During the early modern period the proof of God’s existence based on universal consent (consensus... more During the early modern period the proof of God’s existence based on universal consent (consensus gentium) was widely regarded as the most powerful argument that could be deployed against atheism. Yet from the mid-eighteenth century the argument began to disappear from the roster of arguments for God’s existence. Modern readers, moreover, find it difficult to see what makes this a proof at all and wonder why it was ever thought to be persuasive. This article offers a history of the consensus gentium principle, showing why it was long regarded as logically compelling, and explaining its relation to the three better-known ‘classical’ proofs of God’s existence. Consideration of the varying fortunes of this argument yields important insights into the changing nature and status of proofs for God’s existence and especially how these changed during the early modern period. It also shows why the burden of proof has gradually shifted over the past four centuries so that it is now belief in God rather than atheism that is thought to require rational justification. The history of this argument thus sheds light on the emergence of a distinctive feature of secular modernity, in which belief in the existence of God has become just one possibility among others. The article concludes with a brief consideration of modern vestiges of the argument in Rudolf Otto’s sense of the numinous, in revivals of Reidian reliabilism associated with reformed epistemology, and in the work of some practitioners of the cognitive science of religion.
I was delighted to see Paul Tyson's A Christian Theology of Science appear in print. By way of fu... more I was delighted to see Paul Tyson's A Christian Theology of Science appear in print. By way of full disclosure, I was in the fortunate position of watching the book take shape in real time and to have had (at times, lively) discussions with its author about its central claims. Like any stimulating new work that seeks to lay out a new agenda, the book not only articulates a bold thesis, but at the same time raises a host of new questions. What follows is a brief summary of the book's argument as I understand it, followed by some of the questions I was left with having completed it. These mostly concern the overall framing device of the book-what Tyson refers to as 'the first truth discourses' of science and theology. A second, and relatively brief set of questions is to do with what follows from Tyson's analysis for our evaluation and understanding of modern science. A Christian Theology of Science is part of a relatively new and (literally) unapologetic trend to relocate the science-theology discussion into the heart of Christian theology. 1 The central argument of the book is that modern science embodies a worldview that is incompatible with, and indeed opposed to, a genuinely Christian worldview. Tyson speaks in this context of the 'first truth discourse of science' which he opposes to 'the first truth discourse of Christianity' (1-3). The historical thesis is that in the West, from the seventeenth century onwards, the latter was gradually displaced by the former. Tyson identifies the first truth discourse of science with a form of reductive materialism (24-25), while the first truth discourse of Christianity entails belief in doctrinal propositions that coincide broadly with traditional symbols of faith such as the Apostle's Creed (12, 110). The normative thesis is that unless we recognize the implicit tension between these competing discourses, any attempt to understand the relationship between science and religion is doomed to failure. Tyson argues that this is true for most of such efforts since the nineteenth century: these are variously categorized as 'adaptation', 'withdrawal', and 'appropriation' (5-7, cf. 83-88). Adaptation,
This entry offers a history of the different ways in which the formal study of the natural world ... more This entry offers a history of the different ways in which the formal study of the natural world has been related to theological considerations in the Western Christian tradition. Because what counts as science and what counts as theology has changed over time, it begins with a history of the concepts 'theology' and 'science' and the bearing of these conceptual shifts on their relationship. This is followed by a general account of the kinds of relations obtained between science and theology in different periods from antiquity to the present. A final section deals with three recurring issues that also exemplify some general principles.
The first part of this article offers some general remarks about genealogical approaches to histo... more The first part of this article offers some general remarks about genealogical approaches to history, focusing on historical narratives that stress the role played by theological considerations in the formation of aspects of secular modernity. A central question is whether such genealogies can serve to critique the present without drawing upon contestable moral or religious commitments. I suggest that genealogies fulfil this function when they identify inconsistencies in putatively neutral or secular stances by revealing how their coherence ultimately relies upon unacknowledged theological foundations.
2016 saw the publication of Science and Religion: An Impossible Dialogue by French-Canadian socio... more 2016 saw the publication of Science and Religion: An Impossible Dialogue by French-Canadian sociologist Yves Gingras. 1 The book, it must said, does not constitute a particularly helpful intervention, and against the grain of virtually all recent scholarship presents a reactionary reassertion of the discredited notion of an enduring historical conflict between science and religion. 2 But it does offer an interesting challenge, evident in its title, in that it enquires after the conditions of possibility for a dialogue between science and religion, and raises the normative issue of whether such a dialogue is desirable. By way of contrast, much contemporary science-religion discussion has tended to assume, to some degree uncritically, both the possibility and desirability of dialogue between science and religion. 3 This chapter begins with the question posed by Gingras's book, asking what must be true of 'science' and 'religion' for dialogue between them to be possible. One obvious response to this question is that they must in some sense be commensurable: that is, be the kinds of entities that can be in conversation with each other. My suggestion will be the understanding them in these terms can perpetuate an illicit reification in which they come to be understood primarily as enterprises that deliver propositions about the world. The chapter explores two main alternatives: science and religion as formative practices; and science and religion as historical traditions. The latter argument proceeds by way of a discussion of the problem of incommensurability, and potential solutions to it. In both cases, some form of historically informed philosophy turns out to be vital for an understanding of the relations between science and religion.
This essay considers some of the major theological differences between Eastern and Western tradit... more This essay considers some of the major theological differences between Eastern and Western traditions of Christianity and puts forward proposals about how these might be related to the divergent trajectories of the formal study of nature in these two cultural contexts. A key difference lies in the "other-worldly" orientation of Eastern Orthodoxy and its emphasis on deification, which contrast sharply with ideas of original sin and fall-redemption theology in the West. These latter ideas came to play a significant role in the rise of Western science, with the sciences being understood as part of a practical redemptive exercise that could help alleviate the material consequences of original sin.
In a series of impressive works, Alister McGrath has made a major contribution to contemporary na... more In a series of impressive works, Alister McGrath has made a major contribution to contemporary natural theology. The natural theology he has in mind is not the "established" variety, which seeks to provide rational support for religious beliefs from nonreligious premises. Rather, it is an explicitly Christian natural theology that involves "seeing" the world through the lens of Christian revelation. Nevertheless, McGrath seems to hold that a sufficiently capacious understanding of natural theology can encompass both the established version and the broader vision that constitutes his own project. This article suggests that there is a significant tension between these two conceptions of natural theology. It argues that the supposedly "established" version of natural theology was never really established within the Christian tradition to any significant degree but was instead belatedly projected onto it for various reasons. The historical tradition comports with McGrath's project, but not with his generous comprehension of the established conception within a genuinely Christian natural theology.
The year 1667 saw the publication of the History of the Royal Society, a work produced by the pre... more The year 1667 saw the publication of the History of the Royal Society, a work produced by the prelate and preacher Thomas Sprat. Given that the Society first met in 1660 and had only received a formal Royal Charter and its official name in 1663, writing its history at this early juncture might seem to have been a little premature. Close consultation of Sprat's History, however, reveals that its true purpose was less to provide a chronological account of the founding and activities of the Society than to offer an apologetic defence of its methods and potential accomplishments. The fact that its author was better known for his literary abilities than his scientific achievements offers a further clue to the work's true purpose: it was a public relations exercise. Sprat's History was intended to help establish the legitimacy of a scientific enterprise that was considered by many to be politically suspect and of dubious social utility. Many of Sprat's contemporaries held that literary, theological, philosophical, philological, moral, and historical pursuits-activities that we would now classify among the humanities-was where the real action lay. By way of contrast, the new-fangled experimental sciences seemed to aim at crudely utilitarian goals and, even then, were judged to have been unsuccessful in accomplishing them.
Methodological naturalism is usually regarded as compatible with a range of religious commitments... more Methodological naturalism is usually regarded as compatible with a range of religious commitments on the part of scientific practitioners and it is typically assumed that methodological naturalism does not imply metaphysical naturalism. Against this, it has been argued that the cumulative success of the sciences, conducted in conformity with the principle of methodological naturalism, actually provides compelling evidence for the truth of metaphysical naturalism. In this paper I assess the argument for naturalism from the history of science and suggest that it is deficient in a number of ways. There may be reasons for adopting naturalism, but the history of science is not the place to look for them.
The phrase ‘Western values’ calls to mind a long moral tradition dating back to classical antiqui... more The phrase ‘Western values’ calls to mind a long moral tradition dating back to classical antiquity—the thought of the ancient Greeks, the traditions of Roman law, New Testament moral ideals. But the idea that there are such things as ‘Western values’ cannot be found in any of these traditions themselves. The specific concept of ‘Western values’ is not itself part of the tradition to which it putatively refers. In fact, no-one ever thought there was such a thing as ‘Western values’ until the middle decades of the last century. The relative novelty of the idea of Western values is attributable to two factors. First, talk about moral or cultural values turns out to be a historically recent phenomenon. The expression ‘moral values’ was not in use before the middle of the mid-nineteenth century. Second, and turning to the other component of our dual expression, the idea of ‘the West’—in the sense that Western values evokes—is also historically recent. Ironically, for much of its history Europe sought to define its identity by drawing upon cultural norms and traditions that lay beyond its own geographical boundaries. ‘The West’ is not an idea that those now regarded as instantiating it ever had about themselves.
Tertullian is widely regarded as having originated the expression Credo quia absurdum (est) (I be... more Tertullian is widely regarded as having originated the expression Credo quia absurdum (est) (I believe because it is absurd) and the phrase often appears in contemporary polemics about the rationality of religious belief. Patristic scholars have long pointed out that Tertullian never said this or meant anything like it. However, little scholarly attention has been paid to the circumstances in which this specific phrase came into existence and why, in spite of its dubious provenance, it continues to be regarded by many as a legitimate characterization of religious faith. This paper shows how Tertullian's original expression— " It is certain, because impossible " —was first misrepresented and modified in the early modern period. In seventeenth century England a " credo " version—I believe because it is impossible— became the common form of Tertullian's maxim. A further modification, building on the first, was effected by the Enlightenment philosophe Voltaire, who added the " absurdity condition " and gave us the modern version of the paradox: I believe because it is absurd. These modifications played a significant role in Enlightenment representations of religion as irrational, and signal the beginning of a new understanding of faith as an epistemic vice. This doubtful maxim continues to play a role in debates about the cognitive status of religious faith, and its failure to succumb to the historical evidence against it is owing to its ongoing rhetorical usefulness in such debates The North African Church Father Tertullian (c.160-c.225) has the misfortune to be best remembered for something he never said: Credo quia absurdum (est)—I believe because it is absurd. This maxim makes a routine appearance in a wide variety of contemporary contexts: philosophical assessments of the rationality of religious belief, accounts of the putative conflict between science and religion, dictionaries and handbooks, histories of Western thought, and discussions of different theological approaches to knowledge. Almost invariably, Tertullian is depicted as the personification of a regrettable religious anti-rationalism. Patristic scholars have long pointed out that Tertullian said something rather different to the saying typically credited to him. He did not think that the absurdity of a proposition provided a justification for believing it, and almost certainly thought that faith should be supported by reason. Yet the maxim 'I believe because it is absurd' continues to have a life as the one thing that well-read people know about this early Christian writer. This paper is not primarily an attempt to set the record straight, although it will briefly consider the original context of Tertullian's paradox and what he meant by it. Its main purpose is to establish when the expression came to be changed from its original form
Introduction to special issue of Intellectual History Review, 27/1 (2017). With contributions fr... more Introduction to special issue of Intellectual History Review, 27/1 (2017). With contributions from Ian Hunter, Brad Gregory, Peter Harrison, Dominic Erdozain, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Conal Condren, Knox Peden, Simon During
According to a long-standing narrative of Western modernity science is one of the main drivers of... more According to a long-standing narrative of Western modernity science is one of the main drivers of secularization. Science is said to have generated challenges to core religious beliefs and to have provided an alternative, rational way of looking at the world. This narrative typically relies on progressive and teleological understandings of history, and commitment to some version of an ongoing struggle between science and religion. By way of contrast, recent theories of secularization, such as that of Charles Taylor, have suggested that the role of science in secularization has been greatly exaggerated. This article also offers a critique of the standard “science causes secularization” story. But in contrast to other critiques of this kind, it suggests that science nonetheless has a significant role in secularization—one that can be maintained without a commitment to a crude progressivist history or a narrative of science-religion conflict.
Book Symposium on "The Territories of Science and Religion" (Chicago, 2015). My response to Pete... more Book Symposium on "The Territories of Science and Religion" (Chicago, 2015). My response to Peter Kjaergaard, Kaspar von Greyerz, Nathan Ristuccia, and Michael Fuller.
Published version, with footnotes, in Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The... more Published version, with footnotes, in Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century (London: Routledge, 1998) pp. 49-78. Recent studies of the passions in the early modern period have drawn attention to the resurgence of Augustinian accounts of the passions, focusing in particular on their relation to Neostoic views. The lively seventeenth-century debate about the nature of the passions is typically presented as a discussion dominated by philosophical and theological considerations. One of the central features of the Augustinian approach to the passions, however, tends to be routinely overlooked: Augustine's emphasis on the human fall, and its enduring legacy of original sin. These allied notions played a central role in the seventeenth-century treatment of the passions. For both Augustine and his early modern disciples, the fall was not so much a theological doctrine, as an historical event which explained the depravity of the human condition and held out prospects for its alleviation. An important dimension of the seventeenth-century literature on the passions is this historical or mythological component. In this paper I shall show how the narrative of the fall informed the major seventeenth-century treatises on the passions. The story of Adam's fall from grace, moreover, enabled seventeenth-century thinkers to link the mastery of the passions to the scientific enterprise and the quest for dominion over nature. Control of the passions thus became, for the seventeenth century, a means of achieving control over the natural world.
The theory of evolution is often thought to generate unique difficulties for those who subscribe ... more The theory of evolution is often thought to generate unique difficulties for those who subscribe to the idea of providence. This is because evolution by natural selection relies upon random processes and no specific outcomes are guaranteed. Yet this general problem had long been addressed in traditional understandings of providence, which needed to contend with the fact that history seems to be similarly directionless and driven both by contingent human choices and natural accidents. This chapter considers some of the ways in which the ‘historical sciences’ of geology and evolutionary biology were connected to history proper in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and will suggest, amongst other things, that the difficulties which evolution presents for theistic belief arise not so much from its status as a natural science, but from the fact that it makes historical claims.
THAT scholastic philosophers engaged in speculations about how many angels could dance on the hea... more THAT scholastic philosophers engaged in speculations about how many angels could dance on the head of a pin has long been exposed as a myth invented in the seventeenth century. William Chillingworth is usually identified as the originator of this canard on account of his claim, in The Religion of Protestants (1638), that medieval Catholic theologians routinely occupied themselves with such trivial issues as 'Whether a Million of Angels may not sit upon a needles point?' 1 However, there is a hitherto unnoticed seventeenth-century reference to angels and points of needles that is significant not only because it is earlier than Chillingworth's, but also because it adds a new dimension to this old chestnut, offering a key insight into why the specific image of the point of a needle became part of this popular way of caricaturing scholastic disputations.
During the early modern period the proof of God’s existence based on universal consent (consensus... more During the early modern period the proof of God’s existence based on universal consent (consensus gentium) was widely regarded as the most powerful argument that could be deployed against atheism. Yet from the mid-eighteenth century the argument began to disappear from the roster of arguments for God’s existence. Modern readers, moreover, find it difficult to see what makes this a proof at all and wonder why it was ever thought to be persuasive. This article offers a history of the consensus gentium principle, showing why it was long regarded as logically compelling, and explaining its relation to the three better-known ‘classical’ proofs of God’s existence. Consideration of the varying fortunes of this argument yields important insights into the changing nature and status of proofs for God’s existence and especially how these changed during the early modern period. It also shows why the burden of proof has gradually shifted over the past four centuries so that it is now belief in God rather than atheism that is thought to require rational justification. The history of this argument thus sheds light on the emergence of a distinctive feature of secular modernity, in which belief in the existence of God has become just one possibility among others. The article concludes with a brief consideration of modern vestiges of the argument in Rudolf Otto’s sense of the numinous, in revivals of Reidian reliabilism associated with reformed epistemology, and in the work of some practitioners of the cognitive science of religion.
I was delighted to see Paul Tyson's A Christian Theology of Science appear in print. By way of fu... more I was delighted to see Paul Tyson's A Christian Theology of Science appear in print. By way of full disclosure, I was in the fortunate position of watching the book take shape in real time and to have had (at times, lively) discussions with its author about its central claims. Like any stimulating new work that seeks to lay out a new agenda, the book not only articulates a bold thesis, but at the same time raises a host of new questions. What follows is a brief summary of the book's argument as I understand it, followed by some of the questions I was left with having completed it. These mostly concern the overall framing device of the book-what Tyson refers to as 'the first truth discourses' of science and theology. A second, and relatively brief set of questions is to do with what follows from Tyson's analysis for our evaluation and understanding of modern science. A Christian Theology of Science is part of a relatively new and (literally) unapologetic trend to relocate the science-theology discussion into the heart of Christian theology. 1 The central argument of the book is that modern science embodies a worldview that is incompatible with, and indeed opposed to, a genuinely Christian worldview. Tyson speaks in this context of the 'first truth discourse of science' which he opposes to 'the first truth discourse of Christianity' (1-3). The historical thesis is that in the West, from the seventeenth century onwards, the latter was gradually displaced by the former. Tyson identifies the first truth discourse of science with a form of reductive materialism (24-25), while the first truth discourse of Christianity entails belief in doctrinal propositions that coincide broadly with traditional symbols of faith such as the Apostle's Creed (12, 110). The normative thesis is that unless we recognize the implicit tension between these competing discourses, any attempt to understand the relationship between science and religion is doomed to failure. Tyson argues that this is true for most of such efforts since the nineteenth century: these are variously categorized as 'adaptation', 'withdrawal', and 'appropriation' (5-7, cf. 83-88). Adaptation,
This entry offers a history of the different ways in which the formal study of the natural world ... more This entry offers a history of the different ways in which the formal study of the natural world has been related to theological considerations in the Western Christian tradition. Because what counts as science and what counts as theology has changed over time, it begins with a history of the concepts 'theology' and 'science' and the bearing of these conceptual shifts on their relationship. This is followed by a general account of the kinds of relations obtained between science and theology in different periods from antiquity to the present. A final section deals with three recurring issues that also exemplify some general principles.
The first part of this article offers some general remarks about genealogical approaches to histo... more The first part of this article offers some general remarks about genealogical approaches to history, focusing on historical narratives that stress the role played by theological considerations in the formation of aspects of secular modernity. A central question is whether such genealogies can serve to critique the present without drawing upon contestable moral or religious commitments. I suggest that genealogies fulfil this function when they identify inconsistencies in putatively neutral or secular stances by revealing how their coherence ultimately relies upon unacknowledged theological foundations.
2016 saw the publication of Science and Religion: An Impossible Dialogue by French-Canadian socio... more 2016 saw the publication of Science and Religion: An Impossible Dialogue by French-Canadian sociologist Yves Gingras. 1 The book, it must said, does not constitute a particularly helpful intervention, and against the grain of virtually all recent scholarship presents a reactionary reassertion of the discredited notion of an enduring historical conflict between science and religion. 2 But it does offer an interesting challenge, evident in its title, in that it enquires after the conditions of possibility for a dialogue between science and religion, and raises the normative issue of whether such a dialogue is desirable. By way of contrast, much contemporary science-religion discussion has tended to assume, to some degree uncritically, both the possibility and desirability of dialogue between science and religion. 3 This chapter begins with the question posed by Gingras's book, asking what must be true of 'science' and 'religion' for dialogue between them to be possible. One obvious response to this question is that they must in some sense be commensurable: that is, be the kinds of entities that can be in conversation with each other. My suggestion will be the understanding them in these terms can perpetuate an illicit reification in which they come to be understood primarily as enterprises that deliver propositions about the world. The chapter explores two main alternatives: science and religion as formative practices; and science and religion as historical traditions. The latter argument proceeds by way of a discussion of the problem of incommensurability, and potential solutions to it. In both cases, some form of historically informed philosophy turns out to be vital for an understanding of the relations between science and religion.
This essay considers some of the major theological differences between Eastern and Western tradit... more This essay considers some of the major theological differences between Eastern and Western traditions of Christianity and puts forward proposals about how these might be related to the divergent trajectories of the formal study of nature in these two cultural contexts. A key difference lies in the "other-worldly" orientation of Eastern Orthodoxy and its emphasis on deification, which contrast sharply with ideas of original sin and fall-redemption theology in the West. These latter ideas came to play a significant role in the rise of Western science, with the sciences being understood as part of a practical redemptive exercise that could help alleviate the material consequences of original sin.
In a series of impressive works, Alister McGrath has made a major contribution to contemporary na... more In a series of impressive works, Alister McGrath has made a major contribution to contemporary natural theology. The natural theology he has in mind is not the "established" variety, which seeks to provide rational support for religious beliefs from nonreligious premises. Rather, it is an explicitly Christian natural theology that involves "seeing" the world through the lens of Christian revelation. Nevertheless, McGrath seems to hold that a sufficiently capacious understanding of natural theology can encompass both the established version and the broader vision that constitutes his own project. This article suggests that there is a significant tension between these two conceptions of natural theology. It argues that the supposedly "established" version of natural theology was never really established within the Christian tradition to any significant degree but was instead belatedly projected onto it for various reasons. The historical tradition comports with McGrath's project, but not with his generous comprehension of the established conception within a genuinely Christian natural theology.
The year 1667 saw the publication of the History of the Royal Society, a work produced by the pre... more The year 1667 saw the publication of the History of the Royal Society, a work produced by the prelate and preacher Thomas Sprat. Given that the Society first met in 1660 and had only received a formal Royal Charter and its official name in 1663, writing its history at this early juncture might seem to have been a little premature. Close consultation of Sprat's History, however, reveals that its true purpose was less to provide a chronological account of the founding and activities of the Society than to offer an apologetic defence of its methods and potential accomplishments. The fact that its author was better known for his literary abilities than his scientific achievements offers a further clue to the work's true purpose: it was a public relations exercise. Sprat's History was intended to help establish the legitimacy of a scientific enterprise that was considered by many to be politically suspect and of dubious social utility. Many of Sprat's contemporaries held that literary, theological, philosophical, philological, moral, and historical pursuits-activities that we would now classify among the humanities-was where the real action lay. By way of contrast, the new-fangled experimental sciences seemed to aim at crudely utilitarian goals and, even then, were judged to have been unsuccessful in accomplishing them.
Methodological naturalism is usually regarded as compatible with a range of religious commitments... more Methodological naturalism is usually regarded as compatible with a range of religious commitments on the part of scientific practitioners and it is typically assumed that methodological naturalism does not imply metaphysical naturalism. Against this, it has been argued that the cumulative success of the sciences, conducted in conformity with the principle of methodological naturalism, actually provides compelling evidence for the truth of metaphysical naturalism. In this paper I assess the argument for naturalism from the history of science and suggest that it is deficient in a number of ways. There may be reasons for adopting naturalism, but the history of science is not the place to look for them.
The phrase ‘Western values’ calls to mind a long moral tradition dating back to classical antiqui... more The phrase ‘Western values’ calls to mind a long moral tradition dating back to classical antiquity—the thought of the ancient Greeks, the traditions of Roman law, New Testament moral ideals. But the idea that there are such things as ‘Western values’ cannot be found in any of these traditions themselves. The specific concept of ‘Western values’ is not itself part of the tradition to which it putatively refers. In fact, no-one ever thought there was such a thing as ‘Western values’ until the middle decades of the last century. The relative novelty of the idea of Western values is attributable to two factors. First, talk about moral or cultural values turns out to be a historically recent phenomenon. The expression ‘moral values’ was not in use before the middle of the mid-nineteenth century. Second, and turning to the other component of our dual expression, the idea of ‘the West’—in the sense that Western values evokes—is also historically recent. Ironically, for much of its history Europe sought to define its identity by drawing upon cultural norms and traditions that lay beyond its own geographical boundaries. ‘The West’ is not an idea that those now regarded as instantiating it ever had about themselves.
Tertullian is widely regarded as having originated the expression Credo quia absurdum (est) (I be... more Tertullian is widely regarded as having originated the expression Credo quia absurdum (est) (I believe because it is absurd) and the phrase often appears in contemporary polemics about the rationality of religious belief. Patristic scholars have long pointed out that Tertullian never said this or meant anything like it. However, little scholarly attention has been paid to the circumstances in which this specific phrase came into existence and why, in spite of its dubious provenance, it continues to be regarded by many as a legitimate characterization of religious faith. This paper shows how Tertullian's original expression— " It is certain, because impossible " —was first misrepresented and modified in the early modern period. In seventeenth century England a " credo " version—I believe because it is impossible— became the common form of Tertullian's maxim. A further modification, building on the first, was effected by the Enlightenment philosophe Voltaire, who added the " absurdity condition " and gave us the modern version of the paradox: I believe because it is absurd. These modifications played a significant role in Enlightenment representations of religion as irrational, and signal the beginning of a new understanding of faith as an epistemic vice. This doubtful maxim continues to play a role in debates about the cognitive status of religious faith, and its failure to succumb to the historical evidence against it is owing to its ongoing rhetorical usefulness in such debates The North African Church Father Tertullian (c.160-c.225) has the misfortune to be best remembered for something he never said: Credo quia absurdum (est)—I believe because it is absurd. This maxim makes a routine appearance in a wide variety of contemporary contexts: philosophical assessments of the rationality of religious belief, accounts of the putative conflict between science and religion, dictionaries and handbooks, histories of Western thought, and discussions of different theological approaches to knowledge. Almost invariably, Tertullian is depicted as the personification of a regrettable religious anti-rationalism. Patristic scholars have long pointed out that Tertullian said something rather different to the saying typically credited to him. He did not think that the absurdity of a proposition provided a justification for believing it, and almost certainly thought that faith should be supported by reason. Yet the maxim 'I believe because it is absurd' continues to have a life as the one thing that well-read people know about this early Christian writer. This paper is not primarily an attempt to set the record straight, although it will briefly consider the original context of Tertullian's paradox and what he meant by it. Its main purpose is to establish when the expression came to be changed from its original form
Introduction to special issue of Intellectual History Review, 27/1 (2017). With contributions fr... more Introduction to special issue of Intellectual History Review, 27/1 (2017). With contributions from Ian Hunter, Brad Gregory, Peter Harrison, Dominic Erdozain, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Conal Condren, Knox Peden, Simon During
According to a long-standing narrative of Western modernity science is one of the main drivers of... more According to a long-standing narrative of Western modernity science is one of the main drivers of secularization. Science is said to have generated challenges to core religious beliefs and to have provided an alternative, rational way of looking at the world. This narrative typically relies on progressive and teleological understandings of history, and commitment to some version of an ongoing struggle between science and religion. By way of contrast, recent theories of secularization, such as that of Charles Taylor, have suggested that the role of science in secularization has been greatly exaggerated. This article also offers a critique of the standard “science causes secularization” story. But in contrast to other critiques of this kind, it suggests that science nonetheless has a significant role in secularization—one that can be maintained without a commitment to a crude progressivist history or a narrative of science-religion conflict.
Book Symposium on "The Territories of Science and Religion" (Chicago, 2015). My response to Pete... more Book Symposium on "The Territories of Science and Religion" (Chicago, 2015). My response to Peter Kjaergaard, Kaspar von Greyerz, Nathan Ristuccia, and Michael Fuller.
Published version, with footnotes, in Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The... more Published version, with footnotes, in Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century (London: Routledge, 1998) pp. 49-78. Recent studies of the passions in the early modern period have drawn attention to the resurgence of Augustinian accounts of the passions, focusing in particular on their relation to Neostoic views. The lively seventeenth-century debate about the nature of the passions is typically presented as a discussion dominated by philosophical and theological considerations. One of the central features of the Augustinian approach to the passions, however, tends to be routinely overlooked: Augustine's emphasis on the human fall, and its enduring legacy of original sin. These allied notions played a central role in the seventeenth-century treatment of the passions. For both Augustine and his early modern disciples, the fall was not so much a theological doctrine, as an historical event which explained the depravity of the human condition and held out prospects for its alleviation. An important dimension of the seventeenth-century literature on the passions is this historical or mythological component. In this paper I shall show how the narrative of the fall informed the major seventeenth-century treatises on the passions. The story of Adam's fall from grace, moreover, enabled seventeenth-century thinkers to link the mastery of the passions to the scientific enterprise and the quest for dominion over nature. Control of the passions thus became, for the seventeenth century, a means of achieving control over the natural world.
The theory of evolution is often thought to generate unique difficulties for those who subscribe ... more The theory of evolution is often thought to generate unique difficulties for those who subscribe to the idea of providence. This is because evolution by natural selection relies upon random processes and no specific outcomes are guaranteed. Yet this general problem had long been addressed in traditional understandings of providence, which needed to contend with the fact that history seems to be similarly directionless and driven both by contingent human choices and natural accidents. This chapter considers some of the ways in which the ‘historical sciences’ of geology and evolutionary biology were connected to history proper in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and will suggest, amongst other things, that the difficulties which evolution presents for theistic belief arise not so much from its status as a natural science, but from the fact that it makes historical claims.
THAT scholastic philosophers engaged in speculations about how many angels could dance on the hea... more THAT scholastic philosophers engaged in speculations about how many angels could dance on the head of a pin has long been exposed as a myth invented in the seventeenth century. William Chillingworth is usually identified as the originator of this canard on account of his claim, in The Religion of Protestants (1638), that medieval Catholic theologians routinely occupied themselves with such trivial issues as 'Whether a Million of Angels may not sit upon a needles point?' 1 However, there is a hitherto unnoticed seventeenth-century reference to angels and points of needles that is significant not only because it is earlier than Chillingworth's, but also because it adds a new dimension to this old chestnut, offering a key insight into why the specific image of the point of a needle became part of this popular way of caricaturing scholastic disputations.
Symposium on Peter Harrison, The territories of science and religion. Chicago: Chicago University... more Symposium on Peter Harrison, The territories of science and religion. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2015. xiii + 300 pp. $30 Cloth I am grateful to my interlocutors for their careful reading of the book and their incisive remarks. Thanks also to the editors of Metascience for this opportunity to offer a brief response. Necessarily, I am unable to respond to everything the commentators have raised and instead will address four major concerns which to varying degrees appear in each of the three commentaries. 1. Christianity and Propositional Religion. One of the key arguments of the book is that the modern understanding of the relationship between science and religion requires a careful investigation of the origins of the concepts themselves. In relation to 'religion', my argument was that our modern idea of plural religions characterised by sets of beliefs and practices is an idea that appears for the first time in the early modern period. All three of my reviewers have expressed various levels of doubt about this claim, pointing variously to the importance of creedal statements for the early church, to the vigour with which heresy (false belief) was pursued in the middle ages, and to the fact that the pre-modern relations between Christianity and Judaism (and possibly Islam) already look
New Directions in Theology and Science: Beyond Dialogue, 2022
This book sets out a new agenda for science-theology interactions. It explores how science-theolo... more This book sets out a new agenda for science-theology interactions. It explores how science-theology discussions can constructively change as a result of recent developments in the history of science, the sociology of religion, and theology. The contributions take seriously the historically conditioned nature of the categories "science" and "religion" and consider the ways in which these categories are reinforced in the public sphere. Reflecting on the balance of power between theology and the sciences, the authors demonstrate a commitment to moving beyond scientistic dialogue and seek to give theology a more active role in determining the interdisciplinary agenda.
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Papers by Peter Harrison
Erdozain, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Conal Condren, Knox Peden, Simon During
Erdozain, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Conal Condren, Knox Peden, Simon During