Papers by Bogdan Boghitoi
Manager Journal, 2013
One of the unfulfilled ideals of the mod- ern mind is that of "unity of science". It is... more One of the unfulfilled ideals of the mod- ern mind is that of "unity of science". It is , at the core, a reductive ideal (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). A key part part of its re- ductive approach consists, most often, in finding matches between the kinds one em- ploys to theorize about certain processes and unique types of entities on a lower level in a mereological scale. This is widely assumed to provide reductions of the theory on the upper level to that on the lower one, and ultimately to the most basic, namely that of physics. Nevertheless this ideal, according to which every type of entity has to be shown to be ultimately equated with a definite type of microstructure, has been vehemently chal- lenged. One source was the functional ap- proach, originating in the philosophy of mind. The origins of functionalism lay in the assimilation of our psychological states with the functioning of a Turing machine. The same way a Turing machine is characterized by a "machine table", which describes the transitions between an input, internal states and output, a physical system will have an internal functional structure, which describes steady causal relations between the sensory stimulations, internal states and the behav- ioral output.(Putnam 1967). Mental proper- ties are nothing more than places typically held in causal chains. What individuates the mental states is their causal relations with the input and output. (see Lewis 1972).One rather immediate consequence of the functionalist outlook is the multiple re- alizability. The causal structure involved can be realized by a host of realization bases, not amenable to a unique description in the lan- guage of the theories dealing with the infe- rior levels. Such functional descriptions of phenomena imply nothing with regard to microstructural properties of what under- lies this web of causal relations. From this standpoint, a theory about the mind means tracking causes at this upper level, without specifying anything what the lower level phenomena implementing it are supposed to be. Any assembly of entities that can enter into the patterns of causation specified by the functional description would do.Although functionalism has started as a stance on the theories about mind and be- havior, philosophers have been quick to re- alize that the same issues at the core of this approach also face other special sciences. There are situations where our only chance to make science is to track this upper level causal chains, between items that are typed so that they would be capable to enter into stable causal relation, but without being ca- pable to effectively indicate any fixed mi- crostructural pendants. As Fodor remarks (Fodor 1974), there are scientifically inter- estening general statements that can be made about items whose physical description has nothing to do with each other. Whatever they have in common according to this low- er level descriptions has nothing to do with the truth of the upper level generalizations. One example to this point could be economic general statements, such as those concerned with monetary exchange (e.g. Gersham's law). Nevertheless money can have differ- ent physical make-ups, like coins of different metals and sizes, banknotes, a certain electri- cal charge in the memory of a computer (in the case of electronic money), they can be wampoons and so on. Such examples strong- ly suggest that any description of the physical realization of money must be wildly disjunc- tive. Nevertheless when it comes to monetary exchange, whatever the physical structure of money, we are bound to attend to the upper functional level because there are here inter- esting generalizations that otherwise would be missed.Of course, there is also a backlash. According to Kim microstructure is crucial for having genuine natural kinds because the macrophysical properties are determined by microstructure. Take for instance jade, which is not a true mineral kind. "Jade" designates actually two different substances, with un- like molecular structures, namely jadeite and nephrite, although its surface proper- ties might be similar, and we might employ both substances for similar purposes, which makes us to employ the naive taxonomy we use in our daily lives. …
Logos & Episteme, 2012
My goal is to clarify the type of relations one could hope can be established between psychology ... more My goal is to clarify the type of relations one could hope can be established between psychology and the social sciences in general, on one side, and evolutionary biology, on the other. Thus, the paper analyzes one of the most remarkable contemporary attempts to forge such ties, namely that of John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, who explore the interface between the two domains and try to articulate a research methodology aimed at their better integration. Unfortunately, as I shall try to show, the position Tooby and Cosmides advance is undermined by adaptationist assumptions they don't manage to successfully defend. In doing so, my paper picks up the threads of the current adaptationism debate and seeks to draw some of the consequences it has for psychological research. Subsequently, I will attempt to generalize the chief results of my analysis, by emphasizing a few aspects of evolutionary theory I think are key for understanding its relation with human culture. On this grounds, I will argue for a position that makes social sciences autonomous in respect to evolutionary thinking, yet preserves solid ties with evolutionary thought, securing integration with the rest of science.
Annals of the University of Bucharest - Philosophy Series, 2012
The goal of the paper is to determine what could provide grounds for the idea that mind could be ... more The goal of the paper is to determine what could provide grounds for the idea that mind could be partly realized by environmental items. In this respect, it analyses the now classical arguments put forward by Clark and Chalmers, and shows that both the thought experiments and the parity approach they devise fail to substantiate the claim that cognitive processes extend beyond skin and skull. Yet, the paper concludes that we should not discard the idea of a mind that extends into the environment, as it can extract its credentials from life sciences.
The paper provides an alternative argument for the extended mind thesis. It shows that parity bas... more The paper provides an alternative argument for the extended mind thesis. It shows that parity based approaches are ultimately ineffective, because they are too liberal with what we are to count as cognitive and thus unacceptably revisionist about the way science in general divides nature. The present analysis points to the way science deals with nonstandard biological mechanisms as a possible basis for the extended mind thesis. This is not only more consistent with solidly established bodies of knowledge but also makes the extended mind an offshoot of the usual way we build our scientific theories. Furthermore, certain technological achievements, such as sensory substitution systems, show that the extended mind is an effective reality, not only a conceptual possibility, and sometimes it is the only option we have in order to construct explanations or experiments.
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Papers by Bogdan Boghitoi