The Universality of Preconscious Experience: A Conceptual Outline

Presentation to the Society for Consciousness Studies - December 5, 2020

Abstract: When phenomenal experience is examined through the lens of physics, several conundrums come to light including: Specificity of mind-body interactions, feelings of free will in a deterministic universe, and the relativity of subjective perception. The new biology of “emotion” can shed direct light upon these issues, via a broadened categorical definition that includes both affective feelings and their coupled (yet often subconscious) hedonic motivations. In this new view, evaluative (good/bad) feelings that trigger approach/avoid behaviors emerged with life itself, a crude stimulus-response information loop between organism and its environment, a semiotic signaling system embodying the first crude form of “mind”. Emotion serves the ancient function of sensory-motor self-regulation and affords organisms – at every level of complexity – an active, adaptive, role in evolution. A careful examination of the biophysics involved in emotional “self-regulatory” signaling, however, acknowledges constituents that are incompatible with classical physics. This requires a further investigation, proposed herein, of the fundamental nature of “the self” as the subjective observer central to the measurement process in quantum mechanics, and ultimately as an active, unified, self-awareness with a centrally creative role in “self-organizing” processes and physical forces of the classical world. In this deeper investigation, a new phenomenological dualism is proposed: The flow of complex human experience is instantiated by both a classically embodied mind and a deeper form of quantum consciousness that is inherent in the universe itself, implying much deeper – more Whiteheadian – interpretations of the “self-regulatory” and “self-relevant” nature of emotional stimulus. A broad stroke, speculative, intuitive sketch of this new territory is then set forth, loosely mapped to several theoretical models of consciousness, potentially relevant mathematical devices and pertinent philosophical themes, in an attempt to acknowledge the myriad questions – and limitations – implicit in the quest to understand “sentience” in any ontologically pansentient universe.

Hollows of Memory: Featuring Gregory M Nixon's Work with Commentaries & Responses – Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 2010

When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recognition that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic investigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could become conscious of itself, I aim here to demonstrate that the terms experience and consciousness are not interchangeable. Experience is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down, but I see non-conscious experience as based mainly in momentary sensations, relational between bodies or systems, and probably common throughout the natural world. If this continuum of experience — from non-conscious, to conscious, to self-transcending awareness — can be understood and accepted, radical constructivism (the “outside” world as a construct of experience) will gain a firmer foundation, panexperientialism (a living universe) may gain credibility, and psi will find its medium.

Introduction to a new, consistently monistic and immaterialist philosophy of consciousness, presented at the same time as a critique of traditional and essentially dualistic understandings of 'panpsychism' - which claim that consciousness is merely an innate 'property' or 'feature' of all things - rather than being constitutive of them and of all that is.

Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015

When phenomenal experience is examined through the lens of physics, several conundrums come to light including: Specificity of mindebody interactions, feelings of free will in a deterministic universe, and the relativity of subjective perception. The new biology of "emotion" can shed direct light upon these issues, via a broadened categorical definition that includes both affective feelings and their coupled (yet often subconscious) hedonic motivations. In this new view, evaluative (good/bad) feelings that trigger approach/avoid behaviors emerged with life itself, a crude stimulus-response information loop between organism and its environment, a semiotic signaling system embodying the first crude form of "mind". Emotion serves the ancient function of sensory-motor self-regulation and affords organisms e at every level of complexity e an active, adaptive, role in evolution. A careful examination of the biophysics involved in emotional "self-regulatory" signaling, however, acknowledges constituents that are incompatible with classical physics. This requires a further investigation, proposed herein, of the fundamental nature of "the self" as the subjective observer central to the measurement process in quantum mechanics, and ultimately as an active, unified, self-awareness with a centrally creative role in "self-organizing" processes and physical forces of the classical world. In this deeper investigation, a new phenomenological dualism is proposed: The flow of complex human experience is instantiated by both a classically embodied mind and a deeper form of quantum consciousness that is inherent in the universe itself, implying much deeper e more Whiteheadian e interpretations of the "self-regulatory" and "selfrelevant" nature of emotional stimulus. A broad stroke, speculative, intuitive sketch of this new territory is then set forth, loosely mapped to several theoretical models of consciousness, potentially relevant mathematical devices and pertinent philosophical themes, in an attempt to acknowledge the myriad questions e and limitations e implicit in the quest to understand "sentience" in any ontologically pansentient universe.

Consciousness - An Adventure on the Anthropic Pathway, 2021

What is consciousness? How did it arise? Why did it evolve? These are among the most profound questions ever asked. More than three thousand years ago, consciousness was described in the Rig Veda as being a fundamental property of human life. Since then, numerous conjectures, dogmas, and mystical beliefs have been put forward to explain the origin and nature of consciousness. None have gained general acceptance. But today, a compelling solution to the mystery of consciousness is at hand. The scientific disciplines, empowered by sophisticated technological tools, have identified the elements necessary to formulate a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The purpose of this book is to elucidate the new theory. In so doing, we will take an adventure on the Anthropic Pathway—the branch of evolution where consciousness originated and ascended. Some original concepts include: 1- Elementary consciousness vs. mental consciousness —“Organisms that can self-encode and utilize knowledge acquired from prior experiences have elementary consciousness… an amoeba that can seek out, recognize, and engulf paramecia, while continuously improving its survival skills on the basis of accrued knowledge, has elementary consciousness. However, this organism lacks the means to be aware, mentally, of its experiences, for such an aptitude requires yet another level of complexification and holism—and the realization of mental consciousness.” 2- Integrated Information Theory expanded Structures representing integrated information are dual to structures able to collectively sense that information. These collective structures also affect the nature of an organism’s qualia and behaviors. —“Interneurons are specialized to manage the integration of information, as well as to assemble complementary structures able to collectively sense, or “ultrasense,” that information. The ultrasensation of integrated information is implemented exclusively within an emergent, novel realm of neuronal functionality, the interneuronal domain, where mental consciousness is made possible. (In vertebrae, the interneuronal domain is located entirely within the skeletal confines of the central nervous system, whereas the peripheral nervous system is absent of interneurons.)… Also, pages 4-5 and 15-18 of the book outline the emergence of the interneuronal domain in primitive species such as Platynereis dumerilii, how the collective ultrasensory structure and mental experientiality evolved, and why the trait selected for unitarity.” —“Mental consciousness has three experiential components: the experiencer (the collective ultrasensory structure), the experienced (integrated information), and phenomenal experience (the essence of mental consciousness that supervenes upon the experiencer).” 3- Dendritic arbors are the (content-specific) neural correlate of mental consciousness The question was raised (by TgB), “If dendritic connections are the physiological key, how come standard anesthetic agents allow neurological functioning to continue, but without consciousness?” The answer is: while dendritic arbors continue to support brain regions subliminally, anesthetics prevent their global synchronization, thus impeding the (particular function of) formation of a content-specific neural correlate of consciousness. Anesthetics operate on components of the full neural correlate of consciousness by impeding (or altering) frequency locking of brain regions—e.g., in the case of pain, anesthetic alteration of alpha network and harmonics across insular, cingulate, and prefrontal cortices, thalamus, brainstem, etc. In turn, a content-specific correlate of consciousness (dual information-ultrasensory process-structure described in excerpt 2), which requires sustained, reentrant cycling through a spatiotemporally distributed network of dendritic arbors, is precluded. —"The interface between the experiencer and the experienced consists of the group of dendritic arbor synapses active during an event of mental consciousness...ranging in complexity from the neuropil in the cerebral ganglia of a primitive sea star to those that foliate the pyramidal neuron/interneuron framework of a human neocortex...dendritic arbors are also [crucially] the repositories of memories encoded in the configuration of synaptic spines studding the surface of each dendrite." —“Interactions between collective structures and integrated information are fundamental to both consciously experienced and subliminal neural operations. For an informational representation to be consciously experienced it must attain a certain threshold of stability. Experiments in cognitive psychology have correlated consciously reportable events with sustained, reentrant states of informational representation; whereas brief or variable representations are always subliminal (although they may affect sensory-limbic, executive-motor, cognitive, memory, and other functionalities). Over extended durations, the reentrant cycling of information through a series of incrementally updated stable states has the effect of endowing mental consciousness with a coherent temporal flow.” —The collective structure of the experiencer consists of a patterned array of postsynaptic dendrites, and the informational representation it experiences is rendered by an inversely patterned array of presynaptic axons. Signaling between the experiencer and the experienced is conducted both through and around the core synaptic interface. Feedforward signals transmitted from the presynaptic side of the interface bypass it in order to shape the collective structure directly, priming it to interact with only the most salient and contextually relevant informational signals passing through the interface. In turn, feedback signals transmitted from the postsynaptic side of the interface cycle back and reenter the presynaptic input stream, prioritizing, filtering, and qualifying the very (sustained, recycling) information being experienced by the collective structure. Thus, the visual image of a cat (presynaptic signaling pattern originating in the retina) might induce (based on the form of the postsynaptic collective structure) an experience [qualia] of fondness in a human being but one of fright in a mouse." —"At this level of complexity, the physical distinction between the experiencer and the experienced is inscrutable. Nevertheless, while the core interface may be subsumed in the complexity of the neuronal group, the reciprocative duality between the experiencer and the experienced retains its archetypal, causative influence on the third component of mental consciousness, phenomenal experience, which has its own, subjective, ontological nature.” 4- Mind-body problem —“The explanatory gap is illusory, dispelled by recognition that both the first- and third-person ontologies refer to the same state [Searle state is physically identified in the book]. The one physical state is the bridge, connecting two perspectives. The bridge does not connect the physical brain to a distinct experiential mind; rather, it connects the third-person objective ontology conjectured about a physical state [based on empirical observations], to the first-person subjective ontology based on that state’s experiential essence.” 5- Anthropic Pathway —“In Chapter 15, the ‘fine tuning problem’ is investigated, i.e., what was the cause or reason for the universe to have possessed the improbable coincidence of property values necessary for complexity and conscious life to emerge and evolve? The multiverse solution to the fine tuning problem is negatively critiqued; instead, a specific evolutionary pathway that has developed within the event horizon of our observable universe is delineated. This pathway has traversed an extremum between order [arising from gravitational entropy] and disorder [from thermodynamic entropy], proceeding inexorably toward an anthropic attractor of complexity, and the conscious human brain.”

Philosophical Papers (2015, 44,3, 389-437), 2015

This paper introduces cosmopsychism as a holistic alternative to atomistic panpsychism, and as a general perspective on the metaphysics of consciousness. I begin with some necessary background details concerning contemporary panpsychism and the problems it faces, and then proceed to the theory itself. The starting point of the theory is the assumption that an all pervading cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate. From this assumption, a panpsychist ontology of mind with distinct holistic overtones is developed. In particular, I argue that such universal consciousness serves as the ground for the emergence of individual conscious creatures. The result is a theory with significant conceptual resources which presents novel means for confronting some of the most recalcitrant problems facing contemporary panpsychism: in particular, the subject combination problem, and to the problem of entailment associated with it. In so doing, cosmopsychism places itself as an viable alternative to atomistic varieties of panpsychism as well as to orthodox physicalist accounts of consciousness.

[1] Stoff ist Kraft (≈ being is energy). [2] Wesen ist Werden (≈ being is becoming). [3] Sein ist Sosein (≈ being is qualit(ativit)y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein (≈ being is mind). [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles, and there are also good reasons for favouring [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals about the fundamental nature of concrete reality. More strongly: unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favour panpsychism over all other substantive theories. This is not simply because panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view—given that the existence of conscious experience is certain, and that panpsychism doesn’t posit the existence of any kind of stuff other than conscious experience. A question arises as to why metaphysicians have posited the existence of something for which there is no evidence: non-experiential concrete reality—especially since physics is completely silent on the question of the intrinsic non-structural nature of reality.

KannenBright: Concordia University's Journal of Theology, vol. 2, 2011

This paper is an essay in the philosophy of mind. Its focus is on the mind-body problem as a perennial issue in the unraveling of mentality, and on panpsychism as a viable alternative to both the humanist and mechanist solutions which have dominated the discourse in recent years. As such, the paper examines the problem itself, charting its origins and exploring its nature. It then proceeds to define panpsychism and give a brief account of its history and manifestations. This is followed by a similar treatment of the two primary modes of objection to the panpsychist thesis: humanistic dualism and mechanistic materialism. The panpsychist meta-theory—and more specifically the panexperientialist variant—is then defended as a superior response to the problem via a series of interconnected arguments recently elucidated by process philosophers such as Alfred North Whitehead, David Ray Griffin and D.S. Clarke. Following this argumentation, the metaphysical picture which arises from the acceptance of the panpsychist argument is discussed, for the ramifications of panpsychism affect far greater philosophical vistas than just the philosophy of mind—stretching into the both ontology and ethics.