The Origenism of Maximus Confessor: Critic or True Exegete?

St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 63:3 (2019) 277–295 The Origenism of Maximus Confessor: Critic or True Exegete? Daniel Heide Perhaps the most noteworthy critique of Origen in the Greek Patristic tradition is found in Maximus Confessor’s Ambiguum 7.1 In the Ambigua, Maximus proposes to clarify certain ambiguities pertaining to key passages of (Pseudo-) Dionysius and Gregory of Nazianzus—both towering authorities among the Greek Fathers. With respect to the latter, it would seem that Gregory, in making a passing reference to “we, who are a portion of God that has flowed down from above,”2 had given utterance to ideas that sounded vaguely akin to the Origenist doctrine of “pre-existent souls.” According to this teaching, formally condemned at the 5th Ecumenical Council of Constantinople II in 553, the original creation consisted of a henad of pure intellects (logika) abiding in blissful union with the divine, but who inexplicably fell away from God and, as punishment, came to be trapped in coarse, fleshly bodies. Though a caricature of Origen’s actual teaching, this view was attributed to Origen and subsequent “Origenists.” Appallingly, it would seem that certain of these Origenists were drawing upon the words of the impeccable Nazianzen himself to lend authority to their heretical views, and it 1 2 “Perhaps the only important anti-Origenist document in Greek patristic literature that rejects the doctrine of the henad with sympathetic understanding rather than with a judgment of heresy”: Hans Urs von Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus Confessor (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 2003), 127. Cf. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration on Love for the Poor: “What is this wisdom that concerns me? And what is this great mystery? Or is it God’s will that we, who are a portion of God that has flowed down from above, not become exalted and lifted up on account of this dignity, and so despise our Creator? Or is it not rather that, in our struggle and battle with the body, we should always look to Him, so that this very weakness that has been yoked to us might be an education concerning our dignity?,” cited by Maximus in Ambiguum 7, 1069A. 277 278 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY was this that prompted Maximus to engage in his famous critique of Origen’s controversial cosmology. If Maximus’ critique of Origen in his Ambigua is the most noteworthy criticism in the writings of the Fathers in late-antiquity,3 it is undoubtedly Hans Urs von Balthasar’s analysis of Maximus’ critique of Origen that is most renowned among modern commentators. This latter analysis is found in von Balthasar’s monumental Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus Confessor. Here, von Balthasar treats Maximus’ critique of Origen (or rather, Origenism) in two parts.4 In the first part Balthazar argues that Maximus corrects Origen’s “Platonic” understanding of motion as a sinful falling away from the Good, by taking recourse to the Aristotelian understanding of motion as the good and natural impetus of the creature toward the Good. By introducing the Aristotelian distinction between potency and act, Maximus overcomes the instability inherent to Origen’s cosmos with its threat of endlessly repeated falls away from the Good. In the second part von Balthasar points out the “truth” of the myth by showing how Maximus transforms Origen’s protology into eschatology; the original henad of pre-existent intellects (logika) are seen to represent the future eschatological anticipation of stable union with God in the world to come. The rational creatures (logika) are seen to be the rational principles (logoi) grounding and governing the sensible world. While I find myself mostly in agreement with von Balthasar’s conclusions, I take issue with the fact that von Balthasar fails to give sufficient credit where credit is due: namely, to Origen himself. Like many scholars up to the present day,5 von Balthasar tends to see Origen as a “Platonist” and, as such, in need of correction at the hands of the Aristotelian Maximus. As such, von Balthasar overlooks the extent to which Origen is himself an Aristotelian, and thus capable of serving as a corrective to himself. Von 3 4 5 Cf. von Balthasar, 127. Von Balthasar,127–36. A notable exception being Robert Berchman’s From Philo to Origen: Middle Platonism in Transition (Scholars Press, 1984). The Origenism of Maximus Confessor 279 Balthasar, in other words, fails to grasp the extent to which the solution to Origenism lies within Origen himself. In this paper I hope to show how Maximus’ revision is less a correction than it is an accurate interpretation and development of Origen’s thought. By means of this revision, I hope to bring about a subtle yet important shift in the historical narrative by emphasizing the continuity between Origen and Maximus rather than the discontinuity— a continuity rooted in their mutual use of Aristotle. In sum, I shall argue that in the process of dismantling the strawman of Origenism, Maximus in fact shows himself to be a true disciple of Origen. He is not so much a critic, as a true exegete. I. Genesis-Kinesis-Stasis: Maximus’ Critique of Origenism Maximus’ critique of Origen, as von Balthasar definitively demonstrated,6 is based upon an ontology of motion, whereby Maximus quite literally turns Origen’s understanding of motion on its head. Whereas Origen, as Maximus presents him, held to a progression of rest (στάσις)—motion (κίνησις)—becoming (γένεσις), Maximus argues that the true ontological sequence is in fact becoming (γένεσις)—motion (κίνησις)—rest (στάσις). By moving rest from the beginning of the sequence to its culmination, Maximus transforms Origen’s protology into eschatology. In this way, Maximus attempts to salvage the ontological truth concealed within Origen’s cosmology under the guise of “correcting” him. Maximus begins Ambiguum 7 with a brief summation of the Origenist myth as popularly understood: According to the opinion of these people [the alleged Origenists], there once existed a unity of rational beings (τῶν λογικῶν ἑνάδα), by virtue of which we were connatural with God, in whom we had our remaining (μονὴν) and abode. In addition to this they speak of a “movement” (κίνησιν) that came about, as a result of which the rational beings were variously dispersed, prompting God to look toward the creation (γένησιν) of this corporeal world, so that He could bind 6 Cf. von Balthasar, 127–36. 280 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY them in bodies as a punishment for their former sins. This is what they think our teacher Gregory is alluding to in this passage.7 They do not realize, however, that their theories are completely untenable, and their assumptions are all unsound, as a truthful examination will presently demonstrate by means of more reasonable arguments. (Amb. 1069B)8 The primal henad of rational beings refers to the infamous doctrine of “pre-existent souls,” ascribed to Origen and condemned at Constantinople II, according to which the original creation consisted of a realm of purely noetic beings who only later acquired bodies as a punishment for their sins. Maximus ignores the heterodox implications of this doctrine and focuses instead upon the logical contradictions implicit in the narrative. For him, the initial remaining of the logika in God represents rest (στάσις); their falling away indicates motion (κίνησις); while their subsequent embodiment represents their coming into being (γένεσις). Origen’s ontological progression is thus that of rest—motion—becoming. Maximus begins his counterargument with rest. Only God, who “fills all things” (ὡς πάντων πληρωτικόν) and thus has nowhere to go, he declares, is originally and eternally at rest (ἀκίνητον); beings, on the other hand, who have been created ex nihilo are naturally in motion (κινητόν) and, insofar as they are not yet in possession of their ultimate desired end, cannot be said to be at rest (Amb. 1069B–C). Next, he argues that it is impossible for rest to produce motion prior to becoming. Motion is not some abstract, disembodied phenomenon that occurs in a vacuum, but rather a natural expression of an actual, created being.9 We know what kind of being something is according to what kind of motion it exhibits (Amb. 1072B). Finally, it is not genesis that marks the culmination of the ontological sequence, but rest. All natural 7 8 9 Cf. note 2 above. All citations of Maximus are taken from the Greek/English On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua, Vols. I&II, ed. & tr. Nicholas Constas (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press/Dumbarton Oaks, 2014). Cf. Maximus’ discussion of natural motion and activity in Ambiguum 5, 1045D– 1048B. The Origenism of Maximus Confessor 281 motion is teleological; every created being is moved by an intrinsic desire for completion, for self-realization. All things are moved by their love of God, the Unmoved Mover in whose infinite rest and eternal perfection finite beings attain their own longed-for rest and perfection (Amb. 1257D–1260D). Maximus’ assertion that God is at rest “because he fills all things” (ὡς πάντων πληρωτικόν) becomes clearer when we examine a passage in which he is talking about the opposite case; namely, creatures who are not at rest. “Nothing,” says Maximus, that has come into being is perfect in itself (αὐτοτελές), for if it were, it would be devoid of activity (ἀνενέργητον), being full (ὡς πλῆρες), having no want or need of anything, since it owes its origin to nothing outside itself. (Amb. 1072C–D) In negating the idea of an original perfection of created beings, Maximus defines “fullness” (πλῆρες) as a state of absolute selfsufficiency, self-perfection, and hence rest. Insofar as beings are by nature incomplete, contingent, and “unfulfilled” with respect to their existence, they are not at rest (ἀνενέργητον) but rather in continuous motion. God, on the other hand, is at rest (ἀνενέργητον), filling all things precisely in that he is himself “full” as eternally self-realized actuality. Because motion for Maximus, as for Aristotle, involves a teleological progression from incompletion to completion, from potentiality to actuality, there is nowhere for God as uncaused (ἀναίτιος) and eternally self-perfect (αὐτοτελές) actuality to “go.” Rest, then, indicates actuality, the fullness, or perfection of being properly pertaining to God alone. Like Aristotle, Maximus understands God as entelecheia (i.e., as full, complete reality possessing its end in itself ), as the Unmoved Mover who, eternally at rest, moves all things as the supreme object of desire (Amb. 1257D–1260D). If the Divine is immovable (ἀκίνητον) “since it fills all things,” beings created ex nihilo are perpetually on the move (κινητόν) “since all things are necessarily carried along toward some cause” (Amb. 1069B–C). Maximus’ understanding of creation ex nihilo, of the contingency and incompletion of beings is essentially Aristotelian. 282 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Every created nature is necessarily in motion, and this natural motion is teleological—it is an “appetitive movement” (ἔφεσιν κινήσεως) oriented toward its “ultimate object of desire” (ἐσχάτῳ ὀρεκτῷ); namely, God as the Unmoved Mover (Amb. 1069B–C; 1257D–1260D). Insofar as creatures do not possess their origin and end within themselves—i.e., are not uncaused and self-perfect but contingent upon God as the source (ἀρχὴ) and consummation (τέλος) of their being—they are intrinsically incomplete (cf. Amb. 1217D). As such, creatures are compelled by a correspondingly natural desire for completion, for participation in the fullness of being that properly pertains to God alone. To be a creature is to emerge from nonbeing and progress toward the fullness of being. Only God is originally at rest; creatures are originally in motion. Maximus offers a unique articulation of this creaturely motion in terms of the three modes of existence accessible to human beings; namely, being (εἶναι), wellbeing (εὖ εἶναι), and eternal-being (ἀεὶ εἶναι). The first is bestowed upon beings by essence; the second is granted them by the power of free choice; the third is lavished upon beings by grace (Amb. 1116B–C). The two extremes, being and eternal being, are gifts bestowed by God as the archē and telos of creatures, while the intermediate mode depends upon the freewill and motion of rational beings (ibid.). In other words, both genesis and stasis are givens; the creature can neither bring itself into existence nor attain the goal of perfection on its own. What it can do—and is called to do—is to mediate between its transcendent origin and end by means of its own freely willed activity, or motion. Kinesis, as “the good ontological activity of a developing nature,”10 mediates between genesis and stasis, the potential for existence and the perfection of being—the latter being attained only with the help of grace (Amb. 1392B). Maximus expresses this ontological progression in terms of the biblical distinction (Gen 1:27) between the human created according to the image (κατ᾿ εἰκόνα) and according to the likeness (καθ᾿ὁμοίωσιν)—an important distinction that we shall meet 10 Von Balthasar, 135. The Origenism of Maximus Confessor 283 again when we return to Origen. Like certain others among the Greek Fathers, Maximus interprets “image” as indicating the potential for deiformity, and “likeness” as referring to the actual realization of deiformity, the ultimate telos of humanity (Amb. 1084A–B;1092B;1345D–1348A). In contrast to the Origenist myth, rational creatures (logika) are not created perfect but merely with the potential for perfection—a potential which they must freely choose to cultivate through a life of ascetic virtue, and which they can only attain with the help of grace. For Maximus, the Fall is thus not a fall from an original perfection, but a turning away from the goal of perfection. By choosing the immediate gratification of the senses over the future promise of spiritual blessings, humanity lost its capacity for deiformity, acquiring instead the likeness of irrational beasts (Amb. 1348B). Insofar as human beings have never actually experienced perfection, but merely the potential for perfection, the restoration and fulfilment of this capacity in rest is free of the danger of repeated falls. By shifting perfection from the beginning of the ontological sequence to the end, Maximus attempts to overcome the instability of the Origenist cosmology. Motion is not a sinful movement away from the Good but, as von Balthasar puts it, “the good ontological activity of a developing nature” involving a progression from potency to act, from incompletion to completion, from genesis to stasis. Having at long last come to rest in God who is Rest, there is no longer any possibility of repeated falls. Perfection qua perfection is irreversible.11 In sum, then, according to Maximus’ Aristotelian logic, the Origenist myth of pre-existence gets things completely backwards: it begins by positing an original state of perfection which then inexplicably produces an anti-teleological motion away from the Good, culminating in the created cosmos, an unstable world of becoming populated by a diversity of beings. As such, Origen seems to hold to an illogical and tragic view of reality as a progression (or rather, regression) from perfection to imperfec11 I qualify this statement below by suggesting that, for Maximus, it is the fact of the Incarnation that provides the ultimate guarantee of stable rest in God. 284 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY tion. The world is not so much an expression of the goodness of the Creator, as it is a response to the fallenness of the creature. As such, Origen’s cosmology is inherently unstable, for if beings are capable of even once spurning the Good in favor of an inferior mode of existence (as though perfection were somehow dissatisfactory to them) what, asks Maximus, will prevent them from doing so again and again ad infinitum? (Amb. 1069C). The Origenist myth is thus one of cosmic instability and existential despair, in which the universe is doomed to endless cycles of disintegration and restoration without hope of any final resolution. Maximus overcomes this intolerable position by turning the Origenist myth on its head: the proper ontological sequence is not rest— motion—becoming, but becoming—motion—rest. Motion is not a sinful falling away into the flux of becoming, but the natural impulse of created beings toward the perfection of being. II. From Logika to Logoi Thus far our discussion has focused upon what von Balthasar terms “correcting the myth.” I would like now to examine the second part of Maximus’ critique of Origen, what von Balthasar refers to as the “truth of the myth.” Von Balthasar, it seems to me, is indubitably correct in arguing that Maximus transforms Origen’s protology into eschatology—his main fault lies in not recognizing the extent to which the seeds of this “transformation” are already present in Origen. In other words, von Balthasar arrives at the right conclusion without, in my opinion, giving the great Alexandrian his due. I shall deal with this quibble when we get to Origen. For now, I want to develop von Balthasar’s basic intuition. As the latter points out, for Maximus, “the original henad of the intellects is, in reality, the unitary existence of created ideas in the Logos.”12 In other words, the primal unity of rational creatures (logika) centered upon God, become the rational principles (logoi) united without confusion within God: 12 Von Balthasar, 131. The Origenism of Maximus Confessor 285 Who—knowing that it was with reason and wisdom that God brought beings into existence out of nothing—if he were carefully to direct the contemplative power of his soul to their infinite natural differences and variety, and, with the analytical power of reason, were (together with these) to distinguish in his mind the logos according to which they were created, would not, I ask, fail to know the one Logos as many logoi, indivisibly distinguished amid the differences of created things … ? Moreover, would he not also know that the many logoi are one Logos, seeing that all things are related to Him without being confused with Him, who is the essential and personally distinct Logos of God, the origin and cause of all things … (emphasis added; Amb. 1077C–1080A). For Maximus, the rich diversity and rational order of the world reveals the wisdom of the Creator. In fact, as we see from the striking Christological language of the Logos and the logoi being “indivisibly distinguished” and “related without being confused,” the entire universe according to Maximus is a kind of incarnation of the Logos. The original unity of the world is not located in some mythical past henad of logika which subsequently fell into division and multiplicity, but is eternally rooted in the Logos. Unity and multiplicity are simultaneously present, and both are fundamentally good. The diversity of the world is not due to sinful divisions on the part of the fallen creature, but a natural expression of the wisdom and goodness of the Creator. While von Balthasar’s basic intuition concerning Maximus’ transformation of Origen’s protology into eschatology is correct, eschatology for Maximus is in fact inseparable from protology. It might be more accurate to say that Maximus transforms both the protology and eschatology of the Origenist myth from a tragic quasi-historical narrative into an optimistic account of reality that is simultaneously ontological and historical. The ontological grounding of the myth is evident in Maximus’ understanding of the logoi as the unchanging principles (archai) of existence within the divine Logos: “From all eternity,” says Maximus, “He contained within Himself the pre-existing logoi of created 286 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY beings” (Amb. 1080A). Origen’s pre-existent logika, have become pre-existent logoi, the unchanging principles of existence. Following (Pseudo-) Dionysius, Maximus calls these pre-existent logoi “predeterminations” and “divine wills” (Amb. 1085A–B).13 As such, they represent the unwavering intentionality of God for the created order in terms of both universals and particulars (cf. Amb. 1080A). It is on the basis of these logoi or divine willings that God brings all things into being “at the appropriate time” (Amb. 1080A– B). The logoi are at once timeless intentions in the divine mind and dynamic potencies to be actualized in history (cf. Amb. 1081B). By interpreting Origen’s rational creatures (logika) as rational principles (logoi), and identifying these latter as multiple expressions of a singular and unwavering divine will, Maximus transfers rest from the creature to the Creator where it properly belongs. Insofar as the creature is eternally rooted in the unwavering will of God as the principle of its being, it too possesses a kind of rest already from the beginning. The creature can never truly become other than it is; it may deviate from its preordained destiny on account of its free will, but it cannot cease to be what it most fundamentally is. From the ontological perspective, the logoi remain unchanged and hence at rest. This rootedness of the logoi in the divine Mind enables us, along with the blessed Gregory, to refer to rational beings as “portions of God” (Amb. 1080C).14 Yet, these logoi, which remain eternally at rest in the divine Mind as the unified content of the Logos, nonetheless require actualization in history (Amb. 1081B). In terms of the logos of humanity, this actualization is threefold: God wills for the human not merely to be (εἶναι), but to utilize its freewill to acquire well-being (εὖ εἶναι) and, beyond that, to realize with the help of grace its ultimate destiny of eternal being (ἀεὶ εἶναι). As the image of God, the human is called to realize the likeness of God, to move from potential deiformity to actual deiformity. It is this realization of likeness to God (homoiosis theou), or deification, that represents the ultimate telos of creation, the 13 14 The notion of “predeterminations,” as we shall see later, ultimately goes back to Origen. Cf. introduction, note 2 above. The Origenism of Maximus Confessor 287 fulfilment of its eschatological hopes, the final culmination of creaturely motion in rest. So long as beings move in accordance with their logos which pre-exists in God as their Origin and Cause, and do not “flow away”15 (i.e., deviate from their preordained destiny), they will come to be in God as their final resting place (Amb. 1080C–1081A). It is in this ultimate sense of eschatological fulfilment that the human, having become god by grace, may truly be said to be a “portion of God”16 (Amb. 1084C). For Maximus (and for Origen, as I will demonstrate shortly), protology and eschatology coincide. All creaturely motion is circular, moving from beginning to beginning. And yet, as von Balthasar so aptly puts it, what seems to be circular from God’s point of view, because the beginning and the end are the same, can appear just as authentically as genuine development and movement, from the standpoint of the world: the course of loving movement toward “the ideas that pre-exist in God, or better: towards God himself.”17 For Maximus, eschatological rest as the culmination of natural motion is stable (a stability guaranteed by the Incarnation) and free of any danger of repeated falls. Having realized their likeness to God, creatures become wholly permeated by God, united without confusion like the inseparable union of soul and body. By transforming creaturely motion from a sinful movement away from perfection into “the good ontological activity of a developing nature,”18 Maximus transforms the instability and despair of the Origenist myth into the joyful anticipation of eternal rest in God. III. Origen Revisited; or, Allegorizing the Allegorist Having explored the various ways in which Maximus critiques and transforms the Origenist myth, I would like now to show the extent to which Maximus’ solution to the problem of Origenism is already 15 16 17 18 Ibid. Ibid. Von Balthasar, 134; Ambigua 1084B. Von Balthasar, 135. 288 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY present in Origen himself. This will involve a close reading of Origen’s De Principiis in order to get at the underlying truth of the myth. The key to this venture lies in coming to recognize the largely overlooked Aristotelian character of Origen’s philosophy, in particular his hylomorphism and his understanding of nature in terms of potency and actuality. These Aristotelian notions serve to undermine the Platonic-inspired myth of pre-existence, revealing the ontological and eschatological truth hidden beneath the poetic, quasi-historical narrative. In a sense, then, we shall proceed by allegorizing the allegorist, wresting the philosophic kernel from its poetic husk. According to Maximus’ account of Origen’s cosmology, the original creation consisted of a henad of noetic beings (logika) who subsequently fell, prompting God to create the sensible, corporeal world as a kind of prison in which beings were bound to bodies as punishment for their sins. This sketch of Origen’s cosmology, though caricatured, has its source in certain passages in the De Principiis in which Origen speculates upon the origin of the world; in particular, Origen is concerned to reconcile the appalling inequality of creation with the goodness of the Creator. Ironically, the principal aim of Origen’s much-maligned cosmology is theodicy—it is a defense of God’s goodness in face of the evident evils of the world. Origen’s solution is to credit God with creating an original world of equality, while attributing the inequality of the world to the free will of created beings who chose to turn away from God in varying degrees. To this end, Origen speaks of beings falling away from the “original unity and harmony in which they were first created by God” (DePrinc. II.I.1), and of creation as a descent (katabole) from higher to lower conditions in response to the spiritual defects of beings (DePrinc. III.V.4). Taken in isolation these passages could be construed as positing an original purely noetic creation which subsequently fell into embodiment. However, when one examines Origen’s theology as a whole, this simplistic reading of the myth becomes increasingly untenable. To begin with, there is Origen’s hylomorphism. Following Aristotle, Origen insists that form is inseparable from matter; it may The Origenism of Maximus Confessor 289 well be possible to separate them conceptually, he acknowledges, but in reality the one is never found in isolation from the other. Form is always the form of some tangible, material object, while matter is always enformed matter (cf. DePrinc. II.I.4–5; IV.IV.7–8). This same logic applies to the relation of soul and body. Contrary to the accusations leveled against him from antiquity to the present day, Origen repeatedly insists upon the inseparability of soul and body.19 Only God is capable of a purely noetic existence; creatures cannot live apart from bodies. Origen states that: while the original creation (principaliter creatas) was of rational beings, it is only in idea and thought (opinione quidem intellectu solo) that a material substance is separable from them, and that though this substance seems (videri) to have been produced for them, or after them (pro ipsas vel post ipsas), yet never have they lived or do they live without it; for we shall be right in believing that life without a body is found in the Trinity alone. (Emphasis added; DePrinc. II.II.2) As we can see, the relation of soul and body parallels that of form and matter; it may well be possible to distinguish between them conceptually, but in reality soul and body are never found in isolation from the other. Origen explicitly states that the creation of bodies subsequent to minds is an illusion. Beings have never lived apart from bodies and never will—such a simple, uncompounded, purely noetic existence pertains to God alone. If this is so (and numerous other passages in Origen suggest that it is),20 then it cannot be the case that the original creation consisted solely of intellects who subsequently fell into embodiment, thus precipitating the creation of the material world. To the contrary, 19 20 This deeply entrenched misunderstanding is in part due to the enduring tendency to portray Origen as a world-negating gnostic or “Platonist” in the crudest sense of the term, while entirely ignoring the Aristotelian character of his thought. This misunderstanding is then reinforced by a long-standing “hermeneutic of suspicion” in which all positive references to embodiment are attributed to Origen’s Latin translator Rufinus, who is accused of having altered the original text. For a discussion of this problem see my “Heresy, Hermeneutics, and the Hellenization of Christianity,” ARC 44 (2016). Cf. DePrinc I.VI.4; II.III.2; IV.III.15; IV.IV.8. 290 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY the “original creation” of rational beings here does not refer to an original disembodied existence in time, but to the ontological priority of minds to bodies, whereby the former “precedes” the latter as its formal principle.21 This ontological reading of the myth is confirmed by a passage in which Origen speculates whether just as the Father is the principle of the Son and the Holy Spirit, yet in such a way that no thought of before (anterius) or after (posterius) can be entertained in respect of them, some similar kinship or close connection (societas vel propinquitas) might not be understood to exist also between rational natures and bodily matter. (DePrinc. II.II.1) This latter passage strongly suggests that the truth of the Origenist myth is, as Maximus rightly divined, ontological. Just as the Father is the eternal archē of the Son and the Spirit, so the original rational creatures (logika) are in fact the unchanging rational principles (logoi) of embodied beings. While this ontological interpretation of the logika does not yet get us to Maximus’ logoi, Origen’s understanding of the Logos as the locus of the “Ideas” or principles of creation brings us very close indeed. In the same way that Maximus speaks of the logoi as “predeterminations” (προορισμούς) within the divine Mind, so Origen speaks of the multiple content of the Logos as “prefigurations” and “rationes” (=logoi): “there have always existed in wisdom,” states Origen, “by a prefiguration (praefigurationem) and preformation (praeformationem), those things which afterwards have received substantial existence” (DePrinc. I.IV.4,5). Elsewhere he identifies these principles as the “beginnings (initia=archai) and rationes (=logoi)” of creation (DePrinc. I.II.2). While Origen does not explicitly speak of the logoi as Maximus does in terms of “divine wills,”22 his language of “prefigurations” is strikingly similar—if 21 22 Cf. my Christian Eschatology and Aristotelian Teleology in Origen’s De Principiis (MA Thesis, Dalhousie University, 2016, 58–59. In fact, Origen does speak of the creativity of the divine will, though more in connection with the Father than the Logos. The Father produces, or emanates, the LogosSon as “will proceeds from mind.” The content of the Logos by extension is implicitly The Origenism of Maximus Confessor 291 not identical—to Maximus’ “predeterminations.” Though we lack Origen’s original Greek, the meanings of praefiguratio and προορισμός are virtually identical: both terms can be taken as signifying the timeless, foreordained wisdom of God according to which the universe unfolds in time. Like Maximus,’ Origen’s logoi are dynamic: they are at once timeless principles prefigured within the divine Mind as well as potencies (virtus= δύναμις) to be actualized in history (cf. DePrinc. I.II.2). Though Origen never explicitly equates or reconciles his philosophical doctrine of the logoi with his poetic depiction of the logika, Maximus does so in his “transformation” of Origen—a transformation wrought on the basis of Origen himself. By using Origen to interpret Origen Maximus uncovers the ontological truth concealed within the quasi-historical narrative of the Fall. So much for the ontological truth of Origen’s protology. I want to conclude our discussion of Origen by showing the extent to which Maximus’ eschatology—including his understanding of natural motion—is also already present in Origen whom he purportedly corrects. We noted above that Origen’s logoi are dynamic: they are simultaneously eternal “prefigurations” within the divine Mind as well as potencies (δυνάμεις) to be actualized in history. Like Maximus several centuries after him, Origen holds to an Aristotelian understanding of formal causation. Everything in existence moves from potential being to actual being and as such is dependent upon a prior actuality as its formal, efficient, and final cause. Origen encapsulates this idea in his oft-repeated maxim that “the end must be like the beginning.” For him, as subsequently for Maximus, the archē and the telos coincide. All creaturely motion is at once circular and linear—circular because the beginning and the end are the same; linear because the movement from one to the other involves genuine progress from potential being to actual being culminating in God as the source and consummation of being. then the multiplication of this singular divine will. In this sense, one might speak of “divine wills” in Origen, though this idea is never developed or made explicit or, at any rate, expressed in these terms by Origen. 292 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY Despite the fact that Maximus portrays Origen’s understanding of motion exclusively as a sinful falling away from God—a view that Maximus regards as fundamentally wrong-headed insofar as it is antiteleological—Origen’s actual understanding of creaturely motion is in fact remarkably close to that of Maximus. This is evident in Origen’s use of the image/likeness distinction which Maximus likely inherits directly from him, as well as Origen’s understanding of this biblical distinction in Aristotelian fashion as a movement from potency to actuality. Even more striking is the unmistakable outline in Origen of Maximus’ three modes of being, well-being, and eternal being. Origen is among the earliest Christian thinkers to draw a distinction between the Genesis language of “image” and “likeness.” He begins by noting that the ultimate telos “toward which all rational nature is progressing” is likeness to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ),23 a notion which the philosophers, he claims, ultimately derived from Moses (DePrinc. III. VI.1). The fact that Moses uses the terms image and likeness in the way that he does in the creation narrative, Origen claims, points to nothing else but this, that man received the honor of God’s image in his first creation (prima conditione), whereas the perfection (perfectio) of God’s likeness was reserved for him at the consummation (in consummatione). The purpose of this was that man should acquire it for himself by his own efforts to imitate God, so that while the possibility (possibilitate) of attaining perfection was given to him in the beginning (in initiis) through the honor of the “image,” he should in the end (in finis) through the accomplishment of these works obtain for himself the perfect “likeness.” (Ibid; cf. II.XI.3, 4) In this passage, Origen explicitly links the “original creation” (prima conditione) with the potential (possibilitate) for deiformity, and the goal of creation (in consummatione) with the actualization (perfectio) of deiformity. In precisely the same way that Maximus does in allegedly “correcting” him, Origen distinguishes between the “image” as potency, and the “likeness” as actuality, while positing a natural teleological motion or progression from one to the other. While Origen does not develop this idea as fully as Maximus does, 23 Cf. Plato’s Theaetetus (176b). The Origenism of Maximus Confessor 293 it is subtly present throughout the De Principiis, typically expressed in terms of innate “seeds of virtue,” or the innate capacity of rational creatures for God (capax dei), the realization of which stands as the ultimate goal of human life (cf. DePrinc. IV.IV.9, 10; I.I.6; I.III.6; II.XI.4).24 As such, motion for Origen does not merely involve a sinful falling away from the Good, but also and more fundamentally a teleological progression from imperfection to perfection. In terms of Maximus’ three modes of being, Origen alludes to this scheme in a discussion concerning the Trinity. For him, God the Father bestows the gift of being, the Logos-Son bestows the gift of well-being, while the Holy Spirit bestows the sanctifying gift of eternal being (DePrinc. I.III.6–8). As with Maximus, Origen equates well-being with the free exercise of the creature’s innate rationality. The creature is free to choose between acting according to nature or acting contrary to nature (DePrinc. I.III.8). The fall for Origen, just as for Maximus, is not a departure from an original perfection but a deviation from the goal of perfection, the failure to live according to one’s logos (cf. DePrinc. I.V.2). Every living creature, Origen insists (contra Maximus’ accusation!), is in perpetual motion (DePrinc. II.XI.1); for the rational creature this motion takes the form of an innate intellectual yearning for “the reality of things,” for the fullness of truth and being (DePrinc. II.XI.4). Through participation in the Trinitarian Godhead creatures are able to progress from being, to well-being, to the ultimate perfection of eternal being, of eternal life in God the source and consummation of creation (DePrinc. I.III.6–8). In Origen’s use of the three modes of being, which he identifies with the three Persons of the Trinity, we find the seeds of Maximus’ own threefold scheme. Here too Maximus finds the solution to Origenism within Origen himself. Having demonstrated some of the ways in which Origen anticipates his own correction at the hands of Maximus, what are we to make of the 24 In Origen’s Commentary on Romans, Rufinus preserves for us the key Greek terms dynamis and energeia. In translating Origen’s discussion regarding the difference between the Logos abiding within beings potentially (possibilitas) versus abiding in them actually (efficiens), Rufinus remarks that this is a distinction which “the Greeks call δύναμις and ἐνέργεια” (CommRom. 8.2.5–6). 294 ST VLADIMIR’S THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY latter’s criticism of Origen’s cosmology as one of instability and despair? Is there no truth to the oft-repeated accusation of repeated falls from the Good? Is the problem of Origenism a complete chimera? To begin with, Origen’s quasi-historic narrative of a primal fall from perfection is clearly problematic. Qua myth, Origen’s narrative inevitably devalues history and embodied existence, while tending toward pessimism and despair. Yet even on the philosophical level there are lingering problems. Though Origen’s philosophical understanding of motion is considerably more positive than the poetic narrative alone would lead us to believe, he lacks the optimistic “theophanic” vision of the cosmos that Maximus inherits from Dionysius. Nor can the fundamental problem of repeated falls be entirely expunged from Origen’s eschatology. Origen’s uncompromising commitment to free will compels him to keep open the possibility that beings might choose to reject the supreme Good in favor of lesser goods, a position he seems to maintain despite his positive, teleological understanding of motion (cf. DePrinc. I.III.8; I.VI.2; II.III.3). Ultimately, the transformation of Origenist motion, or rather, the retrieval of Origen’s philosophical understanding of motion, is only a partial solution. Maximus, who shows considerable anxiety over this problem, arguably only overcomes it with the help of the Incarnation. By uniting the divine and human natures within his own Person, Christ becomes the ultimate guarantor of stable eschatological rest. The Incarnation provides the model for deification whereby the human becomes by grace what Christ is by nature (Amb. 1084C–D). Just as God inseparably united Himself with humanity in the Incarnation, so humanity will be inseparably united with God in the eschaton. In the same way that soul and body are inextricably united without confusion, so Christ, says Maximus, “joined us to Himself and knit us together in the Spirit” (Amb. 1097C; cf. 1088B; 1092C). It is in this final sense of deification in which the human becomes entirely permeated by God “like iron in a forge”25 (1076A) that we can truly be said to 25 This classic analogy for deification also has its root in Origen, who uses it to illustrate the inseparable union of the Logos with the soul of Christ (DePrinc. II.VI.5–6; IV.IV.4). Whereas Origen reserves this indestructible union for Christ alone, Maximus, by means The Origenism of Maximus Confessor 295 be “portions of God.” For Maximus, it is by grace that humanity freely chooses the Good for all eternity. IV. Conclusion: Maximus as True Exegete I have tried to show in this essay some of the key ways in which Maximus is indebted to Origen—so much so that he often “corrects” Origen by means of Origen himself. As such, I have deliberately set out to emphasize the continuity of thought between Origen and Maximus as a counterbalance to the discontinuity emphasized by von Balthasar in his groundbreaking account. This is not to say that these two great philosopher-theologians are entirely of one mind. That would be going to the opposite extreme, and would devalue the originality of Maximus’ thought, along with his crucial contribution to the history of theology. It is not simply that Maximus borrows from Origen, but that he develops and expands considerably upon the latter’s thought; what is often implicit and tentative in Origen, is made explicit by Maximus who establishes the latter’s intuitions upon the firm foundations of sophisticated philosophical reasoning. In addition, Maximus takes the insights he derives from Origen and fuses them with the Christological insights of Chalcedon and the other ecumenical councils subsequent to Origen’s time. It is above all the Incarnation that, for Maximus, provides the crucial stability lacking in Origen’s cosmology. The genius of Maximus, as von Balthasar recognized, was to extract and develop the enduring insights present in Origen and to surreptitiously pass them on to posterity. While the demise of Origen remains a mystery shrouded in ecclesiastical and imperial politics, one thing is certain: in dismantling the strawman of Origenism Maximus largely draws the right conclusions regarding Origen’s true aim. As such, Maximus shows himself to be less a critic than a true exegete. of his Incarnational theology, extends this possibility to the whole of creation (cf. Amb. 1076A). 

The Origenism of Maximus Confessor: Critic or True Exegete? What is this wisdom that concerns me? And what is this great mystery? Or is it God’s will that we, who are a portion of God that has flowed down from above, not become exalted and lifted up on account of this dignity, and so despise our Creator? Or is it not rather that, in our struggle and battle with the body, we should always look to Him, so that this very weakness that has been yoked to us might be an education concerning our dignity? – Gregory Nazianzus Perhaps the most famous critique of Origen in the Greek Patristic tradition is found in Maximus Confessor’s Ambiguum 7. Arguably Maximus’ greatest work of philosophical theology, the 2volume Ambigua proposes to clarify certain ambiguities pertaining to key passages of (Pseudo) Dionysius and Gregory Nazianzus – both towering authorities among the Greek Fathers. Whereas Dionysius as the alleged disciple of St. Paul possessed a quasi-apostolic authority, Gregory Nazianzus was reverently referred to as “The Theologian” on account of his crucial contributions to Nicene orthodoxy – the first to be so named after the apostle and gospel writer John the Theologian. Only one other Father, Simeon the New Theologian in the 10th cent. is honoured with this epithet. Both Dionysius and Gregory thus possessed an authority akin to that of Scripture, with the latter in particular standing as a pillar of orthodoxy (and eloquence!). All the more troubling then that “The Theologian” would seem to have given utterance to ideas that sounded alarmingly Origenist. Gregory Nazianzus’ enthusiasm for Origen, shared by his fellow Cappadocians Basil of Caesarea, and Gregory of Nyssa (all three champions of Nicene Orthodoxy), is well known to historians. In fact, Nazianzus and Basil composed the Philokalia, a compilation of Origen’s less controversial writings. In his oration On Love For The Poor Gregory makes a passing reference to “we, who are a portion of God that has flowed down from above”. Cf. Ambigua 7, 1069A. Gregory’s reference to souls being a “portion of God” which subsequently “flowed down from above” sounded suspiciously like Origen’s infamous doctrine of “pre-existent souls”. According to this teaching, formally condemned at the 5th Ecumenical Council of Constantinople II in 553, the original creation consisted of a henad of pure intellects (logika) abiding in blissful union with the divine, but who inexplicably fell away from God and, as punishment, came to be trapped in coarse, fleshly bodies. Though a caricature of Origen’s actual teaching, this view was attributed to Origen and subsequent “Origenists”. Worse, it would seem that certain of these Origenists were drawing upon the words of the impeccable Theologian himself to lend authority to their heretical views, and it was this that prompted Maximus to engage in his famous critique of Origen’s controversial cosmology. If Maximus’ critique of Origen in his Ambigua is the most noteworthy criticism in the writings of the Fathers in late-antiquity Cf. Balthasar 127., it is undoubtedly Hans Urs von Balthasar’s analysis of Maximus’ critique of Origen that is most renowned among modern commentators. This latter analysis is found in von Balthasar’s monumental, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus Confessor. Here, von Balthasar treats Maximus’ critique of Origen (or rather, Origenism) in two parts entitled: a. Correcting the Myth; and b. The Truth of the Myth. Balthasar 127-136. In the first part (a) Balthazar argues that Maximus corrects Origen’s “Platonic” understanding of motion as a sinful falling away from the Good, by taking recourse to the Aristotelian understanding of motion as the good and natural impetus of the creature towards the Good. By introducing the Aristotelian distinction between potency and act, Maximus overcomes the instability inherent to Origen’s cosmos with its threat of endlessly repeated falls away from the Good. In the second part (b) von Balthasar points out the “truth” of the myth by showing how Maximus transforms Origen’s protology into eschatology; the original henad of pre-existent intellects (logika) are seen to represent the future eschatological anticipation of stable union with God in the world to come. The rational creatures (logika) are seen to be the rational principles (logoi) grounding and governing the sensible world. On the whole, I find myself mostly in agreement with von Balthasar’s conclusions, especially his explication of how Maximus reveals the eschatological truth of Origen’s protological narrative. My primary dispute with von Balthasar lies in the manner in which he arrives at his conclusions, whereby he fails to give sufficient credit where credit is due; namely to Origen himself. Like many scholars up to the present day, A notable exception being Robert Berchman’s From Philo to Origen: Middle Platonism in Transition (1984). von Balthasar tends to see Origen as a “Platonist” and, as such, in need of correction at the hands of the Aristotelian Maximus. While this is not entirely false insofar as Origen needs Maximus to liberate him from the misinterpretations of the Origenists (and the misrepresentations of the anti-Origenists) von Balthasar’s narrative of “correction” overlooks the extent to which Origen is himself an Aristotelian, and thus capable of serving as a corrective to himself. Von Balthasar fails to grasp the extent to which the solution to Origenism lies within Origen himself. The aim of this paper is thus a modest one: building upon von Balthasar’s analysis I hope to show how Maximus’ revision is less a correction than it is an accurate interpretation and development of Origen’s thought. By means of this revision, I hope to bring about a subtle yet important shift in the historical narrative by emphasising the continuity between Origen and Maximus rather than the discontinuity – a continuity rooted in their mutual use of Aristotle. This in turn will lead to a deeper appreciation for the subtlety of Origen’s philosophical theology and a more precise understanding of Maximus’ retrieval of Origen. In sum, I shall argue that in the process of dismantling the strawman of Origenism, Maximus shows himself to be a true disciple of Origen. He is not so much a critic, as a true exegete. I. Genesis-Kinesis-Stasis: Maximus’ critique of Origenism Maximus’ critique of Origen, as von Balthasar definitively demonstrated, Cf. Balthasar, 127-136. is based upon an ontology of motion, whereby Maximus quite literally turns Origen’s understanding of motion on its head. Whereas Origen, as Maximus presents him, held to a progression of rest (στάσις) – motion (κίνησις) – becoming (γένεσις), Maximus argues that the true ontological sequence is in fact becoming (γένεσις) – motion (κίνησις) – rest (στάσις). By moving rest from the beginning of the sequence to its culmination, Maximus transforms Origen’s protology into eschatology. Later, I will attempt to show the extent to which Maximus polemically misrepresents Origen in his critique (or rather, the spectre of Origenism, which by now had become the favorite theological strawman and heretical whipping post of orthodoxy), in order to salvage the truth of Origen’s cosmology under the guise of “correcting” him. First, however, we need to familiarize ourselves with the criticism. Maximus begins Ambiguum 7 with a brief summation of the Origenist myth as popularly understood: According to the opinion of these people [the alleged Origenists], there once existed a unity of rational beings (τῶν λογικῶν ἑνάδα), by virtue of which we were connatural with God, in whom we had our remaining (μονὴν) and abode. In addition to this they speak of a “movement” (κίνησιν) that came about, as a result of which the rational beings were variously dispersed, prompting God to look toward the creation (γένησιν) of this corporeal world, so that He could bind them in bodies as a punishment for their former sins. This is what they think our teacher Gregory is alluding to in this passage. They do not realize, however, that their theories are completely untenable, and their assumptions are all unsound, as a truthful examination will presently demonstrate by means of more reasonable arguments (Amb. 1069B). The primal henad of rational beings refers to the infamous doctrine of “pre-existent souls”, ascribed to Origen and condemned at Constantinople II, according to which the original creation consisted of a realm of purely noetic beings who only later acquired bodies as a punishment for their sins. Maximus ignores the heterodox implications of this doctrine focusing instead upon the logical contradictions implicit in the narrative. For him, the initial remaining of the logika in God represents rest (στάσις); their falling away indicates motion (κίνησις); while their subsequent embodiment represents their coming into being (γένεσις). Origen’s ontological progression is thus that of rest – motion – becoming. Maximus begins his counterargument with rest. Only God, who “fills all things” (ὡς πάντων πληρωτικόν) and thus has nowhere to go, he declares, is originally and eternally at rest (ἀκίνητον); beings, on the other hand, who have been created ex nihilo are naturally in motion (κινητόν) and, insofar as they are not yet in possession of their ultimate desired end, cannot be said to be at rest (Amb. 1069B-1069C). Next, he argues that it is impossible for rest to produce motion prior to becoming. Motion is not some abstract, disembodied phenomenon that occurs in a vacuum, but rather a natural expression of an actual, created being. Cf. Maximus’ discussion of natural motion and activity in Ambiguum 5, 1045D-1048B. We know what kind of being something is according to what kind of motion it exhibits (Amb. 1072B). Finally, it is not genesis that marks the culmination of the ontological sequence, but rest. All natural motion is teleological; every created being is moved by an intrinsic desire for completion, for self-realization. All things are moved by their love of God, the Good, the Unmoved Mover in whose infinite rest and eternal perfection finite beings attain their own longed for rest and perfection (Amb. 1257D-1260D). This, in a nutshell, is Maximus’ argument. I would like now to explore this argument in somewhat greater depth. What is behind Maximus’ assertion that only God is eternally at rest “since he fills all things”, while beings created ex nihilo are perpetually in motion – at least until that future time in the eschaton when they will come to rest in God who alone is Rest? What is rest, or stasis, for Maximus? What is his understanding of the relation between motion and rest? What is his conception of created being; i.e., of nature, or physis? Maximus’ assertion that God is at rest “because he fills all things” (ὡς πάντων πληρωτικόν) becomes clearer when we examine a passage in which he is talking about the opposite case; namely, creatures who are not at rest. “Nothing,” says Maximus, “that has come into being is perfect in itself (αὐτοτελές), for if it were, it would be devoid of activity (ἀνενέργητον), being full (ὡς πλῆρες), having no want or need of anything, since it owes its origin to nothing outside itself.” (Amb. 1072C-D) In negating the idea of an original perfection of created beings, Maximus defines “fullness” (πλῆρες), as a state of absolute self-sufficiency, self-perfection and hence rest. Insofar as beings are by nature incomplete, contingent, and “unfulfilled” with respect to their existence, they are not at rest (ἀνενέργητον) but rather in continuous motion. God, on the other hand, is at rest (ἀνενέργητον) filling all things precisely in that he is himself “full” as eternally self-realized actuality. Because motion for Maximus, as for Aristotle, involves a teleological progression from incompletion to completion, from potentiality to actuality, there is nowhere for God as uncaused (ἀναίτιος) and eternally self-perfect (αὐτοτελές) actuality to “go”. Rest, then, indicates actuality, the fullness, or perfection of being properly pertaining to God alone. Like Aristotle, Maximus understands God as Energeia, the Unmoved Mover who, eternally at rest, moves all things as the supreme object of desire (Amb. 1257D-1260D). If the Divine is immovable (ἀκίνητον) “since it fills all things”, beings created ex nihilo are perpetually on the move (κινητόν) “since all things are necessarily carried along toward some cause” (Amb. 1069B-C). Beneath the Christian language of creation ex nihilo, Maximus’ understanding of the contingency and incompletion of beings is essentially Aristotelian. Every created nature is necessarily in motion, and this natural motion is teleological – it is an “appetitive movement” (ἔφεσιν κινήσεως) oriented towards its “ultimate object of desire” (ἐσχάτῳ ὀρεκτῷ); namely, God as the Unmoved Mover (Amb. 1069B-C; 1257D-1260D). Insofar as creatures do not possess their origin and end within themselves – i.e. are not uncaused and self-perfect but contingent upon God as the source (ἀρχὴ) and consummation (τέλος) of their being – they are intrinsically incomplete (cf. Amb. 1217D). As such, creatures are compelled by a correspondingly natural desire for completion, for participation in the fullness of being that properly pertains to God alone. Like Aristotle, Maximus recognizes that no creature springs from the earth fully formed. Everything in the realm of physis depends upon a prior actuality as its efficient cause, and is drawn towards that same principle as its final cause, or telos (Amb. 1217C-1217D). Everything begins as a potency and moves toward the fulfilment of that potency as the actuality of its being; to be a creature is to emerge from nonbeing and progress towards the fullness of being. Only God is originally at rest; creatures are originally in motion. In dealing with rest and becoming we have already dealt extensively with motion. I shall content myself here with a few specifications crucial for our understanding of Maximus and his reception of Origen. As we noted in our discussion concerning God and creatures, motion involves a progression from potency to act. Maximus offers a unique articulation of this progression in terms of the three modes of existence accessible to human beings; namely, being (εἶναι), wellbeing (εὖ εἶναι), and eternal-being (ἀεὶ εἶναι). The first is bestowed upon beings by essence; the second is granted them by the power of free choice; the third is lavished upon beings by grace (Amb. 1116B-1116C) The two extremes, being and eternal being, are gifts bestowed by God as the archē and telos of creatures, while the intermediate mode depends upon the freewill and motion of rational beings (ibid). In other words, both genesis and stasis are givens; the creature can neither bring itself into existence nor attain the goal of perfection on its own. What it can do – and is called to do – is to mediate between its transcendent origin and end by means of its own freely willed activity, or motion. Kinesis, as “the good ontological activity of a developing nature,” Balthasar, 135. mediates between genesis and stasis, the potential for existence and the perfection of being – the latter being attained only with the help of grace (Amb. 1392B). Maximus expresses this ontological progression in terms of the Biblical distinction (Genesis 1:27) between the human created according to the image (κατ᾿ εἰκόνα) and according to the likeness (καθ᾿ ὁμοίωσιν) – an important distinction that we shall meet again when we get to Origen. Like certain others among the Greek Fathers, Maximus interprets “image” as indicating the potential for deiformity, and “likeness” as referring to the actual realization of deiformity, the ultimate telos of humanity (Amb. 1084A-1084B;1092B;1345D-1348A). In contrast to the Origenist myth, rational creatures (logika) are not created perfect but merely with the potential for perfection – a potential which they must freely choose to cultivate through a life of virtue, and which they can only attain with the help of grace. The Fall for Maximus, is thus not a fall from an original perfection, but a turning away from the goal of perfection. By choosing the immediate gratification of the senses over the future promise of spiritual blessings humanity lost its capacity for deiformity, acquiring instead the likeness of irrational beasts (Amb. 1348B). Insofar as human beings have never actually experienced perfection, but merely the potential for perfection, the restoration of this capacity eventually culminating in rest is free of the danger of repeated falls. By shifting perfection from the beginning of the ontological sequence to the end, Maximus attempts to overcome the instability of the Origenist cosmology. Motion is not a sinful movement away from the Good but, as von Balthasar puts it, “the good ontological activity of a developing nature” involving a progression from potency to act, from incompletion to completion, from genesis to stasis. Having at long last come to rest in God who is Rest, there is no longer any possibility of repeated falls. Perfection qua perfection is irreversible. I qualify this statement below by suggesting that, for Maximus, it is the fact of the Incarnation that provides the ultimate guarantee of stable rest in God. In sum, then, according to Maximus’ Aristotelian logic, the Origenist myth of pre-existence gets things completely backwards: it begins by positing an original state of perfection which then inexplicably produces an anti-teleological motion away from the Good, culminating in the created cosmos, an unstable world of becoming populated by a diversity of beings. As such, Origen seems to hold to an illogical and tragic view of reality as a progression (or rather, regression) from perfection to imperfection. The world is not so much an expression of the goodness of the Creator, as it is a response to the fallenness of the creature. As such, Origen’s cosmology is inherently unstable, for if beings are capable of even once spurning the Good in favour of an inferior mode of existence (as though perfection were somehow dissatisfactory to them) what, asks Maximus, will prevent them from doing so again and again ad infinitum? (Amb. 1069C) And if, he adds, there is no “hope for an immovable foundation in the Beautiful, what more pitiful condition of existence could there possibly be?” (ibid) The Origenist myth is thus one of cosmic instability and existential despair, in which the universe is doomed to endless cycles of disintegration and restoration without hope of any final resolution. Maximus overcomes this intolerable position by turning the Origenist myth on its head: the proper ontological sequence is not perfection – motion – becoming, but becoming – motion – perfection. Motion is not a sinful falling away into the flux of becoming, but the natural impulse of created beings towards the perfection of being. II. From Logika to Logoi Thus far our discussion has focused upon what von Balthasar terms “correcting the myth”. I would like now to examine the second part of Maximus’ critique of Origen, what von Balthasar refers to as the “truth of the myth”. Von Balthasar, is seems to me, is indubitably correct in arguing that Maximus transforms Origen’s protology into eschatology – his main fault lies in not recognizing the extent to which the seeds of this “transformation” are already present in Origen. In other words, von Balthasar arrives at the right conclusion without, in my opinion, giving the great Alexandrian his due. I shall deal with this quibble when we get to Origen. For now, I want to develop von Balthasar’s basic intuition. As the latter points out, for Maximus, “the original henad of the intellects is, in reality, the unitary existence of created ideas in the Logos.” Balthasar, 131. In other words, the primal unity of rational creatures (logika) centred upon God, become the rational principles (logoi) united without confusion within God: Who – knowing that it was with reason and wisdom that God brought beings into existence out of nothing – if he were carefully to direct the contemplative power of his soul to their infinite natural differences and variety, and, with the analytical power of reason, were (together with these) to distinguish in his mind the logos according to which they were created, would not, I ask, fail to know the one Logos as many logoi, indivisibly distinguished amid the differences of created things…? Moreover, would he not also know that the many logoi are one Logos, seeing that all things are related to Him without being confused with Him, who is the essential and personally distinct Logos of God, the origin and cause of all things…. (emphasis added; Amb. 1077C-1080A) For Maximus, the rich diversity and rational order of the world reveals the wisdom of the Creator. In fact, as we see from the striking Christological language of the Logos and the logoi being “indivisibly distinguished” and “related without being confused”, the entire universe according to Maximus is a kind of incarnation of the Logos. The original unity of the world is not located in some mythical past henad of logika which subsequently fell into division and multiplicity, but is eternally rooted in the Logos. Unity and multiplicity are simultaneously present and both are fundamentally good. The diversity of the world is not due to sinful divisions on the part of the creature, but a spontaneous expression of the wisdom and goodness of the Creator. While von Balthasar’s basic intuition concerning Maximus’ transformation of Origen’s protology into eschatology is correct, eschatology for Maximus is in fact inseparable from protology. It might be more accurate to say that Maximus transforms both the protology and eschatology of the Origenist myth from a tragic quasi-historical narrative, into an optimistic account of reality that is simultaneously ontological and historical. The ontological grounding of the myth is evident in Maximus’ understanding of the logoi as the unchanging principles (archai) of existence within the divine Logos: “From all eternity”, says Maximus, “He contained within Himself the pre-existing logoi of created beings” (Amb. 1080A). Origen’s pre-existent logika, have become pre-existent logoi, the unchanging principles of existence. Following (Pseudo) Dionysius, Maximus calls these pre-existent logoi “predeterminations” and “divine wills” (Amb. 1085A-1085B). The notion of “predeterminations”, as we shall see later, ultimately goes back to Origen. As such, they represent the unwavering intentionality of God for the created order in terms of both universals and particulars (cf. Amb. 1080A). It is on the basis of these logoi or divine willings that God brings all things into being “at the appropriate time” (Amb. 1080A-1080B). The logoi are at once timeless intentions in the divine mind and dynamic potencies to be actualized in history (cf. Amb. 1081B). By interpreting Origen’s rational creatures (logika) as rational principles (logoi), and identifying these latter as multiple expressions of a singular and unwavering divine will, Maximus transfers rest from the creature to the Creator where it properly belongs. Insofar as the creature is eternally rooted in the unwavering will of God as the principle of its being, it too possesses a kind of rest already from the beginning. The creature can never truly become other than it is; it may deviate from its preordained destiny on account of its freewill, but it cannot cease to be what it most fundamentally is. From the ontological perspective, the logoi remain unchanged and hence at rest. This rootedness of the logoi in the divine Mind enables us, along with the blessed Gregory, to refer to rational beings as “portions of God” (Amb. 1080C). Yet, these logoi, which remain eternally at rest in the divine Mind as the unified content of the Logos, nonetheless require actualization in history (Amb. 1081B). In terms of the human, this actualization is threefold: God wills for the human not merely to be (εἶναι), but to utilize its freewill to acquire well-being (εὖ εἶναι) and, beyond that, to realize with the help of grace its ultimate destiny of eternal being (ἀεὶ εἶναι). As the image of God, the human is called to realize the likeness of God, to move from potential deiformity to actual deiformity. It is this realization of likeness to God (homoiosis theou), or deification, that represents the ultimate telos of creation, the fulfilment of its eschatological hopes, the final culmination of creaturely motion in rest. So long as beings move in accordance with their logos which pre-exists in God as their Origin and Cause, and do not “flow away” (i.e. deviate from their preordained destiny) they will come to be in God as their final resting place (Amb. 1080C-1081A). It is in this ultimate sense of eschatological fulfilment that the human, having become god by grace, may truly be said to be a “portion of God” (Amb. 1084C). For Maximus (and for Origen as I will demonstrate shortly) protology and eschatology coincide. All creaturely motion is circular, moving from beginning to beginning. And yet, as von Balthasar so aptly puts it, “what seems to be circular from God’s point of view, because the beginning and the end are the same, can appear just as authentically as genuine development and movement, from the standpoint of the world: the course of loving movement toward ‘the ideas that pre-exist in God, or better: towards God himself’”. Balthasar, 134; Ambigua 1084B. For Maximus, eschatological rest as the culmination of natural motion is stable (a stability guaranteed by the Incarnation) and free of any danger of repeated falls. Having realized their likeness to God, creatures become wholly permeated by God, united without confusion like the inseparable union of soul and body. By transforming creaturely motion from a sinful movement away from perfection into “the good ontological activity of a developing nature” Balthasar, 135., Maximus transforms the instability and despair of the Origenist myth into the joyful anticipation of eternal rest in God. III. Origen Revisited; or, Allegorizing the Allegorist Having explored the various ways in which Maximus critiques and transforms the Origenist myth, I would like now to show the extent to which Maximus’ solution to the problem of Origenism is already present in Origen himself. This will involve a close reading of Origen’s De Principiis – arguably the first great work of philosophical theology – in order to get at the underlying truth of the myth. The key to this venture lies in coming to recognise the largely overlooked Aristotelian character of Origen’s philosophy, in particular his hylomorphism, his views on the eternity of the world, and his understanding of nature in terms of potency and actuality. These Aristotelian notions serve to undermine the Platonic-inspired myth of pre-existence, revealing the ontological and eschatological truth hidden beneath the poetic, quasi-historical narrative. In a sense, then, we shall proceed by allegorizing the allegorist, wresting the philosophic kernel from its poetic husk. According to Maximus’ account of Origen’s cosmology, the original creation consisted of a henad of noetic beings (logika) who subsequently fell, prompting God to create the sensible, corporeal world as a kind of prison in which beings were bound to bodies as punishment for their sins. This sketch of Origen’s cosmology, though caricatured, has its source in certain passages in the De Principiis in which Origen speculates upon the origin of the world; in particular, Origen is concerned to reconcile the appalling inequality of creation with the goodness of the Creator. Ironically, the principle aim of Origen’s much-maligned cosmology is theodicy – it is a defence of God’s goodness in face of the evident evils of the world. Origen’s solution is to credit God with creating an original world of equality, while attributing the inequality of the world to the free will of created beings who chose to turn away from God in varying degrees. To this end, Origen speaks of beings falling away from the “original unity and harmony in which they were first created by God” (DePrinc. II.I.1), and of creation as a descent (katabole) from higher to lower conditions in response to the spiritual defects of beings (DePrinc. III.V.4). Taken in isolation (as indeed they were by Origen’s increasingly hostile critics), these passages could be construed as positing an original purely noetic creation which subsequently fell into embodiment. However, when one examines Origen’s theology as a whole this simplistic reading of the myth becomes increasingly untenable. To begin with, there is Origen’s hylomorphism. Following Aristotle, Origen insists that form is inseparable from matter; it may well be possible to separate them conceptually, he acknowledges, but in reality the one is never found in isolation from the other. Form is always the form of some tangible, material object, while matter is always enformed matter (cf. DePrinc. II.I.4-5; IV.IV.7-8). This same logic applies to the relation of soul and body. Contrary to the accusations leveled against him from antiquity to the present day, Origen repeatedly insists upon the inseparability of soul and body. This deeply entrenched misunderstanding is in part due to the enduring tendency to portray Origen as a world-negating gnostic or “Platonist” in the crudest sense of the term, while entirely ignoring the Aristotelian character of his thought. This misunderstanding is then reinforced by a long standing “hermeneutic of suspicion” in which all positive references to embodiment are attributed to Origen’s Latin translator Rufinus who is accused of having altered the original text. For a discussion of this problem see my “Heresy, Hermeneutics, and the Hellenization of Christianity”, forthcoming in ARC, 2018. Only God is capable of a purely noetic existence; creatures cannot live apart from bodies. Origen states that: while the original creation (principaliter creatas) was of rational beings, it is only in idea and thought (opinione quidem intellectu solo) that a material substance is separable from them, and that though this substance seems (videri) to have been produced for them, or after them (pro ipsas vel post ipsas), yet never have they lived or do they live without it; for we shall be right in believing that life without a body is found in the Trinity alone (emphasis added; DePrinc. II.II.2). As we can see, the relation of soul and body parallels that of form and matter; it may well be possible to distinguish between them conceptually, but in reality soul and body are never found in isolation from the other. Origen explicitly states that the creation of bodies subsequent to minds is an illusion. Beings have never lived apart from bodies and never will – such a simple, uncompounded, purely noetic existence pertains to God alone. If this is so (and numerous other passages in Origen suggest that it is), Cf. DePrinc I.VI.4; II.III.2; IV.III.15; IV.IV.8. then it cannot be the case that the original creation consisted solely of intellects who subsequently fell into embodiment, thus precipitating the creation of the material world. To the contrary, the “original creation” of rational beings here does not refer to an original disembodied existence in time, but to the ontological priority of minds to bodies, whereby the former “precedes” the latter as its formal principle. Cf. my Christian Eschatology and Aristotelian Teleology in Origen’s De Principiis, 58-59. This ontological reading of the myth is confirmed by a passage in which Origen speculates whether just as the Father is the principle of the Son and the Holy Spirit, yet in such a way that “no thought of before (anterius) or after (posterius) can be entertained in respect of them, some similar kinship or close connection (societas vel propinquitas) might not be understood to exist also between rational natures and bodily matter” (DePrinc. II.II.1). This latter passage strongly suggests that the truth of the Origenist myth is, as Maximus rightly divined, ontological. Just as the Father is the eternal archē of the Son and the Spirit, so the original rational creatures (logika) are in fact the unchanging rational principles (logoi) of embodied beings. A further argument against a literal reading of the Origenist myth involves Origen’s understanding of the eternity of the world, another Aristotelian notion that follows from Origen’s conviction in the unceasing creativity of God. While the question of the eternity of the world is not typically raised in relation to the myth of pre-existence, it is worth mentioning insofar as it effectively undercuts any lingering doubts concerning the ontological truth of Origen’s cosmological narrative. For Origen, it is unthinkable to suppose that the creative and providential powers of God have ever, even for a single moment, been in abeyance. It is of the very nature of divine goodness to be engaged in acts of well-doing, and of creative power to produce creatures. To suggest that God might not have actively exercised his powers at some point would lead to the impious suggestion that God was either unwilling to do so (and hence not good), or unable to do so (and hence not omnipotent) (DePrinc. I.IV.3; III.V.3). Thus, argues Origen, it follows plainly that “at no time whatever was God not Creator, nor Benefactor, nor Providence” (ibid). The simplicity of God is such that He does not merely possess powers of creativity and providence, but that He is Creativity and Providence Itself (cf. DePrinc. I.I.6). As such, it follows inevitably that “during the whole of God’s existence his creatures have existed also”, having subsisted, Origen insists, “if we may say so, without a beginning” (DePrinc. I.IV.4). The qualifier “if we may say so” points to the ambiguity in the term “beginning” (archē); though creation has no beginning in time, it does have an ontological beginning in the mind of God. The world may be without temporal origin, but it is not anarchos. If one takes Origen’s understanding of the eternity of creation as limited to the intelligible world in the mind of God (a common and perfectly orthodox position) this offers no rebuttal to the notion of a primal fall of logika precipitating a subsequent sensible world. Crucially, while Origen does speak of creation as eternally “prefigured” in the Wisdom of God (cf. DePrinc I.IV.4-5), he strongly insists that the intelligible “outlines” or archetypes of the world are eternally substantiated in matter. Origen’s understanding of the Forms is not so much Platonic, as Aristotelian. At DePrinc. II.III.6 Origen rejects the Platonic understanding of the Forms as mere “phantasia mentis” unworthy of the mind of God. Cf. Aristotelian Teleology and Christian Eschatology, 44-45. Form, as we noted above, is always embodied form. Consequently, in response to the enduring question as to what God was doing before the world began, Origen states that “God did not begin to work for the first time when he made this (istum) visible world (visibilem mundum), but that just as after the dissolution of this world there will be another one, so also we believe that there were others before this one existed” (DePrinc. III.V.3; cf. I.IV.10). Elsewhere Origen insists that “if anyone would have it that certain ages (saecula), or periods of time…elapsed during which the present creation did not exist (cum nondum facta essent quae facta sunt), he would undoubtedly prove that in those ages or periods God was not almighty” (DePrinc. I.II.10). Here, Origen draws on the Stoic notion of an infinite succession of worlds, or aeons, to resolve the issue concerning the temporal or eternal character of the cosmos. Though this particular world has a temporal beginning, the universe as a whole (understood as the underlying continuity of an infinite succession of worlds), Aristotle sees no contradiction between his theory of the eternity of the world and that of endless cycles of regeneration: “To say  that the universe alternately combines and dissolves is no more paradoxical than to make it eternal but varying in shape…. So that if the totality of body, which is a continuum, is now in this order or disposition and now in that…then it will not be the world that comes into being and is destroyed, but only its dispositions” (Cael . I. 10. 280a12-25). This, it seems to me, is precisely Origen’s view. For the him, the world is never destroyed but undergoes endless transformations. is eternal – a fact that follows inevitably from God’s unceasing creativity. Cf. Aristotelian Teleology and Christian Eschatology, 56. Insofar as Origen’s cosmology consists of a timeless, hylomorphic universe in which forms are eternally instantiated in matter and minds never exist apart from bodies, it becomes impossible to maintain the view that the logika once enjoyed a beatific, disincarnate existence at some point in time prior to the creation of the sensible, material world. Instead, the astute reader of Origen must conclude that the myth of pre-existence is precisely that – a myth. Like Plato’s myth in the Phaedrus to which it is clearly indebted, Origen’s quasi-historical narrative is a poetic expression of a deeper ontological truth. The original prelapsarian henad of pure intellects centred upon God does not ultimately refer to some primitive paradise lost, but points rather to the unified ground and goal of all embodied, rational beings created throughout beginningless time. The logika, in other words, represent the eternally created principles rooted in the Logos as the “Idea of ideas” (ἰδέαν ἰδεῶν) and “Being of beings” (ὀυσίαν οὐσιῶν). CCels. VI.64; VII. 38. While this ontological interpretation of the logika does not yet get us to Maximus’ logoi, Origen’s understanding of the Logos as the locus of the “Ideas” or principles of creation brings is very close indeed. In the same way that Maximus speaks of the logoi as “predeterminations” (προορισμούς) within the divine Mind, so Origen speaks of the multiple content of the Logos as “prefigurations” and “rationes” (=logoi): “there have always existed in wisdom,” states Origen, “by a prefiguration (praefigurationem) and preformation (praeformationem), those things which afterwards have received substantial existence” (DePrinc. I.IV.4,5). Elsewhere he identifies these principles as the “beginnings (initia=archai) and rationes (=logoi)” of creation (DePrinc. I.II.2). While Origen does not explicitly speak of the logoi as Maximus does in terms of “divine wills”, In fact, Origen does speak of the creativity of the divine will, though more in connection with the Father than the Logos. The Father produces, or emanates the Logos-Son as “will proceeds from mind”. The content of the Logos by extension is implicitly then the multiplication of this singular divine will. In this sense, one might speak of “divine wills” in Origen, though this idea is never developed or made explicit or, at any rate, expressed in these terms by Origen. his language of “prefigurations” is strikingly similar – if not identical – to Maximus’ “predeterminations”. Though we lack Origen’s original Greek, the meanings of praefiguratio and προορισμός are virtually identical: both terms can be taken as signifying the timeless, foreordained wisdom of God according to which the universe unfolds in time. Like Maximus’, Origen’s logoi are dynamic: they are at once timeless principles prefigured within the divine Mind as well as potencies (virtus= δύναμις) to be actualized in history (cf. DePrinc. I.II.2). Though Origen never explicitly equates the logoi with the logika, Maximus does so in his “transformation” of Origen – a transformation wrought on the basis of Origen himself. By using Origen to interpret Origen Maximus uncovers the ontological truth concealed within the quasi-historical narrative of the Fall. So much for the ontological truth of Origen’s protology. I want to conclude our discussion of Origen by showing the extent to which Maximus’ eschatology – including his understanding of natural motion – is also already present in Origen whom he purportedly corrects. We noted above that Origen’s logoi are dynamic: they are simultaneously eternal “prefigurations” within the divine Mind as well as potencies (δυνάμεις) to be actualized in history. Like Maximus several centuries after him, Origen holds to an Aristotelian understanding of formal causation. Everything in existence moves from potential being to actual being and as such is dependent upon a prior actuality as its formal, efficient, and final cause. Origen encapsulates this idea in his oft-repeated maxim that “the end must be like the beginning”. For him, as subsequently for Maximus, the archē and the telos coincide. All creaturely motion is at once circular and linear – circular because the beginning and the end are the same; linear because the movement from one to the other involves genuine progress from potential being to actual being culminating in God as the source and consummation of being. Despite the fact that Maximus portrays Origen’s understanding of motion exclusively as a sinful falling away from God – a view that Maximus regards as fundamentally wrong-headed insofar as it is anti-teleological – Origen’s actual understanding of creaturely motion is in fact remarkably close to that of Maximus. This is evident in Origen’s use of the image/likeness distinction which Maximus likely inherits directly from him, as well as Origen’s understanding of this Biblical distinction in Aristotelian fashion as a movement from potency to actuality. Even more striking is the unmistakeable outline in Origen of Maximus’ three modes of being, well-being, and eternal being. Origen is among the earliest Christian thinkers (quite possibly the earliest) to draw a distinction between the Genesis language of “image” and “likeness”. He begins by noting that the ultimate telos “towards which all rational nature is progressing” is likeness to God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) Cf. Plato’s Theaetetus (176b)., a notion which the philosophers, he claims, ultimately derived from Moses (DePrinc. III.VI.1). The fact that Moses uses the terms image and likeness in the way that he does in the creation narrative, Origen claims, points to nothing else but this, that man received the honor of God’s image in his first creation (prima conditione), whereas the perfection (perfectio) of God’s likeness was reserved for him at the consummation (in consummatione). The purpose of this was that man should acquire it for himself by his own efforts to imitate God, so that while the possibility (possibilitate) of attaining perfection was given to him in the beginning (in initiis) through the honor of the “image,” he should in the end (in finis) through the accomplishment of these works obtain for himself the perfect “likeness” (ibid; cf. II.XI.3, 4). In this passage, Origen explicitly links the “original creation” (prima conditione) with the potential (possibilitate) for deiformity, and the goal of creation (in consummatione) with the actualization (perfectio) of deiformity. In precisely the same way that Maximus does in allegedly “correcting” him, Origen distinguishes between the “image” as potency, and the “likeness” as actuality, while positing a natural teleological motion or progression from one to the other. While Origen does not develop this idea as fully as Maximus does, it is subtly present throughout the De Principiis, typically expressed in terms of innate “seeds of virtue”, or the innate capacity of rational creatures for God (capax dei), the realization of which stands as the ultimate goal of human life (cf. DePrinc. IV.IV.9, 10; I.I.6; I.III.6; II.XI.4). In Origen’s Commentary on Romans, Rufinus preserves for us the key Greek terms dynamis and energeia. In translating Origen’s discussion regarding the difference between the Logos abiding within beings potentially (possibilitas) versus abiding in them actually (efficiens), Rufinus remarks that this is a distinction which “the Greeks call δύναμις and ἐνέργεια” (CommRom. 8.2.5-6). As such, motion for Origen does not merely involve a sinful falling away from the Good, but also and more fundamentally a teleological progression from imperfection to perfection. In terms of Maximus’ three modes of being, Origen alludes to this scheme in a discussion concerning the Trinity. For him, God the Father bestows the gift of being, the Logos-Son bestows the gift of well-being, while the Holy Spirit bestows the sanctifying gift of eternal being (DePrinc. I.III.6-8). As with Maximus, Origen equates well-being with the free exercise of the creature’s innate rationality. The creature is free to choose between acting according to nature or acting contrary to nature (DePrinc. I.III.8). The fall for Origen, just as for Maximus, is not a departure from an original perfection but a deviation from the goal of perfection, the failure to live according to one’s logos (cf. DePrinc. I.V.2). Every living creature, Origen insists (contra Maximus’ acccusation!), is in perpetual motion (DePrinc. II.XI.1); for the rational creature this motion takes the form of an innate intellectual yearning for “the reality of things,” for the fullness of truth and being (DePrinc. II.XI.4). Through participation in the Trinitarian Godhead creatures are able to progress from being, to well-being, to the ultimate perfection of eternal being, of eternal life in God the source and consummation of creation (DePrinc. I.III.6-8). In Origen’s use of the three modes of being, which he identifies with the three Persons of the Trinity, we find the seeds of Maximus’ own threefold scheme. Here too Maximus finds the solution to Origenism within Origen himself. Having demonstrated some of the ways in which Origen anticipates his own correction at the hands of Maximus, what are we to make of the latter’s criticism of Origen’s cosmology as one of instability and despair? Is there no truth to the oft-repeated accusation of repeated falls from the Good? Is the problem of Origenism a complete chimera? To begin with, Origen’s quasi-historic narrative of a primal fall from perfection is clearly problematic. As myth, Origen’s narrative inevitably devalues history and embodied existence, while tending towards pessimism and despair. Origen lacks the optimistic “theophanic” vision of the cosmos that Maximus inherits from Dionysius. Yet even on the philosophical level there are lingering problems. Despite that fact that, as we have seen, Origen does not in fact subscribe to the rest – motion – becoming model that Maximus foists upon him, the fundamental problem of repeated falls cannot be entirely expunged from Origen’s eschatology. Origen’s uncompromising commitment to freewill compels him to keep open the possibility that beings might choose to reject the supreme Good in favour of lesser goods, a position he seems to maintain despite his positive, teleological understanding of motion (cf. DePrinc. I.III.8; I.VI.2; II.III.3). Transforming motion so that it culminates in rest is thus only a partial solution. Maximus, who shows considerable anxiety over this problem, arguably only overcomes it with the help of the Incarnation. By uniting the divine and human natures within his own Person, Christ becomes the ultimate guarantor of stable eschatological rest. The Incarnation provides the model for deification whereby the human becomes by grace what Christ is by nature (Amb. 1084C-1084D). Just as God inseparably united Himself with humanity in the Incarnation, so humanity will be inseparably united with God in the eschaton. In the same way that soul and body are inextricably united without confusion, so Christ, says Maximus, “joined us to Himself and knit us together in the Spirit” (Amb. 1097C; cf. 1088B; 1092C). It is in this final sense of deification in which the human becomes entirely permeated by God “like iron in a forge” This classic analogy for deification also has its root in Origen, who uses it illustrate the inseparable union of the Logos with the soul of Christ (DePrinc. II.VI.5-6; IV.IV.4). Whereas Origen reserves this indestructible union for Christ alone, Maximus, by means of his Incarnational theology, extends this possibility to the whole of creation (cf. Amb. 1076A). (1076A) that we can truly be said to be “portions of God.” For Maximus, it is by grace that humanity freely chooses the Good for all eternity. IV. Conclusion: Maximus as True Exegete I have tried to show in this paper some of the key ways in which Maximus is indebted to Origen – so much so that he often “corrects” Origen by means of Origen himself. As such, I have deliberately set out to emphasise the continuity of thought between Origen and Maximus as a counterbalance to the discontinuity emphasised by von Balthasar in his groundbreaking account. This is not to say that these two great philosopher-theologians are entirely of one mind. That would be going to the opposite extreme, and would devalue the originality of Maximus’ thought, along with his crucial contribution to the history of theology. It is not simply that Maximus borrows from Origen, but that he develops and expands considerably upon the latter’s thought; what is often implicit and tentative in Origen, is made explicit by Maximus who establishes the latter’s intuitions upon the firm foundations of sophisticated philosophical reasoning. In addition, Maximus takes the insights he derived from Origen and fuses them with the Christological insights of Chalcedon and the other ecumenical councils subsequent to Origen’s time. It is above all the Incarnation that, for Maximus, provides the crucial stability lacking in Origen’s cosmology. Origen is not always consistent. His theology is not so much a system as a « théologie en recherche » as Henri Crouzel famously called it. Thus, what Origen says in one place may not necessarily coincide with what he states elsewhere, and there is no shortage of ambiguities and loose ends in the De Principiis. As a pioneering theologian, Origen is at once the arch-heretic of theological history, and a (largely unacknowledged) father of orthodoxy. The genius of Maximus, as von Balthasar recognized, was to extract and develop the enduring insights present in Origen and to surreptitiously pass them on to posterity. While the demise of Origen remains a mystery shrouded in ecclesiastical and imperial politics, one thing is certain: in dismantling the strawman of Origenism Maximus largely draws the right conclusions regarding Origen’s true aim. As such, Maximus shows himself to be less a critic than a true exegete. 1