sino indian relations and bdy dispute 2024

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SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

From the 1st century onwards, many Indian and Chinese scholars and monks
have traversed the huge tracts of land to visit either countries. Batuo (fl. 464-495
CE)—first abbot of the Shaolin Monastery—and Bodhidharma—founder of Chan/Zen
Buddhism ( described as a Pallava Dynasty Prince), were from India, while Chinese
scholars like Xuanzang (b. 604) and I Ching (635-713), both of whom were
students at Nalanda University in Bihar which was a seat of learning for both Indian
and Chinese scholars.

The Cholas maintained good relationship with the Chinese. Arrays of


ancient Chinese coins have been found in the Cholas homeland (i.e. Thanjavur,
Tiruvarur and Pudukkottai districts of Tamil Nadu, India). Under Rajaraja Chola and
his son Rajendra Chola, the Cholas had strong trading links with Chinese Song
Dynasty. The Chola navy conquered the Sri Vijaya Empire of Indonesia and
Malaysia and secured a sea trading route to China.

During the 8th century, the astronomical table of sines by the Indian
astronomer and mathematician, Aryabhatta (476-550), were translated into the
Chinese astronomical and mathematical book of the Treatise on Astrology of the
Kaiyuan Era (Kaiyuan Zhanjing), compiled in 718 CE during the Tang Dynasty. The
Kaiyuan Zhanjing was compiled by Gautama Siddha, an astronomer and
astrologer born in Chang'an, and whose family was originally from India. He was
also notable for his translation of the Navagraha calendar into Chinese.

Between 1405 and 1433, Ming dynasty China sponsored a series of seven
naval expeditions led by Admiral Zheng He. Zheng He visited numerous Indian
kingdoms and ports, and also Ceylon, Persian Gulf, Arabia, and later expeditions
ventured down as far as Malindi in what is now Kenya. Throughout his travels, Zheng
He liberally dispensed Chinese gifts of silk, porcelain, and other goods. In return, he
received rich and unusual presents, including African zebras and giraffes. Zheng He
and his company paid respect to local deities and customs, and in Ceylon they
erected a monument (Galle Trilingual Inscription) honouring Buddha, Allah and
Vishnu.

During the 19th century, China's growing opium trade with the East India
Company triggered the First and Second Opium Wars During World War II, India
and China both played a crucial role in halting the progress of Imperial Japan.

The modern relationship began in 1950 when India was among the first countries
to end formal ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan) and recognize the PRC as
the legitimate government of Mainland China.
Mao Zedong viewed Tibet as an integral part of the People's Republic of
China. Mao saw Indian concern over Tibet as a manifestation of interference in the
internal affairs of the PRC. The PRC reasserted control over Tibet to end Lamaism
(Tibetan Buddhism) and feudalism, which it did by forceful occupation in 1950. To
avoid antagonizing the PRC, Nehru informed Chinese leaders that India had no
political ambitions, territorial ambitions, nor did it seek special privileges in Tibet, but
that traditional trading rights must continue. With Indian support, Tibetan delegates
signed an agreement in May 1951 recognizing PRC sovereignty but guaranteeing that
the existing political and social system of Tibet would continue. In April 1954, India
and the PRC signed an eight-year agreement on Tibet that became the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence (or Panchsheel). Although critics called the Panchsheel
naive, Nehru calculated that India's best guarantee of security was to establish a
psychological buffer zone in place of the lost physical buffer of Tibet.
In January 1959, PRC premier Zhou Enlai wrote to Nehru, pointing out that no
government in China had accepted as legal the McMahon Line, which in the
1914 Shimla Convention defined the eastern section of the border between India and
Tibet. In March 1959, the Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal head of the Tibetan
people, sought sanctuary in Dharmsala, Himachal Pradesh. Thousands of Tibetan
refugees settled in northwestern India. The PRC accused India
of expansionism and imperialism in Tibet and throughout the Himalayan region.
China claimed 104,000 km² of territory over which India's maps showed clear
sovereignty, and demanded "rectification" of the entire border.
This was followed by the 1962 Sino-Indian war in which the Chinese handed
a physical and psychological defeat to India.
China’s grand strategy encompasses three concise objectives:
safeguarding sovereignty, maintaining stability, and sustaining economic
progress. Any danger to the Communist Party is perceived as an ‘existential
threat’. Sovereignty implies, besides external non-interference, safeguarding core
interests, control of the South China Sea, unification of Taiwan, and integration of
claimed territories with the mainland including South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh).
In pursuit of these vital national interests, the use of force remains an option.
In 1978, the Indian Minister of External Affairs Atal Bihari Vajpayee made
a landmark visit to Beijing, and both countries officially re-established
diplomatic relations in 1979. The PRC modified its pro-Pakistan stand
on Kashmir and appeared willing to remain silent on India's absorption of Sikkim and
its special advisory relationship with Bhutan. The PRC's leaders agreed to discuss the
boundary issue, India's priority, as the first step to a broadening of relations.
A warming trend in relations was facilitated by Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988. The two sides issued a joint communiqué
that stressed the need to restore friendly relations on the basis of the Panchsheel.
India and the People's Republic of China agreed to achieve a "fair and reasonable
settlement while seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border dispute. The
communiqué also expressed China's concern about agitation by Tibetan separatists in
India and reiterated that anti-China political activities by expatriate Tibetans would not
be tolerated. Since the late 1980s, both countries have successfully rebuilt diplomatic
and economic ties.
In a major embarrassment for China, the 17th Karmapa, Urgyen Trinley Dorje,
who was proclaimed by China, made a dramatic escape from Tibet to the Rumtek
Monastery in Sikkim. Chinese officials were in a quandary on this issue as any protest
to India on the issue would mean an explicit endorsement on India's governance of
Sikkim, which the Chinese still hadn't recognised. In 2003, China officially
recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim as the two countries moved towards
resolving their border disputes. In 2006, China and India re-
opened Nathula pass for trading. Nathula was closed 44 years prior to 2006. Re-
opening of border trade will help ease the economic isolation of the region. The trade
which started with a few lakhs of Rupees went upto approx. Rs 80 crores worth by
2016. Major exports being from India through the local traders. After the Doklam
incident of 2017, the trade has been stopped.
In November 2006, China and India had a verbal spat over claim of the
north-east Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. India claimed that China was
occupying 38,000 square kilometres of its territory in Kashmir, while China
claimed the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as its own.
Until 2008 the British Government's position remained the same as had been
since the Simla Accord of 1913: that China held suzerainty over Tibet but
not sovereignty. Britain revised this view on 29 October 2008, when it recognized
Chinese sovereignty over Tibet through its website. The Economist stated that
although the British Foreign Office's website does not use the word sovereignty,
officials at the Foreign Office said "it means that, as far as Britain is concerned,
'Tibet is part of China. Full stop.' This change in Britain's position affects India's
claim to its North Eastern territories which rely on the same Shimla Accord
In June 2012, China stated its position that "Sino-Indian ties" could be the most
"important bilateral partnership of the century". However, India did not respond to that
initiative from China in equal terms, as the government now chooses to be cautious in
every move it takes with respect to China.
Sept 14 – Xi visits India – Ahmedabad
Since 2014 eight meetings of Xi and Modi but 2017 Doklam pushed things
back. Further aggravated by Galwan incident. Trust in China lost but will continue to
trade till alternate markets found/Make in India gains momentum. Can’t wish away
neighbours.
Sino Indian Border

The India-China border is divided into three sectors, viz. Western, Middle and Eastern.
The major disputed areas in each sector are as given below :-

Eastern sector extends from Sikkim till the border with Myanmar with
most disputed territories being in Arunachal Pradesh.

Namka Chu (river) valley (Tawang district) It is located about 60 km ahead


of Tawang. It is the area where the 1962 war began.
Sumdorong Chu (Tawang district)—It is a rivulet east of Namka Chu in the
area of Kya Pho of Tawang district. Occupied by the Chinese army in a surprise
swoop in 1986.

Yangste (Tawang district) As a retaliation to Sumdorong Chu, the Indian


Army occupied Yangste in the latter half of 1986.

Asaphila It is located in 100 sq km of forested, mountainous area located


along the LAC in the Upper Subansiri Division. It was one of the primary areas
that came under Chinese onslaught in 1962 war. Currently, Asaphila is not
under occupation of either country.

Longju It is located in the Upper Subansiri Division, The first armed


clash (Aug 25, 1959) between PLA and 9 Assam Rifles took place here.
Since then India did not reoccupy Longju and instead set up a post at Maja,
10 km south of Longju.

Middle sector (from Demchok in eastern Ladakh till the border with Nepal)
545 km, runs along Himachal and UP.
Barahoti It is a grazing ground in Uttarakhand’s Chamoli district. This area too
has a history of incursions by Chinese troops.

Western sector (from northwest of Karakoram Pass to Demchok)


Aksai Chin It is the biggest disputed territory, which is 38,000 sq km in
size. For India it is part of Ladakh. China has been claiming this region as its own
since the 50s. In 1957, it built its Western Highway that connects Xinjiang with
Tibet, cutting across Aksai Chin. China eventually occupied it after 1962.
Demchok It is a village and military base in Leh. It is a site of frequent face-
offs. In November 2017, Indian and Chinese troops clashed over the construction
of an irrigation canal. A similar altercation took place in 2014.

WESTERN SECT (LADAKH)

The boundary dispute in the Western Sector pertains to the Johnson Line
proposed by the British in the 1860s that extended up to the Kunlun Mountains and
put Aksai Chin in the then princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Independent
India used the Johnson Line and claimed Aksai Chin as its own. China initially did
not demur when India said so in the early 1950s; however, in the years that followed
it reversed its position and stated that it had never acceded to the Johnson Line and
therefore did not see why it should cede Aksai Chin to India. China first occupied
Aksai Chin in 1948 and secured its land corridor to connect Xinjiang, based on the
Macartney Mc Donald line(1899) in which area to the North of the Karakoram Range
were shown as part of China. Broadly, it represented the watershed between the Indus
River system and the rivers draining into the Tarim basin. In the 1962 war it pushed
it’s claim line west of Karakoram to provide depth to the land route to Xinjiang.
MIDDLE SECT (HP)
Trade used to take place through the passes from 1800s. No tax collected.
1888 first Tibetan Camp noticed in Barahoti, apparently primary purpose was
to collect taxes for trade. In July 1952, IB prepared a note stating that if the practise
of tax collection was allowed to continue they may lay claim to the territory. The State
govt rejected such claims. In 1954 trade agreement of the five passes in HP
recommended by Indian Govt Tibet accepted only two leaving the door open for China
to contest the areas below the other passes. 1954-55, claims and counter claims by
both sides about ‘wu Je’(12 miles North of Tunjula ) and ‘Barahoti’. The dispute is a
minor one at Barahoti (1.5 sq miles). Barahoti was the first location in Indian territory
claimed by China in 1954.
In a conf held from Apr-may 1958, China failed to provide any documentary
evidence, including coordinates of it’s claim location of Wu Je. Aim appeared to be to
reject all colonial maps and the principle of watershed. Later that year, according to
Indian Government, once winter set in and Indian border posts were dismantled, two
adjacent areas (on east and west) —Lapthal and Sangchamalla— were intruded by
Chinese troops only for China to claim all the three places (individually) next
year, a total of 750 sq kms.
On 23 Jan 1959, Zhou en lai blamed India for not sending people to investigate
the issue on ground and asked to end this ’minor issue’ on the boundary. In May 1959,
Nehru said in the Parliament that since no Chinese troops were found by Indian troops
at Barahoti, the government did not plan on tackling the characteristic winter
aggression of China by stationing forces. in 1960, China would claim the composite
area spanning across the three places and were included in '59 as disputed territories.
Presently, border still undemarcated, patrolled by ITBP and Indian Army on.
It is the only one where India and China have exchanged maps on which they
broadly agree, but not yet resolved.
Eastern Sector
The disputed boundary in the Eastern Sector of the India-China border is over
the McMahon Line. Representatives of China, India and Tibet in 1913-14 met in
Shimla, where an agreement was proposed to settle the boundary between Tibet and
India, and Tibet and China. Though the Chinese representative at the meeting
initialled the agreement, they subsequently refused to accept it. The Tawang tract
claimed by China was taken over by India in 1951. Till the 1960s, China controlled
Aksai Chin in the West while India controlled the boundary up to the McMahon Line in
the East.
After securing its northern borders by signing treaties with Nepal, Bhutan, and
Sikkim a hard line with respect to China was advocated by Sardar Patel. On 07 Nov
1950, he wrote a letter to Nehru warning that the attitude of the Chinese government
was unfriendly and its policy expansionist. He said that the disappearance of Tibet
would bring the Chinese Army to the gates of India . Nehru preferred to take a
friendly attitude towards China, which he believed to be the best guarantee of
India’s security. GS Bajpai, the then Secretary General in the Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA) advised Nehru that India should formally inform the Chinese
government that it regarded the Mc Mahon Line as its boundary. This diplomatic
act would have forced the Chinese to agree, disagree or by silence acquiescence.
Nehru did not agree on the grounds that firstly, it had been raised in the Parliament
and secondly, Panchsheel was the basis of Sino-Indian relations. China had not
signed the agreement but had signed the map of 27 Apr 1914 showing the
alignment of Mc Mahon Line without any reservations. Then on 23 January 1959,
it gave in to its expansionist ambitions by disputing the alignment of the
McMahon Line.
Then, in the 1962 war, it pushed its claims in Arunachal Pradesh and it ran over
the complete territory and almost reached the banks of Brahmaputra and retreated on
its own, inflicting a severe psychological blow to the Indian nation. In later years
until the Eighties, the Chinese offer to trade off the Eastern Sector (Arunachal
Pradesh) with the Western Sector (Ladakh) with India were attempts to secure its
interests in the Karakoram. Except for Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh did not have any
importance for the then weak China. Earlier, the Chinese claim was only Tawang. It is
much after, in 2005, they brought Arunachal Pradesh into the picture calling it
Southern Tibet.
Accepting the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was the first step towards the final
settlement. Historically, there were four lines of actual control suggested at different
times : the 1947 line at the time of Independence; the November 1959 line at the
Colombo conference; the September 1962 line at the end of the Sino-Indian conflict
and the current line of actual control that is almost similar to the 1947 line and easy to
identify. The LAC agreement signed in September 1993 was another step in this
direction.
The crux of the border dispute is that neither China nor India is willing to accept
any loss of territory which they claim. Innumerable rounds of talks and negotiations
by different sets of high-ranking officials under several leaders and governments have
not been able to resolve the issue. What to talk of resolution, the top layer of the crust
which could define the approach to be taken has not been finalised. Status quo
appears to be the conclusion of all talks. The Joint Working Group on boundary
had in 1995 identified two disputed areas – Trig Heights and Demchok – in the
western sector. Between 1995 and April 2013, there were five identified areas of
dispute in the western sector, namely, Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), Pangong Tso, Chumar,
Trig Heights and Demchok. Today, there are 12 areas of dispute in the western
sector; an increase of seven areas between April 2013 and now. The People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) has put the Indian Army under enormous stress on the entire
LAC – From DBO to Demchok – in the western sector. China carried out a three weeks
long April 2013 PLA intrusion in Depsang Plain near DBO in Ladakh. Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh called the occupation of Indian land by PLA forces a
‘localised affair’. Even in the 1950s when China started construction of its road in
Aksaichin India neither objected nor took proactive steps to ‘defend’ its territory, as it
claimed Aksaichin to be. China got emboldened and started occupying the territory
with troops to such an extent that the LAC has become sacrosanct even for patrolling
and domination, thus India is actually ceding that part of the territory to China. India
has succumbed to China’s military coercion or coercive diplomacy, which is an
important component of its irregular warfare. It is thus a mind game that we need to
be wary of. China’s military power – is a mix of symmetrical, asymmetrical,
psychological and military diplomacy capabilities. China is altering the LAC without
a fight, by intrusion diplomacy, something that Pakistan with a violent Line of Control
(LC) has not been able to do. We addressed this moral ascendancy to a certain extent
in the Doklam Incident of 2017(Jul to Sept), where we too built our forces to a level,
where China had to take note of and withdraw. 2020 Galwan Incident was also a result
of Chinese intrusion to thwart Indian territorial border infrastructure development.
India, therefore, will remain engaged with China on border talks even when
there is little light at the end of tunnel because not doing so could lead to worsening
of relations and possibly conflict. This explains why border resolution talks have
diffused its mandate to include all bilateral issues, what Chinese media referred to as
‘strategic communication’ between the two politically-empowered special
representatives.
The military restiveness on the Sino-Indian border does not bode well for
regional stability as the military balance along the long and contested border is rapidly
altering in Beijing’s favour with the upgrade of Chinese military and civilian
infrastructure in Xinjiang and Tibet. Chinese military modernization has far
outpaced Indian defence upgrade.

Thus, India has to be assertive and push back such incursions so that the
sanctity of the LAC is respected. India needs to keep the option of either accepting
the LAC as a border or push back the Chinese to the Johnson line/ Mc Mahon Line,
at a future appropriate date, while continuing to develop our infrastructure in all the
border areas.

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