Pakistan-US Relations

Lecture #02
Kiran shah rashdi(PMS)
Outline
Introduction
Historical Background
Current Relations
Conclusion
Introduction
a. Both are mutually important.
b. Ups and down / roller coaster
c. Convergence and divergence of interests.
d. Unequal relationship.
e. Love-hate /marriage-divorce relationship.
f. Trust deficit.
g. Each country protects its National Interests
h. History/ Present/ Future of relationship
Introduction
Both are mutually important for each other.
Quaid-e-Azam,while highlighting significance of Pakistan
for USA stated during Cold War:
“America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs
America,” &“Pakistan is the pivot of the world.”
USA being a major power in the past and a super power
of 21st Century is equally important for Pakistan.
Introduction
Established on 20th October 1947, this
relationship has seen many ups and downs. At
times this relationship is termed as roller coaster.
Love and hate Relationship, marriage and divorce
comparison. Three marriages and two divorce.
Three Military periods (Ayub, Zia and Musharaf)
as marriages and two democratic periods (ZAB
and 1990s) as divorce.
Introduction
Some times there is convergence of interest
and some times there is divergence of interest.
It is an unequal relationship between a Super
power (US) and economically week country
(Pakistan).
Former PM Yousaf Raza Gillane stated,
“USA can’t live with us and also can’t live
without us”
Introduction
Trust deficit in relationship. Both of them consider each
other as unreliable partners.
US enmity and friendship is equally bad.
Former Secretary of State, Hennery Kissinger had once
stated,
“US enmity is dangerous and its friendship is fatal”.
Introduction
Each country protects its National Interests
US relations with Pakistan are based on its national
interest which during the Cold War was Containment of
Communism and during post-cold War period is War
against Terrorism.
Whereas Pakistan’ s relations with the US are determined
by its Security and economic considerations.
Introduction
After 9/11 Pakistan took a u-turn on its afghan policy and
decided to support Operation Enduring Freedom(OEF).
In Musharaf Period relation were cordial and during the
subsequent two democratic periods (2008-2018), there
was a downward slide.
Raymond Davis/ Abbotabad Operation/ Salala Check Post
Incident/ Stoppage of NATO Supplies to
Afghanistan/Shamsi Air bass.
Introduction
There are certain irritants such as drone attacks, Dr Shakil
Afridi, safe heaven accusations and US support to India in
south Asian region.
Future of this relationship is depended upon the
perception of leadership about each other and convergence
and divergence of interest.
US-India and Pakistan-China relationship appears to be
the future prospects.
Historical background

Phases in Relationship
1. Independent Foreign Policy (1947-1953)
2. Alignment with the West (1954-1962)
3. Transition (1963-1971)
4. Bilateralism (1972-1978) (‘bilateralism’, defined as
amity towards all and animosity toward none)
5. Afghanistan and tilted Non-Alignment (1979-1989)
6. Redefining Foreign Relations (1990-2000)
7. War Against Terror (2001-2014)
Current Pak-US Relations

1. Trump Afghan Policy.

2. Operation in North Waziristan against Haqqani
Network.
3. Drone Attacks - A Bone Of Contention
4. Strategic Dialogue.
5. US tilt towards India in South Asia (US Kashmir Policy)
6. Kerry Lugar Berman Act (KLB).
7. Dr Shakil Afridi.
Current Pak-US Relations

8. War on terror aid

9. F-16
10. Release of Hafiz Saeed
11. FATF
12. Afghan peace process
Current Pak-US Relations

In August, 2017, Trump unveiled his South Asia strategy

in which he declared the US has changed its approach and
how to deal with Pakistan, referring to its “safe havens for
terrorist organizations”.
On 1st Jan, 2018, the US president tweeted harsh and
unsettling words
Which, have essentially become the core of his
administration’s policy towards Pakistan.
Current Pak-US Relations

The steps that followed have widened the trust gap.

The administration first halted financial aid, and recently
discontinued the international military education and
training programme.
In the interim, both countries imposed restrictions on the
movement of each others’ diplomatic staffers.
Trump Afghan Policy.

President Donald Trump new policy for South Asia was

critical of Pakistan.
It is painful to note that instead of recognising the
sacrifices rendered by Pakistan, the US has chosen to
target the country and neglect the tremendous role played
by it in fighting militancy as a frontline state.
Trump Afghan Policy.

Trump accused Pakistan of harbouring “agents of chaos”

and providing safe havens to militant groups.
Pakistani officials responded by saying the U.S. should
not “scapegoat” Pakistan and accused the American
military of failing to eliminate militant sanctuaries inside
Afghanistan.
Operation in North Waziristan
One of the US demand after Swat (2007) and South
Waziristan (2009) operations.
 Pakistan initially resisted but had to start it in mid June
2014 due to its own security considerations, after failure
of talks with Taliban.
So far 3,500 terrorists have been killed from militants side
and 300 security personal and one million have become
TDP.
USA wants this operation to be across the board.
Drone Attacks - A Bone of Contention

Pakistan terms drone attacks illegal, counterproductive

and in violation of its sovereignty.
For US drones are ethical, legal, just and proportional, in
full accordance with US and international law.
• The Obama Doctrine, “If we have actionable
intelligence about high value terrorist targets
and Pakistan won’t act, we will”.
Drone Attacks - A Bone of Contention

The killing of Akhtar Mansour in Pakistan

He was leader of Afghan Taliban an killed in Baluchistan
through drone strike.
Pakistan strongly protested against it saying he was about
to resume dialogue for reconciliation.
According to US he was hurdle in dialogue and process of
reconciliation.
Drone Attacks - A Bone of Contention

Drones started in 2004 and so far 400 drones have taken

place killing about 3000 people including 70 Al-Qaida
leaders.
The trend has gradually decreased 2010 (124), 2011 (86),
2012 (46) 2013 (20) and 2014 (20), 2015 (16), 2016(10),
2017 (4 so far)
In October 2013, during Nawaz Sharif visit to USA,
Pakistan raised this issue forcefully and there was no
drone during negotiations with Taliban.
Strategic Dialogue
The dialogue aimed to inject a stronger bilateral
dimension to ties and to widened them.
It started in 2006 and the level of dialogue was Secretary
level.
During Obama period it was upgraded to the Minister
level.
This framework includes working groups in areas that the
two countries have jointly identified as high-priority,
which are:
Strategic Dialogue
1. Energy
2. Economic issues
3. Water
4. Counter-terrorism,
5. Law enforcement
6. Non- proliferation
7. Defense cooperation
8. Education
9. Health
10. Women Empowerment
US tilt towards India
• USA gives more importance to India compared to Pakistan
due to its huge market, democracy and Non- proliferation.
In January 2015, President Obama came to India but
ignored Pakistan.
Its Kashmir policy is more helpful to India than
Pakistan.
Pakistan has always desired US active role is
resolving Indo-Pakistan disputes,
Kerry Lugar Berman Act (KLB).
Karrry – Lugar Bill was presented in US Congres in 2009.
It was passed in 2010 a package of $7.5 (B) over a period
of 5 years (2011-2015), each year $1.5 (B).
It was a sort of compensation for war against terror.
Remained suspended during dowward slide of 2011-2012.
Dr Shakeel Afridi
Dr Shakil Afridi, who is presently lodged at the Peshawar
Central Prison,
He is believed to have helped the CIA hunt down al-
Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden through a fake vaccination
campaign in Abbottabad.
The al-Qaeda founder was killed by the US Navy Seals in
a raid on his compound in Abbottabad in May 2011.
Dr Shakeel Afridi
Dr Shakil Afridi was a hero for the US, but a culprit for
Pakistan and would neither be released nor handed over to
the US.
Shakil Afridi was involved in anti-state activities and was
arrested in May 2011.
Dr Shakil Afridi, who was serving as the agency surgeon
in Khyber Agency
Dr Shakeel Afridi
Dr Afridi was sentenced to 33 years in prison and fined
Rs320,000 on charges of colluding with Lashkar-i-Islam
(LI) and its chief Mangal Bagh in 2012.
He was tried under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)
by an assistant political agent in his capacity as additional
district magistrate and convicted on multiple charges.
Since 2014, his review petition has been pending before
the Fata Tribunal.
Dr Shakeel Afridi
The issue of Dr Shakil Afridi resurfaced after the victory
of Donald Trump in the US presidential election.
During his election campaign Trump had declared that he
would not waste any time and get Dr Shakil Afridi freed
from Pakistani custody within two minutes after becoming
the president.
War on terror aid
Pakistan received $33.4bn from US during the past 15
years.
44% ($14.573) billion of which was on account of
services that Islamabad rendered to support US’s anti-
terror operations in Afghanistan of logistics and aerial
support (CSF).
 The civilian and security-related aid to Pakistan from
2002 to 2016 was only $18.8 billion (56%).
War on terror aid
Compared to the actual foreign aid of $18.8 billion to
Pakistan, Pakistan sustained $123.13 billion losses on
account of the war against terrorism since 9/11.
US economic leverage over Pakistan has significantly
reduced since 2014, as it came down to $1.6 billion per
annum against the average of $2.3 billion per annum
between 2002 and 2013.
War on terror aid
By excluding CSF, US assistance to Pakistan from 2014
to 2016 was $810 million per annum against the average
of $1.4 billion during the 2002-2013 period.
The flow of funds from the US to Pakistan saw another
drastic reduction in 2017.
US economic assistance historically remained around 1%
of Pakistan’s budget, which can easily be met from other
sources.
War on terror aid-Security
Since 2002, the US has given $7.96 billion in security
assistance to Pakistan with an annual average of $530.4
million, which is 23.83% of total.
A major chunk of it – $3.8 billion – has been given under
the Foreign Military Financing programme.
Another sum of $2.35 billion has been given under the
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund and Counterinsurgency
Capability Fund.
War on terror aid-Security
The third major portion was $911 million, which the US
gave under the International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement programme.
Against the 12-year average of $576.7 million, the US
gave $1.03 billion from 2014 to 2016 with an average of
only $345 million under the security-related assistance to
Pakistan. Most of this sum came under the foreign
military financing programme.
War on terror aid-Economic
The US has given $10.85 billion in economic assistance
to Pakistan during the past 15 years at an average of
$723.5 million per annum.
The 12-year average was $788 million per annum. The
economic assistance was about one-third of the total US
budgetary appropriations for Pakistan.
War on terror aid-Economic
Out of $10.85 billion, the US gave $8.5 billion under the
Economic Support Fund, followed by $918 million under
the International Disaster Assistance Programme and
another $623 million in food aid to Pakistan.
However, during the past three years, the economic
assistance has come down to only $1.4 billion, at an
average of $345 million per annum.
War on terror aid
Although the American civilian and military assistance
has significantly dried up in the recent past, Pakistan still
needs US support for securing loans at less harsh terms
from the IMF and the World Bank.
Pakistan’s economic relations with the US has been on the
decline for the past 15 years, as its share in exports,
remittances and foreign direct investment have drastically
reduced.
F-16
Initially, the $699 million deal for eight F-16 was to be
partially financed through the US Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) programme.
The Congress disallowed subsidising the sale over
concerns that Pakistan had not done enough to end the
Haqqani network’s sanctuaries on its soil as well as fears
about Islamabad’s nuclear programme.
F-16
Pakistan, which expected to get the fighters at the
subsidised rate of $270 million, was subsequently asked
by the US administration to make the full payment for the
eight aircraft from its national resources.
This was not acceptable to Pakistani authorities, who
remained adamant that the offer must come without any
preconditions.
F-16
The aircraft were required by PAF for counter-insurgency
and counter-terrorism operations.
The additional jets would have enhanced the PAF’s
capacity to sustain counter-terrorism operations by
increasing aircraft availability and providing training
opportunities for pilots.
Furthermore, the aircraft would have come with ‘all-
weather, non-daylight environments and self-defence/area
suppression capability’.
Release of Hafiz Saeed

Saeed was released in November 2017 from house arrest.

USA reacted by stating that Saeed’s release, after
Pakistan’s failure to prosecute or charge him, sends a
deeply troubling message about Pakistan’s commitment to
combating international terrorism and belies Pakistani
claims that it will not provide sanctuary for terrorists on
its soil.
Release of Hafiz Saeed

If Pakistan does not take action to lawfully detain Saeed

and charge him for his crimes, its inaction will have
repercussions for bilateral relations and for Pakistan’s
global reputation.
Since 2012, the United States has offered a $10 million
reward for information bringing Saeed to justice.
Release of Hafiz Saeed

In May 2008, the United States Department of the

Treasury designated Saeed as a Specially Designated
Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.
Saeed was also individually designated by the United
Nations under UNSC R1267 in December 2008 following
the November 2008 Mumbai attack in which six American
citizens were killed.
FATF
Members of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an
anti money-laundering watchdog based Paris, voted in
February, 2018 to place Pakistan on its grey list of nations
which are not doing enough to combat terror financing in
June, reportedly under US pressure.
That gives Pakistan three months to make enough changes
to avoid the listing.
Afghan peace process:
About a year after President Trump publicly excoriated
Pakistan for “lies and deceit” and cut off security
assistance in early 2018, the country became Pakistan
became key third player in the U.S.-Taliban peace talks.
By February 2020, when the U.S.-Taliban peace deal was
signed, Pakistan had not only propelled itself back into
America’s good graces. it was testing out an ambitious
new approach to foreign policy, hoping that it could
begin to shed its image of a state associated with terror
key confluence of interests on the Pakistani side:
Khan has long opposed an American military
presence in Afghanistan and favored a negotiated
settlement with the Taliban; the Pakistani army,
meanwhile, recognized that an ascendant Taliban
meant that any power-sharing arrangement
accompanying a peace deal would likely align with
Pakistan’s vision of “strategic depth” in Afghanistan
(i.e. a Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan).
The Brookings
Reset relations
Pakistan also received an IMF bailout, and its status
with the Financial Action Task Force — an
international watchdog — stayed constant at a
warning “grey” level.
WHAT PAKISTAN WANTS IN AFGHANISTAN
There are two things Pakistan does not want in Afghanistan.
The first is a hasty American withdrawal. To Pakistan, that
evokes the time period after the Soviet-Afghan war, which
fueled its sense of and narrative of abandonment, setting the
stage for many of Pakistan’s subsequent destructive behaviors.
Pakistan also does not want an unfriendly government in
Kabul . it does not want a government that is more friendly
with India than it is with Pakistan.
Pakistan wants some kind of power-sharing arrangement to
emerge in Afghanistan. If the Taliban has a large enough role,
the government is likely to be friendlier to Pakistan.
The State Department, in its latest country reports on
terrorism, notes that the Haqqanis and the Afghan
Taliban still have safe haven in Pakistan.
the prime architect of Pakistan’s jihadist foreign policy
to date, remains the most powerful institution in
Pakistan, it is hard to argue that anything will change
The Brookings
Pakistan’s military has significantly consolidated its
hold on the civilian government in the last two years
But Pakistan has also enjoyed the benefits of being back at the
table, and it badly wants to shed its image associated with
terrorism. It knows that cracking down on terrorist groups brings
economic and soft-power benefits — directly, via its status with
the Financial Action Task Force, and more broadly as well
Pakistan wants to increase its trade with the United States.
Pakistan wants to shed its notorious image
Pakistan wants its efforts to be recognised for example Pakistan
indicated, for instance, its “disappointment” with the State
Department’s recently released country reports on terrorism,
including by saying the report had not acknowledged the full
scale of its help with the Afghan peace process.
Can Pakistan pursue its neutral policy notwithstanding of
growing Sino-US divergence and competition?
 It would be a nightmare for Pakistan to make a “new enemy” –
that is even to be one of the global giants!
Washington has branded Islamabad as the “strategic ally” of
Beijing. Now the US policymakers look Pakistan through the
prism of US-China strategic competition – that certainly erodes
the decades old partnerships and engagements with Islamabad.
India has been considered to be a “counterweight” to China, so
Washington has negotiated the “Defence Deal 2020” with New
Delhi to consolidate their defence ties.
In this complex struggle, the Pak-Russia relations redux and
strong Pak-China ties would be a counterweight to Indo-US
alliance, that would rebalance the imbalance.
It provides Pakistan “extended deterrence”
Conclusion
It is concluded that Pakistan-US relations have not been
consistent and smooth over the last 70 years.
The current year is particularly difficult due to Trump
policy towards this region.
In the days to come Pakistan would be more inclined
towards China and Russia due to the changing global and
regional situation.
Pakistan and the US have maintained “torturous” – but
cooperative – relations with each other that must not be
completelyshut down
Pakistan and the US have cooperated in different areas:
defence, economics and regional stability.
Pakistan’s help to the US to negotiate the deal with Afghan
Taliban has created room for cooperation and engagement
Washington has been the biggest export market of Islamabad
Islamabad must convince Washington that it should not be
seen through the lenses of China rather they have been
traditional partners historically: the Baghdad pact, Cold War
and the War on Terror partnerships are the gross evidences. In
the future, likewise, both countries can also cooperate on
mutual interests.

The end