Border Disputes, War and the Changing Dynamics of India's China Policy

Sibaram Badatya

Abstract
Relations between India and China, two of the oldest living civilizations had been
warm, friendly and cooperative for centuries. Both nations had established greater
linkages through cultural exchanges and trade throughout history. Ancient trade and
religious pilgrimages had been flourishing through the ancient silk route for centuries.
After independence, the civilizational relationship gains new momentum and the spirit of
'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' guided a new era of the Asian century. However, the brotherhood
spirit started deteriorating after the Tibetan Uprising of 1959, leading to a trust deficit
and subsequent border disputes. In 1962, both the neighbours engage a brief war and
stand to juxtapose in many regional and global issues. Over the years, Chinese has
emerged as a major international player and India's China policy has undergone a
dynamic change to balance the Chinese threat. In this background, the current paper is
intended to highlight the dynamics of India's China policy and analyse the changing
relationship between India and China over the years.

Keywords
India-China relations, Border disputes, War, Tibet uprising.

Introduction
India and China have been sharing a friendly and cooperative relationship since
ancient times. This relationship has developed further after the independence of both
countries during the late 1940s. The period between post-independence to 1957, known as
the "Period of Panchsheel" is perhaps the golden age of India China relationship. India's
full support to China's freedom movement and its reorganization, its unconditional
support to China's admission into UN, support to China's stand on Korean crisis,
annexation of Tibet and India's policies towards Formosa crisis are some of the events on
which India and China shared similar thoughts. But, the year of 1989 was the important
turning point of age-old relationship and the event that reshuffled the whole game was the
Tibetan uprising of 1959.

Understanding the India-China Border Issues

India and China share 3,488 kilometers ling border and has been long-standing
border issues throughout the stretches at different regions, namely eastern, middle and
western sector (Ministry of Home Affairs). While in the Eastern Sector, China claims the
large portions of the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which is now under Indian control, at the
Chin, which it believe is a part of its Ladakh region. At the middle sector, both the states
claim their sovereignty on various unmarked spots throughout the borders and have been
 Border Disputes, War and the Changing...

the spotlight of repeated border violation by both the forces. While both the parties up the
ante and engage a series of military stand-ups in the recent past, the border disputes
remain the guiding principle of the bilateral relationship.
The Issues of the Western Sector
While the issue got larger public attention in the recent past due to the repeated
military stand-ups, the origin of these disputes dates back to the colonial era. The Ladakh
region, which was once the part of Tibet was annexed by the Sikh army in 1841 and the
subsequent signing of the Treaty of Chushul in September 1842 stipulated no
transgressions principle between the Sikhs and Qing empires. Following the defeat of the
Sikh Army in the Anglo-Sikh War, the British officials have taken over the state of Jammu
and Kashmir, including the Ladakh region. Here for the first time, the British Empire
shares a common border with China and both the parties respected the natural boundaries
and taken no effort to demark the border on the map or ground till 1865. In 1865, British
officials appointed a survey officer, William Johnson, to carry out a survey and draw a
boundary line between British India and the Chinese Empire. After a rigorous survey, he
presented the "Johnson Line" as the border, placing the entire Aksai China as a part of
Kashmir. However, the proposed line was severely criticized for gross inaccuracies and
reprimanded by British officials.(Raghavan2010, p. 228) The issue had been put in cold
storage till the threat of expanding of Russian empire extended till Indian borders. To draw
a militarily defendable line to prevent any future Russian advancement into India, a new
line was proposed by the British military officer, Sir John Ardagh along the crest of the
Kun Lun Mountains. Considering various threat perception the Ardagh line was
effectively a modified and a new line was drawn in 1897 merging the Johnson's survey and
Ardagh recommendation. Called as the 'Johnson–Ardagh Line' or the 'Karakoram Line',
the British proposed a military defendable line between India and China. (Hoffmann
1990, p. 15)
While both the lines were drawn unilaterally by British officials, that failed to
impress the Chinese authority for agreement, a revised line was proposed by British India
government placing the Lingzi Tang plains in India, and Aksai Chin proper in China. The
boundary was prepared by the George Macartney, the British consul general at Kashgar
after considering the Chinese map handed over by the Hung Ta-chen, a senior Chinese
official at St. Petersburg in 1893. Making the Karakoram Mountains a natural boundary,
the British government presented the Macartney-MacDonald Line to the Chinese in 1899
in 1899 with a diplomatic note by Sir Claude MacDonald (Hoffmann 1990, pp. 15-
16).The Qing government did not respond to the note, speculating the British of Chinese
acquiescence. Although no official boundary had ever been negotiated, China believed
that this had been the accepted boundary and redrawn the China-Pakistan border based on
this line in 1962 (Noorani 2010). On both occasions British authorities never demarked
Western Sector, India demanding the withdrawal of the Chinese presence from Aksai the
border on the ground, hence, they left the issues for further complication. Moreover,
British officials had been using both the Johnson-Ardagh and the Macartney-MacDonald
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lines in their maps, leaving the scope for further discord.

However, with the collapse of the central power in Chinese following the Xinhai
Revolution and alarming Russian threat, the British resorted to the earlier stand and
started using the Johnson Line officially. Thought the claim strengthened further after the
Second World War, no efforts were taken to set up border outposts and demarcation of the
boundary on ground, leaving the border unmarked. In 1927, the line was adjusted again as
the government of British India abandoned the Johnson line in favor of a line along with
the Karakoram range further south. However, the maps were not updated and still showed
the Johnson Line (Bradnock 2015, pp. 174-75). However, following the establishment of
Pro-Russian leadership in Xinjiang 1933, Russia carried out several mining surveys in
China. The increasing Russian footprints in neighboring China and its territorial surveys
prompted the Britishers, to reopen the strategic grate game in the region. As a result, the
British government has abandoned the Macartney-MacDonald and shifted their stand to
Johnson Line by claiming the sovereignty on the whole of Aksai Chin. However, like
other occasions, no measures have taken to establish border outposts and physical
demarcation of the border with China. This policy was continued until the independence
of India, making the Indians believe the Johnson Line as the border between India and
China since 1947.

The disputes of the Middle Sector

In the middle sector, India-China shares 545 kilometers long border from
Demchok to Western Nepal that runs through the borders of two Indian states, Himachal
Pradesh and Uttarakhand. While three of the disputed border areas, namely Kauirik in
Lahaul and Spiti valley comes under the state of Himachal Pradesh, the rest of the two,
including the Bara Hoti and Nelang Valley falls under the state of Uttarakhand. Though
both the countries have a different opinion and claim their sovereignty, all the disputed
areas of the middle sector are now under the control of India. This sector also witnesses
several Chinese invasions in the recent past. Bara Hoti, for instance, came under repeated
Chinese invasion and as many as 37 border violations have been reported between 2007
and 2012 (Times of India, Apr 16, 2012). Despite the constant patrolling by India's ITBP
personnel, repeated border violation Chinese force has been reported recently (Indian
Express, July 28, 2016).

The Eastern Sector along McMahon Line

Among the all disputed territories between India and China, the eastern sector
comprising of Arunachal Pradesh is the biggest territorial claims by China. The border is
well defined by the McMahon Line and approved by Tibet as a border between India and
Tibet during the Shimla agreement in 1914. China, as a party to the Shimla agreement,
didn't sign the agreement. Though Chinese protest against the Indian high-level visits to
Arunachal Pradesh and its claim on the easternmost part of India have increased recently,
the origin of the disputes dates back to the colonial era. British India and China shared no
common border in the eastern sector before 1826. After the annexation of Assam from
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Burma in the Treaty of Yandabo and conquering subsequent areas during the Anglo-
Burmese Wars, India gained control over the Brahmaputra basin and extended its border
up to China in the eastern sector for the first time.
To demark the border between the three neighbours, Britain, China, and Tibet, a
conference was organized by British authority at Shimla in 1913. At the Convention, the
British government proposed the McMahon Line as the boundary line marking the
Himalayas as the natural border and placing Tawang inside India. After several rounds of
discussion, Tibet agreed to sign the agreement. However, Chinese representatives raised
some objections to the final map and return without signing the accord (Ray 2013. pp.
216-17). However, Britain showed no seriousness to demark the border on the ground and
took no step to claim their sovereignty in the border regions as the line had no serious
challenge following the collapse of Chinese power in Tibet. After two decades, the Shimla
Convention was first published by British Government in 1938 as a bilateral agreement
followed by a detailed map by the Survey of India showing Tawang as a part of in North-
East Frontier Tract (NEFT) (Ray 2007, p.203).However, the British sovereignty was
hardly visible on the ground and Tawang continued to govern by Tibetan authority.
Following the arrest of British botanist F. Kingdon-Ward in the tribal regions of northern
Assam on the charge of unauthorized expedition into Tibetan territory, prompted the
British government to send a mission to Tawang for the proclamation of British
sovereignty. In April 1938, a small British force led by Captain G. S. Lightfoot arrived in
Tawang and proclaimed the British authority on the region. The Tibetan government
protested against the British claim and subsequently ignored Lightfoot's declaration while
collecting taxes in Tawang. However, Lhasa did not object to British activity in other
sectors of the McMahon Line (Raghavan 2012 pp. 17-18). Heading to no progress,
Lightfoot returns to New Delhi in recommending stronger measures for the establishment
of British authority over Tawang. However, due to the outbreak of World War II, the
British did not pay much attention in enforcing authority in the valley. But, with the
increasing Japanese surge in Asia, forcing the British to maintain a strong frontier in the
region to prevent possible Japanese attack. Moreover, Britain was also concerned about
the subsequent Chinese map showing not only Assam Himalayas but also areas that are
100 miles south of the agreed borderline during the Shimla convention. (Raghavan 2012
pp. 17-18) Alarmed by the adverse situation, British Indian authorities sent British civil
servants and anthropologist J.P Mills to bring the tribal into British control and assert
British authority in the tribal areas. With his pioneering efforts, he consolidated British
influence among the tribals and able to establish several border posts from Walong at the
east to DirangDzong at the west all along the McMahon Line. These border posts were
guarded by Assam Rifles to prevent any kind of Chinese and possible Japanese
expeditions and nullify the Tibetan influence in the region. By 1947, when the British
Empire collapsed in India, Britain able to establish the Indo-Tibetan frontier as per the
McMahon Line and the British sovereignty within the frontier was transferred to
Independent India after 1947. After independence, India merged the North-East Frontier
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Tract into the state of Assam and retained the border posts as usual. However, for better
administrative management, the Indian government reorganize the hill tracts and
constituted the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in 1951 which was renamed as
Arunachal Pradesh in 1972 and become a union territory. In 1987 Arunachal Pradesh
given full statehood status and become the 24th State of Indian Union. Following the
Chinese liberation in 1951 and subsequent annexation of Tibetan in 1954, the Indian
sovereignty in the region was questioned by Beijing citing the Chinese rejection of the
McMahon line at the Shimla Convention. For India, the Indo-Tibetan and now Indo-
Chinese frontier is well demarked and the McMahon line remains the border between
India and China. Both the countries failed to resolve the disputes through dialogue in 1960
and fought a war in claiming sovereignty in this area. Whoever, after a short occupation,
Chinese solders decided to withdraw from this region and NEFA once again came under
the Indian authority. China still claims its sovereignty over whole of Arunachal Pradesh
and objects the visits of Indian Authorities into this area.

The Tibetan Uprising and the Emergence of Sino-Indian Border disputes

India China relations have been seriously damaged by the incident of militant
Tibetan uprising of 1959. The revolt once again brought the age-long issue of Chinese
sovereignty over Tibet into living. The uniqueness of the revolution was that it was mostly
driven by armed militants and carried out by the people against the Chinese authority,
while previous revolutions were mostly unarmed and state-sponsored.
The Chinese government has successfully brought back Tibet into Chinese
manifold by signing the "Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local
Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" with the Tibetan
government on May 23, 1951 (Lal 2008, p. 145). It kept India at bay while signing the
treaty, though Indian footprints were firmly visible in the Himalayan kingdom since the
British era. Later, it successfully convinced the Indian government on its sovereignty over
Tibet and got its stamp approval by signing the "Panchsheel Agreement" on 1954 which
clearly states 'Tibet' as the "Tibet region of China". While signing the treaty China
promised to maintain the status quo of the position of the Dalai Lama and the autonomy of
Tibet which was gradually curbed by the Chinese authority and tried to impose the
Chinese policies over Tibet. In protest, the anti-Chinese revolt erupted on March 10, 1959,
on the capital of Tibet Lhasa (Jian 2006). The People's Liberation Army used subsequent
forces to dismantle the revolution. Following the attack on Norbulingka, the summer
residence of Dalai Lama, especially after March 17, 1959, when China ordered its army to
crush the rebel and Tibetan authority Dalai Lama fled to India along with his mother,
brother and other 80,000 fellow Tibetans and reached India on March 31, 1959 (BBC,
March 31, 1959). There was a public pressure to grant political asylum to Dalai Lama and
India granted the same to Dalai Lama subsequently (Smith2010, p. 240).
After the voluntary surrendering of all its traditional tights in Tibet and accepting
Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, India hardly got interested to intervene in the so-called
"internal matters" of China and restricted its stand just as a spectator. On the other hand,
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Chinese authority was suspicious about India and was constantly alleging its involvement
in the Tibetan uprising (Raghavan2010, p.249). Chinese authority criticized India for
extending its asylum to Dalai Lama and the other Tibetans and alleged Indian backing in
the armed confrontation. However, India denied any involvement and made it clear that its
asylum to Tibetan spiritual leader was based on humanitarian ground. Clarifying Chinese
allegation on India's political interest and function of the government in exile of Tibet it
stated that "Government of India…... did not recognize any separate government of Tibet
and hence there is no question of Tibetan government under the Dalai Lama functioning in
India" (Sali, 1998, p.78). However this assurance and clarifications did not satisfy the
Chinese authority and premier Mao Zedong asked the People's Delay to criticize India. He
drafted the article where he termed India as "expansionist" and alleged that India "wants
ardently to grab Tibet" (Garver 2006, pp. 93-94).
The Chinese authority started criticizing India and accused of the violation of the
1951 Panchsheel agreement by granting asylum to Dalai Lama. They also accused India
of pressurizing and motivating Dalai Lama to leave Tibet. Clarifying the doubt over his
exile, Dalai Lama declared on April 18, 1959, that he had fled into India "of his own will
and not under duress". He also made it clear that "there was a strong desire for
independence on the part of the people of Tibet" and the seventeen point Agreement had
been concluded under the pressure from the Chinese government". He also showed his
gratitude towards the Indian government and the public for their generosity and support
towards the people of Tibet and charged China for the violation of the 1951 'Seventeen
Point Agreement' and gradual withdrawal of autonomous statues to Tibet (Deepak 2005,
p. 207). However, as earlier China claimed that the recent statement also was full of lies
and was prepared under duress (Deepak 2005, pp. 207-08). Defusing the charges, the
spiritual leader issued another statement on April 22, 1959, where he clarified that "I wish
to make it clear that the earlier statement issued by my authority and indicated my view
and I stand by it" (Deepak 2005, p. 210).

China's Charges of Indian Involvement in Tibetan Conflict

So far, the debate in India was merely a reaction to the Tibet conflict and the
sufferings of the Tibetan people due to the conflict. India did not come under any Chinese
criticism directly and China did not link India with the conflict. But, on March 28, 1959,
the Chinese government in its official communiqué termed the Tibetan uprising as the
conflict against imperialism and alleged its base at the Kalimpong, the Indian consulate.
By doing so, China indirectly alleged Indian involvement in the conflict. The
communiqué also criticized the conduct of debate on Tibetan uprising in the Indian
Parliament and termed the debate as to the attempt to interfere in China's internal matters.
(Jain 1060, p. 85) After three days on March 31, 1959, another similar propaganda article
was published in the state-run People's Daily where the Indian consulate at Kalimpong
was charged as the epicentre of Tibetan conflict.
Following the constant demand from various political parties to declare the
government of India's policy towards Dalai Lama and Tibetan uprising as well as to
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clarify Chinese spuriousness on India's interest, Nehru presented a detailed statement in

Indian Parliament on April 28, 1959. "I need not tell the house that Dalai Lama entered
India entirely of his own volition. At no time had we suggested that he should come to
India. We had naturally given thought to the possibility of his seeking asylum in India and
when such a request came, we readily granted it." He also asked the Panchan Lama and
other Chinese authorities including the Chinese ambassador to meet Dalai Lama and find
some solution for the Tibetan crisis. Following the article Communist Party of India on
May 12, 1959, issued a resolution on Nehru's statement over Tibet and alleged Nehru for
the violation of the principles of the Panchsheel Agreement.

The Emergence of Sino-Indian Border Disputes

The “Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai” spirit got a major setback during the late fifties of
the twentieth century due to the increasing skepticism between India and China over
Tibet. As a consequence of the Tibetan Crisis and India's political asylum to Dalai Lama,
China in many times took a strong stand on various unsettled issues, including border
disputes. While China had never raised the border issues during the 1954 agreement and
perhaps, as Nehru said had accepted the McMahon line as the de facto border between
India and China gradually denied to recognize the same after the Tibet crisis. First, it
issued the map showing some eastern sectors of India as Chinese territory and
subsequently raised its army's presence in these regions. India, on the other hand also
increased its patrolling activities to protect its border, though both India and China had
vowed for the peaceful settlement of the frontier line. At ground border forces of both, the
countries tried to maintain the perceived borderline according to their assumptions.
Hence, often they came front to front during the patrolling and accused each other as the
violator of the borderline. Sometimes the military activities led to the small intensity
armed clash between the forces like the incidents of Pangong, Migyitum, and Longju.
In an extension of its claim, Chinese forces intruded into the Indian Territory near
to Pangong Lake on July 28, 1959, and arrested six Indian policemen including an officer.
India soon reacted sharply to the border violation act and demanded the immediate release
of its policemen. However, China denied the allegation and accused Indian forces of their
incursion into Chinese territories.(White Paper I, 1959) A similar incident occurred near
Migyitun on August 25, 1959, where the Chinese forces attacked an Indian army post and
killed one Indian soldier and injured another three. On the very next day, what the
government of India believed, the Chinese force-marched further into the Indian Territory
and surround the small garrison of the Indian army at Longju on August 26, 1959. In
defence the Indian forces opened firing but did not sustain longer against the large Chinese
force. The Indian forces abandoned the barrack after heavy losses from the Chinese army.
(White Paper II 1959) The Chinese version, however, blamed the Indian troops for its
firing on Chinese troops after crossing the Chinese border. (Deepak 2005, pp. 216-18)
These incidents started a series of public uproar across India and the centre of the
Parliamentary debate.
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Looking at the intensity of differences, Nehru wrote a series of letters to Chinese

counterpart Zhou En-Lai citing various historical records, ancient maps, and provisions of
agreements to reclaim the Indian stand. After a silence of about six months, Chinese
premier En-Lai replied to Nehru's letter on September 8, 1959, where he raised several
arguments in justifying Chinese claim over the border regions of India. En-Lai in his letter
wrote that China was not a party to the treaty of 1842 and did not approve it later.
Therefore there was no question of recognizing the frontier line. He made it clear that the
Chinese government was not recognizing the McMahon and illegally occupied the
LongjuYaxierShatze, Khinzemane and Tamaden regions of China. He also blamed the
Indian forces for the Lonju incidents and argued that the deployment of a Chinese border
guard at the Indian border was just to threaten India, but to prevent the Tibetan gorillas
from inter into Tibet and make disturbances. (White Paper-II, 1959) The En-Lai letter to
Nehru for the first time made a formal claim of 90,000 square Kilometer of the Indian
Territory. Meanwhile similar border violation and subsequent clashes reported from the
Kongka pass of the Aksai Chin area, where 10 Indian soldiers were killed and few were
arrested by Chinese soldiers. However, the Chinese version claimed that it was the Indians
who passed into the Chinese side and attacked the Chinese picket subsequently and the
Chinese forces only retaliated to the attack.

Sino-Indian Dialogue on border issues

Amidst growing tensions in the border regions, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai wrote a
letter to Nehru proposing to maintain status quo on the border and to ensure tranquillity at
the border by withdrawing forces twenty kilometres away from both the sides of the
McMahon line in the east and Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the west. He also proposed
not to send a patrol party into the evacuated region to avoid any conflict, while
maintaining civil administrative personnel there. At last, he suggested a meeting between
the two Prime Ministers at a convenient venue to discuss and resolve the border issues.
(White Paper III, 1960, p. 46) Both the suggestions were accepted by Indian and a meeting
was fixed after through negations of the two sides to resolve the border issues. After
several diplomatic commutations, the meeting was fixed on April 19, 1960 in New
Delhi.Despite steep domestic pressure, Nehru decided to hold a meeting with Chinese
premier Zhou Enlai on April 19, 1960, in New Delhi. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai with a
huge Chinese delegation that included Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, Vice-Foreign Minister,
Zhang Hanfu and Assistant Foreign Minister Zhang Qiaogun visited New Delhi to discuss
and resolve the outstanding border conflict. Apart from Nehru, the Chinese Premier
discussed with various political leaders such as vice-President Radhakrishan, Defense
Minister Krishna Menon, Home Minister Pandit G.B. Pant separately. The talks went on
up to six days between Indian and Chinese delegation to find some interim solution that
was convenient to both the parties. After 20 hours of talks between Nehru and Zhou, no
such significant result came out, except the joint communiqué. The communiqué read
that, the officials of the two governments would meet from June to September
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alternatively at two capitals and examine, check and study all historical documents,
records, accounts, maps and other study materials relevant to the boundary question on
which each side relied in support of its stand, and draw up a report for submission to the
two governments". The two governments also agreed to take all possible and available
mechanisms to avoid the ongoing border clashes between the two armies. (Ministry of
External Affairs 1960, pp. 107-08) There is no doubt that the talks failed to resolve the
issue, as there were huge differences between Indian and Chinese viewpoints, besides a
lack of mutual trust.
Meanwhile, the report of the on-going Sino-Indian border talks was published on
February 14, 1961. As expected by most of the non-communist opposition parties, it failed
to resolve the outstanding disputes. Instead of one unanimously accepted report, the
whole bunch consisted of two different independent reports, each narrating the arguments
of one side, followed by a short three-page joint declaration. And the Indian version of the
report was contrasted with the Chinese version. The fundamental difference was
surrounded to the demarcation of the frontier line. While India argued that it had been
demarcated previously, China said, it had never been delimited earlier. China also refused
to discuss Sino-Bhutanese and Sino-Sikkim boundaries stating that they were beyond the
scope of the present discussion. On the other hand, India argued that it was treaty-bound to
protect Bhutan's boundary, hence it should be discussed in the on-going talks. Even the
short joint report lacked any concrete mechanism to settle the border, hence the talk could
be considered as a failed attempt. The Only thing both the parties gained out of the talks
was perhaps an attempt to understand each other's stand. (Ministry of External Affairs
1960, pp.1-11)

India's Forward Policy and Sino-Indian War

Despite all possible attempts to convince the Chinese leadership, China continued
to occupy a large chunk of the Indian Territory and refuse to withdraw its troops back. The
peaceful options such as talks and negotiation also failed to resolve the issue and there was
a report of Chinese military buildups along the borders. At this juncture, India opted to use
hard power to push back Chinese occupation from the occupied Indian territories,
assuming that China was unlikely to launch a major operation to counter the Indian move.
Popularly, known as India's "Forward Policy", the plan intended to deter further Chinese
aggression and reoccupy the lost territories that India assumed to fall within its territorial
jurisdiction. For the realization of the plan, the Indian government decided to create
additional forward posts and cover unreachable areas along the Chinese border. In
addition to this, the strength of the Indian posts was increased with the deployment of
additional forces and the soldiers were asked to drive out the Chinese incursion. (Prasad
2010 pp. 273-75; Raghavan 2010 pp. 273-75) Though the operation gained success
initially, it led to full-fledged war and cost heavy casualties subsequently due to improper
planning and lack of logistics. The Forward Policy also became a point of Justification for
China to lunch a massive attack against India that ended with a loss of a large chunk of
Indian Territory to China.
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By this time the Chinese authority began to object to India's forward posts and
military buildups along the border regions. They also issued protest notes and ultimatums
to India asking it to be prepared to face the consequences if it won't withdraw its troops
from the Chinese borders. Such kind of protest note, for the first time was received by
India on November 30, 1961. In this note, China suggested to call back Indian forward
posts and to maintain the earlier line. (White Paper VI 1962, pp.3-5 &15) Another similar
note was presented to India on March 1, 1962, accusing India of refusing to hold talks with
China while continue to march towards the Chinese territories. (White Paper VI 1962,
p.18)
While the heated argument was being exchanged and the situation of the frontiers
was intense, China proposed India to negotiate for a new agreement on trade and
intercourse (as popularly known as Panchsheel earlier) on December 3, 1961. On
December 15 government of India, in reply wrote a letter to the Chinese government
showing little interest mentioning the collapse of the previous agreement due to China's
unnecessary restrictions on Indian businessmen and pilgrims. (White Paper VI 1962,
p.18) A few consecutive notes were exchanged between India and China. After a long
exchange of notes, India, on April 11, 1962, informed that it had no objection to the
proposed negotiation for a new agreement, but China had to withdraw its troops from the
Indian soil. Hence in other words, it put the condition of vacation of occupied frontiers
before any negotiation, on which China never agreed. Hence the proposed negotiation
never happened and the old treaty of trade and intercourse lapsed on its due date of June 3,
1962.

China's All-out Invention

Looking at the intensified Chinese aggression and heavy military buildups, a high-
level meeting was organized on September 9, 1962, under the Presidentship of Defence
Minister, Krishna Menon. In the meeting, it was decided that the Chinese forces had to
push back from the Thang La Ridge immediately at any cost and by any means. (Prasad
1992. pp. 94-95) This decision was reflected in Prime Minister Nehru's statement. While
leaving for Sri Lanka on October 12, Nehru informed the press that he had ordered the
army to "clear Indian territory in the NEFA". (Orton, 2010, p. 50) The government of India
decided to raise new army crops, named IV Crop, under the Eastern Command on October
12, 1962, and General B.M. Kaul was appointed its Commander to evict the Chinese
occupation in NEFA. A Codenamed as "Operation Leghorn" an offensive military
operation, for the first time from the Indian side, was launched in Thang La Ridge and the
other regions of NEFA on October 10, 1962. (Kaul 1967, pp. 355-56) There was a general
assumption among the Indian leaderships that, China would not involve in large-scale
offence against India, which proved wrong later. Proving Indian calculation wrong, China
reacted to the Indian movement and attacked back the Indian troops on October 10, 1962.
After the Indian offensive attack and loss of 77 soldiers during the military clash, China
decided to punish India and lodged a massive attack in NEFA and Ladakh simultaneously
on October 20, 1962. (Deepak 2005, p. 250) With the large scale Chinese attack, an
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undeclared war between India and China started in the high Himalayas. The
overwhelming Chinese troops easily chased out Indian attackers and within 48 hours most
of the Indian posts fell down in Ladakh and NEFA. Following the catastrophic casualties,
Nehru, in a broadcast to the nation on October 22, 1962, appealed the people "to be united
in this great enterprise and put aside the controversies and arguments, and present a solid
united front before all those who see to endanger our freedom and integrity". (Ministry of
External Affairs 1963, pp. 1-20)
Following the Mao Zedong's “da da, tan tan(fight fight, talk talk)." strategy, China
offered three-point ceasefire proposal to India on October 24, 1962, stating that, the border
was a disputed issue and never been demarked hence, the present ceasefire line should be
maintained till permanent solution been achieved. (White Paper VIII 1962, p. 1)
However, on October 27, Nehru refused to accept the proposal that attempted to compel
India to follow the Chinese plan of boundary settlement by taking advantage of India's
weak position in the war. He replied to China that, India had no objection to any further
peaceful negotiation on border disputes, provided China would pull its army back to the
pre-September 8 line (White Paper VIII 1962, pp.4-5). Few consecutive notes were
exchanged between India and China but it failed to reach any conclusion. Following
India's refusal of the Chinese designed ceasefire proposal, China marched ahead deep into
the Indian Territory and continued its brutal attack on Indian defend lines. Looking at the
increased Chinese attack, a state of national emergency, for the first time in the history of
India was declared by the President of India, and the emergency session of the Parliament
was called on November 8 to discuss the grave situation of the country. Meanwhile, China
attacked the eastern sector and captured Tawang and Walong on November 16.
While the Chinese attack was at its peak during the late Novembers and Indian
posts were falling consecutively, China declared the unilateral ceasefire in the eastern,
western and middle sectors. It also declared to withdraw its troop twenty kilometre back
from the line of actual control that was maintained on November 7, 1959. The note further
asked the Indian government to re-establish the consultative activities and negotiation in
the future to discuss the delimitation of the ceasefire line and demilitarized zones.
(Appadorai 1982, pp. 676-77)

International mediation in dispute resolution and the Colombo Proposal

Though both India and China agreed to adhere to maintain the ceasefire, neither
side was able to fix the ceasefire line and demilitarization zone due to perceptional
differences. Meanwhile, some Afro-Asian countries came forward to facilitate the
ceasefire formula. With the prime initiative of the Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) Prime Minister,
Mrs. Bandaranaike, Six Afro-Asian Countries such as Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon (Sri
Lanka), Ghana, Indonesia and United Arab Republic (Egypt) met in Colombo between
December 10 to 12, 1962 to finalize a workable agreement between India and China to
resolve the border disputes. At the end of the conference, a suggestive document was
produced which prescribed a way out the formula for all the three disputed frontier
regions. In the western sector, the document suggested, China had to withdraw its troops
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20 kilometres from the ceasefire line as per the declaration, whereas, India could hold the
present ceasefire line and need not withdraw its troops anyway. After the Chinese
vacation, this 20-kilometre frontier region would be a demilitarized zone and would be
"administrated by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon, without prejudice to the
rights of the previous presence of both India and China in that area." In the Eastern Sector,
both the countries had maintained the "Line of actual control" as the de-facto border,
whereas, status quo had to be maintained in the middle sectors. A delegation led by Prime
Minister Bandaranaike visited India and China to convince the countries to accept the
Colombo proposal. India first did not accept the proposal and informed the Bandaranaike
delegation that, it could give its reply to the proposal only after his consultation with
Parliament.(Hoffmann 1990, pp. 226-28)

China's renounce of Colombo Proposal and the enduring hostility

On April 20, 1963, Zhou Enlai informed the government of India that, China
would not accept the added provisions (which included the clarification wanted by India)
of the Colombo Proposal as it was not part of the official report. India strongly objected to
China's decision and made it clear that there should not be half acceptance of the proposal
suggested by Colombo Powers. (White Paper IX, p. 10-20 ) Zhou's letter in rejecting the
Colombo proposal drove another huge anti-Chinese public opinion. While intimating the
Chinese decision to LokSabha on May 7, 1963, Nehru once again repeated that no further
negotiation was possible, if China would not accept the Colombo proposal in total.
(LokSabha Debates, 1963, Cols. 14195-96) While answering to the question on Chinese
border violation on August 16, 1963, Nehru acknowledged that China had set up twenty-
six civilian posts in the declared demilitarized zone. He also argued that China had
repeatedly violated India's air space boundaries and acuminating military presence in the
Tibet regions to maintain the tension alive in the border. He was afraid that China might
have a greater design just to maintain tension and might in a process to invade India once
again. But, he assured, India was fully prepared to handle the situation better than the past.

Chinese Nuclear Explosion and territorial reclamation of NEFA

Two years after the Sino-Indian border war, on October 16, 1964, China
conducted a nuclear test at the Lop Nor nuclear testing site in the Xinjiang province and
became the fifth nuclear power state on the planet. India, the forerunner of the nuclear
Disarmament programme, reacted strongly to the Chinese. The newly elected prime
minister approached the superpowers to guarantee security for India but failed to get a
positive response. (Abraham 1998, p. 125) With the nuclear weapons in hand, Chinese
leadership started threatening India over the unsettled frontier regions. Warning India,
Chinese Prime Minister, ZohuEnlai stated that China had never relinquished its
sovereignty over the 90000 square kilometres of territory south of McMahon line and
condemned India's demand of dismantling of Chinese civilian posts across the frontier
line. (The Hindustan Times, January 1, 1965)
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Sino-Indian Border Skirmishes in Recent Past

Though the border dispute between India and China dates back to decades, both
the countries have been engaged in several high intensive border skirmishes in the recent
past. Both the forces blame others for the border violation along the frontiers in the
western, eastern and middle sector. Though no large casualty was reported due to the
border skirmishes, both the forces engaged in several military standoffs along the Line of
Actual Control (LAC) and other hotspots in middle and eastern sectors amounting to
further escalation and war.
On the Line of Actual Control, for instance, China allegedly intruded into 19 km of
the borderline and established a camp at Raki Nula, 30 km south of Daulat Beg Oldi on 15
April 2013. The incursion included the air space violation by Chinese military helicopters
to drop supplies to the troops. However, Chinese officials denied any trespassing having
taken place. Soldiers from both countries briefly set up camps on the ill-defined frontier
facing each other, but the tension was defused when both sides pulled back soldiers in
early May resulting in a 21days long military standoff between the rivalry countries. (Lee
2013) Similarly, in September 2014 about 35 Chinese soldiers also reportedly entered into
Indian territory and set up a camp at 30R post of Chumar valley located 300 km northeast
of Ladakh. Confronted by the Indian Army, PLA refused to leave claiming the land as
theirs leading to another military standoff in Ladakh. After multiple rounds of flag
meetings between both the forces, China pulled back their army on the condition of some
dismantling of Indian military structures, ending to 16 days long standoff. (Pandit 2014)
In September 2015, Chinese and Indian troops faced off in the Burtse region of northern
Ladakh after Indian troops dismantled a disputed watchtower the Chinese were building
close to the mutually agreed to patrol line. (Indian Express, September 13, 2015)
Similarly, the border village of Demchok in Leh district had been the center of
conflict between India and China for decades. Troops of both countries engage in two
military standoffs in September 2014 and in November 2016 for the construction of
irrigation canals in the village. On both occasions, the tensions were dismantled after the
termination of construction work and the mutual withdrawal of troops from the region.
(Singh 2016) Above all, the Doklamcrisis, which occurred at the border tri-junction
between India, chin, and Bhutan was one of the low points of India-China relationships.
Indian efforts to maintain statuesque by preventing Chinese forces to build a strategic road
in the disputed region led a long military standoff between Indian and Chinese forces. The
repeated Chinese warning, subsequent live-fire drills in Tibet and wider media coverage
make the situation worse leaving narrow scope for consensus building and negotiation.
The standoff continued for 72 both the parties withdrawn their troops from the disputed
land and the statuesque have maintained once again.
The Eastern Sector along the McMahan Line also remains hostile since the Sino-
India war. China's claim over Arunachal Pradesh in general and Tawang, in particular, led
to several small scale border skirmishes in the region. Among all border clashes, the 1987
border skirmishes are prominent, where both the countries came close to another hot war
at Sumdorong Chu Valley. Solders of both the countries had engaged several border
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clashes at various spots of the valley including, Namka Chu, Kya Pho, Yangtse,
Khizemane, Asaphila, Longju, Tuting, and Fish Tail. However, both the countries
maintain restraint and defused the tension after negotiations. In the recent past, several
border violations by Chinese forces were reported and Chinese officials have been critical
of Indian policies in the region.

India's China Policy Since the Border War

The dynamic relationship India and China remain tizzy after the 1962 border war
and both the neighbours remain estranged for years before their rapprochement in the
1980s. With the collapse of the great wall of Sino-Indian hostility at the end of the Sikkim
crisis, both India and China decided to move ahead to develop a normal relationship.
(Deepak 2005, pp. 298-99) The process of Sino-Indian détente was started getting
momentum after the non-intervention of China in the Sikkim crisis and the goodwill visit
of the Chinese Table Tennis team along with the Chinese Vice-Minister Wang Bingnan.
Chinese leaderships showed her interest to re-establish the normal diplomatic
relationship with India. On the other hand, Foreign minister Chavan declared to send K.R.
Narayan as the Indian ambassador to China. Subsequently, Chen Zhayuan was sent as the
Chinese ambassador to India in September 1976 and the two Asian giants once again re-
established their ambassador level diplomatic relations after 15 years. Following the
invitation of Wang Bingnan, foreign minister Vajpayee visited Beijing on February 12,
1979, and called for greater Sino-Indian engagement. (Jain 2010, p. 229) Following
Vajpayee's visit, the Chinese vice premier and foreign minister Huang Hua paid his return
trip to India on June 25, 1981. It was the first visit by any Chinese foreign minister
ever.(Beijing Review, July 13, 1891) During the visit of Huang, both the countries agreed
to resume talks to resolve the long-pending border problems. There were altogether eight
similar talks held between December 1981 and November 1987. Though the talk failed to
resolve the outstanding issue due to subsequent rejection of each other's proposal, it
opened up several new doors for both the governments to understand each other's
concerns. (Lal 2008, p. 24; Vang, 2008, p. 174) Subsequently, India and China granted the
status of Most Favoured Nation (MNF) to each other on 15 August 1984. Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi paid his historic visit to China on December 19, 1988, and Chinese Prime
Minister Li Peng visited India in December 1991followed by Narshimarao's China visit in
December 1993. (Ranganathan 1998, pp. 443-45) From 1976 to 1997 several high-level
visits and diplomatic exchanges occurred, which further strung the age-old relation
between India and China and put the relationship on track.
The Joint Working Group (JWG) on border disputes that were set up by the mutual
agreement during Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's China visit, became an effective tool in
the subsequent years to reduce tension at the border and promoting peace and tranquillity
at the border. The specialist group went through ten rounds of intensive negations from
1989 to 1997in New Delhi and Beijing alternatively. As a result, in the eighth round of
meeting in August 1995, both the countries agreed to withdraw their troops back from the
Sumdorung Chu Valley to end the nine yearlong military standups. To avoid such kind of
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standups in the future, both India and China decided to set up a meeting point for military
officers at the Nathu La. More importantly, the 'pockets of disputes' were identified and it
was decided to take utmost care to avoid any armed confrontation while patrolling. The
subsequent meetings also helped to adapt the policy to boost the Confidence Building
Measures (CBM) between both the armed forces and other normalization initiatives to
deescalate the tensions. (Deepak 2005, pp. 349-350) To strengthen the bilateral ties
further, Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid an official visit to India in 1996 and signed the
CBM agreement with India. (Deepak 2005, pp. 151-53)
China also denied the allegation of the transfer of Chinese nuclear weapon
technology or M-II missiles to Pakistan and clarified that it would not sell any of its
advanced nuclear technologies to any of its neighbours. (Perkovich, 1999 p. 387) On the
Kashmir disputes, China ruled out any third party mediation and stated that India and
Pakistan had to resolve the issue bilaterally. That means, as Perkovich believed, Kashmir
for China is no longer an international problem, rather a bilateral dispute between India
and Pakistan now. (Perkovich, 1999 p. 387) During the Kargil war, China took a neutral
stand despite Islamabad's appeal to world communities and its all-weather for support.
'Without slightest partiality to any side' Chinese leadership suggested Pakistan resolve the
issue peacefully. (Deepak 2005 pp. 386-87) For Swaran Singh, China's decision to
maintain complete neutrality was the result of its changing role in the post-soviet world
order, but for India, it was the fruit of the yearlong normalization process. (Singh 1999 pp.
1083-94)

Cooperation and Competition

With the beginning of the 21st century, the India-China relationship has entered
into a new phase of cooperation and competition. After a short episode of disturbance
following the Pokhran-II Nuclear explosion, the Kargil war and the Karmapa incident, the
roller-coaster relationship between India and China started improving after the visit of
Indian President K.R. Narayanan to China. India's timely negotiation regarding these
issues did not let the thing go wrong. China also realized the importance of friendship with
India to attain its global stature and maintained a constructive dialogue with Indian
leadership to resolve the outstanding issues. In addition to this, the growing
interdependency and trade relations also played a significant role to promote Sino-Indian
cooperation. As a result, several agreements have been signed between the two countries
to improve the state of the relationship, trade, and commerce. New Delhi and Beijing also
decided to extend their area of cooperation in other non-explored areas including the
energy section. However, this honeymoon lasts apparently for a short period. Due to the
rapid global transformation and emergence of new economic world order, both the
countries found themselves just as oppose to each other in many areas and knowingly or
unknowingly, they indulged in the zone of competition soon. In this background, the
present chapter discusses the course of India-China relations in the twenty-first century
and the outstanding issues of this defining relationship.
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The terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan based terror organization
on December 13, 2001 and subsequent India–Pakistan military stand-up put China in a
difficult situation (Swamy 2011 pp. 23-26). For India, it was the time to measure the
Chinese attitude vis-à-vis the growing Sino-Indian cooperation. However, China
condemned the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament and perhaps, for the first time
acknowledged that it was also a victim of terrorism in Xinjiang. (The Renmin Ribao,
November 14, 2001) Like the Kargil crisis, this time also China maintained equal distance
from the crisis and asked both the countries to uphold calm in the border. Answering to a
question during his official visit to India, Chairman Li Peng stated that, like India, China
views international terrorism as a big threat to its national security and offers China's
cooperation to tackle the menace of international terrorism. (The Hindu, January 14,
2001) This was a new development in India-China relations, as China was a little hesitant
to support India in its war on terrorism. Similarly, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongli during his
visit to New Delhi also condemned the Parliament attack and assured China's full
cooperation to combat terrorism. Even, both the countries agreed to establish an anti-
terrorist dialogue mechanism to reduce the menace of terrorism in the region. (Cherian
2002). However, the state-run China Institute of Contemporary International Relations
stated the terror attack on the Indian Parliament was inside job and was carried out by the
Indian outfits. Similarly, the state-run Institute of Strategic Studies warned that, if the war
broke out China would support Pakistan. (Gupta 2014, pp 383) Besides, China was the
only country that opposed to the blacklisting of Pakistan linked terrorist originations
(Markey 2013, p. 183).

Widening Differences and the Beginning of India China Great Game

The roller- coaster relation between India and China was gradually growing
upwards since the official visit of the Indian president K.R. Narayanan. Since then, many
high-level visits were conducted from both sides' subsequently including the state visit of
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongli and Wen Jiabao as well as the visit of Indian Prime Minister
Vajpayee to China in 2003. Meanwhile, for the first time, the total bilateral trade between
New Delhi and Beijing crossed the US $ 10 billion marks in April 2005 (Ministry of
External Affairs). However, the Sino-Indian honeymoon did not last long. The growing
relationship took a new turn when India decided to oppose China's inclusion into the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as an observer. Clarifying
its position Indian External Affairs Ministry stated that, "India's position is that China's
request along with others can be considered once the criteria and modalities for such
association have been worked out." (Bhattacharya, 2005) Moreover, for India, China's
entry into the SAARC, which is mostly dominated by India, would curtail its influence.
(Gupta, 2014, pp. 383-85) However, with the help of its alliance partner Pakistan and the
backing of Nepal and Bangladesh, China managed to get the observer status. India, on the
other hand, agreed to the Chinese bid when other SAARC members agreed to grant
observer status to Japan. Furthermore, China had been blocking the Russian proposal to
grant observer status to India in Shanghais Cooperation Organization (SCO). Beijing
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proposed the name of Pakistan as an observer and only allowed India when Russia agreed
to allow Pakistan into the SCO. Similarly, China also opposed the inclusion of India into
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a full dialogue partner. For many, this was the
beginning of a "New Great Game" and the Sini- competition (Nadkarni 2010, p.188;
Hauser &Kemic 2009 p.116; Sánchez-Cacicedo 2014, pp.169-70).
Similarly, the Sino-Indian competition is quite visible in the energy sector despite
the existence of the bilateral energy cooperation agreement (Jiali 2010). The competition
between the two Asian giants was quite visible when China decided to challenge the Indian
bid for the exploration of natural gas in Myanmar and use its political contacts to outplay the
Indian bid (Zhao 2012, pp.119-131). Apart from this, both the states were competing with
each other in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia in energy exploration (Bajpaee
2005). Similarly, the Chinese refusal to issue a visa for the people of Arunachal Pradesh and
subsequent issue of stapled visa to the Kashmiris has been one of the major bones of
contention between Indian and China for a long time (The Indian Express, 2007; Luttwak,
2012, pp.78-79).

Conclusion
The relationship between India and China during the first decade of the 21st
century witnessed several ups and downs. The Indian president visited China to ease the
tension that erupted following India's nuclear detonation and the Karmapa incident. Since
then, both the countries have taken several measures to improve their relationship and
several high-level visits have exchanged. Few important agreements also have been
signed between New Delhi and Beijing to facilitate the growing bilateral trade, including
the agreement to open the Nathu La pass. The India-China cooperation also reached a new
high when both the countries decided to go for joint bidding and to co-operate with each
other in international oil exploration. However, the promises deemed low as the two
countries slowly entered into competition in many areas.
During this period the attitude of the Indian Parliament towards India's China
policy was mostly cooperative as well as cautious. While most of the constructive
initiatives, such as the improvement of relationship and promotion of trade between India
and China were appreciated by the members of the Parliament. But the matter that affects
India's national interest, including the Sino-Pakistan Nuclear cooperation and the visa
issues with China, has been opposed by Parliament as a whole. The Indian Parliament, at
large has been encouraging greater Sino-Indian trade and economic engagement and also
encouraged the opening of the Nathu La to pass for border trade. However, there was a
little hesitation among the members of the Parliament about the attitude of China towards
India and the growing gap between the volume of importing and exporting in the bilateral
trade with China. There was overall consensus among all sections of the Parliament for
greater relation with China and no political party, whether the ruling party or opposition
has opposed to improving relations with China.

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