's View of East Asia: Between Moscow-centric and Region-based

Alexander P. Golikov Associate Professor Dept. of Pacific Asia School of Regional and International Studies Far Eastern Federal University RussiК’s ViОа ШП EКst AsiК: BОtаООЧ MШscШа-centric and Region-based The Russian presence in the Pacific Coast dates back to the end of the 17th century, with mid19th century being the time when the imperial strongholds were established in Nikolayevsk, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. So, the close encounter with the East Asians has already 150 years of controversial and often uneasy history. This article explores the structure of the Russian perception of the East Asians. Considering educational background of the author, the focus would be made on Chinese, with the Korean and Japanese neighbors being covered for the reason of comparison. The contemporary Russian view of East Asia is extremely complex and complexly extreme. It has historical, geographical, cultural, social, political and ideological dimensions. Its manifestations vary from racist forms of xenophobia to the concept of the Russian Asianess, which embeds the Russian Far East into a general context of the Asia Pacific. Preliminary Notes Prior to going into the details, some preliminary notes should be made here:  Less than 15% of Russians have Passports, with the majority concentrated in the European part. The personal contacts with the East Asians are limited to the population of the big cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg) and certain enclaves in the Far East.  Western Influence and Westward Drift of Human Migrations. The East Asia remains less culturally meaningful and, consequently, the perception is more dependent on media influence than on personal ties and impressions.  The Russian audience is polarized by the principal information source – the older and less educated tend to depend on traditional media (TV), while the younger generation and more well-off Russians belong to the Internet community.  Despite long-established tradition of the East Asian studies, the absence of the public intellectuals limits the influence of the academic community onto the general perception of the population.  Considerable gap exists between various regions, with the population of the Russian Far East and East Siberia naturally more acquainted with the East Asians. Historical Background: from Mythology to Modernity The contemporary Russian perception of the East Asia has, to different extent, accumulated various historical traits. The eldest layer of the perception was formed by the legendary Kingdom of the Presbyter John (‘ И ’ most likely based on the Inner Asian Christian communities) and the land of the White Waters (‘ ’), which the Orthodox Believers had been aspiring to find somewhere in Asia. While there is hardly anyone still cherishing these dreams, the religious aspects of the Russian attitude should not be overlooked. It may express differently – through active proselyte activity of the Orthodox Church or in the interest to the East Asian philosophy and religion1. The Russian expansion towards the Pacific Ocean (1500s onwards) brought more practically based attitude. Enormous resources (furs, walrus tusks, precious stones, etc.) initially, abundance 1 See more in Ф ш : . . : , 2003 (БIII-БVIII .) Д Ж. - - of cultivable lands and considerable benefits of the trade were the driving force behind it. Closer to the 20th century, both foreign and Russian explorers were boldly predicting the emergence of the Pacific-based new engine of the Russian development. These ideas, though never came true, are still re-appearing from time to time during the public discussions2. The major eastward shift of the Russian/Soviet imperial expansion in 1850-1950s established the firm presence, but drove the focus towards the Great Power politics and military presence. The consequences were controversial: it tied Siberian and the Far East firmer to the European Russia, but, at the same time, led to widely spread paternalistic attitude (which hardly presumed integration into the Asia-Pacific). A major defeat in the Russo-JКpКnОsО аКr lОН to tСО ОmОrРОnМО oП tСО ‘ВОlloа pОrТl’ (‘ ё я ’) phobia, which culminated in almost paranoid fear of the Chinese invasion during the Cultural Revolution (1960-70). Largely disappeared from the public discourse, it survived among the lower social stratum which embraced xenophobia to compensate theirs desperate life conditions3. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, more regionally-focused agendas developed as survival strategies. This became a common knowledge, that the relations with the East Asia were crucial during the crisis years of 1990s. With considerable improvement of the social conditions in 2000s, it evolved into more articulate discourse which favored closer ties with the East Asia as a possible stimulus that can push forward the regional development. Spatial Patterns of Perception The perception of the East Asians is seriously influenced by the spatial organization. The capitals (both national/federal Moscow and St. Petersburg, and supra-regional, e.g. Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk) enjoyed booming trade and cultural exchanges with China, Japan, and South Korea. It surely created a favorable image of East Asia. At the same time, the massive in-migration became perceived as a serious threat. Since the major recent migrants are of Central Asian origin, the East Asians are far from being first on the hate-list. But the emergence and popularity of xenophobia of the formerly tolerant big cities may, at some moment, be channeled against the East Asians.4 Still, the bulk of European Russia remains largely unfamiliar with the East Asians. The perception is dominated by the mass-media, and, usually, lacks clearness and articulation. The ideological and political motives shape the attitude. The Asian Russia, au contraire, enjoys higher level of trade and cultural exchanges, as well as more intimate knowledge of the East Asians. Considerable Korean national minority in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, migrant communities of the Chinese (of various ethnic groups), presence of the Japanese, South Korean, Chinese business communities – this is what differs Asian Russian from European5. The East Asians are often viewed as natural neighbors, with whom the relations should be sustainable and non-conflicting, at least. Little racially-based xenophobia exists – the marriages between the East Asians and Russians is a culturally accepted phenomenon. E.g. as witnessed by F. Nansen, see Ф ь Д Ж // И / . . .. : +, 2004 3 . Ф., . . . . : Д Ж. : , 1982. 4 For traditional tolerance, exemplified by the absence of anti-Semitic sentiments during the worst civil conflicts, see . . я ( я БIБ - 20ББ ) Д Ж. я : , 2001. - ( я" ", . 7) 5 Э я я Д Ж // . - 2007 .. - 1 : . 9. . 252-277 2 Cultural Identity – Going East Through 400 years of the relations with the East Asia (beginning with the earliest Cossack encounters with the Ming China), Russia has developed a wide scope of cultural paradigms. There was considerable in-bound influence from Western Europe. The 1700s Russian monarchs enjoyed chinoiserie, while in the 1800s the imperial officers and administrators embraced colonialТst pСТlosopСв oП tСО ‘АСТtО MКn BurНОn’. TСО orТОntКlТsm аКs Кlso ТmportОd, with considerable number of the works of art clearly influenced by it. As a part of imperial colonial mentality, it emphasized the essentially European nature of Russia6. More native Russian influence is visible in the Eurasianism ( ), a blend of 1920-40s European Right-wing concepts with traditional Slavophile anti-Westernism. Different incarnations are known. The belligerent General Roman, baron von Ungern-Sternberg (who dreamed of unifying Asia with Russia against the Jewish Bolshevism), or the prolific man of letters and controversial academic Lev Gumilev are two names to be mentioned7. While not rejecting the European roots of the Russian culture (language, religion, etc.), as well as considerable influence of the East, the recently trend is trying to re-focus towards more practical considerations. The idea of the Pacific Russia became popular both in the officialdom and among the intellectuals8. It emphasizes the emergence of the regional identities and attitudes that looks favorably towards Asian neighborhood. Social Structure: Industrial and Post-Industrial Russias The Russian social system (inherited from the Soviet Union) was largely deformed during the crisis/reforms of early 1990s. The new social borders has not fixed yet, with a wide geographical and cultural gaps adding complexity to the whole situation. So, the broader and less strict division would be applied to define the social specifics of perception of East Asia. Broadly speaking, the big cities witnessed the emergence of the new classes, with high/middle income professionals forming the culturally (though not statistically) dominant one. The middle/small-size cities and rural settlements are still undergoing a painful deconstruction of the Soviet-style industrial classes – largely impoverished and culturally disoriented. Interestingly, both post-industrial and industrial Russias developed their own unique perceptions of the East Asians, both positive and negative alike. Post-industrial Russia generally shares the idea that the Asia Pacific is emerging as the core area of the world economy. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and southeast China are recognized as the leaders of this transformation. The attitude towards the East Asians is highly personalized – НОpОnНТnР on onО’s ОбpОrТОnМО, tКstОs КnН prОПОrОnМОs. OnО oП tСО stТmulТ Тs tСО НООp pОnОtrКtТon oП tСО EКst AsТК’s МulturО Тnto tСО quotidien of the big megalopolises – as restaurants, apartment design (fengshui), art world and media personalities, some philosophical (though westernized and vulgarized) concepts and vocabulary. Interestingly this may led to mythology-like images of certain nations. Industrial Russia (when not importing the post-industrial perceptions) lacks acquaintance with, even incoherent, elements of the East Asian culture. More stereotypes present, varying from the ‘ВОlloа pОrТl’ pСoЛТК to tСО nКэvО КНmТrКtТon oП, sКв JКpКn or CСТnК Кs ТНОКlТгОН soМТОtТОs. 6 Martin Richard and Koda Harold Orientalism: Visions of the East in Western Dress [Book]. - New York, NY : Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1990 7 ь . . яД Ж // Pro et Contra. - 2005 .. - . 5. . 41-65 8 It was, for example, recently put forward by Prof. Viktor Larin, a leading Sinologue, during the Summit of the Mayors of the principal cities of Sea of Japan. National-level Political Culture The overall landscape of the Russian politics has significant impact on the perception of East Asia. This, to certain extent explains why the officially stated politics of deeper Russian involvement in all things Asian is rarely bringing practical results. The principal features of the post-2004 PutТn’s rцРТmО КrО: 1. High level of centralization, with regions largely deprived of financial and institutional capabilities to carry out any autonomous policy; 2. Considerable institutional and ideological impact of the militocracy (a technical term introduced by Olga Krysztanowska to describe officials (known as siloviki) with the background in the Armed forces, secret police, and law-enforcement services). 3. Preference of personal loyalty over administrative capabilities within the bureaucracy. The impact of these features cannot be understated. Inability of the regional governments to develop any region-centric agenda of foreign relations leaves this task to the Moscow-based government bodies and think-tanks. Quite often the result is widely-spread misconceptions about the real conditions of cross-border relations. The most are the myth the millions of Chinese migrants in the Asian part of Russia, and the ongoing colonization of the Russian Far East by China. Another example is pre-Fukushima propaganda campaign that portrayed Japan as military power capable of launching an attack against the Russian Far East9. At the same time, it considerably limited the forms of exchanges between Russia and the rest of the world, including the nations of East Asia. The government-sponsored are predominant, while society-to-society, business-to-business; intra-academic communities, etc. are much less common. The result of militocracy is multi-fold. On a grass root level it is clearly visible in the excessive scrutiny of the cross-border check procedure. Another manifestation is the grossly inflated semКntТМs oП tСО аorН ‘sОМurТtв’ – a constant theme discussed during various conferences, seminars, etc. Initially limited to conventional military security, it now expandeН to МovОr ‘ПooН sОМurТtв’, ‘ТnПormКtТon sОМurТtв’, КnН ОvОn ‘МoРnТtТvО sОМurТtв’. GОnОrКllв КТmОН to НОtОr tСО tСrОКt from the West (US and Western Europe) this nevertheless impacts the perception of the East Asian nations. TСО ‘loвКltв КЛovО Кll’ ОtСos created the type of officials, who are obsessed with presenting the state of affairs to the higher levels of bureaucracy (up to the national leadership) as absolutely perfect, while often cautiously hiding everything that may not please the eyes and ears of the boss. Thus, for example, the current state of the Sino-Russian relations is often described as having no problems at all. The opposition camp, being largely obsessed with anti-establishment campaign, rarely addresses to the East Asian agenda. The Asian strategy of the Russian opposition is yet to be defined. Ideological Trends The ideology influences perception, though the absence of articulated ideological discussion distorts the divisive lines. Still, there is a large Soviet-nostalgic conservative part of spectrum that sees East Asia through the Cold War lenses – the Socialist North Korea and China are viewed as natural allies, for some they had also preserved non-НОsОМrКtОН ОssОnМО oП StКlТn’s tвpО soМТКlТsm. 9 As, e.g. in the statement of Nikita Mikhalkov, that Japan was punished for claiming Russian territory as well as for the lack of faith, see http://www.snob.ru/profile/27172/blog/61865. The orchestrated nature campaign became obvious when it stopped immediately on getting news of the Fukushima tsunami and earthquake damages. Others may see China as successfully transformed Soviet Union, which went the wrong way under the guidance of Gorbachev and Yeltsin10. On the opposite part of political spectrum, the Neo-liberals construct another image of the East Asian nations. They are true free market capitalism, unspoiled with socialist influence, which pОrМОТvОН to ЛО tСО sourМО oП tСО АОst’s НОМlТnО КnН ОМonomТМ unsustКТnКЛТlТtв11. Anti-Americanism, popular and propagated by the pro- and some anti-government media, has its own impact on the perception of the East Asia. China, Japan and two Koreas are judged by their alleged closeness to the United States. Japan and South Korea are view as entirely pro-American (the name of Ishihara is not known), while China and North Korea – anti-American (despite enormous economic and cultural ties between US and the PRC). Some of extremely pro-Western liberals strangely revived the ColН аКr pОrТoН’s SТnopСoЛТК, which manifests itself Тn К Пorm oП ‘sМОnКrТos’ oП tСО CСТnОsО invasion to Russia12. TСОrО’s СКrНlв Кnв sТРnТПТМКnt НТППОrОnМО Тn EКst AsТК-perception between the pro-government and the opposition camps. An explanation seems quite simple: the division is drawn not in the sphere of ideology: both camps have liberals, nationalists, lefts, rights, etc. Far Eastern Specifics Some aspects of the perception of East Asian are crucial for understanding the regional specifics in the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia. TСОrО’s РОnОrКl МonsОnsus tСКt, НОspТtО Кll СТstorТМКl, МulturКl КnН polТtТМКl НТППОrОnМО (ЛotС ТntОrnal and external), Asian Russia is pre-destined to deal closer with the East Asian nations. It is recognized as unavoidable, though not always pleasant, fact. More frequent contacts on official, social, and personal levels, have created merely practical approach to the neighbors, especially МompКrТnР аТtС morО polТtТМКllв КnН ТНОoloРТМКllв ЛТКsОН КpproКМС oП RussТК’s АОst. TСО МonsОnsus КЛout ‘EКst RussТК’s НОstТnв Тn AsТК’ Тs ЛОМomТnР Кn ТmportКnt ОlОmОnt oП tСО growing regionalized identities – rarely expressed as outright separatism, but almost always containing the discourse of anti-colonialism. During 1990s through the mid-2000s the Russian Far East was generally neglected by the central government. The situation changed dramatically in late 2000s when the city of Vladivostok was chosen as a site of the APEC conference. Although the considerable infrastructure investments were poured into the area, the consequences were highly controversial: despite considerable improvement of infrastructure, the very rationale for the project remained dubious. Additionally the КrОК ЛОМКmО ОбposОН to tСО ТnСОrОnt vТМОs oП tСО PutТn’s rцРТmО – corruption, incompetence, colonial style arrogance. Among the local population, the comparison with the administrative effectiveness of the Japanese, South Korean, and Chinese governments was clearly not in favor of the Russian one. Another important comparison was caused by the immigration politics of the Moscow-based authorities, which has few proponents in the Far East. The APEC summit construction project brought to the Far East unprecedented number of low-skilled workforce from ex-Soviet Central Asia – principally from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Widely spread xenophobia became spreading among formerly relatively tolerant local population. Interestingly, however, it was rarely aimed against the East Asians, principally focused on Central Asians. The former, despite clearly visible racial type, are usually considered legitimate part of the ethno-cultural landscape of the Russian Far East. 10 For example http://www.pkokprf.ru/personal/embulaev/knr.htm This point of view is most clearly articulatОН Лв К УournКlТst oП tСО ‘EkСo Moskvв’ (‘tСО ОМСo oП MosМoа’) rКНТo-station Julia Latynina. Recently at www.youtube.com/watch?v=k0yWHnrGwj0 12 Most recently by Alexander Khramchykhin, see http://www.snob.ru/profile/27172/blog/61865 11 Bibliography and Additional Reading 1. ь . 2. Contra. 3. Д 4. . . : . . : . Ж. - 252-277. . : . .. - , 2012. ь я : +, 2004. , 2005 .. - 5. . . 6-24. Д я Ж // Д Д Ж // И Д Ж // Pro et Ж // .- . - 2007 .. - 1 : . 9. Ж // И - . - . .. : +, 2004. Ж/ . . .. : И, 2005. . я я ( ). Д Ж // я .:И И Э , 2006 .. - 6. . 141-155. 9. . . я .И я я БIБББ .Д Ж. :И , 2004. 10. . . я ( я БIБ - 20ББ ) Д Ж. я : , 2001. - ( я" ", . 7). 11. Ф ш . . : (БIII-БVIII .) Д Ж. : , 2003. 12. ь . . яД Ж // Pro et Contra. - 2005 .. - . 5. . 41-65. 7. 8. / Ф . , 1996 .. - 1. Э я 5. 6. / Д Д . 13. Bassin Mark Imperial visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840-1865 [Book]. - Cambridge, England : Cambridge University Press, 2004. 14. Breuillard Sabine LО РцnцrКl KТslТtsТn, МСОП Нu ЛurОКu НО l'лmТРrКtТon russО р HКrЛТn — du monarchisme russe et de l'esprit du Bushido [Revue] // Ebisu. - 1999. - Vol. 20. - pp. 109149. 15. Gamsa Mark The Many Faces of Hotel Moderne in Harbin [Journal] // East Asian History. 2011. - Vol. 37. - pp. 27-38. 16. Martin Richard and Koda Harold Orientalism: Visions of the East in Western Dress [Book]. - New York, NY : Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1990. 17. Pavlovsky Leo Russia in the Far East [Book]. - New York, NY : MacMillan Company, 1922. 18. Wolff David To the Harbin Station: the Liberal Alternative in Russian Manchuria, 18981914 [Book]. - Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press, 1999.