The General Will

PROBLEM TO BE TACKLED Rousseau was disturbed at the level of inequality in wealth of the members of the society and so he sought a way to tackle this problem. He felt that if the common good of all were sought, the problem of inequality would be dealt with. Thus, he proposed the theory of the General Will as a mechanism with which this problem would be adequately dealt with. The General Will also stands as the basis for a legitimate government. A SHORT STATEMENT ON THE TOPIC Humans are said to have undergone a transition from the State of Nature to the Civil Society a view held by Rousseau and other Social Contract philosophers. This transition from the State of Nature to the Civil Society was necessitated by the need to protect life and property which should be achieved in a way that respects the principles of liberty and equality. The Social Contract, then, surfaces as an answer to the need of creating an arrangement that would securely “defend and protect, with the whole common force, the person and goods of each associate and by which every person, while uniting himself with all, shall obey only himself and remain free as before". And in order to achieve this goal of the Social Contract, Rousseau proposed a mechanism which he calls the General Will. The General Will, for Rousseau, is the integrated will of the society towards the good and the just. He further argued that once one becomes part of the General Will, one automatically becomes part of an indivisible civic identity adding that through submission to the General Will, single individuals give up their natural liberty and gain civil liberty which makes them equal citizens with equal and undifferentiating rights. At this point we could say that Rousseau’s theory of the General Will is foremost a theory of legitimate government. Thus, his notion of the General Will is his solution to the problem of legitimacy. He argues that a legitimate social order should necessarily bind upon consent and agreement and that it might only be possible through a Social Contract through which all the members of the society become equal partners. This social pact becomes possible, says Rousseau, by the “total alienation of each associate with all his rights to the whole community”. This community which is also referred to as the Sovereign is constituted not by an individual or a group of individuals but by all the members of the association. In this work, we shall focus on Rousseau’s notion of the General Will and the problem of Legitimacy, with emphasis on Rousseau’s solution to the problem of Legitimacy which is his theory of the General Will.

It is absolutely reasonable to posit that Jean Jacques Rousseau's concept of the general will should govern the exercise of political power in a society because the most important facets that a political system must ensure to its people, rely upon a duty to the common good for the constituency. The most fundamental social problems in the world today, come as a result of a lack of devotion to the common good, and therefore the absence of an active political employment of the general will. Additionally, Rousseau's general will, while difficult to ascertain, does act as a means to freedom, despite its anti-individualist nature, while promoting moral and common good. In this paper I will counter several critiques against a polity's plausible necessary enactment of the general will by drawing upon philosophical texts and various exemplars.

Tamaddun

The General Will is one of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s original contributions to the district of political philosophy. The intellectual burden and herculean task of this inquiry consist of reconciling the General Will with the sanctity of individual freedom, which Rousseau also purports to protect. Through the method of philosophical and textual analysis, this paper examines the inherent absurdities, complexities, and obscurities associated with the determination and realisation of the General Will, which lie at the heart of, and are the nucleus of, the political philosophy of Rousseau. It further x-rays the acclaimed infallibility and veracity of this political theory vis-à-vis its claim as a moral norm—an authentic will that is ultimately right in its normative credentials. It adopts a qualitative research method, in which case, it is basically descriptive and highly analytical. It is significant as it provides a blueprint and a veritable guide for policymakers at all governance or so...

2014

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was a philosopher and writer, as well as a key influencer in the years leading up to the French Revolution of the late 18 th century. He was famous for his own theory of human nature, as were many of his predecessors including John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. Their theories attempted to explain the nature of humans, of society, and how to better form a relationship between the two in order to make the life of man more fulfilling and fruitful. Rousseau put forth that humans, in their natural state, we good and loving creatures, and that the existence of property and the subsequent social contract that enforced control over that property was harmful to the nature of humans. In response to this derogatory form of social contract that existed to damn the then-prevalent nature of humankind, he proposed an alternate social contract which would allow the development of humans in society. In

2014

This paper addresses two interrelated questions. Firstly, it will inquire into whether Rousseau’s philosophy includes a theory of liberal rights. In other words, it will ask whether one can find in Rousseau’s writings a defense of what Benjamin Constant calls the “liberty of the moderns” and Isaiah Berlin designates as “negative liberty”. The second question deals with Rousseau’s understanding of the “liberty of the ancients”. The paper asks what type of political participation Rousseau desires for citizens. On one interpretation, Rousseau’s demands the submission to and internalization of an already established, objective good. This good is embodied by the general will, which represents the will of the community. According to another interpretation, Rousseau’s citizens are supposed to participate in the public space by public deliberation while bringing arguments from a widely shared conception of common good. Thus, in this account, the general will is formed (rather than discovere...

Constitution and the Classics: Patterns of Constitutional Thought from Fortescue to Bentham, 2014

In this chapter I look at the constitutional features of Rousseau’s "association of the general will" and address the question whether and how is the tension between popular sovereignty and limited government resolved there. First I provide an account of Rousseau’s arguments for popular sovereignty and outline the main features of his "Association of the General will". Then, I look at the issue of constitutional beginning: (1) how is the sovereign constituted: how a mere aggregate of individuals becomes an association of the general will with the above properties; and (2) how is its general will shaped. The godly Legislator as Rousseau’s controversial solution to the problem of constitutional beginning is the focus of the second part. The last part is organized around the more strictly “constitutional” features of Rousseau’s project. What role does Rousseau envisage for constitutional safeguards of individual freedom within the association of the general will? I discuss in detail here his doctrine of limited government as involving supremacy and separation of the sovereign from its government. Rousseau’s account of the rule of law, as well as the related controversy over the purported limits on the general will are next addressed. Rousseau’s understanding of individual rights protection and his likely response to the charge of tyrannical majorities within the association of the General will are the foci of the concluding section of this text.

Most commentators of Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts seem to agree on one point: Hegel misrepresents Rousseau and this leads him to a misdirected critique. This observation is not unfounded. Hegel states that Rousseau’s general will is no more than a lowest common denominator of the collection of individual wills, while Rousseau argues in Du contrat social that this is not the case. It would however be strange that Hegel, who was obviously an avid reader of Rousseau’s books, made such a caricature of the general will. This paper will defend the view that Hegel’s argument actually reaches at the core of Rousseau’s philosophy and discloses an irresolvable and even dangerous paradox. To arrive at this insight I will firstly discuss the meaning of the general will in Rousseau. This theory will lead us to a central paradox, namely that the general will of the people transcends the individual and yet can only exist in individuals. For Rousseau this is the cornerstone of legitimate politics. Afterwards I will show that Hegel’s critique is directed against this paradox. The main thrust of his argument is that Rousseau leaves open the possibility of the transcendent general will to destroy all individuality. Individuals create the general will in a social contract, but this creation turns out to be a monster consuming its makers. The general will of the people runs the risk of making the same people run off a cliff towards their own death, just like lemmings do. A Rousseauian democracy would hence be the last march of the lemmings.