2017 elections in Japan And its consequences for East Asia

2017 elections in JApAn And its consequences for eAst AsiA Gustavo Henrique Feddersen1 Betina Thomaz Sauter2 Bruno Magno3 Rômulo Barizon Pitt4 • The coalition led by Shinzo Abe maintained an absolute majority (two thirds) in the Lower House of the Japanese Diet after the October 22 elections in Japan. • The victory of the Liberal Democratic Party re ects rising tensions in the region, with North Korea’s missile tests being one of the factors. • Despite the political-institutional and economic reform platform, the alliance with the United States is con rmed as the main pillar of Japan’s foreign and defense policy. Presentation Con rmation of Shinzo Abe’s coalition victory on the evening of October 23, 2017 proves that his political bet on dissolving the lower house of the Diet (Japan’s legislature) to convene general elections out of schedule was successful. The goal was to take advantage of the favoring situation to reach an absolute majority in the parliament and renew the popular mandate in preparation for the implementation of his political project. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito coalition, both center-right parties, won 313 seats out of the 465 in the lower house of the Diet, securing more than two-thirds of the house. Additionally, the outcome of the elections demonstrates a deepening crisis among the opposition parties, with the non-participation of the Democratic Party (DP, the former center-left DPJ, partly succeeded by the new Japanese Constitutional Democratic Party, CDP) and the failure of the Kibo no To (Party of Hope, new conservative party) to present an alternative agenda to the LDP. The political moment in Japan is one of the factors shaping the situation in East Asia. Japan is the third largest economy in the world and one of the main maritime forces in the region. The current government’s proposal for economic and political reforms may limit the possibility of regional cooperation initiatives. The project for constitutional reform which aims to, among other things, review its paci st character (Japan abdicates traditional armed forces, limiting their use), may have a catalytic effect on tensions with China. Meanwhile, China continues the process of 1 PhD candidate in International Strategic Studies by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. President of the South-American Institute for Policy and Strategy (ISAPE). E-mail: [email protected] 2 Specialist in Strategy and Contemporary International Relations by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. Research Associate at the South-American Institute for Policy and Strategy (ISAPE). E-mail: [email protected] 3Masters student in International Strategic Studies by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. Research Associate at the South-American Institute for Policy and Strategy (ISAPE). E-mail: [email protected] 4 PhD candidate in International Strategic Studies by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. Research Associate at the South-American Institute for Policy and Strategy (ISAPE). E-mail: [email protected] 70 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.2 n. 7 | p. 1-99 | out./2017 | ISSN: 2525-5266 countries made closer relations between China and Japan possible. Cooperation between countries in that region was increasing over the decades; mainly on economic and institutional matters, but also, albeit to a lesser extent, on security issues. The US’ return to the region after a decade of War on Terror materialized in the 2011 American Pivot to Asia, which is one of the reasons of this in ection that caused the recent anti-Chinese twist on Japanese politics. Since then, Shinzo Abe has been advocating for a change in Japanese defense law and for continued alignment with the United States, so that Japan continues to be the preferred American ally in Asia for restraining China and in case of a war against it. With the result of the last Japanese election, a further step was taken to move the region away from the trend of rapprochement observed until 2010. modernizing its armed forces and adopts a more assertive pro le in its regional relations. This analysis is divided into three parts. Initially, it undertakes an overview of the East Asian strategic dynamic to contextualize the importance of the 2017 elections and their relationship to the events from recent years in terms of economy, politics and security. Next, a description of the Japanese political system, economic projects and relations with its neighboring region and with the US aims to explain the internal dynamics that conditioned the elections. Finally, the elections are analyzed based on previous sections’ remarks, in order to indicate how these recent events t the trend observed in recent years. We conclude that, at the regional level, the US continues to play a destabilizing role in regional integration initiatives. The elections con rm the Japanese movement of detachment from China and alignment with the US. At the national level, in turn, Japanese lack of interest in undertaking a comprehensive reform of the Constitution imposed at the end of the Second World War indicates continued alignment with the US and polarization with China, at least as long as the US maintains its current policy towards East Asia. The contemporary regional economic integration of East Asia had its foundations laid with the Japanese Fukuda Doctrine (1976-1978) of closer relations with neighboring countries and distribution of productive chains throughout Asia (Arrighi 1997). On the political side, the signing of the World War II peace treaty between the People’s Republic of China and Japan took place in 1978, and included an anti-hegemonic clause. This clause meant a commitment of the parties neither to establish themselves as hegemonies in the region, nor to allow some external power to do the same. Later, from a strategic perspective, the power vacuum left by the US’ strategic retreat at the end of the Cold War led to a China-Japan-Korea dialogue as a way to manage competition and economic cooperation and seek political autonomy in the unipolar order (Huntington 1997). Historical Background of East Asian Regionalism: from integration to polarization The importance of the Japanese elections and the strategic changes of recent years can only be perceived by contextualizing them as an in ection of a process that has been happening in East Asia since the 1970s. At that time, SinoAmerican rapprochement and the expansion of Japanese production chains throughout neighboring 71 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.2 n. 7 | p. 1-99 | out./2017 | ISSN: 2525-5266 This con uence supported the evolution of Asian regionalism in the 1990s. Structurally, the model was that of a “power condominium”, that is, a security regime centered on the cooperation between China, Japan and Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), according to Buzan and Weaver (2003). As a result of the 1997 Asian crisis, the ASEAN + 3 Forum, which brought together those three countries along with their Southeast Asian neighbors, and the Chiang Mai Initiative, for currency swap, were created. In this process, China’s growing participation in regional and global level governance mechanisms secured Japanese support for its WTO accession in 2001. These mechanisms would be the basis for future trilateral cooperation and the East Asian Community project that emerged in 2008. relations, this party advocated the creation of the East Asia Community, with Japan as “intellectual leader” of the regional economic network. Japan would mostly ll the role of trademarks and patents manager, in a division of labor with other countries in the region, such as China and South Korea (Munhoz and Magno 2012). To this end, measures such as the creation of a single currency, regulation on intellectual property and investment protection were proposed, which could shape a common market. The integrationist platform in China, in turn, was led by the CCP wing known as the Communist Youth5. Like the DPJ, this wing advocated a region-oriented foreign policy, the pursuit of a sustainable economy and a government focused on social concerns. At times, the same terms were used both in Japan and China, such as “fraternity” and “putting people rst” (CPC 2007; Hu 2007; DPJ 2009; Hatoyama 2009, Magno, 2012). In addition, also in 2009, China became Japan’s main economic partner, both in exports and imports, surpassing the US. The eventual success of this integration process could form a new great power in the International System, considering the impressive characteristics of this hypothetical new actor: 25% of the world’s population, 20% of the world’s economy and the 3rd largest economic area in the world (Trileteral Cooperation Secretariat 2012). Arguably, the biggest setback in this trend was the election of Koizumi as Japanese Prime Minister in 2001. His project consisted in making Japan a manufacturing export platform, competing directly with China and South Korea, shifting the focus of Japan’s economic relations to the United States. From a strategic point of view, Koizumi was aligned with the United States and sought to dilute China’s regional in uence. Among the key demonstrations of the government’s strategic pro le were Japan’s insertion into the US Missile Defense System and the adoption of a joint statement with the United States in 2005, mentioning the Taiwan issue for the rst time in a common strategic goal (USA and Japan 2005). The brief administrations that followed Koizumi’s sought to reconnect with China. All these issues were received with apprehension by Washington. In November 2011, in a speech in Australia, President Obama declared that “the US is in Asia to stay” (Reuters 2011), and further disclosed that Asia-Paci c was at the top of its foreign policy agenda, committing itself to send troops to the region, speci cally to Australia. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also called for The trend towards integration was resumed with the rise of the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ, later renamed to DP), which took power in 2009. Regarding external 72 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.2 n. 7 | p. 1-99 | out./2017 | ISSN: 2525-5266 rivalry, and (3) energy resources and shing areas in the East China Sea. strengthening bilateral relations with traditional partners, a broad military presence in the region and the creation of the Trans-Paci c Partnership (TPP) (Clinton 2011). A possible Trump Doctrine seems to indicate, on the one hand, reaf rmation of the security commitments (restraining China) and, on the other, a departure from the economic proposals, with the abandonment of the TPP. The main material example of the continuity of Chinese contention lies in the Air-Sea Battle: a preemptive operational concept based on an in-depth attack on Chinese territory in order to disable systems that would allow China to protect its maritime environment (Machado and Simionato 2015). The high value of armaments that would be used (aircraft carriers, next-generation ghters and bombers, satellites, electronic warfare and Command and Control aircrafts), combined with the relative reduction of US capabilities to defend such armaments, explains the need for the support from the Japanese navy for full employment of this doctrine. The crisis came as a result of a national campaign by Shintaro Ishihara, then mayor of Tokyo, who mobilized public opinion for acquiring the islands. This was done by the central government, at the time in the hands of the Democratic Party of Japan (DP), in order to avoid a crisis. Although unintended, this only stirred up the moods. A series of nationalist and anti-Japanese protests began in China, harassing Japanese individuals and companies in the country, forcing the closure of their activities on Chinese soil, reducing trade and causing indirect damage to productive chains (Fackler 2012). Even though crises have directly affected SinoJapanese relations, they are a re ection of the US policy of Pivot to Asia. This can be demonstrated by the unprecedented American assertion that the islands would be under the scope of the US-Japan Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security (Manyin 2016, Panda 2017). One of the most signi cant consequences of this process initiated by the American pivot was a change in the correlation of forces in the political system of the two countries, leading to the rise of governments with more assertive foreign policies at the regional level compared to their predecessors. In addition, North Korea is always central to Japan’s perceived insecurity, and assertive LDP and Japanese nationalist responses have gathered support from the electorate. But the climax of polarization occurred in 2012, with the Diaoyu / Senkaku crisis. There are three elements that deserve attention in the dispute over these islands: (1) control of maritime routes in the region, crucial for transportation of goods and energy resources; (2) political manipulation, based on historical In Japan, this process culminated in the election of Shinzo Abe in December 2012 with a nationalist discourse and aligned with the United States. In China, in November of the same year, the XVIII CPC Congress took place, which paved way not only for the transition of power from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping but also, more importantly, for reformulation of the Politburo with a more favorable composition for the Shanghai Group. On the economic front, TPP negotiations with the US intensi ed. In response, China proposed the One Belt One Road Initiative, as well as to initiate negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a free trade area made up of ASEAN member 73 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.2 n. 7 | p. 1-99 | out./2017 | ISSN: 2525-5266 countries and countries which have FTA with ASEAN, not including the United States (Denyer 2013). its relations with its neighbors (DPJ 2009, Munhoz and Magno 2012). However, the imbroglio caused by the attempted relocation of the Futenma US base in Okinawa in May 2010 resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Hatoyama and in gave way to the destabilization of the DPJ government. The Incident of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, poorly managed by the DPJ, added to the already mentioned Diaoyu / Senkaku crises, after several exchanges of Prime Minister, ending Japan’s pro-regionalization government. It also paved the way for the rise of Shinzo Abe, to LDP’s return to power and to a new orientation of Japanese foreign policy (Munhoz, Reis and Magno 2013). From 2012 onwards, the polarization between China and Japan only deepened, and US strategic competition with China appears to have imploded integration efforts in East Asia. Strategically, China seeks to respond to the challenge from the AirSea Battle by reinventing the doctrine of Active Defense, emphasizing initiative and operational and tactical offense (China 2015, Feddersen 2017). Japan reinforced its military pro le as a possible US military aide, but without the ability to act alone against China. It is in this sense that this year’s elections demonstrate the latest milestone in the trend of Asian polarization, with Abe’s victory. In 2012, Shinzo Abe took of ce in this scenario. From an economic perspective, he promotes an attempt to revitalize Japanese economy through a combination of scal expansion, monetary easing and structural reforms. The immediate intention was to boost domestic demand and GDP, while increasing in ation to 2%. However, despite the government’s great stimulus, growth has gone on without much enthusiasm, in ation has remained below target, concerns over the expansion of government debt have continued, and structural reforms have proved dif cult. Thus, the Japanese government spent trillions of dollars trying to lift the economy, continuing to accumulate one of the largest public debts in the developed world. Japanese Politics after the ”Lost Decade” Historically, the critical conjuncture to understand current political context in Japan was the dismantling of the so-called “iron triangle”, an alliance between bureaucrats, businessmen and the LDP. Despite conferring stability to Japanese politics through consensus in economy and foreign relations, this alienated citizens from the formulation of policies (Hook et al 2005, Bueno et al 2010). The legitimacy of the system was maintained through its economic success, despite the democratic de cit. After years of stagnation during the “lost decade,” two facts point to the depletion of this system: Koizumi’s LDP government, which deconstructed the efforts of the Fukuda Doctrine and, more importantly, Yukio Hatoyama’s election by the DPJ in 2009. Hatoyama’s goals included combating income inequality, re-establishing the economy by developing green technologies and restoring the political role of bureaucrats, as well as tightening Abe hoped that his monetary policy would change this dynamic, starting by lowering exchange rates and boosting exports. However, the weak yen is a double-edged sword, since it can increase the cost of imports including food, oil and other natural resources on which Japan is highly dependent, 74 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.2 n. 7 | p. 1-99 | out./2017 | ISSN: 2525-5266 which in turn may reduce the Japanese consumers’ demand and therefore their expenditure (Obe 2014, McBride and Xu 2017). Abe’s monetary policy in the international arena came to be part of the discussion about a currency war, or competitive devaluation, in which countries weaken their currencies to obtain advantages for their exports (Fensom 2013). Thus, disputes between China and Japan over the Daioyu / Senkaku islands in the East China Sea have spilled over into their economic relationship with the yen’s downfall, increasing hostility between those countries. In addition, along with its initiatives to amend Japan’s paci st constitution, TPP’s business momentum could also be seen as a way to contain Beijing. However, the arrival of Trump at the US presidency led to a change in global trade and economic policy, unlike President Obama’s stance toward multilateral negotiations, complicating Abe’s options. Trump’s rejection of the TPP and his criticisms of what he calls manipulation of Japanese currency, accusing Abenomics of “playing the money market”, could destabilize the US-Japan alliance. As such, Trump interrupted Abe’s efforts to complete a regional trade agreement and put the US-Japan relationship under new strain (Kawanami and Imamoto 2017). Japanese, of General MacArthur’s of cers’ draft (Quigley 1959). Over the decades, amendments have been proposed to revise articles or adapt the text, but are always faced with the need to ensure an absolute majority in the Diet and to be approved by the majority of the population in a referendum (Article 96 of the Constitution of Japan). More recently, during the rst Abe administration of 2012, the LDP had already attempted to undertake a general revision of the Constitution. However, the public’s disgruntlement or lack of interest on the issue caused the government to retreat for fear of defeat in an eventual referendum. Today, however, the revision of the Constitution, especially its Article 9, returns to the debate and becomes once more the central theme of the elections. Its revision is encouraged by the US allies and it is considered necessary by the Japanese government for greater participation in international issues and for increasing its dissuasive power with respect to its neighbors. It is curious to note that after more than half a century Japan remains governed by a Constitution, the greatest symbol of popular sovereignty, written by its former occupants. Furthermore, the mere debate on its revision or the convocation of a constituent assembly is not seriously considered by the Japanese electorate. Another point of tension in the Japanese political scene is the issue of constitutional revision, especially the so-called “Paci st Article” or Article 9 of renunciation of war. The current Japanese constitution was drawn up in the immediate post-war by the command of Allied occupation forces. Although the Potsdam Declaration demanded that the new Japanese government should be established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, the nal document approved by the Diet was a mere translation, with minor changes, from English into From a military perspective, recent Japanese strategic developments point to the strengthening of its role as US Navy’s aide in a US-China confrontation. Elements for such a conclusion can be gleaned from the analysis of Japan’s most recent White Paper on Defense. In categorizing modernization programs to address the challenges of securing effective deterrence, three issues stand out on the regional balance: (i) sea and air security around Japan; (ii) response to attacks on remote islands; (iii) and response to ballistic missile attacks6 75 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.2 n. 7 | p. 1-99 | out./2017 | ISSN: 2525-5266 (Japan 2016). In response to those challenges, the explicit focus on light and patrol systems, the subsidiary insertion in US-controlled systems, and the absence of air superiority aircrafts with relevant autonomy, bombers and naval decision vessels in the inventory and modernization programs (IISS 2016) indicate continuing Japanese material inability to conduct stand-alone military operations against a power such as China. As a consequence, Japan should continue to be included in the US strategic architecture for East Asia. because it brought to the limelight the impact of the Japanese constitution’s paci st provision on the limitations of Japanese self-defense forces, even in peacekeeping missions. The latter was one of the arguments in defense of the military legislative revision of 2015. Inada’s resignation represented another blow to the popularity of constitutional reform. Moreover, the defeat of the LDP in elections for the government of Tokyo (against Yuriko Koike) was seen as the beginning of the end of Abe’s leadership (Osaki 2017). The Result of the 2017 Elections in Japan On the disorganization of the opposition, the Democratic Party (DP), formerly known as the Democratic Party of Japan, was absent from the elections after the decision of its leader, Seiji Maehara, to join forces with the new party Kibo no To (Party of Hope) of the popular governor of Tokyo, Yuriko Koike. The DP parliamentarians were then divided between Kibo no To and the new Constitutional Democratic Party. The latter is the current leader of the opposition and represents the left wing of the former Democratic Party, which is committed to paci sm. Such events reinforce the leadership of Shinzo Abe’s LDP. It is important to note that the two main opposition parties represent two vastly different blocs: the CDP is left-aligned and Kibo no To is conservative. In the words of then-leading opposition political leader Yuriko Koike (Nhk 2017a), the victory of LDP renewed the momentum for Shinzo Abe’s political project, whose term was extended until 2021. It should be noted that the LDP-Komeito coalition already had a majority in the Lower House. Even with the victory, there was a loss of 6 seats from the previous elections, in 2014. What explains the extraordinary convocation (which would normally happen next year, 2018) was Abe’s perception that he could mitigate his low popularity because of the opposition parties’ disorganization and of a rm stance towards North Korea and its recent missile tests. In addition, the TPP’s uncertain future with the exit of the United States could imply necessary changes in Japan’s economic policy, which also would affect Abe’s platform in the near future. In fact, 2017 was a year of signi cant setbacks for Abe’s government. Among the political scandals that surfaced, the resignation of Defense Minister Tomomi Inada on July 28 should be noted (Kimura 2017). The decision was taken because of the heavily redacted reports on military actions of the Japanese UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan and their withdrawal from the country. This matters On the demographic aspect, it is interesting to note that the conservative vote, especially in the LDP, was concentrated among the younger population (NHK 2017b). Some of the factors behind this are the low unemployment rate of 2.8% and the negative experience with the government of the Democratic Party of Japan until 2011. Yet another factor that can explain it is the high abstention rate of 46.32% of voters (voting is not compulsory in Japan). 76 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.2 n. 7 | p. 1-99 | out./2017 | ISSN: 2525-5266 Constitutional reform is one of the main points of LDP’s policy platform, especially the normalization of Japan’s military. Despite the victory at the polls, any constitutional change would need to go through a popular referendum. The 2015 reform on the interpretation of the paci st article denoted the unpopularity of this project with the population (Soble 2015). However, the main reason for the early convocation of elections was North Korea’s missile tests, a factor that contributed to polarization in the region (Pereira and Geiger 2017). The main consequence of the launch of a missile that ew over the Japanese island of Hokkaido on September 15 was the increase of Abe’s popularity from 20% in July to 50% at the end of September (Asahi Shimbun 2017). The recent North Korean stance reinforces the Japanese perception of the need to increase their defensive capabilities, both from a legislative and from a material point-of-view, an argument associated with Abe. On the other hand, a drop in Abe’s government’s approval indicates that there is room in the Japanese political environment for alternative projects, although there is no indication that opposition parties will take advantage of this conjuncture in the short or medium term. The pro le of Japan’s armed forces, along with LDP’s platform leads to the conclusion that they do not incur an increase of autonomy in Japanese foreign policy: the country remains dependent on the alliance with the United States in a case of con agration with China. Japan also has no capacity of power projection beyond the Japanese archipelago, which determines that a policy of closer relations with countries outside northeastern Asia also depends on US support. One of the most important consequences of Abe’s election for regional geopolitics is the possibility of constitutional revision and the “normalization” of Japan’s armed forces. The Prime Minister made progress in this direction in 2015, with the approval of new legislation that reinterprets Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (which prohibits the use of force outside Japan) to include the possibility of collective self-defense under limited circumstances. The immediate result is that Japan can shoot down missiles heading towards US territories like Guam and Hawaii. As explored in the previous section, its use beyond this is limited by material conditions , but also by legislative conditions (even though there is the possibility of safeguarding Japanese citizens abroad, this is limited to a minimum of strength even if there is no other possibility) (MOFA 2016; Harding 2017). In the context of priority to relations with the US and of regional polarization, Japan also tends to get closer to South Korea. From 2014 onwards, bilateral relations have improved, and by the end of 2015 the two countries had celebrated an agreement on the Japanese recognition of the “comfort women” issue in World War II (Brites and Vieira 2017). Although the current president, Moon Jae-in, had a critical stance on Japan during his campaign, the regional context led to a rapprochement between South Korea, Japan and the United States (Kang 2017; USA, Korea and Japan 2017). Another key of Abe’s policy platform is economic reform. The mandate renewal maintains the impetus for consumption taxes to be raised by 2019. The plan is to spend the increased revenue on education and childcare - if in fact this revenue is not destined to lower the debt, it would 77 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.2 n. 7 | p. 1-99 | out./2017 | ISSN: 2525-5266 efforts. Similarly, China, facing this scenario and after the con rmation of Xi Jinping in power, should continue with its own project of regional integration and military modernization, extraneous to the US and its allies. Thus, there is a possible continuity, and even an increase, of the regional polarization in East Asia. Any change in this trend would depend on a US repositioning for the region. Meanwhile, at the national level, with the end of the rapprochement policy with China, Japan has a deep dependence on the US regarding its foreign policy in the region. Not only because of the economic reorientation from the East Community project to the TPP (now also at risk), but also in its dependence on maintaining a minimum deterrence capacity and the functionality of their Armed Forces’ pro le as a support force of the US Navy. Any change in this orientation from internal initiatives would depend on a revision of its constitution con rmed by referendum, an initiative that at least for the time being does not seem to be interesting to Japanese public opinion. Thus, at least in the medium term, Japanese foreign policy in the region remains dependent on its alliance with the US. possibly corroborate to increase in ation, one of the Abenomics objectives (Wakatabe 2017). An electoral promise to proceed with the increase in consumer tax suggests the continuity of the Bank of Japan’s (BJ) responsibility in guaranteeing monetary policies against recession. In that sense, Abe’s victory increased the chance that Haruhiko Kuroda would receive a second term in the BJ in 2018. This likely means continued quantitative easing over a long period to combat de ation, given the ongoing recovery of economic growth (DBS Bank 2017). The nancial market expressed expectation of a continued monetary policy, with Nikkei reaching its highest level in two decades, and the yen the lowest since July (Fensom 2017). Therefore, Japanese currency shows no signs of reversing its downward trend against the dollar, which, as discussed earlier, could strain relations not just with neighboring countries but also with the US. This could jeopardize economic interdependence. Final Remarks From this brief analysis, we can draw conclusions on two levels: regional (East Asian) and national (Japanese). Regionally, despite a long and persistent trend of cooperation and regional integration that has lasted for decades in East Asia, US strategic reorientation towards the Paci c has reversed this historical development. Although the current Washington government has retreated from the TPP, it is still willing to maintain a tensioning stance, whether on the issue of the Korean peninsula (raising the tone of the speech and expanding the installation of its missile defense systems), or on the freedom of navigation and territorial disputes of the South China Sea issues. This stance ended up sabotaging Japan’s cooperation and integration Therefore, it can be said that the prognosis for Japan and the region in a short or medium term can vary from maintenance of the status quo to an increase in polarization. Japan’s diplomatic and security dependence on the US makes the next steps of the Tokyo government dependent on Washington’s decisions, which so far has tended to polarize the region even further. On the other hand, internal political stagnation tends to maintain the status quo, given the contradictions between constitutional limitations inherited from the postwar occupation, the LDP project and its lack of popularity, as well as the lack of viable alternative projects. 78 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.2 n. 7 | p. 1-99 | out./2017 | ISSN: 2525-5266 Notes 5 The Chinese Communist Party was divided into two main factions: the Communist Youth wing, which prizes for social stability, through income distribution and reduction of regional disparities, and whose main exponent is Hu Jintao; and the “Shanghai group,” led by Xi Jinping and centered on nationalism, accelerated economic growth and competition with neighbors (Martins and Visentini 2011). 6 The rst issue includes the acquisition of SH-60K patrol helicopters, submarine construction, acquisition of early warning aircraft E-2D and acquisition of part of the Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle system. To defend the remote islands, Japan intends to build observation units in Yonaguni; procurethe F-35A ghter, the air refueling and transport aircraft KC-46A, the Osprey (V-22) helicopter, and amphibious and maneuver vehicles, besides upgrading Osumi-class landing vehicles. Finally, to defend against ballistic missiles, the aim was to build a destroyer equipped with the US Aegis system (replaced by two frigates that could become capable to operate state-of-the-art anti-missile systems, if the trend already adopted by other countries, including China, is con rmed); conduct Japan-US cooperative development of advanced ballistic missile interceptor RIM-161, SM-3 Block IIA; recerti cation and infrastructure development for the PAC-3 missile system (Japan 2016) References Arrighi, Giovanni. 1997. “A ilusão do desenvolvimento”. Petrópolis: Vozes. Asahi Shimbun. 2017. “CDP surges ahead of Hope party but still well behind LDP”. http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/ AJ201710190042.html Brites, Pedro Vinícius Pereira and Vieira, Maria Gabriela. 2017. “A Crise Política na Coreia do Sul: Dilemas Internos e a Geopolítica Regional”. 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Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ mwakatabe/2017/09/21/snap-election-japan-endanger-abenomics-shinzo-abe/#159da0dde34 Received on November 6, 2017. Approved on November 8, 2017. 81 Bol. Conj. Nerint | Porto Alegre | v.2 n. 7 | p. 1-99 | out./2017 | ISSN: 2525-5266