NegativePlatonismandthe
Appearance-Problem
TamásUllmann
Theexpression“negativePlatonism”isnotonlythetitleofawell-knownessayby
Patočka,itpointsaswelltoawholephilosophicalprogram.Patočka’sthoughtwas
guidedanddirectedbythisprogramfrom1953–theyeartheessaybegancirculating
inmanuscriptform–throughhislatewritingsofthe1970s.Itmaysoundstrange
tosaythatPatočka’srichandcomplexphilosophicalœuvre,extendingfromhistoricalresearchandaestheticstoconcretepoliticalquestions,andcoveringalmostall
relevantphilosophicaldomains,hasbutonecentralproblem.Iwouldnonetheless
liketoarguethat,insofarasweconsiderPatočkaasaphenomenologist,hisphenomenologicallyorientedworkisaconstantrethinkingofoneandthesamepredominantproblem:thatofnegativePlatonism.Ishallbeginmyessaywithabrief
outlineofitsmainphenomenologicalideas,thengoontotrytoshowtherelation
betweennegativePlatonismandtheappearance-problemonthebasisofthetexts
publishedinthevolumeVomErscheinenalssolchem.1Concerningtheproblemof
appearing,wemustconsiderfirstPatočka’scritiqueofHusserl,Heideggerandothers,thentheradicalizedphenomenologicalapproachthathehimselftermsasubjectivephenomenology.Atthispoint,adeep,indeedaporeticalquestionarisesinthe
conceptualframeworkofPatočka’sphilosophy:howcanwespeakinonebreathof
asubjectivephenomenologyandpersonalresponsibility?Itwouldseemdifficultto
reconcile the goal of asubjective phenomenology and the supposition of free
responsibility in one coherent theory. Viewing this as the central problem of
Patočka’slaterphilosophy,Ishallconcludebyattemptingtoreconstructapossible
answertothisaporeticquestion.
JanPatočka,VomErscheinenalssolchem.TexteausdemNachlaß,ed.H.Blaschek-Hahnand
K.Novotný(FreiburgandMünchen:Alber,2000).
1
T.Ullmann()
FacultyofHumanities,EötvösLorandUniversity-ELTE,Múzeumkrt.4/i,
Budapest1088,Hungary
e-mail:
[email protected]
71
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T.Ullmann
1 NegativePlatonism
The questions raised in Patočka’s essay “Negative Platonism” are the following:
whatdoesmetaphysicsmean,howcanweunderstandsomethinglikeaPlatonicIdea,
andwhatisthetaskofphilosophyinourpragmatictechnicalage?Theauthorsees
acrucialchangeattheGreekbeginningsofphilosophy:thetransformationofthe
SocraticattitudeintoPlatonicidealism.AccordingtoPatočka,thisseeminglyminor
shift has had a tremendous impact, not only on philosophy, but on the whole of
Europeanhistory.Ifwelivetodayinaculturalcrisis,itisbecausemetaphysics–the
metaphysics born in Plato’s theory of Ideas – continues to determine our present
worldviews.ThephilosophicalprogramoutlinedinPatočka’s“NegativePlatonism”
takesshapearoundthreecentralconcepts:metaphysics,freedom,andIdea.
1.NegativePlatonismtriestofindtherealsenseofmetaphysicscleansedofall
higherobjectiveentitiesorabsoluterules.Turningawayfromthedreamofaperfect higher ideal reality implies that there are no metaphysical facts. As Patočka
writes:“Metaphysicshasnoindependentsubject-matter.”2Inotherwords,alogicalepistemological analysis easily reveals that the supposedly metaphysical objects
aresheerfictions,duemainlytolanguageschemes.Hemakesalistofmetaphysical
fictions:ideasbothasrealitiesandaslogicalentities,universals,values,categories
suchassubstanceandcausality(whenunderstoodastheultimatebuildingblocks
ofreality),andfinallyBeingitself,ittoowithoutobjectivecontent.Itisinteresting
to note that his argumentation is not only similar to the Nietzschean critique of
metaphysics,butreliesonthesamecentralargument:theseductionoflanguage.
Metaphysicalfictionsemergebecausewesubmittoourlanguageschemes.
Thenegativityofmetaphysicshastwosides:the“logical-epistemological”side
consists in positing a higher, but fictitious reality, whereas the “existential” side
assurescomfortagainstfear,anxiety,suffering,lossofmeaning,doubt,anddespair.
Nonetheless,metaphysicshasapositivesideaswell,andthatprofoundlyintrigues
Patočka.Howcanwefindourwaybacktometaphysicsinapositivesense?Atthis
point,Patočkareliesonphenomenologicalinsights.Firstofall,onthefactthatwe
canwithdrawfromoureverydayoccupation,fromparticularthings.Phenomenology
andphilosophyarenothingelsebutthisactofdistancingfromparticularentitiesand
interests.Metaphysicsinthissenseisnottheunfoldingofanewuniversebeyondthe
sensibleworld,itdoesnotreveal“theexperiencewehave,”butrather“theexperience
weare.”3Metaphysicsinitspositivesenseisthusturnedtowardsourworld,towards
realityhereandnow,andittendstoopenupthehiddenstructureofthisworldandof
“theexperienceweare.”Insteadofanidealuniverseandeternalrules,innerdrama
andtheparticularstructureofthisconcreteworld–thisishowPatočka’sconception
ofmetaphysicscouldbesummarized.
JanPatočka,“NegativePlatonism:ReflectionsconcerningtheRise,theScope,andtheDemiseof
Metaphysics–andWhetherPhilosophyCanSurviveIt,”inPhilosophyandSelectedWritings,ed.
andtransl.E.Kohák(ChicagoandLondon:UniversityofChicagoPress,1989),p.188.
3
Ibid.,p.192.
2
NegativePlatonismandtheAppearance-Problem
73
2. His second intention is to interpret freedom in a new way. The negative
interpretation of freedom has two main branches in tradition: either we suppose
freedomtobenothingmorethanarbitrariness,orwedetermineitasthemerelack
ofnaturaldeterminism.Neitheroneoftheseinterpretationscanelucidatethereal
phenomenonoffreedom.AccordingtoPatočka,weshouldadoptaradicallynew
attitude:freedomshouldnolongerbetreatedfromthestandpointofcausality(the
above-mentioned two versions of freedom are both dependent on the concept of
causality). Both because freedom in a positive sense has nothing to do with the
conceptualframeworkofcausalityandbecausecausalityhasturnedouttobeone
ofthemajormetaphysicalfictions.
Ontheotherhand,Patočkarefusestodividehumanbeingsintoasensibleanda
suprasensiblecomponent,asiftheformer,thebody,weresubordinatedtotherules
ofnaturalcausality,andthelatter,thesoulorthemind,werebeyondanyphysical
determinism. Both conceptions are linked to a false metaphysics. We are free as
sensuous beings, and we are free in the sensible, natural world. But how is this
possible? Patočka attributes three characteristics to freedom: (1) Freedom is an
experience.But,unlikesenseexperience,itisnotrelatedtoanyfact,orobject,or
state of things: it is not the experience of something objective to which one can
returnwheneveronewishestodoso.Theexperienceoffreedom,linkedtoaconcretesituation,happensonceandonlyonce.Itneverrepeatsitselfinthesameform.
Theexperienceoffreedomisanexperienceofriskandstruggle,andoflosingstabilityandcomfortinhabituallife.(2)Freedomisnegativeinthesensethatwearenot
satisfiedwithsenseexperienceandpre-givenready-madethings.Andwhat’smore:
thewholecontentofpassivesenseexperiencecanbecomevoidandinsignificant.
The negativity of the experience of freedom consists in the troubling insight that
irrealityandfantasycan,undercertaincircumstances,bemoreimportantthansocalledreality,thesupposedobjectofourperceptualexperience.Thehumanbeing
seemstobeflexibleandplianttosuchanextentthathishopes,fantasies,desires
overcome the harshness of reality. (3) The experience of freedom is always “full
experience.”AsPatočkawrites:“Theexperienceoffreedomisalwaysanexperienceofthewhole,onepertainingtoaglobal‘meaning.’”4Thatiswhyheconcludes:
“Forallthesereasonswecandesignatetheexperienceoffreedomasoneoftranscendence.”5 However, transcendence is not something “suprasensible” in traditionalterms,itbelongstoallhumanlifeasitsnaturalmovementandtendency.On
theotherhand,freedomastranscendenceisnotlimitedtothe“moralorexistential”
sphereofhumanlife,sinceothersortsofhumanactivityaswell(distancingfrom
things,language,science,thinking,etc.)arerootedintheexperienceoffreedom.
3. Finally – and this seems to be the most programmatic part of Patočka’s
reasoning–heattemptstoreconsidertheconceptofidea.Thisiscertainlytheclimax
ofhisessayonnegativePlatonism.Hetriestofindamiddlewaybetweenthetwo
extremitiesthathavedeterminedphilosophysincePlato:thefirstdeclaresthatallthat
appears is somehow determined by an ultimate ideal structure of essential rules.
Ibid.,p.193.
Ibid.
4
5
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T.Ullmann
ThisattitudecanberepresentedbythePlatonicIdea,theCartesianrationalGod,
Kant’stranscendentalidealandtheeideticstructureofconsciousnessintheearly
Husserl.ThesecondextremitysupposesthatthereisnothingstableinBeing:things
as well as experiences of things are constantly changing (radical empiricism,
Schelling, etc.). According to Patočka, we should give up the ancient dream of
metaphysicsofanultimate,stable,eternalstructureofBeingassuch.Thefirstand
fascinatinglyperfectexpressionofthisdreamtookshapeundoubtedlyinPlatonic
idealism.Unfortunately–asweshallsee–HusserlandevenHeideggercontinued
topaytributetothistendency,mainlybecauseoftheirhiddensubjectivism.Butthe
otherextremitycannotbeacceptedeither:philosophybasedonrawempiricismor
ontheproductiveimaginationgivesupnotonlyrulesandideal-logicalform,but
the very sense of experience. Experience risks losing all concrete determination,
content,andform,ifitisbasedonsheersensualityoronthearbitrarinessofimagination.Patočkaisconvincedthatthereisasenseofexistence,oftime,oflife,but
thissenseisfarfrombeingideallypre-given.Atfirstsight,hissolutionseemsto
beastrangereversalofthePlatonicconceptionofIdea.Asifbythisreversalwe
couldeliminatethefalsemetaphysicalaspectsoftheIdeaandretainonlyits“phenomenological”characteristics.
Patočka’snegativePlatonismconsiderstheIdeainametaphysical,butnotina
supra-sensibleorsupra-naturalway.ItmeansthattheIdea,thoughneitherahigher,
supratemporalentity,norageneralobjectivity,nonethelesstranscendstheparticular. How are we, however, to grasp something that would thus function between
ideal entity and particular thing? Traditional philosophy has no word for such a
thing or structure. It is clear from the text that the Idea in the sense of negative
Platonism is not what we see, but that which makes it possible to see things in
general.Ideaexpressesourabilitytostepbackfromthepresentandthegiven,it
freesusfromthebondageofreality,itmakespossibletoseewhatismoreandwhat
isnewascomparedwiththeperceptuallygiven.ThatiswhytheIdeainnegative
Platonism falls within the province of temporality and history, rather than
eternity.
Thereisaconceptappearinginthelastpartoftheessay,theimportanceofwhich
hasnot–inmyopinion–beendulystressed:theconceptofchōrismos(separation).
InPlato,itrefersprimarilytotheseparationbetweenthesensible,naturalworldand
thesuprasensiblesphereofIdeas,but,inamoregeneralapproach,ithastodoalso
with the separation between sensuous givenness and ideal meaning, and with the
separationbetweencausal-temporaldeterminationandsupratemporalfreedom.Itis
notdifficulttoseethattheconceptofchōrismoslatentlydeterminesthewholemetaphysicaltraditionfromPlatotoHusserl:sensuousexperienceandidealmeaningare
alwaysseparated,thatiswhytheyhavetobesynthetized.
AccordingtoPatočka,itispreciselythePlatonicformofchōrismosthatmust
berelinquishedifwewishtogivesensetometaphysics.Givingupthiscentral
metaphysical conviction of a clear-cut separation of the spheres is the clue to
negative Platonism. For example, one of Patočka’s most significant insights,
guidinghislaterphenomenologicalresearchonthenatureofappearance,isthat
thereisnoseparationbetweenthesensuousandthelogical-idealpartofexperience.
NegativePlatonismandtheAppearance-Problem
75
Toputitmoreconcisely:idealmeaningisnotapartfrom,butratherpartofthe
p henomenologicalfield.
Thesethreetransformations–thatofthemetaphysicalattitude,thatofthefunctionoffreedomandthatoftheconceptofIdea–outlinetheoverallframeworkof
thenewprogramcalled“negativePlatonism.”IbelievethewholeofPatočka’slater
thinkingcanbeconnecteddirectlyorindirectlytothesebasicinsights.Letussee
nowhowhereturnstothesethemesinthelate1960s,when–thankstohisrenewed
teachingactivity–hecanoncemoreconcentrateonthefundamentalproblemsof
phenomenology.
2 F
romtheCritiqueofPhenomenologytoAsubjective
Phenomenology
Duringhisfirstperiodasauniversityteacher,aftertheSecondWorldWar,Patočka
dealtwiththebeginningsofphilosophyinAncientGreece,focusingonSocrates,
PlatoandAristotle.Hissecondperiod–inthelate1960s–canbecharacterizedby
astrongrenewalofhisinterestinbasicphenomenologicalquestions.Introduction
totheStudyofHusserl’sPhenomenology,aswellasBody,Community,Language,
World,andTheProblemoftheNaturalWorldaretheclassicalresultsofthisperiod.
Iprefer,however,toconsiderherehismanuscriptsfromthe1970s,publishedinthe
volume Vom Erscheinen als solchem, which seem to represent an even deeper
immersioninphenomenologicalproblems.
Theprogramcalled“negativePlatonism”offersseveralpossiblepathsforthinking.
Whatishistoricity?Howcanhumanlifebeconceivedaslifeinthenaturalworld?
Howisfreedomtobedefinedinanethicalandinanexistentialcontext?What
isthehistoricaldestinyofmetaphysics?Themeaningoftechnology?Theessence
ofpolitics?Theroleofartinlife?Etc.Beallthatasitmay,itisinterestingtonote
theresolutenessofPatočka’sreturntotheveryfoundationsofphenomenology,as
soon as political change allows him to devote himself to deeper studies and
research.Hisinterestfocusesonapredominantquestion:whatisappearing?Allthe
othersseemtobereducibletothisfundamentalproblem.And,asweshallseelater,
thephenomenologicalphilosophyofappearingoutlinedinhislatermanuscriptsis
one of his major attempts to elaborate the program put forward in the essay on
negativePlatonism.
HiscritiqueofHusserl’sphenomenologyisbasedonacleardistinctionbetween
epochéandreduction.Thepatientelaborationofthisdistinctionbecomesthemethodological background of Patočka’s later phenomenology. Though epoché and
reductiondonotcoincideinHusserl’sapproacheither,theradicalizationoftheir
differencemakesitpossibleforPatočkatoopenupanewpathforphenomenologicalresearch.Greatlysimplifying,wecansaythattheepochéisthefundamentalact
ofphenomenologyandofphilosophyingeneral.Itisafreeact,akindofstepping
backfromconcretethingsandfromtheonticbelief,whichismeanttoopenthe
phenomenologicalfield.Contrarytotheepoché,thereductionisadubiousstep.
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T.Ullmann
ForPatočka,itmeansreductiontosomethingthatisposited,supposedasaconstant
background.ThoughHusserlwasthefirsttouncoverthephenomenologicalfield,
thankstothemethodologicalmeansprovidedbytheepoché,histranscendentalturn
falsifiedthisessentialdiscovery.ThoughHusserlrejectsDescartes’objectifyingof
thesum,healsofixesconsciousness,notontologically,asDescartesandKantdid,
buttranscendentally:positinganessentialstructureastheultimateframeworkofall
consciousactivities.
Theappearanceandimportanceofthereductionafterthetranscendentalturnis
aclearsymptomofHusserl’sCartesianismandofitsmetaphysicalresidues.For
Patočka, this Cartesianism originates in Husserl’s confusion of subjectivity and
phenomenality.Atfirst,phenomenalitywassubjectivesolelyinthenarrowsense
that all phenomena appear to me, in this given perspective, in this given aspect.
It shifted, however, from this neutral position to a central one, and subjectivity
becamethesourceofallthatappears.ThisshiftisinadmissibleinPatočka’seyes.
To speak of constitution instead of phenomenal appearance is, for Patočka, the
samemistakeastospeakofsubjectivityinsteadofthephenomenologicalfield,or
ofreductionratherthanepoché.Anappearingbeingisreducedtoanotherbeing
andwemisstheappearingitself,sincereductiontotranscendentalsubjectivityis
not reduction to the real source of appearance, but to a special component of
appearingitself.Appearingassuchismoreoriginalthansubjectivity,which–even
initsnon-psychological,transcendentalform–ispartofthephenomenalfield.As
Patočkaputsit,inverysimplewords:“Historically,onehasalwaysattemptedto
reduce the appearance-problem to some appearing being.”6 And this is true of
Husserlhimself,whodiscoveredtheepoché,thegatewaytotheage-oldproblem
(“dasuralteProblem”)7:whatisappearing?
PatočkaconsidersHeidegger’sphilosophyasovercomingthedifficultiesofthe
Husserliantranscendentalapproach.HiscritiqueonHeideggerisnonethelesssharp
andappropriate.AlthoughHeideggerunderlinestheexistential-ontologicalcharacter
ofDasein,theproblemofappearingtakesshapeforhimintheframeworkof“opening
possibilities.”ThefundamentaleventorfunctionofDaseinistheopeningofthe
world,which,accordingtoHeidegger,isnothingbuttheprojectionofpossibilities
(“EntwurfderMöglichkeiten”).8Patočka’scounter-argumentagainstthisconceptionisthatnoonecouldopenhisorherpossibilitiesifthesepossibilitieswerenot
alreadyopenedtohim.9
6
JanPatočka,VomErscheinen…,op.cit.,TextV:“PhänomenologiealsLehrevomErscheinen
alssolchem,”p.154:“ManhatinderGeschichtediesesProblemsimmerErscheinungaufirgendein
Erscheinendeszurückzuführenversucht.”
7
Seeibid.,p.149.
8
Seeibid.,TextIII:“Leib,Möglichkeiten,Welt,Erscheinungsfeld,”pp.87,92,94.
9
Ibid.,p.94:“KeinendlichesWesenistimstande,Möglichkeitenzuschaffen–genausowenigwie
Wirklichkeiten.… Der Entwurf eigener Möglichkeiten ist kein ursprüngliches Schaffen von
Möglichkeiten, kein Weltentwurf, sondern es ist bloß ein Entwurf meiner Existenz auf der
HintergrundderWelt.”
NegativePlatonismandtheAppearance-Problem
77
Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology seems to be subjectivistic to the
extentthattheprojectionofpossibilities,onwhichallappearanceisbased,canonly
be understood as my project of possibilities. The project of possibilities, which
makes it possible to open the world and all that appears in the world, originates
frommyownDasein.“Idonotopenmypossibilities,butmysituationinthelight
of the possibilities that open themselves.”10 In spite of his struggle against
Cartesianism and transcendentalism, Heidegger’s approach remained subjectivistic,sincethestructureoftheprojectionofpossibilitiesisfundamentallyatranscendentalstructure.Andthereisanothercrucialproblem:“Heideggerdoesnotdeny
corporeity,hedoesnotdenythatweexistalsoasthingsamongotherthings,buthe
doesnotanalyzeitfurther,doesnotrecognizeitasafundamentalofourlife.”11
The method that Patočka calls “a-subjective phenomenology” is probably his
mostenigmaticyet,atthesametime,mostpromisingattempttorenewphenomenologicalresearch.Thestarting-pointofhisreasoningcouldbesummarizedasfollows: with the transcendental turn, Husserl fell back into a certain Cartesianism.
Albeithisconceptofsubjectivityimpliestemporalityandcorporeity,andisthus
morethanthepoint-like,abstractKantianego,itisstill,forPatočka,ametaphysical
conception.TheHusserliantranscendentalconsciousnesscarriesatranscendental
structureofeternal,ideal,pre-givenformsthatHusserlcallseidē.Intheconnection
ego-cogito-cogitatum,Husserlfocusedontheego,onthesense-bestowingactivity,
neglectingthesum,themodeofexistenceofthisego.
ThisisthepointwherePatočka’sowninvestigationbegins.Whenweexamine
thesum,existence,wefindthatitcannotbetracedbacktoaconstitutiveegowhich
wouldberesponsibleforallmannersofappearance.Onthecontrary,itbecomes
clear that even the ego itself, consciousness, which Husserl supposes to be adequatelygiveninreflection,isaconceptualconstruction,aprojection,anillusion:
theillusionofanultimateorigin.Tobesure,thephenomenalfieldhasacentral
perspective, a certain pole of appearing, which is what we normally call ego or
consciousness.Butconsciousnessappearstoitselfinthesametemporalstreamas
theotherphenomena,soitispartofappearingandbynomeansitssourceorfoundation.Thephenomenalfielddeterminesthispoleofappearing,justasconsciousnessdetermineswhatappearsandhowitappears.
Thesumthusprovestobemorefundamentalthantheego.Initself,thisideais
notparticularlyoriginal.Heidegger,Merleau-Ponty,Ricœurhavealltriedtofollow
thesameargumentation,reversingtheorderofthesubjectanditsmodeofexistence.
Yetthesethinkersallbelievedthatexistence,evenprecedingconsciousness,must
haveaninvariantstructure.Anditispreciselyonthispointthatweseetheoriginality
ofPatočka’sidea:asubjectivephenomenologydoesnotsupposeanyhiddenstructure, any invariant foundation within human existence, on the level of the sum,
beneaththeego.AccordingtoPatočka,thesubjectivebeinghasnodeterminableor
Ibid., p. 93: “Ich erschließe nicht meine Möglichkeiten, sondern meine Lage im Lichte der
Möglichkeiten,diesicherschliessen.”
11
JanPatočka,Body,Community,Language,World,ed.J.Dodd,transl.E.Kohák(Chicagoand
LaSalle:OpenCourt,1998),p.176.
10
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T.Ullmann
conceivablecharacteristicwhatsoever,butthatinnowaymeansthatconsciousness
isnothingorthatitissheerindetermination;itsdeterminationcomesfromitssituation and its acts: its being is a system of possibilities. The basic aspects of this
a-subjectivephenomenalpoleare:temporality,movement,historicity.Andtheway
Patočka more concretely describes his a-subjective phenomenal sphere brings us
backtotheformofhumanbeinginthenaturalworld.
Nevertheless, two questions arise: (1) We have seen that Patočka tries to go
beyondallmetaphysicalconstructionsoastofreeourvision.Theresultis,apparently,thatthereremainsinhisdescriptionnothingtoholdonto.Wenolongerfind
anyconstantstructureintheappearingworld,nor–parallelly–anyinvariantmoment
in human consciousness or being. Everything seems to be moving, changing –
everythingseemstobepartofaHeracliteanstream.Doesthisconceptionnotlead
toextremeskepticism?(2)WeknowhowimportantfreedomisinPatočka’sdescription of the movements in the natural world. Freedom is the third movement, the
breakthroughtoone’sownpossibilities,thehighestpossiblelevelofself-realization.
Freedomhasnothingtodowitharbitrariness,itcoincidesessentiallywithresponsibility.Andifwespeakofresponsibility(inwhateversensewetakeit:responsibility
forothers,formyselforfortheworld),itisverydifficultnottoconceiveitinterms
ofanI,asmyown,personalresponsibility.Myresponsibilityismymostessential
possibility,itiswhatconstitutesmeasaperson,andthemeaningofmyexistenceis
inevitablylinkedtothispersonalresponsibility.Wehavehere,apparently,anaporetic
problem,ensuingfromahiddencontradiction,inasmuchasasubjectivephenomenologyseemstogobeyondallsubjective,ego-like,personalcharacteristics,evenbeyond
theauthenticconceptionofBeing-in-the-world.HowcanthisconceptionbereconciledwithPatočka’sverystrongaccentuationoffreedomasresponsibility?Howcan
wepracticeasubjectivephenomenologyandstillspeakofpersonalresponsibility?
IbelievethesetwofundamentalquestionsmotivatedPatočka’sthinkinginhis
laterperiod,anditseemstomethatthetwocanonlybeansweredatthesametime,
oratleastinaparallelmanner.
3 AppearingasSuch
Patočkaexpressesonmanyoccasionshisconvictionthattheultimateproblemof
philosophy as interpretation of our experience is nothing other than appearing.
However,itisnottheappearingofthisorthatobject,orofanyparticularkindof
objectivity,butappearingassuch,Erscheinenalssolches.Whatdoesthismean,and
how can we approach appearing as such? Let’s begin with some remarks in
“NegativePlatonism.”Patočkaspeakshereoftheexperienceoffreedomasanexperiencewithnosubstrate,“ifbysubstrateweunderstandsomefinitepositivecontent,
somesubject,somepredicate,orsomecomplexofpredicates.”12Theexperienceof
JanPatočka,“NegativePlatonism…,”op.cit.,p.196.
12
NegativePlatonismandtheAppearance-Problem
79
freedomcanbegraspedinbothanegativeandapositivemanner.“Ithasthenegative character of a distance, of a remove, of an overcoming of every objectivity,
every content, every re-presentation and every substrate.”13 That is why Patočka
termsthisexperiencepoor.Nevertheless,ithasapositiveaspectaswell:fromthis
point of view, the experience of freedom means an experience of totality, of the
whole.Preciselyinthissensewecansaythat,forPatočka,theexperienceoffreedominallitsguisesimpliesaholisticcharacter,akindoftotality,notinthesense
ofasumtotalofparticularbeings,butastheultimateandoriginalconditionofall
thatappears.ThatkindoftotalityiswhatPatočkacalls“appearingassuch.”Ina
firststep,wecanapproachappearingassuchthroughtheconceptsofthewhole,of
worldandofhorizon.
Appearingassuchrelatestothewhole.Thisproposition,enigmaticatfirstsight,
isthekeyformulaofPatočka’slaterphenomenology.Thetaskofasubjectivephenomenologyissimplytouncoverappearingasawhole.Ofcourse,thiswholedoes
notcoincidewiththewholeofoursenseexperience,nordoesitrefertoasphere
beyondsensuousexperience,asphereofimagination,ofspeculativethinking.The
wholeisrealityitself,but–sotosay–aftertheactofepoché.Thesuspensionofthe
validity of particular beings and ontic convictions does not reduce everything to
nothing, but rather turns our attention to the whole. However, the whole is not a
higherlevelofBeingoramoreintense,fullermannerofBeing(inatheologicalor
mysticalsense).ForPatočka,thewholeisnotanontological,butratheraprofoundly
phenomenologicalterm:itistheessenceofappearance,appearingassuch.
Ifweconsiderappearingasthecentralproblemofphenomenology,phenomenologybecomesaphenomenologyoftheworld.Tounderstandthesignificanceofthis
phenomenologicalapproachtotheworld,wemustturnourattentiontoEugenFink’s
philosophy.Asweknow,PatočkaandFinkkeptupanintense,lifelongcorrespondence.14TheCzechphilosopherconsideredFink’sphenomenologyasoneofthemost
important philosophical achievements after the Second World War, and he was
deeplyinspiredbyFink’sworldphilosophy(Weltphilosophie).AlongsidetheforgettingofBeing,FinkspeaksoftheforgettingoftheWorld.Metaphysics,whichconfineditselftoparticularbeings(asalatentDingontologie),isnothingbutthehistory
ofthisfundamentaloblivionoftheWorld.FinkcriticizesHeidegger,whosucceeded
inovercomingobjectiveontology,butfailedtoovercomethemetaphysicsoflight.
ThelogosoftheWorld(Weltlogos),atworkinallbeingsaccordingtoFink,cannot
begraspedfromtheviewpointofa“Lichtmetaphysik.”Fink’scosmologicalapproach
isanexemplarymodelforPatočka’slaterphenomenology.AndthefactthatFink’s
philosophyisatleastasdeeplyinfluencedbyNietzscheasbyHeideggeralsopoints
toapossiblemannerofthinkingthatbecameexemplaryforPatočka.
Why does Patočka’s concept of “world” not coincide with that of Husserl’s
“life-world,” despite Husserl’s apparent overcoming of Cartesianism in his later
Ibid.
See Eugen Fink and Jan Patočka, Briefe und Dokumente 1933–1977, ed. M. Heitz and
B.Nessler(FreiburgandMünchen:Alber,1999).
13
14
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T.Ullmann
philosophy?WecanbetteranswerthisquestiononthebasisofFink’sphilosophy.
However positive his turn towards the life-world, Husserl still fails to take into
accountthehistoricityoftheworld,whichisneithertheexternaltemporalframeworkofanatemporal,unchangingbasicstructure,noratranscendentalhistoricity,
butrathertheconstantchangingoftheverybasicstructureoftheworlditself.In
Patočka’sterms:thehistoricityofappearingassuch.
Patočka’snewapproach–whatwemightcallaphenomenologyofworld–cannot
be easily defined. We can first reach a few negative determinations: (1) It is not
subjectivisticinthesensethatappearingassuchcannotbetracedbacktoatranscendentalsourceofconstitutionandsense-bestowingactivity.(2)Itisnotobjectivistic
either, since Patočka rejects all traditional approaches that consistently reduced
appearingtoanappearingentity15andfailedtotakeintoaccountthephenomenologicaldifferencebetweenphenomenalbeingandphenomenalityitself.Theconcept
of horizon does not help either, since horizon is always the horizon of a certain
object.Evenconceivedasaninfinitebackground,horizonremainsrelativetoafinite
object. Object presupposes horizon, and vice versa, hence the concept of horizon
remainsintheframeworkofanobjectivisticconception.(3)Thephenomenologyof
worldcannotbemetaphysical,ifmetaphysicsmeansanahistoricapproach.
Thislastinsight–namely,thateverythingistemporalandhistorical–canbe
foundinvariousformsandonvariouslevelsinPatočka’smanuscripts.(1)Onthe
levelofappearingassuch,sensedataandintentionalsense-bestowingactivitycan
nolongerbeclearlyseparated.Animationofhyleticdatabyobjectifyingintentions
isnoadequatewayofdescribingappearance.16Everythingthatcanbeconsidered
asa“datum”isnotanexternal,indifferent,neutralmomentofappearing,butessentially part of appearing, and appearing itself as well: “everything that is in the
appearance-field is already appearing being.”17 In other terms: the components
presumed to make appearing possible (intentionality, consciousness, sense data,
horizon,etc.)arenotexteriortoappearingassuch;onthecontrary,allarepartand
parcel of it. This means that we can grasp them only retroactively, by making a
detour through separation and abstraction. (2) Analogously, Patočka states that
temporalitydoesnotmeaninsertingatemporalobjects,data,forms,aspects,etc.,
intothestreamoftime.Theconceptoftemporalityimpliesthatallpartsandcomponentsoftemporalityaretemporalaswell.Therearenounchanging,supratemporal spheres of reality. Husserl recognizes something similar when he speaks of a
manner of temporality even in the case of ideal objects, but he fails to reach a
deeperleveloftemporalization.Thoughhegivesup,inhisanalysisoftime,the
structure“formofapprehension–contentofapprehension,”hestillpresupposes,
withtheconceptof“Urimpression,”atemporalsensedata.AccordingtoPatočka,
therecanbenoatemporalcomponentsofthetime-stream,justastherecanbeno
dead“hylē”inintentionalexperience.(3)Temporalityistheultimatebackground.
Seenote6above.
Cf.JanPatočka,VomErscheinen…,op.cit.,TextV,pp.126,135.
17
Cf.ibid.,TextIII,p.94.
15
16
NegativePlatonismandtheAppearance-Problem
81
Inotherwords:theasubjectivefundamentforphenomenologyisnothingotherthan
temporality.ThisthesisisnotoftenformulatedinPatočka’swritings,butwhenit
doesappear,wefinditalwaysonlociofprimaryimportance,anditcan,therefore,
beconsideredasafundamentalprincipleofhisphenomenology.18Ashewritesin
thefirstofhistwoarticlesonasubjectivephenomenology:“Theresultofradical
analysisofthephenomenalspherepointsinthedirectionofanoriginaltime,not
towardsameretime-experience,buttowardstimeassuch.”19Timeplaysanimportantrole,notonlyintheorderoffoundation,butalsofunctionally.WhenPatočka
meditatesontheunityoftheworldasanappearance-structureandonthequestion
ofhowtheamazingmultiplicityofthings,aspects,appearances,canbelongtoone
unitarywhole,hisanswerisasfollows:whatassuresthesyntheticunityofexperienceisnottranscendentalcategoriesorothergeneralidealities,itistheunityof
timewhichpreventsmultiplicityfromfallingapart.20
Everything is thus part of appearing, and everything is part of time. In other
words:everypartofappearingappearsinitsentirety,justaseverypartoftimeis
temporalineveryrespect.Astrangevision.Husserl’sabsoluteconsciousnessand
transcendental ego seem to be devoid of temporal change or genesis (even in
geneticphenomenology,onefindsresiduesofatemporalstructures:formsofintention, hyletic data, absolute horizon, a priori structures of the life-world), and
Heidegger’s Being, somehow, beyond temporality (despite its being what gives
temporality).Patočka’svisionismoreradical.Forhim,therecanbenoexception
toappearingor,consequently,totemporality–neitherconsciousness,norBeing,
nor world. He seriously endeavors to think through the consequences of such a
radicalphenomenologicalattitude.Thatishowhisphilosophybecomesthoroughly
andcompletelyhistorical.
4 AsubjectiveAppearingandPersonalResponsibility
The enigma posed by Patočka’s late phenomenology resides not only in giving a
coherentinterpretationofappearingassuch,butalsoinfindingawaytomediate
between or reconcile asubjective phenomenology of appearing and subjective
Ibid., Text II: “Die Transzendentalphilosophie Husserls nach der Revision,” p. 52: “Ist es
umgekehrtnichtnotwendig,aufeinerneuen,asubjektivenGrundlage,d.h.aufderGrundlagevon
Zeit[myemphasis]undderenErhellungetc.,eineTheoriedermenschlichenErfahrungalsderjenigenErfahrungdarzustellen,dieindenZusammenhangdieserursprünglichenErhellunggehört?”
19
JanPatočka,“DerSubjektivismusderHusserlschenunddieMöglichkeiteiner‘asubjektiven’
Phänomenologie,”inDieBewegungdermenschlichenExistenz.PhänomenologischeSchriftenII,
ed.K.Nellen,J.NěmecandI.Srubar(Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1991),p.284:“Dasineinerradikalen
AnalysederphänomenalenSphäregewonneneResultatzeigtindieRichtungeinerursprünglichen
Zeit,keinesbloßenZeiterlebens,sondernderZeitalssolcher.”
20
JanPatočka,VomErscheinen…,op.cit.,TextIV:“WeltformderErfahrungundWelterfahrung,”
p.105:“EsmußeineganzanderevorgängigeEinheitdasein…welchenieisoliertist,sondern
immersichweitet,ohnesichzuzersplittern.EsistdieEinheitderZeit.”
18
82
T.Ullmann
f reedomasresponsibility.Ibelievethereareatleastthreepossiblemediations,allof
whichcanbefound,inamoreorlesselaboratedform,inPatočka’slaterwritings.
1. The first would be a kind of aesthetic-artistic approach to reality. The aestheticobservationofappearingthingsandthebeautyoftheworldrevealsnotonly
appearingassuch,butalsoakindofresponsibility,whatPatočkacallsresponsibilityforBeing.Wecanfindtracesofsuchaconceptioninseveralessays.21Anartist
observes things and at the same time lets them appear as they are: this twofold
movementis,accordingtoPatočka,theessenceofart.Lettingthingsappearasthey
areisanaestheticaspectofresponsibilityforBeing.22
2.AnotherpossiblemediationcanbeerectedontheconceptoftheOther.My
beingintheworld,mylifeasmovementintheworld,cannotattainitssupreme
possibility,thebreakthroughtofreedom,withoutOthers.Allformsofheroic,solitary,self-sufficientattemptstoliveanauthenticlife(eitherintheNietzscheanform
ofTitanism,inHeidegger’sheroicattitude,orintheSartreanformofahopeless
struggleagainstreification)implyamannerofnihilism,whichboilsdowntoclingingtotheego.Beingintruthcannotberealizedwithoutresponsibilityforothers.
Asubjectivephenomenologyofappearingnecessitatestheinvestigationofthesum
intheworld,andthissum,thismovementintheworld,inevitablyimpliesarelation
totheothers,whichisresponsibility.23
3.Itseemstomethat,inhismanuscriptsonappearingassuch,Patočkaoutlines
athirdpossibilityofmediationbetweenasubjectivephenomenologyandpersonal
responsibility. This mediation makes both implicit and explicit references to
Nietzsche’s and Fink’s conception of world. As we have already mentioned,
Patočkawas,mainlythroughFink,verydeeplyinfluencedbyNietzscheanphilosophyandcritiqueofmetaphysics.Nietzsche’sconceptionofbeing,basedonmovement,change,andconflictofforces,hadastrongimpactonPatočka’sphenomenology
ofappearingassuch.Ontheotherhand,itisaNietzscheanismwithoutdeterminant
factorsofNietzscheanthinking:Patočkadoesnotacceptthewilltopower,theidea
ofeternalreturnandthetendencytowardsheroicTitanism.
Oneshouldbeverycarefulinapproachingtheconnectionbetweenthetwo
thinkers. I by no means want to suggest that Patočka was a follower of the
Nietzscheanwayofphilosophizing.Iwishmerelytoshowthattheradicalization
ofphenomenologymadeitwellnighimpossibleforhimtoexpresshisnewvision
Cf.JanPatočka,“DieSinnfrageinderEpochedesNihilismus:Masaryk–Dostojewski–Kant–
Nietzsche – Heidegger,” in Tschechische Philosophen im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. and transl.
L.Hagedorn(StuttgartandMünchen:DeutscheVerlags-Anstalt,2002),p.250:“soetwaswieein
von der Liebe geleitetes Verstehen, dessen nächtsliegendes Beispiel in unserer Welt die
künstlerischeLiebeist,diedieDingesichaussichselbstentfaltenläßt.”
22
JanPatočka,Body,Community…,op.cit.,p.170:“Inamannerofspeaking,humansarepragmata,somethingthatserves;humanlifeservesinasensedifferentfromthatinwhichthingsare
equipmental.Objectivity[věcnost]meanslettingthingsbe,lettingthemcometothemselves,to
theirbeingwhichisexternaltothemandyetistheirs.”
23
See Patočka’s analysis of Dostoevsky’s “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man” in “Die Sinnfrage…,”op.cit.,pp.239–253.
21
NegativePlatonismandtheAppearance-Problem
83
in a conceptual way. Appearing as such, the appearance-field as the ultimate
backgroundofallphenomenalities,seemstodefynotonlyconceptualinterpretation,
butalsophenomenologicaldescription.PatočkaisnotNietzschean,buthetendsto
applyNietzscheanconceptsandmetaphorstoexpresshisownphilosophicalvision.
Ishalltrytodescribe,fromthispointofview,themediationbetweenasubjective
phenomenologyandsubjectiveresponsibility.Itwillbeanattempttoreconstruct
Patočka’sphenomenologyofappearinginaseriesofsuccessivesteps,thoughitis,
ofcourse,notanargumentationintheclassicalsense.
Firststep:Weltapriori. Investigatingthestructureofappearing,Patočkarelieson
the concept of the apriori of the world. The world is not the universe of things:
world-structures are not the structures of finite things, just as the lawfulness of
appearinghasnothingtodowiththecausallawsofphysicsorpsychology.World
inthissensemeansacomprehensiveunityoforganicstructuralmoments.24This
aprioriasanorganicunityofstructurallawsofappearingisnotbehind,butinthe
veryheartofallthatappears.Itisverydifficulttograsp,becausetheonticstructure
ofappearingthingscoversoverthislayer.Theapriorioftheworldiswithinthings
andobjectiverelations,butisnotitselfathingoranobjectiverelation.
Secondstep:Otherkindsofrealities. Epochémeanstakingastepbackfromfinite
thingsandturningourattentiontothewholeassuch,butitisnotmerelyaheuristic or methodological claim, after which the phenomenologist could safely turn
backtothings.Thechangeinattitudemeanschangingtheorientationofourattentionaswell.Themodaltransformationofourattitudetowardsrealityinvolvesa
moreradicaltransformation:thatofthesubjectofourphenomenologicalintuition.
Instead of objective things and real connections, we must be able to bring into
sightotherkindsofrealities.Whataretheserealities?Patočka,onseveraloccasions,makesanattempttolistthem,buttheresultseemsalwaysratherlimited:
thenearandthefar,perspectives,charactersofappearance,levelsoffullnessand
emptiness, the zero-point of orientation, totality of space, duration, deficiency,
actuality and inactuality, etc.25 What does this list suggest? Neither ontological
24
JanPatočka,VomErscheinen…,op.cit.,TextIV,p.104:“DieZugänglichkeitdesEinzelnen…
bedeutet nur, daß kein einziges Seiendes erfahren werden kann außerhalb dieses Zusammenhangs, welcher das ständig-grundlegende Apriori jeder Erfahrung bedeutet. Dies Apriori ist
kein Verhältnis von Kategorie zur Anschauung, es ist kein Begrifflich-Allgemeines, sondern
mankönnteesehermitdemVerhältnisvoneinerdurchgehendenEinheitzurvonihrumfaßten
Mannigfaltigkeitvergleichen.”
25
Ibid.,TextV,p.121:“SelbstgegebenundursprünglichgegebensinddaDingeinPerspektiven
undErscheinungscharakteren,inNäheundFerne,imOptimumderFülleoderschwindenderFülle
biszumVerdecktseinundVerschwindenimLeerhorizont,dergarnichtsoleerist”;p.146:“Aus
den Erscheinungscharakteren wie Raumtotalität, Dauer, perspektivische Gegebenheit des
Seienden,OriginalgegebenheitundDefizienz,GegenwartinAktualitätundInaktualitäten,kann
sich wegen der Formalität dieser Züge kein ‘Weltbild’ ergeben”; p. 151: “Kein Ding und
Sachverhalt kann erscheinen, ohne in die Felder von Anschaulich-Unanschaulich, Leere-Fülle,
Nähe-Akme-Ferne usw. einbezogen zu sein. Diese Zusammenhänge und ihr ‘Funktionieren’,
ihren Sinn zu durchforschen scheint uns, anstatt der ‘noetisch-noematischen Strukturen’, die
AufgabeeinerPhänomenologiealsErscheinungslehrezusein.”
84
T.Ullmann
descriptionintermsofsubjectandpredicate,nortranscendental-phenomenological
approachintermsofnoetic-noematicconstitution.Patočkaattemptstograspthe
structurallinesofanewsphere,whichhasneverbeenapproachedbytraditional
thinking.
Third step: Perspectivism, forces, struggle. This kind of phenomenological
approachiscompletedbyastrongemphasison–Iwouldsay–Nietzscheanmotifs.
Ipresentthreeofthem:perspectivism,forces,andstruggle.(A)Patočkaunderlines
inmanycontextstheimportanceofaperspectivisticview:thelackofperspectivism
canbeconsideredasthemainflawofeverymetaphysics.Perspectivismdetermines
not only temporal and historical description, but also movements in the naturalsocial world.26 Perspectivism is the clearest expression of the both thoroughly
socialandthoroughlyhistoricalcharacterofappearingassuch.(B)Patočkadiscoversacertaincooperationortensionofforcesonthelevelofappearingassuch;in
other words: he substitutes description of forces for analysis of objects. This is
perhaps the point where he most clearly goes beyond subjectivism. To speak of
forces in appearing implies that these forces belong neither to intentional sensebestowingactivity,nortoparticularobjects.Phenomenologyofappearingassuch
abandonsonceandforallsubjectivismandobjectivismfromthemomentPatočka
takesintoaccountthefunctioningof“forces”ofappearing.27Thetaskofphenomenology is thus to uncover the “Kraftlinien des Erscheinens,” which in no way
coincide with particular things or objective relations. (C) From the concept of
forces,itisbutashortsteptothelikewiseNietzschean,andindeedHeraclitean,
concept of struggle between forces. We know the importance of polemos in
Patočka’sphilosophy,butthefunctionofpolemosonthelevelofappearingassuch
isnotobvious.Wemightbetemptedtothinkofthephenomenologyofappearing
as a sphere of peaceful Being and quiet contemplation. However, the novelty of
Patočka’sthinkingconsistspreciselyinshowingthatappearingassuch,theessence
of phenomenality, is not only temporal, historical, and thoroughly dynamic, but
also“polemic.”Polemicinthesensethatthingsdonotbelongtoacalm,neutral,
and inoffensive sphere of aesthetic appearances; on the contrary: what presents
itselfasstableandlastingBeingintheclassicalonticorontologicalsense(with
asubstantialcoreandvariablepredicates)isadynamicandorganiccomplexof
struggling forces. Temporality and historicity characterize, not only the socialnaturalworld,butalsotheseeminglymoreindividuallevelofphenomenological
contemplation. Parallel to this: polemos functions, not only in the social-natural
world,butalsoonthephenomenologicallevelofappearingassuch.
26
Ibid.,p.126:“Waserscheint,istnämlichnieeineWeltohnediekonkretenSubjekte,sonderndie
WeltsamtihnenundihremZusammenhang,derSozialität.…er[derZusammenhangzwischen
konkretenSubjekteundWeltdingen]läßt…dieMöglichkeitverwirklichen,eineperspektivische
Welterscheinenzulassen,dieWelt,diejemandemerscheint.”
27
Ibid.,p.124:“DieangeblichenIntentionensindnichtsanderesalsKraftliniendesErscheinens
amErscheinenden.Sieformierenund‘konstituieren’auchnichts,sondernzeigenbloßundweisen
aufanderes[,]als[es]dasschonErscheinendeist.”
NegativePlatonismandtheAppearance-Problem
85
Fourthstep:Embodimentandaction. Hence,theimportanceofbodilybeingfor
Patočka.Corporeitycannotbeinterpretedasatransparentmediumofperceptual
experience or practical-pragmatic Being-in-the-world. For Patočka, corporeity is
more:itiswhatmakesuspartofawholetowhichwebelongbythewholeofour
activity,passivity,andaffectivity,yetfromwhichwecanstilldistanceourselves.
Corporeity symbolizes Patočka’s profound insight that, as bodily beings, we are
neitherthemerepassive,observing,contemplativepartofappearing,noritsactive,
constitutivesource,butratherafieldofforceswithinthewhole,withintheultimate
fieldofforces.ThatiswhyPatočkarejectsaphenomenologyofkinesthesis.28The
bodyisnotsomethingthatprecedesactions,apermanentsubstratumformomentaryactions.Thebodyisnothingotherthanthecomplexsystemofactions.
Fifth step: Actions and responsibility. Perspectivism, struggle of forces, and
embodimentimplythat,evenfromtheviewpointofasubjectivephenomenology,
wewouldseemtoarriveatakindofinterrelatedcomplexof(non-Cartesian)ego
and (non-subjectivistic) activity. Activity directly implies responsibility, since
freedomisnotprojectionofpossibilities,butresponsibilityforactions.29Though
the adjective that best characterizes Patočka’s phenomenology of appearing is
doubtless “antihumanistic,” it still implies the idea of responsibility. Like all
other phenomena in the world, we are not substantial beings, but the result of
struggling forces, physical and biological forces, bodily and psychic instincts.
Thetaskofthinkingconsistsfirstofallinuncoveringtheillusionsofanthropomorphism.30ThisveryNietzscheaninsightisanexemplaryideaforPatočka,and
he tries to show from many points of view that freedom is not my particular
freedom, since there is no human substrate with the special attributes of freedom.31Nonetheless,freedom,distancingfromthings,iswhatconstitutesmyown
personal perspective of experiencing appearance and performing acts in the
world.Strangeasitmaysound,itseemsthatbodilybeingandpolemosofforces
constitute my personality and personal, free responsibility. In other words: the
origin of responsibility is not a spiritual component of my existence, because
Ibid.p.132:“sogibtesauchkeineeinzelnen‘Kinästhesen’,sondernesgibtebennurdenagierendenundreagierendenLeib.”
29
Ibid., Text III, p. 87: “Die Freiheit liegt nicht im Entwurf der Möglichkeiten, sondern in der
VerantwortungfürdieAktion,darin,daßesnichteinProzeß,einpassivrezipiertesGeschehen,
sonderneineLeistungist,dieichdadurcherbringe,daßichdieMöglichkeit,diemichausderWelt
anspricht,alsmeineaufnehmeoderabweise.”
30
JanPatočka,Body,Community…,op.cit.,p.168:“Istherenot,inHeidegger’sconception,still
toomuchthatisanthropological?…Istherenot,intheconceptionoftheworldasanaggregate
ofpotentialitieswhichwecaninterpret,read,stilltoogreatatendencytoignoretheoriginalclosure within itself of what is, the primordial dark night of existence which precedes all
individuation?”
31
JanPatočka,VomErscheinen…,op.cit.,TextI:“KritikderHusserlschenphänomenologischen
Philosophie,”p.49:“WennesaberkeinSeiendesoder‘Vorseiendes’gibt,zudessenAttributen
dieFreiheitgehörte…”
28
86
T.Ullmann
thereisnosuchspiritualcomponent.Theverynatureofappearing,thecorporeal
relationtoappearingandforceswithinappearingturnouttobetheoriginoffreedom
andofresponsibility.
Thesebrieflysketchedstructuralmomentsseemtocomposethemiddlesphere
between two extremities, between metaphysical idealism and a chaotic vision of
Being:Patočkacallsthismiddlesphere“Idea”inthesenseof“negativePlatonism.”
An“idea”referring,nottothegeneralcharacteristicsofanobjectivemodeofBeing,
butpreciselytothecomplexofasubjectiveandnon-objectivefeatures,aspects,patterns,structures,perspectivesandforcesthatcomposeappearingassuch.