Books by Julien A. Deonna
Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is b... more Desires matter. What are desires? Many believe that desire is a motivational state: desiring is being disposed to act. This conception aligns with the functionalist approach to desire and the standard account of desire's role in explaining action. According to a second influential approach, however, desire is first and foremost an evaluation: desiring is representing something as good. After all, we seem to desire things under the guise of the good. Which understanding of desire is more accurate? Is the guise of the good even right to assume? Should we adopt an alternative picture that emphasizes desire's deontic nature? What do neuroscientific studies suggest? Essays in the first section of the volume are devoted to these questions, and to the puzzle of desire's essence. In the second part of the volume, essays investigate some implications that the various conceptions of desire have on a number of fundamental issues. For example, why are inconsistent desires problematic? What is desire's role in practical deliberation? How do we know what we want? This volume will contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on a neglected, albeit crucial, dimension of the mind.
Le plaisir est-il une valeur ? La vertu requiert-elle l’exercice de la raison ? Le goût est-il ob... more Le plaisir est-il une valeur ? La vertu requiert-elle l’exercice de la raison ? Le goût est-il objectif ? Peut-on mettre un prix à la vie d’une personne ? Une chose peut-elle être drôle si elle ne fait rire personne ? En quoi l’amitié diffère-t-elle de l’amour ? Est-il immoral d’être impartial ? L’esclave est-il libre si son maître bienveillant n’interfère jamais dans ses choix ? Voici quelques unes des questions abordées dans ce Petit Traité des valeurs, composé de trente-cinq essais brefs et originaux consacrés à la présentation d’une notion particulière.
Si nous invoquons sans cesse notre attachement à certaines valeurs, leur existence ne va néanmoins pas de soi. Les valeurs ne sont-elles que le reflet de nos attitudes ? À l’inverse, les choses pourraient-elles être belles, utiles, intéressantes ou plaisantes en l’absence de quiconque pour les apprécier ou en faire l’expérience ?
Chaque valeur retenue fait l’objet d’une étude menée par un philosophe qui s’efforce d’en déployer le sens et les enjeux et de présenter l’attrait des controverses qu’elle soulève.
"The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of th... more "The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us?
The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics:
the diversity and unity of the emotions
the relations between emotion, belief and desire
the nature of values
the relations between emotions and perceptions
emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes
the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge
the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits.
Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences."
See Review here: http://www.disputatio.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Smith-Joel_Are-Emotions-Embodied-Evaluative-Attitudes.pdf
"Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in discipli... more "Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and political applications?
In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account of shame aimed at answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support what they call the two dogmas about shame: its alleged social nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a sophisticated understanding of its moral significance.
This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics and public policy."
Review: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/42308-in-defense-of-shame-the-faces-of-an-emotion/
Cet ouvrage répond à la question « Qu’est-ce qu’une émotion? » à la lumière des débats les plus c... more Cet ouvrage répond à la question « Qu’est-ce qu’une émotion? » à la lumière des débats les plus contemporains en philosophie des émotions tout en s’appuyant sur les recherches empiriques les plus récentes au sujet de l’affect. Une fois exposée la manière dont les émotions se distinguent d’autres phénomènes affectifs tels que les humeurs, les sentiments et les dispositions affectives, l’étude propose une élucidation originale du problème majeur auquel fait face aujourd’hui la philosophie des émotions : comment comprendre la spécificité de l’intentionnalité affective? A travers une discussion à la fois fouillée et didactique des théories contemporaines les plus abouties concernant les relations entre émotion et désir d’une part, et entre émotion et valeur d’autre part, les auteurs défendent l’idée selon laquelle le corps ressenti peut fonctionner comme présentation intentionnelle en première personne d’un monde de valeurs.
Papers by Julien A. Deonna
Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes eBooks, 2008
Desire has not been at the center of recent preoccupations in the philosophy of mind. Consequentl... more Desire has not been at the center of recent preoccupations in the philosophy of mind. Consequently, the literature settled into several dogmas. The first part of this introduction presents these dogmas and invites readers to scrutinize them. The main dogma is that desires are motivational states. This approach contrasts with the other dominant conception: desires are positive evaluations. But there are at least four other dogmas: the world should conform to our desires (world-to-mind direction of fit), desires involve a positive evaluation (the “guise of the good”), we cannot desire what we think is actual (the “death of desire” principle), and, in neuroscience, the idea that the reward system is the key to understanding desire. The second part of the introduction summarizes the contributions to this volume. The hope is to contribute to the emergence of a fruitful debate on this neglected, albeit crucial, aspect of the mind.
Article de synthèse sur la philosophie des émotions abordant les sujets suivants:
1. Les émotion... more Article de synthèse sur la philosophie des émotions abordant les sujets suivants:
1. Les émotions et le domaine affectif
2. Émotions et évaluations
3. Épistémologie et compréhension
4. Inné vs acquis
5. Émotions et action
6. Émotions et éthique
U. Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, 2017
This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds... more This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, we focus on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such as sadness, fear and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria’s remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger’s relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focussing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? We shall see that there are reasons to think it does. Still, are these reasons of sufficient import to dispel the scepticism of those who think that nothing of consequence plays out at the personal level of emotional experience? Given the role of emotional experience in our evaluative practices, we shall conclude that they are. Our discussion is structured as follows: section 1 focuses on feeling approaches to phenomenology, section 2 on componential approaches, section 3 on perceptual approaches and section 4 on attitudinal approaches. Section 5 concludes with some observations regarding the significance of emotional phenomenology.
WIREs Cognitive Science, 2015
We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – ... more We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then address the question of the social dimension of emotions, explaining how the traditional nature vs. nurture contrast applies to the emotions. We finish by exploring the relations between emotions, motivation and action, concluding this overview with a more specific focus on how these relations bear on some central ethical issues.
dialectica, 2015
In this article, we encourage a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions qualify as eva... more In this article, we encourage a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions qualify as evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion-value connection at the level of emotional content and that we should instead locate it at the level of emotional attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we situate the leading accounts of the emotions in the contemporary literature. We next offer reasons to think that these accounts face substantial problems since they conceive of the link emotions bear to values at the level of content. This provides the incentive to pursue an alternative approach according to which emotions qualify as evaluations because they are specific types of attitudes, an approach we then substantiate by appealing to felt bodily stances. We conclude by considering two reasons for which such an approach may be resisted and which respectively pertain to the alleged impossibility to draw an attitude-content contrast in emotions and the suspicion that it introduces qualia.
D. Sander and T. Brosch (eds.), Handbook of Value, pp. 155-174, 2015
There are close links between emotions and values, or at least this is what our ordinary ways of ... more There are close links between emotions and values, or at least this is what our ordinary ways of talking suggest. For many, if not all, types of emotion it is thus possible to find a corresponding evaluative term, one often derived from the name of the emotion in question. These are for example evaluative terms such as ‘shameful’, ‘offensive, ‘annoying’, ‘dangerous’, ‘contemptible’, ‘admirable’, ‘amusing’, ‘exciting’, ‘boring’, and the like. Starting perhaps from these linguistic observations, the philosophical task is of course to elucidate the nature of the links between emotions and values, and attempts at doing so have traditionally revolved around the following three questions: first, what is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, should dangerousness be understood in term of the fear response? Second, what is the role of emotions in our getting access to values? For example, what may be the role of fear in becoming aware that a given animal is dangerous? Third, what value do emotions have? For example, is fear of special value because it helps behaving appropriately towards its object? We hall take up these questions in turn and survey the most important answers they have received in the literature. As we shall discover, answering the first question amounts to surveying a variety of theories according to which there is an ontological relation between values and emotions since the former should be elucidated in terms of the latter (Sec. 1). Addressing the second question consists in reviewing theories according to which there is an intentional relation between emotions and values because the former are apprehensions of value or evaluations (Sec. 2). Grappling with the third question, we shall explore some reasons for thinking that emotions can exemplify values (Sec. 3).
Philosophical Topics, Special Issue on Happiness, E. Zamuner and T. O’Leary (ed.)
In this article, we ask whether and in what way emotions are in themselves good for the well-bein... more In this article, we ask whether and in what way emotions are in themselves good for the well-being of the individuals who experience them. Our overall argument aims at showing that an objectivist list theory of well-being suitably anchored within a value-based theory of the emotions provides the best framework for answering these questions. Emotions so conceived, we claim, provide for the sort of first-person perspective understanding of values that is required in order to pursue them. This conclusion we reach only after having brought to light in the first part of the article the limitations of rival hedonist and desire-based theories of well-being. We conclude that at least part of the insights fuelling these theories, i.e. getting what one wants and good feelings are a measure of how well our lives go, can happily be accounted for within the approach we recommend.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40.10, 1270-1284, Sep 2014
This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a viol... more This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterized
by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened
moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in
the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war (Ns = 147, 256, 399). Results showed
that the two forms of shame could be distinguished. Moreover, once the other form of shame was controlled for, they were
differentially related to orientations toward the outgroup: Image Shame was associated with negative orientations, whereas
Moral Shame had associations with positive outgroup orientations. These associations were distinct from the associations of
guilt and rejection. Study 3 used a longitudinal design and provided evidence suggestive of a causal direction from emotions
to outgroup orientation.
In: Anne Reboul (ed.) Mind, Value and Metaphysics: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. Dordrecht: Springer
Simulation , if used as a way of becoming aware of other people’s mental states, is the joint exe... more Simulation , if used as a way of becoming aware of other people’s mental states, is the joint exercise of imagination and attribution. If A simulates B, then (i) A attributes to B the mental state in which A finds herself at the end of a process in which (ii) A has imagined being in B’s situation. Although necessary, imagination and attribution are not sufficient for simulation: the latter occurs only if (iii) the imagination process grounds or justifies the
attribution. Depending on the notion of justification we use to make sense of the idea that an episode of imagining
serves as a reason for attributing a mental state, the shape of the debate and the options it offers look very different. Reconfiguring the discussion in this way, we claim, shifts the focus of the simulation vs. theory-theory debate to a question located in
epistemology.
C. Todd and S. Roser (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford: Oxford , Nov 2014
Why think that emotions are kinds of evaluations? This chapter puts forward an original account o... more Why think that emotions are kinds of evaluations? This chapter puts forward an original account of emotions as evaluations apt to circumvent some of the chief difficulties with which alternative approaches find themselves confronted. We shall proceed by
first introducing the idea that emotions are evaluations (sec. I). Next, two well-known approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are in and of themselves unemotional but are alleged to become emotional when directed towards evaluative contents are explored. According to the first approach, emotions are nothing but evaluative judgments. Sec. II reminds the reader of the problems associated with this idea: one of its consequences is to deprive creatures with limited cognitive
capacities of any sort of partaking of emotional life. According to the second approach, which is often praised for its capacity to avoid the pitfalls facing an appeal to evaluative judgments, emotions are perception-like experiences of evaluative properties and are as such within the reach of creatures bereft of conceptual capacities. This perceptual theory is taken up in sect. III, in which we explain why it remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that what makes emotions evaluations is the specific contents that they have. On this basis, we proceed by outlining in sect. IV an alternative—the attitudinal theory of emotions. Its main point of departure from current theorizing about the emotions consists in elucidating the fact that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but rather in terms of the sort of attitude subjects take towards what they represent. We explore here what sorts of attitudes emotions are and defend the idea that they are felt bodily attitudes.
In Anita Konzelmann Ziv, Keith Lehrer & Hans Bernard Schmid (eds.), Self-Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality. Springer, 2011
In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is ... more In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regard shame as displaying a structure in which ‘others’ play an essential role. We argue that while all these theses are true of some important families of shame episodes, none of them generalize so as to motivate the conclusion that shame is an essentially social emotion. We consider each thesis in turn, explaining in the process their connections with one another as well as the constraints on a theory of shame they help uncover. Finally, we show how a non-social picture of shame is not only capable of meeting these constraints, but has the further virtue of shedding light on those situations in which others seem to play no role in why we feel shame.
in Hügli, Anton (red.), Horn, Anita et al. (dir.): Die anthropologische Wende. Studia philosophica 72, Basel: Schwabe, 131-152.
"In this article, I ask whether it is possible to reconcile the claim that animals have emotions ... more "In this article, I ask whether it is possible to reconcile the claim that animals have emotions with the attractive and widespread idea that emotions are relations between a subject and a value. I start by explaining that the challenge requires that we avoid ascribing to animals cognitive capacities that are too complex and I close by putting forward a theory which, through its specific articulation of the relation between emotion and value, is ideally placed to meet this challenge. Before that, I present the grounds for the claim that emotions are forms of evaluations. I stress the fact that!this idea has traditionally led to a theory of emotions according to which emotions are nothing but judgments of value, the consequence being that animals are construed as devoid of emotions. I then consider whether a particular theory – the perceptual theory – is apt to resolve the problem. According to it, emotions constitute experiences of evaluative properties which could be enjoyed by members of many different species. Given that there are compelling reasons to reject this theory, I finally present
an original alternative – the attitudinal theory of emotions – that has the virtue, among others, of being able to account for animal emotions."
Dialogue 51.1, 55-77, 2012
Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need f... more Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the roles of motivational bases. Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for justified evaluative judgements.
Emotion Review, Jan 1, 2010
Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, w... more Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not qualify as intentional. We argue that these disappearing acts, deliberate or not, generate fruitless debate and add little to the advancement of our understanding of emotion as an adaptive mechanism to cope with events that are relevant to an organism’s life
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Books by Julien A. Deonna
Si nous invoquons sans cesse notre attachement à certaines valeurs, leur existence ne va néanmoins pas de soi. Les valeurs ne sont-elles que le reflet de nos attitudes ? À l’inverse, les choses pourraient-elles être belles, utiles, intéressantes ou plaisantes en l’absence de quiconque pour les apprécier ou en faire l’expérience ?
Chaque valeur retenue fait l’objet d’une étude menée par un philosophe qui s’efforce d’en déployer le sens et les enjeux et de présenter l’attrait des controverses qu’elle soulève.
The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics:
the diversity and unity of the emotions
the relations between emotion, belief and desire
the nature of values
the relations between emotions and perceptions
emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes
the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge
the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits.
Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences."
See Review here: http://www.disputatio.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Smith-Joel_Are-Emotions-Embodied-Evaluative-Attitudes.pdf
In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account of shame aimed at answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support what they call the two dogmas about shame: its alleged social nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a sophisticated understanding of its moral significance.
This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics and public policy."
Review: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/42308-in-defense-of-shame-the-faces-of-an-emotion/
Papers by Julien A. Deonna
1. Les émotions et le domaine affectif
2. Émotions et évaluations
3. Épistémologie et compréhension
4. Inné vs acquis
5. Émotions et action
6. Émotions et éthique
by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened
moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in
the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war (Ns = 147, 256, 399). Results showed
that the two forms of shame could be distinguished. Moreover, once the other form of shame was controlled for, they were
differentially related to orientations toward the outgroup: Image Shame was associated with negative orientations, whereas
Moral Shame had associations with positive outgroup orientations. These associations were distinct from the associations of
guilt and rejection. Study 3 used a longitudinal design and provided evidence suggestive of a causal direction from emotions
to outgroup orientation.
attribution. Depending on the notion of justification we use to make sense of the idea that an episode of imagining
serves as a reason for attributing a mental state, the shape of the debate and the options it offers look very different. Reconfiguring the discussion in this way, we claim, shifts the focus of the simulation vs. theory-theory debate to a question located in
epistemology.
first introducing the idea that emotions are evaluations (sec. I). Next, two well-known approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are in and of themselves unemotional but are alleged to become emotional when directed towards evaluative contents are explored. According to the first approach, emotions are nothing but evaluative judgments. Sec. II reminds the reader of the problems associated with this idea: one of its consequences is to deprive creatures with limited cognitive
capacities of any sort of partaking of emotional life. According to the second approach, which is often praised for its capacity to avoid the pitfalls facing an appeal to evaluative judgments, emotions are perception-like experiences of evaluative properties and are as such within the reach of creatures bereft of conceptual capacities. This perceptual theory is taken up in sect. III, in which we explain why it remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that what makes emotions evaluations is the specific contents that they have. On this basis, we proceed by outlining in sect. IV an alternative—the attitudinal theory of emotions. Its main point of departure from current theorizing about the emotions consists in elucidating the fact that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but rather in terms of the sort of attitude subjects take towards what they represent. We explore here what sorts of attitudes emotions are and defend the idea that they are felt bodily attitudes.
an original alternative – the attitudinal theory of emotions – that has the virtue, among others, of being able to account for animal emotions."
Si nous invoquons sans cesse notre attachement à certaines valeurs, leur existence ne va néanmoins pas de soi. Les valeurs ne sont-elles que le reflet de nos attitudes ? À l’inverse, les choses pourraient-elles être belles, utiles, intéressantes ou plaisantes en l’absence de quiconque pour les apprécier ou en faire l’expérience ?
Chaque valeur retenue fait l’objet d’une étude menée par un philosophe qui s’efforce d’en déployer le sens et les enjeux et de présenter l’attrait des controverses qu’elle soulève.
The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics:
the diversity and unity of the emotions
the relations between emotion, belief and desire
the nature of values
the relations between emotions and perceptions
emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes
the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge
the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits.
Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences."
See Review here: http://www.disputatio.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Smith-Joel_Are-Emotions-Embodied-Evaluative-Attitudes.pdf
In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account of shame aimed at answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support what they call the two dogmas about shame: its alleged social nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a sophisticated understanding of its moral significance.
This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics and public policy."
Review: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/42308-in-defense-of-shame-the-faces-of-an-emotion/
1. Les émotions et le domaine affectif
2. Émotions et évaluations
3. Épistémologie et compréhension
4. Inné vs acquis
5. Émotions et action
6. Émotions et éthique
by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened
moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in
the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war (Ns = 147, 256, 399). Results showed
that the two forms of shame could be distinguished. Moreover, once the other form of shame was controlled for, they were
differentially related to orientations toward the outgroup: Image Shame was associated with negative orientations, whereas
Moral Shame had associations with positive outgroup orientations. These associations were distinct from the associations of
guilt and rejection. Study 3 used a longitudinal design and provided evidence suggestive of a causal direction from emotions
to outgroup orientation.
attribution. Depending on the notion of justification we use to make sense of the idea that an episode of imagining
serves as a reason for attributing a mental state, the shape of the debate and the options it offers look very different. Reconfiguring the discussion in this way, we claim, shifts the focus of the simulation vs. theory-theory debate to a question located in
epistemology.
first introducing the idea that emotions are evaluations (sec. I). Next, two well-known approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are in and of themselves unemotional but are alleged to become emotional when directed towards evaluative contents are explored. According to the first approach, emotions are nothing but evaluative judgments. Sec. II reminds the reader of the problems associated with this idea: one of its consequences is to deprive creatures with limited cognitive
capacities of any sort of partaking of emotional life. According to the second approach, which is often praised for its capacity to avoid the pitfalls facing an appeal to evaluative judgments, emotions are perception-like experiences of evaluative properties and are as such within the reach of creatures bereft of conceptual capacities. This perceptual theory is taken up in sect. III, in which we explain why it remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that what makes emotions evaluations is the specific contents that they have. On this basis, we proceed by outlining in sect. IV an alternative—the attitudinal theory of emotions. Its main point of departure from current theorizing about the emotions consists in elucidating the fact that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but rather in terms of the sort of attitude subjects take towards what they represent. We explore here what sorts of attitudes emotions are and defend the idea that they are felt bodily attitudes.
an original alternative – the attitudinal theory of emotions – that has the virtue, among others, of being able to account for animal emotions."
. In this article, the authors take seriously the categories of emotions, moods,temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of therelations existing among the phenomena they cover. They argue that whereas ascribingcharacter traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stabilityin the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions)is to ascribe a certain stability in the moods (episodes) she is likely to feel. The rationale for this distinction, the authors claim, lies in the fact that, whereas appeal to character traits or sentiments in explanation is tantamount to making sense of a given behaviour in terms of anindividual’s specific evaluative perspective --- as embodied in this individual’s emotional profile --- appeal to temperaments makes sense of it independently of any such evaluative perspective.