Dennis ChapterOne

C H A P TE R o n e
“Validity Crisis” in Qualitative Research

Still? Movement Toward a Unified Approach
B a r ba r a Dennis (for mer ly Kor t h)
F or a while now, academics have produced a cacophony of validity concepts and anti-validity
rhetoric that can be stultifying, confusing, frustrating, infuriating, even (for some) silenc-
ing. Dialogue on the topic of validity reaches a fever pitch in journal articles and conference
presentations where the choice of words indicates the magnitude with which communities of
researchers are both laying stake to their own conceptions of truth and validity and where they
are simultaneously wrestling with the uncertainty/promise of understanding one another’s re-
search (Schwandt, 1996; Alexander, 1990). Despite this noise, chapters on qualitative research
in educational research texts (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005) and research reports themselves
(Aguinaldo, 2004) give relatively little attention to validity — the issues seem almost too com-
plicated and too divisive to deal with so people tend to write for an audience that already agrees
with them in terms of validity (Polkinghorne, 2007). The traditional definition of validity for
qualitative research involved the degree to which the researcher’s account of the phenomena
matched the participants’ reality (Eisner & Peshkin, 2000), but this definition is now totally
up for grabs (Rolfe, 2006). Polkinghorne (2007) says that validity is not even properly thought
of as a definitional concept and should instead be thought of as a “prototype” concept.
There are moments in the history of doing quantitative social science where validity de-
bates were prominent and where progress was made in clarifying what manner of validity
questions arise in the context of doing quantitative inquiry (for examples, see Campbell, 1957;
Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Cronbach, 1971; Messick, 1989; Kane, 1992; Shepard, 1997).
The debates among quantitative researchers are not as widely scattered as those we find going
on among qualitative methodologists, but they do, nonetheless, address some similar defini-
tional and practical complexities (Wolming & Wikström, 2010). According to Wolming and
Wikström (2010), the fervent debate among statisticians that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s
4 | Section One: Philosophical Explorations
has come to a recent standstill, with no progress in terms of the debated issues being resolved
or more deeply understood (Winter, 2000). Moreover, the validity debates among statisticians
have not explicitly called into question the very nature of doing social science inquiry, though
there have been significant shifts in validity conceptions. For example, Cronbach (1971) and
Messick (1989) invited a shift from talking about the validity of instruments to talking about
the validity of interpretations with respect to research that uses tests for data gathering. For
qualitative researchers, the “conversation” on validity is a conversation about the nature of
understanding, the status of truth, the possibility of justification and rational deliberation,
and the purpose of inquiry. In quantitative social science, these sorts of validity concerns lurk
behind the definitional reification that has been achieved. The reification has resulted in these
basic concerns only surfacing periodically and even then without much of a splash (despite
work like Kane, 1992). Efforts among quantitative methodologists to address these more basic
questions concerning validity have been largely ignored in practice (Wolming & Wikström,
2010). Despite some theoretical advances toward the development of a more unifying concept
of validity (Messick, 1989), the reified notions of construct, content, and criterion validity are
still primarily treated as types of validity dependent upon the idea that it is a test that is vali-
dated, not a score or an interpretation.
The status of validity conceptualization for qualitative inquiry is contrastingly problem-
atic. The contemporary qualitative research literature poses such a plethora of concepts, ideas,
arguments, and approaches to validity that making sense of the literature and weighing into
the varied discussions are difficult at best (Seale, 1999; Smith and Deemer, 2000; Lewis &
Ritchie, 2003) and contribute to the “crisis in validity” in qualitative research (Gergen &
Gergen, 2000; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, 2000; Lincoln & Denzin, 2000).
While the proliferation of ideas might be inspiring, creative, and insightful, there seems
to me a need for bringing the conversations together. The risk is that in the bringing together
we lose ideas, we close off conversations, and we end up subjugating some ideas to other ideas
for reasons that might not be shared. Another possibility, in light of what we have witnessed
among quantitative inquiry practices, is that we end up reifying constructs to such an extent
that their intractability produces a paralysis in theory and practice. There is synergy between
the lack of judgment over which validity concepts/constructs might be more or less valid and
the way the contemporary proliferation continues to churn out new ideas without taking
positions capable of settling the question of validity and of validity constructs themselves.
For some researchers (Richardson, 1994, 1997; Schwandt, 2000; Lincoln & Guba, 2000;
Bochner, 2000; Denzin, 2008) this unwieldy proliferation would be counted as a strength of
the literature, but it seems to me that the contemporary conversation is stunted because we are
not actually relating these disparate and varied ideas with one another in ways that would lead
us to more deeply understand validity (and I am not alone in this view, see also Tracy, 2010;
Polkinghorne, 2007; Carspecken, 2003; for examples). We have a flat development and array
of ideas that are not gaining in the sort of complexity that many of us envision (Donmoyer,
1996). The validity conversation is, practically speaking, difficult to jump into, maintain, and
develop in its current state and this is a problem with ramifications for methodological prac-
tices and theory (Tracy, 2010; Creswell & Miller, 2000; Scheurich, 1997).
Typically, the issue of validity is approached by applying one’s own community’s protocols about what, in
its view, is acceptable evidence and appropriate analysis to the other community’s research. In these cases,
“Validity Crisis” in Qualitative Research | Dennis | 5
the usual conclusion is that the other community’s research is lacking in support for its knowledge claims.
I think this cross-community approach is unproductive and leads to a dead end because each community
is making different kinds of knowledge claims. (Polkinghorne, 2007, p. 475)
A number of attempts at managing the various validity concepts and practices have been
developed (see Maxwell, 1992, 1996; Hammersley, 1992; Winter, 2000; Tracy, 2010) as well as
attempts to start anew (see Lather, 1993). These efforts suggest some impetus toward bringing
diverse sets of validity ideas and concerns into a common dialogue. Most approaches to doing
this start with research practice and definitional criteria that was established through research
practice. My approach will be different because I will use ordinary life conceptions of validity
as the basis for talking about validity in research (I am directly following Habermas, 1984, and
Carspecken, 1996, 2003). The trajectory of this chapter points toward a unifying concept of
validity that ought to be relevant for quantitative and qualitative methodology (though the
focus here will be on its relevance for qualitative methodological theory and practice). My
proposal should be challenged and queried, for in the end, that is what validity is based on.
To begin with, I will briefly describe the contemporary state of affairs regarding the validity
discourse among qualitative researchers. Then, I will introduce the problems and possibilities
of moving toward a unified approach to validity. I establish the basis for a unified concept of
validity in our ordinary concepts of validity, then, I demonstrate how this ordinary description
of validity is applicable to social science (Habermas, 1984, 1987; Carspecken, 2003; Korth,
2005). These two sections lead to a situated articulation of what this unified concept might
look like. This approach to validity is not new with me (see, most particularly, Habermas and
Carspecken as cited above), but I am hoping that this detailed examination and explanation
will seal its relevancy for the validity crisis and increase its understanding among researchers.
State of Affairs: Cacaphony

Lewis (2009) reviewed validity conceptions according to philosophical eras in an effort to ar-
rive at what validity might look like in this fifth (post-modernist) moment (Denzin & Lincoln,
1994) of conducting qualitative inquiry. His trajectory demonstrates the increasing complex-
ity, divergence, and discontent riddling the scholarship. He suggests that there is unified agree-
ment about the nature and status of validity and reliability for both quantitatively and qualita-
tively conducted inquiries among positivists and post-positivists, but that constructivists were
not content with these constructs and their definitional baggage. Soon new words replaced old
ones. Transferability as a kind of generalizability was the more advanced concept meant to sup-
plant constructs oriented toward external validity. Words like “dependability,” “consistency,”
and “accuracy” were, taken all together, a better fit for qualitative research than the quantita-
tive rendition of reliability. Credibility and truthfulness were more acceptable ways of talking
about internal validity for qualitative research. And, confirmability replaced objectivity. By the
mid-80s:
[r]esearch was being dispersed in various interpretive forms, with no consensus between the different
paradigms within qualitative research (posistivists, postpositivists, naturalists, constructivists, and the
orientationalist inquirists) and the internal paradigms of the crisis of representation period (feminists,
culturalists, Marxists, etc.) about the standard for reliability and validity. (Lewis, 2009, p. 6)
And so the proliferation goes.

Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005) identified 50 “components of validity or legitimation”
in use by qualitative educational researchers. Fifty? Fifty! And since their publication, several
more have popped up. One benefit of such a rich conceptual state of affairs is the extent to
which the terms provide both the grounds and the substance for dialogue. Schwandt (2000)
cogently argued that labeling complicated theoretical and practical ideas as this or that “is
dangerous, for it blinds us to enduring issues, shared concerns, and points of tension that cut
across the landscape of the movement, issues that each inquirer must come to terms with in de-
veloping an identity as a social inquirer” (p. 205) and, indeed, perhaps this has been evidenced
in the discourse on validity in quantitative approaches with the tendency to remain tethered
to construct, content, and criterion validity. However, failing to bring in some coherency and
conciseness across the divergent ways of thinking about validity makes it difficult to figure out
how to go about conducting valid qualitative research (Tracy, 2010; Lewis, 2009; Creswell &
Miller, 2000). Does one just pick the validity concepts that seem most helpful? How does one
determine the extent to which one’s inquiry is valid? These are the sorts of questions that Tracy
(2010) says cause problems for students of qualitative inquiry. It’s no wonder that there are
researchers (for examples, Lather 1993; Richardson, 1994, 1997) that purposively strike off on
an altogether “transgressive” path (Lather, 1993; Rolfe, 2006).
The cacophony is marked by different approaches that have different sorts of goals. Moving
on from the proliferation of constructs, each with their important nuance, I provide a sample
of the variety of approaches scholars have taken to deal with validity in qualitative inquiry.
I do this in order to demonstrate the breadth and unwieldy nature of the discourse, but the
sampling is by no means exhaustive and at best can be thought of as illustrative. I analyzed the
literature and have organized it according to various ways validity seems to be conceptualized.
Doing this helps to highlight the differing ways that a unified approach might be developed.
The review is a simplified rendition of a complicated set of dialogues. Much more emphasis is
placed on the proposal that follows than on the breadth of existing literature.
Organizing/Categorizing Validity According to

Research Design or Paradigm
Creswell and Miller (2000)1 argued that the validity criteria to which researchers might hold
themselves accountable are dependent upon two attributes of their research; namely, the par-
ticular methodological design and the paradigmatic assumptions invoked by the researcher.
Thus, Creswell and Miller’s approach to validity has been to organize the range of options in
the field according to research design or paradigm, locating specific constructs and methods
appropriate for different methodologies with their varying paradigmatic assumptions. This ap-
proach is well cited and seems particularly useful for novice qualitative researchers. It is nonof-
fensive and inclusive in the sense that Creswell and Miller refrain from judging the validity of
the different designs and paradigms with their concommitment criteria for validity. It serves as
a basic description of a simplified set of paradigms and designs.
Design-Specific Criteria
A substantial number of scholars discuss validity concepts from within one particular design or
approach. This seems like a spin-off of the tact Creswell and Miller (2000) have taken. Whereas
Creswell and Miller (2000) survey across approaches, scholarship in this design-specific group
focus in one particular theoretical attitude and/or design and address validity as a coherent
byproduct of that attitude/design.2 There are many examples of this, such as addressing validity
as it applies to a grounded theory study (for instance, Elliott & Lazenblatt, 2005) or narrative
study (Polkinghorne, 2007). Sikes and Gale (2006) created a web-based module for learning
about narrative inquiry. In that particular module, there is a section on how one might go
about evaluating narrative research. Drawing heavily on Richardson’s (2000) work, Sikes and
Gale propose tentative criteria for evaluating creative, transgressive and nontraditional forms
of research such as we find in narrative inquiry. They are hoping to inspire conversations about
criteria, acknowledging that validity propositions should be open to criticism. It is informative
to look at the substance of the criteria to see what it is they envision as validity standards. They
propose that good research: (1) makes a “substantive contribution” to the “understanding of
a social and cultural life”; (2) has “aesthetic merit” noticeable through the way it “opens our
senses”; (3) addresses the complexities of representation through reflexive and participatory
engagement; (4) has a potential impact for its participants; and (5) what they refer to as “expe-
rience-near” accounts — accounts that are fair to the participants (Sikes & Gale, 2006). Sikes
and Gale also provided a few techniques for addressing these validity criteria. While Sikes and
Gale recognize the risks involved in laying out such criteria, for our purposes, the paper serves
as an example of how validity criteria are generated within the context of a specific design or
approach linking the criteria as closely to the design characteristics and theoretical principles
that are the foundation of the design/approach.
Identifying Validity in Terms of Specific Threats

One way of thinking about validity has involved conceptualizing what threats might accrue
both in the general sense, as related to the design, and in the specific sense, as related to the
specific implementation/conduct of a research project. Maxwell (1992)3, in an effort to cre-
ate a dialogue, wrote an article on the topic of validity in qualitative research. He articulated
five domains through which validity can be queried in qualitative research. Those five do-
mains include descriptive validity, which involves the extent to which one’s descriptions of
an objective nature are accurate; interpretational validity, which involves the extent to which
one’s interpretations articulate the range of plausible, possible interpretations the participants
themselves might understand through their interactions with one another; theoretical valid-
ity, which involves articulating how well a theoretical explanation fits the data it is meant to
explain; evaluative validity, which involves the extent to which an evaluative framework can
be appropriately applied to making sense of the data; and lastly two forms of generalizability.
Internal generalizability refers to the extent to which particular inferences can be generalized
to the group of participants involved in the study and their particular modes of understanding.
External generalizability refers to the extent to which particular inferences can be generalized
beyond the group, setting, and particular context within which the inferences were derived.
Organizing Validity According to Research Purpose

In a manner that is similar to organizing validity according to research design or paradigm,
Cho and Trent (2006) identified two main types of research genres according to their purposes
(transactional and transformational). Then, they identified validity approaches appropriate to
the underlying assumptions of the two main purposes. Their work stands as a criticism of the
approaches that are design specific because they think too much is made of design differences
when, instead, the purposes of research are a better way to identify underlying paradigmatic
assumptions that would be relevant to matching up with validity tools. Cho and Trent extend
Donmoyer’s (2001) organization of qualitative research to identify relevant “uses” of validity
techniques according to each of the five purposes Donmoyer (2001) identified. For example,
Cho and Trent identified the main use of validity for research oriented through “truth-seeking”
purposes was to establish the correct answer (Cho & Trent, 2006, p. 326). The specific validity
techniques, it is argued, do not ensure the study is valid, but can be engaged holistically —
that is, across the entire research process — to address the kind of validity that is useful for the
particular purposes of the inquiry.
Counter-validity, Transvalidity, and Transgressive Constructs

Lather (2007) writes of transgressive validity.
The following [approach to validity] is a dispersion, circulation, and proliferation of counter-practices of

authority that take the crisis of representation into account. In creating a nomadic and dispersed valid-
ity, I employ a strategy of excess and categorical scandal in the hope of both imploding ideas of policing
social science and working against the inscription of “another regime of truth.” (Lather, 2007, p. 120).
Lather’s work aims to be an antithesis of modern validity strangleholds. In 1993, Lather

presented the idea of catalytic validity, which asks researchers to consider how the findings of
the research and/or the research process itself contribute to transforming both the community
and the researchers who were involved in the study. Catalytic validity is transgressive in two
fundamental ways. First, it speaks of a different kind of relationship between researchers and
participants. Second, it suggests that the primary meaning of a research endeavor is its trans-
formative potential and worthwhileness. This second point is transgressive in a summative way.
That is, it suggests that data collection and analysis are not the focal junctures through which
research ought to be assessed as valid.4 Lather and Smithies heart-rendering poststructuralist
account of women living with HIV/AIDS is a stunning, bold, unnerving example of how this
transgressive and catalytic validity is enacted.
The Problems and Possibilities of a Holistic Approach to Validity:

Unifying Without Simplifying?
Campbell and Stanley’s (1963) influential scholarship identifying threats to internal and ex-
ternal validity has been importantly consequential in conceptualizing and making practical
validity concerns for experimental and quasi-experimental quantitative designs, although it left
these concerns less articulated with respect to correlational or descriptive quantitative studies.
The debate between Cronbach and his colleagues Cook and Campbell has been revisited for
experimental and quasi-experimental designs, but these debates have not been extended or
examined with respect to nonexperimental designs (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). In an
educational age in the U.S. that re-emphasizes randomized control trials as the gold standard
of educational research, perhaps this revisitation makes sense despite the limitation it reflects
in terms of inquiry as a social scientific field (Denzin & Giardina, 2008).
Messick, 1989 (as not the only, but perhaps the most widely cited scholar), encouraged a
unitary concept of validity, meant to locate validity concerns variously related to constructs,
criterion-related issues, content, and social consequences in one conceptual apparatus or sys-
tem. Messick’s unitary system of validity was also a more expansive notion, unifying and adding
to the prominent notions of validity to which researchers using quantitative methods were be-
ing held accountable. Other scholars argued that the best way to unify the concepts of validity
would be to focus and simplify what was being conceptualized as validity. This would not force
researchers to discount important concerns for how research was applied, but the definitional
simplification would result in these kinds of concerns not being treated as a matter of validity
(Popham, 1997; Mehrens, 1997). It should be noted that there has been difficulty translating
these theoretical ideas of a unitary validity into practice (Wolming & Wikström, 2010).
Given that there has been limited progress toward unifying constructs of validity for quan-
titative inquiry, and we can see that the conversation on validity among qualitative research-
ers is far from unified, what sort of progress is possible for unifying across quantitative and
qualitative methods? One approach to unification basically held that concepts and standards
of validity as they had been worked out by quantitative researchers should be thought of as
universal to research, in general, and thus applicable to qualitative research directly. To be sure,
the work of qualitative research was blatantly misunderstood and misread when the traditional
quantitative ways of reading research were simply applied to the practices of qualitative inquiry
(Aguinaldo, 2004; Lewis, 2009; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Qualitative researchers were asked
to verify and justify their research methods and findings through questions that did not seem
either applicable or appropriate (Aguinaldo, 2004). For example, if the findings of an ethnog-
raphy of a school were presented, the ethnographer might have been asked: “But how do you
know whether or not your findings will generalize to other schools?” as the main validity issue
to which the research should be accountable. If this question was not answered in a way that
might be similar to the answer a statistician might provide in describing how her research was
generalizable from a sample to a population, the qualitative findings would likely be discount-
ed as invalid or irrelevant despite the fact that ethnography was usually conducted for reasons
unrelated to this kind of generalizing.
It will come as no surprise to social scientists that there has been little effort to apply
concepts and standards of validity developed among qualitative researchers to quantitative
approaches. If the approach to unifying validity concepts merely involved subsuming the ex-
pectations of qualitative inquiry to those of quantitative inquiry on the technical level or vice
versa, an oversimplification and misunderstanding would ensue. This is one important impetus
behind Lather’s (1993) efforts to problematize the historical taken-for-grantedness of validity
in social science.
One is left to wonder what other possibilities there might be for developing a more uni-
fied validity theory. Rolfe (2006) argues that any attempt to bring together approaches to
validity across the various qualitative methodological traditions will prove futile. But perhaps
the proliferation of validity concepts among qualitative researchers opens up new possibilities
for exploring unified concepts of validity precisely because traditional knowledge about valid-
ity, in this context, cannot be taken for granted (Tracy, 2010). Moreover, it is inevitable that
researchers involved in the simultaneous use of both qualitative and quantitative approaches
to inquiry will have to confront the tensions across the different terms and concepts through
which validity is addressed and this could contribute to a more unified approach to social
science validity. There are some efforts toward this end already at work (see Shaffer & Serlin,
2004; Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006; Mertens, 2007).
Among qualitative researchers, I am not the first to suggest movement toward inclusive,
unifying validity conceptions. I will begin this section of the chapter by introducing the work
of a few scholars whose exemplary efforts at organizing and unifying validity conceptions with
respect to qualitative inquiry contribute to the dialogue.
Sarah Tracy
Tracy (2010) drew on her experience as a teacher of qualitative research to propose a twofold
schematic for thinking about validity. Her idea can be considered a conceptual advance of ap-
proaches that categorize the various ways of thinking about validity across the field of qualita-
tive inquiry. Tracy equates “validity” with “good” in so far as the characteristics she identifies
are said to describe good research, and then she assumes that what is meant by “good” is that
the research is valid. She suggested that there are eight common markers of goodness (p. 139)
that can be examined through a variety of practices (techniques, crafts) that address particu-
lar elements specific to each of the common markers. She takes a “big-tent” approach, hav-
ing reviewed the literature and synthesized it to locate these eight common markers of good
qualitative research. She contends that these markers are prevalent regardless of which specific
theoretical or design approach one employs. Their particular manifestations may vary. That is,
the way the eight markers might actually be put into practice given particular methodological
decisions and proclivities will vary. The proposal is a holistic, integrated one. The basis of it is
this set of markers assumed to be commonly applicable and that were derived via a review of
the validity literature. Given each of those markers, there would be a variety of possible ways to
address the common concerns that one might select contingent on one’s philosophical orienta-
tion. In this way, the markers transcend orientation. Tracy skillfully knits together many of the
various constructs of validity within her scheme.
Here is the basic skeleton of a schematic depicting her approach (it’s not entirely filled in
for want of space):
Self-reflexivity
Transparency
Sincerity
Worthy Rich Mindfulness of
Topic Rigor Participants
Credibility
Significant
Contribution
Ethical
Resonanc
e
Meaningful
Coherence
Now let’s focus on just the common marker of “Sincerity” to see how Tracy is developing
this twofold idea. You can see that for the marker there are qualities that would be involved
in the extent to which one would be judged “sincere” through one’s research, and there are
specific things to do to increase the extent of one’s sincerity. The flexibility so noteworthy and
appreciative in qualitative research is respected on the level of how one goes about addressing
the common markers.
• Assessing biases introspectively

• Include self‐re'lexivity in 'ield
Self‐ notes
Re'lexivity • Self as instrument
• Get feedback from participants
Transparency • Auditing (show methodological

about the details)
methods and • Disclosing challenges
challenges • Giving credit where it is due
• Consider the needs of the

participants
Mindful of • Behave earnestly,
participants empathetically, kindly with self‐
deprecation
• Be vulnerable in the 'ield
To develop this particular marker, Tracy drew together the following validity constructs
she found in the field. For example, she refers to Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw’s (1995) inclusion
of self-reflexivity in their field notes. She could have just as easily made reference to others,
Peshkin (1988) and Korth (2005), as examples. My point here is that she identified a key ele-
ment in the literature and then she showed how to establish criteria related to that element
by synthesizing the scholarship — reminding us as qualitative researchers what we are saying
about our own work. She refers to Seale (1999) and Creswell and Miller (2000) to talk about
the method of auditing (using audit trails) to document the process one engages in as a way of
increasing transparency. If you return to Tracy’s (2010) article, you will notice that her chart
only includes the first two sets of criteria, but her text talks about the third and so I added it
to the scheme I created.
She skillfully pulls together the various constructs, ideas, and approaches. She locates them
either at the level of criteria related to the eight common markers or at the level of craft (for ex-
ample, how one goes about achieving sincerity, specifically). Gaps indicate gaps in the existing
literature. For example, Tracy has identified criteria for assessing the marker “Worthy Topic,”
but not necessarily techniques or methods for applying those criteria to pieces of research.
Further contributors could build on her work at this point.
Dennis Beach
Beach (2003) assumes a view of validity that is unifying through purpose and transgression.
His unifying approach can be interpreted as a conceptual advance on validity discussions de-
scribed above as related to organizing validity around purpose (e.g., Cho and Trent, 2006) and
counter-validity/transgressive validity (Lather, 2007). Rather than acknowledging a set of cat-
egories of research linked to varying purposes (as did Cho and Trent, 2006), Beach argues that
there is one significant reason for doing education research under the conditions of capitalism
and this purpose has consequences for validity. Beach is concerned, fundamentally and solely,
with research that serves to promote democracy over and against the pressures and illusions of a
capitalist market system. “My suggestion is that because of the inequities of capitalism, educa-
tion research should be concerned with trying to improve equity and democracy both within
and through education and that it also requires a validity form that corresponds with this task”
(Beach, 2003, p. 860). Beach goes on to indicate that catalytic validity is the only validity con-
cept up to the task. As Beach has argued, it is most typical that education research reifies and
supports the inequities that are the effects of capitalism. Rather than following Lather’s (2007)
ironic approach to validity as something that names itself in order to erase itself (Rolfe, 2006),
Beach takes seriously the concept of catalytic validity— seriously enough to think it can serve
as a unifying approach to validity across social science in the capitalistic milieu—ethical social
science whose lust for democracy should not be assuaged.
Beach indicates that it is very difficult to conduct research that supports and engages in
democratic practices because of contradictions that riddle our research (he is writing specifi-
cally about education research, but in a way that suggests his points are applicable regardless of
the substantive social domain). These contradictions limit the validity of research in ways that
are systematically ignored. The contradictions include:
a. the celebration of distance, objective truth, and neutrality rather than closeness, subjective engage-
ment, and authenticity;
b. the creation of a labor hierarchy and theory-practice distinction that favors the decisions and ideas of
theorists over practitioners with respect to truth claims;
c. the presence of a low exchange rate regarding care for the communities researched, where researchers
leave the application of findings to others and wash their hands of any responsibility for the consequences
of this application;
d. the production of alienating concepts (e.g., Spearman’s g) that severely damage the ecology of genuine
community and possibilities for equity and solidarity (see, e.g., racially slurring research such as that by
Jensen, 1985a, 1985b, 1987). (Beach, 2003, p. 861)
One can see from the list of contradictions that traditional validity requirements for so-
cial science inquiry have, themselves, served to structure the contradictions. Beach holds that
catalytic validity loosens research dependency on those first terms in the stated contradictions
above. In his description of the research situation under capitalism, Beach (2003) argues that
democratically valid inquiry, to be valid, must “contribute toward changing education [and
other social contexts] in the interests of a more egalitarian form” and that “this can be done by
researchers recognizing and showing in theoretical and practical detail what education actually
involves for a population, how it occurs within the corrupted forms of symbolic exchange that
Reformatted image (for book page size) on this
“Validity page.
Crisis” See original
in Qualitative figure
Research on | 13
| Dennis
following page. The image in a version of the chapter I saw recently seems to
be incorrect.
we currently Please organize
call schooling, and howthe parts
class of theare
interests image as they
presently are on in
disguised thisand/or
page.protected
by education” (p. 864).
The background schematic that emerges through Beach’s conceptualization of validity is
vividly described as the practice and promise of research bursting through the capitalist condi-
tions to transform them.
Capitalist Conditions
Research Bursts Through
A microscopic view of this background schematic shows us the contrastive nature of the
schema through three moments.
The first moment relates to the purposes of research. The first contrast internal to this first
moment is a conflict between perpetuating/promoting capitalist economic and ideological
conditions versus promoting and establishing democratic opportunities. The second moment
relates to validity elements of engaging in democratic inquiry with an internal contrast be-
tween the validity requirements of democratic research, which include correspondence validity
and catalytic validity. The third moment relates to the practice of democratic research with an
internal contrast involving the challenges posed by capitalism, but with the possibilities for
transforming the very conditions under which those challenges are sustained.
The internal relations of the contrast sets are not the same across the moments, and this
seems to suggest that the moments actually have a trajectory — they are not flat, equivalent
phases with characteristics, but rather dynamically evolving moments in the engagement of
meaningful social science. The three moments are paradigmatically linked as a trajectory from
the purposes to the possibilities. Beach locates validity as the catalyst and lynchpin between the
purpose and the possibility of democratic inquiry within capitalist situations.
Practices of
Democratic
Research:
Validity ELements Challenges, but
of Democratic Promise
Research: Catalytic
Validity and
Correspondence
Validity
Purposes of
Research: Promote
Capitalism Vs.
Foster Democracy
Beach’s unified approach to validity has less to do with specific techniques and more to do
with the underlying momentum for social inquiry, most particularly education research.
Laurel Richardson
One way of proposing a unifying concept of validity is to describe the character of validity
using a metaphor. This approach shares something in common with the one I will take up: it
begins by describing validity itself, rather than by looking at research and trying to locate valid-
ity there. Richardson has provided a crucial voice in the scholarship on validity for qualitative
inquiry. One of her most cited contributions has been the development of the metaphor “crys-
tallization” for thinking about validity and methodology. The metaphor reflects the (at once)
unitary and complicated “nature” of validity for qualitative researchers and expands on the tri-
angulation metaphor that has wide currency in the discourse on validity in qualitative research.
In postmodern mixed genre texts, we do not triangulate, we crystallize…. I propose that the central image
for “validity” for postmodern texts is not the triangle — a rigid, fixed two-dimensional object. Rather
the central imaginary is the crystal, which combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of
shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of approach. (Richardson, 2000,
p. 934, emphasis in original)
Ellingson (2009) forged Richardson’s “crystallization” metaphor into a framework for

qualitative researchers to draw upon — putting “crystallization” into the context of a specified
methodology for nontraditional qualitative inquiry (Cugno & Thomas, 2009). By developing
a metaphor for validity, Richardson is, at base, locating characteristics of both validity and
research as if they are really one and the same. Though certainly some evaluative criteria would
be presupposed in these descriptive attributes, Richardson’s work really stays with locating the
characteristics of validity as doubling for characteristics of good research. She then engages
people in interacting with those characteristics in studies — for example, encouraging people
to use multiple dimensions and modalities. These characteristics enhance the validity of a proj-
ect because they resist oversimplification, enabling the researcher to both accept and explore
the complexities of the field, including one’s own position in it, without reducing, masking, or
hiding its validity issues.
Another metaphor that has gained some currency among qualitative researchers as a de-
scription of validity is the “rhizome.” As with the above example, this metaphor doubles both
as a description of validity and as a description of research. Rhizomes are interconnected net-
works or systems that are complex and tangled beneath the ground. “Rather than a linear
progress, rhizomatics is a journey among intersections, nodes, and regionalizations through a
multicentered complexity” (Lather, 2007, p. 124). This description of research begs for validity
conceptions to mirror its principle characteristics, for example, to be inclusive of complexity.
In both of these cases, as with others that might be similar, the metaphor is considered a
unifying concept that would apply to social science research in general, on the whole. But the
metaphors are also complicated and inviting; inclusive and nondirective. Some people refer to
them as ironic because they seem to turn the traditional way of thinking about validity on its
head. They require us to recognize the characteristics that might map over to research/validity
as a way of conceptualizing validity. Specific combinations of attributes and research decisions
would be fit to the metaphor by aligning in saliency and quality.
From http://www.dicts.info/picture-dictionary.php?w=crystal. Accessed January 30, 2011.Used

with permission.
Barbara Dennis
The path I want to forge toward a holistic concept of validity is one that has been developed
through Habermas’s (1984, 1987) critical theory and Carspecken’s (2003) postenlightenment
methodological theory. It is a path that begins with validity in the ordinary context and then
moves into social science. Habermas’s (1988) On the Logic of the Social Sciences pointed a
way toward this unified theory of validity, which becomes more visible in terms of details in
Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) (1984, 1987). In the Logic of the Social
Sciences, Habermas establishes a procedure for connecting validity to the logic of doing social
science across the various disciplines. Through this process, he raises questions that propel the
reader toward an increasingly unified view of social science validity. For example, he begins by
exploring the field of economics, which he argues has two prominent approaches — one that
examines economy as a matter of normalized individual behavior and the other that exam-
ines economy as a matter of rational choice and deliberation. Habermas is able to argue that
both approaches, when modified, contribute in different ways to a fuller understanding of
human economic activities, because together they provide a richer description and explanation
of those activities. Habermas explored what in practice seemed like divergent, oppositional
approaches to validity with the logics of a given social science, and found convergence and
correctives. That is, he used the benefits of one to correct the indulgences of another. More
important than the really exciting content of his arguments is the structure and origination of
the arguments themselves. Habermas kept making the validity assumptions explicit. That is,
he looked at the ordinary context of proposing a particular logic to one’s social science in con-
versation with one’s colleagues and he brought out implicit validity conditions through which
those arguments might be persuasive. It was on the level of examining these implicit conditions
and truth claims that Habermas was able to point toward some unifying validity criteria for the
social sciences. Carspecken (2003) took a similar approach in examining the philosophical un-
derpinnings of postenlightenment theories of knowledge and inquiry. Both Habermas (1984,
1987) and Carspecken put into practice on the level of social science critique what we can find
at work in the ordinary communicative context and they both know they are doing this.
• In relationship with
participants
• In self‐reClection
• In dissemination
Application to the
Domains of Doing
Research
Application to
Characteristics
of Research
Quality of Validlity in
Ordinary Life
• Openness
• Egalitarianism • Claims and Truth
• Uncertainty
• As if Quality
• Dasein
This picture illustrates the interactive, communicative nature of the unified proposal for ad-
dressing validity. Image from http://www.rmu.edu/web/cms/academics/scis/organizational-
studies/Pages/bs-org-studies.aspx. Accessed January 30, 2011. Used with permission.
The proposal I am spreading is this: We can forge a unifying approach to validity by look-
ing first at a description of validity in its ordinary context. The ordinary context is already
necessarily a linguistic, social, intersubjective one (Habermas, 1984, 1987 and many others as
this is a well-accepted description of ordinary life across myriad philosophical communities).
This becomes the starting place because it is the starting place for validity itself.
Ordinary Concepts of Validity

To suggest, as I am doing, that ordinary concepts of validity supply insight for how we think
about validity in qualitative research is not novel in either the general or particular way. For
example, in general terms, it is common for qualitative researchers to talk about research va-
lidity using words like “trustworthiness” and “authenticity” (Lewis, 2009), which are taken in
the first place from our experiences with truth in ordinary life contexts. In particular, specific
methodologists and methodological theorists have provided detailed accountings and justifica-
tions for this (Habermas, 1984; Altheide & Johnson, 1994; Carspecken, 2003), even in the
particular way I am advocating. Habermas (1984) made the following comparison between
doing research and the ordinary life context:
In thematizing what the participants merely presuppose [in ordinary life] and assuming a reflective at-
titude to the interpretandum, one does not place oneself outside the communication context under in-
vestigation; one deepens and radicalizes it in a way that is in principle open to all participants.” (p. 130,
emphasis in original)
By examining what validity looks like in ordinary life, we learn more about the nature and
structure of validity itself. This examination will produce a description of validity rather than a
description of how to apply validity to research. While this link between ordinary concepts of
validity and research practice is certainly not an idea original to me, its potential as a unifying
orientation for validity has not been realized. Thus, it is my hope to move further along in its
realization.
Moreover, this link is not simply a heuristic for understanding validity; it is matter of ne-
cessity — that is, concepts of research validity cannot really escape a connection with ordinary
concepts of validity. This isn’t a matter of choosing this approach over others; it means that
our very validity discussions and the process of deliberating what validity means for qualitative
inquiry, in addition to the practices involved in engaging in valid qualitative research, are de-
pendent upon these ordinary concepts of validity (Habermas, 1984; Carspecken, 2003; Korth,
2002, 2005). The subsections below should adequately illustrate this.
Validity in Everyday Interpretations

“To understand a proposition [in ordinary life] means to know what is the case if it is true.
(One can understand it, therefore, without knowing if it is true)” (Wittgenstein, 1974, p.
21). In rather precise form, Habermas’s (1984, 1987) TCA articulates the everyday manner
in which people interacting with one another will grasp the meaning of those interactions
by grasping the reasons one might offer to explain the actions. Every meaningful action, for
example, a head-nod greeting in the hallway as you pass by someone you know, or a gesture
with one’s hand indicating to another an available place to sit down, is imbued with claims to
truth that one’s interactant will draw on, in part, to understand the activity. Let’s say I see you
walk into the room. The room is bustling with talk, many people (including me) are already
seated in chairs around a large conference table. You look at me and I point with my hand
to the empty chair next to me. Then, I move my bags from the chair to the floor next to my
chair. You nod and come over to sit there. As you lower yourself into the chair, you smile and
whisper, “Thanks.” You interpreted my pointing at the chair and looking at you as an invita-
tion for you to sit in that chair. You understand the meaning of my pointing at the empty chair
within a context of possible things I might mean. In this case, that range of possible meanings
would be narrower than is sometimes the case when we act. To ask if your interpretation of
my gesture is valid is to ask more than just whether or not your interpretation matches my
intended meaning. According to Polkinghorne (2007), “Validity is not inherent in a claim [by
which he means not inherent in the fact that it was claimed with particular intentions] but is
a characteristic given to a claim by the ones to whom the claim is addressed [or those who as-
sume the claim includes them as addressees]” (p. 475). The assumption of validity implies that
the interpretation could be queried and the interpreter would be able, in principle, to provide
responses to those queries. For me to intend my gesture to be interpreted in a particular way,
I must be able to anticipate what the likely interpretations are. I also must be able to draw on
shared understandings of expression, appropriateness, the states of affairs at the time, and so
forth. These shared understandings form a background horizon that is implicit in the meaning
of my gesture. The background horizon may be made explicit at any point during our interac-
tions, should you have a question or should there be a misunderstanding. In ordinary life, we
do not have a simple yes/no experience with the validity of meaning actions. Instead, when we
understand something to be true, we understand what it would take to validate that specific
claim to truth should queries be raised. We grasp this intuitively. Thus, to understand my ges-
ture is to understand a whole host of plausible validity claims that are assumed to hold if the
given interpretation of my action is reasonable.
In this way, truth claims are quickly and intuitively switched over to validity claims, which
Habermas has organized according to categories through which the validity is intuitively estab-
lished. Let’s return to the previous example: If you come over to sit in the chair and I say, “Oh,
I am sorry, but I was saving that chair for Lucy,” we will both realize that there was a misunder-
standing in terms of who I meant to be looking at and gesturing toward. You know who Lucy
is and you also know that she is my friend. At this point you become aware that Lucy walked
into the room right behind you. Both you and I can see how the misunderstanding happened.
The various categories of validity involved in the interpretive process can be demonstrated
in this example. The interpretations and my claims to truth are validated through the process
of sussing out what the validity claims/claims to truth are. The validity of aspects of the inter-
pretation that assume the existence of things in the external world, as well as cause and effect or
functional, mechanical relations among things in the external world, are examined through an
articulation of what is and what works given the principle of multiple access. The principle of
multiple access means that any one of us (and in principle, any anonymous observer) should be
able to utilize the same methods (usually observational in some way) and definitions in order
to arrive at the same claim to truth. Habermas refers to this category of validity as objectivity.
Some objective validity claims referred to in my comment include (but are not limited to): that
there is a chair I am pointing at, that you entered the room, that Lucy also needs a chair, that
there are a particular number of chairs, that the room holds a particular number of people,
that there are enough chairs for the number of people who will be attending the meeting, and
so on. The interpretation that I am saving a chair for Lucy is valid, in part, to the extent that
these objective validity claims hold. This is the most recognizable and well-developed valid-
ity category in the practices of doing social science. Habermas (1984, 1987) argues against
limiting our truth conceptions and validity to this one category, as it defies our ordinary ex-
perience with meaning. Another category of validity, according to Habermas, is subjectivity.
Subjective claims refer to claims a person makes about his or her own feelings, states of mind,
proclivities, and desires—attributes that indicate the existence of a person’s internal world.
These claims involve the principle of privileged access, which means that each subject has a
distinctly privileged way of knowing his or her own feelings, states of mind, proclivities, de-
sires, and matters internal. These claims point to a world internal to the speaker describing the
ontology of that internal world on an epistemological basis. We cannot validate these claims
about one another primarily through direct observation. Instead we must establish the extent
to which the speaker is being honest and authentic; that is, the extent to which the speaker is
both aware of his or her feelings and is being open and honest about those feelings. Part of the
meaning you might infer from our interactions about the chair would include that I feel sorry
about the misunderstanding and/or I feel awkward. Also, you might think that I did have the
intention of saving the seat for someone else—namely Lucy. This would mean ruling out that
I intended to put you in an awkward situation or snub you — to articulate just a few counter
interpretations. The validity of these parts of the interpretation depends on the extent to which
I am being honest and self-aware, because they make reference to states of affairs internal to me
to which I would have privileged access. According to Habermas, there is a third category of
truth claim whose validity is different from both objectivity and subjectivity—Habermas calls
this category normativity. Though we will recognize this category immediately in the ordinary
context, we rarely see it referred to in a distinct manner in the research literature—its claims
are generally lumped in the category of subjectivity. An example of a couple of normative truth
assumptions implicit in the interpretations one would articulate for my comment to you about
my saving the chair for Lucy includes that people should sit in chairs for meetings when chairs
are available, people should sit in one and only one chair, people should not hoard chairs for
non-sitting purposes when chairs are in short supply, people should be able to hold chairs
for other people, people should rectify misunderstandings when they happen. The validity of
normative truth claims is linked to the extent to which people in a given community find the
norms worthy of their assent. The social world is referred to (as objective claims refer to an
external world and subjective claims refer to an internal personal world). The social world is a
linguistically, culturally constituted set of relationships with norms and values as its material.
Four insights from the above exploration of validity in the everyday context will be drawn
forward in the subsection to come: (1) That validity is conceptualized in terms of interpretive
justification or answers to queries that, regardless of whether such queries are explicated, are
always implied in the way interpretations are rendered valid. (2) That validity queries reflect
categorical differences across objectivity, subjectivity, and normativity. (3) That validity is in-
tersubjectively structured. (4) That validity is horizonally structured—that is, there will be
claims in the foreground and claims in the background and the horizon ever recedes so that it’s
not possible to fully articulate all claims involved in understanding any particular interaction.
These insights about validity eliminate the need for debates about whether or not: (a)
subjective claims can be valid; or (b) objective claims always invoke a positivist/postpositivist
paradigm; or (c) subjectivity and objectivity work against each other, as in the more objective
something is, the less subjective it is. Realism is implied, though the validity procedures are
about the claims related to those implications. This is basically what we mean by “critical”—
open to scrutiny on the grounds that it claims as its own.
The Uncertainty of Meaning in Ordinary Life

You can see from this approach to validity that there is not a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the interpretation and the act being interpreted because meaning does not work that
way. When I act, the horizon of my act implies that I expect a range of possible interpretations
would be likely, but also your response to my act will hone or shape the meaning of my act.
As such, there is an openness to the interpretive process—a bounded openness, not free-for-all
incoherency. In terms of the character of validity, the interpretive openness implies a con-
tinual nature of validity (which also jibes with the idea that validity has a horizon-like shape
with respect to meaning) rather than either/or nature (either it is valid or it isn’t valid). As we
explicitly query particular truth claims, we draw out the reasons that justify particular claims
and interpretations. Let’s return to the earlier example. If you come to the empty chair near
me and begin to sit down, you are implicitly querying an interpretation of my gesture. You are
raising your interpretation as valid. I realize this interpretation is valid and I can either leave
the interpretation in place and let you sit down without revealing my initial intentions (which
involved directing my gesture at Lucy rather than at you) or I might raise the alternative inter-
pretation, which would rely primarily on knowledge of my initial intentions or on the view of
the room that included all three of us: you, me, and Lucy. Then Lucy sees you sitting down.
She smiles at me because she recognizes the misunderstanding. She walks passed the two of us
to an empty chair behind me (which in fact I had not seen). The opennesss of interpretation is
necessarily bounded, but this boundedness is not standardized across various interpretive en-
counters. It is linked to the context of the action. Every act is both open/flexible and bounded
in terms of interpretation and this quality of interpretation is important when thinking about
validity. As such, validity must be conceptualized as the process through which people come to
understand one another given the bounded range and flexible field of possible interpretations.
Both the boundedness and the openness are tethered to the context of the interpretive milieu,
not to rules about the correspondence between the referent and the expression. There is no
one-to-one correspondence of my gesture to an interpretation that would always hold across all
particular instances. It is in this way that we can understand Polkinghorne’s (2007) comment
that validity does not inhere in the claim, but in the judgment of the claim by the interpreting
audience/interactants.
Also, there are always presumably shared assumptions in the interpretation process, but
there are reasons for us to be more or less certain of the sharedness of our assumptions. The
context of our action sets the background for this aspect of certainty. Do we share a common
language and culture? Is the meaning general enough to be warranted, given the level of knowl-
edge and history we have of one another and of our shared context? This layer of certainty is
most often called into question on definitional levels, but not only on definitional levels.
The uncertainty of meaning is, also, implicit to the assumption that an act always could
have been otherwise (Giddens, 1979). In ordinary life, this means that we would be hard
pressed to assume that there was a unidirectional, deterministic cause-effect relation for act-
ing. The more plausible way of thinking about contingencies to which our meaningful action
might be partially attributed would be as conditions of action. Conditions of action cannot
be used to predict forthcoming action, but would instead be linked to action in terms of how
the act might be interpreted (Carspecken, 1996). As just mentioned, the context within which
I am acting and within which my action is being interpreted contributes to how the action is
understood, but does not determine how the act is understood. In ordinary life we cannot ef-
fectively understand one another if we limit what is taken to be a valid interpretation to only
those interpretations that have a direct cause/effect relation between the conditions of action
and the meaning of the action itself. In fact, it is difficult to talk about ordinary validity in this
way. Consider this convoluted description of our example articulated using this cause/effect
sense of validity: You walked into the room and this caused me to point out the empty chair
beside me. Or, the empty chair beside me caused me to indicate its availability for your use. Or,
the social norms of politeness caused me to offer you the empty chair beside me. None of these
cause/effect articulations would be considered adequate or even accurate in the everyday world
of giving reasons for our actions. If you had approached me and said, “Why did you gesture at
this chair when I walked into the room?” none of the above answers would have made sense.
However, the above conditions help to provide a context within which interpretations are con-
sidered plausible or are ruled out. In the ordinary context, there are some examples in which
we think of more deterministic, causative conditions as having more sway over the interpreta-
tions than is typical for most claims. For example, when someone gets hit and falls down, we
might feel some confidence in saying that the force of the hit caused the person to fall down.
Even so, this kind of physical description with its focal point on the cause/effect element does
not satiate our understanding of the action per se. So while cause/effect relations might be
foregrounded in some physical descriptions (he hit her and she fell down) where the range of
plausible interpretations is quite narrow, they do not suffice in ordinary life as explanations. We
could say that because he hit her, she fell down — but there are assumptions that we must also
accept that reveal the partiality of the cause/effect explanation. For example, we must accept
that he is stronger than she is and that she was unable to resist the hit; or that he caught her
off guard; or that she was, for some reason, unwilling to resist the hit. We would also want to
understand why in the world he hit her.
Sometimes in research literature, uncertainty is treated as a concern peculiar to subjectiv-
ity—that the procedures of objectivity specifically preclude interpretive uncertainty, but in our
ordinary context we recognize that we experience uncertainty across all three types of claims.
In other words, the uncertainty of meaning is addressed, but not eliminated, through validity
queries of all three types. There will always be some degree of uncertainty. The validity of ob-
jective aspects of interpretation is only potentially resolvable through the principle of multiple
access. Thus, it seems easier to diminish the extent of uncertainty related to objective claims.
Moreover, objective claims can be very easily taken for granted because of a strong sense of
certainty ascribed by Westerners to information from their senses, particularly from vision
(Carspecken, 2003). For example, we would probably have little reason to question whether
or not the chair next to me was empty (an objective claim) or exists — our certainty would be
very strong and the level of facticity we ascribe these claims would be high. In fact, it would
seem crazy to query such claims in this example. Actually, in this example, it is hard to come up
with an objective claim that would even seem sensible to query, but let’s look at the crux of the
misunderstanding: you did not notice that Lucy was behind you and I did not realize that you
were looking at me when I gestured to her. These are objective claims whose uncertainty had to
do with the scope of observational and attentional view we each had. In ordinary life, we deal
with the uncertainty associated with objective claims by addressing definitions, by making sure
our observations are accurate (including in terms of scope), and by establishing procedures for
getting information. Certainty about objective claims invokes a distinction between the claim
and the “observation” or the way things are/work.
In contrast, with respect to the uncertainty that might be involved in understanding my
initial intentions, one will have to trust that I am being honest and sincere and that I know
how I feel. I might experience greater certainty about this than you, because you do not have
direct access to my intentional states of mind. So certainty about our self-knowledge claims
involves a distinction between our claims and our self-awareness and self-expression.
We would establish certainty about the norms involved by pointing to other supportive
and backgrounded norms on which we find agreement. For example, if you said to me “Are
you saying that it is okay for you to save a chair for someone at this meeting?” then you would
be calling the certainty of that validity claim into question. I might be quite certain about
the validity of many other normative claims (such as that people should sit in chairs at the
meeting and that people should sit one person to a chair), and experience less certainty about
the validity of the normative claim that people should be able to hold or save chairs for other
people. Your query would indicate some uncertainty about the validity that particular norma-
tive claim.
So while uncertainty is linked to validity claim and while different aspects of certainty re-
flect different types of validity, uncertainty itself is not solely a product of subjectivity, nor is it
totally eliminated when objective claims are offered up. (For a detailed discussion of certainty
as it relates to meaning and truth claims, see Carspecken, 2003.) This is important because in
the ideology of U.S. life there is a counterintuitive claim that the more certain we are of a truth
claim, the more objective it is; the less certain we are of a truth claim, the more subjective it is.
This formulation is just not as precise as we actually experience it in our ordinary lives. I am
every bit as certain that I love my children (and so are my children)—a subjective claim—as I
am that my children exist in observable form—an objective claim.
There is one more aspect of uncertainty that is even more primary than certainty related
to the validity of truth claims, and that is the uncertainty linked to never knowing for sure
what someone means. This isn’t just about never knowing for sure what another intends, but
actually never knowing for sure that there is identity of meaning in any given particular in-
teraction (Carspecken, 2003). We at best understand a range of possible meanings. As Rolfe
(2000) stated, it is not a matter of “denying the existence of a real(ist) world, nor … necessarily
claiming that we can never ‘know’ that world, simply that we can never know that we know
it” (p. 173). The reason we can never know that we know it is because we cannot establish the
identity of meaning. Understanding does not require identity of meaning and instead requires
intersubjective fields of possible meaning. Validity as an interpretive concept in ordinary life
has this same quality.
Three insights about validity given the certainty/uncertainty of meaning are relevant to the
discussion applying ordinary concepts of validity to social science. These insights include: (1)
that uncertainty is not a fixed commodity, but indicates domains of validity concern; (2) that
uncertainty happens at the level of meaning and is, therefore, not solely a matter of method and
is always a matter of interpretation (specifically, interpretation is always partial and a person al-
ways could have acted otherwise); and (3) that (un)certainty is addressed via query. “Certainty
simply has no paradigm, it is rather a telos of a longing for presence” (Carspecken, 2003, p.
1039) that cannot be fully resolved communicatively through validity queries. “When people
push on the question of certainty …, then principles that had always been in the background
move forward to become problems” (Carspecken, 2003, p. 1039). These insights are about the
nature of validity itself and how we might query that uncertainty, though provisionally and
incompletely. “No final answer [to the question ‘What do you mean?’] can be formulated but
we do [in everyday life] understand what conditions would be required” to answer the question
in any given instance in which the question of certainty arises (Carspecken, 2003, p. 1039).
The “As If” Character of Ordinary Interpretation

In our ordinary lives, we understand gestures and utterances through an “as if ” quality. This
as-if character is basic to meaning. It implicates the intersubjective ground of interpretation.
Just in the way a person could have always acted otherwise, within a bounded range of pos-
sibilities, an interpretation will always indicate that one is interpreting/expressing something as
if a particular set of conditions, assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, proclivities, and whole worlds
hold as valid truth claims. This as-if quality indicates that we cannot ever fully explicate the
meaning of something and must instead make references that cannot be totally cashed in. On
some level, we have to allow the as-if character of understanding to remain. The as-if aspect of
understanding always takes a propositional form—actually, the as-if nature of interpretation is
entirely propositional in structure (Tugendhat, 1986). This is one of the clearest ways to see the
necessarily linguistic and representational aspect of understanding — the way understanding
always, in part, invokes this as-if quality. This quality also has motivational force underneath
it—the desire to be understood or to understand in a particular way.
Let’s return to the example. Of course, on the surface, one might interpret my gesture
as if it were an invitation. The mode of inviting carries with it a host of claims including the
expectation that you would thank me and that I am a nice person. In addition to this layer of
as-if clustering, there is also the as-if character that has to do with the pragmatic coordination
of our interaction. This could be articulated like this: We act as if we are making entitlements
for which we are also implicitly expected to make good on should this be requested of us.
“Every time any of us acts meaningfully our expressions tacitly carry ‘promissory notes’ that
others can ask to be redeemed’” (Carpecken, 2003, p. 1023). This as-if character is part of what
constitutes the paradigmatic horizon of our understanding one another (Carspecken, 1996).
In referring to Habermas’s ideas about the normative grounds of understanding, Carspecken
(2003) reminds us that “the form of both objective and subjective validity claims may have
evolved via metaphoric extension from the normative claim” (p. 1034).
It is this as-if quality that some of the sharpest work on referential semantics elucidates and
it is this as-if quality of meaning that we have more particularly focused on since the linguistic
turn in philosophy and social science.
Care and Dasein in Ordinary Experience

When we are oriented toward understanding those we are interacting with, we are invest-
ing ourselves — we care. We care in a way that brings our own identity into being with
others while simultaneously opening up our interest in understanding others in a particular
way. This understanding has the potential of changing us, and we realize that when we are in
these interactive encounters with others, we may emerge new in the process. Heidegger used
the word “Dasein” to mean something like one’s particular being there, one’s “disclosedness”
(paraphrased from Tugendhat, 1986, p. 151). It is through understanding that we are able to
understand and be understood—to be recognized. “A core ‘interest’ to all human beings would
be the ‘interest’ in having and maintaining a self. This is an interest that is wholly intersubjec-
tive in constitution” (Carspecken, 2003, p. 1035). Recognizing others and being recognized by
others is a fundamental element of understanding and interpretation in our ordinary experi-
ences. Often enough, this recognition is satisfied in quite backgrounded ways. “Meaningful
acts are motivated, in part, at varying levels of foregrounding and background[ing], by the
identity claims they put at stake” (Carspecken, 2003, p. 1036).
There is a necessary connection between the validity of truth claims we offer up and the
sense of self carried by the claim. This connection links the validity accepted of the claim to the
sense of one’s self as a valid worthwhile truth-sayer. When we are engaged in validity efforts,
we are also engaged in identity efforts. In some ways, this helps us better understand why there
is such passion and diffusion and proliferation going on in the validity discourse itself. As we
have staked ourselves in our research and our research findings, we have linked the validity of
our own identities in the validity of the work to which we are associating our “selves” (Korth,
2005).
Applying These Concepts to Social Science

Ordinary concepts of validity seem particularly relevant to the way social scientists make sense
or interpret ordinary life. In other words, it does not seem like much a stretch to say that or-
dinary concepts of validity would apply to the substantive material of ordinary life experience
under investigation by social scientists. The interpretation of ordinary life tends to be more
directly engaged in qualitative approaches to inquiry because ordinary life tends to be more
directly engaged with through qualitative research endeavors. However, ordinary concepts of
validity are also applicable in a basic way to understanding social science validity across all sorts
of methodological approaches, methods, and designs. This point has been made by others. For
example, Carspecken (2003) wrote: “Critical epistemology is a theory of knowledge, truth and
power that is exactly this: an articulation of already understood but implicit assumptions and
structures used in the course of everyday life” (p. 1040).
This section will largely explore the insights for social science, in general, and qualitative
research, most specifically, but will end by troubling this approach. The idea here is to look
directly at validity and see how in what ways the concept of validity drawn from ordinary life
might have merits for social science.
The Interpretive, Intersubjective Quality of Validity

Validity claiming is a process of articulating what it would take to figure out whether or not
something is true (in the objective sense), authentic (in the subjective sense) and right or ap-
propriate (in the normative sense). It is an interpretive process and all interpretation is a man-
ner of position-taking (Mead, 1934; Habermas, 1984; Maxwell, 1996; Carspecken, 2003).
This quality of validity holds for all kinds of claims in social science. It is a characteristic of
validity, not a characteristic of particular social science methodologies, per se.
We can talk about this with respect to observation. Elements of observation are involved
in all forms of social science, whether through direct observation or not. In Western experi-
ence, we talk as if “seeing is believing” and so we can easily take for granted the interpretive
work involved in “seeing.” Historically speaking, the effects of this for Western social science
have been to think that objective claims associated with observation primarily rely on our
senses and work off of the principle of multiple access and are not, in fact, interpretive. But a
similar error is offered up by scholars who claim that qualitative research is subjective and not
objective; these scholars they fail to acknowledge the observational engagements of qualita-
tive research. These observational elements have objective components to them regardless of
the type, manner, or paradigm under which the researcher is attending to her work. When
queried, the objective validity will rely upon procedures related to what things are (how they
can be measured, observed, and so forth) and how they work (functions and consequences).
In any given particular study (even autoethnography), there will be observations and there will
be objective claims. But these will not be the only kinds of claim (even in quantitative studies,
objective claims may be foregrounded, but they do not operate solely) and all observations are
constituted of interpretation and intersubjectivity. Observations are not free of interpretation.
While most social scientists will acknowledge this point, the ramifications for it have not been
easily admitted into the conceptions of validity held by the social scientists.
The categorical distinctions between objectivity, subjectivity, and normativity are implicit
in the interpretive nature of validity because our interpretations are understood through these
categories. This distinction would help us talk about validity issues that have surfaced in the
literature. For example, there are arguments about whether or not research should be held
accountable to criteria of accuracy. In our ordinary lives, if we were interpreting something
objectively, we would hold the meaning accountable to accuracy with respect to its descriptive
characteristics of things in the external world and how they work. We would do this even if our
conversation is primarily about subjective and evaluative interests. Similarly, it would be possi-
ble to raise queries about research interests too (Korth, 2005). Transformational research (Cho
& Trent, 2006) foregrounds normative claims about what the research itself should accomplish
in the real world. Even with normative claims foregrounded, there are objective claims about
the way things are for the participants that could be queried, and subjective claims about
the experiences of the researcher (research reflections) that can be queried. The point here is
that all research projects will involve, to varying degrees, objective, subjective, and normative
claims with warrants that necessarily fit the category (criteria of accuracy, honesty, normative
rightness, for example). Each of these criteria can be addressed through a variety of validity
techniques (which the research literature has abundantly supplied). Qualitative researchers
might take Peshkin’s (1988) work on subjectivity (which includes both subjective and norma-
tive interests) as one approach to articulating the subjectivity involved in the research process.
It has been common for researchers to speak of objective and subjective validity in research
(though these are often talked about as if their difference is one of magnitude or continuum,
rather than category).
This interpretive, intersubjective characteristic of validity can be unifying procedurally (an
argument-based approach to validity would be implied) and also in terms of the claim-oriented
types of validity that would be amenable to query regardless of the type of research or philo-
sophical paradigm one wants to affiliate with and conduct. Given this characteristic, it doesn’t
make sense to treat research validity as being either objective or subjective or research projects
as being only objective or subjective. Furthermore, it would not make much sense to talk about
research as valid without an understanding that this is always a negotiable, consensual process
of querying what might be taken for granted in the claims.
The Uncertainty of Meaning and Validity

Uncertainty is one of the characteristics of meaning and validity. Uncertainty related to partic-
ular kinds of truth claims will involve querying those claims on grounds related to the type of
claim — objective, subjective, normative as has been previously described. This is primarily the
kind of uncertainty that social scientists try to eliminate. We know that our truth claims can be
fallible and that we must be open to challenge and change. When social scientists thought of
their work as noninterpretive, a more limited view of uncertainty made sense. Now, however,
even people involved in using very objective, quantitative methods acknowledge the interpre-
tive aspects of their research. And interpretation will always carry an element of uncertainty
that is not merely about the content of the truth claims—full and complete understanding is
not possible to articulate. This insight, also, speaks to the goals of research. The idea of accu-
mulating accurate information about the world (internal and external) can, at best, be a provi-
sional and secondary one: provisional in the sense that our research will constantly be updated
by new information, but also by new ways of interpreting old information; secondary in the
sense that how people interpret, utilize, care about, change, and engage with the information
is more primarily of interest.
The uncertainty character compels us to move past thinking of research as either valid
or not. “Either it is/or it isn’t” nature of validity has been challenged by others. For example,
Aguinaldo (2004) proposed that qualitative researchers should not be asking “is this valid
research? Yes or No”; but should instead be asking “What is this research valid for?” However,
the nature of validity even in this second question seems to reside in the either/or proposi-
tion. For example, if we answer the second of Aguinaldo’s questions with the proposition
“This research is valid for better understanding the way children read difficult texts,” we have
still assumed it either is or is not valid for this purpose. We don’t assume it is or is not valid
in general, but in particular, given a context. Scheurich (1997) also argued against this ei-
ther/or way of thinking of validity. In the place of this either/or conceptualization, Scheurich
proposed an approach to validity that is dialogic specifically across difference. Conversations
across difference help researchers address the uncertainty related to content of truth claims in
part because the difference requires us not to take certainty (or identity/sameness of meaning)
for granted. Conversations across difference can help researchers face the limits of understand-
ing and interpretation.
What we can be certain about is the conditions under which we could query (Carspecken,
2003).
In research, we need to toggle between the limits of knowledge and the conditions of
knowledge. We also need to address the content fallibility, which is the result of never being
surely able to reach full consensus on the level of content. This quality of validity seems to re-
quire that researchers (1) leave their work open to scrutiny and (2) recognize the boundaries of
their work, particularly across difference. Postmodern and poststructuralist forms of research
foreground this necessary uncertainty, but often times the insights have been treated as if this is
uncertainty rules out the possibility of knowledge or truth all together. In contrast, the insights
of ordinary life teach us that even though uncertainty is necessary, it only means our capacity
to understand is partial, not eliminated. Our will to knowledge is strong and our capacity for
learning and coming to better understand one another is ongoing. This uncertainty does not
rule out the possibility for truth; it rules out the concept of totalizing and complete truth at
any one given time. Keeping the dialogue of difference at play is one way of taking seriously
the uncertainty that inheres in meaning and validity. Scheurich’s proposal is one that not only
applies to postmodern forms of research, but to all research precisely because uncertainty is a
characteristic of all validity and, therefore, all inquiry.
“As if” Quality of Validity

Searle’s (1970) speech act theory helped to illustrate the illocutionary force of utterances — the
action that was accomplished in speaking. For example, if I say “Girls do well in mathematics,”
the illocutionary force is something like “I AM SAYING that girls do well in mathematics” and
“I ASSERT that I KNOW girls do well in mathematics” The as-if quality of the validity comes
to play in the relation between my speech action as a claim (the illocutionary force) and the
claim itself. The as-if quality of validity indicates that social science approaches to validity that
solely depend on the idea of a match between referent and object are not tenable.
This as-if quality is found foregrounded in approaches to social science that theorize lan-
guage as the fundamental basis for validity. For example, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) proposed
the idea that all language is metaphorical and this has implications for how research claims
are interpreted (for example, one might look at the ways the claims themselves are metaphori-
cally contingent) and how research claims are established (for example, one might examine
metaphors like inside/outside as applied to research positionality). Minh-ha (1989) voiced a
strongly representational view of social science that also foregrounds the as-if quality of valid-
ity. With respect to validity, she concludes that no universal validity is possible, only fractured,
momentary structures of meaning that do not or need not hold up to particular validity tests.
The most important validity issue for her is how the researcher acts as if she is a knower, an
interpreter, an articulator, and so forth. Here the metaphorical nature is located between the
researcher and how she positions herself. In other words, the as-if quality is about the relation
between the I in the illocutionary force and the pragmatic positionality one would find in that
force. I—the sayer; I—the knower; and so forth.
Earlier in the chapter, I described some metaphorical approaches to the description of va-
lidity—namely, Richardson’s crystallization. The metaphorical approaches to validity recognize
that validity itself has an as-if quality that defies being fully articulated, but can be alluded to
and referenced through metaphors. The metaphors can invoke subtleties for the interpreters
that might be difficult to convey straight up. Though this difficulty speaks to the practical
problem of describing validity, at its heart, those who have been drawn to describing validity
in this way recognize that validity might best be understood and enacted through proximal
metaphors that unite particular characteristics and demonstrate particular uses.
The Dasein Quality of Validity

This aspect of validity links both the doing and producing of research to the praxis needs
of the researcher (Carspecken, 2002) and to the researcher’s relationship with participants.
Ultimately, the researchers, as with persons in their ordinary life experiences, must win the
free assent of rational colleagues regarding the validity of their work as part of what it means
to be recognized as a worthwhile and valid scholar. One’s passion must be engaged, but also
opened to others and reflected upon. In some research, this aspect of validity might be more
highly backgrounded than in other types of studies (perhaps this is the case with the natural
sciences in comparison with autoethnography, for example). Nevertheless, it isn’t really the
type of research that makes this an issue; rather, it is always at issue. I remember reading about
the scientist Maurice Wilkins (Nobel Laureate) who was involved in research that contributed
to the atomic bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. He felt remorse when the bomb
worked. He spent much of the rest of his life trying to engage in science in ways that contrib-
uted to making the world a better place. He led a group called the British Society for Social
Responsibility in Science, which was formed in 1969 in order to pose questions about the
social effects of science (Rose & Rose, 1976). Rose and Rose (1976) describe a natural science
that is moving increasingly toward an articulation of this insight in the way it accounts self-
reflectively for its own worth.
Cho and Trent (2006) distinguished between transactional and transformational qualita-
tive research, suggesting that transactional researchers were those who looked at validity in
terms of their interactions, interpretations, and understandings with/of participants; while
transformational qualitative researchers are those who associate the validity of their work with
eventual ideals regarding transformational outcomes. This distinction suggests that the Dasein
quality of validity is more directly drawn out in some instances, namely when transforma-
tional orientations are foregrounded or explicated. But every act of inquiry is an act whereby
the researcher is risking herself and the effects for this on validity have been variously named
(catalytic validity is one example). McLaren (1993) described this as “being wounded in the
field.” When one enters a research project, one does so open-minded not only with respect to
the substance of one’s research questions, but also with regards to one’s cares for others and for
the self, one’s identity so to speak. The basic validity issue at question has to do with worth-
whileness and this issue gets at the heart of intersubjectivity and the normative claim. Every
critical effort questioning claims to truth, that is, every validity effort, involves the problem of
identifying who we are and who we can be through the critique.
The Trouble with Ordinary Validity in Practice:

Must Social Science be Truer than True?
Our ordinary validity ensuring processes have problems. In practice, our orientations toward
understanding are deeply riddled with oppressive hangovers that go masked in terms of our
orientations and intentionalities (Beach, 2003; Carspecken, 2003). Power can distort our ca-
pacity to reach consensus and understand truth. But good research ought not perpetuate such
masks, rather research ought to contribute to making the world a better place.
Woodhouse, Hess, Breyman, and Martin (2002) remind us that all research is troubled:
Because all inquiries and knowledge claims occur in social contexts by persons with cognitive, emotional,
interpersonal, and other commitments, biases, and ideologies, all research can, of course, be said to have
a normative component. (p. 298)
Woodhouse includes biases and ideologies in the category of normative, but I think we can
safely say (given Habermas’s refinements of the terms “objective,” “subjective,” and “norma-
tive”) that “social” would be an adequate substitution. The point here is that ordinary interac-
tions have problems in terms of validity. How then can we loosen research from the ordinary
binds that limit our understanding of one another (Beach, 2003; Lather, 1993)?
Habermas (1987) has suggested that validity queries can be and regularly are violated on a
procedural level because of power, other forms of inequity, and structural distortions.
The answer to this question draws researchers back to the ordinary context of validity.
Habermas (1984 and elsewhere) has suggested that validity queries can be violated on a proce-
dural level. These violations take the fundamental form of breaching with principles of egalitar-
ianism and openness, losing sight of the ideal that is implicit to every critical act. Carspecken
(1996) ends his practical, methodological guide with the principle of egalitarianism, stating
that the best way to limit potential harm to participants is to engage in as democratic a research
process as possible. Beach (2003) and Korth (2002) would echo these sentiments. Openness
involves coming to the dialogue with an open mind, willing to learn from those with whom
you are conversing. The point has already been made that this is best facilitated by encouraging
a dialogue across difference. Wilkins (1999), in referring to the strong working relationship
among his colleagues Watson and Crick, concluded that “dialogue between scientists who do
not share views might be the most important vehicle for keeping science accountable for its
social effects” (Dennis, 2009). Power distorts our capacities to freely assent and dissent by dam-
aging the possibilities for egalitarian and open conditions. This happens both in our research
and in the ordinary context. We must work against this in both spheres. However, the added
complication of the power wielded by science and publication results in the likelihood that the
claims rendered by social scientists will be interpreted as “more true” than claims offered up
in everyday interactions. For this reason, and because such interpretive distortions have effects
on the social world, researchers must be extra careful to encourage conditions of egalitarianism
and openness, at the heart of which is self-reflection and freedom from power.
The knowledge gained by a social scientist in research can and should follow the principles of the ideal
speech situation [referencing Habermas’s notion and the principle just identified] to invite the voices of
those “being studied” into the research process and to allow those voices to change the pre-existing ideas
of the researchers. This theory gives us standards by which to design and undertake research that will
result in well-supported claims and well-articulated articulations of the research limitations. (Carspecken,
2003, p. 1027)
Also, we should not forget that one of the first layers of transformation comes in the shape of
consciousness-raising. Research always has this potential at its disposal (Korth, 2002).
A Unifying Approach to Validity: Conclusion

Rather than approach the problem of complexity by proposing a proliferation of different,
divergent, and even contradictory constructs that might each in some nuanced way contribute
to thinking of research as valid, the approach I have been establishing involves characterizing
the nature of validity in ordinary life from which we might be able to discuss the validity of
particular research efforts. In other words, I am starting with the nature of validity rather than
with the nature of research; though the two are like sides of the same coin. In this conclusion, I
briefly locate an approach to validity that shares many similarities with this proposal and then
sketch out the proposal using the schematic presented earlier in the paper.
Argument-Based Validity
Moghaddam (2007), like Carspecken (2003), argued that “validity refers to the reasons we
have for believing truth claims” (p. 236). This approach matches up with an approach known
as the argument-based validity—an idea that has currency among methodologists of both
quantitative and qualitative inquiry (Kane, 1992; Polkinghorne, 2007). Kane (1992), who
writes on validity in the quantitative tradition, suggested that validity is an interpretive ac-
complishment (he drew on Cronbach, 1971, and Messick, 1989, to develop these ideas) whose
inferences must hold up to queries. He proposed the idea of argument-based validity “adopts
the interpretation as the framework for collecting and presenting validity evidence and explic-
itly associates validity with the plausibility of the various assumptions and inferences involved
in the interpretation” (p. 528). Kane goes further to indicate that the validity argument is
actually inherent in the interpretation itself. He proposes (1992), for the context of research
that analyzes test scores, that interpretations be analyzed according to “the arguments associ-
ated with the interpretations” and that validity be defined “in terms of the overall justification
of those arguments” (p. 528). According to Kane, the kinds of evidence needed for validation
is determined by the content of the interpretive argument itself. “The validity of an interpre-
tation can be defined in terms of the degree to which the interpretive argument is plausible
and appropriate” (p. 532). The validity argument functions as a meta-argument, making the
interpretive argument more explicit.
Kane et al. (1999) identified five types of inference made in quantitative research, par-
ticularly when using tests as a way of gathering data. These five types of inference include
evaluation, generalization, extrapolation, explanation, and decision. Others have been devel-
oping this argument-based approach even further (see Kim, 2010; Bachman, 2003; Mislevy,
Steinberg, & Almond, 2003). This particular group of scholars makes reference to the argu-
ment-based validity work of Toulmin (1969). They have this in common with Habermas. This
synergy might indicate some common starting points for forging a unifying conceptualization
of validity across the traditional quantitative/qualitative divide.
Polkinghorne (2007) argued that validity is a “prototype” concept rather than a “defini-
tional” concept. He was also arguing for a more unified approach to validity across research
communities and he built his position up in much the same way I have done here—by look-
ing at validity directly and then talking about its application for social science. “A conclusion
is valid when there is sufficient evidence and/or reasons to reasonably believe it is so… . A
degree of validity or confidence is given to a claim that is proportionate to the strength and
power of the argument” (p. 475). He goes on to say, “In spite of differing assumptions, I ex-
pect that both social science communities adhere to the general notion that judgments about
the validity of a knowledge claim depend on the force and soundness of the argument [not
in a rule-based way, but following Habermas in a communicative-rationality way] in sup-
port of the claim” (Polkinghorne, 2007, p. 476). What divides the communities, according
to Polkinghorne, are disagreements about what counts as evidence and reasonable argument.
I think a way through this division is Habermas’s categorization of the three types of validity
claim, which corresponds with how we resolve validity concerns in ordinary life experiences.
We can look at the structure of arguments to get an idea of how these might apply to
social science. Toulmin (1969) proposed that a good argument makes explicit the connection
between the conclusion and the evidence, examples of the evidence, justification for the link
between the evidence and the conclusions, and rationale for the justification. Perelman (1982)
described arguments as (1) having an informal structure (not the formal or strict structure of
induction or deduction); (2) addressing an audience ideal or concrete; (3) involving ambiguity;
and (4) seeking a measure of acceptance (not total acceptance). These descriptions are compat-
ible with what we learned about validity in ordinary life.
The New Proposal: Following Habermas

The argument-based approach is in line with the insights we garnered from the everyday con-
text of validity and it demonstrates a potential line of synergy among researchers who engage
in both quantitative and qualitative inquiry. We can locate this argument-based approach in
the unifying proposal that I am advocating here. The procedural similarities might make it
seem that my proposal is redundant to the argument-based approach; these other approaches
do not maximize their own insights because they stop short in identifying the intuitive criteria
for assessing the validity of objective, subjective, and normative claims, which would be the
same regardless of whether one is conducting a study that employs qualitative or quantitative
methods and regardless of the type of paradigm to which one ascribes. The following schematic
is a representation of that proposal — a proposal that focuses on the nature of validity as its ori-
enting force with explicit correctives for possible ideological distortions and the force of power.
Qualities/Characteristics of Validity. This proposal involves describing the characteristics of va-

lidity in the ordinary contexts. I did that by identifying four main elements of the characteris-
tics that emerge from already assumed social, intersubjective way of understanding meaning.
These characteristics of validity have been well described in the chapter. They provide the
ground for saying an argument-based approach to validity is, in fact, valid. They also supply
the ground for critique that would enable researchers to move toward making claims that are
in some ways liberated from the ideologies and distortions that can riddle truth in the ordinary
milieu. Though, this same potential for critique is also accessible to participants. There is no
reason why these emergent characteristics of validity would not be relevant to all forms of so-
cial science regardless of whether quantitative or qualitative methods are being utilized.
• Validity is communicatively • Validity is linked to praxis

structured • Validity is linked to the
• Validity is always partial, validity of self and identity
never whole and the nature of being
• There is a metaphorical • Validity is self‐reBlexive
quality to validity
"As if"
Dasein
quality
Categories
Uncertainty of Valdility
Claims
• Fallibility of truth claims • Objective
• Uncertainty of • Subjective
interpretation • Normative
• Lack of pure identity of
meaning
Applications to Characteristics of Research. Habermas’s ideal speech situation is a limit case de-
scription of the basic underlying assumptions of coming to understand one another through
communication. The fundamental principles of this are (1) openness (both in terms of one’s
expression and in terms of one willingness to hear and be persuaded by others’ perspectives)
and (2) egalitarianism (all people having equal opportunity to voice and listen to the various
ideas that are expressed). These principles set the conditions to best engage the above charac-
teristics of validity. This is no different than in ordinary contexts, but in our research projects
we should be explicit about accounting for these conditions. Argument-based approaches to
validity make the most sense when these conditions are actualized to the best of our abilities.
This holds regardless of whether we are talking about qualitative or quantitative approaches
to inquiry. Dialogue across difference and democratic research practices seem to be the most
fruitful way to engage these conditions in the conduct of social science.
Openness
Egalitarianism
Applications to the Domains of Doing Research. In every social science effort, ordinary validity
concepts come into play across at least three recursive domains. One domain involves under-
standing participants. Another domain involves the researcher’s self-reflective understanding
of his or her own involvement in the activities of participants. A third domain has to do with
how the dialogue about those findings is rendered public. In all cases, the validity issues are
related to the insights garnered from looking at validity in the ordinary context: We can liken
the first domain to the experience of witnessing an interaction and being involved in the same
interaction. We can liken the second domain to the experience of reflecting on our interactions
with others. We can liken the third domain to the experience of telling someone else a story or
an account of the interactions. We do these things all the time in ordinary life. For researchers
involved in more fixed- designed, quantitative studies, these three domains are quite distinct
from one another in ways that are abstracted from, but not unrelated to, the more recursive
nature of the domains in ordinary life.5 The characteristics of validity are not shifted because of
the domain involved. Each of the characteristics would apply, but the specificity of the relevant
questions would, of course, be different. For example, the second domain would really focus
on questions about the researcher’s perspectives, while the third domain would focus more on
questions of representation; but the process of examining the validity would be the same.
Like Beach (2003), I would argue that validity is the catalyst that infuses the three domains
and holds the three domains together. The experiences in all three domains should be recur-
sively returned to participants in order to maximize egalitarianism and openness.
Understanding
Self in the
Understanding
research
Particiipants context/
experience
Understanding the
nature and product of
dissemination
In Summary
I have provided an argument for an approach to validity that is grounded in our everyday
experience with validity. This approach can be unifying in that its basic principles hold across
all varieties of methods. Moreover, it eliminates the need for some divisions that have per-
plexed the validity debates (like pitting objectivity against subjectivity). Remaining true to the
underlying argument itself, this proposal should be queried, interrogated, challenged, added
to, and developed. The idea is to get the conversation on validity moving in a productive, com-
plicated, and inclusive manner.
Notes
1. Creswell and Miller’s (2000) approach, on the surface, is antithetical to a movement toward a unified concept
because they assume that people from differing paradigms would not be able to agree on what validity means
and how it might best be established. The best- case scenario from this perspective is to be sure that one has
taken up the validity challenges appropriate to the paradigm or design one is utilizing. It is a utilitarian ap-
proach that might be, in the end, the principle upon which a unified vision of validity could be forged from
their work.
2. Criteria in these examples are meant to explicate and clarify validity concepts and procedures within very
particular fields of qualitative research conduct. There is an abundance of such validity conversations going
on within particular design/approach categories. Often, scholars taking this approach assume that validity is
such a specified, contingent concept that conversations across designs and paradigms are moot. (Polkinghorne,
2007, is a counter-example of this.) The unifying concept here would have to be something like validity as
a paradigmatic-contingent concept—and then one would need to argue (in general, philosophic terms) how
validity and paradigm are internally linked.
3. Maxwell’s proposal is a strong one, but there are problems in terms of how it has been utilized. One problem
with this scheme is that the domains themselves are distinct from the decisions one must make to fit or use the
domains in their research (Tracy, 2010). Another problem involves how to link Maxwell’s five domains with
what others who are approaching the validity problem in the same way are writing (this is a problem related
not specifically to Maxwell’s ideas, but to the state of the cacophony). For example, Greenwood and Levin
(2000) distinguish between credibility, validity, and reliability in ways that Maxwell subsumes into validity.
4. The prospect of a unified concept of validity would be particularly suspect from this perspective because unifi-
cation is generally the result of power subordination and ideology rather than the force of the better argument.
And yet the idea that research ought to be accountable to its ends is a unifying claim itself applicable to any
research endeavor.
5. For example, a quantitative researcher might examine the factors correlated with recidivism in juveniles. The
researcher seeks to understand the participants by providing some sort of stimulus (a test maybe) for the partic-
ipants to use to report their experiences with the juvenile justice system as well as their experiences with crimi-
nal activity. The researcher’s interest in correlation is at its heart an interest in understanding what conditions
and characteristics seem to be involved in the person’s recidivism. The test and test responses are an abstraction
of a possible conversation about recidivism that a researcher and a participant might, in principle, hold. If
the participant does not understand the questions on the test or does not have a way to adequately express
an honest response or does not think it’s appropriate to interact with the researcher, then a misunderstanding
akin to the first domain is likely. Also, issues related to how test scores are interpreted have to do with how the
researchers are understanding their participants. When the researcher reflects on her decisions (for example,
choice of tests and inclusion of particular variables), her commitment to juveniles,her concern for recidivism,
or even her discussions of her own objective perspective—these fall into the second domain. The third domain
is involved when researchers include particular literature in their scholarship, publish in particular journals, or
return findings to participants.
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C H A P TE R o n e

“Validity Crisis” in Qualitative Research

B a r ba r a Dennis (for mer ly Kor t h)

State of Affairs: Cacaphony

And so the proliferation goes.

Organizing/Categorizing Validity According to

Identifying Validity in Terms of Specific Threats

Organizing Validity According to Research Purpose

Counter-validity, Transvalidity, and Transgressive Constructs

The following [approach to validity] is a dispersion, circulation, and proliferation of counter-practices of

Lather’s work aims to be an antithesis of modern validity strangleholds. In 1993, Lather

The Problems and Possibilities of a Holistic Approach to Validity:

• Assessing biases introspectively

Transparency • Auditing (show methodological

• Consider the needs of the

Research Bursts Through

Ellingson (2009) forged Richardson’s “crystallization” metaphor into a framework for

From http://www.dicts.info/picture-dictionary.php?w=crystal. Accessed January 30, 2011.Used

Ordinary Concepts of Validity

Validity in Everyday Interpretations

The Uncertainty of Meaning in Ordinary Life

The “As If” Character of Ordinary Interpretation

Care and Dasein in Ordinary Experience

Applying These Concepts to Social Science

The Interpretive, Intersubjective Quality of Validity

The Uncertainty of Meaning and Validity

“As if” Quality of Validity

The Dasein Quality of Validity

The Trouble with Ordinary Validity in Practice:

A Unifying Approach to Validity: Conclusion

The New Proposal: Following Habermas

Qualities/Characteristics of Validity. This proposal involves describing the characteristics of va-

• Validity is communicatively • Validity is linked to praxis

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