Papers by Patrizio Lo Presti
Philosophia, 2022
This is a contribution to the controversy which of individual or collective intentionality is mor... more This is a contribution to the controversy which of individual or collective intentionality is more fundamental. I call it the fundamentality-question. In a first step, I argue that it is really two questions. One is about sense and one about reference. The first is: Can one grasp or understand the concept individual intentionality and, correspondingly, individuality, on the one hand, without grasping or understanding the concept collective intentionality and, correspondingly, collectivity, on the other? The second is: Can the concept individual intentionality and corresponding concept of individuality, on the one hand, refer to something without the concept of collective intentionality and corresponding concept of collectivity referring to something, on the other? Simplifying somewhat, this elaborated fundamentalityquestion admits of nine answers. In a second step, I pursue a tentative answer to the elaborated fundamentality-question. Given a disambiguation of individuality and, correspondingly, individual intentionality, the answer is the combination of claims that individuality and individual intentionality in one sense is fundamental in reference-dependence but that collectivity and collective intentionality is fundamental in reference-dependence in the other sense of individuality, while collectivity and collective intentionality is in both cases fundamental in sense-dependence.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Sep 13, 2022
The prepositional 'in' and possessive pronouns, e.g., 'my' and 'mine,' in the context of attribut... more The prepositional 'in' and possessive pronouns, e.g., 'my' and 'mine,' in the context of attributions of mental states, such as "in my mind" or "in your mind," threaten to confuse attempts to account for knowledge of other minds. This paper distinguishes proper from improper uses of such expressions. I will argue that proper use of the prepositional 'in' and possessive pronouns in the context of mental state attributions presupposes capacities to properly track and attribute what are really, in a sense to be specified, intersubjectively articulated and inferentially interrelated normative statuses. What we call "mental states" or "minds," in as far as primarily cognitive states such as beliefs are concerned, are intersubjectively constituted. As opposed to being inner and private, something we must learn to intersubjectively discover, minds and mental states are intersubjectively articulated and we learn to attribute them as inner and private. A scorekeeping-model is used to illustrate how the privacy of mind presupposes intersubjectivity. Using that model, I argue that the traditional problem of knowing other minds can be re-framed as a problem of learning how to pursue intersubjective practices of acknowledging, attributing and undertaking mental states.
Contemporary Pragmatism, 2020
Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My... more Mental episodes are typically associated with subjective ownership and first-person authority. My belief that an apple is red is had by me; it is mine and I’m in a privileged position to know it. Your experience of red is had by you; it is yours and you are in a privileged position to know it. The two assumptions are that mental events are had by individuals to whom they occur, and that owners are in a privileged epistemic position to fallibly report their own. This paper asks how to understand ownership and first-person authority (section 1). It argues that the two assumptions should not be accepted by default (section 2). A normative pragmatism is specified, on which mental episodes are not owned, but owed to practices of reason articulation (section 3). Finally, a positive account of ownership and first-person authority is considered (section 4).
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2020
The possibility of autonomous artificially intelligent systems (AAIs) has awaken a well-known wor... more The possibility of autonomous artificially intelligent systems (AAIs) has awaken a well-known worry in the scientific community as well as in popular imaginary: the possibility that beings which have gained autonomous intelligence either turn against their creators or at least make the moral and ethical superiority of creators with respect to the created questionable. The present paper argues that such worries are wrong-headed. Specifically, if AAIs raise a worry about what human ways of life it a worry for a certain human way of thinking about what it is to be human. What is threatened is a way of thinking about what it is to be human, not human ways of life or human value.
AVANT, 2020
This paper argues that first-person singular I-and first-person plural we-intentionality are cons... more This paper argues that first-person singular I-and first-person plural we-intentionality are constituted in normative second-person relations. Their relata are individuals who mutually recognize each other as loci of responsibility. Such relations constitute an I-You, which is argued to be sufficient for both singular I-and plural we-intentionality. Whenever there is I-intentio-nality there is we-intentionality, because whenever the relevant second-person relations obtain , conditions sufficient for both are satisfied. Consequently, the possibility of autonomous individual I-intentionality as well as plurally shared we-intentionality depends on at least two individuals involved in normative mutual recognition. Neither individual is an intentional 'I' independently of entering the I-You, and when they do so they are an intentional 'we.'
Theory & Psychology, 2020
Direct perception and theory–theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to wh... more Direct perception and theory–theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to whether social cognition is inferential. The latter argues that it is inferential, the former that it is not. This article argues that the opposition in terms of inference is mistaken. A sense of inference is specified on which social cognition can be inferential and directly perceptual. Arguing for inferential social cognition does not commit to a defense of indirect social cognition if inferential access to other minds can be direct. Contrary convictions are symptomatic of working with too simplistic a notion of inference. The dispute between direct and inferentialist social cognition is one in which both sides can be right. The argument, then, is that inferentialism should not be called on to witness in favor or disfavor of advocates of either direct or indirect social cognition.
Ecological Psychology, 2020
Interdisciplinary interest in affordances is increasing. This paper is a philosophical contributi... more Interdisciplinary interest in affordances is increasing. This paper is a philosophical contribution. The question is: Do persons offer affordances? Analysis of the concepts 'person' and 'affordance' supports an affirmative answer. On a widely accepted understanding of what persons are, persons exhibit many of the features typical of socionormative affordances. However, to understand persons as offering affordances requires, on the face of it, stretching traditional understandings of the concept of affordance: persons, in contrast to the organisms that partially constitute persons, do not seem to be available to perception. This and similar worries are responded to. The environment for an individual is filled with animate features, and prominent among them are persons. That being the case, a full accounting of environmental perception would by necessity include consideration of the information and the processes underlying person perception.-Heft, 2007, p. 86 (emphases added). Two great theorists of the mid 20 th century help us think of persons as offering affordances for socionormative interaction. They are James J. Gibson and Wilfrid Sellars. To my knowledge, few have considered the possibility that two theorist, as opposed in interests as these, have a common lesson to tell. J. J. Gibson is a de-mentalizer of intelligence and perceptuomotor capacities. On his approach to capacities for intelligent environmental engagements, mediating inferences are taken out of the picture (e.g., 1979, p. 127; Lobo et al., 2018, p. 2). Sellars, in contrast, is a denier of direct perceptual (or empirical) givenness. Knowing and agency is for him necessarily inferential. Indeed, he spent large parts of his opus classicus (1956) to bury the "Myth of the Given." The myth as he conceived it is the possibility of direct non-inferential knowledge. Thus it seems that Gibsonian ecological psychology cannot account for knowledge or agency from Sellars's inferentialist point of view. Whether this is an apparent or real opposition is discussed in the concluding section (see also footnote 1). Adverse as J. J. Gibson and Sellars seemthe first, a radical empiricist (1967), advocating non-inferential direct perception and agency, the latter attacking radical
Tidskrift för Politisk Filosofi, 2020
Phenomenology and Mind, 2019
This paper argues that rules and norms are conceptually distinct: what is norm is not thereby rul... more This paper argues that rules and norms are conceptually distinct: what is norm is not thereby rule, and vice versa. Versions of conflating the two are discussed and an argument for distinction given. Two objections to the argument are responded to. It is accepted that rules and norms are often intimately related. They are so causally, not conceptually: what norms we live by can make a difference to what rules we accept and what rules we accept can make a difference to what norms we live by. This is a social, dynamic and continuous causal process of development of the social practices of community.
SATS, 2017
Contemporary debate on the nature of meaning centres on whether meaning is normative. Agreement i... more Contemporary debate on the nature of meaning centres on whether meaning is normative. Agreement is widespread that meaning implies correctness, but disagreement on whether correctness is normative remains. Normativists argue that correctness implies obligations or permissions. Anti-normativists disagree and hold that correctness is a descriptive term. This paper argues that, fundamentally, meaning presupposes norms, but not in the generic normativist sense: a vocabulary is recognisable as part of a language if and only if it is part of a practice of committing and entitling to ask for and provide reasons for what is said. To commit and entitle is not obliged or permitted. It is a presupposition for speaking about obligations and permissions.
Theory & Psychology, 2016
According to direct perception theory (DPT) people understand each other’s minds by way of percei... more According to direct perception theory (DPT) people understand each other’s minds by way of perceiving each other’s behavioral engagements in the world. I argue that DPT admits of two interpretations. One interpretation is found in Searle’s social ontology. The other interpretation departs from an enactivist account of social cognition. Both can make sense of what it is to perceive other minds, but in two different ways. The first claims that people can directly perceive states of mind shared in a community. In contrast, the second interpretation allows for direct perception of particular individuals’ states of mind in the context of participation in social practices. The two interpretations are argued to be compatible. People can perceive communal states of mind in another’s responsiveness to action possibilities in social environments, not only the particular other’s states of mind.
Adaptive Behavior, 2016
It is argued that normativity is an embodied and situated skill that resists explanation in terms... more It is argued that normativity is an embodied and situated skill that resists explanation in terms of rule-following. Norms are dynamic and negotiable, and are understood in practice by engaging with others. Rules are a subclass of norms and have pragmatic functions, e.g., to impose norms and elucidate implicit normativity. The propositional articulation of norms is secondary to normativity. Norms can be explained within the framework of ecological psychology as a particular kind of affordance that enables actions to be directly understood as correct. This view entails that the niche of human beings is inherently normative. Finally, the ecological account of normativity is used to elucidate the notion of rule-following.
The Philosophical Forum, 2015
Matters collective are receiving increased attention. 1 Philosophers discuss concepts such as we-... more Matters collective are receiving increased attention. 1 Philosophers discuss concepts such as we-action, we-want, we-intentionality, and in general how to understand psychological states and agency prefixed the first person plural we. I will be concerned with we-agency in particular, and I will be focusing on one issue of we-agency specifically; namely, what kind of reasons it involves, and in what sense it "involves" reasons. The two central claims of the paper are, first, that we-agency involves a special kind of reason: All individual part-actions of a we-action must be performed for a we-reason. By a we-reason, I understand a reason such that the agent wants what she does to realize an end together with others; she wants to do it as part of what a we does. This positive claim, it will be seen, is quite uncontroversial. Secondly, we-actions need not involve reasons that any participating agent is aware of as a we-reason. In other words, consciousness of what one does as part of what a we does is not conceptually implied in we-action. I assume that agency conceptually implies reasons. We understand Jones' drinking as being an action only if Jones drinks for a reason; for example, he is thirsty and believes that drinking will quench his thirst. 2 If by some contraption Jones' arm is caused to reach for the glass, his hand to grab it and bring it to his * Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Björn Petersson and an anonymous reviewer at The Philosophical Forum for comments and criticism that greatly helped to improve this paper.
Human Affairs, 2015
The paper submits a criticism of the standard formulation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following parado... more The paper submits a criticism of the standard formulation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox. According to the standard formulation, influenced by Kripke, the paradox invites us to consider what mental or behavioral items could constitute meaning. The author proposes instead an enactivist understanding of the paradox. On this account there is no essential gap between mental items and behavioral patterns such that the paradox enforces a choice between meaning being constituted either internally ‘in mind,’ or externally ‘in behavior.’ The paper begins with an introduction to the paradox and then presents arguments against standard solutions. It ends with the enactivist proposal, admitting that although much more needs to be said before it can be established as a full-fledged alternative, it nonetheless holds some promise both for revising our understanding of the paradox and for the formulation of a novel solution.
Logos & Episteme, 2014
If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination... more If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, 2013
This contribution provides interdisciplinary analysis of expressions of austerity-policies. It is... more This contribution provides interdisciplinary analysis of expressions of austerity-policies. It is argued that expressions of austerity-policies are meaningful if and only if intended addressees’ psychological states are adequately attuned and conceptual preconditions for implementation met. Furthermore, it is argued that if addressees are suitably psychologically attuned and preconditions met, utility will, by definition, be maximised and successful economical recovery enjoyed in equal measure among austerity-implementors. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first section the political scene is set in which austerity-policies are expressed and terminology introduced. In the second section expressions of austerity-policies are dissected and analysis of reference conditions of such expressions provided. The third section reviews conceptual analysis of intending and acting together and relates it to jointly implementing austerity-policies. In the fourth section economical r...
Abstracta, May 3, 2013
The aim of this paper is to show that there is a reciprocal dependency relationship between socia... more The aim of this paper is to show that there is a reciprocal dependency relationship between social cognition and social ontology. It is argued that, on the one hand, the existence conditions of socially meaningful objects and of social groups are about sucjets' social cognitive processes and interactive patterns and, on the other hand, social cognitive processes and interactive patterns are modulated by socially meaningful objects and social groups. I proceed from a historically informed distinction between social ontologies-between what might be called constructivist and emergentist theories of social reality. I then distinguish three theories of social cognition, theory-theory, simulation theory, and interaction theory, and argue that the first distinction and the latter map onto each other. Finally I argue that the reciprocal dependency between social ontology and social cognition can be justifiably though of as causal in Di Paolo et. al.'s (2010) sense of "downward" or "circular" causation. It is concluded that the dependency between social ontology and social cognition pertain to both a methodological and a phenomenal level. First, research on social ontology depends on research on social cognition; and, secondly, social phenomena, involving socially meaningful objects and groups, influence social cognitive processes and interaction, which in turn influence social phenomena. 1 Introduction: The construction and emergence of the social How can the contingent empirical fact that we live in a world of nations, cultures, religions, families, and other forms of social relationships that seemingly have causal efficacy on each individual's life, be accommodated with the reductionist realist paradigm prevalent today? As John Searle (2006, p. 13) put it, how, in a world constituted by particles in fields of force, can it be that some carbon based organism after 5 billion years of evolution have created a world of money, property, and government? These questions form the core of the subject matter of social ontology, a discipline that since Searle's The Construction of Social Reality (1995) has surged analytical philosophy and given rise to lively debates. Social ontologists are concerned with the existence conditions of social phenomena. Social phenomena are phenomena involving subjects and social relations which 'give rise to' families, groups, organizations, nations, and so on, or units of agency with concomitant roles, rules, norms, and functions. This paper focuses on the 'give rise to'-relation between subjects and social phenomena. To that end, as an introduction, it is informative to put the 'give rise to'-relation in historical perspective.
Cosmos and History the Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 2013
The paper argues that contexts of interaction are structured in a way that coordinates part actio... more The paper argues that contexts of interaction are structured in a way that coordinates part actions into normatively guided joint action without agents having common knowledge or mutual beliefs about intentions, beliefs, or commitments to part actions. The argument shows earlier analyses of joint action to be fundamentally flawed because they have not taken contextual influences on joint action properly into account. Specific completion of earlier analyses is proposed. It is concluded that attention to features distributed in context of interaction that signal expected part actions is sufficient for a set of part actions to qualify as a joint action.
Cogency, 2012
Pragma-dialectical argumentation theory has received criticism from epistemological argumentation... more Pragma-dialectical argumentation theory has received criticism from epistemological argumentation theorists. While the former emphasizes argumentation as aimed at resolving differences of opinion through adequate procedures, the latter emphasizes that argumentation is aimed at reaching a justified conclusion of the argumentation. In this paper pragma-dialectics is analyzed and two objections considered. The first objection pertains to the pragma-dialectical definition of reasonable argumentation, the other to the lack of an account of normativity of argumentation in pragma-dialectics. It is argued that the objections are not convincing.
Books by Patrizio Lo Presti
Lund University Publications, 2015
at the Humanities office, Ylva von Gerber, Anna Östberg, and the Lund University IT-support unit.... more at the Humanities office, Ylva von Gerber, Anna Östberg, and the Lund University IT-support unit. Thank you also Åsa Burman for the Finish On Time course. I am grateful for the friendly help of Jan Hartman. Last but far from least I would like to thank my doctoral student colleagues Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup and Oscar Ralsmark for our lively discussions in the philosophy of mind reading group as well as for helping me with comments on several occasions. Thank you Frits Gåvertsson for all those pauses outside the Department of Philosophy at Kungshuset and LUX. And thank you Martin Viktorelius, friend since undergraduate studies and now doctoral student in cognitive science at Chalmers University of Technology. None of this would be possible without the last eight years of friendship and off the hook, open-minded, at the bar, at the dinner table, on the train, and on vacation discussions of everything in philosophy, and what it is that we are really doing when doing philosophy. ! Chapter 20 has a certain meaning means that one should use it according to certain norms. This is called meaning-normativism and has its modern roots in Saul Kripke (1982), who argued (or argued that Wittgenstein argued) that the relation between meaning and use must not be how we do or will use language according to some pattern but how we should use it. On a competing approach to meaning and normativity correctness is not unambiguously a normative term (Hattiangadi 2007). It can have descriptive purport as well. For example, when it is said that 'dog' means dog implies that 'dog' can be used correctly (to refer to dogs) or incorrectly (to refer to non-dogs), then this only means that it is true, relative to those correctness conditions, that 'dog' means dog. It does not follow from this, or so it is argued by anti-normativists, that there is any particular manner one should or should not use 'dog'; words refer and to use words correctly simply means that it is true that one uses them according to a certain standard. Hence, it seems, 'correctness' has descriptive meaning, and norms must be imposed, e.g., socially, for meaning to be normative (Glüer and Wikforss 2009). Anti-normativists agree that norms can be imposed on language use; i.e., it can be normative but it is not a conceptual truth that it is. For example, it might be a social norm that one should not lie, not assert what one believes to be false, to be conspicuous, and so on (Grice 1989). But these are not norms that can be directly derived from meaning alone. They must be supported by social agreement on correct use. Hence to say that meaning entails correctness, as many philosophers do, is not, according to anti-normativists, to say that meaning is normative, because correctness might be a non-normative term. At least, it is ambiguous whether correctness is normative and therefore not sufficient for meaning to entail normativity that it entails correctness. It can be seen here that there is a difference between saying, on the one hand, that meaning is normative in the sense that semantics is normative and, on the other hand, saying that pragmatics is normative. Thus it might be argued that the semantics of a language does not entail norms, because for norms to apply the language must have a socially agreed on pragmatics; that is, an agreement in use. Given this difference between norms for semantics and norms for pragmatics several positions are opened up. For example, one might argue Since the field of meaning of 'norm' is not only heterogeneous but also has vague boundaries, it would probably be futile to try to create a General Theory of Norms covering the whole field. The theory of norms must be somehow restricted in its scope. From this observation, accurate or not, von Wright goes on to distinguish a host of different domains in which the term 'norm' might apply, much as I have done here.
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Papers by Patrizio Lo Presti
Books by Patrizio Lo Presti