Summary-The-2012-Gender-Barometer1.pdf

Summary SUMMARY 1. THE 2012 GENDER BAROMETER The Gender Barometer Survey was first conducted in Serbia in 2006, as the first survey offering a complex analysis of everyday life from a gender perspective (http://www.awin.org.rs/sites/default/files/RODNI_BAROMETAR_2006). This survey tries to go a step further than previous Gender Barometers in the region (Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, Montenegro in 2008 and Serbia in 2006) and pave the way for a new kind of understanding and consensus, that could be described as a post-materialist, post-conflict, post-industrial, post-neoliberal vision of harmonizing relations between men and women, or of inclusion based on gender – and any other characteristic. The starting point for this vision is the notion that men and women are equally engendered, that their de-gendering – or stripping of gender and gender determination – is a condition of their personal integrity and the establishment of a harmonious relationship with (other) men and (other) women, i.e. with people in general, and with nature, both within and around them. Gender has to be recognized and acknowledged, while also deconstructed and overcome. In Serbia, it is still very important to demonstrate that gender matters, but it is also important to understand that gender, just like other social identities, is itself a limitation that inhibits the expression of individual differences and capabilities. 247 RODNI BAROMETAR U SRBIJI: RAZVOJ I SVAKODNEVNI ŽIVOT 2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH This survey has been based on quantitative and qualitative methodology, which complement each other: 1. The quantitative survey covered various aspects of everyday life; 2. Qualitative methods used included: focus groups (22), interviews (32), participant observation, personal records. The survey was based on a representative sample of the population aged between 20 and 50, which allowed for comparisons with the data from 2006. This sample provided an insight into the lifestyle of the part of the population that not only is the most active and affected by public policy, but is, at the same time, most likely to influence development. On the other hand, qualitative sources served to provide additional insight into the parts of the population and areas not covered by the survey. While the survey primarily provided a snapshot of the situation, the qualitative part was more focused on the search for “vantage points” that allow for acceleration of transformation of everyday life, and society as a whole, in the direction of achieving greater equality and greater gender inclusion in both private and public spheres of life. 3. GENERAL FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY > The gender regime of Serbia is being transformed in two separate directions: 1. towards the strengthening of family, while maintaining a certain gender asymmetry, and 2. towards the strengthening of individualization, with an emphasis on symmetry and egalitarianism in family and partnership relations. However, both directions retain a strong family orientation combined with a decrease in gender inequalities. > Family is central to both women and men and is more important to them than work. Work is seen primarily as a means to an end, while the idea of self-actualization through work and career is largely frustrated by high unemployment and low utilization of human potential. > Gender roles are being redefined in accordance with the capacities shaped by the social context. The asymmetry of gender roles is a result of different investments of time by women and men into paid and unpaid activities. Unlike men, who do more paid work, women perform more unpaid work, but women, on the whole, spend over an hour a day more than men doing paid and unpaid work combined. > Women and men operate within two different models simultaneously – these are the family solidarity model and the competitive market model. As a consequence, ambivalence in people’s attitudes to gender equality is reinforced. 248 Summary > The biggest difference in the attitudes of men and women is related to the assessment of the position of the other gender. Here an asymmetric picture emerges, where men see themselves as bigger “victims” and in a less favourable position, while women think the same about their own. > The transformation of the private sphere in the direction of egalitarianism is reflected primarily in the fact that women and men perform an increasing number of activities related to home and child-rearing “together.” The establishment of an egalitarian model follows the erosion of male patriarchal authority in almost all areas of family life and the subsequent strengthening of women’s authority, i.e. the empowerment of women along the lines of the model of self/sacrificing micro-matriarchate. > “Self/sacrificing micro-matriarchate” is a transitional form within the emerging general egalitarian trend, which is shaped by the processes of de-development and which has contributed to the strengthening of women’s position in the private sphere. However, new generations of men and women are establishing a more egalitarian model, based on the concept of “togetherness” and shared responsibilities of both parties. Men and women have very similar views on different aspects of life, but the biggest differences of opinion are those related to gender. > The greatest gender disparities in behaviour are related to private life and the exploitation of women’s resources in the private sphere (the self/sacrificing micro-matriarchate). There is a direct negative relationship between the family responsibilities of women and their position on the labour market. > With the current trends of retraditionalisation and repatriarchalisation, men are rather traumatized by being assigned the role of “breadwinners.” They find themselves in the paradoxical situation where they, just as much as women, hold the family in high esteem, but still do not have a pronounced enough role in family life, while at the same time their options in the public sphere to fulfil their role of “breadwinners” are very limited. The frustration is reflected in their attitudes about “men having it more difficult” than women and in a general “crisis of masculinity.” > The current gender role of men, exhausted and disrupted to a large extent, accompanied by an authentic strengthening of egalitarianism in both the private and public sphere, despite occasional ups and downs, has contributed to the strengthening of patriarchal ideology in reaction to this situation. However, changes taking place at the level of behaviour point to the establishing of genuine egalitarianism, even as attitudes reflect patriarchal ideology. Men resist changes in gender relations and at the same time display more conservative attitudes towards women. > Men’s failure to adjust is extensively manifested in various aspects related to partnerships, and in particular to parenthood. It ranges from 249 RODNI BAROMETAR U SRBIJI: RAZVOJ I SVAKODNEVNI ŽIVOT > > > > > > > 250 not having any children, to refusing to take equal responsibility for parenting (including active involvement in child-rearing activities, taking custody of children, paying alimony, etc.). Men’s failure to assume responsibility in partnership and parenting leads to widely dissimilar assessments of satisfaction with partnership relations: men are generally much more satisfied than women. Since employment is the primary source of income, everything related to it has a direct impact on the status of the individual and the family. “Permanent employment” model (as indicated by the qualitative analysis), especially in the civil service, remains the norm, an ideal, regardless of its practical viability. In a corrupt environment, civil service offers the possibility of generating social capital and creates opportunities to profit from corruption. In addition, corruption is the easiest way to secure one’s employment in the civil service. Meritocracy is severely undermined, as job recruitment through advertisements barely functions in a system based on corruption, nepotism and clientelism. The issue of gender is not overly important in many aspects of social existence and general attitudes and it represents a feature of only secondary significance, especially compared to education and the rural-urban divide. Gender is the most important determinant of behaviour related to biological reproduction, both the everyday aspect of it, and the work of reproducing new generations. There are still significant differences between women and men in their opportunities for achieving economic independence. When viewed in relation to family status and the number of children, data indicates that, in the economic sphere, gender operates in the expected direction, that is, towards the exclusion of women and their economic dependence. Education improves the quality of life of women in different spheres: better educated women are more satisfied with their work, lives, partnership relations etc. Education remains the most essential individual strategy to improve one’s social position. Particularly interesting is a big difference in the attitudes of men and women when it comes to women’s participation in politics. Women are much more likely than men to believe that the situation would be better if women were the decision makers in political matters (57% of women vs. 25% of men). According to this and many other responses, women show a strong tendency toward “conquering new territories” outside the household, although they are still keeping “one foot” in that domain too. Still, despite the expanding patriarchal ideology, the current situation in gender relations cannot be characterized as a “war between the sexes,” either at the micro or the macro level. The solidarity component at the foundation of family life is too strong, and has been further reinforced during “transition,” to be seriously shaken by the gender asymmetry in views on true roles of men and women, especially since there is actual change in behaviour towards egalitarianism. This asymmetry in atti- Summary tudes is largely a reflex of patriarchal ideology, which constitutes a reaction to the real-life empowerment of women. It can be argued that a new kind of consensus is emerging on the level of practical problemsolving in the ever-gloomier everyday life, which in turn leads to the establishment of new patterns of what is considered “normal.” 4. KEY DATA FROM THE SURVEY Economic base and status of households > Around two thirds of both women and men feel that they are missing “a lot” in order for the basic needs of their households to be met. Only 19% of men and 13% of women think that their income meets their needs. > In 36% of households with the lowest education, agriculture is a source of at least some income. However, in as many as 55% of cases of respondents from rural areas, agriculture does not feature as a source of income at all. > Female household members are less likely to be generating income than male ones (by a 15% margin). > Slightly more men then women have health insurance, while women are more likely to be enrolled in a pension scheme. > Estimates based on the age structure and household size indicate that households with an average of 3.5 members have a total of 0.5 members in need of some kind of care. This means that one in seven people aged 20-50 years lives with someone who needs care. Marriage and family > Both women and men in the sample (20-50 years of age) typically live in households of the same average size (3.5 members), i.e. in small families. > In comparison to men, women aged 20-50 are more likely to live out of wedlock, are more often married with no children, and more often married with children. > Men aged 20-50 are more likely than women to start an independent life, but also to stay with their parents, and are less likely to raise their children alone and to live in common-law marriages. > Differences between men and women are particularly prominent among single-parent families (single parents): the share of women who live in this type of family is seven times greater than that of men. The probability that a woman in Serbia aged 40-50 is a single parent with one or more children is as much as thirty times greater than for a man of that age group! > Compared with 2006, there have been significant shifts in the family status of the respondents. The share of both men and women who 251 RODNI BAROMETAR U SRBIJI: RAZVOJ I SVAKODNEVNI ŽIVOT > > > > > > > > > > > > 252 are married and have children is now significantly smaller than before. In 2006, 51% of women and 42% of men had this status, while in 2012, these percentages were 39% for men and 42% for women. Broken down by age, it can be noted that only 45% of men aged 30-39 years live in a marriage with children, and only 63% of men aged 40-50 years. Among both women and men, those most likely to live in common-law marriages are those belonging to the middle age-group (30-39), with a share of about 11%. 11% of respondents, the majority of them with lower education, live in extended families. On the other hand, better educated respondents are more likely to live out of wedlock. 50% of men aged 20-50 have no children. In comparison with 2006, the share of men with no children has increased from 45% to 50%, while the percentage of women (aged 20-50) with no children has gone up from 32% to 40%. As much as 44% of men aged 20-29, compared to 26% of women of the same age, have no children. One in five of the male respondents from the oldest age-group has no children, compared to one in six women of the same age. When answering the question “How important is family in relation to one’s job,” only 4% of men and 2% of women said that their work is more important to them, while 32% of men and 34% women consider them equally important. While in 2006 as much as 84% of female respondents said that parents should do everything they can for their children, this percentage has now dropped to 66%. The sacrificial model of parenting becomes less prominent with the rise in mother’s education, so it is no wonder that as much as 54% among the least educated women “sacrifice for their children,” as opposed to 33% of those with university education. As much as 68% of men, by their own admission, rarely or never cook, 65% of them rarely or never engage in cleaning/tidying up, and 78% seldom or never wash and iron laundry. Of all the men living in partner relationships, as much as 80% are satisfied with the division of housework, while only 35% of women are satisfied with the level of their partner’s involvement. 80% of men think that they can count on the support of their partners when they are sad, depressed or when they are having a hard time, in contrast to 67% of women who feel this way. Only 27% of women with the lowest level of education regard their sexual relations with their partners as harmonious, as opposed to 40% of women with college or university degrees. Most often, in two thirds of the cases, partners jointly decide on birth-control measures. Summary > 80% of men, as opposed to 60% of women, are satisfied or very satisfied with their partnership relations. In both women and men, the satisfaction rises with education. > 80% of men and 85% of women claim there is no family violence in their current relationships. > One in five men aged 20-50 still believes that male and female children should be raised differently. > Only 51% of all respondents claim they never use corporal punishment on their children, while 33% say they do it only rarely. About 11% do so occasionally or frequently. > Compared to 2006, the percentage of parents who never use corporal punishment on their children has increased from 47% to 52%. The share of men who never resort to physical punishment with their children has risen from 48% to 52%, while the figures for women are 46% to 51% respectively. Work, employment and career > Men in the sample, compared to women, were more likely to be students; employed in a private company; owners or co-owners of private firms; farmers (who are paying into health insurance and pension scheme); unpaid helping family members (who are not paying into health insurance and pension scheme); self-employed; employed in the informal economy, as well as freelancers. > Women in the sample, compared to men, were more likely to be unemployed (as much as 1.7 times more likely than men); “discouraged workers”, i.e. those who do not even register as unemployed because they do not believe they will ever get a job; dependents (nearly three times more often than men); housewives (20 times more often than men); and pensioners. > Just as in 2006, the 30-39 year age-group continued to be the most likely job-holding population group among both women and men, with four fifths of male respondents and three fifths of female respondents from this group holding a paying job. > Men are equally likely to get a job through friends and contacts as by applying for it, while women most often get it through friends, followed by applying for it. Men are more often self-employed, and are more likely to use bribes, while women are more likely to use their party affiliation to get employed. > Only 30% of both women and men got a job through applying for it. > Only one in ten women with no or little education and one in four with a university degree got a job through applying for it. > Only 23% of men and 17% of women believe that they are sufficiently paid for the work they do. > Only about a fifth of all men and women still work in their first job. Men are more likely than women to change jobs. 253 RODNI BAROMETAR U SRBIJI: RAZVOJ I SVAKODNEVNI ŽIVOT > An almost identical percentage of both men and women say they would quit their jobs if they had enough money (43% women and 42% of men). > While only 29% of women with the lowest education believe that work is a source of stress, this view is shared by 50% of women holding a degree. > Better educated women enjoy their work more than those who are not: as much as 56% of women with university degrees, compared to only 10% of women who are least educated, enjoy their work. > Unemployed respondents, whether officially registered as such or not, still work and make money. As much as 39% of men and 25% of women who are nominally unemployed (de facto) earn a wage in one way or another. Food production > As much as 30% of men in the sample and 34% of women perform work related to the production of food for their own consumption. > 11% of men and 7% of women are engaged in food production for the market. > Among men who are not educated, 53% produce food for their own consumption, compared to 46% of those living in rural areas. As much as 67% of women with no education at all produce food for their own consumption, as well as 54% of women living in rural areas. > Only 27% of men with the lowest education produce food for the market, whereas of those living in rural areas only 22% do so. Women are less involved in this type of activity, with only 21% of the least educated among them producing food for the market, and only 12% of those living in rural areas. Only 6% of women in the youngest age group are involved in food production for the market. Property > Women in Serbia are much less likely to own real estate and motor vehicles than men. On the other hand, they are more likely than men to co-own property. There is an obvious transfer of ownership underway, which is gradually putting men and women on an equal footing in this respect. This is reflected in the increasing incidence of co-ownership situations. > Among higher educated men, 36% own apartments, and among those with a university degree, this is true in as many as 46% of cases. The corresponding numbers for women are 23% and 30% respectively. On the other hand, the least educated men own individual homes in 41% of the cases, while 24% of the least educated women do. > Among women with higher education, 30% own motorcars, whereas among women with university degrees, this is true in 20% of the cases. The corresponding numbers for men are 62% and 73% respectively. > In as much as 46% of all cases, men with the highest education levels have bank savings to their name and loan arrangements in 46% of the 254 Summary cases. At the other extreme are the least educated women, of whom only 6% have savings and 10% have loans. Emigration and entrepreneurship > Only 26% of parents want their children to live in Serbia. In this respect, men are even more ‘liberal’ than women, with only 23% of fathers versus 29% of mothers wishing that their children stay in the country. > Compared with the 2006 figures, men have displayed an increasing tendency (from 45% to 51%) to seek emigration, while among women it remained at roughly the same level (42%). > In terms of the respondents’ age, as much as 66% of the youngest men would like to emigrate, and so would 57% of the youngest women. > When it comes to starting a private business, the figures for 2012 show an almost equal number of those who would consider starting their own business (43%) and those who would not (42%). Here, men show significantly greater readiness to do so than women (47% vs. 39%). > Women with higher education show the greatest interest in starting a private business, with 47% of them saying they would be interested in it. > As much as 47% of the youngest women would try their hand at starting a private business if they had an opportunity for it, as well as 65% of the youngest men. Interest in entrepreneurship is obviously increasing among the younger generations. Family budget contribution > Men typically provide the greater part of the family budget. Most women contribute less than 50% of the family budget, while the majority of men who contribute to the family budget provide more than 50%. > One in four women and one in ten men aged 20-50 do not contribute at all to their family budget. > Men and women with university education contribute to their family budget in equal shares. Time use > Women spend almost an hour a day less than men doing paid work (four hours as opposed to five hours in men). They also spend half as much time as men doing informal but paid work. > Women spend more time than men in activities related to child rearing (twice as much) and housework (4.3 times more), as well as in caring for the elderly and children (2.7 times more). > Paid and unpaid work combined, women work more than men (8:46 versus 7:28 hours per week day, i.e. the difference being one hour and 18 minutes per day). > Women are much less likely than men to take up sports and spend less time socializing. 255 RODNI BAROMETAR U SRBIJI: RAZVOJ I SVAKODNEVNI ŽIVOT Education, knowledge and skills > Most of the respondents have a secondary education, men to a slightly greater degree than women (62% versus 60%). > Women are slightly more likely than men to have computer skills (85%), although it is a minor difference. > As much as 87% of men and only 58% of women have a driver’s license. > In comparison with the 2006 GB data, there has been a significant shift in the use of new technologies. In 2006, internet was used by 48% of men and 38% of women, while in 2012, it was used by about 80% of both sexes. > Men more often than women hold a job that matches their qualifications (46% men versus 38% women). > Women with college and university education hold a job that matches their qualifications in 56% of the cases, compared to 33% of women with secondary education. Health > Men state that their health is “excellent” more often than women: 33% of men compared to 24% of women. 85% of all men reported no health problems, compared to 76% of women. > As much as 36% of the least educated women stated they had chronic health problems; this was stated by 17% of men in this educational category. > In 2012, as well as in 2006, women and men most frequently went to see a doctor only when they were ill. However, women are twice as likely as men to go for regular checkups. > In comparison with 2006, the number of those who went to see a doctor only when they were ill significantly decreased. While in 2006, as much as 63% of men and women went to see a doctor only when they were ill, in 2012 that percentage dropped to 50% for men and 40% for women. There has apparently been an increase in the overall health awareness and this is an undoubtedly positive trend. > Also, in 2012 compared to 2006, there was an increase in the share of women who underwent regular gynaecological examinations (from 20% to 28%), and a decrease in the share of those who never went (or went only if they had to), from 26% to 13%. > Women are less likely than men to smoke, they are less likely to drink alcohol, but more likely to take tranquilizers. > As much as 44% of women and 56% of men smoke. > As much as 55% of men with the lowest education level regularly consume alcohol, compared to 26% of men with university education. > Least educated women take tranquilizers in 20% of cases. > The oldest generation of women take tranquilizers seven times more frequently than the youngest women in the sample. > Only 11% of women engage in regular recreation activities. 256 Summary > While 37% of the least educated women said they often felt stressed, the most educated ones reported this three times less frequently. > Rural women are not experiencing less stress than women in cities. > About 53% of women use contraceptives, the majority of them more educated women. There is no difference between women in rural and urban areas in this respect. > The most commonly used contraceptive is the contraceptive pill, followed by the condom. > Almost two thirds of respondents have not had an abortion. However, 18% had an abortion, while 10% had more than one. > Among women with university education, 73% have not had an abortion, compared to 51% of those with the lowest levels of education who have not had one. > One in four women with low education level had more than one abortion. Transition and influencing their surroundings > Only about 27% of men and 26% of women think of themselves as “transition winners.” > Nearly half of both women and men cannot assess whether they are transition losers or winners. > Nearly one in two women with no education considers herself to be a loser. > Only 30% of women in urban areas and 24% of rural women consider themselves to be winners. > In comparison with 2006 there was a considerably reduced difference between men and women when it comes to membership in a political party. Whereas in 2006, only 8% of women were members of political parties, in 2012 that number was as high as 19%. > In comparison with 2006, there was an increase in the percentage of women who believed that they were able to influence decisions in the local community (from 6% to 10%), as well as nationally (from 2% to 3%). Quality of life > About 1/3 of the respondents believe that their quality of life is satisfactory, and 1/3 believe that it is average. > Only 17% of women with the lowest education believe that most of their needs have been met, compared to 42% of women with the highest levels of education. > 43% of women with no education believe that the quality of their lives is very unsatisfactory or unsatisfactory; 29% of rural women also gave this answer. > In comparison to 2006 there was a slight increase among women who believed that their quality of life was either very unsatisfactory or un257 RODNI BAROMETAR U SRBIJI: RAZVOJ I SVAKODNEVNI ŽIVOT satisfactory (from 20 to 23%), while there was a decrease of those who believed that their quality of life was very satisfactory or satisfactory (from 35% to 34%). > Only 30% of women with the lowest level of education are satisfied with their lives compared to 54% of women with college or university education. Attitudes about gender > A vast majority of men (83%) believe that domestic violence should be severely penalized. > 85% of women and 78% men agree or strongly agree that “children give life meaning.” > 71% of men and 58% of women agree or strongly agree that “every family should know who the boss is.” > 36% of men and 30% of women agree or strongly agree that “abortion should be banned.” > 74% of men and 66% women agree or strongly agree that “every woman should be a good homemaker.” > 66% of men and 55% women agree or strongly agree that “gay marriages should be banned.” > 70% of men and 75% women agree or strongly agree that “education is key to success in life.” > 63% of men and 55% women agree that “for a man the most important thing is to earn well.” > 33% of men and 61% women agree that “women’s lives are harder.” > 38% of men and 25% women agree that “men are bigger losers in transition.” 5. DE/CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER IN THE DISCOURSES OF EVERYDAY LIFE The part of the research concerned with the de/construction of gender in the discourses of everyday life was based on qualitative methodological tools (focus groups, interviews). This part of was not focused on being “representative,” which is impossible to achieve using qualitative methodology, but on understanding the underlying changes taking place in the field of gender relations, changes that point to their transformation. The assumption was that gender is constituted not only by everyday life practices, which are largely structurally conditioned, but also discourses, which are relatively stable patterns of attitudes, stereotypes and generalizations that are interconnected and, to a large extent, shaped by ideologies. Discourses that constitute gender are highly culturally and contextually sensitive because they adhere to local narratives about the nation, history, family. They are not necessarily “rational” 258 Summary or coherent and unambiguous, but correspond to structural characteristics of the environment. Individuals interiorise these discourses and largely abide by them, but also reinterpret, challenge, destabilize and change them. Some regularities and patterns can be identified in these acts of interiorisation. The starting theoretical premise was that the dichotomous heteronormative model of gender relations, identities and roles is shaped within the specific model of gender regime that exists in the semi-periphery, which is in turn characterized by de-development, and finds itself in the process of gradual disintegration. This is reflected through the ambivalence, ambiguity, uncertainty, instability and diversity of discourses on the differences between the genders. In so far as social life patterns that restore gender dichotomy are transcended in discourse, but also in (material) reality, gender identities are problematised and transcended. Since the sample included a large number of very different respondents, gender kept emerging as a kind of metaphenomenon, a metadiscourse, something that incorporates individual stories and establishes itself as a medium onto which individual rationalisations, understandings of social reality and self-understandings can be projected. This discourse is a form of “collective consciousness” that exists independently of individual life situations, and it in itself sometimes produces such and similar situations in life, primarily through norms and “expectations” which the micro, meso and macro social environment have from the individual. The key findings of discourse analysis are as follows: > The qualitative part of the survey showed that in everyday life gender was becoming a less and less important fact, except in the field of biological reproduction (both the everyday aspect of it, and the work of reproducing new generations). > When it comes to upbringing and education, gender differences have largely been eliminated, that is, they are collapsing. First of all, there is a strong trend to minimise differences in the upbringing of male and female children. This has been achieved by way of gender-neutral child-rearing “taking over” one by one area of gender identity, moving from public to private roles. > Also, a “top down” process of the equalisation of expectations is taking place, i.e. the change first affects the upper strata of society and moves downwards. However, education is perceived differently in the upper and lower social strata: it is seen as more instrumental in the lower, and more oriented toward self-actualization in the upper ones. > Qualitative research has shown that investing in children’s education is still the most important family strategy, throughout the social hierarchy. Investing in children’s education is an imperative among parents from all social strata. Class patterns greatly outweigh gender differences when it comes to education. 259 RODNI BAROMETAR U SRBIJI: RAZVOJ I SVAKODNEVNI ŽIVOT > A discourse analysis of the responses related to professional life shows that respondents overwhelmingly accept the “dual employment” and “dual career” pattern, i.e. the employment of both man and woman in the family. Normalization of this pattern has been achieved by several generations of women being engaged in paid labour. Employment is an ideal, a norm, but also a need felt by women and recognised by their environment. > Limited opportunities for getting a job, combined with solidarity-oriented nature of family and the general pressure of survival, contribute to the deconstruction of the model of male “breadwinner”. This model is more fictitious than real, also because women’s economic contribution is considerable (both paid and unpaid work). > De-development and re-patriarchalisation increase the pressure on men to be breadwinners, and on women to be caregivers. The paradox is that for women, under the pressure of de-development, some adjustments and a reconciliation of the ideological and the actual, the discursive and the tangible have taken place, while for men the gap between these has became more dramatic and has produced a “crisis of masculinity.” > Employment-related gender discourses show, first, that both women and men recognize sexuality as a form of capital particular to women, and that there is an ambivalence among women themselves regarding use of that capital, because it leads to nepotism. The respondents also point to the widespread problem of sexual blackmail in getting and keeping a job, as well as in career advancement. > Patriarchal legacy is not the only thing, though, that exacerbates the problem of sharing household tasks: what most does it is the overall organization of daily life, which has suppressed “normalcy,” understood as “normal” business hours, “normal” work and “normal” pay. Repatriarchalisation and retraditionalisation of family relations are more due to changes in the environment during “transition,” than to the negative impact of this legacy. > Changes in relationships towards achieving greater equality occur gradually, from generation to generation, unless circumstances act in a drastically different direction (e.g. the nineties on the territory of former Yugoslavia). It is important to note that the change in the rigid patriarchal model already took place a couple of generations ago, primarily among people/women with university education. > The strengthening of certain (quasi)traditional and patriarchal values in the public discourse, expressed through acceptance of right-wing ideologies or extreme nationalism, is not simply transferred to the micro level, especially not to the level of actual behaviour. The micro level usually preserves its own “logic,” while the public discourse, especially in the media, only partially corresponds with this “logic.” The “traditional” is often constructed by erasing the memory of what was previously there. 260 Summary > The general finding of discourse analysis related to gender identities is that they are mostly in the process of profound transformation, in the direction of their relativisation. Relativisation of identity is taking place on several levels: identity as such is explicitly relativised (if it ever had been established as a clear experience of self); different group affiliations, including gender, are relativised, and among many respondents there exists a kind of “discursive void“ in terms of identity, which is filled with stories of life course and eventfulness. > For individuals, gender operates at the level of practices, by default, in unreflected daily routine. It follows that gender is discursively constructed and reproduced precisely at the level of metadiscourse, which is predominantly present in the media and the public in general, and not quite as much at the level of everyday practices. > The system of practices, as demonstrated primarily in the quantitative analysis, but also qualitative, is in fact far more symmetrical, even cooperative, than could be inferred from the metadiscourse on gender. > The discourse on the “naturalness” of gender differences is focused on sexuality and on motherhood in particular. Deconstruction of this discourse is not possible within, but only outside of the question of “naturalness,” because “naturalness” cannot serve as an explanation for the large cultural and social differences in the status of women and men. > The discourse of conflict, including conflict among women themselves, permeates much of the discourse on gender. The discourse of conflict is often replicated from the macro level onto the micro level, as already demonstrated in numerous analyses of the connections between narratives on gender and narratives on the nation. There is an absence of discourse on cooperation, solidarity, connection, exchange: individual narratives on gender lack the metadiscourse of cooperation in which they could be situated. 6. THE MICRO UNIVERSE OF CARE: THE GENDER PERSPECTIVE The aim of discourse analysis applied to qualitative responses was to map the discourses of everyday life that relate to care, the gaps in these discourses and the way in which people formulate explanations and rationalisations for care-related activities. It was important to examine how “life philosophies” associated with care are discursively shaped. The goal of this approach was, on the one hand, to deconstruct the engendered nature of care, and on the other, to show the absolute centrality of care in everyday life of men and women. We wanted to use this to shift the perspective and show that, in fact, human life takes place primarily in the area of care and is primarily characterised by care – indeed that the economy of everyday life is the economy of care. 261 RODNI BAROMETAR U SRBIJI: RAZVOJ I SVAKODNEVNI ŽIVOT In our language/cultural environment, discursively the term “care” (staranje) is still rarely used. This has to do with a pronounced invisibility of care practices, and with the lack of understanding that these practices, however diverse, are basically just different ways of expressing care. At the level of language, in line with this invisibility, we observe the absence of a generally accepted term to encompass a variety of different care practices. Also, on the level of language and discourse there is a partial overlapping of the terms “care”, “care work” and “caregiving.” This situation is in itself indicative of a very low awareness among the general public of the problems of care. Care refers to activities (work and non-work related, such as communication and play) but also to thoughts; it includes actual behaviour and anticipation of the needs of another; responsibility as well as obligation; and inner need that is born out of love, but also from a sense of duty, which is socially prescribed and expected, and often deeply interiorised. Care can be institutional and non-institutional, formal and informal. The main findings of this part of the research are as follows: > Through the naturalization of care, care is defended as women’s practice, which is supported by positive stereotypes (women are “naturally” more caring, more gentle, more sensitive, better parents, etc.). Motherhood is the focal point of defence of the “naturalness” of women’s care. > Care is “invisible,” for the most part to the caregivers themselves, as well as to the “objects” of care. There is no discursive space that can accommodate a variety of care practices; there is no language, no knowledge at the level of everyday life, that can combine a variety of care practices aimed at children, the sick, persons with disabilities, and the daily reproduction of household members (unpaid domestic work). > Principal caregivers – women – generally do not know how to describe their care practices as being related to one another, nor can they clearly see the links between care activities and other dimensions of their own lives (including their status on the labour market, career advancement, fatigue, health, etc.). > At the micro-level, care generates key differences in people’s lives. Given the very large variations in the need for care, the scope of care and involvement of various people, an individual life can either be completely centred on care or very little dependent on care. These differences may be so great that sometimes they become a key determinant not only of individual psychological states (satisfaction, dissatisfaction), but also of the social status of an individual or individuals (professional success, earning capacity, wealth, reputation, etc.). As shown in the qualitative analysis, these differences often outweigh gender differences because pressure and needs produce situations in which gender differences become irrelevant. 262 Summary > Care can manifest itself differently in women and men, according to their gender roles. Men see their caring role primarily as that of “provider of financial support,” i.e. the one whose financial contribution to the family is greater, while women perceive their caring role as consisting of “care work” and “caregiving.” > Care is more visible when it is carried out in the public sphere – that is, when it is professionalised and paid. Regardless of the fact that in real life, much of the care provided by the family and in the household does not lag behind professional care in terms of the quality of services provided, at the level of everyday life, due to this discursive gap, it is not seen, perceived or recognised as a set of knowledge and skills that transcends women’s “natural predisposition” to be good caregivers. > Care is provided for different reasons. In the practical ethics of care, pragmatism and idealism, customary ethos and a conscious and deliberate altruistic attitude are present in different degrees in different people. Lines of social differentiation, including gender, class/social stratum, education etc., are difficult to link with motives; it is difficult to identify relevant patterns, which means that we are dealing with primarily personal and psychological factors. > In many cases, care brings very high intrinsic rewards for caregivers, especially when it comes to child care. If one does not respond adequately and with dedication to needs, especially those of the elderly and sick parents and relatives, a feeling of guilt emerges. > Condensed and relatively long-term situations of strong conflict of roles between the professional/work role and that of caring for others (children, the sick, the elderly) have a very negative impact on caregivers: the neglect of their own needs, illness, giving up career or employment, lack of free time etc. > Due to de-development, accompanied by a demographic crisis, Serbia is facing a crisis of care, which consists of a chronic lack of financial and human resources to adequately care for those who are in need of care. What appears as a mitigating factor in this situation is, paradoxically, the high unemployment rate of women, and even men, which opens up their resources for care of dependents (particularly the elderly) and a high level of familialism – that is, of high regard for the family. > The crisis of care, when it comes to older generations, is particularly exacerbated due to the process of emigration of younger generations. > The most drastic institutional aspect of the care crisis is corruption in the health sector, which not only emphasises and reproduces social inequalities but also creates an intense feeling of helplessness and loss of trust. > In the ethics of care, there is a shift from traditional towards post-materialistic values. There are views that defend care in the name of love, solidarity and the very meaning of existence. In this perspective there are no “surplus people,” a phenomenon characteristic of de-develop263 RODNI BAROMETAR U SRBIJI: RAZVOJ I SVAKODNEVNI ŽIVOT ment. On the contrary, care and the economy of care are seen as the centre of human reproduction, reproduction of the human species and long-established human values. > The discourse of care should overwhelm public discourse, in order to counter the utilitarian, cynical, materialistic value system which produces “surplus people.” Denaturalization of care can help overcome the narrow, selfish, individual, familial and national frameworks and introduce humanity, the planet, nature and universe as the focus of “care.” 7. CHALLENGES FOR GENDER EQUALITY POLICIES: SOME KEY COORDINATES In addition to a number of specific findings that can be applied when considering different aspects of gender equality policies, here we will point out several directions in which gender equality policies in Serbia should continue to develop in order to accelerate not only the course towards gender equality, but also the development process itself. > Above all, in a situation in which a large portion of the population are “surplus people” because they do not ‘fit’ into the patterns imposed by neoliberal globalisation, all public policies, including gender equality policies, should be viewed in the context of the whole society, and solutions should be advocated that deliver maximum benefits for the entire population, not individual groups. It is important to reinforce the lines of solidarity and cooperation instead of competition over scarce resources. Both discursively and in reality, it is necessary to point to patterns of exchange, connection, solidarity and support that exist in society and allow it to survive. A paradigm shift in this sense is a necessary prerequisite to finding development alternatives that will expand the emancipatory potential for the vast majority of people. > Development needs to be considered in the context of the quality of life, as a goal which should lead to a better quality of life, and not serve as a means of “economic growth” that would be an end in itself. Quality of life can be broken down into several important determinants, which are contextually defined, but generally follow several lines, the key ones among them being peace, security, food, health. Gender equality policies need to be (re)interpreted and implemented as development policies that are both discursively and in fact inseparable from development and general welfare. To this end it is necessary for these policies to shed development models and prototypes created in the developed North and adapt to the context of a society undergoing de-development, society that has different development options open to it exactly because of that. > The survey discovered a very high degree of marginalisation of the issue of care, which receives unsystematic, ad hoc treatment in every264 Summary > > > > day life and everyday discourse, but also in various public policies. This not only limits the reach of the solution to the crisis of care – the greatest burden of which has been shifted to women – but also produces unnecessary bureaucratisation and technocratisation of “solutions” for certain “vulnerable” groups or sections of the population (children, the elderly, socially vulnerable, etc.), which makes access to resources even more difficult for those who are most in need. In highly corrupt societies, like the Serbian, gender equality policies and other public policies should be adapted to the context, with the clear aim of strengthening the vulnerable, while reducing mediation and simplifying procedures. Sensitisation of the public to the issue of care is extremely low, which marginalizes a whole sphere of social and economic life, as well as those primarily involved in it – women mostly. It is necessary not only to sensitise the general public and women in particular to issues related to care, but also to support campaigns, research, trainings, development of indicators etc., which would enable a comprehensive approach to care. Above all, it is important to focus on the “economy of care” because it is the economy of survival and of the production of sociability. Analysis of the survival strategies of the family and the household has shown that they are primarily linked to the production of food, especially among those from lower social strata. Since the issue of “food sovereignty” is a key development issue, especially in the circumstances of global economic crisis and food shortages, it is essential that Serbia’s development strategy follows the logic already established at the micro level. Gender aspects of these development strategies are also very clear: they imply, above all, forging links between rural development, intensive empowerment of rural women and rapid modernisation of Serbia’s rural areas. On many levels, this research has shown that it is necessary to conceptualise of gender equality policies as policies that focus on “gender” rather than women exclusively. It is evident that the “transition” has exacerbated the “crisis of masculinity,” just as repatriarchalisation has increased the pressure on men to be “the breadwinners.” Young men are particularly exposed to the pressure of high expectations and have a strong sense of frustration because they fail to fit into existing gender stereotypes. It is therefore essential that gender policies focus much more on men and on the raising of their awareness of gender issues. The high price paid by young men, in the form of unhealthy lifestyles and a tendency to violence, is associated with low levels of gender awareness. Gender equality policies should focus on changing the discourse on gender, including discourses on gender equality, care, violence against women, homosexuality. However, changing the discourse cannot 265 RODNI BAROMETAR U SRBIJI: RAZVOJ I SVAKODNEVNI ŽIVOT be achieved simply by organising public campaigns. Rather, it involves an understanding of discursive patterns that already exist in a particular context. In Serbia, the gender metadiscourse focuses on conflict and non-understanding, rather than on connectedness and solidarity between genders. It is these patterns that need to be changed, as well as the patterns of negative framing of “women’s emancipation“ and “feminism.” > The biggest development challenges in Serbia are linked to the survival of its rural areas and its agricultural production, as well as to unfavourable demographic trends, which pose a serious obstacle to economic development. Both of these key development issues have a strong gender component. 266 267 RODNI BAROMETAR U SRBIJI: RAZVOJ I SVAKODNEVNI ŽIVOT 268