National Parliaments by Valentin Kreilinger
LSE EUROPP, 2021
In December, the EU agreed on a €750 billion pandemic recovery fund, financed by joint borrowing.... more In December, the EU agreed on a €750 billion pandemic recovery fund, financed by joint borrowing. However, the implementation of the fund has already encountered difficulties in the EU’s three largest states, with more trouble potentially on the horizon
LUISS SOG Working Paper, 2020
After the last election in 2017 the German Bundestag reached the record size of 709 parliamentari... more After the last election in 2017 the German Bundestag reached the record size of 709 parliamentarians. The quasi-automatic increase of the number of MPs at every election is the product of rulings by the Federal Constitutional Court, inter-party bargaining and a changing party system. After describing the rules and their implementation, this paper analyses reforming the electoral system to downsize the Bundestag as a “trilemma” between the three conflicting priorities of 1) proportional representation of parties, 2) a close relationship between MPs and constituents, and 3) proportional representation of regions. The paper shows that no reform proposal has so far been able to ensure a smaller parliament, gather sufficient support and solve the trilemma. An upper limit for the number of parliamentarians seems to be the only option for downsizing the Bundestag on which the current governing parties might be able to agree in time before the 2021 election.
Jacques Delors Centre Policy Paper, 2019
Durch den Frühwarnmechanismus zur Kontrolle des Subsidiaritätsprinzips, den Politischen Dialog mi... more Durch den Frühwarnmechanismus zur Kontrolle des Subsidiaritätsprinzips, den Politischen Dialog mit der Europäischen Kommission und die interparlamentarische Zusammenarbeit wirken die nationalen Parlamente an politischen Entscheidungen im EU-Mehrebenensystem mit. Dieses Policy Paper legt sechs Empfehlungen für eine pragmatische Weiterentwicklung der bestehenden Verfahren und Praktiken vor.
Les cahiers européens de Sciences Po, 2019
The emergency regime of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) affects the budgetary powers of na... more The emergency regime of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) affects the budgetary powers of national parliaments in the Euro area. But under what conditions do national parliaments get a substantial say on ESM rescue packages? This paper examines how national parliaments are involved in practice by examining the various possible drivers for substantial parliamentary involvement in the context of the negotiations on the third rescue package for Greece in 2015. Only few national parliaments can rely on direct legal enabling clauses for substantial parliamentary involvement. In other national parliaments, domestic political dynamics are the key explanatory factor. The paper concludes that this tangled web of parliamentary involvement in ESM affairs will remain a prominent feature of Europe’s post-crisis economic governance.
Two scrutiny relationships in the EU’s multi-level system are particularly complex: National parl... more Two scrutiny relationships in the EU’s multi-level system are particularly complex: National parliaments are monitoring the activities of the European Commission, and the European Parliament has started to act as a public forum that does not hesitate to pick a fight against any individual national government. In both cases, parliamentary voices can articulate their ideas, concerns and general views. Taking the European Parliament’s Rangel report and recent interparliamentary developments as a starting point, this Policy Paper puts forward six recommendations to enhance the ways in which parliamentary voices are heard in the EU’s multi-level system.
Journal of European Integration, 2018
How exactly are national parliaments involved in the European Semester? The stronger coordination... more How exactly are national parliaments involved in the European Semester? The stronger coordination of fiscal and economic policies in the European Union (EU) in reaction to the sovereign debt crisis has forced national parliaments to adapt their procedures. This article examines how the European Semester is scrutinised and what factors have driven parliamentary activities in the French National Assembly, the German Bundestag, the Irish Dáil and the Portuguese Assembleia between 2012 and 2017. Particularly noteworthy is that legal provisions for a parliamentary debate on the Stability Programme can be ignored in France, that the German Bundestag is much less active in the European Semester than in EU affairs or in the budget process and that the weakness of Ireland’s parliament in the annual budget procedure affects its role in the European Semester. This article therefore suggests defining minimum standards for parliamentary involvement and strengthening interparliamentary cooperation.
The Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process ... more The Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process by creating the Early Warning System. This procedure offers them the possibility to send reasoned opinions to the European Commission if they have subsidiarity concerns about a legislative proposal. Since 2009 the necessary threshold (i.e. one third of the total number of votes) has only been reached three times. The most recent of these 'yellow cards' was triggered by the Commission's proposal to revise the Posted Workers Directive, an event that allows us to shed some light on how national parliaments use this mechanism and how the European Commission has reacted. The subsidiarity concerns were rejected by the Commission and the legislative process continues despite deep divisions between old and new Member States over the controversial policy issue of revising the Posted Workers Directive.
The Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group for Europol (JPSG) will meet for the first time in Brussel... more The Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group for Europol (JPSG) will meet for the first time in Brussels in the autumn of 2017. Its creation was agreed by the EU Speakers Conference (the Presidents of the EU's national parliaments and the European Parliament) in April 2017. With this decision, the idea of a body to ensure parliamentary scrutiny of the European Police Office (Europol) finally manifests itself in the JPSG. In the emerging Security Union that the EU seeks to create, also in reaction to recent terror attacks, the responsible actors at the EU level must be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. According to Article 51 of the new Europol Regulation No. 2016/794, the JPSG will play an essential role to " politically monitor Europol's activities in fulfilling its mission, including as regards the impact of those activities on the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons. " In its first part, the Policy Paper examines the political difficulties to move forward with respect to intentions and provisions for enhancing the parliamentary scrutiny over Europol. The in-depth analysis of the positions of national parliaments and EU institutions is based on reports, resolutions, publicly available minutes and amendments to draft conclusions as well as other texts. This paper evaluates the agreement on the JPSG for Europol as promising. The second part of the Policy Paper presents concrete proposals in order to make the JPSG work efficiently: The JPSG should complement the existing scrutiny of Europol by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs in the European Parliament and it should adopt ambitious Rules of Procedure at its first meeting in order to clarify and fix its internal functioning. The new body could subsequently become a blueprint for interparliamentary scrutiny in the EU.
The proposal to establish a " Parliament of the Eurozone " has re-emerged in the debate on deepen... more The proposal to establish a " Parliament of the Eurozone " has re-emerged in the debate on deepening the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), particularly in France. In this context, we look beyond the institutional innovation at what might be the interest and scope of such a proposal and how it could be useful or even essential for a better functioning of the Eurozone.
On 10 May 2016 national parliaments, mainly from Central and Eastern European countries, managed ... more On 10 May 2016 national parliaments, mainly from Central and Eastern European countries, managed to trigger a “yellow card” that forces the European Commission to reconsider its proposal to revise the Posted Workers Directive. In a preliminary assessment, Valentin Kreilinger answers eight questions on proposal, procedure and precedents.
Coordination and surveillance mechanisms play an increasingly important role in EU Economic Gover... more Coordination and surveillance mechanisms play an increasingly important role in EU Economic Governance. Involving national parliaments has been widely acknowledged as a key to contribute to ensuring legitimacy, ownership and accountability in the Economic and Monetary Union. Despite the creation and the strengthening of the European Semester, acceptance of the common rules and compliance in member states are still too low.
This study asks to what extent the role of national parliaments and national political ownership can help to explain the lack of compliance and how recent reforms have contributed to improving the situation. National parliaments of crisis-hit countries have been weaker in the annual budget process than the national parliaments of other EU member states. In the European Semester, most national parliaments scrutinise the Stability and Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes that their governments submit to the European Commission each year at the end of April. Hearings with European Commissioners also take place more often. But, in general, parliamentary scrutiny could be enhanced further: The adaptation of national parliaments to the stronger surveillance and coordination mechanisms in the Economic and Monetary Union has so far only happened in an asymmetric way.
The public opinion of those countries that had a low implementation record for Country-Specific Recommendations and whose national parliaments did not obtain new prerogatives in the European Semester is particularly in favour of more economic policy coordination. Thus, as a contribution to the debate on strengthening and completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, this study puts forward five options for better parliamentary control at the national level and the European level.
David Cameron schlägt eine „rote Karte“ für nationale Parlamente vor, die es ihnen erlauben würde... more David Cameron schlägt eine „rote Karte“ für nationale Parlamente vor, die es ihnen erlauben würde, EU-Gesetze zu blockieren. Dieser Artikel argumentiert, dass der britische Premierminister versucht, ein Kartenhaus zu bauen, und sein Vorschlag die existierenden Schwächen bei der Einbeziehung nationaler Parlamente ignoriert.
This blog post provides an overview of the participation of national parliaments on the third pac... more This blog post provides an overview of the participation of national parliaments on the third package for Greece. It shows that parliamentary power in the euro area is distributed asymmetrically. Only the German Bundestag votes on the start and the result of negotiations. In Estonia, Finland and Austria, deliberation and voting is confined partly or entirely to committees. Other national parliaments play an even smaller role, or none at all.
The parliaments in the EU are facing a choice. They may exploit the existing possibilities, conti... more The parliaments in the EU are facing a choice. They may exploit the existing possibilities, continue business as usual (possibly with declining participation in inter-parliamentary cooperation, so no change), or bypass existing interparliamentary structures. The last and most extreme scenario would mean that some national parliaments, for example the six founding members or the Member States that have adopted the euro, create their own conference, with serious repercussions to “pre-in” countries, to the EU institutions, and to the inclusiveness of economic and financial governance. The second option (business as usual) does not help building a genuine Economic and Monetary Union either. Only the first scenario would help reduce the existing weakness in democratic accountability and legitimacy, both in general, and especially in connection with the genuine EMU in the making. An inter-parliamentary conference as a place to discuss these policies could have the positive effect of gradually becoming an arena in which the future direction of the Union’s economic policy is shaped.
The European Council is increasingly central to the governance of the European Union. Even if nat... more The European Council is increasingly central to the governance of the European Union. Even if national parliaments have originally focused their involvement in EU affairs on the ordinary legislative process, most of the chambers have started to develop specific activities, before or after European summits. From ex-ante influence to ex-post accountability, seven different models of control have been identified. Beyond their differences rooted in national democratic systems, they call for twelve recommendations listed in this report.
La Conférence interparlementaire sur la gouvernance économique et financière se réunit pour la pr... more La Conférence interparlementaire sur la gouvernance économique et financière se réunit pour la première fois à Vilnius les 16 et 17 octobre 2013. Il fut décidé de sa création par les Présidents de tous les parlements de l'Union européenne en avril 2013. Cette décision fut prise sereinement, mais c'est finalement lors de la première rencontre de cette conférence qu'apparaît l'idée d'une conférence interparlementaire qui assure-rait un échange parlementaire et le contrôle des questions liées à l'Union économique et monétaire (UEM). Ce Policy paper passe au crible l'accord sur la Conférence interparlementaire sur la gouvernance économique et financière.
La première partie évalue les fonctions qu'une conférence interparlementaire peut assumer et fait le bilan des deux autres conférences interparlementaires de l'Union européenne (voir pages 3 à 7) : La Conférence des organes parlementaires spécialisés dans les affaires communautaires des parlements de l'Union européenne (COSAC) et la Conférence interparlementaire pour la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) et la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC). La taille des délégations envoyées par les parlements nationaux à ces conférences interparlementaires varie de façon significative : seuls quelques États membres y ont régulièrement envoyé six députés, tandis que certains États n'ont envoyé en moyenne que deux députés sur les sept dernières réunions de la COSAC entre 2010 et 2013.
Dans la deuxième partie (voir pages 8 à 17) de ce Policy paper sont exami-nées les difficultés politiques qu'il y a à avancer dans le champ de mine institutionnel que constitue l'article 13 du TSCG, qui a entériné une conférence interparlementaire de ce type « dans le but de débattre des politiques budgétaires et autres questions couvertes par ce Traité » et qui pré-sente des éléments clefs de la décision prise à la Conférence des Présidents d'avril 2013. L'analyse approfondie des positions des différents acteurs se base sur des documents de travail, des rapports, des résolutions et autres documents provenant à la fois des parlements nationaux et des institutions européennes.
La troisième partie de ce document (voir pages 18 à 21) qualifie, à ce stade, l'accord sur la Conférence inter-parlementaire sur la gouvernance économique et financière d'« occasion manquée » : l'aménagement institutionnel n'a pas été suffisamment bien défini. Le Policy paper explique comment les parlements nationaux sont, une fois de plus, passés à côté de leur chance de devenir des acteurs collectifs dans l'UE et étudie les façons d'améliorer le profil des conférences interparlementaires et de faire en sorte que fonctionne la nouvelle confé-rence sur la gouvernance économique et financière. Le projet de Règlement intérieur qui devra être adopté les 16-17 octobre 2013 constitue une avancée considérable dans le sens d'une clarification du fonctionnement de la conférence. Ce Policy paper propose cinq recommandations appelant à une amélioration du contrôle par-lementaire à tous les niveaux, afin que les parlements persévèrent dans les futurs développements visant à construire une « véritable » UEM et que le contrôle parlementaire devienne, lui aussi, « véritable ».
Le Policy paper conclut en affirmant la valeur de la mise en place de cette Conférence interparlementaire sur la gouvernance économique et financière dans le contexte d'un lien entre solidarité et contrôle au sein de l'UEM. À long terme, cette conférence pourrait devenir l'arène où se livrent les batailles concernant la direction de la politique économique de l'Union.
Multi-speed Europe by Valentin Kreilinger
LUISS SoG Working Paper Series, 2020
The EU’s current fiscal and economic response to COVID-19 contains several different elements, in... more The EU’s current fiscal and economic response to COVID-19 contains several different elements, including the agreement on a € 750 billion Recovery and Resilience Facility. Criticised by some as “too little too late” and hailed by others as a “Hamiltonian moment”, this paper uses three different institutional lenses to look at the institutional shifts that this response entails. The measures affect the inter-institutional balance by strengthening both the European Commission and the national governments in the Council while the European Parliament as well as national parliaments have been mostly side-lined. In addition, the response stops further Euro area integration and pushes back differentiated integration. All this amounts to tectonic changes which were inconceivable a year ago.
Jacques Delors Institute Berlin Policy Paper, 2019
Ursula von der Leyen's election as President of the European Commission has revived the debate ab... more Ursula von der Leyen's election as President of the European Commission has revived the debate about institutional reforms. This Policy Paper examines the inter-institutional implications of individual reforms. He argues that above all the EU needs a coherent reform package.
In the debate on the future of the EU, it is the first time since the signing of the Treaty of Li... more In the debate on the future of the EU, it is the first time since the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon that fundamental institutional issues are again under discussion. This Policy Paper analyses the proposals made in recent months as part of the debate and examines the legal requirements, along with the political scope for action for their potential implementation.
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National Parliaments by Valentin Kreilinger
This study asks to what extent the role of national parliaments and national political ownership can help to explain the lack of compliance and how recent reforms have contributed to improving the situation. National parliaments of crisis-hit countries have been weaker in the annual budget process than the national parliaments of other EU member states. In the European Semester, most national parliaments scrutinise the Stability and Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes that their governments submit to the European Commission each year at the end of April. Hearings with European Commissioners also take place more often. But, in general, parliamentary scrutiny could be enhanced further: The adaptation of national parliaments to the stronger surveillance and coordination mechanisms in the Economic and Monetary Union has so far only happened in an asymmetric way.
The public opinion of those countries that had a low implementation record for Country-Specific Recommendations and whose national parliaments did not obtain new prerogatives in the European Semester is particularly in favour of more economic policy coordination. Thus, as a contribution to the debate on strengthening and completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, this study puts forward five options for better parliamentary control at the national level and the European level.
La première partie évalue les fonctions qu'une conférence interparlementaire peut assumer et fait le bilan des deux autres conférences interparlementaires de l'Union européenne (voir pages 3 à 7) : La Conférence des organes parlementaires spécialisés dans les affaires communautaires des parlements de l'Union européenne (COSAC) et la Conférence interparlementaire pour la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) et la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC). La taille des délégations envoyées par les parlements nationaux à ces conférences interparlementaires varie de façon significative : seuls quelques États membres y ont régulièrement envoyé six députés, tandis que certains États n'ont envoyé en moyenne que deux députés sur les sept dernières réunions de la COSAC entre 2010 et 2013.
Dans la deuxième partie (voir pages 8 à 17) de ce Policy paper sont exami-nées les difficultés politiques qu'il y a à avancer dans le champ de mine institutionnel que constitue l'article 13 du TSCG, qui a entériné une conférence interparlementaire de ce type « dans le but de débattre des politiques budgétaires et autres questions couvertes par ce Traité » et qui pré-sente des éléments clefs de la décision prise à la Conférence des Présidents d'avril 2013. L'analyse approfondie des positions des différents acteurs se base sur des documents de travail, des rapports, des résolutions et autres documents provenant à la fois des parlements nationaux et des institutions européennes.
La troisième partie de ce document (voir pages 18 à 21) qualifie, à ce stade, l'accord sur la Conférence inter-parlementaire sur la gouvernance économique et financière d'« occasion manquée » : l'aménagement institutionnel n'a pas été suffisamment bien défini. Le Policy paper explique comment les parlements nationaux sont, une fois de plus, passés à côté de leur chance de devenir des acteurs collectifs dans l'UE et étudie les façons d'améliorer le profil des conférences interparlementaires et de faire en sorte que fonctionne la nouvelle confé-rence sur la gouvernance économique et financière. Le projet de Règlement intérieur qui devra être adopté les 16-17 octobre 2013 constitue une avancée considérable dans le sens d'une clarification du fonctionnement de la conférence. Ce Policy paper propose cinq recommandations appelant à une amélioration du contrôle par-lementaire à tous les niveaux, afin que les parlements persévèrent dans les futurs développements visant à construire une « véritable » UEM et que le contrôle parlementaire devienne, lui aussi, « véritable ».
Le Policy paper conclut en affirmant la valeur de la mise en place de cette Conférence interparlementaire sur la gouvernance économique et financière dans le contexte d'un lien entre solidarité et contrôle au sein de l'UEM. À long terme, cette conférence pourrait devenir l'arène où se livrent les batailles concernant la direction de la politique économique de l'Union.
Multi-speed Europe by Valentin Kreilinger
This study asks to what extent the role of national parliaments and national political ownership can help to explain the lack of compliance and how recent reforms have contributed to improving the situation. National parliaments of crisis-hit countries have been weaker in the annual budget process than the national parliaments of other EU member states. In the European Semester, most national parliaments scrutinise the Stability and Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes that their governments submit to the European Commission each year at the end of April. Hearings with European Commissioners also take place more often. But, in general, parliamentary scrutiny could be enhanced further: The adaptation of national parliaments to the stronger surveillance and coordination mechanisms in the Economic and Monetary Union has so far only happened in an asymmetric way.
The public opinion of those countries that had a low implementation record for Country-Specific Recommendations and whose national parliaments did not obtain new prerogatives in the European Semester is particularly in favour of more economic policy coordination. Thus, as a contribution to the debate on strengthening and completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, this study puts forward five options for better parliamentary control at the national level and the European level.
La première partie évalue les fonctions qu'une conférence interparlementaire peut assumer et fait le bilan des deux autres conférences interparlementaires de l'Union européenne (voir pages 3 à 7) : La Conférence des organes parlementaires spécialisés dans les affaires communautaires des parlements de l'Union européenne (COSAC) et la Conférence interparlementaire pour la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) et la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC). La taille des délégations envoyées par les parlements nationaux à ces conférences interparlementaires varie de façon significative : seuls quelques États membres y ont régulièrement envoyé six députés, tandis que certains États n'ont envoyé en moyenne que deux députés sur les sept dernières réunions de la COSAC entre 2010 et 2013.
Dans la deuxième partie (voir pages 8 à 17) de ce Policy paper sont exami-nées les difficultés politiques qu'il y a à avancer dans le champ de mine institutionnel que constitue l'article 13 du TSCG, qui a entériné une conférence interparlementaire de ce type « dans le but de débattre des politiques budgétaires et autres questions couvertes par ce Traité » et qui pré-sente des éléments clefs de la décision prise à la Conférence des Présidents d'avril 2013. L'analyse approfondie des positions des différents acteurs se base sur des documents de travail, des rapports, des résolutions et autres documents provenant à la fois des parlements nationaux et des institutions européennes.
La troisième partie de ce document (voir pages 18 à 21) qualifie, à ce stade, l'accord sur la Conférence inter-parlementaire sur la gouvernance économique et financière d'« occasion manquée » : l'aménagement institutionnel n'a pas été suffisamment bien défini. Le Policy paper explique comment les parlements nationaux sont, une fois de plus, passés à côté de leur chance de devenir des acteurs collectifs dans l'UE et étudie les façons d'améliorer le profil des conférences interparlementaires et de faire en sorte que fonctionne la nouvelle confé-rence sur la gouvernance économique et financière. Le projet de Règlement intérieur qui devra être adopté les 16-17 octobre 2013 constitue une avancée considérable dans le sens d'une clarification du fonctionnement de la conférence. Ce Policy paper propose cinq recommandations appelant à une amélioration du contrôle par-lementaire à tous les niveaux, afin que les parlements persévèrent dans les futurs développements visant à construire une « véritable » UEM et que le contrôle parlementaire devienne, lui aussi, « véritable ».
Le Policy paper conclut en affirmant la valeur de la mise en place de cette Conférence interparlementaire sur la gouvernance économique et financière dans le contexte d'un lien entre solidarité et contrôle au sein de l'UEM. À long terme, cette conférence pourrait devenir l'arène où se livrent les batailles concernant la direction de la politique économique de l'Union.
This Policy Paper provides an assessment of how the two main flexibility tools of the Lisbon Treaty – Enhanced Cooperation and Permanent Structured Cooperation – function under the Treaty's legal provisions and have recently been used for the cases of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO): EPPO is an independent EU body which, under certain conditions, will have the powers to investigate and prosecute EU-fraud and other crimes that affect the EU's financial interests. PESCO will constitute the framework for deepening defence cooperation between those EU member states that are capable and willing to do so. The analysis of the two cases will help to draw lessons from their establishment and clarify the preconditions for the further use of these flexibility tools in practice.
The two tools have several common features: They allow for non-participating member states to opt-in at a later stage and they aim for full and unitary integration in the long-term. Enhanced cooperation and Permanent Structured Cooperation are, however, also two distinct flexibility tools. While Enhanced Cooperation can, in principle, happen in all policy areas that are not within the exclusive competence of the EU, the situation is different for Permanent Structured Cooperation: It exclusively applies to well-defined aspects of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
Finally, the Policy Paper shows that in the current political climate, efforts to use these flexibility tools have been able to gather widespread political support: The Regulation establishing a European Public Prosecutor’s Office applies to 20 member states; and 23 member states signed the Joint Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation on 13 November 2017. In both cases, the aim has been to have large groups of participating member states. Despite open questions about interinstitutional cooperation and parliamentary scrutiny at the national and the EU level, it may therefore well be that such “EU20+ for- mats” of European integration emerge more often in the future.
At the time of writing, the 28 EU Member States have failed to reach an agreement on the Commission plan for a mandatory quota to relocate 120.000 refugees. On 14 September 2015 the Justice and Home Affairs Council only endorsed an earlier plan for the relocation of 40.000 refugees to Member States on a voluntary basis. The most likely outcome of the ongoing negotiations is “no agreement” or another voluntary mechanism. As an alternative strategy, only pushing through the proposal by a qualified majority vote is currently being discussed.
This article argues that the situation in the refugee crisis in general – and with respect to the Commission´s plan for a mandatory quota for the relocation of refugees in particular – is a case where enhanced cooperation (Article 20 TEU) could be used to overcome the current deadlock. The refugee crisis requires thinking “out of the box” in order to move forward with the quota for the relocation of refugees. There are, however, legal and political obstacles that cannot be ignored.