The Chechen Rebels: from separatism to terrorism

Miss Natalia Tereshchenko Researcher Institute of Oriental Studies Russian Academy of Sciences [email protected] The Chechen rebels: from separatism to terrorism Chechnya has recently fallen into the list of “forgotten conflicts” with more hot spots prioritized by the international community. The historical battles with Russia have seemingly been forgotten, as attention shifted to Ukraine and a more painful economic, rather than security, relation with Russia. Nevertheless, Chechnya and its hub of well-trained and experienced ‘boeviki’ should be taken into high consideration, when looking at the conflicts in Ukraine and in Syria, the emergence of ISIS and the ever-increasing threat of global extremism. The Russian conflict with Chechnya has been continuing from around 1785, or even earlier, when the Russian Empire has been trying to instill peace in the region, and Peter the Great followed his ambitions of annexation and expansion of the Empire. Much later on, Chechnya became part of the Soviet Union, and many Chechens were deported into Central Asia in order to lower the potential of counter-colonial insurgencies. However, the ethnic separatist conflict that we are witnessing today has its direct roots later, in the late 1980s-early 1990s. With the fall of the Soviet Union, separatist and openly hostile and genocidal movements have been born in Chechnya, as a result of many previous years of suppression. Two fullscale wars ensued, with many deaths on both sides, before an agreement could be reached. The current ongoing low-level insurgency between Russia and Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan has quite frequently been sparked by terrorist attacks, directed by Chechen rebels, within Russia and abroad. To name but a few: the theatre hostage crisis, the school in Beslan, Domodedovo airport bombing, and further afield- the Boston Marathon bombings. How have the Chechen rebels transgressed the boundary from the right to self-determination, from separatism, even from war against Russia, to a more outspoken and evident terrorist action? It is difficult to trace the rise of extremism, but, back in 2002, Russia had already noticed more violence, more radical ideology in the Chechen rebel movement. One of the theories explains this tendency as a reaction to the high media attention the group has received and the politics of Putin, who heavily emphasized the danger Chechnya poses for Russia. Slowly, but steadily, this one-way policy gave rise to a counter-productive reactionthat of the propagation of extremist support through social media, with extremism-dedicated websites across Russia and the CIS. The series of events in Ukraine and the prolonged stay in power of Putin have heavily impacted economic, political and social determinants of regional coexistence. Ramzan Kadyrov, the Chechen leader and a fervent ally of Putin, has been quite openly supportive of Russia, yet as outspoken about his own power aspirations. With internal tensions rising within 1 both, Russia and Chechnya, both Putin and Kadyrov find themselves in a sensitive situation with regards to their future power and the bi- and multi-lateral dynamics of regional relations. So what is the current situation among the Chechens and their power dynamics within the region? Recruiting from among the war veterans, as well as from among the rebels, Kadyrov has managed to establish a well-prepared governmental armed force. Determined to combat terrorism, Kadyrov, nevertheless, claims to have little power over the Chechens outside Chechnya. To date, Chechens are fighting in Ukraine, ironically both, on the Ukrainian side, and on the Russian side. What we are witnessing is a conflict within conflict, an extraterritorial civil war, but not only, and perhaps not so much between the hardline Caucasus Emirate and the traditional moderate Muslims, supporting Kadyrov’s government; but also between those that support Kadyrov and those that are combatting his friendship with Russia. Ramzan Kadyrov, has always denied the involvement of Chechen groups in Ukraine, stating that the Chechen diasporas abroad are big enough, and to control the activities of any given national outside the borders of Chechnya is an impossible task. However, what is impossible is to deny the presence of Chechens on the two sides of the conflict. The battalion “Vostok”, formed during the second Russian-Chechen war at the initiative of the Russians, has been transformed and has been fighting on the side of the Russians. Earlier in February there has been some information that Kadyrov is calling back his forces due to the destabilized situation in Chechnya after the December terrorist attacks in Grozny. However, intense military activity is continuing within Ukraine, and the Chechens are becoming more openly involved in it. At the same time, news has emerged about the existence of a new battalion “Dzhokhar Dudaev”, under the leadership of Isa Munaev, made up of “volunteers” who deny recruitment by the Ukrainian government. Munaev, before Adam Osmaev took his place after the death of the former, had motivated his actions as a fight against Russian imperialism, with Ukraine taking integral part in this combat and supporting the decolonization of Caucasus. The battalion comprises mixed numbers of those with prior experience within the RussianChechen wars, and those with no prior experience, yet a more hardline approach. Dubbed by the Russians as ‘boeviki’, the battalion may be seen as having a directly terrorist approach to Russia. Which does not, however, mean, it is exclusively extremist towards Russia. Going further afield from Ukraine, it is essential to briefly consider the case of Chechen rebels in Syria. Of some ISIS’ 15000 foreign fighters, about 1000 originate from Russia, more specifically from the Caucasus. An eminent figure is Omar al-Shishani, one of the toughest military leaders of ISIS, who has Chechen roots. Ironically, al-Shishani is not a follower of any traditional religious rituals, making him an ‘unpopular Muslim’ among the fighters. This minor fact is quite revealing in discovering the motivation of the Chechens in their fight for separatism or extremism. Apart from presence in ISIS, Chechens form parts of other rebel groups, such as Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar, which calls itself the official group of the Caucasus Emirate in Syria; and whose emir, Salakhuddin Shishani, is of Chechen origin. 2 The Syrian “jihad” began as a sort of proxy conflict for fighters who could not go home to fight in Chechnya or Dagestan. In time, that ideological trend has developed, with the rise of ISIS. The majority of Chechens in ISIS argue that the concept of global jihad is important, and that the fighting in Chechnya is “nationalism” and therefore wrong. Yet, at the same time, individuals like al-Shishani support both causes and do not allow for a religious interpretation of their actions. On the other side, even though national ethno-separatist movements like the Caucasus Emirate have had, up to now, a very clear line of ideology, and have even proclaimed that allegiance to ISIS is an act of “treachery”, splint movements or, rather, ideologies have also been forming in the Caucasus. At the same time, the belonging to the Chechen nation and the root cause of the current engagement takes its toll. The recent attacks in Grozny, apparently staged by the Vilayat Nokchicho, the Chechen wing of the Caucasus Emirate, have been praised by Chechen militants in Syria, demonstrating a continuous interest in domestic “politics” and fight for separatism, as well as a certain engagement between the different parties across the borders. Whereas the ideology or political stance of ISIS may not always be aligned to that of smaller regional organizations, it forms a solid backbone for limited-resource groups, and may serve as a stepping stone towards the propagation and expansion of individual or coalition terror organizations upon the return of the jihadists home, or upon their expansion regionally. Apart from that, being part of a group that is widely covered by the media is undoubtedly prestigious. By far not all Chechen fighters in Syria form a military “elite”, as the West likes to portray. Yet, the media overblowing attention plays well for the fighters to boost their image and perhaps even their cause back in Chechya. Finally, what is the implication, if any, on the activity of the Chechen groups in the region? The presence of Chechen rebels in Ukraine, their links with Chechnya and, potentially, with networks in Syria and Turkey, is a direct, destabilizing factor, due to the proximity of such forces to Europe. As soon as the fighting in Syria and Ukraine is over, a new, and a much stronger old generation of Chechen fighters will occupy the Russian borders, where pro-ISIS and extremist social networks and propaganda have been steadily increasing. Beyond this, with human, financial and weapon resources, the “war front” and the influence of rebels has expanded to the very borders of Europe. The potential of Syrian, Turkish and other jihadists from the Middle East to migrate to Ukraine, obtain false identity documents for a sum of around $15,000 and immigrate to Europe is increasing. This poses a threat not only to Russia and its direct neighbours, but also to wider Europe. Even though Chechnya and Chechens are on the low radar today within the international community, there are several points of concern that raise alert. Intense conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, the emergence of ISIS and the proximity of hotspots within the Middle East may account for a re-birth of the Chechen question, or its transition to a more dangerous phase of terrorism. In the current situation, it remains to see whether nationalism will prevail over jihadism, and localization of conflict will prevail over globalization of the conflict, now the former being the lesser of two evils. 3