CSCAP regional security outlook 2017

CSCAP Regional Security Outlook Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 2012 The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the region’s leading Track Two (non-official) organization for promoting cooperation and dialogue on regional security issues. CSCAP was established in 1993, and now has 21 national Member Committees and one Observer. (For more information about CSCAP, please visit www.cscap.org.) CSCAP thanks the University of British Columbia Security and Defence Program for additional support of this publication. Copyright @ 2012 by CSCAP ISBN: 978-981-07-0632-6 Editor Dr. Brian L. Job (CSCAP Canada, Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia) Associate Editor Erin Elizabeth Williams (CSCAP Canada Administrator) Editorial Advisers Dr. Carolina G. Hernandez (CSCAP Philippines and Founding President and Chair of the Board of Directors, International Strategic and Development Studies) Dr. Tsutomu Kikuchi (CSCAP Japan, Professor of International Political Economy, Aoyama Gakuin University) Access to the CRSO is available at www.cscap.org. Designed by Nancy Boyes at Five Stones Creative (Vancouver, Canada) Printed by Booksmith Productions (Singapore) Cover photographs: Shan State soldier, eastern Myanmar; Abu Bakar Bashir behind bars before his hearing verdict; Japanese man crying for his daughter after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami. The CSCAP Regional Security Outlook (CRSO) is a product of an editorial group established by CSCAP. While efforts were made to ensure that the views of the CSCAP membership were taken into account, the opinions and material contained in this report are the sole responsibility of the authors and the editor, and do not necessarily reflect those of the CSCAP Member Committees, their individual participants, or any of the CRSO’s financial supporters. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the Editor. CSCAP Regional Security Outlook Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Letter from the Editor O On behalf of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), we are pleased to present this CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2012 (CRSO 2012). Inaugurated in 2007, this is the fifth annual CRSO volume. The CRSO is directed to the broad regional audience encompassed by CSCAP itself. The CRSO mandate is to survey the most pressing security issues of today and to put forward informed policy-relevant recommendations as to how Track One (official) and Track Two (unofficial) actors together can advance multilateral, regional security cooperation. As in prior years, this volume of the CRSO reflects the exceptional professional service of Ms. Erin Williams, Associate Editor. Special thanks are due to the authors of chapters, updates, and Ms. Ashley Van Damme, who provided timely editorial assistance. The CRSO is available in digital form on the Internet at www.cscap.org. A limited number of hard copies are available to CSCAP Member Committees. Copies of the CRSO will be distributed at the 26th Asia Pacific Round Table meetings in Kuala Lumpur in 2012. HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE CRSO 2012 2011: A Year of Treading Cautiously Rhetoric and confrontation were considerably reduced from 2010 levels. China and the U.S. looked to smoother relations; Burma and North Korea created less regional tension. (See Chapters 1 and 3, and Update, page 28) 9/11 Ten Years On While terrorist acts, within the context of insurgencies, remain a concern, there are no signs of Southeast Asia’s having become a ‘second front.’ (See Chapter 2 and Update, page 24) Concerns Remain Military buildups aggravate insecurity. Clashes continue in the South China Sea. Conflict and tension in South, Southwest, and Central Asia threaten spill over effects. (See Updates on pages 26 and 30) Human Security Crises Asian populations remain under severe stress, beset by natural disasters, food insecurity, and environmental damage. Significantly, the protection of populations through the RtoP received greater attention in 2011. (See Chapters 4 and 5) Significant Challenges for 2012 ■ Stabilization of the global financial system is essential for sustaining economic growth underpinning regional stability. ■ China and Asian states in the G20 must be given and accept greater roles. ■ Human security priorities—refugees, IDPs, people in poverty—demand attention. ■ Regional conflict prevention and conflict resolution capacities need to be bolstered. ■ Proactive leadership in regional institutions such as ASEAN, APEC, ARF and the EAS is needed. ■ Track Two deserves a greater role, and must move beyond current inhibiting institutional formats. (See Chapter 6) Brian L. Job, Editor Table of Contents 1 2011: A YEAR OF TREADING CAUTIOUSLY Brian L. Job and Erin Williams ................................................................................................................................ 4 – 11 2 TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA TEN YEARS ON Sidney Jones ........................................................................................................................................................................ 12 – 17 3 BURMA’S BROKEN BALANCE Desmond Ball and Nicholas Farrelly ............................................................................................................... 18 – 23 UPDATES Aim Sinpeng, Mark Valencia, Chung-in Moon, Richard Bitzinger ........................................24 – 33 4 IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ASIA’S ROLE Pierre Lizee ............................................................................................................................................................................ 34 – 39 5 FOOD SECURITY IN ASIA: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE Paul Teng and Margarita Escaler ........................................................................................................................ 40 – 45 6 THE CHALLENGE OF ENGAGING TRACK ONE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION Carolina Hernandez and Dalchoong Kim .................................................................................................... 46 – 51 ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................................................................... 52 CHAPTER 1 BRIAN JOB AND ERIN WILLIAMS 2011: A Year of Treading Cautiously The events THE DIPLOMATIC DUST-UPS THAT and Burma, the response by the U.S. punctuated 2010 have been mostly and other key interlocutors has been of 2011 brought missing in the Asia Pacific in 2011. tepid. Improvements in major power Verbal sparring by states with claims relations may reverse course if the or interests in the South China Sea global economy goes into a tailspin. has increased in both volume and What’s more, even in what has been frequency, but in other respects the an otherwise ‘good’ year, the region’s momentum has shifted toward leaders are confronted with human engagement rather than provocation. and non-traditional security threats Notable developments include positive of immense scale. These issues are gestures by North Korea and Burma, considered below, followed by hard— warming relations between Washington and perennial—questions about and Beijing, and encouraging, if whether regional multilateral modest, steps in building a U.S.-India organizations are capable of managing partnership. and minimizing tensions and crises. home the growing mismatch between regional economic and security developments and their respective institutional mechanisms. CRSO 2012 PAGE 4 But if 2011 was a year when the security pendulum seemed to swing POSITIVE SIGNS IN TROUBLE in a more conciliatory direction, 2012 SPOTS will be a reality check on whether North Korea: The violent provocations these changes are fundamental or that marked inter-Korean relations in fleeting. There are good reasons for 2010 were not repeated in 2011, as caution. In the case of North Korea the North scaled back its military desperation, made worse by the from the U.S. and Europe is not drop-off in humanitarian aid by most forthcoming. donors except China (see Update, “...if 2011 was a year when the security pendulum ceasefires with ethnic minorities has motivations, Seoul and Washington cast a pall over an otherwise positive were unmoved. The Lee Myung-bak picture of change in Burma (see government is sceptical and remains Chapter 3). Joshua Kurlantzik firm in its “proactive deterrence” recently raised the possibility that policy, and the U.S. appears to be conditions in the northern and eastern running out of “strategic patience” regions could deteriorate further, 1 seemed to However, the breakdown of p. 28). Whatever the North’s with the North. The two sides’ talks describing these minority areas as in Geneva on October 23-24 yielded “ungoverned zones of conflict.”3 little in the way of progress, and swing in a more conciliatory according to one analyst, the Obama MAJOR POWER RELATIONS ON Administration is not likely to “get A MORE EVEN KEEL sucked into a process...that fails to US-China Relations: The prickly deliver denuclearization.” direction, 2012 will be a reality check on whether these changes are fundamental 2 Burma: The November 2010 in 2010 softened in 2011, and elections, Burma’s first in over twenty important high-level engagement has years, ushered in a level of political happened on both sides, with change most observers did not expect. Hu Jintao visiting the U.S. in January, Although the leadership is still followed by a resumption of military- dominated by the military, it has been to-military relations later that month. somewhat ‘civilianized’ with the Statements over the South China Sea inclusion of more technocratic and issue were more muted, although bureaucratic elements. Naypyidaw’s there is little to indicate that either new self-confidence is palpable; it has side has fundamentally changed its taken multiple steps to loosen its position on that issue. internal grip, allowing for the or fleeting.” rhetoric between the U.S. and China Economic concerns—trade formation of unions, releasing imbalances, currency valuations, and political prisoners, and meeting with management of debt—will increasingly Aung San Suu Kyi after releasing her shape the China-U.S. relationship as from house arrest. both sides are becoming preoccupied Internationally, the regime has with their domestic economies and shown interest in engaging the U.S. with uncertainty over potential adventurism against the South. and Europe, both of whom have changes of political leadership. Leadership succession from Kim Jong-il reciprocated verbally but stopped to his son, Kim Jong-un, seems to short of lifting sanctions. China and and geo-economic concerns have have gone more smoothly than many India continue to court Naypyidaw, encouraged India to continue “looking observers expected. The elder Kim mostly because of Burma’s natural east” to a major role in an expanded embarked on a “charm offensive” by resources and its geographic Asia Pacific political-security reaching out to key supporters in advantage for pipeline access for oil environment. China is not necessarily China and Russia, and then expressing and gas shipments. Stewardship by opposed to a stronger India, as Beijing its his willingness to re-start the Six- these two regional powers, as well as believes India’s rise could be useful in Party Talks process. by ASEAN, insulates the regime in limiting U.S. global and regional the event that a fuller reciprocation influence.4 But the sentiment may not Pyongyang’s apparent change of heart may be driven by economic India Looking East: Geopolitical be as sanguine on the Indian side, PAGE 5 CRSO 2012 particularly among those who focus face internal crises, as in Japan and sophisticated weapons are more more narrowly on points of bilateral Thailand, or are preoccupied with oriented to forward deployment, but tension, such as Pakistan, China’s major leadership transitions or also to technology frontiers in space deepening engagement in Bangladesh contests. In 2012, power in China will and cyberspace, particularly in the and Sri Lanka, the Sino-Indian border pass to the Xi Jingping government in case of China. Southeast Asian states, dispute, China’s opposition to India a process that is preplanned and for their part, have been more active “ Geopolitical and geo-economic concerns have encouraged India to continue “looking east” to a major role in an expanded Asia Pacific politicalsecurity environment.” becoming a permanent member of the carefully choreographed, but in joint military exercises and UN Security Council, and more nonetheless not free of uncertainty cooperation agreements with the U.S. recently, China’s efforts to stifle Indian- and learning curves. Elections in the Natural disasters continue to Vietnamese energy cooperation in the U.S. next year also create distraction plague large numbers of Asians. South China Sea. and uncertainty. In addition, U.S. Although Japan is generally well- pullout from Iraq and drawdown in prepared for earthquakes, little could concluded the U.S.-India Strategic Afghanistan may usher in a genuine have been done to anticipate the de- Dialogue, which, if not providing “return to Asia,” but it is not clear struction of the March 11 triple dramatic breakthroughs, was whether that will improve or strain disaster, especially the tsunami, nonetheless an important step in the U.S.-China relationship. More which in turn triggered the generally, one expert notes that the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Four In July, New Delhi and Washington 5 building this relationship. political gridlock and dysfunction that aspects of this crisis merit regional DISQUIETING TRENDS AND has gripped Washington is prompting attention: MIXED SIGNALS ON THREE Asian strategists to worry that the OTHER FRONTS U.S. is losing its “bounce-back Economic growth, so fundamental to capability,” and what that might mean overwhelm even the wealthiest Asia’s domestic and regional stability, for its ability to lead.6 and most well prepared states. is faltering. Many in Asia have been The militarization of the region 1) The scale of natural disasters can Such disasters often have spared the worst effects of the global continues. Although weapons transnational effects and highlight financial crisis, mostly thanks to acquisitions by regional states may state interdependence and the China’s burgeoning economy, but not be considered an “arms race” by need for prior and subsequent there is a sense that the world is at any strict definition, those acquisitions cooperation among sub-regional a more serious juncture than in 2008. may still be dangerous and destabilizing actors. The U.S. economy remains stagnant, (see Update, p. 30). Many of the with a corresponding drop-off of region’s long-standing crisis points— Daiichi nuclear plant does not imports. The E.U. crisis has made the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan appear to have significantly altered clear the immediacy of reforming Straits, and China’s “Near Seas” plans for nuclear power by global financial governance. The (Yellow Sea, South China Sea)—are regional states looking to diversify major Asian economies will be the focus of defence planners and their energy sources (see Box 1). If expected to assume greater leadership, procurement. In addition, jurisdictional these plans continue, the safety of but how the region —or its individual disagreements over maritime territories these and existing facilities must states—exercises its economic leverage and control of sea lane passages have reach the highest standard. To the remains to be seen. encouraged a significant build-up extent that some in the region of regional naval capacities. Regional scale back their nuclear energy experts have noted also that increasingly plans, as is the case in Japan, and It also remains to be seen who will lead this transition. Many Asian leaders CRSO 2012 PAGE 6 2) The disaster at the Fukushima because full operation of planned their quality of life is of primary notes in Chapter 4, Asian states facilities elsewhere is still years concern. Access to adequate food and cannot avoid coming to terms with away, demand and competition for potable water, safe environmental the RtoP, both in terms of extra- oil and gas supplies could intensify, conditions, and relief from natural regional crises such as Libya, and in thereby focusing attention on disasters is what ultimately matters. terms of confronting the histories and proven and possible regional energy Events of 2011 reinforced the reality current realities of certain regional sources in areas such as Central that all Asian states are challenged to states’ treatment of their own Asia and the South China Sea. meet the human security needs of populations. Increasingly, approval their populations. and response by regional institutions 3) A significant, though underreported, aspect of the Japan Food insecurity is still pervasive in is envisaged as essential (along with disaster was the role that military many parts of Asia. For many Asians, UN sanction) before proceeding with forces played as critical first food insecurity persists despite the RtoP ventures. Asian institutions, as responders. The Japanese Self region’s overall increasing prosperity. Lizee argues, have only slowly begun Defence Forces, in its largest post- Environmental degradation of land, to grapple with how they can and WWII response, mobilized up to unsustainable land utilization practices, should respond to failing states and/or 180,000 personnel in immediate urban encroachment, growing food deal with strong repressive states that response to the earthquake and demand, and volatile markets for abuse their populations. tsunami. In addition, the U.S.’s basic foodstuffs all contribute to the military forward presence, as with problem. Teng and Escaler also regional concerns ten years after the 2004 tsunami, utilized its highlight in Chapter 5 the effect of 9/11. However, as Sidney Jones points multiple carrier task force concentration of Asian populations in out in Chapter 2, of Southeast Asia capabilities to assist rescue efforts mega-cities and point out that poor becoming a “second front” for global urban dwellers are not only incapable terrorism never materialized. 7 in inaccessible locations. Terrorism and insurgency remain of producing their own food, but also Casualties from attacks by extremist Japan’s triple disaster must be seen vulnerable to diseases associated with groups have fallen and have been within a broader regional context where malnutrition. largely associated with insurgent civilian populations are regularly State threats to human insecurity movements in the Philippines, subjected to the deadly consequences cannot be ruled out. In certain of natural disasters, as shown in circumstances, the state is active or Southeast Asian states are credited Box 2. Almost all Asian states struggle complicit in threatening and attacking with having adopted counter-intelligence Indonesia, and Thailand. Several “ [U.S.-China] rhetoric softened in 2011…economic concerns will increasingly shape [this] relationship.” to cope with the humanitarian, its own people. At the international and policing strategies that have infrastructural and economic effects systemic level, dilemmas of when and effectively and selectively targeted of these disasters. Although how to react to prevent or stop mass individuals and groups, aided in part preparedness is generally improving, killing and related atrocities prompted by populations who have been alienated regional states should give serious the promulgation of the Responsibility by the indiscriminate victimization of contemplation to upping the level of to Protect (RtoP). Asian states, civilians by terrorist attacks. In South multilateral coordination in this area. prioritizing norms of non-interference, Asia, threats of political extremism, Diplomatic maneuvering and defence have resisted the acceptance and state destabilization, and terrorism establishments have had little impact application of the RtoP, albeit less so are still serious concerns, especially on the lives of most Asians, for whom since the RtoP’s sanction at the 2005 amid a possible regional spill over of protecting, sustaining and improving World Summit. However, as Lizee the Afghanistan conflict. PAGE 7 CRSO 2012 THE CHALLENGES AND environmental or maritime safety and economic crises, combined with the PROSPECTS FOR ASIAN security; or (c) the importance of failure of half-measures to halt the MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS alternate, regularly scheduled forums negative momentum of events, may Regional and global transformations dealing with hard security issues, the have triggered an exogenous shock of have thrown the Asia Pacific’s most notable being the annual significant magnitude to compel multilateral economic and security Shangri-la Dialogue. However, such institutional transformation. architectures into flux. Two general institutional networking, much of it What is less certain is how the U.S., observations are in order before conducted within the framework of the E.U. and Asian states—Japan, and addressing specific institutional the ARF, ASEAN, or other now China as a critical actor—will developments. institutional contexts, while valuable respond. Failure to collaborate in its own right, does not come to effectively will have ripple effects terms with critical disjunctures of across the globe. For the Asia Pacific, First, regional multilateral institutionalization has advanced and “ The scale of natural disasters can overwhelm even [Asia’s] wealthiest and most well prepared states.” has been ‘ASEANized’, as in the case national policies, as evidenced in the this could mean the slowing or halting of the ADMM+ forum for defence South China Sea or Korean Peninsula. of the economic growth that has been ministers; and the East Asia Summit, Second, the events of 2011 have a key factor undergirding regional and which convenes the ASEAN Plus brought home the growing mismatch Three (ASEAN plus Korea, China, and between regional economic and A closer look at the agenda of Japan), Australia, New Zealand, India security developments and their multilateral meetings highlights and most recently Russia and the U.S. respective institutional mechanisms. several key events of 2011 and While these institutions mark regional Miles Kahler contends that Asia’s foreshadows the importance of 2012 players’ acceptance of ASEAN norms “thin institutional core” is insufficient, for creating meaningful synergy of dialogue, whether they move and that “the absence of links between global and regional, and beyond the stasis that has come to between economics and security is economic and security, governance prevail in established ASEAN-based distinctive,” when compared to other structures. institutions, such as the ASEAN regional contexts. Economists, such Regional Forum (ARF), remains to be as Benjamin Cohen, argue that On the security front: seen. Rigid norms of consensus financial cooperation among regional The ADMM+, launched in May 2011, decision-making and “non- players, now urgently required as the was the first meeting of regional interference” have kept disputes off effects of U.S. and E.U. economic defence ministers and a relevant multilateral agendas, even in the case troubles take hold, is “constrained counterpoint to the foreign ministerial of Track Two institutions such as in practice by underlying security meetings of the ARF. However, CSCAP (see Chapter 6). This is not to discount (a) the 8 tensions.” Historically, major changes in global domestic stability. whether or not the ADMM process can sustain momentum between its increase in Track One (official) and and regional institutional architectures currently scheduled triennial meetings Track Two (unofficial) activities have been triggered by severe, is uncertain. dealing with non-traditional security exogenous shocks to the system, such issues; (b) the tendency towards as the failure of empires, the ending participation by the U.S. and China officially managed meetings involving of world wars, or the collapse of global was generally quiet and scripted. experts (Track 1.5 meetings), usually markets and economic systems. At Leaders touted Beijing-ASEAN concerning technical matters such as present, there are indications that agreement on guidelines to implement the spread of disease, food safety, the effects of the 2008 and 2011 the 2002 Declaration of Conduct on CRSO 2012 PAGE 8 At the July 2011 ARF meeting, the South China Sea. (This negotiations starting in 2011 as critical ABOUT THE AUTHORS multilateral gesture, however, has not in determining whether or not “rhetoric Brian Job is a Professor of Political deterred Chinese bilateral actions in 10 can be translated into reality.” these waters, which continue to be What do these developments marked by confrontations with the portend for continued ASEAN and Philippines, Vietnam, and India.) On ASEAN leadership, (“in the driver’s other matters, ARF members hued to seat”) of regional architecture? their traditional reluctance to Signals are mixed. Within its own sub- confront tough issues or pursue new regional context, ASEAN unity and avenues towards preventive the solidity of ASEAN norms are diplomacy. Indeed, some analysts see under stress. The resort to military signs that the ARF is morphing into force between Thailand and Cambodia an instrument of multilateral strategic is a symbolic renunciation of ASEAN’s diplomacy between the U.S. and principles of peaceful dispute Science at the University of British Columbia. Erin Williams is the CSCAP Canada Administrator 1 Scott Snyder, “Dialogue and ‘Strategic Patience’ with North Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations, Asia Unbound, October 26, 2011, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/10/26/dialogueand-strategic-patience-with-north-korea/. 2 Douglas Paal, “Talks Set to Start with North Korea,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Asia Pacific Brief, April 25, 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/25/talksset-to-start-with-north-korea/2no. 3 Joshua Kurlantzik, “Myanmar: The Next Failed State?” Current History, September 2011. 4 M. Taylor Fravel, “China Views India’s Rise: Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differences,” Strategic Asia 2011-12,” National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011, pp. 65-98. 5 Teresita Schaffer, “After the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue: Not Visionary, but Solid,” Brookings Institution Up Front Blog, July 21, 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/ 2011/0721_us_india_schaffer.aspx. 6 Kenneth Lieberthal, “What the Current U.S. Political Dysfunction Means to and for Asia,” Brookings, August 16, 2011, www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0816_us_ power_lieberthal.aspx. 7 Yuki Tatsumi, “The Role of the Japan SelfDefense Forces in the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake” Stimson Foundation, March 17, 2011, http://www.stimson.org/ spotlight/the-role-of-the-japan-self-defenseforces-in-the-great-eastern-japan-earthquake/). 8 Miles Kahler, “Weak Ties Don’t Bind: Asia Needs Stronger Structures to Build Lasting Piece,” and Benjamin Cohen, “Security Still Trumps Finance in East Asia,” both in Global Asia, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 2011, available at http://www.globalasia.org/ 9 See Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, “ASEAN Regional Forum 2011: China and the United States,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, No. 127, August 4, 2011, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ publications/asean-regional-forum-2011-chinaand-united-states. 10 Deborah Elms, “Trans-Pacific Partnership: Now It Gets Difficult,” RSIS Commentaries No. 46, March 2011, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/ commentaries.asp?selRegion=7 11 Yang Razali Kassim, “ASEAN Community: Losing Grip over Vision 2015,’ RSIS Commentaries No. 87, June 2011, www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS 0872011.pdf settlement (see Update, p.24). While China, “a showcase for [their] soft 9 competition … in Southeast Asia.” ASEAN showed initiative in seeking to resolve the conflict, these efforts On the economic front: yielded few demonstrable results, and It is too soon to say whether or how one senses an increasing divergence global economic governance of interests for institutional change structures will be reformed in between (democratized) Indonesia response to the unfolding European and the Philippines on the one hand, crisis. Suffice it to say that China has and the (authoritarian) Cambodia, emerged with a significant yet Vietnam, and Laos on the other. uncertain role, effectively cementing With ASEAN’s current proactive the shift of global economic centre of Indonesian Chair about to cede this gravity to Asia. The G20, with its role to Cambodia (2012), Brunei inclusion of the BRICS and key Asian (2013), and Burma (questionable, but states such as Indonesia, aspires to likely in 2014), one can not anticipate become a critical component of global institutional advancement from this governance. But there are no strong organization at what looks to be a signals of effective leadership critical regional turning point. emerging to bridge the divergence of Internal tensions and difficult interests in its North-South economic times have slowed ASEAN’s membership. The November 2011 momentum towards its aspirations for APEC leaders meeting may be an an ASEAN Community 2015. important venue for continuing Surin Pitsuwan has retreated to discussion among regional leaders, characterizing the movement towards but its viability is increasingly in economic, socio-cultural, and political- question; regional states have security community as “a work in prioritized bilateral free trade progress,” with 2015 as a “target,” and agreements (FTAs) and other “not an end-date”—a more realistic, multilateral institutional settings. At but sobering statement regarding the same time, the prospects for a Asian regionalism.11 next-generation multilateral regional economic institution, as represented by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are uncertain. Analysts see PAGE 9 CRSO 2012 T THE HUMAN IMPACT OF NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC The dominant story line in Asia over the past few decades has been the region’s tremendous economic growth. But alongside the positive news has been the devastation caused by natural disasters. According to the 2010 World Disasters Report, 85% of those affected by natural disasters are in Asia and the Pacific. The situation in 2011 has been just as frightening; flooding in the Philippines earlier this year affected 4.3 million people,1 and the havoc currently wreaked by floods in Thailand has killed 381 people and affected at least two million. What’s more, even after the flood waters start to recede in these and other flood-prone countries, fears about the spread of malaria and water-borne diseases start to set in. ASIA PACIFIC COUNTRIES RANKED BY NUMBER OF PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DISASTERS, 1980-2009 Rank Country Number Affected The March 11, 2011 9.0-magnitude earthquake, tsunami and nuclear reactor meltdown that struck Japan’s northeast coast provided painful evidence that even the region’s most developed country is not spared. As of April, the disaster had claimed 14,063 lives, injured 5,302, and left 13,691 people missing and 136,000 evacuated.2 (For more on the broader consequences of the Fukushima nuclear crisis, see Box 1, this chapter.) (millions) 1 China 2,550 2 India 1,501 3 Bangladesh 316 4 Philippines 109 5 Vietnam 68 6 Thailand 54 7 Iran 42 8 Pakistan 30 9 Indonesia 18 10 Cambodia 16 ASIA PACIFIC COUNTRIES RANKED BY NUMBER OF DEATHS FROM DISASTERS, 1980-2009 Rank Country Deaths 1 Bangladesh 191,650 2 Indonesia 191,164 3 China 148,419 4 India 141,888 5 Myanmar 139,095 6 Pakistan 84,841 7 Iran 77,987 8 Sri Lanka 36,871 9 Philippines 32,578 10 Russia 31,795 Source: ESCAP, based on data from EM-DAT: the OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be – Université Catholique de Louvain – Brussels – Belgium, printed in UNESCAP and ISDR, “The Asia Pacific Disaster Report 2010,” http://www.unescap.org/idd/pubs/Asia-PacificDisaster-Report-2010.pdf, p. 5. The 2011 “Hyogo Framework Agreement Progress in Asia-Pacific” report notes some improvements in the region’s disaster risk reduction, but also notes that the region still has far to go to reduce the devastating human and financial impact of natural disasters. 1 2 See US AID, “Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year 2012, Southeast Asia – Floods,” October 28, 2011, available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_2745.pdf. Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance, Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Update, April 20, 2011,” available at http://coe-dmha.org/Research/ResearchInfoMgmt/Japan/Japan04202011.pdf/ Data taken from NHK. PEOPLE REPORTED AFFECTED BY DISASTERS, 2000-2009 Africa America Europe Asia Pacific, 85% Source: UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, “HFA Progress in Asia-Pacific: Regional Synthesis Report 2009-2011,” 2011, available at http://www.unisdr.org/files/21158_hfaprogressinasiapacific20092011.pdf. CRSO 2011 10 T THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR DISASTER: CAUSE FOR RECONSIDERATION? The March 11, 2011 tsunami that hit Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant badly damaged four of that facility’s six reactors. The subsequent radiation leak and difficulties in containing the problem rapidly prompted “soul searching” among many within and beyond Japan regarding the safety of their nuclear facilities and the soundness of their reliance on nuclear energy.1 More specifically, the crisis exposed the inherent dangers of nuclear power, and in particular the vital need for strong regulatory structures. Whereas some countries in South and Southeast Asia may rethink or delay existing plans to build reactors in the future, the overall trend in the region is to move forward with construction plans, particularly in China, India and South Korea, albeit with greater attention to operational safety.2 The table below highlights the steep trajectory of building planned by India and China. According to James Goodby of the Brookings Institution, the Fukushima Daiichi incident has demonstrated the need for tighter cooperation in Northeast Asia around nuclear safety. The subregion already hosts a high concentration of reactors, and is poised to grow even higher in the coming years. Moreover, given the region’s vulnerability to natural disasters (see Box 2, this chapter), “it would be prudent,” he says “to consider whether additional safety measures are called for” and how concerns might be addressed multilaterally.3 Goodby notes two possibilities: the Nuclear Security Summit, which will be held in Seoul in 2012; and the Six-Party Talks. Others have echoed Goodby’s suggestion about the Nuclear Security Summit, saying that the Japan disaster has demonstrated the need to broaden the Summit’s focus from issues of nuclear security, fissile materials and concerns about nuclear terrorism to include safety concerns.4 With the Six-Party Talks, Goodby suggests that the working group on economy and energy could be tasked with looking at issues of nuclear safety. “Although the main target…should be urgent development of a regional energy safety system,” he says, “in the longer run what should emerge is a fully developed energy system…a Northeast Asian Energy Development Organization” that would would function as a provider of nuclear fuel services for both Koreas, Japan, China and Russia.5 1 2 3 4 5 NUCLEAR REACTORS IN ASIA, CURRENT AND FUTURE, AS OF OCTOBER 2011 Country In Operation Under Construction Planned Proposed Bangladesh 0 0 0 2 China 14 27 51 120 India 20 6 17 40 Indonesia 0 0 2 4 Japan 51 2 10 5 Korea 21 5 6 0 Malaysia 0 0 0 1 See Daniel P. Aldrich, “Future Fission: Why Japan Won’t Abandon Nuclear Power,” Global Asia, vol. 6, no. 2 (Summer 2011), pp. 63-67. Pakistan 3 1 1 2 Vlado Vivoda, “Nuclear Power in Asia after Fukushim,” East Asia Forum, April 14, 2011, www.eastasianforum.org/2011/04/14/nuclear-power-in-asia-after-fukushima/; See also Charles K. Ebinger and John P. Banks, “Reassessing Power: Fukushima accident increases global concern over nuclear safety,” Beijing Review, No. 20, May 19, 2011, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2011-05/16/content_358423.htm. Russia 32 10 14 30 Thailand 0 0 0 5 Vietnam 0 0 2 12 Total 141 51 103 221 James Goodby, “The Fukushima Disaster Opens New Prospects for Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” Brookings Institution, June 28, 2011, available at www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/0628_fukushima_goodby.aspx. Duyeon Kim, “Fukushima and the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March 18, 2011, available at http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/fukushima-and-the-seoul2012-nuclear-security-summit. Goodby, “The Fukushima Disaster.” Source: World Nuclear Association, World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements, as of October 21, 2011, http://world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html. 11 CRSO 2011 2 CHAPTER 2 SIDNEY JONES Terrorism in Southeast Asia Ten Years On By 2002, TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, THE the global jihad, and foreign jihadis in Southeast Asian countries with home- the Philippines, while dangerous, Southeast Asia grown jihadists—Indonesia, Singapore, are few in number and increasingly and Malaysia—have handled the constrained in their operations. looked like it had problem reasonably well. The region potential to become a terrorist hub. For many reasons, this did not happen. CRSO 2012 PAGE 12 The Bali bombing focused world never became terrorism’s “second attention on Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), front,” despite widespread fears after a regional terrorist group that had the 2002 Bali bombing, and both the established links to al-Qaeda. Bali also size and capacity of jihadi groups marked the height of the group’s have steadily diminished. Indonesia influence—JI has been on the decline continues to face major challenges as ever since. Founded in 1993 as a religious intolerance rises and provides breakaway group from an old an enabling environment for the Indonesian Islamist insurgency called emergence of new groups, but Darul Islam, JI built a hierarchical casualties from terrorism over the last organization that extended to five five years have been low. Thailand and countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines face a different problem Singapore, the Philippines and —the need to find political solutions Australia. Many men who went on to armed insurgencies, some of which to become JI leaders trained on the use terror tactics. But after seven Pakistan-Afghan border before the years of war, insurgents in southern split with Darul Islam; JI’s Malaysian Thailand show no interest in joining branch, led by Indonesian nationals, “…only after 9/11 when the U.S. declared its war on framework of a global jihad, and intelligence to intelligence. However, recruitment soared. The first jihadi information-sharing did not always bombs in Indonesia were aimed at work smoothly when the lead local Christians in response to Ambon counter-terror agency in one case and Poso. It was only after 9/11 when was the military, as in the the United States declared its war on Philippines, but in other cases was terror and invaded Afghanistan that the police, as in Malaysia and local jihadi attention turned toward Indonesia. But border security foreign targets. improved and it became more By 2002, Southeast Asia looked like it had serious potential to become a get to or from Mindanao to transit terrorist hub. But there were many through Malaysia without getting reasons why this did not happen: caught. terror [did] 3. No real interest in a regional 1. Good law enforcement. From late local jihadi difficult for Indonesians trying to Islamic state. JI leaders, particularly 2001 in Singapore and Malaysia those operating out of Malaysia, and after the Bali bombing in hoped that they could generate Indonesia, local police, with interest in an archipelagic Islamic generous international support, state, comprising Indonesia, moved forcefully against jihadi Malaysia, Brunei, southern networks, arresting key members, Philippines, and southern Thailand. in many places smashing local cells But the idea never took off, nor did and disrupting chains of command. JI’s efforts, in 1999 and 2000, to Singaporean and Malaysian security form a regional Mujahidin League forces were already highly skilled; from a nucleus of Afghanistan- the most dramatic improvement trained “alumni” that would came with Indonesia’s creation include representatives of all of the organized a second round of training of a police counter-terror unit above, along with the Rohingya in Afghanistan after the Taliban took called Detachment 88 which over from Myanmar. The priorities of power, with a cell in Karachi that time grew in confidence, different groups varied too widely provided logistical support for South- professionalism and achievement. from country to country, and attention turn toward foreign targets.” east Asians to travel there. A JI training 2. Peaceful regional environment. many were not comfortable with academy in the Philippines, set up in Unlike South Asia or the Middle the use of violence against civilian 1994, ran parallel to several smaller East, where interstate rivalries and targets. Leaders of local ethno- camps of Indonesians from other hostilities provided fertile ground nationalist rebellions in particular extremist groups, working in tactical for terrorist growth, no state in did not want to confuse agendas alliance with the Moro Islamic Southeast Asia had any interest by adopting the al-Qaeda line. Liberation Front (MILF). in encouraging attacks on its 4. Resolution of Indonesian conflicts neighbors, and there were strong and peace talks in the Philippines. provided in 1999 and 2000 with the incentives for regional cooperation. Indonesian government initiatives outbreak of bitter fighting between If the latter did not always work as in the two communal conflict Muslims and Christians in two parts of well as desired, it had as much to areas produced peace agreements, Indonesia: Ambon, Maluku; and Poso, do with bureaucratic obstacles as in Poso in December 2011, and in Central Sulawesi. Local Muslims dying deliberate obstruction. In particular, Maluku in February 2002. One- at Christian hands allowed extremists militaries generally talked to sided violence by extremists to put these local conflicts in the militaries, police to police, and continued, particularly in Poso, A powerful local driver for jihad was PAGE 13 CRSO 2012 TIMELINE: SIGNIFICANT POST 9/11 ATTACKS BY INSURGENTS AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA* but the communal conflicts gradually waned, taking away an important local driver for jihad. In Philippines – 28 October 2001: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) bombs a food court in Zamboanga (Mindanao) killing 11 people. the Philippines, the MILF expelled a militant JI contingent in Indonesia – 12 October 2002: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) carries out first Bali bombing. 88 Australians and 38 Indonesians are among the 202 dead. November 2005 in the interest of Philippines – 4 March 2003: A remote-detonated bomb at the Davao airport kills 24 people. Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) denies involvement, but members with suspected links to JI are accused of perpetrating the attack. government. This pushed some of Indonesia – 5 August 2003: A splinter group of JI led by Noordin Top detonates a bomb in front of the Marriott hotel in Jakarta, killing 13. Philippines – 27 February 2004: A large ferry, the Superferry 14, sinks off the coast of Manila after a bombing, killing at least 118 people. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and members of other groups working under ASG command found responsible. Indonesia – 9 September 2004: Noordin Top group bombs Australian Embassy in Jakarta, killing 11. Thailand – 17 February 2005: Separatists explode a car bomb in front of a restaurant in Narathiwat province, leaving 6 dead. Burma/Myanmar – 7 May 2005: Three coordinated blasts in Yangon kill 19. The ruling junta blames ethnic rebels and the pro-democracy government in exile; these groups deny involvement. Indonesia – 28 May 2005: Bombing in Tetena market, in Poso, central Sulawesi kills 22. A local affiliate of JI is believed responsible. Indonesia – 1 October 2005: Second JI Bali bombing results in 20 deaths. pursuing peace talks with the the most notorious jihadis, including Bali bombers Dulmatin and Umar Patek, into the arms of the Abu Sayyaf Group, but it further narrowed the terrorists’ room for movement. 5. Rifts in the movement. The growing number of arrests produced divisions within the jihadi movement. Police cooptation of jihadi prisoners generated mutual suspicions and recriminations, especially in Indonesia after prisoners, many of whom were given light sentences, were released. In Malaysia and Singapore, where prisoners were held under their respective Internal Security Acts (ISA), no one was brought to trial. Thailand – 18 February 2007: Coordinated attacks across the southern provinces kill 7 people. And while many were eventually Thailand – 8 June 2009: Five gunmen burst into a mosque in southern Thailand and begin shooting at praying Muslims. 11 people are killed. counselling and with tight Indonesia – 17 July 2009: JI splinter group bombs two luxury hotels in Jakarta, killing 9. Thailand – 2-3 September 2009: 11 people are killed in various shootings, bombings and military raids across the southern provinces. freed, it was only after intensive surveillance after release. There were also differences across the region over tactics and strategy. One of the most important was between qital nikayah and Philippines – 27 February 2010: ASG kills 11 people in Basilan in an alleged revenge attack. qital tamkin. The former was Philippines – 13 April 2010: ASG bombs kill 12 in Basilan. violence against civilians—in Iraq, Burma/Myanmar – 15 April 2010: 3 bombs explode in Yangon during the New Year celebrations, killing 10. Philippines – 21 October 2010: A bomb explosion on a bus kills at least 10 people in Mindanao. associated with indiscriminate the brutal tactics of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; in Southeast Asia, the Jakarta and Bali bombings by Malaysian national Noordin Mohammed Top, a JI member who * Information gathered from the International Crisis Group’s Crisis Watch database, found at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/ crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx; and the Rand Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, found at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorismincidents/about.html. had fled to Indonesia to escape the late 2001 crackdown and who by 2004 had established a separate organization. Qital tamkin, by contrast, was based on a longer- CRSO 2012 PAGE 14 term strategy of establishing an sive government. In France, Aus- and in 2008, a few Malaysians Islamic state where attacks would tralia, Germany, Spain and the operating out of southern Thailand only be used in support of that goal. U.S., recruiters could appeal to the tried to foment support for Southeast Many JI leaders came to see idea of an alienated minority. These Asia branch of al-Qaeda there. These Noordin’s tactics as counter- drivers were mostly not present in efforts were not successful, and the productive and argued the need to Southeast Asia. The alienated leader, Mohammed Fadzullah Abdul focus energies on rebuilding the minority aspect was a factor in Razak, was arrested in July 2010 in organization through religious Singapore, but there was no critical Malaysia. The violence in southern outreach (dakwah) and education. mass to build a movement, Thailand remains a problem that is particularly under the tight better addressed through negotiations who believed the clandestine nature political control of a security- on autonomy than through any of jihadi organizations should be conscious city-state. counter-terrorism program. Another rift was between those maintained and those who believed Likewise in the Philippines, while an above-ground front working for THAILAND AND THE three of the insurgencies operating the establishment of Islamic law PHILIPPINES there—the Moro National Liberation was desirable. Indonesian cleric All of these factors contributed to the Front (MNLF), the MILF, and Abu Abu Bakar Ba’asyir fell in the latter decline of JI, but several other factors Sayyaf—have had contact with jihadis category, first with the establishment kept terrorism in the region alive. in Southeast Asia, South Asia and the of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia Southern Thailand erupted in January Middle East, all are largely ethnically- (MMI) in 2000, then after he fell 2004 with militant attacks on police based rebellions against the government “ From a counter-terrorism perspective, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines remain particular headaches, Indonesia especially due to its size, shape, and political system.” out with MMI in 2008, the creation posts and an army arsenal, and again in Manila or involved in power struggles of Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) in April with synchronized attacks on closer to home; they are mostly not in 2008. JAT tried to operate on police posts and a bloody confronta- interested in a broader Islamic struggle. both levels, with clandestine mili- tion at the Krue Se Mosque in Pattani. Indonesian and Malaysian jihadis, tary training combined with public This was followed in October 2004 by however, see both the Philippines and protests and demonstrations in the incident in Tak Bai, Narathiwat, Thailand as struggles of intense interest, collaboration with hard-line Is- where 78 protestors arrested by police not least because there are guns and lamist civil society organizations. and piled several layers deep into combat experience to be had there. trucks suffocated en route to an army As of 2011, a trickle of Indonesians pore and Malaysia, there was little base for questioning. These incidents from various jihadi factions was support for terrorist attacks to gave new fuel to a decentralized Mus- managing to find its way through to begin with; what little there was in lim Malay insurgency which has rou- Mindanao; members of a Darul Islam Indonesia as a result of Ambon, tinely used homemade bombs to kill faction were arrested at a port in East Poso and U.S. policies after 9/11 informers, Muslims working for the Java in July 2011 trying to bring in evaporated with the deaths of Mus- government, and Thai Buddhists. The state-of-the-art weapons that they had lims in many of Noordin’s bomb- fear that the insurgency would find purchased from corrupt police in ings. In Iraq, Palestine, Chechnya common cause with the al-Qaeda or Zamboanga. and Kashmir, it was possible to regional jihadi organizations has build on hatred of an occupier. In never materialized, although there DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA large parts of the Middle East, one have been offers—politely rejected— From a counter-terrorism perspective, could build on hatred of a repres- from Indonesian jihadis to join forces, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines 6. Lack of local support. In Singa- PAGE 15 CRSO 2012 remain particular headaches, Indonesia abandoned jihad, and Noordin Top, Middle East, especially from the especially due to its size, shape, and for having no strategy. The break-up Jordanian scholar Abu Muhammad political system. The last major jihadi of this group proved to be a gold mine al-Maqdisi, have suggested that the bombing in Indonesia with civilian for police and led to a new wave of more important enemy is at home and casualties was in July 2009 when a arrests. that the focus should be on removal of team loyal to Noordin Top bombed Since then, a host of small groups, obstacles to an Islamic state. Second, the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels harder to detect but with less well it is easier to recruit people for attacks in Jakarta in an attack that seemed to indoctrinated or militarily trained on police for several reasons: the be aimed at Western businesses. cadre than the old JI, have emerged, police have been the lead agency Noordin was tracked down and killed with their attacks aimed at local targets. arresting and sometimes killing shortly thereafter. The only people killed by terrorists in “mujahidin” in operations and revenge Several developments have taken Indonesia is 2010 were ten police is a potent motive; because at a local place since then. A short-lived training officers. The only people killed in level, they are often corrupt and camp in Aceh, Sumatra, broken up by 2011, aside from suicide bombers abusive; the police have weapons; and police in February 2010, led to the themselves, have also been three police are relatively easy targets, arrest of more than 100 people and the police, although several bombs placed particularly in remote areas. Third, recognition that the constellation of at churches failed to explode. One many jihadis found that appeals to the jihadi groups had changed. The group development that has taken place has persecution of Muslims in Iraq, in Aceh called itself Al-Qaeda for the thus been a shift in target away from Afghanistan or Palestine did not Veranda of Mekkah, (a traditional foreigners, although the focus could resonate in the larger population; appellation for Aceh) and constituted always shift back. local targets had more of a chance. an alliance of some six or seven groups The reasons have been several. This in turn has led to the merging of who were critical of both JI, for having First, ideological influences from the agendas in Indonesia between thuggish CITIES AND REGIONS OF SIGNIFICANT POST-9/11 ATTACKS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA MYANMAR Yangon PHILIPPINES LAOS VIETNAM THAILAND Mindanao Basilan Jolo CAMBODIA Yala, Pattani and Narathawit Aceh MALAYSIA Sulawesi INDONESIA Jakarta Note: Map not according to scale. CRSO 2012 PAGE 16 Bali Maluku but non-terrorist organizations like and by whom convicted terrorists known as Wahabism, has certainly the Islamic Defenders Front, which were radicalized has led to huge contributed to religious intolerance. has led the fight against the Ahmadiyah wastage of resources on ineffective But Wahabism and salafi jihadism, the sect and the construction of Christian programs. There are unquestionably ideology behind the global jihad, are churches, and groups like JAT which terrorists from poor backgrounds, but diametrically opposed, with Wahabis “ Ten years after 9/11, terrorist groups have evolved and mutated.” see in these issues as an opportunity economic status does not explain why seeing the more politically focused for recruitment. they, rather than other men from the jihadists as heretics. In Indonesia, same villages, were drawn into the physical clashes have broken out radical net. between the two camps. DERADICALIZATION AND COUNTER-RADICALIZATION If the thesis that poverty leads to Singapore and Malaysia have had radicalization is one of the most CONCLUSION reasonably successful counselling popular false assumptions about Ten years after 9/11, terrorist groups programs for prisoners accused of terrorism in Southeast Asia, there are have evolved and mutated. The terrorism, although it is difficult to two others. One is that draconian laws ideology of salafi jihadism is not going know whether the ‘success,’ in terms are a panacea. Some officials in away any time soon. It is disseminated of released prisoners not returning to Indonesia argue that the reason for through religious meetings (taklim), violence, has more to do with tight the lack of serious attacks in Singapore books, radio and the Internet, and has surveillance than with changes of and Malaysia has been the ISA, an appealing black-white clarity. But mind-set in the individuals concerned. whereas the looser laws in Indonesia public revulsion at bombings of soft Indonesia has had a problem with and the Philippines allow more scope targets, the lack of outside enemies, recidivism, in part because its prisons for extremist activity. Singapore is so absence of influential backers and are so corrupt. There is also poor data small, its security system so tight and increasingly professional and effective management and virtually no post- its vigilance so high, that the ISA is police work ensure that the scope of release monitoring program. Despite hardly the only factor keeping terrorism in Southeast Asia will being praised for its deradicalization terrorism at bay. Malaysia, which in remain limited. The onus is on program, there is, in fact, no September 2011 announced the lifting governments to allocate the resources systematic program in place, but of the ISA, is a regional transit hub and put in the time to develop effective rather a series of ad hoc efforts aimed which allows all Muslims to enter strategies to counter extremist largely at a small group of cooperative visa-free and which in the heyday of teachings, improve prison management, “Afghan alumni” and some other JI JI was that organization’s cash cow. restrict access to guns and explosives, members. There was never any rationale for offer alternative youth activities in attacks in Malaysia, regardless of the problem areas and generally recognize has anything remotely approaching an strictness of its laws. Some Indonesian that the problem goes a long way effective counter-radicalization strategy officials appear to see more draconian beyond law enforcement. aimed at preventing vulnerable youth anti-terror legislation as a silver bullet from getting drawn into extremist for a complex problem that they need circles. There remains a widespread to address at its roots; a new law will assumption, which is demonstrably not miraculously make terrorism false, that the main driver of go away. Neither Indonesia nor the Philippines radicalization is poverty. If this were Another false assumption is that true, the majority of recruits would Saudi funding has been a major factor be the urban poor. Failure to do the in the spread of extremism. The Saudi research to understand how, where brand of ultra-puritan Islam, generally ABOUT THE AUTHOR Sidney Jones is a Senior Advisor to the International Crisis Group’s Asia Program. PAGE 17 CRSO 2012 CHAPTER 3 DESMOND BALL AND NICHOLAS FARRELLY Burma’s* Broken Balance The aftermath After two decades of unrelenting doom many Burmese now openly dream of and gloom, a hopeful mood has started a peaceful and democratic society of the 2010 election to color commentary about Burma where the bloodshed and horrors of since the election of November 2010. the country’s postcolonial decades The understandable excitement can fade into memory once and for has been punctuated by eruptions of that greeted pro-democracy leader all. Nobody wants Burma to struggle Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from through more years of poverty, house arrest has been followed by calamity, violence and heartbreak. suggestions that the country is finally Internationally, there is also more poised for meaningful and positive of a mood for change and action than violence; the political change. ever before. Old policy debates about Burmese democrats and their sanctioning the country’s ruling elite, balance that supporters see cause for optimism. prosecuting military commanders for In September and October 2011, the human rights abuses and calling the government’s decisions to release top leaders to account for alleged war political prisoners and suspend crimes now vie for precedence with the controversial Myitsone dam new plans for investment, engagement project were greeted by widespread and interaction. prevailed during the ceasefire years has finally broken. CRSO 2012 PAGE 18 acclamation. With this taste of more responsive Polite conversation with Burma’s new quasi-civilian government, government, and the prospect of headed by a former general, President greater and more radical reform, Thein Sein, is widely considered the “...over the remained actively hostile to the agreements should recognize their dictatorship and its plans. Under custodianship of their ethnic areas these arrangements, infrastructure and their leadership of ethnic political projects, impossible to consider while causes. the wars raged from the 1940s to the months and years ahead, the prospect of ever 1980s, sprang up on old battlefields VIOLENCE IN THE AFTERMATH the length and breadth of the country. OF THE 2010 ELECTION Dams, mines, pipelines, bridges and With no such final agreements, roads proliferated; and new wealth Burma’s 2010 election was marked by followed. tension, resentment and fear in ethnic Over those two decades tens of escalating violence needs to be seriously considered. New humanitarian thousands of anti-government fighters barred from participating and were incrementally taken out of the candidacies with the faintest security equation as their leaders association to ethnic nationalism were enriched themselves on the spoils of declared invalid. officially sanctioned “development.” emerging.” To their great frustration, however, Burmese government negotiators eruptions of violence; the balance that failed to deliver final truces in ethnic prevailed during the ceasefire years regions. Most of the country’s ethnic has finally broken. are, at this moment, increasingly In November 2010 units from the if they ever agreed to disarm, resisted Democratic Karen Buddhist Army final political settlements where their (DKBA), a long-time government ally, self-determination was not guaranteed. attacked the Burmese government- Stalemates followed. Then, from best way forward. The sins of the past Unsurprisingly the aftermath of the election has been punctuated by armies, perceiving their vulnerability emergencies are areas. Some ethnic leaders were controlled towns of Myawaddy and 2008 the Burmese government Phya Thonzu (Three Pagodas Pass). ratcheted up the pressure. Some of After seizing these strategic outposts, the smaller ethnic armies eventually and declaring their dissatisfaction capitulated to government demands with the political process, they but the most formidable fighting retreated under the threat of forces—the United Wa State Army government counter-attack. (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Then the Karen National Liberation Army (KIA), the Shan State Army- Army (KNLA), which through years of North (SSA-N), and the Mon National negotiation had never agreed to a final BALANCE Liberation Army (MNLA)—all held to ceasefire with the government, Favorable receptions of recent political their ceasefires without accepting the abruptly increased its operational events in Burma should not, however, government’s demands. tempo. Its fighters have now been dismissed as ancient history. 1988-2010: A PRECARIOUS distract attention from the country’s broken balance. That balance—predicated on a These groups worried that if they joined by around 3,000 troops from the accepted transition to government- DKBA who no longer want to challenge controlled Border Guard Forces (BGF) their ethnic Karen “brothers”. The fighting in Karen State is not, nationwide set of ceasefire agreements they would be slowly forced into with ethnic armies—was the defining redundancy and ultimately left however, the main factor determining strategic ploy of the military impotent in the face of any future the dangerous tilt of the broken dictatorship that ruled from 1988 to security contingencies. Powerful balance between ethnic armies and 2010. The balance was designed to ethnic leaders voiced their scepticism the Burmese government. It is, limit the number of ethnic armies that and held to the view that any final instead, the new wars in the Shan and Kachin States that make Burma a far PAGE 19 CRSO 2012 FIGURE 1: MAP OF CONFLICT HOTSPOTS IN BURMA, 2011 forces resumed on June 9, 2011. The proximate cause was a dispute over security at the Tapain hydro-electricity project near the China-Burma border. That dispute joined a long list of other government provocations, including the now suspended construction of the dam at Myitsone. KACHIN INDIA The KIA conflict must also be seen in the context of the breakdown in CHINA communication over transformation to a Border Guard Force. In the new war the death toll is SAGAING high. By October 2011, there had been hundreds of combat deaths, with government forces reportedly taking BURMA the heaviest losses. CHIN While government forces have SHAN MAN directly attacked KIA bases with their AY DAL artillery, infantry and armor, they MAGWE KARENN RAKHINE (RAKHINE) have been confronted by nimble guerrilla ambushes and sabotage deep I NAYPYIDAW LAOS in government-held territory. Kachin squads, roaming far from their bases, have destroyed road and rail infra- PEGU structure, blown up bridges and fortified compounds, obliterated KAR YANGON government re-supply boats, and also THAILAND EN IRRAWADDY YANGON struck at Myitkyina, the Kachin State’s capital and symbolic heart of MON Burmese government control. As the new war has escalated, the KIA has executed devastatingly effective attacks on government IM SSER TENA convoys. In a number of single engagements, dozens of Burmese troops have been killed. Elsewhere in Burma’s destabilized ethnic areas, such as the Shan State, the fighting is just as fierce. The Shan State Army-North, which agreed to a Source: Provided by the Australian National University (ANU). ceasefire back in 1989, has now been fighting since March 13, 2011 and has more dangerous and unstable place unravelling the equilibrium which re-grouped with its former allies in the than it was during the ceasefire period. prevailed for the past two decades. Shan State Army-South. The war in Deliberately or not, Burma’s newly In the Kachin State, fighting Shan areas is similarly punctuated by elected government has steered the between the 10,000-strong Kachin government offensives and guerrilla country into a perilous situation, Independence Army and government counter-attacks. CRSO 2012 PAGE 20 Some Burmese army commanders are reportedly unhappy about the TIMELINE: SIGNIFICANT POST-2007 EVENTS scale of their losses in these new wars. In recent years the most complete casualty figures have come from the Karen State where the Burmese government has remarkably sustained Killed In Action ratios of 60:1 and Wounded In Action of 100:1, or more.1 The new war in the Kachin State appears to be reproducing these heavy government losses. Notwithstanding the inevitable misgivings about such a one-sided casualty count, the new government is clearly prepared to fight. It does so at a time when shares of power and profit within the country’s ruling elite are freshly contested. Senior General Than Shwe’s elevation to less active roles means that the quasi-civilian political leaders, many of whom are former generals, are jostling for control alongside the military leadership. Senior military leaders—wary of losing prestige, influence and resources—are reportedly motivated to continue demonstrating the September/October 2007: Large-scale protests by Buddhist monks and others; these protests are known as the “Saffron Revolution”. May 2008: Cyclone Nargis leaves the Ayeyarwady Delta region devastated and around 140,000 people dead. May 2008: Constitutional referendum. November 2010: Nationwide election, the first in 20 years. November 2010: Aung San Suu Kyi released from house arrest. January 2011: New parliament convenes for the first time. Early 2011: Renewed conflict in Karen and Mon areas. March 2011: Renewed conflict between the Shan State Army-North and the government. June 2011: Renewed conflict between the Kachin Independence Army and the government. August 2011: The United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights visits Burma for the first time in over a year. August 2011: Aung San Suu Kyi undertakes a political tour and also travels to Naypyidaw to meet with President Thein Sein. September 2011: The Burmese government suspends the development of the controversial Chinese-backed dam at Myitsone in the Kachin State. October 2011: The Burmese government announces an amnesty for almost 7,000 prisoners with about 200 of those thought to be political prisoners. essential value of the military to national survival. The renewed ethnic wars are perfect for their purposes. 1) New Ethnic Conflicts Burma’s other ethnic armies opted FOUR AREAS WARRANTING The main ceasefire agreements made to enjoy more peaceful relations with CRITICAL ATTENTION between 1989 and 1995 bought relative the government but they never Burma clearly faces numerous stability to interactions between managed to develop mutually agreeable political challenges but it is the ethnic armies and the Burmese terms for final political settlements. disjuncture between positive political government. The three main non- moves and the resumption of ethnic ceasefire armies—the Karen National the months and years ahead, the hostilities that requires the most Liberation Army, the Shan State prospect of ever escalating violence attention. In this context, can we Army-South and the Karenni Army— needs to be seriously considered. New understand Burma’s broken balance survived because of convenient humanitarian emergencies are in ways that still offer hope for resupply and respite provided by emerging, and flows of refugees to meaningful and positive change? supporters in Thailand, and because Thailand, and also to China, India and many of their battle-hardened fighters Bangladesh, cannot be ruled out. More areas where the changes that are remained unprepared to surrender violence in border areas will, if history occurring require critical scrutiny. without total victory. is any guide, also mean a spike in To answer this question we see four The renewed wars mean that over PAGE 21 CRSO 2012 TABLE 1: MAJOR ARMED FORCES IN BURMA, OCTOBER 20113 Name Estimated Strength Estimated Combat Strength Ceasefire Agreements Arsenal and Weaponry 2011 Combat Fatalities Government 400,000 50,000 Around 24 agreements Heavy plus Air Force Likely more than 1000 United Wa State Army 25,000 15,000 Yes Heavy 0 Kachin Independence Army 10,000 8,000 Broken Heavy Around 30 Shan State Army -South 4,000 3,000 No Medium Few Shan State Army -North 2,000 1,500 Broken Light Unknown Karen National Liberation Army 5,000 4,500 No Light Around 16 Democratic Karen Buddhist Army 4,500 4,000 Partly broken Medium Unknown Mon National Liberation Army Unknown Unknown Tentative Light Unknown Karenni Army 1500 1200 No Light Unknown Border Guard Force Unknown Unknown Yes Light Unknown Splinter groups Unknown Unknown No Light Unknown human rights abuses. While claims of 800 million amphetamines pills crimes against humanity in Burma are being trafficked across the border to difficult to verify, escalation of the 2 Thailand each year. current conflicts is likely to see That Burma’s balance is now broken may, in the longer term, cause them to rethink their strategies. But the lack of any significant trans-border violence and retribution on a hitherto 2) Choices for the Neighbors threat from Burma’s current troubles unforseen scale. The unpredictable pace of change in suggests it will be a long wait for any Burma, and the resumption of ethnic sustained neighborhood diplomacy. monopoly of the government alone. conflict, means governments in the Southeast Asian neighbors will, some These conflicts also influence the immediate region now face the gravest day, need to make choices about regional markets for narcotics. The choices. While Burma’s neighbors whether they are willing to accept United Wa State Army, in particular, may find the new wars inconvenient, Burma’s continued instability. In the used the ceasefire years to fund and and any waves of refugees will be meantime they are apparently arm its troops with profits from the unwelcome, their standard approach prepared to tolerate eruptions of drug trade. is to ignore the realities of Burma’s violence while holding fast to the ethnic wars. notion that Burma’s civil wars are But alleged criminality is not the Floods of amphetamines have washed down from Wa areas in the The non-interference codified by internal political concerns. Shan State since the late 1990s and the Association of Southeast Asian made a long-lasting impression on Nations (ASEAN) discourages regional 3) Multilateral Responses Southeast Asian drug consumption, activism, especially on issues as po- Given the relatively obscure character especially in Thailand. Even after tentially sensitive as ethnic conflict. of Burma’s ethnic wars, the wider brutal Thai government campaigns At the same time the two regional international community may not be to cripple the amphetamines market, powers with opportunities to exert in- inclined to suggest their own suite of it remains as robust as ever. Over dependent influence, China and India, multilateral responses. Some ethnic the past decade there have been have shown no willingness to make leaders embroiled in the new conflicts consistent reports of at least any new moves. hope that international trouble- CRSO 2012 PAGE 22 shooters can be invited to help broker fronts in the long simmering ethnic stop the current trend towards new truces. They distrust Burmese wars have quickly demolished two disintegration, decimation and despair. government authorities and feel that decades of painstaking work towards “ While Burma’s neighbors may find the new wars inconvenient, and any waves of refugees will be unwelcome, their standard approach is to ignore the realities of Burma’s ethnic wars. ” outside mediation is required. For its ceasefires. The re-ignited conflicts part the Burmese government has could now last for many years. remained reluctant to accept any But, on the other hand, many of the international assistance and, as such, government’s recent moves are based immediate moves towards multilateral on the unprecedented embrace of peace-making are unlikely. compromise and reform. They appear serious about building a more 4) Democratization respectable international reputation Aung San Suu Kyi remains a wild card and incrementally steering the with respect to the ethnic conflicts. country towards greater openness She is arguably the only person in and democracy. Burma that the ethnic armies would The decision to suspend the trust to broker a new set of ceasefire Myitsone dam project in the Kachin agreements. But that is also unlikely. State is the most notable in this Indeed the primary hope across regard. It followed a campaign from Southeast Asia and the rest of the some of the country’s small number world is for peace and stability, with of civil society groups. That decision only modest ambitions for genuinely may signal that the government has democratic rule. Even those countries the necessary capacity to broker that have been most critical of Burma, compromises in ethnic areas. Such such as Indonesia and Thailand, capacity is essential if the government seem prepared to indulge the new hopes to motivate peaceful resolutions government. to Burma’s civil wars. For their part, the United States, *The CRSO follows the author’s preference in using the name “Burma” or “Myanmar.” ABOUT THE AUTHORS Professor Desmond Ball and Dr. Nicholas Farrelly work in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. They are active field researchers in Burma and its border regions. 1 These statistics have come to the authors from sources in the Karen National Liberation Army. They are also considered reasonably reliable by others with good access to conflict zones in eastern Burma. 2 While estimates of narcotic flows are understandably vague there is a widespread consensus that Thailand consistently receives more than 800 million amphetamine tablets from Burma each year. See ALTSEAN Burma, “ATS: A Need For Speed” (14 July 2006), available from: http://www.altsean.org/Docs/PDF%20Format/T hematic%20Briefers/ATS%20%20A%20Need%20For%20Speed.pdf; The Star, “Thailand: Thailand Declares War On Drugs A Major Success”, 30 Apr 2003, available from: http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v03/n618/a04 .html 3 The source of this table is the authors’ own long-term field research in ethnic areas of Burma. The challenge for the new European Union and Australia remain government is surely to find a new committed to democratic change in balance to replace the broken one. Burma and have each sought to Such a balance will require reformist influence developments in that instincts to be mobilized in ethnic direction. Nonetheless they are areas across the entire country. It will hesitant to make abrupt moves while not be easy. New ceasefires, to say the future trajectory of political nothing of final peace agreements, will development is unclear. require compromise and conciliation. To maximize its chances of success PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE It is under these conditions that recent decisions by Burma’s new, quasicivilian government are especially intriguing. On the one hand, the new Burma’s government may also need to rely on the charisma and status of Aung San Suu Kyi. She could prove crucial in negotiations with ethnic armies if the government expects to PAGE 23 CRSO 2012 T AIM SINPENG UPDATE BREAK-DOWN OF FATALITIES IN THAILAND SOUTHERN INSURGENCIES, DECEMBER 2008 – JUNE 2011 THAILAND: MOVEMENT ON THREE CRISES The results of Thailand’s much-anticipated national election in July 2011 present a mix of opportunities and challenges to the country’s three low-level crises: pronounced political divisions between the two main political factions, the protracted insurgencies in the Deep South, and the Preah Vihear temple border dispute with Cambodia. Yingluck Shinawatra, who leads the new five-party coalition government, is the country’s first female prime minister and the sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, one of Thailand’s most popular yet polarizing figures. The latter fact is almost certain to prolong the country’s political conflict. Furthermore, the status quo is likely in the insurgencies in the Deep South, while the border dispute with Cambodia, despite warming bilateral relations, is also expected to remain unresolved. Electoral Politics: Thai voters have shown an unprecedented level of support for the democratic process, but the recent electoral results re-emphasized Thailand’s deep political divisions between pro-Thaksin regions and their adversary, the Democrat Party. More importantly, a small minority of conservative forces as well as some anti-Thaksinites have brought down popularly elected governments in past. Forces opposing the ruling Puea Thai have already begun trying to annul the election and dissolve the new governing party. TOTAL DEATHS = 949 Soldiers Rangers & Defense Volunteers Other Civilians Monks Police Headmen & Deputies Teachers Source: Zachary Abuza, “The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics” CSR Strategic Perspectives #6, September 2011, Institute for National Strategic Studies, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/Strategic%20 Perspectives%206_Abuza%20.pdf, p. 7. The battle of colors—between the Red Shirts, Thaksin’s electoral base, and the Yellow Shirts, who support the Democrat Party—in part centers around Thaksin, who was ousted in the 2006 coup. The mass demonstrations led by the Yellow Shirts since 2005 sought to expel Thaksin, whom they regard as highly corrupt, manipulative and authoritarian, and a major threat to the country’s democracy, monarchy and national security as a whole. The Red Shirts, the majority of whom formed Thaksin’s electoral base, saw the ousting of their much beloved leader as unjust, illegitimate and a clear regression of democracy. As such, Yingluck’s Red Shirt-aligned Puea Thai government suggests Thailand's future prospects for national reconciliation remain bleak. Any move towards bringing Thaksin back from exile will create a major uproar among the antiThaksin forces. Likewise, any measures taken to dislodge the Puea Thai government, such as party dissolution, disqualification of Yingluck as prime minister, or worse, another coup, could push the nation to the brink of civil war. Even though the majority of Thais have demonstrated their commitment to democracy through their ballots, the minority of conservative forces, as well as some anti-Thaksinites, have shown in the past their ability to bring down an elected government against the popular will. CRSO 2011 24 TIMELINE: UPTICK IN VIOLENCE AT THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER 2009 March 25-26: Stand-off at Thai-Cambodian border ends peacefully. Early May: Clash between the two sides ends in the death of two Thai soldiers. September 19: Dozens are injured in violence between civilians at border. November 5: Both countries recall ambassadors to the other country. Southern Insurgencies: The new government will be reluctant to take any sweeping measures to counter the protracted insurgencies in Thailand’s three southernmost provinces—Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat—partly because of the unpopularity of Thaksin’s past policies and partly because the powerful military will be wary of drastic changes. In addition, Yingluck’s campaign promise of greater autonomy for the south under the proposed “Pattani Metropolis” plan lacks clarity. The fact that the Deep South, which once voted for Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party, more recently voted for the opposition, removes any motivation for the Yingluck government to give the plan serious consideration. The opposition will also fight hard to maintain their dominance in the region by opposing any major policy changes to the south coming from the government. Prayuth Chan-ocha, the army chief, had made clear that he is against any administrative decentralization plans for the Deep South. 2010 January 24: Soldiers exchange fire near temple, but with no casualties. February 15: Cambodia suggests it may request intervention of International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the UN Security Council to help settle the border dispute. April – June: Troops exchange brief clashes along border, but with no reported casualties. December 30: Cambodia charges seven Thai nationals with illegally entering the country. Thai PM demands their immediate release. 2011 February 4 – 7: Hostilities flare, claiming the lives of at least three Thai soldiers and five Cambodian soldiers. February 14: UN Security Council calls for permanent ceasefire. February 22: Thailand and Cambodia agree, after informal meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, to allow Indonesian monitors. Thai-Cambodia Border: More optimism is warranted on Thailand’s border row with Cambodia. It’s an open secret that Thaksin and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen are “good friends” and Hun could barely hide his enthusiasm when Yingluck won the election. Both countries have vowed to improve bilateral relations, which will remain the cornerstone of resolving this highly politicized dispute. But this is not enough, and multilateral measures through ASEAN, UNESCO and the UN Security Council have not only been ineffective but in fact have worsened the situation. March 23: Thailand’s army chief states that Indonesian observers are “not wanted.” In addition, there are major stumbling blocks to resolving the dispute within Thailand itself, with nationalistic domestic pressure groups, most notably the powerful anti-Thaksin forces, who may view better ties with Cambodia as a step towards amnesty for Yingluck’s exiled brother. The Thai army also has been wary of intervention from the international community. The previous government, led by the Democrats, has also left the temple dispute in such disarray, especially its decision to pull Thailand out of the UN World Heritage Convention, that it would take more than a friendly Hun Sen to make any progress. July 18: ICJ orders both sides to withdraw from “provisional demilitarized zone” around Preah Vihear temple. Thai PM says troop withdrawal should precede discussions. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Aim Sinpeng is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of British Columbia and a Visiting Research Fellow at Thammasat University in Thailand. April 22: Violence claims lives of at least 14 soldiers and one civilian and displaces tens of thousands on both sides of the border. April 28: Thailand and Cambodia agree to a ceasefire. One day later, fighting resumes, killing one soldier. May 1 – 2: At least three soldiers are killed in a flareup at the border. Thailand states that Cambodian troops should withdraw from area before welcoming Indonesian observers. July 22: Cambodian PM proposes three-party talks, with Indonesia as mediator. September 5: Newly elected Thai PM visits Cambodia, agrees to comply with ICJ’s order to withdraw troops, and welcomes Indonesian observers. THAILAND-CAMBODIA BORDER DISPUTE LAOS THAILAND Bangkok Preah Vihear Temple CAMBODIA Phnom Penh VIETNAM Source: BBC News. Note: Map not according to scale. 25 CRSO 2011 O MARK VALENCIA THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IMBROGLIO: SMALL STEPS FORWARD? UPDATE Over the past year, a series of aggressive incidents involving Chinese patrol boats interspersed with soothing Chinese official statements left many analysts puzzled. The incidents included cutting seismometer cables of two Vietnamese-sanctioned survey ships exploring Vietnam’s claimed continental shelf, and threatening a Philippines-sanctioned survey vessel and Philippine fisherfolk in the Philippines-claimed Reed Bank area. China responded to frenetic protests from Vietnam and the Philippines by warning that any exploration in the Spratly area without its consent is a violation of its jurisdiction and sovereignty —as well as the agreed 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Despite China’s attempts to reassure, some ASEAN nations, genuinely alarmed by China’s contradictory behavior, began to explore closer cooperation including the setting up of hotlines. WHY ARE SOUTH CHINA SEA TENSIONS RISING? These incidents and the run up to and including the Bali summits in July 20111 provided fascinating diplomatic theater. Ultimately, ASEAN and China agreed on “guidelines” for implementing the DOC, but negotiations were difficult. The guidelines reveal more by what they do not say than by what they do. Indeed, they lack specifics, timelines, and enforceability; their practical focus is on ‘soft’ security issues. While some viewed the guidelines as a first step towards a binding code of conduct, others saw them as a façade for failure. CHINA South China Sea Paracels Scarborough Shoal VIETNAM Spratlys PHILIPPINES BRUNEI MALAYSIA MALAYSIA SINGAPORE INDONESIA China’s claimed territorial waters UNCLOS 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone Disputed islands The agreement was significant because there was a lot at stake. ASEAN and China both needed to show that they could manage regional disputes more or less by themselves. They also needed to demonstrate that the South China Sea is safe for commerce. Weighing heavily on ASEAN—and Indonesia as the current Chair— was the recent, earlier failure to resolve the violent border dispute between members of Cambodia and Thailand. In short, the capability, credibility and relevance of ASEAN security forums were at risk. Although Philippines’ and Vietnam’s public protests and appeals to ASEAN and the international community called attention to the problem, the main characters in this shadow play were China and the US. Their rivalry drove the issues forward but also created pressure to make some progress. China had long resisted the draft guidelines and made a major compromise by agreeing to them. Perhaps it feared that the disputes were pushing ASEAN toward the U.S. ASEAN also Source: Map based on BBC, “Who’s Right in South China Sea Spat?” 13 March 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7941425.stm, which is based on information from UNCLOS and CIA. CRSO 2011 26 compromised by agreeing to drop a clause that would mandate that it form a unified ASEAN position before dealing with China on South China Sea issues. China’s position was that it should only have to deal with rival claimants on a bilateral basis—Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Whatever the impetus, China—through its rhetoric and behavior—succeeded in reducing tension, at least for the time being. SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE: KEY EVENTS IN 2011 But this may only be temporary. China’s “charm offensive” has begun to unravel. Beijing has complained—to no avail—that Vietnam and the Philippines are violating the DOC by unilaterally exploring for hydrocarbons in areas claimed by China. China’s leadership appears to be losing patience with its Southeast Asian neighbors. Since the Bali meetings, it has warned darkly of “due consequences” if challenged in the South China Sea, and has told Vietnam that with respect to their particular dispute, it will “take whatever measures are necessary.” However, more Vietnamese and Philippines-sanctioned surveys and even exploratory drilling are planned in areas claimed by China. So far, it has used only maritime police to enforce its claimed jurisdiction. But this could change. May 27: Vietnam accuses Beijing of “violating” its marine sovereignty in disputed areas of the South China Sea after Chinese ships damage a PetroVietnam exploration boat. The Philippines and Vietnam publicly have sought and gained support from the U.S. Having confronted China and injected itself into the South China Sea via U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s speech at the ARF Foreign Minister’s meeting in Hanoi in July 2010, which cleverly conflated the disputes with freedom of navigation issues, Washington was only too happy to assist the ASEAN claimants. This included both verbal support and joint military cooperation through exercises and port visits. Just in case China had not gotten the full message, at the end of the 2011 Bali summits Clinton laid the U.S. cards on the table. First, she proclaimed that the U.S. has a national interest in freedom of navigation, peace and stability and respect for international law in the South China Sea. Second the U.S. opposes the threat or use of force by any claimant to advance its claims. Third the U.S. supports a multilateral diplomatic process for resolving the disputes. Fourth, the U.S. “calls on parties to clarify their claims in the South China Sea in terms consistent with customary international law, including as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. Consistent with international law, claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.” These were all challenges to China. Thus concluded Act One. The stage is now set for Act Two. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Mark Valencia is Senior Research Associate at the Nautilus Institute and a Research Associate with the National Bureau of Asian Research. 1 They included principally the meetings of ASEAN-China Senior Officials, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, ASEAN plus China, ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. 27 CRSO 2011 March 4: The Philippines protests the alleged harassment of a survey ship by two Chinese patrol boats near the Reed Bank in the Spratly Islands. April 13: The Philippines launches a formal protest with the United Nations over China’s claims to disputed areas in the South China Sea. May 28: China’s Foreign Ministry states that Vietnam’s oil and gas operations in China’s territorial waters “harms China’s rights, interests, and jurisdiction in the South China Sea and violates the consensus reached by the two countries on the South China Sea issue.” June 13: Vietnam holds live-fire naval drills in the South China Sea about 40 km off Quang Nam province in central Vietnam. June 14: The U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines reiterates his country’s commitment to defending the Philippines in any dispute over the South China Sea. June 14 – 16: China carries out military exercises in the South China Sea described as being aimed at “defending atolls and protecting sea lanes.” June 27: A unanimously passed U.S. Senate bill calls for a peaceful, multilateral resolution to maritime territorial disputes in Southeast Asia. China rejects the resolution, saying that the disputes should only be resolved through negotiations between claimants and maintaining that it has “indisputable sovereignty” over the entire Sea. June 28 – July 8: The Philippines and U.S. conduct naval drills in the South China Sea described as being aimed at deepening defense ties and not linked to Chinese actions in the South China Sea. July 9: The U.S., Australia and Japan conduct joint naval drills in the South China Sea off Brunei, marking the first time Japan has participated in joint drills in this territory. July 15 – 21: Three U.S. Navy ships make a seven-day visit to Vietnam that includes naval training exercises. Officials stress that the visits are part of routine exchanges. China deems the timing of the exercises “inappropriate,” saying they should have been rescheduled. July 19 – 23: ASEAN Summit held in Bali, Indonesia. The agenda includes discussions on how to resolve South China Sea disputes and a set of guidelines on how to implement the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) are created. July 23: Secretary Clinton says South China Sea disputants should provide legal evidence to support their claims, something seen as a challenge to China’s claim of sovereignty over large parts of the Sea. September 1: China and the Philippines jointly affirm the need to settle the South China Sea dispute peacefully, through consultation and cooperation. September 16: China calls on India and Vietnam to cease their joint oil exploration in the South China Sea, claiming that it is an infringement on Chinese sovereignty. Vietnam contends the area of exploration is within its EEZ and on it continental shelf, and India reiterates a commitment to energy exploration in the area. September 21: The Philippines hosts the ASEAN Maritime Legal Experts’ Meeting designed to help reach agreement in ASEAN as to what are disputed and non-disputed waters. I CHUNG-IN MOON UPDATE “ With a collapsing economy and chronic food shortages, economic recovery has become the most urgent issue, particularly for a smooth political succession.” NORTH KOREA AND THE SECURITY OUTLOOK FOR THE KOREAN PENINSULA In 2010, the Korean peninsula experienced one of its worst security crises since the end of the Korean War in 1953. Military tensions rose following the March 26 sinking of the South Korean corvette, Cheonan, and act that killed 46 seamen and was attributed to a North Korean torpedo. Tensions reached a peak the following November 23 with the North Korean artillery attack on South Korean marines conducting practice artillery exercises on Yeonpyong Island. As the first physical attack on South Korean territory since the Korean War, the shelling, which killed two marines and two civilians, elicited an immediate response from Seoul, including the complete severance of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, the mobilization of international pressure, and the adoption of a proactive deterrence policy based on offensive preemption. These events marred the seeming pursuit of a peace offensive by the North, which began with a New Year’s joint editorial calling for the unconditional resumption of all levels of talks with the South. Although official meetings discussing possible inter-Korean summit talks took place, the sincerity of Pyongyang’s efforts was questioned given its resolute denial of responsibility for the Cheonan incident and of any wrongdoing in the Yeonpyong attack, which it viewed as an act of self-defense against South Korea’s shelling of its territorial waterways. North Korea’s ‘dialogue’ offensive has also extended to the United States. In addition to a series of economic delegations sent to the U.S. seeking private investment, the North accepted South Korea’s three-stage approach involving North-South talks, North-U.S. talks, and Six-Party Talks, in order to enter direct talks with the U.S. A meeting between DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan and his U.S. counterpart, Steve Bosworth, on July 27 gave some signs of progress. The North called for the unconditional resumption of Six-Party Talks, reiterated its willingness to denuclearize, and pledged a moratorium on additional missile and nuclear testing in return for food aid and suspension of sanctions. U.S. and North Korean officials met in Geneva in October for “exploratory meetings” regarding Pyongyang’s nuclear program, but these meetings failed to create much notable progress. CRSO 2011 28 TIMELINE: EVENTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, 2011 January 5: The joint editorial of North Korea’s Nodong Shinmun calls for the unconditional resumption of inter-Korean talks. February 8 – 9: Preliminary inter-Korean military talks are aborted. February 28 – April 30: The ROK-U.S. Combined Forces perform Key Resolve and Foal Eagle military exercises. Meanwhile, as international sanctions continue to strangle its economy, North Korea has sought significant assistance from China and economic ties between the countries are closer than ever. China’s share of North Korea’s total trade rose from 24.8% to 88.1% in 2010 and the two countries have agreed to several joint economic development projects. North Korea has also been noted for strengthening its ties with Russia, most recently at the August 24 summit talk with Medvedev, and for seeking more diversified sources of aid and investment, especially from Europe. These moves appear closely aligned with Kim Jong-il’s pledge to achieve a ‘strong and prosperous great nation, ‘Gangsung Daeguk,’ by 2012. North Koreans believe the country has attained status as a ‘strong nation’ with the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but the task of creating a ‘prosperous nation’ has proven problematic. With a collapsing economy and chronic food shortages, economic recovery has become the most urgent issue, particularly for a smooth political succession. 2010 also heralded the political debut of Kim Jong-un, the third son of Kim Jong-il, who was declared a ‘four-star general’ and elected Vice Chairman of the Korea Workers Party Central Military Committee. Kim Jong-un has since firmly established himself as the ‘number two man’ in North Korea, having accompanied his father on more than 100 public occasions and even briefly ruling in his father’s stead during travel absences. In the coming year, North Korea will likely seek more active diplomacy with the outside world and desperate economic needs could lead to concessions on the nuclear front. However, the international community’s failure to engage could result in renewed possibilities of missile and nuclear testing. Finally, the likelihood of social and political unrest resulting from succession politics appears low, as Kim Jong-un is currently protected by three layers of supporting forces: immediate family members in the ruling elite, the Korea Workers’ Party and cabinet, and the military. March 17: North Korea proposes North-South joint research on volcanic activities at Mt. Baekdu. April 27 – 29: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visits North Korea. May 20 – 26: Kim Jong-il visits China. May 30: North Korea cuts off a military hotline on the East Coast. June 1: The National Defense Commission reveals its secret contacts with South Korean officials on the North-South Korean summit. June 3: South Korea tells army training centers to stop using pictures of North Korean leaders (the ‘three Kims’) for target practice after the North vows “retaliatory military actions.” August 16 – 22: South Korean and U.S. hold the Ulji Freedom Guardian joint military exercise. August 20-24: Kim Jong-il visits Russia and holds a summit with President Medvedev. August 30: Lee Myung-bak names new unification minister (who is later replaced on Oct. 24). October 24 – 25: U.S. and North Korean officials met in Geneva to discuss reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. ANNUAL FOOD AID (IN METRIC TONS) TO NORTH KOREA BY MAJOR DONORS, 2001-2010 600000 500000 400000 300000 200000 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Chung-in Moon is a professor of political science at Yonsei University and a former Ambassador for International Security Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Republic of Korea. 100000 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 China European Community Japan Republic of Korea, the United States of America This table is updated from the Congressional Research Service Report on “Foreign Assistance to North Korea” (July 1, 2011) by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin. Source: World Food Program’s International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS) database. 29 CRSO 2011 2011 RICHARD A. BITZINGER UPDATE MILITARY MODERNIZATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC: IS IT AN ARMS RACE? 2011 was a noteworthy year for military modernization in the Asia Pacific. China sent its first aircraft carrier (the ex-Soviet Varyag) off on its initial sea trials and conducted the first flight of the J-20, a prototype of a fifth-generation fighter jet. Beijing also commissioned its second Type-071 LPD-type amphibious assault ship, as well as two new frigates and one new destroyer.1 It was also disclosed that China’s new antiship ballistic missile had achieved “initial operating capability.”2 BOX 1: WHAT CONSTITUTES AN “ARMS RACE”? For an arms race to occur, it must have the following attributes: ■ Two or more actors, usually nation-states. ■ Each actor must regard and specifically designate the other to be an adversary, and a high degree of public animosity and antagonism must exist between them. ■ Each party’s military/political planning—particularly the structuring of their armed forces—must be consciously and directly oriented toward dealing with the supposed military capabilities and military/ political intentions of the other party. ■ There must be an explicit competition between these actors regarding the quantity and quality (i.e., capabilities) of their arms acquisitions. ■ There must be “rapid, extraordinary, and consistent increases” in both military spending and arms acquisitions. ■ These arming processes must be done with the explicit intention of seeking military dominance over the rival actor. Source: Colin Gray, “The Arms Race Phenomenon”, World Politics 24, no. 1 (1971); Grant Hammond, Plowshares Into Swords: Arms Races in International Politics (Columbus: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). Other countries in the region have been equally busy recapitalizing their militaries. Japan commissioned its second Hyuga-class helicopter carrier, while Australia launched the first of its Canberraclass amphibious assault ships. Thailand received its first Gripen fighter jets from Sweden, and Singapore and South Korea continued to take delivery of F-15 combat aircraft. India announced that it would buy 126 fighters, either the French Rafale or the Eurofighter Typhoon (a final decision is expected in late 2011 or early 2012.) These arms acquisitions raise the question: Is the Asia Pacific in the grip of a regional arms race? On the surface, it might appear so given the growth in arms acquisitions over the past 10-15 years (see Table 2). More than the numbers of arms being acquired, increasingly the types of weapons being acquired—fourth-generation fighter aircraft, modern submarines, naval vessels armed with advanced antiship cruise missiles, etc.—constitute a “racheting-up” in the quality of arms flowing to regional militaries, leading to an increase in military capabilities. These recent weapons purchases have been accompanied by a significant rise in regional defense spending (see Table 1), which has enabled the arms buildup. Certainly these developments could be interpreted as pointing to a rather disturbing trend in the regional security calculus. As countries in the Asia Pacific add new capabilities for war fighting— including stand-off precision-strike, long-range airborne and undersea attack, stealth, mobility, and expeditionary warfare—any conflict in the region, should it occur, is likely to be faster, more intense, more lethal, and therefore perhaps more devastating in its effects. If the Asia Pacific is truly in the midst of an arms race that could have such undesired consequences, then it makes sense to consider limiting arms transfers to the region or to encouraging governments to practice self-restraint when it comes to defense acquisitions. But is it accurate to describe recent patterns of arms acquisitions in the Asia Pacific as a genuine “arms race”? In fact, 1 2 Jane’s Fighting Ships, online version, accessed September 2, 2011 (http://jfs.janes.com/docs/jfs/browse_country_results.jsp?&SelPub=jfs&bucket=Country&selected=China). Tony Capaccio, “China Has ‘Workable’ Anti-Ship Missile Design, Pentagon Says,” Bloomberg, August 26, 2011. CRSO 2011 30 this is unlikely, as most of these arms purchases do not meet the strict requirements of an arms race, as laid out by leading theorists (see Box1). Very few countries in the region, for example, are in an overtly hostile relationship; India-Pakistan is certainly one, but the same cannot be said of Korea and Japan, or of Singapore and Malaysia, despite historical enmities; and Japan is still loath to label China an outright threat.3 Even where there are mutual animosities, the bilateral competitions often do not display the kind of reciprocal arms acquisitions manifest in a typical arms race. For example, the Philippines and Vietnam may clash with China over the Spratlys, but they can hardly hope to seriously compete with China in any tit-for-tat arms buildup. Finally, the present process of arms acquisition in the region can hardly be described as “rapid” or “extensive.” Some arms deals have taken years to be consummated, while others have been frequently postponed or even cancelled outright. In terms of numbers, too, many Asia Pacific nations are hardly buying out the store; most countries in Southeast Asia, for example, are purchasing only relative handfuls of advanced conventional weaponry. Rather than an arms race, we may be witnessing more of an arms competition, or an “arms dynamic” occurring in the Asia Pacific.4 While an “arms competition” is still a process of reciprocal arms acquisitions, it is dedicated to maintaining the status quo, rather than seeking dominance (although China, of course, may be the exception here). In other words, these purchases seek to preserve the balance of power in the region, not disrupt it. Even if just an arms competition, however, these arms acquisitions can be worrisome and potentially destabilizing. In particular, they may contribute to a classic “security dilemma”—a situation whereby such arming, ostensibly undertaken to maintain regional stability could actually undermine that very security due to misperception and over-reaction. In the long run, therefore, it may not matter whether the current arms buildup is an arms race or “simply” an arms competition. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Richard A. Bitzinger is a Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. He was previously an Associate Professor with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies and a research analyst with RAND. 3 4 Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2011 (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2011), online version (http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2011.html). Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998). 31 CRSO 2011 TABLE 1: DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE ASIA PACIFIC, 2000-2009 (in billions of constant 2009 U.S. dollars) 2000 2009 Increase (%) Australia 12.8 19.0 48 China* 14.6 70.3 ~350 India 21.8 35.8 64 135 Indonesia 2.0 4.7 Japan 51.8 51.0 (1.5) South Korea 16.2 24.4 51 Malaysia 2.0 3.9 95 Singapore 5.9 7.7 31 Thailand 2.6 4.9 88 Vietnam 1.2** 2.4 100 * Figures for Chinese defense spending are based on officially released figures (current dollars); real growth, 2000-2009, is based on author’s estimates. **Author’s estimate. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (http://milexdata.sipri.org) UPDATE CONT. COUNTRY SURFACE COMBATANTS AUSTRALIA Building 3 Hobart-class Air Warfare Destroyers, equipped with Aegis combat system, SM-2 air-defense missile; could be upgraded to MD capability CHINA 6 Type-051C/-052B/-052C destroyers TABLE 2: RECENT MAJOR ASIA PACIFIC ARMS ACQUISITIONS 4 Russian-built Sovremennyy-class destroyers 8+ Type-054/-054A frigates INDIA INDONESIA JAPAN AAM: air-to-air missile SOUTH KOREA ASCM: antiship cruise missile LACM: land-attack cruise missile LHD: landing helicopter dock Building 4 Hyuga-class Helicopter Destroyers (DDH); could be upgraded to LHD or STOVL-type aircraft carrier Building 3+ KDX-III destroyers, equipped with Aegis combat system, SM-2 air-defense missile; could be upgraded to MD capability 3 KDX-I and 6 KDX-II destroyers MALAYSIA LPD: land platform dock Acquiring 2 British-built Lekiu-class frigates, but program uncertain 6 German-designed, locally built MEKO A100 OPVs; plans to acquire 6+ indigenous littoral combat ships MD: missile defense MRL: multiple-rocket launcher Acquiring 4 Dutch-built Sigma-class corvettes 6 Kongo- and Atago-class destroyers, equipped with upgraded Aegis combat system and SM-3 missile for MD GLOSSARY: AGM: air-to-ground munition Building 3+ Type-15A Kolkata-class destroyers SINGAPORE SSM: surface-to-surface missile 6 French-designed Formidable-class “stealth” frigates STOVL: short takeoff/vertical landing THAILAND VIETNAM CRSO 2011 32 2 Chinese-built Type-053 frigates Acquiring 2 Russian-built Gepard-class frigates ΩΩ AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS/ AIRCRAFT CARRIERS SUBMARINES COMBAT AIRCRAFT MISSILES & OTHER SYSTEMS Building 2 Canberra-Class LHDs 6 Collins-class diesel-electric submarines 24 F/A-18E/F AAM: AMRAAM 1 ex-Varyag (may build additional indigenous carriers) 20+ Song-/Yuan-class submarines 300 Su-27/-30 fighters (some Su-27s locally produced) 12 Russian-built Kilo-class submarines Building 300+ J-10 fighters 2 Type-071 LPDs (may build more in class) May build LHD-class vessel Partner in Joint Strike Fighter ASCM: Harpoon (F-35) program, may acquire AGM: JSOW, Popeye up to 100 F-35s AAM: R-77, PL-12 ASCM: 3M-54E/E1 Sunburn, 3M-80E Moskit, YJ-83 LACM: DH-10 2+ Shang-class nuclearpowered attack submarines, 2+ Type-094 ballistic missile submarines SSMs: DF-11/-15 Acquiring 240+ Su-30MKI fighters (some locally produced) AAM: R-77 Acquiring ex-Russian Kiev-class STOVL aircraft carrier, to be modified to fly MiG-29 fighters Acquiring 6-12 Frenchdesigned Scorpène-class submarines; later submarines could be AIP Building Indigenous Aircraft Carrier, INS Vikrant, to fly MiG-29 or Tejas fighters Launched first nuclearpowered submarine in 2009 Acquiring 4 Korean-built LDPs Requirement for up to 6 submarines, acquisition uncertain 10+ Su-27/-30 fighters 3 Osumi-class LPDs Building 9+ Soryu-class submarines (AIP-equipped) Approx. 100 F-2 fighters AAM: AMRAAM, AAM-5 Plans to acquire 5th-generation fighter ASCM: Harpoon Building 2+ Dokdo-class LPDs SSMs: Prithvi, Agni Plans to acquire 126 foreignbuilt fighters, either Rafale or Eurofighter Typhoon AAM: R-77 ASCM: YJ-83 9 German-designed Type-209 61 F-15K fighters submarines, acquired 1990s 160 F-16 fighters Building 3+ GermanPlans to acquire 5thdesigned Type-214 AIPgeneration fighter equipped submarines AGM: JDAM AAM: AMRAAM ASCM: Harpoon, Haesung LACM: Hyunmoo-IIIC 18 Su-30MKM fighter AAMs: R-77 Plans to acquire 18 additional fighters, type undecided ASCM: Excoet 4 ex-Swedish A-12 submarines 24 F-15S fighters AAMs: AMRAAM, Python IV, AIM-9X 2 ex-Swedish A-17 submarines ASCM: Harpoon Partner in Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) program, may acquire AGM: JSOW, JDAM up to 100 F-35s MRL: HIMARS Acquiring 2 French-built Scorpène-class submarines 4 Endurance-class LPDs Building up to 260 locally produced Tejas fighters ASCM: Exocet, Brahmos Requirement for 2+ 1 Spanish-built STOVL aircraft carrier, equipped with submarines AV-8A STOVL fighters (most inoperable) Acquiring 6 Kilo-class submarines 74 F-16 Block 52/52+ fighters MRL: ASTROS-II 6-12 Gripen fighters AAM: AMRAAM 12 Su-27 fighters AAM: R-77 Acquiring 12+ Su-30MK2V fighters ASCM: Kh-35/SS-N-25 Switchblade Source: Compiled by author. 4 CHAPTER 4 PIERRE P. LIZÉE Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Asia’s Role As RtoP gains THERE ARE INCREASING SIGNALS This approach, and the fact that that the Responsibility to Protect regional endorsements by the Gulf global legitimacy, (RtoP) is now becoming a global norm. Cooperation Council and Arab League In the years since its inception in 2002, were indeed forthcoming, were seen with the release of the International as the demonstration that key non- Commission on Intervention and Western actors are now supportive of State Sovereignty (ICISS) report, RtoP RtoP. Moreover, China, once one of has been portrayed by many Asian the fiercest opponents of the concept, states as an attempt to justify, in law chose to abstain rather than veto at and in practice, interventions that are the UN Security Council, allowing the defined by Western values, interests, Libya operation to go forward. Is and priorities, and then imposed on there, in all of this, increasing global the rest of the world. approval of the RtoP? Has a tipping Asia Pacific states will have to reconcile it with their own security discourse and conflict resolution mechanisms. CRSO 2012 PAGE 34 However, the intervention in Libya, point been reached, and are we authorized by the United Nations witnessing in real time the development Security Council, might be changing of a new, and truly global, norm to all of that. The most crucial component which Asian states subscribe? of the discussions that led to the mid- This question posed above leads, 2011 operation against the Gadhafi however, to the second element of regime was the idea that the operation debate about the RtoP: when did such could not proceed without the a reassessment of the norms that endorsement of Libya’s neighbors. should guide global politics last “The crucial challenge for Asian states is to act upon this new interest in the RtoP, and to set in place the mechanisms to voice is being heard much louder than ramifications. The Libya operation before in debates about development only serves to highlight the underlying approaches and models of economic questions and dilemmas inherent in and financial reforms—the G20 RtoP discourse. provides evidence of this change. Now the region is also called upon by the at the UN and in other international debate on the RtoP to engage in for- circles have gone to great lengths in mulating the norms and methods that recent years to emphasize how the will underlie the evolution of global concept is focused on the prevention approaches to conflict and conflict of conflict—the “responsibility to resolution. prevent”—much more than on forceful This is why the ongoing debate intervention once violence has erupted about the RtoP matters so much for —the “responsibility to react.” Mention Asia. More often than not, in the past is often made of the three so-called most Asian regional actors have chosen pillars upon which the implementation to bypass discussions about the concept. of the RtoP should rest: This approach is no longer possible, as questions about the RtoP increasingly help implement the concept both intraregionally and more globally.” 1) the responsibility of the state to need answers. The Libya operation is protect its population from the the most recent example in a series four crimes (war crimes, crimes that dates back to Kosovo. Asia will against humanity, genocide, and figure, in one way or another, in these ethnic cleansing) as agreed upon answers. A regional debate on the RtoP, in the World Summit Statement then, must be set in motion. As the 2005; 2) the responsibility of the inter- RtoP is arguably gaining global legitimacy, the Asia Pacific states will national community to help the have to reconcile it within their own state in this process; and, 3) only if the state fails to protect security discourse and conflict occur? However far back in time one At one level, proponents of the RtoP resolution mechanisms. This will not its population, the responsibility be unproblematic; debates about of the international community global norms require a response from to respond.2 the region. A significant step in this direction What matters most in this logic, the question, in the changes of the past few was taken when in 2009 a CSCAP Study proponents of the RtoP argue, is the decades in global politics, or possibly Group was established to examine idea that the state retains the primary even all the way to the debates and these issues. After three meetings responsibility to ensure the protection choices which informed the within the region, the Study Group’s might wish to go to answer that of its population. This responsibility entails, before anything else, the construction of the post-1945 global report was made public in mid-2011. order, one crucial difference quickly The Group found that many regional creation of sustainable and legitimate comes to light: Asia’s rise gives it a states are in fact quite willing to models of politics anchored in global growing influence on the norms and engage in the current global debate standards of human rights and law, practices that drive international about the RtoP. This willingness to but also in the concrete conditions of politics. This shift points to what discuss the implications of the RtoP development in which states around might be the most striking element in for Asia also stems from broader the world find themselves. the ongoing debate about the RtoP: it changes in the way proponents of the is a debate that quite simply cannot proceed without Asia. The region’s concept have outlined its logic and 1 This is where regional states in Asia find a first compelling point of entry into the series of debates surrounding PAGE 35 CRSO 2012 BOX 1 the RtoP. Security in Asia has always been about connecting development, conflict resolution, and political HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARYGENERAL’S REPORT “THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT,” JUNE 27, 2011 progress, and in a way that reflects local circumstances and conditions. Positioning the RtoP in a way that is consistent with these priorities, as has been the case now for some time, is ■ ■ The responsibility to protect is a universal principle. Its implementation, however, should respect institutional and cultural differences from region to region. Each region will operationalize the principle at its own pace and in its own way. I would urge that an intraregional dialogue on how to proceed be held among Government officials, civil society representatives and independent experts, such as the Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum. Regional, as well as global, ownership is needed. (p. 3, para 8) Preventing mass atrocity crimes is the legal responsibility of the State. Meeting this responsibility, however, requires partnering with civil society, such as women’s and civic groups, clerics, the private sector, academia, and the media, among others. Parliamentarians can give voice to the moral imperative. The constituencies and stakeholders committed to prevention and protection are diverse, dispersed, and frequently transnational in scope. (p. 4, para 12) allowing the concept to gain new converts in the region. At another level, proponents of the RtoP have also emphasized that the implementation of the RtoP should give priority to regional actors. For example, the Joint Office of the Special Advisers to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, the key structure at the UN charged with developing the means and process through which the RtoP is to be implemented, is promoting dialogues with regional groupings around the world. The goal is to set up consultation ■ Without sustained public understanding and support, the responsibility to protect will remain unfinished business. We look to the NGO and academic communities, as always, for fresh ideas and information, for comparative case studies and empirical research, for accessible materials and media outreach, for innovative public programming and for well-informed commentary on how we could do better. (p. 5, para 16) and dialogue mechanisms that could be triggered in cases of egregious violence and thus calling for an RtoP response. The emphasis on dialogue and consultation indicates that any RtoP operation in the region would ■ Regional and sub-regional arrangements can encourage governments to recognize their obligations under relevant international conventions and to identify and resolve sources of friction within their societies before they lead to violence or atrocity crimes. There are many such examples of neighbours helping neighbours. The launch in 2009 of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, as part of an ongoing effort to develop a more people-oriented ASEAN, complements longer-standing regional human rights bodies in Latin America, Africa, and Europe. (p. 5, para 17) not proceed without extensive prior consultations with regional actors. This also makes for greater comfort with the concept in the Asia Pacific. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRACK ONE: The crucial challenge at the moment for Asian states is to act upon this ■ [We] are confident that the surest path for advancing the responsibility to protect is through global-regional-sub-regional partnership. (p. 13, para 44) new interest in the RtoP, and to set in place the mechanisms through which it will help implement the concept both intra-regionally and more globally. To advance these goals, The full text of the report can be found at http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/ 65/initiatives/Report%20of%20the%20SG%20to%20MS.pdf. action could be targeted in four areas, as outlined in the CSACP RtoP Study Group report: CRSO 2012 PAGE 36 1) The ASEAN Regional Forum institutions such as the ARF However, after the 2005 World (ARF), as the region’s inclusive should seize this opportunity and Summit, the language surrounding Track Two regional security establish regular consultations the RtoP has been much more institution, should take the lead with the Joint Office. about prevention than in establishing a Regional Risk 3) Asian states should identify intervention, and much more Reduction Centre. This Centre structures and individuals within about dialogue with regional actors would devote its work to early their governments whose role than intrusion from the outside. warning assessments related to would be to pursue current Consequently, Track Two actors the four crimes intended to be regional and global discussions are in a position to reengage addressed by the RtoP (war about the RtoP. These could serve discussion about the RtoP and to “ Early warning assessments and, more generally, the prevention of violence before it erupts through national and regional efforts, represent crucial elements of the RtoP.” crimes, crimes against humanity, as the points of interface between propose realistic ways of moving it ethnic cleansing, and genocide). It their regional governments and the forward, such as with the CSCAP would also provide expert advice UN Joint Office on the Prevention RtoP Study Group. to regional policy-makers and of Genocide and the RtoP. would help develop the response Additionally, they could also help SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS mechanisms that would be triggered raise the understanding of the FOR TRACK TWO if egregious violence did erupt in a nature of the RtoP within their Two types of activities should be regional state. Early warning own bureaucracies. undertaken in this regard. Track Two assessments and, more generally, 4) Track Two actors in the region groups should provide support to the the prevention of violence before it should also engage more directly activities of regional governments erupts through national and the current global debate about intended to set in motion the regional efforts, represent crucial the RtoP. Track Two actors have implementation of the RtoP in Asia. elements of the RtoP. In this sense, been crucial in the promotion and Developing a Regional Risk Reduction the creation of a Regional Risk implementation of the concept, Centre, for instance, will require a lot Reduction Centre would give most notably serving as conduits of exploratory work concerning the concrete expression to Asia’s towards the new understandings of exact ways in which the Centre would interest in the concept and the security and sovereignty upon function, where its funding would be new thinking it could instill in which the RtoP rests. The ICISS, found, and how its mandate would regional security frameworks. which set out the first expression connect to other regional security of the RtoP more than a decade mechanisms. Track Two groups— Joint Office of the Special Advisers ago, underscored this need to find chiefly among them the ARF Eminent to the United Nations Secretary- spaces of mobilization outside the and Expert Persons Group (EEP’s)— General on the Prevention of usual channels of inter-state could focus on this exploratory work. Genocide and the RtoP. One of diplomacy. In the years following the Joint Office’s main goals at the the release of the ICISS report, groups should involve raising awareness moment is to establish frameworks faced with resistance on the part of in the region about the RtoP and, of dialogue and cooperation with governments who viewed the RtoP conversely, mobilizing support for the regional organizations to bring as entailing an erosion of national concept within a coherent and together global and regional actors sovereignty, Track Two actors sustained agenda of implementation in the implementation of the found little traction in moving addressed to regional governments. concept. Regional states and acceptance of the concept forward. A number of constituencies within 2) Better use should be made of the A broader agenda for Track Two PAGE 37 CRSO 2012 BOX 2: RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND TRACK TWO: AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY1 The CSCAP Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) made twelve recommendations for implementing RtoP in the Asia Pacific region (see http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/RtoP/CSCAP%20Study%20Group %20on%20RtoP%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf, page 4). Some of these recommendations require additional consideration and elaboration in order to more precisely determine what is required and how it will be delivered. CSCAP or other Track Two bodies are well placed to assist with this type of assessment, possibly through the formation of new study groups. Four important areas of future RtoP-oriented Track Two work include: 1. Examining the key issues relating to early warning and assessment, especially: 1) working towards the development of a shared methodology for early warning and assessment; and 2) examining the modalities for strengthening cooperation between the region and the United Nations in the field of early warning and assessment. government, civil society, and expert groups, need to be brought together if the implementation of the RtoP is to move forward in Asia; Track Two groups are ideally suited to do precisely that. The implementation of the RtoP needs to be integrated into the context of the region’s evolving security architecture. Asia must learn to make the RtoP its own. Regional actors must come to understand how the concept will help Asia deal with its own security threats, and in a way that corresponds to its own approaches to peace and security. Track Two groups, because their role is to spur new thinking on regional approaches to conflict and security, are in a good 2. Developing a proposal for a Risk Reduction Centre. The [CSCAP Study Group on RtoP] report identified some of the principal tasks that would be fulfilled by a Risk Reduction Centre, but many questions remain concerning its function and role, working practices, institutional situation, and funding. A follow-on study could be tasked with developing more specific proposals relating to the establishment of a Risk Reduction Centre. 3. Establishing a register of Track Two mediators and teams of experts. This register could be made available to Track One and Track Two actors seeking assistance with mediation. Additional study is also needed of the practical feasibility and operating procedures for establishing a register of small teams of experts on matters such as ceasefires, power sharing arrangements, election design and monitoring, human rights protection and promotion and constitutional reform to provide expert advice when requested. A CSCAP Study Group on Early Warning and Assessment could convene a one-off experts-level meeting to examine the feasibility of establishing a register and bring forward recommendations. 4. Standing capacity for preventing and responding to the RtoP crimes. The Study Group recognized that early warning and assessment is only part of the equation and that it was equally important to ensure that the region had the capacity to act to prevent and respond to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity when necessary. Given the enormity of the task of establishing a standing capacity along the lines recommended in the [CSCAP Study Group on RtoP] report, the Group recommended that any subsequent Track Two study of the modalities of implementing RtoP in the Asia Pacific region focus on the specific requirements entailed in building a standing capacity. position to take up that task. Indeed, CSCAP has done this through the establishment of its Study Group on the RtoP. Its final report has set in motion an array of discussions within the region and beyond. For example, in his report entitled “The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect,” the UN Secretary-General noted: “Context matters. The responsibility to protect is a universal principle. Its implementation, however, should respect institutional and cultural differences from region to region. Each region will operationalize this principle at its own pace and in its own way. I would encourage intraregional dialogue among government officials, civil society representatives, and independent experts, on how to proceed, such as the Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 1 Excerpted from http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/RtoP/CSCAP %20Study%20Group%20on%20RtoP%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf. CRSO 2012 PAGE 38 Regional, as well as global, ownership is needed.”3 PROSPECTS FOR MOVING should not let the discussion go in that important and immediate questions FORWARDS ON RtoP direction. The region, on the contrary, which lend urgency to the need for Will this attention to and progress on must demonstrate through concrete regional actors in Asia to engage in RtoP continue to move forward in developments within the sorts of dialogue at both Track One and Track 2012? In the coming year, two elements initiatives proposed here that it will Two levels. “ …the [RtoP] concept calls for a global endorsement of responses to violence, and yet the distribution of power in the global system is such that only a few powerful states can actually engineer these responses.” of context will certainly influence how participate in the implementation of Asia will move forward in the the RtoP, and that it will have the unfold in 2012, Asian states need to implementation of the RtoP. One will means and the will to do so over the engage in a sustained discussion about be the way in which the lessons of long term. The debate about the the implementation of the RtoP. Libya are identified in the immediate lessons of Libya which will take place Beyond the immediacy of this need, and longer term, both globally and over the next few months does lend the region must also consider the regionally. A threshold has certainly an urgency on Asia’s part of the need broader stakes of this discussion. For been crossed in Libya, but to what to act. Asia, the RtoP is also about the In light of the events that will effect? What will be the ‘lessons The second crucial element of region’s role in the formulation of the learned’ by Asian states from the context in the coming year will be norms which will guide international conduct of the Libya operation? China’s evolving attitude toward the politics in the future. This is why the Indeed, the recent vetoes by China RtoP. China has always been region must act, and act now. and Russia of a UN response to the fundamentally important in efforts to crisis in Syria suggest that not all push the implementation of the concept these “lessons” will be positive. forward. Its position at the UN Security Any discussion of RtoP raises Council, for example, puts it at the questions of capacities and divisions center of any discussion about RtoP of labor. Asking whether interventions operations. In this context, a significant of the type conducted in Libya should turn of events might develop over the take place again in the future also next year. China abstained on the entails asking, in fact, who can con- resolution to approve the UN duct such operations, and with what authorization of the Libya mission, exact means. This points to a crucial waiting to see how the situation would dilemma in the implementation of the progress and wanting to reserve its RtoP: the concept calls for a global options depending on the success or endorsement of responses to violence, failure of the international interven- and yet the distribution of power in tion there. Now that this operation is the global system is such that only a in its end state, and turning to the few powerful states can actually rebuilding of the Libyan state, how will engineer these responses. China choose to interpret its lessons? Does this bring the discussion back And how will its interpretations and to the idea that the RtoP will remain responses to RtoP situations connect an instrument of the powerful, to be to China’s rising global influence and deployed only when specific and its efforts to be seen as a responsible limited interests are in play? Asia power on the world stage? These are ABOUT THE AUTHOR Pierre P. Lizée is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Brock University in Canada. He cochaired the CSCAP Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect. 1 The Study Group’s full report is available at http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/RtoP/CSCA P%20Study%20Group%20on%20RtoP%20%20Final%20Report.pdf. 2 See Report of the (UN) Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (UN Document A/63/677), 12 January 2009. 3 See Report of the (UN) Secretary-General on the Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (UN Document A/65/877-S2011/393), 27 June 2011 (emphasis added). PAGE 39 CRSO 2012 CHAPTER 5 PAUL TENG AND MARGARITA ESCALER Food Security in Asia: The Changing Landscape Emerging INTRODUCTION FOUR EMERGING Asia’s food security challenges are TRENDS AFFECTING trends occurring formidable, to say the least. The ASIAN FOOD SECURITY region has over 60% of the world’s Asia’s food security is under significant population, as well as some of its pressure from a variety of factors that fastest growing economies, but only include population growth and 34% the world’s arable land and 36% urbanization, the declining performance of the world’s water resources. What’s of agriculture, natural resource more, emerging trends occurring constraints, climate change, high and globally and regionally are further volatile food and oil prices and the threatening Asia’s ability to feed itself. rapid transformation of supply chains. In order to maximize the potential of First, between now and 2050, the both globally and regionally are threatening Asia’s ability to feed itself. Asia’s agricultural sector to improve world’s population is expected to food security in the region and increase by 2.4 billion, from the beyond, governments must embark current 6.9 billion to 9.3 billion with on a multi-faceted and integrated Asia capturing the lion’s share. At the strategy, one that is broader in scope same time, the population living in and adapted to these dynamic urban areas is projected to gain challenges. 2.9 billion, passing from 3.4 billion in 2009 to 6.3 billion 2050 with most growth concentrated in the cities and towns of the less developed regions.1 CRSO 2012 PAGE 40 “A worrying Urbanization, in combination with Asia’s production of irrigated wheat rising incomes, will increase food and rice will be 14% and 11% lower, demand and accelerate the respectively, in 2050 than in 2000 due diversification of diets. As incomes to climate change. rise, diets will come to include more trend is the Fourth, international prices of resource-intensive food products, such major food commodities have risen as meat, dairy, eggs, fruits and sharply in recent months, only a few vegetables, thus unleashing a rapid years after the 2007 – 2008 food crisis. increase in demand for raw agriculture Since June 2010, international maize growth in commodities prices have more than doubled, and productivity, in the region has declined over the Domestic food prices in many last few decades, with its share of gross countries in Asia have also increased domestic product (GDP) falling from rapidly. For example, between June 43% to 18% between 1961 and 2009 in 2010 and May 2011, domestic rice South Asia, for example. The number prices in Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, of people working in agriculture has and Vietnam have risen in the range average also steadily declined from 70% to of 13% to 46%.3 aggregate yield, projected to further fall to 49% in 2020.2 and transport production further This is largely due to the fact that contribute to fluctuations in the price has been farmers are getting older across Asia. of food and rising fuel costs and also slowing over that annual growth in productivity, production and its competition with measured in terms of average food crops for available land. Biofuel aggregate yield, has been slowing over production based on agricultural the years. Global aggregate yield commodities increased more than growth of grains and oilseeds averaged three-fold from 2000 to 2008. Various 2.0% per year between 1970 and 1990, policy measures driving the rush to but declined to 1.1% between 1990 biofuels, as well as tax incentives and and 2007. Yield growth is projected import restrictions in developed to continue declining over the next countries, have been the main driver ten years to less than 1.0% per year. of this development. fact that annual Second, agriculture’s performance measured in terms of 55% between 1980 and 2010, and is A more worrying trend is the fact the years.” Asia, in particular, is projected to see its urban population increase by Third, many of the world’s agro- wheat prices have almost doubled. The rising costs of fuel, fertilizer result in the expansion of biofuel Lastly, in just two decades, Asia has 1.7 billion with China and India alone ecosystems being used as food witnessed a rapid transformation of its accounting for about a third of the production systems are already supply chains which has changed the total increase. One predictable showing worrying signs of degradation. way food is being produced, outcome of this massive population Climate change will put additional processed, packaged, transported and shift is urban poverty. Already, Asia pressure on natural resources and distributed. The fast diversification of accounts for over half the world’s food security through higher and diets towards high-value agricultural slum population. Today, Asia has more variable temperatures, changes products associated with urbanization eleven megacities, which are defined in precipitation patterns, and and increasing incomes, and the rapid as cities with over 10 million increased occurrences of extreme rise of organized retail in food, have inhabitants. By 2025, the number of weather events. According to recent resulted in a “supermarket revolution.” megacities is expected to reach 29, projections by the International Food Over the past two decades, counties with Asia gaining another five. and Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), like China, India and Vietnam have PAGE 41 CRSO 2012 seen the share of supermarkets in implications for food security. While INCREASING IMPORTANCE food retail reach 5-20% of the market, supermarkets may provide higher OF URBAN FOOD SECURITY thereby experiencing the fastest quality and cheaper produce for urban IN ASIA supermarket spread in history. This consumers, market participation by With more and more Asians living in rapid transformation has obvious poorer farmers is lower.5 cities, urban food security will play an 4 increasingly important role in maintaining peace and stability. The BOX 1: 2011 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX, FACT AND FINDINGS: ASIA food crisis in 2007 – 2008 and the resulting food riots that occurred in cities all over the world not only ■ South Asia has the highest regional 2011 Global Hunger Index* (GHI) score—22.6. exposed the vulnerability of the global food system, but more importantly, highlighted the ■ The 2011 GHI score fell by 25% in South Asia compared with its 1990 score, and the 2011 GHI score in Southeast Asia decreased by 44%. increasing problem of urban food security. Food supply, food consumption, and food stability in ■ The South Asia region reduced its GHI score by more than 6 points between 1990 and 1996, mainly due to a large decline in underweight in children under five. But the rapid pace of progress was not maintained; South Asia has lowered its GHI score by only one point since 2001, despite strong economic growth. Social inequality and the low nutritional, educational, and social status of women, which is a major cause of child under-nutrition in the region, have impeded improvements in the GHI score. cities are very different from traditional rural patterns, as some governments, (e.g. Egypt and Tunisia) have learned to their cost. As Ruth Oniang’o, the first woman Nutrition professor in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa and a current MP in Kenya rightly pointed out during a recent ■ ■ ■ ■ Bangladesh and Vietnam saw large gains in improving their GHI score between the 1990 GHI and the 2011 GHI. Vietnam reduced its score by 56%, and Bangladesh reduced its score by 36%.) symposium on global agriculture and In Bangladesh, a country where 25% of the population is ultra-poor (living on less than USD $0.50 a day), only about 7% of the population has access to social protection or safety net programs. hungry person with low blood sugar The GHI score for North Korea increased by 18% since 1990. A weak economy, high military spending, weather-related crop failures, and systematic problems in the agricultural sector have hampered progress. on global and regional food security Cambodia is the only country to improve from an “extremely alarming” to “serious” level of hunger since 1990. to disruptions in the global food supply food security in Washington, D.C., “hunger is really devastating… a is a very angry person—virtually ungovernable.” In the context of increasing pressure the urban environment presents unique challenges which potentially render its residents more vulnerable chain and to price fluctuations. First and foremost, urban residents ■ Bangladesh, India, and Timor-Leste have the highest prevalence— more than 40%—of underweight in children under five. have to purchase almost all of their food as well as other goods and services. For the millions of urban poor who spend 50% to 70% of their * 3 factors contribute to the GHI: mortality rate for children under five, the prevalence of underweight children, and the proportion of undernourished. For more information, see 2011 Global Hunger Index at http://www.ifpri.org/publication/2011-global-hunger-index. income on food, soaring prices may mean going from two meals a day to one, or at worst, to no food at all. Urban residents face more threats to their economic access to food compared to their rural brothers. CRSO 2012 PAGE 42 Second, due to increased incomes in towns and cities, the basket of food drastically with limited capacity to industrialization. Thus the determinants produce their own food. of nutritional status go beyond which households depend on for their income alone. Food availability is not Fourth, because urban areas are existence has become more varied centers of economic opportunity, enough for good nutrition, a reality and more diverse in origin. Thus, the there are more women working which tends to impact city-dwellers urban poor may be more vulnerable outside the home which may mean more than their rural counterparts. “ Cities, with their unique features, must be included on the agenda of food and agriculture policy makers, planners and institutions and conversely, food security and agriculture...” Fifth, the urban poor live in than their rural counterparts to they have less time for traditional variations in the international market food preparation. In addition, because crowded living conditions with poor since many of their food items tend to of greater exposure to advertising and quality housing, poor to non-existent easier access to supermarkets, urban garbage disposal systems, unsafe dwellers often consume more processed drinking water, and non-functional or also more vulnerable to global and fast food, which mean higher non-existent sewage systems—thus economic events since they depend intakes of saturated and total fat as affecting their nutritional status. It is on overseas remittances, exports, well as sugar and lower intake of fibre. not enough that an individual is getting employment, and foreign direct This diet, together with a more what appears to be an adequate quantity investment. As the most recent food sedentary lifestyle in cities, increases of food if that person is unable to crises demonstrated, urban households the risk of chronic diseases including consume the food because he or she is can be among the hardest hit as they diabetes and obesity, diseases always falling sick. For the urban poor see their purchasing power decline associated with wealth and living in slums, their living conditions be internationally traded. Third, many urban residents are FIGURE 1: FOOD RETAIL PRICES IN SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES USD/kg USD/kg 1.1 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 Indonesia 0.7 national average 0.6 Philippines, (RMR) China (wheat flour) Average of main 50 cities national average 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 Bangladesh (wheat flour) India Dhaka Delhi 0.4 India (wheat) Delhi Viet Nam, (25% broken milled) Dong Thap 0.3 Pakistan (wheat) Lahore 0.2 0.2 S O N D J F MAM J J A S O N D J F M AM J J A S 2009 2010 2011 S O N D J F MAM J J A S O N D J F M AM J J A S 2009 2010 2011 Source: UN FAO, Crop Prospects and Food Situation, No. 3, October 2011, p. 20, available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/al980e/al980e00.pdf. PAGE 43 CRSO 2012 could affect their nutritional status more effectively. The more obvious attention needs to be given to the in the form of malnutrition and poor solution of increasing food production links that connect urban and rural health. is only one among many strategies communities, shape the economic needed to meet this challenge. relationships between them and Lastly, jobs of the urban poor are casual, insecure, uncertain, low- While rural areas currently hold paying and vulnerable to outside most of the world’s poor and hungry forces such as macroeconomic and will continue to do so for many policies, social security programmes, years to come, the urban dimensions must be included on the agenda of and of course, the availability of food of food security merit distinct food and agriculture policy makers, through its impact on supplies in the attention and focus from national planners and institutions and market, and therefore on market governments. As it is, the world is conversely, food security and prices. already witnessing the shifting of agriculture must be integrated into determine how resources can be shared and used sustainably. Cities, with their unique features, poverty and the food insecure to cities the agenda of city planners and local THE CHALLENGES AHEAD with most of the poor being absorbed urban authorities. By addressing Feeding and nourishing a larger, more into life-threatening slums. Factors of urban-rural linkages from social, urban and increasingly affluent Asian production, technologies, economic and environmental population sustainably and equitably employment and indeed policies perspectives, a more coherent and will be an unprecedented challenge which were predominantly aimed at holistic approach can be developed. that will require a more holistic rural populations must now adapt to approach to address food security address urban situations. Specific FIGURE 2: INFLATION AND FOOD INFLATION RATES IN SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES Food inflation above overall inflation 3.1 Philippines 3.6 Malaysia 6.2 Thailand 6.8 Bhutan 10.3 China Bangladesh 11.0 Viet Nam 11.0 12.9 Sri Lanka 14.8 Indonesia 15.7 India 17.2 Timor-Leste 20.4 Pakistan 0.0 5.0 10.0 Food inflation rate Overall inflation rate Source: UN FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, “Asia Pacific Food Situation Update,” February 2011, p. 1, available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al410e/al410e00.pdf. CRSO 2012 PAGE 44 15.0 20.0 25.0 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Paul Teng is Dean of the Office of FIGURE 3: PAST AND PROJECTED GROWTH IN ASIAN MEGACITIES (IN MILLIONS) Graduate Studies and Professional Leaning at the National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological Northeast Asia University, and a Senior Fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Dr Margarita Escaler is a Research Fellow at the Graduate Programmes and Research Office of the National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University. Tokyo Osaka-Kobe Seoul Shanghai Beijing Hong Kong Guangzhou Tianjin Shenzhen 1 2 United Nations (2009). World Urbanisation Prospects: The 2009 Revision. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. New York, 2010. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/doc_highlights.htm 0 10 20 30 40 2025 World Bank. 2011. World Development Indicators database. Washington DC: World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/ world-development-indicators (Accessed July 3, 2011) and Food and Agricultural Organization (2010) The State of Food I nsecurity in the World 2010 http://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/en/. 3 FAO, 2011. 4 Reardon, T. (2010) Agri-food Market Transformation: Development Assistance Strategies to Include the Poor. Paper presented at Partners in Agriculture Global Food Security Symposium, 7 April, in Tokyo. http://partners-in agriculture.org/food_ security_symposium/pdf/07E_Tokyo_ Reardon_ppt_symposium_april_7_2010.pdf 5 Chongqing Minten B. and Reardon T. (2008) Food prices, quality and quality’s pricing in supermarkets versus traditional markets in developing countries. Review of Agricultural Economics 30:480–490. 2000 1975 Southeast and South Asia Kolkata Mumbai Delhi Karachi Dhaka Lahore Manila Jakarta Bangkok 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 2025 2000 1975 Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Urbanization Prospects, the 2009 Revision, available at http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/index.htm. PAGE 45 CRSO 2012 CHAPTER 6 CAROLINA G. HERNANDEZ AND DALCHOONG KIM The Challenge of Engaging Track One in the Asia Pacific Region CSCAP should A BRIEF HISTORICAL NOTE seeks to engage through its activities, Engaging officialdom through Track Two particularly through its study groups recall its activities has a notable performance (see Box 1 on current and recent record in the Asia Pacific, whether it CSCAP study groups). commitment to support the ARF’s mission for comprehensive security cooperation in the Asia Pacific region to inspire it to move forward. CRSO 2012 PAGE 46 is through the ASEAN Institutes of Building engagement between Track Strategic and International Studies One and Track Two, however, has (ASEAN ISIS) or the Council for proved to be a challenging task. This Security Cooperation in the Asia is not only because of the high degree Pacific (CSCAP). Popularized in the of diversity in perspectives and 1990s, Track Two engagement of readiness for engagement among Track Track One has met with modest One actors, but also because these successes, including the provision of features are equally shared by Track the seminal idea behind the region’s Two actors, including those active in pre-eminent security dialogue mecha- CSCAP. Yet engagement between these nism—the ASEAN Regional Forum tracks is essential if only to enrich the (ARF)—by individuals and institutes pool of useful and relevant knowledge that later played a central role in the that may inform decisions, but also establishment of CSCAP in 1993. It is because Track Two should promote a noteworthy that the ARF, having been degree of flexibility in outside-the-box fostered by a number of regional thinking that can lead to creative and Track Two actors, is now the Track effective management of policy issues One mechanism with which CSCAP not usually available to officialdom. “…Track Two should promote a degree of flexibility in outside-the-box thinking that as: (1) the Asia Pacific’s broad Asian states than the APEC in that it geographical expanse has implications includes North Korea, Mongolia, and for its coherence; (2) the diversity of India, without extending to Latin perspectives poses difficulties for American states (see Figure 1: Asia reaching consensus and decisions; Pacific Regional Architecture). (3) the region hosts the world’s key Engaging officials from such a broad strategic actors whose interests not section of the world can be a challenge only diverge, but in some cases are in and of itself even in the limited opposed; (4) the mutual suspicion sense of putting them all under a among Track One and Track Two single mechanism with which Track actors in key countries in the region; Two can engage. and (5) the financial costs and independence involved in engaging Diversity of Perspectives Track One. Each of these is considered Related to the region’s broad geographic further below. spread is the various countries’ can lead to diversity of perspectives. Fraught with The Region’s Broad Geographical Expanse differences regarding history, culture, On the economic dimension, the Asia littoral-land-locked; isolated- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) integrated, climactic systems, etc.), geographic footprint includes member security and strategic concerns, management economies from Northeast Asia political regimes, and attitudes towards (China, Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei, Track Two, the region’s foreign policy of policy Russia, Japan, South Korea), South- and defense officialdoms often adopt east Asia (Brunei, Indonesia, different perspectives on key political, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, strategic, economic, and other issues. Thailand, Vietnam), Australasia Engaging them collectively can be (Australia and New Zealand), and the frustrating, with little or no success Americas (Canada, Chile, Mexico, in the offing of achieving acceptable Peru and the United States). The consensus on coordinated, cooperative APEC forum in the future might policy responses, given the rigidity of embrace the other three ASEAN certain national, strategic positions. creative and effective issues…” This article addresses the basic geographic features (mainland- island; member states (Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar) who are currently not Diverse and/or Opposing Interests members, as well as Timor-Leste Diversity of regional perspectives also (a likely future ASEAN member state), tends to create diversity or opposing and others from North and South Asia interests among the regional powers. (North Korea, Mongolia, and Sri The issue of generating a code of Lanka, which was almost an original conduct to promote maritime security, THE CHALLENGES OF ASEAN member state, and India for example, is bound to create ENGAGING OFFICIALS IN THE whose interests include freedom of divergence rather than consensus ASIA PACIFIC REGION navigation of the great bodies of water among Track One (and also Track There are a number of possible such as the Pacific Ocean). On the Two) actors. In this case, Track Two explanations for why Track Two Track Two security dimension, CSCAP’s attempts to wade through these diverse engagement of Track One is so membership is equally broad, and opposing interests are bound to challenging. These include related if constituting 21 member committees. face serious hurdles that would inhibit somewhat different arguments such CSCAP is more regionally inclusive of policy inputs from the unofficial question of why it is challenging to engage officialdom especially in the Asia Pacific region, before sharing highlights of CSCAP’s engagement with Track One during the past year. PAGE 47 CRSO 2012 “Whom do you represent?”— the BOX 1: CSCAP STUDY GROUPS concern being that individuals in Track Two may be either simply CSCAP’s study groups are its primary mechanism for generating policy-oriented insights and recommendations. These study groups are meant as region-wide multilateral Track Two bodies for consensus building and problem solving, and to address specific issues and problems that are too sensitive to be taken up in official regional dialogue. CSCAP currently has four active study groups and one experts group. government representatives who parrot official lines or representatives of special interests, out of tune with current attitudes of their country’s population. On the other hand, there CURRENT STUDY GROUPS are divisions on Track Two over the Cybersecurity as a Central Strategy for Securing the Cyber Environment in the Asia Pacific Region Co-Chairs: CSCAP Australia, CSCAP India, CSCAP Malaysia and CSCAP Singapore wisdom and efficacy of engaging Track Water Resources Security in Mainland Southeast Asia Co-Chairs: CSCAP Cambodia, CSCAP Japan, CSCAP Thailand and CSCAP Vietnam Two efforts do make any real difference Multilateral Security Governance in Northeast Asia/North Pacific Co-Chairs: CSCAP Japan, CSCAP Korea and CSCAP China Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific Co-Chairs: US CSCAP and CSCAP Vietnam Export Controls Experts Group (XCXG) a sub group of the Study Group on WMD Chair: US CSCAP One, including on the issue of whether and to what extent Track in the making of official policy. Expense Considerations and Independence of Track One The rationale for Track Two is its independence to advance ideas and policy options apart from, and indeed beyond the comfort level of, official RECENTLY CONCLUDED STUDY GROUPS Track One positions. There are two Naval Enhancement Co-Chairs: CSCAP China, CSCAP India and CSCAP Japan aspects to this issue, a key one being Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) Co-Chairs: CSCAP Australia, CSCAP Canada, CSCAP Indonesia and CSCAP Philippines Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations Co-Chairs: CSCAP Australia, CSCAP Malaysia and CSCAP Singapore financial. Track Two engagement with Track One is financially costly. Since CSCAP member committees have variable funding sources and fundraising capacities, in practice, member For more information, see http://www.cscap.org/index.php?page=study-groups. committees that are able to fund their activities participate most actively in the study groups. Consequently, CSCAP member committees that are track. In these circumstances, Mutual Suspicion between Track One and Track Two Actors well-funded by their governments are unofficial inputs from Track Two come to reflect statements of the lowest The burden of responsibility in the others and have the ability to sponsor common denominator. Consensus- task of engagement between Tracks and shape study group activities and based decision making in Track One One and Two actors is shared by both topics. Naturally, they tend to reflect institutions like ASEAN and the ARF, sides. Despite over a decade of their respective government’s interest as well as in Track Two in CSCAP, interaction, mutual suspicions on a given issue. This raises the yields outcomes that reflect the between these actors have continued. question of what the value-added by comfort level of the least ready among Questions of representation arise for Track Two deliberations is if there is the members. Thus, critical issues are both Track One and Track Two. On no real difference between Tracks not dealt with in security dialogue the one hand, an issue raised by One and Two policy positions and fora; indeed, in Track One institutions, certain Track One players is the lack perspectives. these issues are kept off of agendas of political legitimacy of Track Two Thus, there is more behind the altogether. actors—often couched in questions funding issue than meets the eye. such as, “Who elected you?” or Until the financial sustainability of CRSO 2012 PAGE 48 capable of being more active than Track Two is assured across the based on mutual confidence and Desmond Ball and Kwa Chong Guan spectrum of member committees, the cooperation between the ARF and were also circulated at the meeting. variability of Track Two engagement CSCAP over the last several years, CSCAP Co-Chair Kim Dalchoong with Track One will remain. and especially during 2010-2011. was invited to the ARF ISG on CBMs Following the Hanoi Plan of Action to and PD held in Sydney in April 2011. But Track Two reluctance to challenge “ The burden of responsibility in the task of engagement between Tracks One and Two actors is shared by both sides.” Track One can be complicated. In implement the ARF Vision Statement In his presentation of the CSCAP Co- many instances, it must be 2020 whereby the ARF is encouraged Chairs’ Report, Kim stressed CSCAP’s acknowledged that Track Two actors to work with Track Two organizations, genuine desire to work closely with (often those with prior, senior the CSCAP Co-Chairs have been the ARF and to hold CSCAP study diplomatic careers in their home invited to the meetings of the ARF group meetings back-to-back with the countries) tend to be more cautious Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence meetings of the ARF Inter-Sessional than some Track One actors when it Building Measures (CBMs) and Support Group (ISG) or Inter- comes to embarking on unknown or Preventive Diplomacy (PD), which are Sessional Meetings (ISM) for more politically-sensitive terrain. This is held twice a year. The ISG meeting is effective dissemination of CSCAP the case of “being more popish than the highest official level where the research to the ARF. the Pope,” which effectively inhibits agenda of the ARF is debated and Track Two’s important role of pushing adopted. It is, therefore, the most that originated much earlier in the limits of the politically-feasible, or appropriate venue to submit reports CSCAP’s lifespan are now being testing the political waters in the by the CSCAP Co-Chairs and CSCAP organized more frequently. The search for innovative and effective memoranda for maximum impact on CSCAP Study Group on Naval policy options that Track One might the ARF. Enhancement in the Asia Pacific met consider adopting. A further, related Kwa Chong Guan of Singapore’s In fact, such back-to-back meetings in Auckland in March 2010 back-to- issue is one of relevant expertise CSCAP Member Committee back with a meeting of the ARF ISM on highly technical issues represented the CSCAP Co-Chairs at on Maritime Security. The meeting of (e.g. epidemiology of the spread of the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD held in the CSCAP Study Group (SG) on disease) or highly security-sensitive Bali in December 2010. Kwa reported Countering the Proliferation of WMDs topics (e.g. terrorism). On such on the work of four CSCAP study in the Asia Pacific also met in Las questions, Track One officialdom has groups, which were set to submit Vegas in February 2011 back-to-back the capacity, either within its own CSCAP memoranda on (1) Countering with the ARF ISM on Nonproliferation ranks or through the commissioning the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass and Disarmament. of international experts, to move Destruction (WMD), (2) Significance more quickly than an institutionalized of the Existence of Regional meeting held in Sydney, it was Track Two entity like CSCAP. Transnational Crime Hubs in the Asia observed that the ARF is moving At the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD Pacific Region, (3) Naval Enhancement rapidly on a wide range of functional CSCAP ENGAGEMENT WITH in the Asia Pacific, and (4) Safety and cooperation in Non-Traditional Security THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM Security of Offshore Oil and Gas (NTS) issues, from Humanitarian IN 2010-2011 Installations. Copies of the CSCAP Assistance and Disaster Relief Against these ongoing challenges to Regional Security Outlook (CRSO) (HA/DR) to Cyber Security, as well as regional Track Two engagement of 2010-2011 and Assessing Track 2 the implementation of UNCSR 1540, Track One, however, there have been Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: which imposes an affirmative obligation clear signals of growing partnership A CSCAP Reader co-edited by on all member states to take active PAGE 49 CRSO 2012 measures to prevent the proliferation been made to enable the attendance Two level. Tran highlighted the of WMDs. CSCAP Co-Chair Dalchoong by the Co-Chairs of the ARF ISG at positive results of the work of the ARF Kim introduced seven CSCAP SGs in CSCAP Steering Committee Meetings ISG/ISM that took into account the areas that CSCAP believes are directly (SCMs) to promote dialogue with innovative ideas of CSCAP. He urged relevant to Asia Pacific security and members of CSCAP. The attendance CSCAP to be more deeply involved in the concerns of the ARF. Copies of the of the ARF representatives at the ARF ISG/ISM deliberations. He also latest CSCAP Memorandum, “Safety CSCAP SCMs shows the commitment recommended that CSCAP interact and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas of the ARF towards the widening and more often with the ARF Chair and Installations” (Memorandum No. 16, deepening of Track One and Track the ARF Unit at the ASEAN dated January 2011) and the CSCAP Two interaction and cooperation. Secretariat to be updated on ARF’s Regional Security Outlook (CRSO) The Chair of the ARF Senior Officials activities and priorities and to provide 2011 were distributed to all ARF Meeting (SOM) for the period of participants. For the fourth successive January-December 2010, presented year, CSCAP has produced a CRSO by Tran Ngoc An, Deputy Director Lumpur in June 2011, Ambassador report which addresses major security General of the ASEAN Department at Hazairin Pohan pointed out that the challenges in the region, indicating the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ARF could be further enriched by the these ARF officials timely inputs. At the 35th CSCAP SCM in Kuala the kinds of emerging security issues Vietnam, made a briefing at the 34th knowledge and studies of CSCAP on CSCAP thinks are ripe for ARF- CSCAP SCM in Manila in November conflict management and resolution CSCAP cooperation. 2010. He focused on how the ARF is as well as the peaceful settlement of reaching out to CSCAP at the Track disputes so that the ARF could then Reciprocal arrangements had also FIGURE 1: ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE PIF See Note 1 Mongolia EU SAARC Afghanistan Bhutan Maldives Nepal SCO ARF See Note 2 PNG Timor-Leste Australia New Zealand ADMM + 8 East Asia Summit Bangladesh Pakistan Sri Lanka APEC CSCAP India China ASEAN + 3 Russia Japan ROK ASEAN Myanmar Laos Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam US Chile Hong Kong SAR Canada Chinese Taipei Mexico Peru DPRK 6PT Note 1: The other countries in the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) include Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Note 2: The Central Asian members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Source: Adapted from earlier editions of the CRSO. CRSO 2012 PAGE 50 incorporate such studies in finalizing above. When daunted by these the ARF Work Plan on Preventive challenges, CSCAP needs to recall its disseminate its research outcomes, Diplomacy. original commitment to supporting the CRSO, and CSCAP memoranda to ARF’s mission for comprehensive the ARF as well as to other Track One briefing the ARF and its ISG/ISM on security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific institutions such as ASEAN and the UN. its activities as well as to submit to region to inspire it to move forward. CSCAP is prepared to continue the ARF its policy memoranda coming CSCAP should also continue to The regular attendance of CSCAP “ CSCAP should seek a more specific direction from the ARF in regard to the direction of the latter’s future work.” out of the work of the CSCAP study Co-Chairs at ARF ISG meetings has ABOUT THE AUTHORS groups. The latest draft CSCAP been practically institutionalized. And Carolina G. Hernandez is the Memorandum from the SG on the also, the reports of the CSCAP Co- Founding President of the Institute for Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) has Chairs have been well received by the Strategic Development studies (ISID) now been approved by all the CSCAP ARF participants. CSCAP needs to in the Philippines and was CSCAP member committees, and will be soon continue making substantive co-chair from 2009 to 2011. submitted to the ARF. The UN presentations at ARF ISGs with ARF- Secretary-General has already made relevant recommendations. some favorable and encouraging CSCAP looks forward to more Dalchoong Kim is Professor of Political Science at Yonsei University and President of the Seoul Forum for remarks recently on the work of the detailed feedback and evaluation from International Affairs (SFIA). He is the CSCAP Study Group on RtoP in one the ARF on its various policy outputs current CSCAP co-chair. of his reports to both the UN General especially in the form of the various Assembly and UN Security Council CSCAP memoranda it has sent to the (A/65/877 and S/2011/393, p.3). (For ARF, as well as the issues analyzed in more on this, see Chapter 4.) the annual CRSOs. In order to make From these recent experiences of optimal use of its limited financial and CSCAP with the ARF, as well as the human resources and to provide recognition extended to the work of guidance to the policy research the SG on RtoP by the UN Secretary- priorities of its SGs, CSCAP should General, it is worthwhile to consider seek a more specific direction from extending the distribution reach of the ARF in regard to the direction of CSCAP’s policy research to also include the latter’s future work. It is also other Track One institutions such as desirable that the ARF request or the Association of Southeast Asian direction would come with some form Nations (ASEAN) without losing sight of funding support to encourage and of the policy concerns of its principal enhance the work of the various Track One partner which is the ARF. CSCAP SGs. In addition, CSCAP hopes to expand LOOKING FORWARD the study group Co-Chairs’ briefings CSCAP finds an increasingly close at the ARF ISM on Humanitarian working relationship with the ARF Assistance/Disaster Relief, Counter based on accumulated confidence and Terrorism, Transnational Crime, trust, in spite of the challenges in its Non-proliferation and Disarmament, engagement with the ARF discussed and Maritime Security. PAGE 51 CRSO 2012 Abbreviations ADMM+ APEC ARF ASEAN ASEAN ISIS Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies BGF Border Guard Force CBM Confidence Building Measure DOC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea DKBA Democratic Karen Bhuddist Army DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea EEP EU HA/DR HGA ICG IFPRI Eminent and Expert Person European Union Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Hyogo Framework Agreement International Crisis Group International Food and Policy Research Institute ISA Internal Security Acts ISG (ARF) Inter-Sessional Support Group ISM (ARF) Inter-Sessional Meetings JAT Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid JI KA KIA Jemaah Islamiyah Karenni Army Kachin Independence Army KNLA Karen National Liberation Army MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front MMI Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia MNLA Mon National Liberation Army MNLF Moro National Liberation Front NTS PD Non-Traditional Security Preventive Diplomacy RtoP Responsibility to Protect SCM (CSCAP) Steering Committee Meeting SOM (ARF) Senior Officials Meeting SSA Shan State Army TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership UNCSR UNESCO UWSA WMD CRSO 2012 PAGE 52 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus United Nations Security Council Resolution United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Wa State Army Weapons of Mass Destruction Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific