Politics

The scholarly literature on democratic transitions has largely ignored developments at the local level and the relationship between federalism and democracy. In this work I examine the development of federalism in Russia and I assess the impact of Russia's highly asymmetrical form of federalism on democratisation. The study shows that federalism far from promoting democracy has allowed authoritarianism to flourish in many of Russia's eighty nine regions and republics. Federalism and democratization in Russia exist in contradiction rather than harmony. In a vicious circle, authoritarianism at the centre has been nourished by authoritarianism in the region and vice versa. "Elective dictatorships" and "delegative democracies" are now well entrenched in many republics, and mini-presidential systems are firmly established in a majority of the regions.

The main task of authoritarian elections is to guarantee the survival of the regime. Achieving this goal, authoritarian rulers rely on authoritarian electoral mobilization that is employed by political machines, targeted mostly on poor and dependent voters. At the same time, since electoral autocracies permit opposition parties, those voters, who avoid mobilization, are able to make a choice between the government and the opposition. If they are dissatisfied by their personal or social conditions, they are liable to engage in 'performance voting' and give their support to the opposition. In this article, we examine how the two logics of 'mobilized voting' and 'performance voting' relate to each other. The study is based on a large-N analysis of local level variations in the electoral support of Russia's three systemic opposition parties in 2016 Duma elections, and a unique dataset comprised of electoral and social-economic data, from local (municipal) units.

By the middle of the 2000s an electoral authoritarian regime had been established under Putin, and the Kremlin's "party of power", United Russia (UR) had emerged as the dominant party. Based on the results of Duma and Presidential elections over the period 2003-2016, this article examines cross-regional variation in static and dynamic nationalization of voting for UR. The main finding is that in the overwhelming majority of Russian regions, a high level of static nationalisation is accompanied by a high level of dynamic nationalization. In most of the regions, voting for UR rises or falls in a consistent manner across the elections. Some of the regions consistently vote in favour of UR whilst another group of regions consistently provides UR with poorer results than the national average. Finally, there are some regions which consistently vote very close to the national results, reflecting the national trends in voting for UR to the greatest degree. Cross-regional variations in both static and dynamic nationalization of UR's support are mostly explained by the degree of authoritarianism in Russian regions.

This study analyses the influence of the party reforms of 2012 and the 'counter-reforms' of 2013-14 on the Russian party system, and the structure of political and electoral cleavages in Russian regions. The emergence of new political parties in 2012-13 led to a temporary increase in electoral competition, an augmentation of the political space and a rise in the number of electoral cleavages, but these developments did not weaken the domination of United Russia. The trend towards an ever greater tightening up of entry requirements for contestation in the elections led to a lowering of the number of political and, consequently, electoral cleavages, in addition to a reformatting of the political space. The study shows that there was an unbalancing of the political cleavage structure in 2012-15: the socioeconomic political cleavage, whose primary place is a key determinant of equilibrium, ceded the top position to the authoritariandemocratic cleavage in 2012-13, and to the "Ukrainian" (systemic) cleavage in 2014-15.

This article provides an analysis of the political values of the Russian middle class. In contrast to those scholars who have viewed the middle classes as bastions of liberal democracy, we demonstrate that most members support the regime, and favor statist over liberal values. However, the study also demonstrates that the middle class is not a homogeneous and cohesive body. A crucial divide here is between those members who depend on the state for their livelihood and those who work in the private sectors of the economy, and there are also important generational differences. The study also compares the values of the middle class with those of the general population.

This study examines three rounds of regional assembly and gubernatorial elections in Russia that took place in September 2015, 2016 and 2017. In particular, it examines the ways in which the regime has manipulated the elections to guarantee the victory of United Russia. The study shows that the Kremlin has adopted a new electoral strategy. Rather than engaging in the risky business of outright fraud during the vote count, which was an important factor in sparking mass protests against the regime, in the wake of the 2011 elections to the State Duma, the authorities have decided to concentrate their efforts on preventing opposition parties and candidates from registering for the elections. Whilst other forms of electoral malpractice have continued to be practiced, such as coercing or bribing voters to turn out and vote for United Russia, promoting "carousel voting" (multiple voting by groups of mobilised citizens), or ballot stuffing, much more focus has been paid in these elections on manipulating the registration process in favour of United Russia. As is clearly demonstrated, scores of opposition candidates and party lists, have been prevented from competing because of problems with their registration documents. However, whilst this strategy has helped United Russia win large majorities in all of the gubernatorial and assembly elections, it has also created lacklustre and predictable contests, and this in turn has led to a sharp decline in turnout, particularly in the gubernatorial elections. There is a real danger that these low levels of turnout may gradually erode the legitimacy of United Russia, embolden the opposition, and threaten the stability of the regime.

Аннотация. Статья посвящена политическим предпочтениям молодых избирателей на выборах в современной России. В развитие своего предыдущего исследования, где рассматривалась связь между уровнем модернизации и политическим плюрализмом в российских регионах, авторы предприняли попытку с помощью корреляционного и регрессионного анализа оценить роль возрастного фактора в поведении избирателей, использовав в качестве контрольных переменных протестированные ими ранее факторы модернизации. Проведенное исследование показало, что представление о том, будто молодые избиратели более склонны поддерживать либеральные и демократические партии, чем старшие поколения, не вполне справедливо. Избиратели в возрасте от 18 до 24 лет действительно демонстрируют повышенную предрасположенность к голосованию за оппозиционные партии, но не обязательно либеральные и демократические. На думских выборах 2016 г. от их поддержки больше всего выиграли карикатурные неосталинисты из «Коммунистов России», на выборах в региональные собрания в 2016-2021 гг.праворадикальные империалисты из ЛДПР. На думских же выборах 2021 г. наибольшую поддержку самой молодой возрастной когорты получили, с одной стороны, «системные оппозиционеры» в лице КПРФ и ЛДПР, с другой, дебютант избирательной кампании-партия «Новые люди», придерживающаяся либеральных взглядов в экономической сфере, но вполне лояльная существующему режиму.

The main task of authoritarian elections is to guarantee the survival of the regime. Achieving this goal, authoritarian rulers rely on authoritarian electoral mobilization that is employed by political machines, targeted mostly on poor and dependent voters. At the same time, since electoral autocracies permit opposition parties, those voters, who avoid mobilization, are able to make a choice between the government and the opposition. If they are dissatisfied by their personal or social conditions, they are liable to engage in 'performance voting' and give their support to the opposition. In this article, we examine how the two logics of 'mobilized voting' and 'performance voting' relate to each other. The study is based on a large-N analysis of local level variations in the electoral support of Russia's three systemic opposition parties in 2016 Duma elections, and a unique dataset comprised of electoral and social-economic data, from local (municipal) units.

Russian federalism and the Soviet legacy According to the 1977 Constitution, 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' was a 'unified, federal, multinational state formed on the principle of socialist federalism'. The federation, which was established according to the dual principles of ethnicity and territory, encompassed fifteen ethnically defined union republics, twenty autonomous republics, eight autonomous oblasts, ten autonomous okrugs, and 159 territorially based regions. But if we adopt the definition of a federation given by Watts in chapter 1, then clearly the USSR was not an authentic federation. For whilst the Constitution proclaimed the republics' rights of sovereignty (article 76), and secession (article 72), the right to enter into treaties with foreign powers (article 80), and local control over economic developments (article 77), such rights were heavily qualified in practice, by the provisions of other articles, which made a mockery of the republic's sovereign powers. 1 And, in any case, whilst the state was supposedly based on federal principles, the party, which declared itself to be 'the leading and guiding force in society', was a unitary body. Moreover, party and state bodies operated under the principle of 'democratic centralism', whereby each administrative level was subordinate to the level above it, and centralised control from Moscow. In 1989 Gorbachev publicly admitted that the republics' rights of sovereignty were largely formal in nature, 'Up to now', he noted, 'our state has existed as a centralized and unitary state and none of us has yet the experience of living in a federation'. 2 This is not to say that the federal subjects in the USSR were totally powerless and subservient to the central authorities or that nationalist demands had been quelled when Gorbachev took over the reins of power in 1985. For paradoxically, the very policies which the communists had used to placate nationalism ended up giving it succour. As Bialer notes,

From constitutional to political asymmetry: crafting authoritarian regimes in Russia's regions and republics 157 10 Conclusions 172 5.11 The portion of taxes credited to the budgets of 'privileged republics' in 1992-98 as a % of total taxes collected in each republic's territory 5.12 Economic status of the seven federal districts 6.1 Party representation in regional assemblies 6.2 Number of seats won by candidates of national parties and number of assemblies in which parties have seats, January 1998 6.3 Comparisons of registered candidates with winners, 1995-97 6.4 Variations in the level of governors' support of parties, 1999 6.5 Regional distribution of parties in the December 1999 Duma elections 7.1 Turovskii's classification of regional legislatures, 1997 9.1 Comparative prima facie evidence of electoral competitiveness and non-competitiveness in elections for the chief executive in the eighty-nine subjects of the Russian Federation Boxes 1.1 Federal structure of the Russian Federation 4.1 The interregional associations 6.1 Political affiliation of Russian governors 7.1 Variations in the powers of legislative and executive bodies of power as stipulated in regional and republican charters and constitutions 8.1 The seven federal districts Appendices

This paper provides a detailed analysis of Putin's radical overhaul of the Russian federal system and its impact on federalism and democratisation. Whilst not all of Putin's reforms have been implemented fully, the reorganisation of the Federation Council, his usurpation of unilateral powers to dismiss regional assemblies and chief executives, combined with his creation of seven federal districts, make a mockery of federalism. There are real worries that Putin's quest for a 'dictatorship of law' will be bought at the cost of civil liberties and the consolidation of democracy. At present it would appear that Putin is willing to sacrifice democracy in order to win unity. However, his attack on the sovereignty claims of the ethnic republics are surely just as likely to stir up nationist sentiments as to quell them.

259 pages. Crucial to the understanding of breakdown and transition are analyses of changes within the internal relations of national elites. In this book, the authors define and detail the political elites under state socialism, showing how the elites under Gorbachev were profoundly fragmented. They further reveal how, with the maturation of state socialism, new class interests arose which were cultivated by, and in turn influenced, the Gorbachev leadership. The authors put forth the argument that these class interests are strongly represented in todayвЂâ"¢s political "settlement" in Russia. They consider various interpretations of what has led to RussiaвЂâ"¢s current condition, including the idea that "executive" capital is more important than political capital and has been reproduced in the transition from communism.. DOWNLOAD HERE Capitalism, communism, and coexistence from the bitter past to a better prospect, John Kenneth Galbraith, Stanislav MikhaÐ"Â-lovich MenКâ"-shikov, 1988, , 225 pages. Shares insights into the history and development of socialist economies and capitalism. Tide Players The Movers and Shakers of a Rising China, Jianying Zha, 2011, Biography & Autobiography, 224 pages. Tide Players depicts a new generation of entrepreneurs and intellectuals in a rapidly transforming China through six sharply etched and nuanced profiles which capture both the ....