Topic – Argument

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ARGUMENT
Unit VI- Logical Reasoning
Indian 01
Indian Logic: Means of
knowledge
Logic
02 Pramanas, Anumana, Upamana,
Shabda, Arthapatti and
Anupalabddhi

03 Structure and kinds of

Anumana

04 Vyapti and Hetvabhasas

 Argument
An argument is a series of statements, called the premises, intended to determine the degree of
truth of another statement, the conclusion.
Types of Arguments
There are generally Three types of arguments as follows:
1. Deductive Argument/Deductive Reasoning
2. Inductive Argument/ Inductive Reasoning
3. Abductive (or Hypothetico-Deductive) Argument/ Abductive Reasoning
 1. Deductive Argument:
•The deductive argument starts out with a general
statement and examines the possibilities to reach a
specific, logical conclusion.
•It is considered as from general to particular.
 2. Inductive Argument:
•It refers to an argument that takes specific information
and makes a broader generalization that is considered
probable, allowing for the fact that the conclusion may
not be accurate
3. Abductive (or Hypothetico-
Deductive) Argument:
•The abductive argument is to take away a logical
assumption, inference, conclusion, hypothesis, or
best guess from observation or set of
observations.
Categorical Syllogism
 INDIAN LOGIC
Ashta̅dasha vidya (18 types of Sa̅stra) was accepted by ancient
Indian seers. Among these eighteen (18) vidya̅s Nya̅ya, that is
also known as ‘Anviksiki’ (Logic) is most important. It has
been esteemed as the lamp of all sciences, the resource of all
actions and the shelter of all virtues.

Indian logic in its rudimentary stage can be traced as early as

the sixth century B.C. At the very early stage, especially at the
time of Upanishad, ‘Atmavidya’ that was identified
‘Anviksiki’ in the later period, got a crucial role in ancient
Indian scholastic circle. ‘Anviksiki’ is an incorporation of two
subjects viz. the soul and the theory of reasons.
 INDIAN LOGIC
The theory of reason is also known as hetu-sa̅stra or hetu-
vidya̅. It is also called as tarkavidya̅ or vadavidya̅, the art of
debates and discussions, in as much as it dealt with rules for
carrying on disputation in learned assemblies called parisad.
Kautilya, the author of Arthasa̅stra has referred it as the lamp
of all vidyas or discourses.
Anviksiki, in the second stage of its development, as we find
in the Nya̅ya-Bha̅sya, was widely known as Nya̅ya-Sa̅stra. The
word “Nya̅ya” popularly signifies “right” or “Justice”. The
Nya̅ya-Sa̅stra is therefore the science of right judgement or
true reasoning. Technically, the word signifies syllogism or a
speech of five parts.
 INDIAN LOGIC
The Nya̅ya-Sutra treats of sixteen topics or categories like,
Prama̅na, prameya, etc. which, according to the commentators on
the Nya̅ya-Sutra, represent stages in the course of a debate between
a disputant and his respondent.
But after their struggle with the Buddha and Jaina logicians for over
a thousand years, Hindu logicians founds it expedient in treating of
the Nya̅ya, to take up only one topic, viz. Prama̅na, to the exclusion
of remaining fifteen topics.
PRAMANAS
 • Knowledge (buddhi)

• Presentation (anubhava) Memory (smriti)

• Valid (Prama) Non- Valid (aprama) True False

• Doubt Error Hypothetical Argument

• (samsaya) (viparyyaya) (tarka)

•
• Perception Inference Comparison Testimony

• (pratyaksa) (anumana) (upamana) (sabda)

 STRUCTURE AND KINDS OF ANUMA̅NA

Anuma̅na has been defined in the Nya̅ya system as the

knowledge of an object, not by direct observation, but by
means of the knowledge of a linga or sign and that of its
universal relation (Vya̅pti) with the inferred object. Gangesa,
the famous writer of Navya-Nyaya’s most popular text,
“Tattva-Cintamani” refutes the view that perception is the only
source of knowledge. According to him inference is also a
source of knowledge.
 STRUCTURE AND KINDS OF ANUMA̅NA

It leads to the knowledge of a thing as possessing a character,

say fire, because of its having another character, smoke, which
we apprehend and which we know to be always connected
with it.

Thus in anuma̅na we arrive at the knowledge of an object

through the medium of two acts of knowledge or propositions.
THE CONSTITUENTS OF INFERENCE
Inference (anuma̅na) always consists of not less than three propositions
and more than three terms. In inference we arrive at the knowledge of
some unperceived character of a thing through the knowledge of some
linga or sign in it and that of vyapti or universal relation between the
sign and the inferred character.

There is first the knowledge of what is called the linga or mark in

relation to the paksa or the subject of inference. This is generally a
perceptual judgement relating to the linga or middle term with the Paksa
or minor term of inference (lingada̅rsana), as when I see that the hill is
smoky, and infer that it is fiery.

Secondly; inference requires the knowledge of Vya̅pti or a universal

relation between the linga̅ (probans) and the sa̅dhy a (probandum), or the
middle and major terms.
THE CONSTITUENTS OF INFERENCE
This knowledge of the linga or middle term as always related to the
sa̅dhya or major term is the result of our previous experience of their
relation to each other. Hence it is a memory judgment in which we think
of the linga as invariably connected with the sa̅dhya (Vya̅ptismarana),
e.g. ‘all smoky objects are fiery’.

Thirdly, we have the inferential knowledge (anumiti) as resulting from

the previous knowledge of the linga and that of its universal relation
(vya̅pti) with the sa̅dhya. It is a proposition which relates the paksa or
minor term with the sa̅dhya or major term, e.g. ‘the hill is fiery.’

The inferential cognition (anumiti) is a proposition which follows from

the first two propositions and so corresponds to the conclusion of the
syllogism.
First Premise:-The Hill is Smoky. (S is M)
Second Premise: - All Smoky objects are Fiery. (M is P) (Memory
Judgement or Vyapti Smarana)
Conclusion: - The Hill is Fiery. (S is P)
Corresponding to the minor, major and middle terms of the syllogism,
inference in Indian logic contains three terms, namely, Paksa, Sadhya
and Hetu. While the Paksa is the subject, the Sadhya is the object of
inference. The third term of inference is called the linga or sign because
it serves to indicate that which we do not perceive. Like the middle term
of a syllogism, it must occur at least twice in the course of an inference.
It is found once in relation to the Paksa or minor term and then in
relation to the Sadhya or the major term. That is, the paksa is related to
the sadhya through their common relation to the hetu or middle term.
There are five characteristics of the middle term.
The first is Paksadharmata, or its being a character of the Paksa. The
middle term must be related to the minor term, e.g. the hill is smoky(S is
M).
The second is Sapaksasattva or its presence in all positive instances in
which the major exists. The middle must be distributively related to the
major, e.g. all smoky objects are fiery. (M is P)
The third is Vipaksasa̅ttva, or its absence in all negative instances in
which the major is absent, e.g. whatever is not fiery is not smoky (No
not-P is M).
The fourth is aba̅dhitavisayatva, or the uncontradictedness of its object.
The middle term must not aim at establishing such absurd and
contradictory objects as the coolness of fire or the squareness of a circle.
The fifth character of the middle is asatpratipaksatva, or the absence of
counteracting reasons leading to a contradictory conclusion. These five
characteristics, or at least four of them, must be found in the middle term
of a valid inference. If not, there will be fallacies.
CLASSIFIATION AND LOGICAL FORMS OF INFERENCE

The Naiyayikas give us three different classifications of inference. According to the

first, inference is of two kinds, namely, Svarthanumana (Inference for one self) and
Pararthanumana (Inference for the sake of others). This is a psychological
classification which has in view the use or purpose which an inference serves.
The first does not stand in need of demonstration but the second does. The
demonstration consists of a syllogism of five parts.

Pratijna Hetu Udaharana Upanaya Nigamana

1. A Proposition – This hill is full of fire.

2. A Reason – Because it is full of smoke.
3. An Example – All that is full of smoke is full of fire, as a kitchen.
4. An Application – This hill is full of smoke.
5. A Conclusion – Therefore this hill is full of fire.
CLASSIFIATION AND LOGICAL FORMS OF INFERENCE

According to another classification, inference is said to be of three

kinds, namely – Purvavat, Sesavat and Samanyatodrsta.
1. In Purvavat inference, we infer the unperceived effect from a
perceived cause. This is illustrated when from the presence of dark
heavy clouds in the sky we infer that there will be rainfall.

2. A Sesavat inference is that in which we infer the unperceived

cause from a perceived effect. This is illustrated in the inference of
previous rain from the rise of the water in the river and its swift
muddy current.
In both these inferences the vya̅pti or the universal relation
between the major and middle terms is a uniform relation of
causality between them. These inferences thus depend on scientific
inductions.
CLASSIFIATION AND LOGICAL FORMS OF INFERENCE

3. In Samanyatodrsta inference, the universal relation

between major and middle terms does not depend on a
causal uniformity. Here we infer one from the other, not
because they are causally connected, but because they are
uniformly related to each other in our experience.
This is illustrated when one infers that the sun moves
because, like other moving objects, its position changes, or,
when we argue that a thing must have some attributes
because it is like substance.
Here the inference depends not on a causal connection, but
on certain observed points of similarity between different
objects of experience. So, it is more akin to an analogical
argument than to syllogistic inference.
• A kevala-Vyatireki inference is that in which the middle term is
negatively related to the major term. It depends on a vya̅ pti or a
universal relation between the absence of the major term and that of
the middle term. Accordingly, the knowledge of vya̅pti is here
arrived at only through the method of agreement in absence
(vyatireka), since there is no positive instance of agreement in
presence between the middle and major terms excepting the minor
term. This may be illustrated by the following inferences:
• (I) No non-soul is animate;
• All living beings are animate;
• Therefore all living beings have souls.
• (II) What is not different from the other elements has no smell;
• The earth has smell;
• Therefore, the earth is different from the other elements.
• Symbolically put the inferences stand thus:
• No not-P is M
• S is M
• Therefore S is P.
• In the second inference above, it will be seen, the middle
term ‘smell’ is the differentia of the minor term ‘earth.’ An
inference which is thus based on the differentia (laksana) as
the middle term is also called kevala-vyatireki. In it the
minor term is con-extensive with the middle. Hence we have
no positive instance of the coexistence of the middle with
any term but the minor. So there can be vya̅pti or universal
relation only between the absence of the middle and the
absence of the major term.
• We cannot point to any positive instance of agreement in presence
etween the major and middle terms, except those covered by the minor
term. Hence the major premise is a universal negative proposition-
arrived at by simple enumeration of negative instances of agreement in
absence between the major and middle terms. The minor premise is a
universal affirmative proposition. But although one of the premises is
negative, the conclusion is affirmative, which is against the general
syllogistic rules of Formal Logic.

• An inference is called anvaya-vyatireki when its middle term is both

positively and negatively related to the major term. In it there is vya̅ pti
or a universal relation between the presence of the middle and the
presence of the major term as well as between the absence of the major
and the absence of the middle term.
• The knowledge of the vya̅pti on which the inference depends, is arrived
at through the joint method of agreement in presence and in absence.
• The vya̅pti or the universal proposition is affirmative (anvayi) when it is the result of an
enumeration of positive instances of agreement in presence between the middle and
major terms. It is negative (vyatireki) when it is based on the simple enumeration of
negative instances of agreement in absence between the middle and major terms.

• The difference between the universal affirmative and universal negative propositions
(anvaya-vyapti and vyatireka-vyapti) is that the subject of the affirmative proposition
becomes the predicate, and the contradictory of the predicate of the affirmative
proposition becomes the subject in the corresponding negative proposition. Hence an
anvaya-vyatireki inference may be based on either a universal affirmative or a universal
negative proposition as its major premise. It is illustrated in the following pair of
inferences:
(I) All cases of smoke are cases of fire;
The hill is a case of smoke;
Therefore the hill is a case of fire.
(II) No case of not-fire is a case of smoke;
The hill is a case of smoke;
Therefore the hill is a case of fire.
In view of the different methods of establishing Vyapti or a universal relation
between the major and middle terms, inferences have been classified into the
1. Kevalla̅nvayi, 2. Kevalavyatireki, and 3. Anvaya-vyatireki.

An inference is called kevalanvayi when it is based on a middle term which

is only positively related to the major term. Here the knowledge of Vyapti
between the middle and major terms is arrived at only through the method of
agreement in presence (anvaya), since there is no negative instance of their
agreement in absence.

This is illustrated in the following inference:

Major Premise: All knowable objects are nameable;
Minor Premise: The pot is a knowable object;
Conclusion: The pot is nameable.
• In this inference the major premise is a universal affirmative
proposition in which the predicate ‘nameable’ is affirmed of
all knowable objects. This universal proposition is arrived at
by simple enumeration of the positive instances of
agreement in presence between the knowable and the
nameable. Corresponding to this universal affirmative
proposition we cannot have a real universal negative
proposition like ‘No unnameable object is knowable,’ for
we cannot point to or name anything that is unnameable.
The minor premise and the conclusion of this inference are
also universal affirmative propositions and cannot be
otherwise. Hence with regard to its logical form the
Kevalanvayi inference is a syllogism of the first mood of
the first figure, technically called BARBARA.
 THE FALLACY OF SAVYABHICA̅ RA OR THE IRREGULAR
MIDDLE

• It is first kind of inferential fallacy. Here hetu is found to lead to no one

single conclusion, but to different opposite conclusions.
• This fallacy arises when the middle term violates its second condition
(sapaksasattva). This condition requires that the major must be present in all
the cases in which the middle is present. But the savyabhica̅ra hetu, however,
is not uniformly concomitant with the major term. It is related to both the
existence and non-existence of the major term. It is therefore called
anaika̅ntika or an ir-regular concomitant of the sa̅dhya or the major term.
• Hence from such a middle term we can infer both the existence and the non-
existence of the major term. The fallacy, Savyabhica̅ra (inconstant reason)
has three subdivisions viz. a. sa̅dha̅rana(common), b.
asa̅dha̅rana(uncommon) and c. anupasamha̅ri (inconclusive).
 A. Sa̅dha̅rana(Common):-
• Here the middle term is in some cases related to the major and in the other cases related to the absence of the major. As
for example:-
All knowable objects are fiery;
The hill is knowable;
Therefore, the hill is fiery.

Here the middle term ‘knowable’ is indifferently related to both fiery objects like the kitchen and fireless objects like
the lake.

All knowable being thus not fiery we cannot conclude that the hill is fiery because it is knowable. Rather, it is as much
true to say that, for the same reason, the hill is fireless.
 B. Asa̅dha̅rana (Uncommon):-
• It is called asa̅dha̅rana (uncommon) because it is a peculiar form of
the fallacy of the irregular middle. Here middle term is related neither
to things in which the major exists nor to these in which it does not
exist. e.g. Sound is eternal because there is soundness.
Sound has soundness;
Soundness or sabdatva is eternal;
Therefore, Sound is eternal.
• It is found neither in eternal object like the soul nor in other non-
eternal things like the pot.
 C. Anupasamha̅ri (Inconclusive):-
• All objects are eternal, because they are knowable.
All knowable things are eternal;
All objects are knowable;
Therefore, All objects are eternal.
• Here the distribution of the middle term cannot be proved either
positively or negatively. The middle term is related to minor term
that stands not for any definite individual or class of individuals,
but indefinitely for all objects.
• (In this fallacy sadhya (the inferent) and the hetu (the reason ) are
nowhere absent.
 2. VIRUDDHA (CONTRADICTORY REASON):-

• “Sound is eternal, because it is caused.”

• In Savyabhica̅ra or the irregular middle only fails to prove the conclusions.
• Whereas the viruddha or the contradictory middle disproves it or proves the
contradictory proposition.
All eternal objects are caused;
Sound is caused;
Therefore Sound is eternal.
• According to the later Naiyayikas, from Uddyotakar downwards, the hetu or the
reason is called viruddha when it disproves the very proposition which it is meant
to prove.
• This happens when a middle term exists, not in the objects in which the major
exists, but in those in which the major does not exist. That is, the viruddha or the
contradictory middle is that which is pervaded by the absence of the major term.
 3. PRAKARANASAMA OR THE COUNTERACTED MIDDLE:-
(Satpratipaksin)
• Literally, it means a reason which is similar to the point at issue (Prakarana). We have a point at issue when there
are two opposite views with regard to the same subject, both of which are equally possible, so that they only give
rise to a state of mental vacillation as to the truth of the matter.
• Now when a middle term does not go farther than producing a state of mental oscillation between two opposite
views we have a case of the prakaranasama middle.
• “Sound is eternal, because the properties of the non-eternal are not found in it”
• And “Sound is not-eternal, because the properties of the eternal are not found in it.”
• The two middle terms being counteracted by each other cannot lead to any definite conclusion and we are left with
the same question with which we started, namely, whether sound is eternal or non-eternal.
• In savyabhicara the same character of the minor is taken as a middle term that may lead to opposite conclusions, in
the prakaranasama two different characters of the minor are taken as the middle terms leading to opposite
conclusions.
• In viruddha or contradictory middle which by itself proves the opposite of what it is intended to prove.
• But here in prakaranasama the opposite conclusion is proved by a different middle term.
 4. THE FALLACY OF ASIDDHA OR THE UNPROVED MIDDLE:-

• It is called also sa̅dhyasama or the asiddha. The word sa̅dhyasama means a middle term
which is similar to the sa̅dhya or the major term. Hence the sa̅dhyasama stands for a middle
term which requires to be proved as much as the major term. This means that the
sadhyasama middle is not a proved or an established fact, but an asiddha or unproved
assumption.
• The fallacy of the asiddha occurs when the middle term is wrongly assumed in any of the
premises and so cannot be taken to prove the conclusion.
• It follows that the premises which contain the false middle become themselves false.
• Thus the fallacy of the asiddha virtually stands for the fallacy of false premises, which is a
form of the material fallacies in western logic.

A̅sryasiddha Svaru̅ pa̅siddha Vya̅ pyatva̅siddha

 A. A̅sryasiddha :-
• One condition of a valid middle term is that it must be present in
the minor term. The minor term is thus the locus of the middle.
Hence if the minor term is unreal and fictitious, the middle cannot
be related to it.
• So the result is that the minor premise, in which the middle is
related to an unreal minor, becomes false.
• Example:-
• ‘The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it belongs to the class of lotus.’
• Class of lotus have fragrant;
• Sky-lotus belongs to the class of lotus;
• Therefore, the sky-lotus is fragrant.
 B. Svaru̅pa̅siddha :-
• It is a middle term which cannot be proved to be real in relation to the minor term. It is a middle term
which is not found in the minor term.
• The existence of the middle in the minor being unreal, the minor premise which relates it to the minor
term becomes false. E.g. Sound is eternal, because it is visible.
• All visible things are eternal;
• Sound is visible;
• Therefore Sound is eternal.
• Here the middle term ‘ visible’ is wrongly assumed in the minor term ‘sound’ and is not justified by facts.
• It has also four divisions:-

1. Bhagasiddha
2. Visesanasiddha
3. Vivesyasiddha
4. Asamarthavisesyasiddha
 1. Bha̅ga̅siddha or Ekadesasiddha:-
• If the minor term stands for a number of things and the middle is
found in some but not all of them, we have the fallacy of
bhagasiddha. E.g. ‘The four kinds of atoms of earth; etc., are
eternal, because they are fragrant.
• Here the middle ‘fragrant’ is related only to a part of the minor
term, namely, the atoms of earth, but not to the other kinds of
atoms.
• Hence the middle term is partly false and so equivalent to the
Svaru̅pa̅siddha middle. So, this fallacy is included within the
fallacy of svaru̅pa̅siddha.
 2. Visesana̅siddha:-

• Here the middle term has a false adjunct, as

when one argues sound is eternal, because being
a substance it is intangible, while sound is not a
substance but a quality.
 3. Vivesyasiddha:-

• Where the middle is an unreal substantive of

a real adjective; e.g. ‘sound is eternal,
because it is an intangible substance.’
 4. Asamarthavisesya̅siddha:-

• Here the middle is an unmeaning substantive of a

significant adjective, e.g. ‘sound is eternal, because
it is an uncaused quality’; in which the adjective
‘uncaused’ renders the word ‘quality’ quite
superfluous.
 C. Vya̅pyatva̅siddha:-
• Vya̅pyatva̅siddha is a middle term whose concomitance (Vya̅pti) with the major
cannot be proved. The fallacy of the vya̅pyatva̅siddha may arise in two ways.
• All reals are momentary;
• Sound is real;
• Therefore Sound is momentary.
• Here the major premise is false; because there is no universal relation between
the ‘real’ and the ‘momentary’.
• ii. ‘The hill is a case of smoke, because it is a case of fire.’
• This inference is invalid, because the relation of the middle terms ‘fire’ to the
major ‘smoke’ is conditional on its being ‘fire’ from wet fuel. This fallacy of the
conditional middle is technically called anyatha̅siddha.
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