Psychology

On September 12, 2001, 54 Duke students recorded their memory of first hearing about the terrorist attacks of September 11 and of a recent everyday event. They were tested again either 1, 6, or 32 weeks later. Consistency for the flashbulb and everyday memories did not differ, in both cases declining over time. However, ratings of vividness, recollection, and belief in the accuracy of memory declined only for everyday memories. Initial visceral emotion ratings correlated with later belief in accuracy, but not consistency, for flashbulb memories. Initial visceral emotion ratings predicted later posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms. Flashbulb memories are not special in their accuracy, as previously claimed, but only in their perceived accuracy.

In survey research, the use of decomposition can lead to pronounced reporting errors as seen by overreporting and overall reporting error. A total of 87 subjects answered either decomposed or undecomposed questions concerning telephone calls made by them while at work. The questionnaire conditions varied the length of the reference period (1 week or 6 months), and the type of call (local or long-distance). Decomposition conditions introduced either spatial or temporal cues. In all comparisons, decomposed questions increased over-reporting bias relative to undecomposed questions. In addition, undecomposed questions with a 1-week reference period led to increased overreporting bias in comparison to undecomposed/6-month questions. Results are consistent with a category split estimation model in which smaller categories are predicted to lead to overreporting, and larger categories to under-reporting. Decomposition is not recommended for gaining retrospective reports of non-distinctive, frequent events.

Consistency of flashbulb memories (FBMs) of the 11th September terrorist attacks and of everyday memories (EDMs) of the preceding weekend do not differ, in both cases declining over the following year for a group of Duke University undergraduates. However, ratings of recollection, vividness and other phenomenological properties were consistently higher for FBMs than for EDMs across time. Belief in the accuracy of memory was initially high for both memories, but declined over time only for EDMs. These findings confirm that FBMs are not extraordinarily accurate, but they may systematically differ from EDMs in other meaningful ways.

The intensity and valence of 30 emotion terms, 30 events typical of those emotions, and 30 autobiographical memories cued by those emotions were each rated by different groups of 40
undergraduates. A vector model gave a consistently better account of the data than a circumplex model, both overall and in the absence of high-intensity, neutral valence stimuli. The Positive Activation
Negative Activation (PANA) model could be tested at high levels of activation, where it is identical to the vector model. The results replicated when ratings of arousal were used instead of ratings of intensity for the events and autobiographical memories. A reanalysis of word norms gave further support for the vector and PANA models by demonstrating that neutral valence, high-arousal ratings resulted from the averaging of individual positive and negative valence ratings. Thus, compared to a circumplex model,
vector and PANA models provided overall better fits.

Students from the Lafayette Class of 2011 (N
100) described events that occurred during their transition to college. Three were unique events (receiving their acceptance letter, being left alone on
campus, and taking the class photograph) and three were first-time experiences (first seeing their dorm room, meeting their roommate, and attending their first college class). The definitional criteria for flashbulb memories (FBM) was met for all six events; memory reports included what participants were doing, where they were, who they were with, the emotions they experienced, and other idiosyncratic details. Therefore, transitional events are a productive analogue for traditional FBM research. Unique
events were rated as more emotional and significant than first-time events, yet both were recalled with similarly enhanced vividness and confidence and both included similar content. Extensions of this method to investigations of other open questions in FBM research are discussed.

To examine recall of personal spatial location during a previously experienced event, Lafayette College students located themselves in a version of their incoming class photograph that was all black with each individual figure identified in white. They then subsequently identified themselves in the original version
of the photograph. The distance between the initial choice in the obscured version and the individual’s correct location was recorded. Participants were remarkably and equally accurate in identifying their location irrespective of whether the event occurred 2, 6, 18, 30, 38, or 42 months earlier. Although nonspatial aspects of the cue and rehearsal did not influence accuracy, objective location in the photograph partially accounted for error rates. However, none of these factors was sufficient to explain the absence of delay effects. Unlike spatial memory, recall of temporal information showed a linear decrease in accuracy with delay, but with exceptionally accurate performance by senior-class students.

Berntsen’s social identity model of flashbulb memory was applied to recall of the 2008 Lafayette–Lehigh (‘The Rivalry’) football game, which Lehigh won. Consistent with Berntsen’s theory, Lehigh fans found the game to be more emotional and therefore rehearsed the event more frequently. They also remembered the factual details of the game more accurately than did Lafayette fans, particularly those facts that enhanced positive social group identity. Although students from both schools recalled the event equally vividly initially, the Lehigh fans maintained that vividness over time, whereas Lafayette fans’ memories decreased in vividness. Surprisingly, both teams’ fans were equally consistent in describing their personal circumstances during the event, were equally confident in the accuracy of those recollections, and felt an equally high degree of reliving the event while remembering it. The significant influence of emotional affect on vividness, reliving, and confidence was partially mediated by rehearsal, consistent with Berntsen’s model.

Studies that distinguish among believed memories, believed-not-remembered events (e.g., family stories), and nonbelieved memories (i.e., memories no longer believed to have occurred) typically rely on experimenter provided or overtly elicited events. These methods may mis-estimate the frequency and nature of such events in everyday memory. Three studies examined whether such events would be elicited via indirect cueing. Participants recalled and rated events on autobiographical belief, recollection, and other characteristics associated with remembering. All three event types resulted, but with a low rate of nonbelieved memories. Believed and nonbelieved memories received similar perceptual and reexperiencing ratings, and both exceeded believed-not-remembered events. Lifespan cueing found nonbelieved memories to be most frequent in middle childhood (ages 6–11). Cueing for ‘‘events’’ vs. ‘‘memories’’ revealed that ‘‘memory’’ cues lead to retrieval of a more homogeneous set of events and differences when predicting autobiographical belief and recollection. These studies support the distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection for autobiographical events.

This article examines the idea that believing that events occurred in the past is a non-memorial decision that reflects underlying processes that are distinct from recollecting events. Research on autobiographical memory has often focused on events that are both believed to have occurred and remembered, thus tending to overlook the distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection. Studying event representations such as false memories, believed-not-remembered events, and non-believed memories shows the influence of non-memorial processes on evaluations of occurrence. Believing that an event occurred and recollecting an event may be more strongly dissociated than previously stated. The relative independence of these constructs was examined in 2 studies. In Study 1, multiple events were cued, and then each was rated on autobiographical belief, recollection, and other memory characteristics. In Study 2, participants described a nonbelieved memory, a believed memory, and a believed-not-remembered event, and they made similar ratings. In both studies, structural equation modeling techniques revealed distinct belief and recollection latent variables. Modeling the predictors of these factors revealed a double dissociation: Perceptual, re-experiencing, and emotional features
predicted recollection and not belief, whereas event plausibility strongly predicted belief and weakly predicted recollection. The results show that judgments of autobiographical belief and recollection are distinct, that each is influenced by different sources of information and processes, and that the strength of their relationship varies depending on the type of event under study. The concept of autobiographical belief is elaborated, and implications of the findings are discussed in relation to decision making about events, social influence on memory, metacognition, and recognition processes.

The study of flashbulb memories has typically been confined to negative events such as the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Previous studies that investigated the role of affect on memory formation have produced conflicting results, making it difficult to ascertain the properties of positive flashbulb memories. In the current study, we employ previously established methods to investigate flashbulb memory formation for the assassination of Osama bin Laden. This resonated as a highly positive event for many Americans evidenced by the thousands of people flooding the streets of Washington, D.C., and New York City to celebrate. Results confirm the fading of memory details over time and further suggest that positive events do not result in the heightened vividness and confidence seen in negatively valenced flashbulb memories. We argue that these findings are additional evidence against a special memory mechanism in flashbulb memory formation.

Two studies examined whether belief in the occurrence of events, recollecting events, and belief in the accuracy of recollections are distinct aspects of autobiographical remembering. In Study 1, 299 student participants received a cue to recall five childhood events, after which they rated each event on these constructs and other characteristics associated with remembering. Structural equation modelling revealed that variance in ratings was best explained by the three anticipated latent variables. In Study 2, an online sample of 1026 adults recalled and rated a childhood event and an event about which they were somehow uncertain. Confirmatory modelling replicated the three latent variables. The relationship of key predictors (perceptual detail, spatial detail, re-experiencing, and event plausibility) to the latent variables confirmed the distinction. These studies demonstrate that belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy appraisals are distinct, the former indexing the truth status of the event and the latter the degree to which the event representation accurately reflects prior experience. Further, they suggest that belief in accuracy indexes the monitoring of the quality of recollections.

Turning points and transitions are both life events marked by significant change. Whereas turning points are personal changes in life direction, transitions are external changes in daily circumstances. Transition-linked turning points are events that fit both of these definitions. Although transitions and turning points have been examined separately, the current study is the first empirical comparison of these types of events and their overlap. Differences in the characteristics of adults’ autobiographical memories of turning points, transitions, and transition-linked turning points were compared using a within-subjects design. Memories of transition-linked turning points and turning points were more central to participants’ life stories than transitions, whereas memories of transitions had more similarities in content, particularly location, with related memories. These results suggest that transitions organize autobiographical memory whereas turning points anchor the life story

We compared young adults' autobiographical (AB) memories involving Music to memories concerning other specific categories and to Everyday AB memories with no specific cue. In all cases, participants reported both their most vivid memory and another AB memory from approximately the same time. We analyzed responses via quantitative ratings scales on aspects such as vividness and importance, as well as via qualitative thematic coding. In the initial phase, comparison of Music-related to Everyday memories suggested all Musical memories had high emotional and vividness characteristics whereas Everyday memories elicited emotion and other heightened responses only in the "vivid" instruction condition. However, when we added two other specific AB categories (Dining and Holidays) in phase two, the Music memories were no longer unique. We offer these results as a cautionary tale: before concluding that music is special in its relationship to cognition, perception, or emotion, studies should include appropriate control conditions.

According to the facial feedback hypothesis, people's affective responses can be influenced by their own facial expression (e.g., smiling, pouting), even when their expression did not result from their emotional experiences. For example, Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) instructed participants to rate the funniness of cartoons using a pen that they held in their mouth. In line with the facial feedback hypothesis, when participants held the pen with their teeth (inducing a "smile"), they rated the cartoons as funnier than when they held the pen with their lips (inducing a "pout"). This seminal study of the facial feedback hypothesis has not been replicated directly. This Registered Replication Report describes the results of 17 independent direct replications of Study 1 from Strack et al. (1988), all of which followed the same vetted protocol. A meta-analysis of these studies examined the difference in funniness ratings between the…

Theories of reconstructive memory have long been influenced by investigations of false recognition errors, in which old/new judgements are compromised by spontaneous activation of associated but nonpresented concepts. Recent evidence similarly suggests that reconstructive memory processes (so-called memory integration) also support positive learning behaviors, such as inferential reasoning. Despite prevailing hypotheses, the question of whether a common integration process underlies these seemingly disparate mnemonic outcomes is not well understood. To address this question, young adults, recruited from two institutions, completed the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (Deese,