Formal epistemology: Russian and Western approaches.

Formal epistemology is a young but vibrant field of research in analytic philosophy. is chapter highlights its major achievements and gives a sense of what can be accomplished by addressing problems from mainstream epistemology with the use of logic, probability theory, computer simulations, and other formal tools. e historical roots of the field are also described, and there is a discussion of new questions that have been raised by formal epistemology that should also be of interest to mainstream epistemologists. Formal epistemology is a flourishing subfield of analytic philosophy characterized both by its matter and method. Its subject matter is epistemology, the theory of knowledge. Its method for investigating this subject matter involves the use of formal, logico-mathematical devices. Formal epistemologists attempt to break new ground on traditional epistemological questions using an ever expanding and improving set of such devices. And the philosophical application of various formal devices has itself given rise to a host of new, hotly debated epistemological questions. In this entry, we begin by discussing the discipline of formal epistemology, its historical background, and foundations (Section 1). en, we summarize some recent work in formal epistemol-ogy, both as it pertains to traditional epistemological puzzles (Section 2) and puzzles born out of the development of formal epistemology (Section 3).

Philosophical Studies, 2006

Modern Science -Moderní věda 2022 № 4 PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY, 2022

In disregard for contemporary postmodern thinking the author of the article analyzes the ideas of V. Lektorsky in the context of paradigmatic thinking of non￾classical philosophy in the field of epistemology. Particular value lies in a very precise definition of the main features of classical and non-classical epistemology. The mentioned definition allows not merely to understand the limitations of posing problems in classical epistemology, but also to pose problems in non-classical epistemology. In this regard, there is an expansion of the field of study of knowledge and cognition in comparison with the classical epistemology. This requires a revision of a number of philosophical ideas. In this sense, it is namely communication, interpreted both as a dialogue and as rational criticism, which is the main theme of non-classical epistemology. The dialogical nature of thinking leads not only to the transformation of thinking itself, but also expands its nature. As a result, firstly, perception appears as a special form of thinking. And secondly, thinking and experience interact and influence each other so much that there is no sharp difference. Non-classical epistemology comes to rethinking the basis of classical epistemology - the subject. The non-classical understanding of the Self, which is being developed in the philosophy of the 20th century, refuses the understanding of the Self that was formulated by Descartes. Postmodernists conclude that the I itself has disappeared in modern cultures, on the basis of the fact that Self – is the result of communicative relations, postmodernists conclude that the I itself has disappeared in modern cultures. But V. Lektorsky states that communication flows do not dissolve the I. On the contrary, this leads to an increase in the role of creativity, which means an increase in individualization. Thuswise, we are witnessing the fact that, in place of the linguistic turn, modern thought has moved to a cognitive, epistemological one. Keywords: non-classical epistemology, extra-scientific form of thinking, critical philosophy, fundamentalism, science-centrism, subject.

2020

The aim of this article is to present a variant of epistemic relativism that is compatible with a language practice especially popular among scientists. We argue that in science, but also in philosophy, propositions are naturally 'relativized' to sets of hypotheses or theories, and that a similar language practice allows one to interpret canonical problems of epistemology. We apply the model to Gettier's problem, and derive a condition under which counterexamples à la Gettier to Plato's account of knowledge do not arise. We argue that these findings give further content to a well-known result by Zagzebski (1994). Our interpretation points to a type of epistemic relativism having links with contextualism in epistemology, and perspectivism in philosophy of science. 1. Introduction. Recent literature shows that the debate between relativism and absolutism is vivid in several fields of philosophy, such as philosophy of language, ethics, and epistemology (for reviews, cf. Harré and Krausz 1996, Boghossian 2006, Baghramian and Carter 2020). Relativism comes in many flavours even within each field, but a common feature of all relativistic models is that they consider their central object of interest (be it concepts, propositions, ethical values, truth, knowledge or even reality) to be relative to something elseto some referent, or parameter. Following Harré and

Quantum Mechanics, Mathematics, Cognition and Action, 2002

The Centre pour la Synthèse d'uneÉpistemologie Formalisée, henceforth briefly named CeSEF, was founded in June 1994 by a small group of scientists working in various disciplines, with the definite aim to synthesize a "formalized epistemology" founded on the methods identifiable within the foremost modern scientific disciplines. Most of the founders were already authors of well-known works displaying a particular sensitivity to epistemological questions. But the aim that united us was new. This aim along with the peculiar choice of its verbal expression are thoroughly discussed in the Introduction. In the present volume, we publish the first harvest of explorations and constructive proposals advanced in pursuit of our goal. The contributions are expressive also of the views of those who shared only our beginnings and then left us 1 ; they equally reflect input from those who participated in our workshops but did not contribute to this volume. We are indebted to the Association Naturalia et Biologica for having supported with a donation the publication of this volume. The camera-ready form of this book we owe to the patient and meticulous labor of Ms. Jackie Gratrix. The superb job she has done is herewith gratefully acknowledged.

As Vincent Hendricks remarks early on in this book, the formal and mainstream traditions of epistemic theorising have mostly evolved independently of each other. This initial impression is confirmed by a comparison of the main problems and methods practitioners in each tradition are concerned with. Mainstream epistemology engages in a dialectical game of proposing and challenging definitions of knowledge. Formal epistemologists proceed differently, as they design a wide variety of axiomatic and model-theoretic methods whose consequences they investigate independently of the need of giving counterexample-free definitions of knowledge. Or at least, this is a common way to explain where both disciplines stand in the larger landscape of epistemic theorising, and why interactions between them remain scarce.

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2011

Though it seems rather surprising in retrospect, until about twenty-five years ago no philosopher in the Western tradition had explicitly formulated the question whether there could be an epistemic analogue to practical akrasia. Also surprisingly, despite the prima facie analogue with practical akrasia (the possibility of which is not much disputed), much of the recent work on this question has defended the rather bold view that epistemic akrasia is impossible. While the arguments purporting to show the impossibility of epistemic akrasia have been criticized by some, I propose instead to make a head-on attack and defend the substantive view that epistemic akrasia is possible — indeed, actual. This leaves for another day the project of diagnosing exactly where the arguments for the impossibility of epistemic akrasia go wrong. Here, I content myself with trying to show that they must go wrong, since — as I will argue — epistemic akrasia is possible.

Abstract: The possibility of justified true belief without knowledge is normally motivated by informally classified examples. This paper shows that it can also be motivated more formally, by a natural class of epistemic models in which both knowledge and justified belief (in the relevant sense) are represented. The models involve a distinction between appearance and reality. Gettier cases arise because the agent's ignorance increases as the gap between appearance and reality widens.

Özet Felsefe, varlık, gerçeklik ve doğru bilgiyi araştırır; fakat Descartes'la başlayan modern felsefenin temel ilgi alanı varlık ve gerçeklikten çok, doğru bilgi olmuştur. Bu anlayış, doğru bilginin imkanını, kaynağını, kapsamını ve ölçütlerini sorgulayarak, doğru bilginin temelindeki en kesin ve apaçık olan ilkenin ortaya çıkartılmasını kendine amaç edinmiştir. Bu çalışma, modern epistemolojinin iki geleneğini ele alarak, bunları bazı yönlerden eleştirmeyi amaçlamıştır. Birinci geleneği oluşturan Descartesçi epistemolojiye göre, doğru bilgiye ulaşmak için, en kesin ve apaçık olanı doğrudan bir kavrayışla ortaya koymak gerekir. Bilginin temelindeki ilk ilkeyi araştıran kartezyen bilgi kuramına temelci bilgi kuramı denilmektedir. Temeldeki ilk ilke en açık ve seçik bir kavrayışla ortaya konulduktan sonra, diğer bilgiler, ilk ilkenin kesinliğinden yola çıkarak elde edilir. Temelci bilgi kuramı Descartes sonrası modern kıta felsefesini de etkileyerek, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant ve Husserl gibi birçok felsefeci tarafından da savunulmuştur. Modern epistemolojinin ikinci geleneği ise, temelci geleneğe karşı çıkan Hegel tarafından öne sürülen anti-temelci bilgi kuramdır. Hegel'e göre, doğru bilgi en temeldeki ilkeden kalkarak elde edilemez, çünkü en temeldekini doğrulayacak veya yanlışlayacak bir başka ilkenin olması gerekir. Bu nedenle, bilgi bir tür durağan konumda değil, tam aksine bilgi kullanımdaki devingen süreçtir; çünkü bilgi, Mutlak Tindin kendisini gerçekleştirme devinimindeki süreçte ortaya çıkar. Böylece doğru bilgi temelci yaklaşımla ancak kendisinin bir kısmını ortaya koyar. Doğru bilginin tümelliği, Mutlakçın kendisini fark etme sürecini veren bir sistemde anlaşılabilir.