Jean Monnet Conference
The Governance of Innovation and Socio-Technical Systems in Europe:
New Trends, New Challenges
International Workshop, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark, 1-2 March 2012
Governance of the Discontinuation of Socio-Technical
Systems
By Peter Stegmaier, Stefan Kuhlmann, Vincent R. Visser
Work in progress! Don’t quote or share without permission. Commentaries and
suggestions are welcome. For contact details, see at the end.
0.
Introduction
The governance of socio-technical systems has preferentially been associated with
advancement and innovation. Discontinuation of socio-technical systems is, at
most, discussed as regime change, innovation setback or failure—as if advancement and innovation was the only direction in which socio-technical development
and its governance would go. This paper aims at a better understanding of the governance of the abandonment of socio-technical systems. As observed since Schumpeter’s (1942) insight concerning the symmetry of creation and destruction, the
anticipation of discontinuation and fading out is as important as the driving force of
expectations about innovation and progress itself. It is crucial to see how technologies are recombined, getting unpopular, liquidated, how promises dissolve—in
short: disappear over the horizon of a different future than the one, which was anticipated in the past.
The analysis is carried out in five steps: Firstly, we conceptualise the idea of
‘discontinuation governance’; secondly, we provide a preliminary analysis of four
exemplary cases placing exemplary emphasis on one of the cases, the phasing-put
of incandescent light bulbs in the Netherlands; thirdly, we outline a heuristic derived from some explorative cases analyses that spot light on four key dimensions
of ‘discontinuation governance’; fourthly, we discuss and partially re-interpret the
technological substitution pathway model of Geels/Schot; and we end with conclusions and outlook for further research and policy uptake of ‘discontinuation governance’ as a strategic challenge.
The paper is partially based on research ideas recently developed by a consortium of researchers from the Netherlands (Stefan Kuhlmann, Peter Stegmaier, Vincent Visser), United Kingdom (Andrew Stirling, Frank Geels), France (PierreBenoît Joly, Marc Barbier, Frank Dedieu), and Germany (Johannes Weyer, Marc
Mölders). The group at STePS, University of Twente, has initially coined the core
research question; with this paper we aim to develop a related research heuristic.
1.
Discontinuation and its Governance
We study the governance of discontinuation by observing and analysing relevant
institutions, actor networks, governance strategies, and governance pathways in a
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multilevel perspective. We explore which forms and ways of termination can be
empirically identified in the aforementioned sectors and which are conceivable in
principle.
The patterns of development of socio-technical systems have been studied
broadly (cf. e.g. Mayntz/Hughes 1988), in particular concerning the growth and the
governance of large technical systems (Coutard 1999, Schneider/Bauer 2009), issues of path dependency (Garud/Karnøe 2001, Meyer/Schubert 2007) or the transformation of established systems, e.g. by regime change (Geels 2007; Geels/Schot
2007; Markard/Truffer 2006; Konrad et al. 2012). However, the success of a new
technology goes hand in hand with the hybridisation, fading out, marginalisation,
or failure of existing technologies. The number of studies addressing this kind of
development is rather small. Latour (2002) tells the story of an ambitious transport
technology system called “Aramis” that was ceased politically after some years of
intensive research and development at the height of the investment activities, but
before the new transport technology could be brought into use. Here, the old systems survive and new ones are developed in the continuity of the old.
Utterback (2003), while describing the role of technological evolution and innovation, also narrates how the U.S. harvested ice industry demised as the result of
the technical feasibility and economic success of first machine made ice and later
electric refrigerators. In this case, an established and highly profit-yielding product
and system has been driven out of the market. Its place was taken—sometimes
abruptly, sometimes gradually—by other technologies and products still offering
ice and refrigeration, but by other means. Utterback suggests:
“Generally, in any product market there are periods of continuity, when the rate of
innovation is incremental and major changes are infrequent, and periods of discontinuity, when major product or process changes occur. Radical changes create a new
business and transform or destroy exiting ones.” (2003: 84)
This summarising observation focuses on the level of markets for technologies and
their innovations. Three dimensions inform the analytical framework: ‘discontinuity’ pertaining to a product or a process; a product substitution or a broadened market; for established industry, competence-enhancement or competence-destruction
(2003: 89). A deeper elaboration has recently been suggested by Turnheim &
Geels, emphasising a “neglected aspect of the transitions literature: the destabilisation of existing regimes and industries” (2012: 1). Reviewing and integrating various literatures, they consider “industry destabilisation is best seen as a longitudinal
process that involves both external pressures (...) and endogenous enactment (...)“
(ibid.: 3) across several stages, such as disruptive’ innovations causing the decline
of existing industries, as an economic decline process, driven by economic performance problems and shrinking financial resources, as a de-legitimisation process
(ibid.: 2-3).
In contrast to ‘discontinuity’ as market phenomenon (Utterback) and ‘destabilisation’ as a regime transition phenomenon (Turnheim & Geels), our attention is
firmly focused on the hitherto somewhat neglected issue of explicit, deliberate,
dedicated governance measures for the discontinuation of established sociotechnical systems and their associated regimes—in other words, on ‘discontinuation’ as purposeful governance action sui generis. The core question can be formulated in a terminology that asks what discontinuation means as a problem of action
for policy-makers. From this point of view, continuity and breaks can be investigated as ‘governance of problems’ (Hoppe 2010): the concept of ‘discontinuation
governance’ becomes recognizable as effects of social action and tangible as for
systematic empirical investigation.
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The study combines the theoretical framework provided by actor-centred institutionalism with an agency perspective that allows for an integrated view on structures and actors (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 2000). The focus is on relevant
(hard, soft) institutions, actors, and their relations and negotiations. The (boundedly
rational) actors and institutions are analysed in terms of how they relate and interact in networks aiming to achieve discontinuation. This may include cabinet decisions and company strategic acts as much as public-private collaborations, public
debate, regulation, and media as actors as well as more or less organised citizens’
groups. To an extent greater than in many other innovation studies, it is also necessary to consider the formative role of social movements and civil society organisations—as ‘sub-political’ (Beck 1996) arenas for the institutionalisation of innovative normativity; as sources of distributed political pressures and as nurturing environments for niche experimentation (Smith 2007; Seyfang/Smith 2007; Stirling,
2011). Framed and sensitised through such considerations, but not limited to them,
we develop a set of empirically grounded categories (Strauss/Corbin 1990) that
allow us to find the appropriate concepts to describe, understand, and explain discontinuation governance.
A general, non-specific, notion for what is at issue here is ‘regime change’. A
‘socio-technical regime’ (Geels 2002: 14; Geels 2007: 399-400)—the extended
concept of Nelson and Winter’s (1982) ‘technological regime’—can be defined as
a socio-technical configuration that fulfils a societal function, such as energy provision, transport, or housing (cf. Konrad/Markard/Truffer 2006: 2). This alignment
and the interrelations of actors, institutions, activities and structures is a key for the
stabilisation of the whole complex. Nevertheless, it can also give direction to
change, making certain changes more likely than others, and “incremental changes
more likely than radical changes” (Konrad/Markard/Truffer 2006: 2). To round off
the picture of regimes, the surrounding macro-level socio-technical landscape,
external to the regime, needs to be taken into account (Geels & Schot 2007: 400).
Regime change, as understood by Smith et al. (2005), is the interaction of two
processes: (a) shifting (economic, legal, political, cultural) selection pressures on
the regime, and (b) the coordination of resources available inside and outside the
regime to adapt to these pressures (cf. Geels & Schot 2007: 400-1). This model is
realistic in so far as it includes both external and internal factors, factors of interrelation and factors of influence, as well as the agency dimension (transition trajectories enacted by social groups; structuration of activities in local practices; strategies
and strategic interactions of involved actors; intended plans and unintended behaviour) (Geels 2011: 29-31; Geels/Schot 2007: 402). Although policy discourses
often superficially encourage such interpretations, it is a mistake for analysis to
assume transitions to be self-evident, technical and deterministic processes, coordinated unambiguously and ex ante from the outset in explicit, centralised ways. In
reality, also the coordination of discontinuity is an emergent, distributed and intrinsically ambiguous political phenomenon, unfolding in real time over the course of
the transition itself (cf. Geels & Schot 2007: 400, 402).
Discontinuation can be interpreted as one kind of regime change. In the light of
the technological substitution pathway described by Geels & Schot (2007: 410)
discontinuation can be thought of as the case when a technology drops off the present sociotechnical regime as the result of (or at least associated with) a specific
moment of shock in the broader political-cultural landscape. Within this imagery,
discontinuation would mean that a socio-technical system falls into a niche existence, if it doesn’t vanish completely.
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Figure 1: Adapted (emphasis added) from Geels/Schot (2007: 410)
In the following, we take four quick explorations as starting basis for the development of a research heuristic. Instead of starting from hypotheses, which makes
sense only in previously well-researched areas, we thus build both the search heuristic and the conceptualisation of the governance problems (questions and theory)
on the grounds of the investigated phenomena themselves. This provides us with a
preliminary heuristic for the analysis of discontinuation governance, which consists
of the five problem dimensions:
Exiting
Process dynamics
Policy instruments
Scope
Legitimation
Types of termination
Types of dynamics
Types of instruments
Types of range and application
Types of regulation and justification
Table 1: Preliminary heuristics for analysing discontinuation governance
The heuristic so far only implicitly addresses aspects like culture (e.g., as knowing
what, when and how to discontinue and to build the necessary agendas and networks) or power (enforcing something in coalitions). These aspects may be added
to the heuristic if we will find that they help to draw the fuller picture. A closer
look at the types of actors and interaction involved in and busy with the dedicated
governance problem of discontinuing technologies and systems is necessary, too, if
the concept of discontinuation governance shall encompass the full complexity of
how structure, process and action is interwoven.
In the next section, we sketch four cases and derive first indications of the typical structures and processes of discontinuation and its governance.
2.
Patterns of Fading Sociotechnical Systems Out
There are a number of relevant present-day cases of purposeful discontinuation of
socio-technical systems and their surrounding infrastructures. Recent examples of
discontinuation discussed in this paper indicate the significant pace and political
momentum that can be acquired in such initiatives.
The following four case studies are well suited to study the conceptual ques-
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tions sketched above. They have been selected due to their topicality, their dissimilarity, but also regarding different policies in four countries, the Netherlands, Germany, France and the United Kingdom:
(1) the phase-out of the incandescent light bulb technology through the EU regulation 244/2009, based on the Eco-Design of Energy-Using Products Directive
2009/125/EC, started in the EU in 2009;
(2) commitments to phase out nuclear power from its current major role in the
energy sectors of several countries worldwide, with others ceasing earlierplanned nuclear expansion; discontinuation efforts have been accelerating since
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, Spring 2011;
(3) the synthetic pesticide DDT which was banned for agricultural use worldwide under the Stockholm Convention in 2004;
(4) a major trend in automotive drive engineering to replace fossil fuel combustion technology by (battery) electric engine technology, a trend that has been
speeding up since the global economic recession in the late 2000s.
Each case exemplifies in different ways the policy pace, political will and institutional momentum required in order to transform wider governance environments so
as to achieve such large-scale shifts in socio-technical infrastructure.
2.1
Phase-out of the incandescent light bulb technology
The phase-out of the incandescent light bulb (ILB) technology through the EU
regulation 244/2009, based on the Eco-Design of Energy-Using Products Directive
2009/125/EC, started in the EU in 2009. Thus the European Union, and also Switzerland and Australia, come four years after Brazil and Venezuela who were the
first to start phasing ILB out in 2005. Argentina, Russia, and Canada are planning
phase-outs in 2012, and Malaysia in 2014. The phase-out occurs disruptive in several countries. In the EU, the immediate discontinuation applies only to generalpurpose, non-directional incandescent bulbs. The limit will be gradually moved
down to lower wattages, and the efficiency levels raised by the end of 2012. Different speeds can be observed also between official and private phase-out policies:
retailers in many EU countries have reported bulk purchasing through consumers,
who thus extend the phase-out in private realms beyond the official deadlines.1
Policy problems of
ILB discontinuation
and its trade-offs
Policy problems for
dealing with consequences of ILB
discontinuation
C1: Level of policy
National vs. supranational
C2: Strategy of discontinuation
Stimulation vs. ban
C3: Pace of regulation
C5: Price regulation
Slowing down due to slow innovation vs. speeding
up regulation in order to foster faster innovation
Intervention high price of bulbs vs. return of investment
Price policy vs. regulation by market
C6: Old infrastructure
Transition period vs. total ban
C7: ILB specificities
Exceptions for (continued) use vs. no exceptions for
use
C4: Replacement costs
Table 2: Considerations in parliamentary debate
1
Many shops in Germany sold 80-150 % more light bulbs in the first half of 2009, as Spiegel
(www.spiegel.de/spiegel/vorab/0,1518,638227,00.html [16.02.2012]) reports.
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We are currently analysing various actors’ governance problems and strategies of
ILB discontinuation in the Netherlands. As a first step, an attempt is made to reconstruct from documents the discourses setting the agenda for governance changes (“establishing the problem”). We start from assessing proceedings of the Dutch
parliament (questions officially asked by members of parliament and answered by
the government), before and after the ILB discontinuation was finally decided on
EU level. Main considerations discussed are displayed in the overview in table 2
above.
In order to give a taste of the considerations that were discussed between government and parliament in the making of a discontinuation policy for the Netherlands, we present abstracts of the seven aforementioned considerations:
C1: In the discussion on the ILB discontinuation, the level of the proposed discontinuation policy is an omnipresent issue. From the beginning the focus of the parliament is in favor of supranational regulation.
In a first reaction on the written questions about a possible ban on the ILB, the minister of Economic Affairs and the state secretary of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM) at
that time explained that they focus on an European approach (TK 2007b: 1933). In a subsequent
round of written questions from the same member of the Dutch parliament (MP), the same minister and state secretary explained that they cannot initiate a national policy, because this topic
was already discussed on the supranational level for the making of an eco-design directive (TK
2007a: 2457-8). The new installed minister of VROM also made it clear that she strives for a European approach as well (TK 2007c: 3763-5). In one document, the ministry of VROM acknowledged that supranational policy in relation to the environment is often more efficient and effective in comparison with national policy. However, due to the specific characteristics of individual countries, they thought it could be justified to develop a national policy as well (TK 2008b: 13). Although in the parliamentary discussion, the supranational focus had not been contested
much, the minister wanted to underline that the Dutch delegation had much influence on the issue and the manner of phasing out (TK 2008a: 31).
In general, the responsible ministers and state secretaries—besides those from VROM also those
from the ministry of Economic Affairs and the after 2010 to the ne ministry of Infrastructure and
Environment—explained that the Dutch government was not able to develop a national regulation due to European policy-making on the same topic. However, they assured to put much effort
in a supranational policy instead. Although they left space open for specific national policy, the
legitimacy of supranational policy seemed not to be a point of discussion.
C2: In the discussion on the discontinuation of the light bulb, there was no disagreement that energy-efficient lighting should be the norm. However, there was discussion on the way this norm
needed to be established.
From the start, the minister of VROM was clear about her goal to ban ILBs. However, various
MPs disagreed on a ban and argued in favor of discontinuation by stimulation of the use of energy-efficient lighting (TK 2007c: 3763-5). The critique on a ban was the high degree of choice
containment of consumers in favor of the collective interests. Although the ministry acknowledged that a ban is a ‘steering measure’ (VROM 2010: 12), the minister believed that there are
enough alternatives, so there will be a low degree of choice containment (TK 2007c: 3763-5).
All the actors wanted to take the effort to make energy-efficient lighting the norm. However, although the minister chooses for a ban, some of the MPs assured that this strategy would have too
much impact on the choice containment of consumers.
C3: While the phasing out of the ILB was taking its first step, the discussion about the feasibility
of the discontinuation reoccurred. In particular, the practicability of the energy-efficient lighting
on the market was openly questioned, due to the slow pace of innovation.
An MP asked the minister of VROM whether there was a possibility to make exceptions for the
use of certain ILBs and slow the regulation down due to the slow innovation of energy-efficient
lighting (TK 2009b: 8375-8). However, the minister underlined that making exceptions for the
use of the discontinued technology should stimulate innovation. She argued that manufactures
need to innovate, therefore exceptions will not be necessary and innovation will be forced upon
them.
While an MP perceived the technological development of efficient-lighting as a feasibility problem for a total ban of the ILB, the minister wanted to improve the feasibility by sticking to the
ban.
C4: The purchase costs were seen by some of the MPs as a major disadvantage of energyefficient lighting. The minister of VROM agreed that these high prices could raise a threshold
(TK 2009b: 8356). However, she did not want to put an effort in eliminating this threshold, be-
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cause the total return of investment is far more than the purchase costs, the lamps use less energy
and have a better durability, she argued.
Although there was an agreement that the purchase costs can be an economic obstacle, the minister, however, did not want to invest in taking away this obstacle, because she focused on the
return of investment of the new light bulbs.
C5: To overcome the high purchase costs of energy-efficient lighting, MPs asked for measures
from the government. A first measure that was discussed is the stop on import levy on energyefficient lighting (TK 2008a: 8). The government agreed on this measure and explained that they
would try to deal with this on EU level. Another measure that was asked from the government is
a VAT reduction on efficient lighting (TK 2009a: 361-2; 2009b: 8355-6). In both documents,
MPs asked the minister of VROM whether she wanted to install a VAT reduction. The minister
replied that the return of investment speaks for itself, and that she believes that the growing demand for efficient lighting will let the manufactures innovate and lower the prices automatically
(TK 2009a: 361-2, 2010: 2).
While some of the MPs asked to come up with measure for the economic effects of discontinuation of ILB, the minister replied that she thinks the market can regulate through innovation.
C6: An important disadvantage of the discontinuation of the IBL discussed is the old infrastructure of lighting that doesn’t fit with the new type of bulbs. This s a result of the different shapes
of the new bulbs in comparison with the old bulbs. Consequently, there is a chance that new
bulbs do not fit in the old armatures of lamps (TK 2007c: 3763-4, 2008: 8). The minister of
VROM did not believe in an extra transition period for these infrastructural problems and adjustments (TK 2007c: 3763-4). She argued that when this will become a problem manufactures
will be forced to solve this.
The minister did not believe that the design obstacles of the discontinuation of the ILB had a
need to be solved by a transition period, but a total ban will force the manufactures to solve this
obstacle.
C7: The ILB has a broad spectrum of light and is believed to produce more natural light. Energy
efficient lighting is often accused of producing artificial or ugly light. As a result, the discontinuation of the ILB can harm light sensitive people and a MP asked to leave room in the discontinuation policy for exceptions like that for the use of the old technology (Tweede Kamer, 2009b, pp.
8357-8358). However, the minister did not want to leave room for the use of ILB in specific cases. She argued that exceptions will not be needed when you force the manufactures to innovate
and overcome these exceptions with the help of a total ban (Ibid.). Additionally, the Minister explained that the improved Halogen light bulb can act as a temporal solution for these types of
problems (Tweede Kamer, 2007c, p. 3765).
Also for specific exceptions, the minister did not want to change the regulation of the ban. In that
way, she believed the ban will be embedded most effectively.
This short excursion into debates and agenda setting shows that, as the heuristic
suggests, in fact the choice between ban and positive sanctions is an issue, as well
as exceptions for different usages, and the question which role regulation could
play as opposed to stimulation by incentives (positive sanctions). Both government
and members of parliament consider not only the state side, but also the market
side of phasing out ILBs, and the government assigns the companies an active role
framed through the way the state acts.2
As a next steps in this pilot research on the Dutch ILB case the strategy discourses of other relevant actor groups will be reconstructed and compared.
The discontinuation strategy in this field is characterised by a domino effect,
where some pioneers made solo attempts, and transnational coordinated efforts
followed later. This case also reveals how much a seemingly small technical device
such as the light bulb is bound into a larger socio-technical system. The phase out
of the small light bulb has wider effects on the infrastructure, on lightening industries as well as on consumer products. Additionally, the case is one recent example
2
Some of the discussion took place before the EU legislation was introduced and some afterwards. So, a part of
the data covers the continued discussion about the regulation that was already finalized on the EU level—
which is interesting, because despite or while there was a supranational decision, the MPs still tried to change,
or at least comment on the regulation by debates with the minister.
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for termination by redefinition of technical standards.
2.2
Nuclear energy
In the energy sector, several of countries all-over the world made formalised political commitments to switch from nuclear towards renewable energy in such a way
that they will either exit nuclear energy technology, build no nuclear power plants
at all, stop their construction, or replace only single out-dated plants 3 (cf.
Geels/Verhees 2011).
We intend to study the exit decisions in different European countries, in particular Germany, and their effects on the energy policies in France, The Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. Vice-versa we want to understand how the nondiscontinuation in the latter three countries effects the situation in Germany. Case
studies will also look at the effect of the Fukushima catastrophe on national debates
and potential de-alignment dynamics.
Exit
No expansion
Plant manufacturing
cancelled
Italy
Spain
Belgium
Germany
Switzerland
Japan
Sweden
Ireland
Austria
Philippines
Cuba
Exit decisions 1986, 2011; exit date 1990
Exit decision 1994; exit date 2034
Exit decision 1999; exit date 2025
Exit decisions 2002, 2011; exit date 2022
Exit decision 2011; exit date 2034
Exit announcement 2011; exit in the long term
Decision by 2009, confirmed 2010
(new power plants only as substitutes for abandoned
ones; no more state funding)
1970s
1978, 1997
1986
1992, 2000
Table 3: International overview of nuclear power plant moratoria
Quite likely, the discontinuation governance in this field can be characterised as
hard termination of a high-risk technology, affecting a large infrastructure system
with many international linkages. It is also shaped by a competition of different
concepts of governance of complex systems: central provision and decentralized
consumption of energy, combined with central coordination (as in former times) or
decentralized provision and consumption of energy, combined with a flexible realtime coordination of future smart grids (Weyer 2011).
2.3
Worldwide DDT ban4
The insecticidal properties of the synthetic pesticide DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) were not discovered until 1939, while it was used with great success
in the second half of World War II to control malaria and typhus among civilians
and troops. After the war, DDT was made available for use as an agricultural insecticide, and soon it became a central product in the agricultural socio-technical system.
In 2004 DDT was banned for agricultural use worldwide under the Stockholm
Convention (Maguire/Hardy 2006). The application of the de-registration procedure (Dunlap 1981, 1978; Agler 2010; Maguire/Hardy 2009; Maguire 2004) went
3
Cf. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kernenergie_nach_Ländern [12.07.11].
4
This section is taken from an earlier version of a research proposal, and was co-authored by Peter Stegmaier
and Pierre-Benoît Joly.
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step-wise in four respects—from single countries to a worldwide band; with forward and backward decisions; differentiating agricultural and vector control as
well as home and foreign markets ban.
Today, we take the ban of DDT for granted (different from nuclear energy or
combustion engine). But DDT once was a great promise (for instance, to control
malaria and typhus) and its ban has been criticized as contributing to the reviving
of malaria epidemics which is said to kill over 2 million people each year—though
earlier use of DDT in earlier decades may also have contributed by fostering resistant strains of insects (Gray/Graham 1997).
The agricultural use of DDT was first banned in few countries the 1970s and
1980s, before others followed (Hungary 1968, Norway and Sweden 1970, Germany and the United States in 1972, United Kingdom only 1984). Agencies charged
with protecting human health and the environment in many countries struggled
with the ban decision for several years. Despite the ban, agricultural use continues
in India, North Korea, and possibly elsewhere. From time to time, even the reversal
of DDT ban to fight malaria is urged (Cocks 2010). Vector control use (mosquito
control, most often) has not yet been banned, but largely replaced by less persistent
alternative insecticides. DDT also continued to be produced, for instance, in the
United States for foreign markets until as late as 1985 (ATSDR 2002; Dar-esSalam Declaration 2009).
Indeed, the process of discontinuation was long and contested and rested on social mobilisation and the framing of DDT use as a public problem. At first sight,
the discontinuation governance in this field is more disruptive than in the other
three cases (almost total ban) and more globally coordinated. However, the discontinuation concerns a single chemical compound (first synthesised in 1874), not the
whole chemical family (organochlorines), nor the technical regime of chemical
intensive agriculture. The DDT ban may be considered either as a first step toward
a broader challenge of the wider technical regime or conversely as a way to reinforce this regime through incremental changes.
2.4
Combustion engine car technologies5
The combustion car regime one of the longest-standing and most robust sociotechnical regimes in modern history (Geels 2005; Marletto 2010). For quite some
time engineers, managers and politicians, in various ways and partially in advocacy coalitions, are planning to discontinue or at least to shrink market for combustion-based automotive drive engineering technologies (Callon 1983; Geels 2002;
Mom 2004; Schöller 2007; Canzler/Schmidt 2008; Canzler/Kaufmann/Kesselring
2008; Canzler 2010).
Cars with combustion engine have been banned in some cities totally (e.g. Zermatt/Switzerland since 1966) or partially (Hagen/Germany since 2007), mostly due
to ecologic reasons or as means to reduce intra-urban traffic. In many big cities
road pricing has been introduced (e.g. Oslo 1990, London 2003), partially accompanied with special permits for electric vehicles, thus providing incentives to use or
even to buy them.
In the last few years many national governments launched major initiatives to
promote research on electric vehicles and to develop prototypes (e.g. France 2009,
5
This section is taken from an earlier version of a research proposal, and was co-authored by Peter Stegmaier
and Johannes Weyer.
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China 2009, Germany 2010, EU 2010). In some countries pilot projects have been
launched to test electric vehicles in practical use and to develop the infrastructure
needed (e.g. Mercedes-Benz in the city of Ulm, Ford in the city of Cologne).6
France even subsidizes the purchase of electric vehicles and uses public procurement as a means to foster the development.7
A number of small and formerly unknown manufacturers (Tesla, Streetscooter
and others) have presented fully operational cars, whereas the big German automobile manufacturers were lagging behind for quite some time and started delivering
electric vehicles only recently. Japanese and even Chinese manufacturers seem to
be far ahead of Europe:
France: Peugeot “iOn” and Citroën “C-Zero” by the end of 2010, Renault “Kangoo Z.E.” and “Fluence Z.E.”
by the beginning of 2012;
Germany: Opel “Ampera” by end of 2011, Audi “e-tron series” 2012/2013, BMW “Active E” by 2012,
Volkswagen “UP blue-e-motion” and “Golf blue-e-motion” by 2013; Mercedes Benz stopped its e-mobility in
January 2011.
Japan: Toyota “Prius”, the world’s first gasoline-electric hybrid since 1997; Nissan “Leaf” since 2010.8
China: “Beijing BE701 EV” by 2011 and others.
In the near-term future, the market penetration of electric cars “will remain fairly
low compared to conventional vehicles. The estimation based on several government announcements, industry capacities and proliferation projects sees more than
five million new Electric Vehicles on the road globally until 2015” (Grünig et al.
2011).
The discontinuation strategy in this field can be characterised as soft termination by gradual replacement, triggered among others by trying out new options.
Since there is no ban on the combustion engine, as a third option of hybridisation
comes in, providing a soft transformation without a hard cut. Nevertheless, the
Center of Automotive Research (CAR) expects all cars sold in Europe in 2025 will
have electric or hybrid engines.9
There is almost no coordination between national policies, but a sharp competition between incumbent manufacturers and new firms, which stem from other
business sectors such as electric energy production or are newcomer garage firms
or start-ups, respectively. Additionally the balance seems to be shifting within industry (from automotive to energy industry) and between continents (from “old”
Europe to Asia). Given the inertia of the combustion engine regime it is an open
question, whether the discontinuation in the field will succeed.
6
Cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_vehicle_network [22.09.11].
7
Cf. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elektromobilität (22.09.11). The Deutsche Post recently announced to order
20.000 “Streetscooters”, build by a startup firm from RWTH Aachen (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
14.09.11).
8
Cf. www.cargroup.org/pdfs/deployment.pdf [28.07.11]. Data also from car manufacturers’ web sites (cf.
www2.peugeot.de/showrooms/index.php?special=showroom-peugeot-ion [28.07.11], www.renault.de/renaultwelt/umwelt/renault-ze/renault-twizy-ze-concept [28.07.11], www.chevrolet.de/chevroleterleben/neuigkeiten/2011/neuigkeiten-2011-overview-news/news-details-2011-13.html [28.07.11],
www.opel-ampera.com/index.php/ger/home [28.07.11], www.nissan.de/DE/de/inside-nissan/innovation-andtechnology/ev-range.html [28.07.11]), online journalistic sources (www.autobild.de/artikel/peugeot-ionelektroauto-im-alltagstest-1593731.html [28.07.11], www.autobild.de/marken-modelle/citroen/c-zero
[28.07.11], www.welt.de/motor/article13369415/Audi-baut-elektrisches-Grossmaul-R8-e-tron.html
[28.07.11], www.autozeitung.de/auto-news/bmw-project-i-bmw-elektroauto-kommt-als-viersitzer-mitkarbonkarosserie [28.07.11], www.welt.de/motor/iaa/article4530200/VW-bringt-2013-das-Elektroauto-E-Upauf-den-Markt.html [28.07.11]) and an online encyclopaedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_car
[28.07.11]).
9
www.faz.net/artikel/C31151/neue-studie-2025-hat-das-benzinauto-ausgedient-30093728.html [20.09.11]
10
Stegmaier,
Kuhlmann,
Visser:
Governance
of
the
Discontinuation
of
Socio-‐Technical
Systems
3
The two layers and the many patterns of discontinuation as governance
problem
The above sketched preliminary analyses draw four different pictures of discontinuation governances, which need to be further elaborated and rendered more precisely (see figure 5).
The studied discontinuation governances have quite different characteristics.
Some apply only to one case (e.g., ‘partial replacement’ to the combustion car engine in Germany and other countries; in Sweden it has been decided to built also
nuclear power plants only in order to replace out-dated ones, but no additional new
ones); or to a few (for instance, the production of very specific light bulbs has been
ceased in all countries, whereas only the usage, but not the production of DDT has
been stopped). ‘Aftercare’ means the governance has not only the problem of fading out the system, but also that of deconstructing the system and managing the
waste after the last atomic power plant will have been taken from the grid. Perhaps
further analyses will show that the same might apply for DDT.
Guiding
problems
Exiting
Process
dynamics
Policy
instruments
Scope
Legitimation
Operationalisation
problems
Abandonment
Construction stop
Partial replacement
Aftercare
Incremental steps
Fw./bw. decisions
Pioneering
Transnat. coordination
Ban
Pricing, permits
Research
Purchase subsidies
Alternative offers
Usage
Home/foreign markets
Official/priv. ending
Nat./supranat. gov. level
Specific regulations
Justification
Incandescent
light bulb NL
x
x
Nuclear
energy D
x
x
DDT NL
Combustion
car engine D
x
x
x
x
(x)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
- (D), x (F)
x
- (D), (x UK)
x
(x)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
?
x
?
x
x
?
- (D), x (F)
x
x
x
x
?
Table 4: Preliminary patterns of discontinuation governance characteristics
If we look at the process dynamics we find in all cases incremental steps toward
ending a system of technology, in the case of nuclear energy and ILBs in combination with full exit decisions. Often forward/backward decision-making characterises the challenge put on a technology and system, in the case of nuclear energy in
Germany the binding decisions have been revised several times within a decade.
Germany, even though not being the first country in Europe to stop nuclear power
(Italy, Spain, Belgium), could still have a pioneering role as the largest economy in
Europe and worldwide to stop this technology along the entire (material, perhaps
not so much the knowledge) infrastructure. Quite normal is a certain degree of
transnational (at least European, or worldwide) coordination on technology exits,
while nuclear energy has been abandoned in individual countries without any
noteworthy coordination among the protagonists. It cannot be excluded that
“through the alignment of visions and activities of different groups” (Geels/Schot
2007: 402) more coordination along informal, unintended or/and newly developed
channels may emerge. The same is true for the quite heterogeneous patterns of
using (positive and negative) sanctions and making differences between usages and
markets to which the stops are applied.
11
Stegmaier,
Kuhlmann,
Visser:
Governance
of
the
Discontinuation
of
Socio-‐Technical
Systems
Through a more systematic and deeper comparison of the cases, on the level of
policy-maker and stakeholder discourses, we expect to be able to explain, both
single constellations and deviations and the larger picture and typical governance
patterns.
4.
Discontinuation and Transition
As set out above, discontinuation can be interpreted as one kind of regime change.
In the light of the technological substitution pathway described by Geels & Schot
(2007: 410) discontinuation can be thought of as the case when a technology drops
off the present sociotechnical regime as the result of a specific moment of shock in
the broader political-cultural landscape.
This may indeed hold true for the abandonment of nuclear energy right after the
1986 Chernobyl and 2011 Fukushima-Daiichi disasters. The shock hypothesis
does, however, obviously not apply to the ILB, DDT, and combustion car engine
phase-outs. Rather it seems that more diffuse, less abrupt changes in the landscape
and the offer of alternative technologies from niches (like energy-saving lamps and
related technologies, less dangerous pesticides, and alternative car engine technologies) can be associated with boosting discontinuation in these areas, in combination with policies and political initiatives pertinent for changes.
Another aspect to be studied further is the fact that in some of the cases possibly
no immediate technological alternatives are available, e.g. in the case of nuclear
energy: while power plants in theory may be substituted by all kinds of non-nuclear
energy generating systems, the grid infrastructure in Germany, in particular, is not
yet ready to distribute large amounts of renewable energy across the country. The
size, shape, and realisation of an appropriate grid is still furiously disputed among
ministries (controlled by members of different parties) and local citizens’ initiatives are taking a stand against wind turbines and transmission lines. Here, the politically intended destabilisation of the regime seems to lead into a vacuum, which
cannot immediately be filled by the “emergence of multiple embryonic nicheinnovations” (Geels/Schot 2007: 408) as perhaps in the other three cases. The dealignment is thus sometimes decoupled from re-alignment (as the stabilisation of
new actor networks, technologies and systems, regimes and policies), substitution
and reconfiguration delays and the transformation romps around in a rather inconsistent state.
Moreover, it remains to be seen how far the transition pathway
(Elzen/Geels/Green 2004; Markard et al. 2012) and destabilisation (Turnheim/Geels 2012) perspectives of existing regime change theory can be used,
adapted, or substituted.
5. Conclusion and outlook: Discontinuation governance as strategic challenge
The presented research approach towards the governance of the discontinuation of
socio-technical systems is, as has been emphasised in this paper repeatedly, still
under construction. Yet, with a serious note of caution, we can state that (1) it takes
place in a highly complex context—technically as well as socially—and (2) in
most cases discontinuation has to cope with quite some resistance to dedicated,
forceful change; not surprisingly, in spite of some strong political will, institutional
inertia and vested interests are prevalent. Discontinuation, if successful, has to
manage the unbundling of forces, the dismantling of existing structures in order to
12
Stegmaier,
Kuhlmann,
Visser:
Governance
of
the
Discontinuation
of
Socio-‐Technical
Systems
overcome inertia of current systems and networks.
Furthermore, the spill-over effects of discontinuation efforts between national
economies, sectors and regions come also into focus. National decisions on the
termination of a specific technology influence the context of decision-making of
other countries, e.g. by providing new arguments or new models of regulatory
measures in favour of termination. Also, the progressive availability of new, alternative technology, such as electric vehicles, as well as successful pilot projects
with renewable energies are major factors affecting national and international discourses about discontinuation.
At a later stage, this project will further develop conceptual offers around the
notion of ‘policy termination’, which can be defined as the discontinuation of a
particular way of solving a policy problem. In case of discontinuation of sociotechnical systems the termination of a (mostly global) technological regime can be
initiated at different levels of policy-making: (1) global or transnational; (2) national; (3) regional or local. Termination may be a coordinated effort or a troublesome process, shaped by the interplay, interferences or even conflicts between
different actors at different levels.
Jim Utterback (2003: 84) sees such continuity and discontinuity following predictable patterns. It is difficult to generalise this to the four cases discussed above,
for nobody was, so far, really able to predict the concrete patterns of discontinuation in terms of point or phase in time, necessary or sufficient conditions, emerging
or set in motion intentionally with respect to nuclear energy, incandescent light
bulb technology, combustion car engines, or DDT. Rather, as the case of nuclear
energy teaches a once achieved termination may sooner or later be revoked and
even recanted—only to be itself taken back after some time. It is utterly hard to
predict how many withdrawals from withdrawals and continuations will occur until
a socio-technical system (and perhaps also its regime) is all over and past.
With our focus on the purposeful discontinuation we want to emphasise the
need to include in the reflection on how to stimulate innovation also a better understanding of how to foster termination.
6.
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7. The authors
Having first introduced the idea of ‘discontinuation governance’, Peter Stegmaier
further elaborates this concept together with Stefan Kuhlmann, and Vincent Visser
recently began a master thesis project as pilot on the Dutch incandescent light bulb
governance.
Dr Peter Stegmaier
Dr Stefan Kuhlmann
Vincent R. Visser MSc
Assistant Professor
Department of Science, Technology, and Policy Studies (STePS)
Institute for Innovation and Governance Studies (IGS); School of
Management and Governance
(SMG)
University of Twente
Professor Foundations of Science,
Technology and Society
Director of Department of Science, Technology, and Policy
Studies (STePS)
Institute for Innovation and Governance Studies (IGS); School of
Management and Governance
(SMG)
University of Twente
Holds a master in Philosophy of
Science, Technology and Society
and is currently completing a
second master in Public Administration at the University of
Twente
E-mail:
[email protected]
E-mail:
[email protected]
15
E-mail:
[email protected]
Stegmaier,
Kuhlmann,
Visser:
Governance
of
the
Discontinuation
of
Socio-‐Technical
Systems
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