Indo-China

Relations
India’s Foreign Policy
Dr. Alok Kumar Gupta
Indicative Resources:

 Ministry of External Relations website

(www.mea.gov.in)
 Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (www.disa.in)
 Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (www.ipcs.org)
 Observer Research Foundation (www.orfonline.org)
 The Diplomat
Historical Perspective

 India was the first non-communist nation to accord

recognition to PRC on April 01, 1950.
 Established diplomatic relations on the same day.
 Jawaharlal Nehru based his vision of resurgent Asia on
friendship between the two largest states of Asia; his vision of
an internationalist foreign policy governed by the ethics of the
Panchsheel (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence), which
he initially believed was shared by China.
 Nehru was later disappointed when it became clear that the
two countries had a conflict of interest in Tibet, which had
traditionally served as a buffer zone, and where India believed
it had inherited special privileges from the British Raj.
 With Indian support, Tibetan delegates signed an agreement in
May 1951 recognizing PRC sovereignty but guaranteeing that
the existing political and social system of Tibet would
continue.
 In April 1954, India and the PRC signed an eight-year
agreement on Tibet that became the Panchsheel.
Historical Perspective

 1950: India was among the first countries to end

formal ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan) and
recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of
Mainland China.
 The Silk Road not only served as a major trade route
between India and China, but is also credited for
facilitating the spread of Buddhism from India to East
Asia during First Century CE.
 During the World War II, India and China both played
a crucial role in halting the progress of Imperial
Japan.
Nehru visited China in October 1954
With Mao Zedong in Pic
Sino-Indian Friendship Association
(Founded in Beijing on 16 May 1952)
 Since the late 1980s, both countries have successfully
rebuilt diplomatic and economic ties.
 In 2008, China became India’s largest trading partner
and the two countries have also extended their
strategic and military relations.
 In 2012, China stated its position that “Sino-Indian ties”
could be the most “important bilateral partnership of
the Century”. [Wen Jiabao, the Premier of China and
Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India set a goal
to increase bilateral trade between the two countries to
US$100 billion by 2015. November 2012 the bilateral
trade was estimated to be $73.9 billion.]
Indo-China Border Dispute

 The entire Sino-Indian border (including the western LAC, the

small undisputed section in the Centre, and the McMahon Line
in the east) is 4,056 (2520 miles) long.
 It traverses five Indian States: Jammu and Kashmir,
Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim, and Arunachal
Pradesh.
 On the Chinese Side, the line traverses the Tibet Autonomous
Region.
 The demarcation existed as the informal cease-fire line
between India and China after the 1962 conflict until 1993,
when its existence was officially accepted as the ‘Line of
Actual Control’ in a bilateral agreement.
 However, Chinese Scholars claim that the Chinese Prime
Minister Zhou Enlai first used the phrase in a letter addressed
to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru dated 24 October
1959.
Outstanding Issues between
India and China
 Border Dispute: Resulting in Three major military
conflicts and two major standoffs:
 Sino-Indian War of 1962;
 The Cho La Incident in 1967;
 Sino-Indian Skirmish in 1986-87;
 Daulat Beg Oldi Incident in 2013;
 Dokalam Standoff of 73 days in 2017.
1. China’s strong strategic bilateral relations with
Pakistan;
2. Frequent Chinese military incursions into Indian
territory;
3. China has expressed concerns about Indian military
and economic activities in the disputed South China
Sea.
4. Change in nomenclature from Asia-Pacific to Indo-
Pacific
5. Tibetan Refugees
6. River Water Dispute
Territorial Dispute
Aksai Chin

 (37,244 square kilometre) Claimed by India as part of the state

of Jammu and Kashmir and region of Ladakh but it is
controlled and administered as part of the Chinese autonomous
region of Xinjiang.
Border Dispute
Aurnachal Pradesh

 Earlier called as North East Frontier Agency.

 The easternmost region lies south of the McMahon Line.
 The McMahon Line was part of the 1914 Simla Convention
between British India and Tibet, an agreement rejected by China.
 It is a line agreed to by Britain and Tibet as part of the Simla
Accord, a treaty signed in 1914.
 It is the effective boundary between China and India, although its
legal status is disputed by the Chinese government.
 It extends for 550 miles (890km) from Bhutan in the west to 160
miles (260km) east of the great bend of the Brahmaputra River in
east, largely along the crest of the Himalayas.
 An agreement to resolve the dispute was concluded in 1996,
including “Confidence Building Measures” and a mutually
agreed Line of Actual Control.
 In 2006, the Chinese ambassador to India claimed that all of
Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory amidst a military build-
up. At that time both countries claimed incursions as much as a
kilometre at the northern tip of Sikkim.
 In 2009, India announced it would deploy additional military
forces along the border.
Contemporary Issues

 Pakistan Factor:
 The long-time friendship between China and Pakistan, rooted
in a time when both countries were deeply mistrustful of India,
has long made India nervous.  
 The relationship has mainly gone one way, with China
providing economic assistance and political backing to
Pakistan.
 Pakistan is also anxious for an alliance it can use to balance the
growing economic and political clout of India.  
 But Pakistan also offers China a gateway to South Asia, Iran
and the Arabian Sea, one of the economic beltways that
President Xi Jinping has sought to build through the region.
 During a visit to Islamabad, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi
said China and Pakistan have an “all-weather friendship.
OBOR
Arctic, Land and Sea Route of
BRI
OBOR (BRI)

 Having overbuilt in many domestic industries, such as

coal, cement, and even solar panels—the Chinese
government is redirecting its capital abroad.
 The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st century
Maritime Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road
(abbreviated as B&R), One Belt, One Road (abbreviated as
OBOR) or the Belt and Road Initiative is a development
strategy and framework, proposed by Chinese paramount
leader Xi Jinping that focusses on connectivity and cooperation
among countries primarily between the PRC and the rest of
Eurasia.
 China’s soaring vision envisages once completed Silk Roads,
would impact the life of 4.4 billion people and, within a
decade, generate trade above a jaw-dropping $2.5 trillion.
 It will bring a paradigm shift in the global economy.
 An economic roadmap explores the economic topography of
seven global regions and profiles 44 individual countries
covered by OBOR. [Now from some reports nearly 78
countries]
 It consists of two main components, the land-based: Silk Road
Economic Belt” (SREB) and Oceangoing “Maritime Silk
Road” (MSR).
 The strategy underlines China’s push to take a bigger role in
global affairs, and its need for priority capacity cooperation in
areas such as steel manufacturing.
 Unveiled in September and October 2013.
 It was also promoted by Premier Li Kequing during the state
visit of Asia and Europe.
 Anticipated cumulative investment over an indefinite timescale
is variously put at US$ 4 trillion to US$8 trillion.
 OBOR has been contrasted with the two US-Centric trading
arrangements, the Trans Pacific Partnership and the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
 The Belt includes countries situated on the original Silk Road
through Central Asia, West Asia, The Middle East, and Europe.
 Another area that is said to be included in the extension of this
belt is South Asia and Southeast Asia.
 North Belt goes from Central Asia, Russia to Europe.
 Central Belt goes through Central Asia, West Asia to the
Persian Gulf and the Mediteranean.
 South Belt starts from China to Southeast Asia, South Asia, the
Indian Ocean.
 Central Belt is spoken down due to complex religion problems
and separation movement along the belt.
 The initiative calls for the integration of the region into a
cohesive economic area through building infrastructure,
increasing cultural exchanges, and broadening trade.
 MSR is a complementary initiative aimed at investing and
fostering collaboration in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and North
Africa, through several contiguous bodies of water—the South
China Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, and the wider Indian
Ocean area. First proposed during a speech by Jinping in
Indonesian Parliament October 2013.
 The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) are officially
classified as closely related to the Belt and Road Initiative.
 In coverage by the media, this distinction is disregarded and
the networks are counted as components of the initiative.
 The CPEC in particular is often regarded as the link between
China’s maritime and overland Silk Road, with port of Gwadar
forming the crux of the CPEC project.
 The AIIB, first proposed by China in October 2013, is a
development bank dedicated to leading for projects regarding
infrastructure. As of 2015, China announced that over one
trillion Yuan ($160 billion US) of infrastructure projects were
in planning or construction.
 AIIB is a multilateral bank that has an authorized capital of
US$ 100 billion, 75% of which will come from Asian and
Oceanian countries. China will be the single largest
stakeholder, holding 26% of voting rights.
 November 2014, US$40 billion development fund created for
the initiative.
India’s Membership to NSG:

 China has continuously blocked India’s entry in UNSC.

Recently China has blocked India’s entry in NSG. Chinese
diplomats say Beijing wants NSG entry to be norm-based — in
other words, whatever rules govern Indian entry should apply
to others too.
 Norm-based entry would, presumably, help Pakistan gain
entry, something many in the NSG are certain to resist because
of the country’s record as a proliferator of nuclear-weapons
technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
The Role of India and China
in South China Sea (SCS)
 The three million square kilometers South China Sea is the
maritime heart of Southeast Asia but also a disputable property.
Maritime boundaries in the South China Sea are particularly
problematic because they involve six separate claimants in a
mostly enclosed body of water with a large number of disputed
land features.
 The South China Sea is ringed by Brunei, China, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and dotted
with hundreds of small islands, shoals and reefs, many of them
occupied by the disputants.
 The fundamental issue in the South China Sea is one of
territorial sovereignty, that is, which state has sovereignty over
the islands and their adjacent waters.
 China opposes India’s oil exploration in the SCS (which has
been undertaken at Vietnam’s request) by calling the area of
exploration a ‘disputed’ area and asserting ‘Chinese
sovereignty’ over the SCS in the ‘historical’ context.  
 It has been continuously expressing its reservation in this
regard in the last few years, and sometimes quite belligerently
at that. India has taken note of the Chinese reservation and has
carefully gone ahead in signing a few agreements with
Vietnam for oil exploration in the SCS.
 These exploration fields are very much within the maritime
space under the actual control of Vietnam.  But at the same
time, China casually shrugs off the issue of India’s
‘sovereignty’ over POK in the ‘historical’ context.
 China is currently engaged on a variety of investment projects
and infrastructural building activities in Gilgit-Baltistan, and
these will be expanded under the CPEC project.  
 China further explains that the Sino-Pak understanding to
implement CPEC through POK is based on a range of bilateral
agreements and understandings, including their 1963 Border
Agreement.
Indian Ocean and Chinese Increasing
Presence:

 China’s Six fold Legitimate maritime interests:

 China’s strategic aim is to become a maritime power, which as
it says, is to be achieved by pursuing ‘convergence of interests’
with concerned nations. Its sincerity in this regard will come
under test in the coming years.
 Reunifying its offshore islands
 Safeguarding its territorial waters
 Assuring its exclusive economic zone for its sole use,
reasonably and economically
 Protecting high sea collaboratively for global legitimate access
 Respecting those legitimate maritime rights of other states as
per relevant international law;
 Resolving maritime disputes with other claimants as peacefully
as possible when they may arise, while reserving all means for
sovereign purpose.
 The two-protecting high sea and use of all means on
sovereignty matters, are striking in importance.
River Water Dispute:

 The dispute between India and China is mainly regarding the

Brahmaputra River flowing through the two countries the
search for water resources in China and India has persistently
been a source of tension between the two countries.
  Chinese efforts to divert the water resources of the
Brahmaputra River away from India will worsen a situation
that has remained tense since the 1962 Indo-China war.
 The melting glaciers in the Himalayas as a result of
accelerating global climate change will have a dramatic effect
on this river’s water supply. This will increase water scarcity as
well as the likelihood of floods, impact agrarian livelihoods
and strain the fragile equilibrium between the two Asian giants.
CPEC--China Pakistan Economic Corridor:

 A collection of infrastructure originally project worth US$40

billion is now being pegged at $62 billion. On 13 November
2016, CPEC became partly operational when Chinese cargo
was transported overland to Gwadar Port for onward maritime
shipment to Africa and West Asia, while some major power
projects were commissioned by late 2017.
The SCO and India’s membership:

 Founded on June 15, 2001, the SCO now has China,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as
its full members, with Afghanistan, Belarus, India, Iran,
Mongolia and Pakistan as observers.
 India has been accorded status of “Acceding Member” at
Tashkent in June 2016. Russia and China has backed India’s
membership to SCO. Currently, both India and Pakistan are
observers at the bloc. Pakistan applied for a full membership in
2006 and India in 2014.
 The SCO has been expanded to Eight Member when
India and Pakistan were accorded as Full Members on
June 9, 2017 at a Summit in Astana, Kazakhastan.
Doklam
Doklam June 2017

 A 73-days military stand-off took place between India

and China, as
 China attempted to extend a road on the Doklam
Plateau southwards near the Doka La Pass and Indian
troops moved into prevent the Chinese.
 India claim to have acted on behalf of Bhutan, with
which it has special relationship.
 Bhutan has formally objected to construction by China
in the Disputed Area.
Geopolitical Rivalry

 Geopolitical rivalry and calibrated cooperation, seemingly

antithetical, coexist within the framework of our relationship
with China. The latter has pinned its colours to the Pakistani
mast as recent developments have demonstrated. It is
suspicious about our friendship with the United States, our
closeness to Japan, and our naval cooperation in the East and
South China Seas with these countries. It challenges us with its
myriad dalliances in our neighbourhood.
Indo-China Trade

 India faces trade imbalance heavily in favour of China. India

has a trade deficit with China of nearly $50 billion, its largest
with any country. Singapore, with a population about 240
times smaller than India, sells twice as many goods to China
each year.
Indo-China Trade
IFP under Narendra Modi’s

 Modi has said eighteenth century mind-set of vistaar-vad

or expansionism won’t work and vikaash-vad or
peaceful development is needed for sustainable peace
and tranquility in the world which was read by a portion
of media as a subtle jibe on China.
 Narendra Modi has visited China nearly five times since
he became Prime Minister of India.
 Chinese President Xi Jinping has visited twice to India.