PhD Dissertation by Daniel Heide
McGill PhD Dissertation, 2022
This dissertation elucidates the sacramental eucharistic ontology of Maximos Confessor. I approac... more This dissertation elucidates the sacramental eucharistic ontology of Maximos Confessor. I approach this endeavour by means of a philosophical historical methodology, arguing that Maximos' sacramental ontology is in continuity with that of the pagan Neoplatonists. This continuity is evident in Maximos' doctrine of creation ex deo (ἐκ Θεοῦ), a Christian doctrine of emanation which, like the corresponding doctrines of Plotinus and Proclus, affirms the continuity between God and the world derived from God. In contrast to the pagans, Maximos' Christian emanationism does not involve a declension of mediating hypostases, but occurs immediately via the eternal erga, the uncreated energies of God. I argue that this is not pantheism, but rather panentheismthe world as imbued with the uncreated grace of God. Against the charge of necessity directed against this teaching by Christian polemicists, I argue that, for Maximos, the unceasing creativity of God is in fact true freedom. That this timeless activity nonetheless unfolds in time marks a crucial difference between Maximos and the pagan Neoplatonists, for whom the world is eternal. Maximos, I argue, holds to a uniquely Christian doctrine of voluntary and temporal emanation; that is, creation as divine self-impartation. What makes this sacramental ontology eucharistic is the Logos as Christian formal principle. The world is not merely grounded in God, but rooted in the Logos whose cosmic incarnation as the many logoi of creation constitutes the world in all its particularity. In sum, all things are created from God according to the Logos through whom all things were made. This eucharistic ontology finds its completion in the anaphoric return of the cosmos back into God as origin and end, mediated by the human as hierarch. This is the cosmic liturgy of Maximos Confessor, the onto-dialectic of procession and return whereby God offers the gift of His own supra-essential Being for the life of the worlda gift freely offered back by the creature in gratitude (eucharistia) culminating in deification. Résumé Cette thèse aborde l'ontologie sacramentelle eucharistique de Maxime le Confesseur. J'entreprends ceci par le biais d'une méthodologie philosophique historique, en soutenant que l'ontologie sacramentelle de Maxime est le prolongement de celle des néoplatoniciens païens. Chez Maxime, cette continuité se manifeste par l'idée de la création ex deo (ἐκ Θεοῦ), une doctrine uniquement chrétienne de l'émanation qui, tout comme les doctrines homologues de Plotin et Proclus, affirme la continuité entre Dieu et le monde dérivé de Dieu. Contrairement aux païens, l'émanationisme chrétien de Maxime n'implique pas une déclinaison des hypostases médiatrices, mais se produit immédiatement via l'erga éternelle, voire, les énergies incréées de Dieu. Je soutiens qu'il ne s'agit pas de panthéisme, mais de panenthéismele monde imprégné de la grâce incréée de Dieu. Contre l'accusation de nécessité, je soutiens que la créativité incessante de Dieu est en fait la vraie liberté. Que cette activité intemporelle se déroule néanmoins dans le temps représente une différence clée entre Maxime et les néoplatoniciens païens, pour qui le monde est éternel. Maxime, je soutiens, s'en tient à une doctrine uniquement chrétienne de l'émanation volontaire et temporelle ; c'est-à-dire la création en tant qu'autocommunication divine. Ce qui rend eucharistique cette ontologie sacramentelle, c'est le Logos compris en tant que principe formel chrétien. Le monde n'est pas simplement fondé sur Dieu, mais enraciné dans le Logos par lequel toutes choses ont été faites. En somme, toutes choses sont créées à partir de Dieu selon le Logos. Cette ontologie eucharistique trouve son achèvement dans le retour anaphorique du cosmos en Dieu comme origine et fin, médiatisé par l'humain en tant que hiérarque. C'est la liturgie cosmique de Maxime le Confesseur, l'onto-dialectique de la procession et du retour par laquelle Dieu offre le don de son propre Être supra-essentiel pour la vie du mondeun don volontairement reorienté vers Dieu par ses créatures en action de grâce (eucharistia) culminant dans la déification. Dedication To my wife Kali, without whose unwavering support I could not have brought this dissertation to completion. And to the newly-born Amelia, whose much anticipated arrival graced the conclusion of my labours. Δόξα Πατρί καί Υἱῷ καί Ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι καί νῦν καί ἀεί καί εἰς τούς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. Ἀμήν.
Papers by Daniel Heide
Studia Patristica CXXXI, 2024
In this paper, I examine the significance of Maximus’ understanding of the human as cosmic hierar... more In this paper, I examine the significance of Maximus’ understanding of the human as cosmic hierarch in relation to contemporary ecological concerns. I argue that Maximus’ priestly understanding of humanity’s relation to nature – its role as mediator between God and nature – has much to offer the contemporary world. The progressive (re)unification of the self which lies at the heart of the ascetic journey is simultaneously a healing of the painful divisions of the world. Maximus’ theocentric cosmology teaches
us that we are not merely homo consumptor, but homo adorans, the human as cosmic hierarch.
Analogia Vol 18 - 20 , 2023
Recently, I have argued that both Dionysius and Maximos Confessor subscribe to a doctrine of crea... more Recently, I have argued that both Dionysius and Maximos Confessor subscribe to a doctrine of creation ex deo, or creation as divine self-impartation, such that all things are grounded in, and hence derived from, the One God as the ultimate archē of existence. This raises a crucial problem: if all things are derived from God in what sense can they be affirmed to be genuinely other than God? Proclus accounts for this otherness through the proliferation of mediating terms. Dionysius transforms this pagan approach into a more 'immediate', energeic model of mediation. For Dionysius, creation ex deo is not creation from the divine ousia but from the uncreated energies, or grace, of God. This view is not pantheism but panentheism.
Heythrop Journal, 2023
The aim of this paper is to challenge the prevailing polemic between 'necessary' emanation and 'f... more The aim of this paper is to challenge the prevailing polemic between 'necessary' emanation and 'free' creation. I begin by arguing for the presence of freedom and volition in the emanationism of Plotinus. I then move on to explore the role of necessity in the creationism of Maximus. In both cases, I rely upon a twofold schematisation of freedom and necessity to dissolve the dichotomy between them effectively. Having levelled the playing field, so to speak, I conclude that, all things being equal, one does find in Maximus (and Christian thinkers generally) a heightened sense of divine volition and relationality beyond that of the pagan Neoplatonists. This greater emphasis upon the freedom of the divine will, however, has little bearing on whether Maximus's doctrine of creation is 'emanationist' or 'creationist'. Instead, it stems from a biblically inspired sense of the One God as intimately involved in His creation which, though derived from God, is crucially other than God.
The central logic of Origen’s De Principiis rests upon the axiom that “the end must be like the b... more The central logic of Origen’s De Principiis rests upon the axiom that “the end must be like the beginning.” Despite the importance of this principle, Origen never elaborates upon it, but simply asserts it as the incontrovertible ground of his philosophical and theological system. This thesis is an attempt to unravel this enigmatic axiom with the help of Aristotelian philosophy. While Origen is typically regarded as a “Platonist”, I argue for the equally important Peripatetic character of Origen’s thought. It is this latter element, I maintain, that holds the key as to why “the end must be like the beginning.” In sum, I argue that, as simultaneously the “activity of being” and the “actuality of existence,” God is both the archē and the telos of the created cosmos. As actuality (ἐνέργεια), God eternally creates the world and leads it to perfection; as eternally-being-actualized, the world is eternally created and moved towards perfection – the realization of eternal wellbeing. Despite the shared activity (ἐνέργεια) of Creator and creation, the two remain importantly distinct. Like iron in the fire, the latter becomes ‘like’ (ὁμοίωσις) the former while remaining substantially itself.
SVTQ, 2019
Perhaps the most famous critique of Origen in the Greek Patristic tradition is found in Maximus C... more Perhaps the most famous critique of Origen in the Greek Patristic tradition is found in Maximus Confessor’s Ambiguum 7. Arguably Maximus’ greatest work of philosophical theology, the 2volume Ambigua proposes to clarify certain ambiguities pertaining to key passages of (Pseudo) Dionysius and Gregory Nazianzus – both towering authorities among the Greek Fathers. Whereas Dionysius as the alleged disciple of St. Paul possessed a quasi-apostolic authority, Gregory Nazianzus was reverently referred to as “The Theologian” on account of his crucial contributions to Nicene orthodoxy – the first to be so named after the apostle and gospel writer John the Theologian. Both Dionysius and Gregory thus possessed an authority akin to that of Scripture, with the latter in particular standing as a pillar of orthodoxy (and eloquence!). All the more troubling then that “The Theologian” would seem to have given utterance to ideas that sounded alarmingly Origenist.
In his oration On Love For The Poor Gregory makes a passing reference to “we, who are a portion of God that has flowed down from above”. Gregory’s reference to souls being a “portion of God” which subsequently “flowed down from above” sounded suspiciously like Origen’s infamous doctrine of “pre-existent souls”. According to this teaching, formally condemned at the 5th Ecumenical Council of Constantinople II in 553, the original creation consisted of a henad of pure intellects (logika) abiding in blissful union with the divine, but who inexplicably fell away from God and, as punishment, came to be trapped in coarse, fleshly bodies. Though a caricature of Origen’s actual teaching, this view was attributed to Origen and subsequent “Origenists”. Worse, it would seem that certain of these Origenists were drawing upon the words of the impeccable Theologian himself to lend authority to their heretical views, and it was this that prompted Maximus to engage in his famous critique of Origen’s controversial cosmology.
If Maximus’ critique of Origen in his Ambigua is the most noteworthy criticism in the writings of the Fathers in late-antiquity , it is undoubtedly Hans Urs von Balthasar’s analysis of Maximus’ critique of Origen that is most renowned among modern commentators. This latter analysis is found in von Balthasar’s monumental, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus Confessor. Here, von Balthasar treats Maximus’ critique of Origen (or rather, Origenism) in two parts entitled: a. Correcting the Myth; and b. The Truth of the Myth. In the first part (a) Balthazar argues that Maximus corrects Origen’s “Platonic” understanding of motion as a sinful falling away from the Good, by taking recourse to the Aristotelian understanding of motion as the good and natural impetus of the creature towards the Good. By introducing the Aristotelian distinction between potency and act, Maximus overcomes the instability inherent to Origen’s cosmos with its threat of endlessly repeated falls away from the Good. In the second part (b) von Balthasar points out the “truth” of the myth by showing how Maximus transforms Origen’s protology into eschatology; the original henad of pre-existent intellects (logika) are seen to represent the future eschatological anticipation of stable union with God in the world to come. The rational creatures (logika) are seen to be the rational principles (logoi) grounding and governing the sensible world.
On the whole, I find myself mostly in agreement with von Balthasar’s conclusions, especially his explication of how Maximus reveals the eschatological truth of Origen’s protological narrative. My primary dispute with von Balthasar lies in the manner in which he arrives at his conclusions, whereby he fails to give sufficient credit where credit is due; namely to Origen himself. Like many scholars up to the present day, von Balthasar tends to see Origen as a “Platonist” and, as such, in need of correction at the hands of the Aristotelian Maximus. While this is not entirely false insofar as Origen needs Maximus to liberate him from the misinterpretations of the Origenists (and the misrepresentations of the anti-Origenists) von Balthasar’s narrative of “correction” overlooks the extent to which Origen is himself an Aristotelian, and thus capable of serving as a corrective to himself. Von Balthasar fails to grasp the extent to which the solution to Origenism lies within Origen himself. The aim of this paper is thus a modest one: building upon von Balthasar’s analysis I hope to show how Maximus’ revision is less a correction than it is an accurate interpretation and development of Origen’s thought. By means of this revision, I hope to bring about a subtle yet important shift in the historical narrative by emphasising the continuity between Origen and Maximus rather than the discontinuity – a continuity rooted in their mutual use of Aristotle. This in turn will lead to a deeper appreciation for the subtlety of Origen’s philosophical theology and a more precise understanding of Maximus’ retrieval of Origen. In sum, I shall argue that in the process of dismantling the strawman of Origenism, Maximus shows himself to be a true disciple of Origen. He is not so much a critic, as a true exegete.
ARC Journal, 2016
In a recent work, I argued that the tendency to regard Origen as a Platonist while neglecting the... more In a recent work, I argued that the tendency to regard Origen as a Platonist while neglecting the all-important Aristotelian dimension of his thought has led to deeply entrenched misunderstandings with respect to Origen’s philosophical theology. Despite compelling textual evidence in its favour, commentators continue to ignore the thoroughly hylomorphic, Aristotelian character of Origen’s thought, interpreting it instead in terms of a “Platonic” soul/body dualism. As a result, Origen’s views concerning the eternity of the world, his repeated insistence upon the inseparability of soul and body, form and matter, crucial to a proper understanding of his philosophical and theological system, have been almost entirely overlooked. A contributing factor to this seemingly willful misreading of Origen, I argued, can be traced to what Cavadini identifies as a “hermeneutic of suspicion.” In this case, the latter refers to the pervasive mistrust within Origen scholarship towards Rufinus’ Latin translations of the works of Origen – in particular the De Principiis. This hermeneutic of suspicion stems largely from the editorial work of Koetschau (1913), who accused Rufinus of having systematically purged any allegedly ‘heretical’ elements from his translations of Origen’s Greek writings. In his critical edition of the De Principiis, Koetschau sets about “supplementing” the Latin text with Greek fragments taken from hostile sources, all the while treating them as unbiased, objective witnesses to Origen’s original meaning. Butterworth (1936), whose translation of the De Principiis remains the sole English language edition, both endorses and expands upon Koetschau’s flawed methodology.
While a critical attitude towards Rufinus is wholly justified – he openly admits to having modified Origen’s text – a correspondingly critical attitude towards hostile witnesses such as Jerome and Justinian seems peculiarly lacking. One ill-fated consequence of this imbalance has been to dismiss the centrality of embodiment for Origen as merely a Rufinian modification. Yet, as I hope to show, this corporealism is so fundamental to Origen’s worldview that attributing it to a few lines pencilled in by Rufinus is entirely untenable. The fact that commentators continue to do so can only be explained by their tendency to see Origen as a Platonist in the crudest sense; namely, as a thinker whose system is constructed upon a radical soul/body dualism. By ignoring the Aristotelian, hylomorphic character of Origen’s thought which, in the case of the soul/body relation is not incompatible with Christian orthodoxy, Origen is seen as much more heterodox than he in fact needs to be. The longstanding hermeneutic of suspicion with respect to Rufinus’ Latin translations of Origen embedded in Koetschau’s critical edition, and Butterworth’s English translation of, the De Principiis has thus resulted in deeply entrenched (and deeply misleading) assumptions concerning Origen’s theological and philosophical views.
In what follows, I intend not only to demonstrate how distorting this hermeneutic of suspicion has been with respect to Origen’s worldview, but further, to examine the roots of the hermeneutic of suspicion itself. I shall contend that the latter is in fact a unique expression of a much broader methodological bias that Peter Martens calls “the Hellenization of Christianity thesis”. This longstanding and notoriously contentious historiographical construct is most closely associated with Adolf von Harnack, who regarded “the spirit of Hellenism” as a corrosive force upon an originally pristine Christianity. As such, Harnack subscribes to an all too familiar Protestant historical narrative of decline – a narrative which, as Wedemeyer demonstrates in the case of Tantric Buddhism, extends to the study of Eastern religions as well. Within Christianity, this narrative serves the Protestant polemic against Catholicism, in which the latter is seen as the (pagan) corruption of an original, Apostolic Christianity. As Jonathan Z. Smith puts it, “the pursuit of the origins of Christian origins takes us back, persistently, to the same point: Protestant anti-Catholic apologetics.” Given that Origen is inextricably bound up with these origins, it comes as no surprise that the study of his work has been profoundly, and adversely, affected. By showing how the Hellenization of Christianity thesis informs the hermeneutic of suspicion, and how this has contributed to deeply misleading assumptions regarding Origen’s theology – particularly with respect to the soul/body relation –, I hope to contribute to a much-needed reappraisal of one of the most important and controversial figures in the history of Christian dogma.
Book Reviews by Daniel Heide
The chief task of G.C. Tympas' Carl Jung and Maximus the Confessor on Psychic Development is, in ... more The chief task of G.C. Tympas' Carl Jung and Maximus the Confessor on Psychic Development is, in the words of the author, to bring together "two dissimilar theories on psychic development" by introducing "a theoretical framework for a synthesis that integrates and, at the same time, exceeds both" (1). Such a theoretical framework, or trans-disciplinary methodology, Tympas argues, is necessary for the critical comparison of Jung's modern psychological model of individuation with Maximus Confessor's ancient theological ideal of deification, or theosis. The aim of this book, then, is to attempt a critical comparison between the psychological and the religious approaches to psychic development or spiritual progress without reducing one to the other. The immediate question that presents itself is, of course, why Jung and Maximus Confessor? What is to be gained from a comparison between an ancient Orthodox theologian and a modern analytical psychologist? The initial inspiration behind this novel comparison appears to be a personal one: Tympas holds a PhD in psychoanalytic studies and serves as a priest in the Greek Orthodox Church. As such, the author's attempt at a non-reductionist comparison between a psychologist and a theologian represents the author's personal attempt at a reconciliation of these two, distinct approaches to interior development. Due to his intimate acquaintance with both parties, Tympas holds the conviction that a "retrospective encounter" between Jung and Maximus could serve to correct Jung's tendency towards psychological reductionism (despite his generally positive view of religion), while providing an ontological grounding for his metaphysically ambiguous notions of synchronicity, individuation, and the Self. On the other hand, Jung's insights into the workings of the unconscious psyche could enrich the traditional, theological understanding of the personal journey towards deification, which tends to minimise the personal and socio-cultural aspects of the journey. The "horizontal" approach of Jungian psychology coupled with the "vertical" approach of Maximian theology, Tympas suggests, are ultimately complementary and capable of being integrated by means of a trans-disciplinary paradigm of development. The need for such a trans-disciplinary paradigm compels Tympas to devote considerable attention to the problem of methodology-a problem with which the book begins and ends. In the interests of avoiding a reductionistic approach, Tympas suggests the inclusion of multiple disciplines such as biology, sociology, psychology, and theology. He envisions this inter, or trans-disciplinary approach to psycho-spiritual development unfolding according to a fivefold "ontological hierarchy":
ARC Journal, 2017
The chief task of G.C. Tympas' Carl Jung and Maximus the Confessor on Psychic Development is, in ... more The chief task of G.C. Tympas' Carl Jung and Maximus the Confessor on Psychic Development is, in the words of the author, to bring together "two dissimilar theories on psychic development" by introducing "a theoretical framework for a synthesis that integrates and, at the same time, exceeds both" (1). Such a theoretical framework, or trans-disciplinary methodology, Tympas argues, is necessary for the critical comparison of Jung's modern psychological model of individuation with Maximus Confessor's ancient theological ideal of deification, or theosis. The aim of this book, then, is to attempt a critical comparison between the psychological and the religious approaches to psychic development or spiritual progress without reducing one to the other.
Drafts by Daniel Heide
Conference Presentations by Daniel Heide
In this presentation, I hope to expand upon Brandon Gallaher's fundamental insight that the core ... more In this presentation, I hope to expand upon Brandon Gallaher's fundamental insight that the core of Solovyov's philosophical theology is not Sophiology, but Christology. It is my contention that Solovyov's Christology extends well beyond any explicit discussions concerning Christ; instead his Chacedonian humanism implicitly informs his entire workfrom his ecclesiology and sophiology, to his views on love, beauty, art and politics. Beneath Solovyov's abstract discussions of the 'real' and the 'ideal' lies the fundamental Chalcedonian notion of the union of two natures without confusion. In addition, Solovyov's understanding of this union in terms of "mutual interpenetration" (взаимного проникновения) or perichoresis, points to the Christology of Maximus Confessor. As such, Solovyov offers a profoundly incarnational vision of the world centred upon the spiritualization of matter and the materialization of spirit, of the realization of the Kingdom when God will be all in all. In what follows I shall focus primarily on Solovyov's aesthetics, beginning with his theory of natural beauty and concluding with his philosophy of art.
This paper attempts to summarize a key argument taken from my recently completed doctoral dissert... more This paper attempts to summarize a key argument taken from my recently completed doctoral dissertation: The World as Sacrament: The Eucharistic Ontology of Maximos Confessor. I argue that Maximos subscribes to a uniquely Orthodox form of creation ex deo (ἐκ Θεοῦ) in which the world is derived from the uncreated works (erga), or energies, of God. As such, the world derives its being from God alone without, however, being identical in essence.
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PhD Dissertation by Daniel Heide
Papers by Daniel Heide
us that we are not merely homo consumptor, but homo adorans, the human as cosmic hierarch.
In his oration On Love For The Poor Gregory makes a passing reference to “we, who are a portion of God that has flowed down from above”. Gregory’s reference to souls being a “portion of God” which subsequently “flowed down from above” sounded suspiciously like Origen’s infamous doctrine of “pre-existent souls”. According to this teaching, formally condemned at the 5th Ecumenical Council of Constantinople II in 553, the original creation consisted of a henad of pure intellects (logika) abiding in blissful union with the divine, but who inexplicably fell away from God and, as punishment, came to be trapped in coarse, fleshly bodies. Though a caricature of Origen’s actual teaching, this view was attributed to Origen and subsequent “Origenists”. Worse, it would seem that certain of these Origenists were drawing upon the words of the impeccable Theologian himself to lend authority to their heretical views, and it was this that prompted Maximus to engage in his famous critique of Origen’s controversial cosmology.
If Maximus’ critique of Origen in his Ambigua is the most noteworthy criticism in the writings of the Fathers in late-antiquity , it is undoubtedly Hans Urs von Balthasar’s analysis of Maximus’ critique of Origen that is most renowned among modern commentators. This latter analysis is found in von Balthasar’s monumental, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus Confessor. Here, von Balthasar treats Maximus’ critique of Origen (or rather, Origenism) in two parts entitled: a. Correcting the Myth; and b. The Truth of the Myth. In the first part (a) Balthazar argues that Maximus corrects Origen’s “Platonic” understanding of motion as a sinful falling away from the Good, by taking recourse to the Aristotelian understanding of motion as the good and natural impetus of the creature towards the Good. By introducing the Aristotelian distinction between potency and act, Maximus overcomes the instability inherent to Origen’s cosmos with its threat of endlessly repeated falls away from the Good. In the second part (b) von Balthasar points out the “truth” of the myth by showing how Maximus transforms Origen’s protology into eschatology; the original henad of pre-existent intellects (logika) are seen to represent the future eschatological anticipation of stable union with God in the world to come. The rational creatures (logika) are seen to be the rational principles (logoi) grounding and governing the sensible world.
On the whole, I find myself mostly in agreement with von Balthasar’s conclusions, especially his explication of how Maximus reveals the eschatological truth of Origen’s protological narrative. My primary dispute with von Balthasar lies in the manner in which he arrives at his conclusions, whereby he fails to give sufficient credit where credit is due; namely to Origen himself. Like many scholars up to the present day, von Balthasar tends to see Origen as a “Platonist” and, as such, in need of correction at the hands of the Aristotelian Maximus. While this is not entirely false insofar as Origen needs Maximus to liberate him from the misinterpretations of the Origenists (and the misrepresentations of the anti-Origenists) von Balthasar’s narrative of “correction” overlooks the extent to which Origen is himself an Aristotelian, and thus capable of serving as a corrective to himself. Von Balthasar fails to grasp the extent to which the solution to Origenism lies within Origen himself. The aim of this paper is thus a modest one: building upon von Balthasar’s analysis I hope to show how Maximus’ revision is less a correction than it is an accurate interpretation and development of Origen’s thought. By means of this revision, I hope to bring about a subtle yet important shift in the historical narrative by emphasising the continuity between Origen and Maximus rather than the discontinuity – a continuity rooted in their mutual use of Aristotle. This in turn will lead to a deeper appreciation for the subtlety of Origen’s philosophical theology and a more precise understanding of Maximus’ retrieval of Origen. In sum, I shall argue that in the process of dismantling the strawman of Origenism, Maximus shows himself to be a true disciple of Origen. He is not so much a critic, as a true exegete.
While a critical attitude towards Rufinus is wholly justified – he openly admits to having modified Origen’s text – a correspondingly critical attitude towards hostile witnesses such as Jerome and Justinian seems peculiarly lacking. One ill-fated consequence of this imbalance has been to dismiss the centrality of embodiment for Origen as merely a Rufinian modification. Yet, as I hope to show, this corporealism is so fundamental to Origen’s worldview that attributing it to a few lines pencilled in by Rufinus is entirely untenable. The fact that commentators continue to do so can only be explained by their tendency to see Origen as a Platonist in the crudest sense; namely, as a thinker whose system is constructed upon a radical soul/body dualism. By ignoring the Aristotelian, hylomorphic character of Origen’s thought which, in the case of the soul/body relation is not incompatible with Christian orthodoxy, Origen is seen as much more heterodox than he in fact needs to be. The longstanding hermeneutic of suspicion with respect to Rufinus’ Latin translations of Origen embedded in Koetschau’s critical edition, and Butterworth’s English translation of, the De Principiis has thus resulted in deeply entrenched (and deeply misleading) assumptions concerning Origen’s theological and philosophical views.
In what follows, I intend not only to demonstrate how distorting this hermeneutic of suspicion has been with respect to Origen’s worldview, but further, to examine the roots of the hermeneutic of suspicion itself. I shall contend that the latter is in fact a unique expression of a much broader methodological bias that Peter Martens calls “the Hellenization of Christianity thesis”. This longstanding and notoriously contentious historiographical construct is most closely associated with Adolf von Harnack, who regarded “the spirit of Hellenism” as a corrosive force upon an originally pristine Christianity. As such, Harnack subscribes to an all too familiar Protestant historical narrative of decline – a narrative which, as Wedemeyer demonstrates in the case of Tantric Buddhism, extends to the study of Eastern religions as well. Within Christianity, this narrative serves the Protestant polemic against Catholicism, in which the latter is seen as the (pagan) corruption of an original, Apostolic Christianity. As Jonathan Z. Smith puts it, “the pursuit of the origins of Christian origins takes us back, persistently, to the same point: Protestant anti-Catholic apologetics.” Given that Origen is inextricably bound up with these origins, it comes as no surprise that the study of his work has been profoundly, and adversely, affected. By showing how the Hellenization of Christianity thesis informs the hermeneutic of suspicion, and how this has contributed to deeply misleading assumptions regarding Origen’s theology – particularly with respect to the soul/body relation –, I hope to contribute to a much-needed reappraisal of one of the most important and controversial figures in the history of Christian dogma.
Book Reviews by Daniel Heide
Drafts by Daniel Heide
Conference Presentations by Daniel Heide
us that we are not merely homo consumptor, but homo adorans, the human as cosmic hierarch.
In his oration On Love For The Poor Gregory makes a passing reference to “we, who are a portion of God that has flowed down from above”. Gregory’s reference to souls being a “portion of God” which subsequently “flowed down from above” sounded suspiciously like Origen’s infamous doctrine of “pre-existent souls”. According to this teaching, formally condemned at the 5th Ecumenical Council of Constantinople II in 553, the original creation consisted of a henad of pure intellects (logika) abiding in blissful union with the divine, but who inexplicably fell away from God and, as punishment, came to be trapped in coarse, fleshly bodies. Though a caricature of Origen’s actual teaching, this view was attributed to Origen and subsequent “Origenists”. Worse, it would seem that certain of these Origenists were drawing upon the words of the impeccable Theologian himself to lend authority to their heretical views, and it was this that prompted Maximus to engage in his famous critique of Origen’s controversial cosmology.
If Maximus’ critique of Origen in his Ambigua is the most noteworthy criticism in the writings of the Fathers in late-antiquity , it is undoubtedly Hans Urs von Balthasar’s analysis of Maximus’ critique of Origen that is most renowned among modern commentators. This latter analysis is found in von Balthasar’s monumental, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus Confessor. Here, von Balthasar treats Maximus’ critique of Origen (or rather, Origenism) in two parts entitled: a. Correcting the Myth; and b. The Truth of the Myth. In the first part (a) Balthazar argues that Maximus corrects Origen’s “Platonic” understanding of motion as a sinful falling away from the Good, by taking recourse to the Aristotelian understanding of motion as the good and natural impetus of the creature towards the Good. By introducing the Aristotelian distinction between potency and act, Maximus overcomes the instability inherent to Origen’s cosmos with its threat of endlessly repeated falls away from the Good. In the second part (b) von Balthasar points out the “truth” of the myth by showing how Maximus transforms Origen’s protology into eschatology; the original henad of pre-existent intellects (logika) are seen to represent the future eschatological anticipation of stable union with God in the world to come. The rational creatures (logika) are seen to be the rational principles (logoi) grounding and governing the sensible world.
On the whole, I find myself mostly in agreement with von Balthasar’s conclusions, especially his explication of how Maximus reveals the eschatological truth of Origen’s protological narrative. My primary dispute with von Balthasar lies in the manner in which he arrives at his conclusions, whereby he fails to give sufficient credit where credit is due; namely to Origen himself. Like many scholars up to the present day, von Balthasar tends to see Origen as a “Platonist” and, as such, in need of correction at the hands of the Aristotelian Maximus. While this is not entirely false insofar as Origen needs Maximus to liberate him from the misinterpretations of the Origenists (and the misrepresentations of the anti-Origenists) von Balthasar’s narrative of “correction” overlooks the extent to which Origen is himself an Aristotelian, and thus capable of serving as a corrective to himself. Von Balthasar fails to grasp the extent to which the solution to Origenism lies within Origen himself. The aim of this paper is thus a modest one: building upon von Balthasar’s analysis I hope to show how Maximus’ revision is less a correction than it is an accurate interpretation and development of Origen’s thought. By means of this revision, I hope to bring about a subtle yet important shift in the historical narrative by emphasising the continuity between Origen and Maximus rather than the discontinuity – a continuity rooted in their mutual use of Aristotle. This in turn will lead to a deeper appreciation for the subtlety of Origen’s philosophical theology and a more precise understanding of Maximus’ retrieval of Origen. In sum, I shall argue that in the process of dismantling the strawman of Origenism, Maximus shows himself to be a true disciple of Origen. He is not so much a critic, as a true exegete.
While a critical attitude towards Rufinus is wholly justified – he openly admits to having modified Origen’s text – a correspondingly critical attitude towards hostile witnesses such as Jerome and Justinian seems peculiarly lacking. One ill-fated consequence of this imbalance has been to dismiss the centrality of embodiment for Origen as merely a Rufinian modification. Yet, as I hope to show, this corporealism is so fundamental to Origen’s worldview that attributing it to a few lines pencilled in by Rufinus is entirely untenable. The fact that commentators continue to do so can only be explained by their tendency to see Origen as a Platonist in the crudest sense; namely, as a thinker whose system is constructed upon a radical soul/body dualism. By ignoring the Aristotelian, hylomorphic character of Origen’s thought which, in the case of the soul/body relation is not incompatible with Christian orthodoxy, Origen is seen as much more heterodox than he in fact needs to be. The longstanding hermeneutic of suspicion with respect to Rufinus’ Latin translations of Origen embedded in Koetschau’s critical edition, and Butterworth’s English translation of, the De Principiis has thus resulted in deeply entrenched (and deeply misleading) assumptions concerning Origen’s theological and philosophical views.
In what follows, I intend not only to demonstrate how distorting this hermeneutic of suspicion has been with respect to Origen’s worldview, but further, to examine the roots of the hermeneutic of suspicion itself. I shall contend that the latter is in fact a unique expression of a much broader methodological bias that Peter Martens calls “the Hellenization of Christianity thesis”. This longstanding and notoriously contentious historiographical construct is most closely associated with Adolf von Harnack, who regarded “the spirit of Hellenism” as a corrosive force upon an originally pristine Christianity. As such, Harnack subscribes to an all too familiar Protestant historical narrative of decline – a narrative which, as Wedemeyer demonstrates in the case of Tantric Buddhism, extends to the study of Eastern religions as well. Within Christianity, this narrative serves the Protestant polemic against Catholicism, in which the latter is seen as the (pagan) corruption of an original, Apostolic Christianity. As Jonathan Z. Smith puts it, “the pursuit of the origins of Christian origins takes us back, persistently, to the same point: Protestant anti-Catholic apologetics.” Given that Origen is inextricably bound up with these origins, it comes as no surprise that the study of his work has been profoundly, and adversely, affected. By showing how the Hellenization of Christianity thesis informs the hermeneutic of suspicion, and how this has contributed to deeply misleading assumptions regarding Origen’s theology – particularly with respect to the soul/body relation –, I hope to contribute to a much-needed reappraisal of one of the most important and controversial figures in the history of Christian dogma.