Lecture: Liberal Theories of International Relations, 2014-15

Andreas Warntjen Department of Public Administration Lecture 3 Liberal Theories of International Relations: A World of Cooperation International Relations Theory 2014/2015 1 Structure of the Lecture • Introduction: (Neo-)Liberalism and (Neo-) Realism – Example: Civil War in Syria – Example: Nuclear Proliferation • Comparing (Neo-)Liberalism and (Neo-) Realism • The Role of International Organizations • Example: Nuclear Non-Proliferation 2 Source: Pinker (2011) 3 Liberal explanations of peace and cooperation Liberal variant Level Main cause(s) of peace/cooperation Classical liberalism (e.g., Kant) Individual Domestic Civic virtue Democracy Commercial liberalism Individual Domestic Pursuit of wealth Trade Neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane 1984) Systemic International regimes 4 Explaining peace after 1945 Great power war 1816-1945 1946-1990 Yes No Nuclear deterrence (realism) No Yes International Organizations (liberalism) Limited Extensive 5 Example: Syria conflict 6 Example: Civil war in Syria • Anti-government protests in Syria are violently suppressed by government forces (2011) • UN-sponsored peace talks and US-Russian initiative (Geneva talks) fail (2013/3014) • Use of chemical weapons reported (August 2013) • US threatens military action (August 2013) • Russia proposes international action to destroy “yria s chemical weapons, to which Syria agrees (September 2013) • UN inspectors inspect Syrian sites and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons starts destruction of chemical weapons (2013-2014) 7 Example: Chemical weapons in Syria Neorealism • UN cannot enforce peace (relies on state capabilities, Russian veto power) • International interventions require US and Russian approval • Syria only agreed to inspections after US threatened military action Neoliberalism • Established norm of not using chemical weapons • UN (=neutral) inspection provide impartial information • Syria would not have agreed to US troops • IO organizes the removal and destruction 8 Example: Nuclear Proliferation I (Neo-)Realism (Neo-)Liberalism States want security (and thus nuclear weapons) Nuclear powers want to preserve their monopoly Non-proliferation as a collective good International regimes (IAEA, UN) foster cooperation and non-proliferation (e.g., monitoring) ► Arms race for hegemony or balance of power ► Coordinated efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 9 Example: Nuclear Proliferation II (Neo-)Realism (Neo-)Liberalism States voluntary join an international regime, or stay out (India, Israel, Pakistan) or withdraw (North Korea) Independent monitoring by an international organizations (IAEA) allows disarmament ►States are not constrained y IO s or i ter atio al law ►IO s allo states to credibly commit to common goals 10 Any questions? 11 Structure of the Lecture • Introduction: (Neo-)Liberalism and (Neo-) Realism • Comparing (Neo-)Liberalism and (Neo-) Realism • The Role of International Organizations • Example: Nuclear Proliferation 12 Comparing Structural Realism and Institutional Liberalism Structural realism Liberal Institutionalism Main goal of states Survival Wealth Focus of states Relative gains Absolute gains Main feature of international relations Anarchy Self-help Anarchy Interdependence Cooperation among states Difficult Limited Possible (mutual interests) Role of international organizations Limited and dependent on state power No independent effect Crucial in facilitating cooperation Independent effect 13 The Neo-Neo Debate I I general, realists have argued that cooperation is possible under anarchy, but that it is harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and more dependent on state power than is appreciated by the institutionalist tradition. (Grieco 1993: 303, my emphasis) Much of the contemporary debate centers on the validity of the [liberal] institutionalist claim that international regimes, and institutions more broadly, have become significant in world politics. (Keohane 1993: 272, my emphasis) 14 The Neo-Neo Debate II Absolute vs. Relative Gains The contention that international anarchy dictates concern for relative rather than absolute gains is not sustainable. Relative gains may be important motivating factors for states…, but only when gains in one period alter power relations in another, and when there is some likelihood that subsequent advantages in power may be used against oneself. (Keohane 1993: 275, my emphasis) 15 The Neo-Neo Debate III The Role of International Organizations [International institutions seem to have] … little independent effect on great-power behavior…. Institutions are essentially arenas for acting out [state] power relationships . (Mearsheimer 2001: 364, my emphasis) … those [international] institutions that succeed in facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation will become valued for the opportunities they provide to states, … their rules will constrain the exercise of power by governments. (Keohane 1993: 274, my emphasis) 16 Structure of the Lecture • Introduction: (Neo-)Liberalism and (Neo-) Realism • Comparing (Neo-)Liberalism and (Neo-) Realism • The Role of International Organizations • Example: Nuclear Non-Proliferation 17 The growth of international organizations in the 20th century Political • International Labour Organization (1919) • United Nations (1945) • World Health Organization (1946) Security • NATO (1949) • IAEA (1957) • OSCE (1975) • Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1997) Economic • Bank for International Settlements (1930) • International Monetary Fund (1945) • World Bank (1948) • GATT (1948)/ WTO (1995) Regional integration • EC (1951, 1957)/EU (1992) • ASEAN (1967) • Mercosur (1991) • OAU (1963)/AU (2001) 18 Growth of international organizations Source: Russett/Starr/Kinsella (2006) 19 Explaining the growth of international organizations Neoliberal institutionalism: • Increase of interdependence in 20th century – Globalization – Transnational issues (environment, health, migration) • Common interests of states • International organizations facilitate cooperation • (hegemonic stability) 20 Liberal institutionalism (neoliberalism) Basic Premises • States=primary actors in world politics • States=rational and unitary actors • Anarchy of international system (identical to neo-realist assumptions) • Interdependence and common interests ►States want to reap the gains from cooperation ► Cooperation is possible due to international organizations 21 Regimes and cooperation … regimes contribute to cooperation not by implementing rules that states must follow, but by changing the context within which states make decisions based on self-interests. Keohane (1984 : 13) 22 States in an anarchic world • States act according to their preferences • Divergent preferences can exist even when cooperation would be mutually benefical • Anarchy induces distrust – no central authority exists to prevent cheating ►States forego cooperation even when it would be in their interests ► International relations resemble a Priso er s Dilemma 23 Obstacles to cooperation Cause Obstacle Preference heterogeneity Distributional conflict Transaction costs of negotiations Risk of non-compliance/defection Risk of free-riding Anarchy Anarchy 24 Regimes and cooperation International regimes facilitate cooperation between states by: • Monitoring states behaviour and providing information • Linking different policy areas • Lowering the transanction costs of negotiations • Acting as transmission belts of reputations 25 Reputation: The shadow of the future As lo g as a o ti ui g series of issues is expected to arise in the future, and as long as a tors o itor ea h other s eha ior a d discount the value of agreements on the basis of past compliance, having a good reputation is valuable… Keohane (1984: 105) 26 Functions of IO s • Providing forums for state interaction (e.g., providing information, OECD) • Pooling resources (e.g., World bank) • Elaborate norms and resolve disputes (e.g., WTO) • Representation (e.g., European Commission in trade matters) • Legitimizing sanctions/indirect enforcement 27 Overcoming obstacles to cooperation Cause Obstacle IO as Remedy Preference heterogeneity Distributional conflict Transaction costs of negotiations Issue-linkage Lowering transaction costs Anarchy Risk of non-compliance/ defection Monitoring Anarchy Risk of free-riding Monitoring Issue-linkage 28 Characteristics of IO s • Centralization (facilitates joint production) • Independence (facilitates conflict resolution and compliance) ► States delegate authority insofar as it is in their self-interest ► Potential tension between short-term (e.g., trade surplus this year) and long-term goals (e.g., increased trade) 29 Any questions? 30 Structure of the Lecture • Introduction: (Neo-)Liberalism and (Neo-) Realism – Example: Civil War in Syria – Example: Nuclear Proliferation • Comparing (Neo-)Liberalism and (Neo-) Realism • The Role of International Organizations • Example: Nuclear Non-Proliferation 31 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1970) • All parties commit to nuclear disarmament (Article VI) • All states have an inalienable right” to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Article IV) • Nuclear states do not transfer nuclear weapons or assist non-nuclear states acquiring them (Article I) • Non-nuclear states accept verification measures, carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency, to prevent the conversion of civilian nuclear technology to military uses (Article III) 32 Challenges • Limited overall transparency (how many weapons are there?) • Nuclear powers (US, Russia) do not completely disarm (but: new initiative of Obama administration) • Nuclear capable states (e.g., Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Brazil) • States can leave the regime (North Korea) • Nuclear powers that did not sign the treaty (India, Israel, Pakistan) • Verification regime might not succeed in fully clarifying the situation to e ery ody s satisfaction (Iran) 33 The case of Iran The Agency remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations… Iran is required to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military di e sio s to Ira s nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency. (IAEA ‘eport, GOV/ / 8, May 2014) 34 Compliance The IAEA has o enforcement capabilities and must rely on states and the UN for the political will to confront noncompliant states. (Pease 2014: 145) 35 Any questions? 36 References Abbott, K. & Snidal, D. (1998), Why States act through formal International Organizations, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 3-32 BBC News, Syria Chemical Attack, 24 September 2013 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23927399 BBC News, Syria: the story of the conflict, 14 March, 2014 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 BBC News, Syria crisis: US to drop ilitary threat , “epte er http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24089510 Hale, T., & Held, D. & Young, K. (2013) Gridlock. Cambridge: Polity Press Grieco, J. (1993) Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory. In: D. Baldwin (ed.): Neorealism and neoliberalism, New York: Columbia University Press Keohane, R. (1984) After hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University Press 37 References ctd. Keohane, R. (1993) Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War. In: D. Baldwin (ed.): Neorealism and neoliberalism, New York: Columbia University Press Kinsella, D., & Russett, B. & Starr, H. (2006) World Politics, Singapore: Cengage Learning Mearsheimer, John (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton Nau, H. (2014) Perspectives on International Relations. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press Navari, C. (2013) Liberalisms. In P. D. Williams (Ed.), Security Studies. New York: Routledge. Pease, K. (2014) International Organizations. Essex: Pearson Pinker, S. (2011) Violence vanquished. The Wall Street Journal, 24 September 2011 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180 #, retrieved 8.7.2014 Swing Sidhu, W. (2013) The Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regime. In P. D. Williams (Ed.), Security Studies. New York: Routledge. Sterling-Folker, J. (2013) Neoliberalism, in Dunne, Kurke, Smith: International Relations Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press 38