Poland and Hungary in Transition

3RODQGDQG+XQJDU\LQ7UDQVLWLRQ János Kis Journal of Democracy, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter 1990, pp. 75-78 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/jod.1990.0000 For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v001/1.1kis.html Access provided by The University of Guelph (29 Sep 2014 15:58 GMT) The Crumbling of the Soviet Bloc POLAND AND HUNGARY IN TRANSITION Jdnos Kis Since 1973, when he was ousted for political reasons from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Janos Kis has actively participated in the democratic opposition. He is a founder of the independent journal Beszelo and of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), a new political party that is working for the establishment of a Western-style democracy in Hungary. Mr. Kis spent the 1988-89 academic year as a visiting professor of philosophy at the New School for Social Research in New York City. T h e past 15 years have witnessed not only the rise of democracy among the authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe and Latin America, but also the birth of democratic opposition movements in the communist countries of Eastern Europe. These latter movements, however, stopped short of initiating a transformation of the political system itself. Instead, they invariably limited themselves to the task of reconstructing civil society within the bounds set by Communist Party control over the levers of state power. Yet now it seems that this era of self-limitation is ending: in Poland and Hungary, power sharing and dissociation of the state from the Communist Party are directly at issue; events in Czechoslovakia may very soon take a similar course. In both Poland and Hungary, the Communist leadership itself has offered opposition movements legal status and a share in the government. It is crucial to understand both the motives for these gestures and their meaning. It would be misleading to view the current situation as analogous to the 1980 Gdansk negotiations. At that time, Poland's Communist rulers found themselves pushed to the wall by a number of particularly vigorous strikes, and agreed to talks because they were unprepared to use force to exclude the opposition from politics. This time, however, they offered talks in response to much weaker pressure because they deemed it in their interest to include the opposition in the political structure. At the end of the 1980s-a decade whose opening years saw first the official recognition and then the outlawing of Solidarity-Polish (as well as Hungarian) Communists have recognized that they cannot rescue their regimes from continuing economic and social decay unless they share responsibility with partners who are truly independent of them. For the first time since the Sovietization of Eastern Europe, ruling parties are seeking to make room in the power structure for a legal opposition with the design of using its authority to legitimize austerity measures and demobilize social resistance. In joining the game that the negotiation offers have started, both sides incur tremendous risks. The danger for the Communist elites arises from the possibility that the process initiated by their talks with the opposition will lead much farther than they wish. The breach thus opened in the one-party system may progressively widen until the way is cleared for the logical outcome, which is a truly competitive parliamentary democracy. Indeed, this prospect provides the only reason for democratic elements to accept the bargain. But the opposition leaders must face the danger that instead of initiating a transition to democracy, the deal may shore up Communist power-and discredit them for having gone along with it. Being manipulated into helping to legitimize Communist rule is not the only risk with which the opposition in Poland and Hungary must reckon, however. The transition process, even if successfully launched, is likely to prove rocky. The sway exercised by both sides over their respective organizational bases will probably come under severe strain. Communist uppal-atchiks in strategic positions may try to upset the deal, perhaps by stage-managing outright provocations. Opposition radicals, on the other hand, may push to delegitimize any compromise with the Communists. The social contract may thus collapse before producing any tangible results. Another danger threatening the transition to democracy arises from the economic crisis. Unavoidable austerity measures and continuing decay may convince the "silent majority" that democratization is only aggravating the trouble. The opposition might then be held partly responsible for the accumulating hardships. The Communists could see such a development as advantageous to themselves since it would seem to remove any conceivable political alternative. Indeed, it could even result in an increasingly widespread longing for order, which would favor the advent of a Stalinist strongman promising to save the fatherland from political and economic chaos. But a chain reaction of spontaneous outbursts of mass violence could also occur, prompted by a disgust with politics of all kinds, official or oppositionist. Dangers threaten from abroad as well. Sharp oscillations in Soviet politics remain possible and could easily derail internal reforms. Exacerbated ethnic and national conflicts may draw public attention away from the issue of democracy, and might tempt authoritarian elements to seek a reimposition of social discipline through the mobilization of explosive nationalist sentiments (like those in Serbia, for instance). It may seem from these cursory remarks that prospects for a peaceful, orderly transition to democracy in Eastern Europe are very dim indeed. Notice, however, that the present situation in Poland and Hungary is not merely the result of a chance opportunity. The Soviet empire has entered the era of its decline and dissolution. Of course the Soviet state still has the military might to reassert its dominance over the region by force of arms, but it no longer possesses the economic power required to maintain its hegemony. That is why Soviet military intervention is becoming less and less likely and why economic decline and political unrest are spreading irresistibly over Eastern Europe. The only hope for stabilizing the region lies in the establishment of market economies and democratic polities. Thus there is a reasonable prospect that the dangers threatening the transition process can be met, which is why we must carefully anticipate them. Accordingly, all those within and outside Eastern Europe who desire a democratic transition must devise strategies to stabilize the process and consolidate its gains. The Role of the West Western governments will have a significant influence on the course of developments in Eastern Europe. First, they have some ability both to accelerate economic reform and to mitigate its social costs. Reduction of the debt burden that is crushing both the Polish and Hungarian economies is essential, as is maintenance (in the case of Hungary) or resumption (in the case of Poland) of credit flows. I am not proposing, however, that the West continue to pour good money into the bottomless pit of our disastrous economies. Debts should not be cancelled but rather partly transformed into resalable industrial assets. Privatization should be encouraged, and creditors' consortiums should ask for the power to supervise the process directly. Extension of new credits should be tied to the progress of privatization and should also be linked to expanding political pluralism as a guarantee for meaningful economic reform. Second, both the ostpolirik that consisted in cooperating only with govemments and the Cold War policies that involved a one-sided preference for opposition movements should be abandoned. Western governments should support neither the one side nor the other but rather the forging of a social contract between the two. This, however, must not mean the abandonment of the opposition to the good will of the so-called reformist wing of the Communist Party leadership. By recognizing the de facto political pluralism that now exists in Eastern Europe, Western govemments can contribute to its consolidation and further development. Third, the West ought to change its perspective on the issue of peace and stability in Europe. It is customary to approach this issue as if it consisted of nothing but the problem of armaments. Actually, the asymmetry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is not reducible to an imbalance between the forces they field. There is also an imbalance in organization, for the Soviet military has more control over Eastern European armies than Eastern European governments do, and until this situation changes, the Warsaw Pact will remain an unpredictable and dangerous adversary. As a first step towards a mutually acceptable dismantling of the military blocs dividing Europe, Soviet troop withdrawals must be accompanied by the reassertion of national sovereignty over national armies within the Warsaw Pact and by an explicit Soviet renunciation of the use or threat of force to influence the internal affairs of Eastern European countries. The sooner this happens, the better insulated will be the democratic transition from the shocks attendant upon shifts in Soviet politics. Finally, the Western powers should firmly support the cause of oppressed national minorities in Eastern Europe. Actions like the Serbian encroachment upon Kosovo's autonomy should not go unanswered. Romanian President Nicolae Ceaugescu must be isolated, and his potential successors must learn that Romania will never win readmission to the community of civilized nations without democratic reforms-including measures for the protection of minority rights. The alternative to such a firm policy is Balkanization, which could in turn be used to justify attempts to reestablish a Pas Sovietica over the region. But a return of that oppressive order is neither possible nor desirable, and a better alternative than Balkanization is within our reach.