new frontier of censorship, between the Pcs. and the Cs. Thus the first of these censorships THE PRECONSCIOUS AND PSYCHIC CHANGE IN FAIRBAIRN’S MODEL OF MIND 9 is exercised against the Ucs. itself, and the second against its Pcs. derivatives [my italics]. One might suppose that in the course of individual development the censorship had taken a step forward. In psychoanalytic treatment the existence of the second censorship, located between the systems Pcs. and Cs., is proved beyond question [my italics]. We require the patient to form numerous derivatives of the Ucs., we make him pledge himself to overcome the objections of the censorship to these preconscious formations becoming conscious, and by overthrowing this censorship, we open up the way to abrogating the repression accomplished by the earlier one. To this let us add that the existence of the censorship between the Pcs. and the Cs. teaches us that becoming conscious is no mere act of perception, but is probably a hypercathexis, a further advance in the psychical organisation (1915, p. 193). This last sentence is relevant to issues of psychic change addressed in the next section. Criticisms of Fairbairn’s model and suggestions for improvement John Padel (1991, 1994) addresses the problem of how psychic growth takes place within a Fairbairnian framework. Padel makes an invaluable contribution to our understanding of Fairbairn by paying close attention to a description of the way in which psychic change may come about with particular reference to the analytic situation. Padel’s account argues that in order for psychic change to take place the subsidiary selves, or aspects of them, have to be able to be transformed (as described in the next section) from the unconscious to the preconscious where they, or rather representations of object relations, can then make their way into consciousness where they can be worked through, such a change being one of psychic growth or integration. Similarly, the passage of new experiences into consciousness and then, if repressed, through the preconscious to the unconscious, seems to be a similar process though working in the opposite direction, and could lead to some forms of undesirable psychic change of a regressive or disintegrative nature. Padel’s comments, upon the process of sorting day residues during sleep, seem entirely consistent with Freud’s account: What actually happens in dream-formation is a very remarkable and quite unforeseen turn of events. The process begins in the Pcs. and reinforced in the Ucs., pursues a backward course, through Ucs. to perception, which is pressing upon consciousness. This regression is the third phase of the dream-formation. For the sake of clarity we will repeat the two earlier ones: the reinforcement of the Pcs. day’s residues by the Ucs., and the setting up of the dream-wish (Freud, 1917 [1915], p. 227). As part of this research, I searched for references to the preconscious and found that there is a dearth of them. Kris (1950) was already aware of this and, given that the topological theory was the theoretical system that Freud spent most time working within, expresses similar regrets to those expressed by Greenberg about the apparent dropping of the concept from contemporary psychoanalytic thinking. Greenberg (1991) believes that the relational view has gone too far and ignores some very real aspects of the drive/structure model, in particular the topographical distinctions between the Ucs., the Pcs. and the Cs. 10 GRAHAM CLARKE Mitchell (1994, p. 81) has expressed the opinion that Fairbairn’s model, as developed in his 1944 paper on endopsychic structure, was unnecessarily complicated and over-formal. He prefers the implicit model of Fairbairn’s 1943 paper where the internalisation of the good object as a preconscious ego ideal was carried out as a defence against the already internalised and unconscious bad objects. In a recent paper, Grotstein suggests a modification to Fairbairn’s model that comes out of his discussion, from a Kleinian perspective, of the patient’s dream through which Fairbairn developed his model of endopsychic structure. This suggestion is isolated and unconnected to any other detailed discussion of this problem in Grotstein’s work that I know of. It falls far short of a concrete modification to the model, though it suggests far-reaching changes along the lines of the change to the model proposed here. Grotstein says: I believe that Fairbairn may well have come around eventually to postulating a normal endopsychic structure but one situated topographically in the preconscious rather than the unconscious—because of his injunction, with which I am in agreement, that good objects do not need to be internalised (except for defensive purposes), only unsatisfying ones. The system preconscious would be the reservoir for the legacy or memory of satisfying experiences with reliable objects as opposed to the unconscious, which is the reservoir for the concrete internalisations of unreliable but needed objects that putatively need to be controlled and processed dissociatively (1998, pp. 79–80). In a similar vein, Scharff and Fairbairn Birtles (1997), in a review article of Fairbairn’s contribution to psychoanalytic theory, suggest that there should be a modification to Fairbairn’s model of endopsychic structure so that the subsidiary selves, as well as being unconscious, should also appear within the central ego as conscious entities. Meanwhile, Rubens, in a series of carefully argued papers (1984, 1994, 1996, 1998), has suggested that ‘structure is pathology’ in Fairbairn’s model, and that this can only be overcome by what he calls ‘non-structuring internalisations’. While agreeing that Fairbairn believed there was some growth through non-structuring internalisation, it is also true that he thought the development of the ego ideal was significant, and this is at least a quasi-structural development based upon internalisation, depending upon your view of the preconscious as a structural division within the endopsychic structure. Rubens accepts that Fairbairn thought that mature dependence depended upon not just backgrounding unconscious structures but also on externalising and dissolving them. Only John Padel seems to have included this process in his suggested explication of the dynamics of Fairbairn’s model. Fairbairn’s model modified in relation to the topographical categories My own contribution is a modification to Fairbairn’s model of inner reality based upon the development of the role of the preconscious. The resulting model might be seen as the incorporation of the topographical categories within Fairbairn’s model of endopsychic structure to produce a new model of inner reality. I would argue that this model is consistent with many of the suggestions for modification of Fairbairn’s model but quite different from any of the concrete proposals heretofore. THE PRECONSCIOUS AND PSYCHIC CHANGE IN FAIRBAIRN’S MODEL OF MIND 11 For me the best place to start is with the work of John Padel. As noted earlier, Padel suggests that psychic change and psychic growth in particular come about by the transformation of the split-off, repressed libidinal and anti-libidinal object relations from unconscious to conscious, that is, their (re-)incorporation into the central ego. Similarly, he suggests that unacceptable aspects of day-to-day object relations are split off and directed to these split-off, repressed sub-selves appropriately on a regular basis during sleep. There is thus a two-way process in this model where, in a repressive move, conscious experience is being turned into unconscious (split-off, dissociated) experience associated with either the libidinal or anti-libidinal self, and, in an integrative move, where (object-relations) aspects of these repressed, split-off selves are being brought to consciousness and reincorporated into the central self. Padel does not employ the preconscious consistently but in Freud’s topographical theory these transitions would always be via the (system) preconscious. Fairbairn acknowledges the existence of the preconscious by placing the ego ideal or ideal object there. When Padel talks about the repressed selves not being absolutely split off from the central ego, or not being equally repressed, he is implying that some aspects of these selves can become conscious or potentially conscious, that is, they are preconscious. A full description of the processes Padel describes, without using the concept of the preconscious, would show conscious experience being transformed into unconscious material without mediation. It seems to me much more reasonable, given that the preconscious is a part of Fairbairn’s model, to see it playing a mediating role between the central ego and the unconscious libidinal and anti-libidinal selves. Given that there are two levels of censorship and that the ego ideal is most closely associated with the second level between the Pcs. and the Cs., it seems reasonable to suggest that there are Pcs. representatives of the libidinal and the anti-libidinal selves. Rubens, as we have seen, suggests, correctly in my view, that in Fairbairn’s theory structure is pathology, and that psychic growth, in a developmental sense, takes place by means of non-structuring internalisations. Accepting that structure is pathology and having no way to ameliorate this process other than the development of non-structuring internalisations (cf. Mitchell and the internalisation of the good object as a defence against bad internal objects) seems to me to be a council of despair. I therefore suggest that Padel’s notion that these structural elements, ‘like the Zuider Zee’, can be drained and reclaimed as productive aspects of the central self is an attractive and convincing hypothesis, producing a more realistic ideal self (ego ideal plus ideal object) and a central self with more (realistic) powers. My suggestion, which might perhaps provide a common basis for these different approaches to agree upon, is that Fairbairn’s original model is modified so that the topographical distinctions between the Ucs., the Pcs. and the Cs. are incorporated into the model consistently. Each of the selves represented should be regarded as comprised of object relations. Thus, we have a Cs. central self with a Pcs. ideal self as per Fairbairn’s original diagram, but now we have a Pcs. and a Ucs. libidinal self and a Pcs. and a Ucs. anti-libidinal self. The proposed model contains Grotstein’s suggestion of preconscious libidinal and anti-libidinal selves as well as an ideal self. This model, in having potentially 12 GRAHAM CLARKE conscious libidinal and anti-libidinal selves in the preconscious, would also be consistent with Scharff and Fairbairn Birtles’s suggestion for a modification of Fairbairn’s model. This incorporation of a structured preconscious, as a modification within the model, allows for all the many features of the preconscious that Sandler et al. (1997) specify. It means that experience of the world can make its way from the Cs. via the Pcs. and into the Ucs. and vice versa. As noted earlier, Greenberg suggests that Freud’s drive theory has been too much ignored by object-relations theory and should be reconsidered. The model I have proposed here, by recombining a structural model with the topographical categories, goes some way towards doing just that. Mitchell’s preference for a more dynamic defensive preconscious aspect of the model also seems to be supported here without giving up the complexity of the endopsychic structure. The Kleinian view too might find some support in this model, where descriptively unconscious phantasy is at the heart of the major preconscious process of organising the integration/disintegration of the psyche, and a triangular (oedipal) relationship, between the ideal, the libidinal and the anti-libidinal selves at a preconscious level, determines the level of integration. Figure 2 — Proposed combination of Freud’s topographic categories with Fairbairn’s object-relations model of dynamic structure THE PRECONSCIOUS AND PSYCHIC CHANGE IN FAIRBAIRN’S MODEL OF MIND 13 The centrality of the preconscious Some comment needs to be made about the central ego, the unconscious sub-selves and the distinction between ego and object in Fairbairn’s model. Like Padel, I see the central ego as the locus of real activity in the world. The unconscious subsidiary selves I see as being the repository of unprocessed and uncontained experience from childhood (Wright, 1991). As to Fairbairn’s use of the terms ‘ego’ and ‘object’ to differentiate between two different aspects of the sub-selves, I do not see any fundamental problem. In the modified model the libidinal links cross boundaries between the Pcs. and the Ucs., and the Pcs. and the Cs., and the Pcs. has now become the central symbolic and oedipal (triangular)1 area of the model, and the place where aggressive links now all reside; it seems reasonable to think of this area as the seat of the self. The ideal self and the preconscious libidinal and anti-libidinal selves are all connected libidinally to dynamic structures outside their domain and may therefore be seen as the more egoic aspects of each of them. Let us remind ourselves of part of Freud’s comment, quoted earlier, ‘the existence of the censorship between the Pcs. and the Cs. teaches us that becoming conscious is no mere act of perception, but is probably a hypercathexis, a further advance in the psychical organisation’ (1915, p. 193). I am suggesting that it is the establishment of this triadic preconscious ensemble of relationships between these dynamic structures, or selfobjects (Kohut), that mediates this advance in psychical organisation. In passing it is worth commenting on the distinctions between the conscious central ego, the triad of preconscious formations—ideal, libidinal and anti-libidinal selves—and the dyad of unconscious libidinal and anti-libidinal selves. The number of elements at each level being of some significance—one-person, three-person and two-person psychologies respectively. John Padel has drawn attention to this aspect of Fairbairn’s diagram and the relations between its dynamic structures that depend upon the distinction between two- and three-person relationships: What he labels indirect repression is really the basic, two-person relationship, which because of its intimacy is for many people so precarious … On the other hand the three-person situation not only contains the threats of the oedipal relationship but seems to make the achievement of two-person intimacy impossible. Each of these two types of relationship is a most effective suppressor of the other one. Fairbairn felt that the five structures shown in his diagram gave much more explanatory scope than the two of classical theory—ego and superego. I not only find that true but now believe that it is so valuable because it shows both the repressed twoperson relationship and the internal structure of the three-person relationship and shows them dynamically related to each other (1991, p. pp. 606–7). I believe that locating the three-person relationship within the preconscious actually represents Padel’s interpretation of Fairbairn’s diagram better than the original diagram itself. Balint (1958) points out that Rickman (1950, 1951a, 1951b) has identified three psychologies of the mind, each of them associated with a number.2 Balint, See Cavell (1998), for the importance of the triangular relationship. See also Wright’s comments on the ‘third’ (1991), Britton’s comments on the ‘third position’ (1989) and Ogden (1994). 2 I am grateful to Professor Joan Raphael-Leff for drawing my attention to Rickman’s and Balint’s thoughts about number and psychology. 1 14 GRAHAM CLARKE a contemporary of Fairbairn, goes on to characterise each of these areas in the following way: the best known among these three areas is characterised by the number ‘3’, and may be called the area of the Oedipus conflict … The whole area is characterized by the fact that everything that happens in it involves in addition to the subject at least two more objects … the second area … is the area of the basic fault, characterized by the number ‘2’, which means that in it two, and only two, people are involved. Their relationship, however, is not that obtaining between two adults, it is more primitive … [finally] we have the area of creation which is characterized by the number ‘1’. There is no outside object involved; consequently there is no object-relationship and no transference. That is why our knowledge of these processes is so scanty and uncertain (1958, pp. 338–9). The coincidence of these distinctive areas of the mind as described by Balint and the distinctive, topographically consistent, areas of the proposed model give reason to hope that it may have captured some of Balint’s thinking. When Balint discusses the origins of these structures in developmental terms he comes to the following tentative conclusions, it is thinkable that the earliest level might be that of primary love and with it the level of the basic fault, out of which … the level of the Oedipus conflict develops by differentiation … the level of creation by simplification (p. 339). This would not be at odds with the proposed model in any radical way. Winnicott—Potential space and the preconscious In the course of my researches, I came across a paper by Civin and Lombardi (1990), which looks at many of the problems I have been addressing, but from a Winnicottian perspective. Broadly speaking, I believe that the view they have developed is consistent with my main thrust. In their summary, they explain the reasons for choosing their approach and point to the possibility for synthesis between models based upon the primacy of the mediating zone they identify with both the Freudian preconscious and the Winnicottian concept of potential space: Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) have suggested that the drive/structure and the relational/ structure model are mutually exclusive models of psychic life. We regard their contribution as an invaluable one, which makes explicit the fundamental divergences in psychoanalytic theory. We have examined a derivative tendency in the field, for drive and relational theorists alike, to present psychic life as a dichotomy between inner experience and outer experience. We see a tendency to equate the drive model with unconscious motivation, and to the primacy of internal experience. There seems to be an equivalent tendency to equate the relational model with conscious perception and motivation, and to the primacy of external experience. We are advocating, for drive and relational theorists alike, greater focus on the process of intermediation between internal and external in the psychic life of the individual. Within the context of the drive model, precedent for such a focus is found in Freud’s conception of the preconscious, an essential third dimension whose function was to mediate between the conscious and the unconscious. Within the context of the relational model, Winnicott’s notion of potential space serves as a bridge between interior experience and external reality in the life of the individual. THE PRECONSCIOUS AND PSYCHIC CHANGE IN FAIRBAIRN’S MODEL OF MIND 15 Finally we have argued that by constructing three-part models of psychic life, these theorists have laid the groundwork for a synthetic theory. Though for Freud the drive state is primary, and for Winnicott the relationship between the infant and its environment (mother) is primary, each theorist posits an intermediate zone that fulfils a similar function in the psychic life of the individual. Whether we choose to call that zone the preconscious or potential space, its function is to translate bidirectionally between the infinitely dimensioned realm of interior, or unconscious, experience and the time- and space-bound realm of external, or conscious, experience. By highlighting the parallel constructs, we are not claiming to have created a synthesis between the theories. Our claim is that the eventual road to synthesis appears to reside in the direction of a movement away from the dichotomy between the primacy of inner or outer experience, and towards the common meeting ground of the primacy of an intermediating function (pp. 583–4). The model I proposed above, based upon Fairbairn’s model of endopsychic structure but using the topographical distinction between conscious, preconscious and unconscious to group the different dynamic structures, offers a richly structured intermediate (preconscious) area made up of a triad of dynamic structures. These three structures represent alternative selves—ideal, libidinal and anti-libidinal. It is the relations between and within these structures that mediate the flow between the conscious and the unconscious world. This triadic structure in the preconscious is a prerequisite for mediating both symbolic and oedipal relations. Translations of summary Title. References Balint M (1958). The three areas of the mind—Theoretical considerations. Int J Psychoanal 39:328–40. Britton R (1989). The missing link. In: The Oedipus complex to-day. London: Karnac. Cavell M (1998). Triangulation, one’s own mind and objectivity. Int J Psychoanal 79:449–67. Civin M, Lombardi K (1990). The preconscious and potential space. Psychoanal Rev 77:573– 85. Fairbairn WRD (1940). Schizoid factors in the personality. In: Psychoanalytic studies of the personality. London: Routledge, 1952. Fairbairn WRD (1943). The repression and return of bad objects. In: Psychoanalytic studies of the personality. London: Routledge, 1952. Fairbairn WRD (1944). Endopsychic structure considered in terms of object-relationship. In: Psychoanalytic studies of the personality. London: Routledge, 1952. Fairbairn WRD (1952). Psychoanalytic studies of the personality. London: Routledge. Fairbairn WRD (1953). Psychoanalysis and art. In: Scharff D, Fairbairn Birtles E, editors. Instinct to self, 2 vols. London: Jason Aronson, p. 423–32. Fairbairn WRD (1954). Observations on the nature of hysterical states. Br J Med Psychol 27:105– 25. Fairbairn WRD (1963). Synopsis of an object-relations theory of the personality. Int J Psychoanal 44:224–5. Ferenczi S (1928). The elasticity of psycho-analytical technique. In: Final contributions to the problems and methods of psycho-analysis. London: Maresfield Library, Karnac Books, 1955. Freud S (1914). On narcissism. SE 14. 16 GRAHAM CLARKE Freud S (1915). The unconscious. SE 14. Freud S (1917 [1915]). A metapsychological supplement to the theory of dreams. SE 14. Greenberg J (1991). Oedipus and beyond. London: Harvard Univ. Press. Grotstein JS (1998). A comparison of Fairbairn’s endopsychic structure and Klein’s internal world. In: Skolnick NJ, Scharff DE, editors. Fairbairn, then and now. London: The Analytic Press. Kris E (1950). On preconscious mental processes. Psychoanal Q 19:540–60. Macmurray J (1939). Boundaries of science. London: Faber & Faber. Milner M (1987). The suppressed madness of sane men. London: Routledge. Mitchell SA (1994), The origin and nature of the ‘object’ in the theories of Klein and Fairbairn. In: Grotstein JS, Rinsley DB, editors. Fairbairn and the origins of object relations. London: Free Association Books. Ogden T (1994). The analytic third: Working with intersubjective clinical facts. Int J Psychoanal 75:3–20. Padel J (1985). Ego in current thinking. Int Rev Psychoanal 12:273–83. Padel J (1991). Fairbairn’s thoughts on the relationship of inner and outer worlds. Free Associations (no. 24) 2:589–617. Padel J (1994). ‘Narcissism’ in Fairbairn’s theory of personality structure. In: Grotstein JS, Rinsley DB, editors. Fairbairn and the origins of object relations. London: Free Association Books. Rickman J (1950). The factor of number in individual and group dynamics. J Mental Science 96:770–73. Also in: Rickman J. Selected contributions to psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth, 1957. Rickman J (1951a). Methodology and research in psycho-pathology. Br J Med Psychol 24:1–7. Also in: Rickman J. Selected contributions to psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth, 1957. Rickman J (1951b). Number and the human sciences. In: Psycho-analysis and culture. New York: International Univ. Press. Also in: Rickman J. Selected contributions to psycho-analysis. London: Hogarth, 1957. Roheim G (1930). Animism, magic and the divine king. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Rubens R (1984). The meaning of structure in Fairbairn. Int Rev Psychoanal 11:428–40. Rubens R (1994). Fairbairn’s structural theory. In: Grotstein JS, Rinsley DB, editors. Fairbairn and the origins of object relations. London: Free Association Press. Rubens R (1996). Review essay: The unique origins of Fairbairn’s theories. Psychoanal Dialogues 6:413–35. Rubens R (1998). Fairbairn’s theory of depression. In: Skolnick NJ, Scharff DE, editors. Fairbairn, then and now. London: The Analytic Press. Sandler J, Holder A, Dare C, Dreher AU (1997). Freud’s models of the mind. London: Karnac. Scharff DE, Fairbairn Birtles E (1994). From instinct to self, 2 vols. London: Jason Aronson. Scharff DE, Fairbairn Birtles E (1997). From instinct to self: The evolution and implications of WRD Fairbairn’s theory of object relations. Int J Psychoanal 78:1085–103. Skolnick NJ (1998). The good, the bad and the ambivalent: Fairbairn’s difficulty locating the good object in the endopsychic structure. In: Skolnick NJ, Scharff DE, editors. Fairbairn, then and now. London: The Analytic Press. Wright K (1991). Vision and separation. London: Free Association Books. Young RM (1998). What is psychoanalytic studies? http://www.human-nature.com/rmyoung/ papers.