GEF/STAP/C.54/Inf.

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June 14, 2018
54th GEF Council Meeting
June 24 – 26, 2018
Da Nang, Viet Nam

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY: DIMENSIONS AND PRIORITIES

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Environmental security: dimensions and priorities

Lead STAP Author: Blake D. Ratner

STAP Contributors: Ralph Sims, Michael Stocking, Ferenc Toth, Rosina Bierbaum

Secretariat Contributors: Virginia Gorsevski, Christopher Whaley

External Reviewers: Ulrich Apel (The GEF Secretariat), Carl Bruch (Environmental Law Institute), Geoff
Dabelko (Ohio University), Janet Edmond (Conservation International), Peter Gleick (The Pacific
Institute), Astrid Hillers (The GEF Secretariat), Andrew Hudson (United Nations Development
Programme), David Jensen (United Nations Environment), Siri Aas Rustad (The Peace Research Institute
Oslo), Jean-Marc Sinnassamy (The GEF Secretariat), Wouter Veening (Institute for Environmental
Security)

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Environmental security: dimensions and priorities

Summary

In its report to the 5th GEF Assembly (2014), the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) noted the
importance of action to “enable improved human well-being, health, security, livelihoods and social
equity at the same time as environmental benefits” and recommended increased attention to
environmental security.

Environmental security has been described as a bundle of issues which involves the role that the
environment and natural resources can play in peace and security, including environmental causes and
drivers of conflict, environmental impacts of conflict, environmental recovery, and post-conflict
peacebuilding. The scope of security and insecurity is by no means limited to violent conflict or its
absence but includes the roots of sustainable livelihoods, health, and well-being.

Environmental security underpins the rationale for investment in global environmental benefits, and is
essential to maintain the earth's life-supporting ecosystems generating water, food, and clean air.
Reducing environmental security risks also depends fundamentally on improving resource governance
and social resilience to natural resource shocks and stresses. The environment is better protected in the
absence of conflict and in the presence of stable, effective governance. GEF investment to achieve
global environmental benefits depends on effective management of environmental security risks as an
element of human security.

The GEF is already engaged through its programmatic and project investments. But, to date, the GEF
does not appear to have addressed environmental security in an integrated manner across its program
areas. One reason may be the lack of a common framework or language to differentiate the various
dimensions of environmental security and, thus, evaluate the case for different strategies of
engagement.

There are four dimensions of environmental security which are of particular relevance to the GEF.

First, ecosystem goods and services fundamentally underpin human well-being and human security.
Human beings depend on the earth’s ecosystems and the services they provide. The degradation of
these services often causes significant harm to human well-being which, in the framework of the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, explicitly includes human security.

Second, conflict, irrespective of its source, affects the viability or sustainability of investments in
environmental protection and their outcomes. Violent conflict often results in direct and indirect
environmental damage, with associated risks for human health, livelihoods and ecosystem services.
Even where natural resources play no role as a source of tension in spurring conflict, the threat of
violence or insecurity can undermine project implementation.

Third, ecosystem degradation, resource competition, or inequitable distribution of benefits increase

vulnerability and conflict risk. Environmental degradation is a cause of human insecurity and can
aggravate other sources of social division based on ethnicity, class, religion, or economic position. While
rarely the simple or sole cause of conflict and insecurity, environmental change (including climate
change) is increasingly characterized as a “risk multiplier.” Even where violent conflict does not occur,

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longer-term environmental trends often act as stressors on rural livelihoods and increase the
vulnerability of natural resource-dependent communities to social, economic, or environmental shocks.

Fourth, environmental cooperation can increase capacity for conflict management, prevention, and
recovery. Managing shared natural resources sustainably and equitably can motivate greater
cooperation, and can also help build institutions that moderate and reduce the disruptive impacts of
conflict, or aid post-conflict reconciliation and rebuilding.

Environmental security is relevant to all of the GEF’s focal areas. The international waters portfolio has
given most explicit attention to investment in institutions for transboundary cooperation, in
international river basins as well as large marine ecosystems. The biodiversity portfolio addresses direct
threats to food security and well-being, often in sensitive environments: there is significant overlap
between biodiversity hotspots and areas of civil strife. Investments addressing land degradation,
including deforestation and desertification, offer direct routes to support the food and livelihood
security of populations living in marginal environments. Approximately 3 billion people reside in areas
with land degradation hotspots, with serious implications for food and water security, aggravated by
climate change. Projects in the GEF portfolio are increasingly addressing these links.

Many GEF operations are also exposed to conflict risk. Half of GEF recipients (77 countries) experienced
armed conflict since the GEF’s inception in 1991, and over one-third of GEF recipients (61 countries)
proposed and implemented GEF projects while armed conflict was ongoing somewhere in the country.
Nearly one-third of all GEF funding has been invested in projects during years when recipient countries
experienced conflict.

For all of these reasons, addressing environmental security in an explicit, consistent and integrated
manner is essential to delivering global environmental benefits, including the long-term sustainability of
project investments. Based on this rationale, STAP recommends the GEF should:

1. Explicitly address environmental security in project and program design. Expressing the benefits of
GEF investment in terms of environmental security, as a component of broader human security, can
link global environment benefits to the more immediate concerns of employment and livelihoods,
equity, social stability and effective governance.

2. Assess conflict risk routinely among investment risks beyond the scope of GEF intervention. GEF
agencies, including UNDP, UN Environment, and the World Bank, routinely carry out such analyses in
their non-GEF financed portfolios. The GEF should consider how to make best use of these protocols
when designing relevant projects.

3. Evaluate the relationships between environmental change and vulnerability within GEF
interventions through the use of tools such as Resilience, Adaptation Pathways and Transformation
Assessment (RAPTA). The aim should be to mainstream project-level analysis on how environmental
change affects the vulnerabilities of different stakeholder groups, and how project interventions
might mitigate or reverse these trends.

4. Contribute to conflict prevention through environmental cooperation. In all projects where conflict
risk is salient, even if not immediate, there are opportunities for the GEF to contribute actively to
conflict prevention, not only by mitigating the vulnerabilities affecting particular stakeholder groups
but also by strengthening institutions of environmental cooperation and equitable resource
governance.

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Environmental security: dimensions and priorities
1. What is the issue?

Environmental security views ecological processes and natural resources as sources or catalysts for
conflict and as barriers or limits to human well-being, and conversely as a means to mitigate or resolve
insecurity.1 Environmental security is understood as a foundation of human security more broadly,
essential to sustainable livelihoods, health, and well-being among households and communities, and
therefore central to achieving the mandate of the Global Environment Facility (GEF). However, lack of
clarity over the many dimensions of the challenge, appropriate entry points for GEF engagement and
metrics for assessing effectiveness have hindered progress. This paper distinguishes four dimensions of
environmental security and recommends those where the GEF might respond to analysis provided by
others, as distinct from those where the GEF can itself play a leading role.

The latest annual Risk Report of the World Economic Forum cites the highest risks, by impact and
probability, as extreme weather events, natural disasters and failure of climate-change mitigation and
adaptation. Large-scale involuntary migration, water crises, and biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
follow closely behind. “Profound social instability” was identified as the risk factor most highly
connected to the range of global trends.2

In its report to the 5th GEF Assembly (2014), the Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) noted the
importance of action to “enable improved human well-being, health, security, livelihoods and social
equity at the same time as environmental benefits” and recommended increased attention to
environmental security.3

UN Environment describes environmental security as a “conceptual envelope” including a variety of

issues involving the role that the environment and natural resources can play across the peace and
security continuum, including environmental causes and drivers of conflict, environmental impacts of
conflict, environmental recovery and post-conflict peacebuilding.4 In this paper, the scope of security
and insecurity is by no means limited to violent conflict or its absence, but includes as well the roots of
sustainable livelihoods, health, and well-being among households and communities—the environmental
dimension of what the UNDP and others have termed “human security.”5

Seen in these terms, the importance of environmental security to the GEF mandate is very clear, and in
many domains the GEF is already deeply engaged through its programmatic and project investments. To
date, however, the GEF does not appear to have addressed environmental security in an integrated
manner across its program areas.6 One reason may be the lack of a common framework or language to
differentiate the various dimensions of environmental security and, thus, evaluate the case for different
strategies of engagement. To address this gap, four dimensions of particular salience for the GEF are
used to structure the analysis in this paper. These four dimensions cover both positive benefits, linking
the environment and human security, and negative impacts or risks (see Figure 1).

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Figure 1. Four dimensions of environmental security from the perspective of the GEF

2. What does the science say?

a) Ecosystem goods and services fundamentally underpin human well-being and human security.

Human beings depend on the earth’s ecosystems and the services they provide. These include
provisioning services such as food and clean water, regulating services such as disease and climate
regulation, cultural services such as spiritual fulfillment and aesthetic enjoyment, and supporting
services such as primary production and soil formation. The degradation of these services often causes
significant harm to human well-being which, in the framework of the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment, explicitly includes human security.7

Global trade networks have made the links between environmental resources and livelihoods less visible
for many. Despite this, the risks of environmental degradation to human well-being and security have
become globalized due to the dramatic growth of the human enterprise since the Industrial Revolution,
threatening the “safe operating space for humanity.”8 This notion, first codified in the Planetary
Boundaries framework, has since been adapted to incorporate dimensions of social equity and justice,
described as the “safe and just operating space for humanity.”9 Others have incorporated dimensions
such as nutrition and health, income, and access to education embedded in the Sustainable
Development Goals.10

These frameworks are important not only for understanding the general linkages between ecosystems
and human well-being and security, but also for identifying policy priorities to reduce vulnerabilities and
build capacity for adaptation and system transformation at finer scales.11 For example, researchers
applied the “safe and just” inclusive sustainable development framework to South Africa, combining 20
indicators and boundaries for environmental stress and social deprivation. Results indicate that the
country exceeds its environmental boundaries for biodiversity loss, marine harvesting, freshwater use,

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and climate change, and that social deprivation was most severe in the areas of safety, income, and
employment,12 which are significant factors in conflict risk. Further downscaling can be done to analyze
and communicate socio-economic and ecological boundaries from a city’s perspective.13

b) Conflict affects the viability or sustainability of investments in environmental protection and their
outcomes, regardless of its source.

Violent conflict often results in direct and indirect environmental damage, with associated risks for
human health, livelihoods and ecosystem services.14 There are also examples where war hinders
resource extraction because it makes certain areas inaccessible to commerce, with the unintended
effect of protecting the resource base such as forest cover or marine fish stocks – though this effect is
often reversed once commercial exploitation resumes.15 In other cases, once conflict is underway, high-
value resources such as gems, oil, and timber become a source of finance for combatant forces. Indeed,
at least 18 civil wars since 1990 have been financed by the illegal exploitation of such resources.16
Wildlife is the fourth largest illegal trade after the trafficking of drugs, people, and arms.17

Following armed conflict, land, timber, and minerals are often in high demand as resources for recovery
and reconstruction. If not managed equitably to support livelihoods, jobs, basic services, etc., then
renewal of conflict is likely. In the absence of equitable governance institutions, otherwise manageable
resource competition can escalate into broader social conflict. In fact, a retrospective analysis of
intrastate conflicts over the past sixty years indicated that conflicts associated with natural resources are
twice as likely to relapse into renewed conflict within the first five years.18 Despite this, of the more than
800 peace agreements since 1945, fewer than 15% address terms related to “natural resources.”19
Fortunately, in recent decades, these trends have improved. While roughly half of all peace agreements
concluded between 1989 and 2004 (51 out of 94) contain direct provisions on natural resources, all
major agreements from 2005 to 2014 contain such provisions.20

Even where natural resources play no role or only a minor role as a source of tension in spurring conflict,
the threat of violence or insecurity at the sub-national level can undermine the feasibility of project
implementation, no matter the focus. International aid to fragile states is more than twice as volatile as
aid to non-fragile states. This factor alone—quite apart from the direct impact of conflict—accounts for
an estimated loss in efficiency of 2.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product for recipient countries.21
Development agencies working in fragile and conflict-prone settings are often poorly equipped to cope
with the particular challenges of achieving sustainable outcomes in these settings.22

c) Ecosystem degradation, resource competition, or inequitable distribution of benefits increase

vulnerability and conflict risk.

Environmental degradation is a cause of human insecurity and in many cases serves to aggravate other
sources of social division based on factors such as ethnicity, class, religion or economic position.23
Currently, there are over 1800 resource-related conflicts worldwide,24 many caused by extractive
activity that polluted or damaged the land, air, water, forests and livelihoods of communities. Such
conditions may contribute to sustained social conflict, often with sporadic violence, and in some cases,
control over natural resources is a central driver of armed conflict.25

A comprehensive study of internal armed conflicts over the period 1946-2006 found a significant
proportion were linked to natural resources: 39 percent in the Middle East and North Africa, 44 percent
in Sub-Saharan Africa, 56 percent in South Asia, and 60 percent in East Asia and the Pacific. Of these,
conflicts over natural resource distribution, for example, access and use rights, or distribution of
revenue, showed the steadiest increase.26

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Mediating factors related to rural incomes, land tenure, governance, strength and inclusiveness of
resource management institutions, and gender equity27 are often critical in influencing whether changes
in the availability of resources foster adaptations – or spur conflict and exodus. While rarely the simple
or sole cause of conflict and insecurity, environmental change (including climate change) is increasingly
characterized as a “risk multiplier.”28 For example, severe and prolonged drought in Syria and the
Greater Fertile Crescent in 2006 spurred massive rural to urban migration and was a contributing factor
to the ongoing conflict.29 In most cases, while natural resources may be linked to the root cause, by the
time the conflict has escalated to violence, the drivers are mixed with a range of factors. This means that
efforts to remedy the natural resource drivers need to complement efforts to address the political
context and associated stresses.30

In other instances, even where violent conflict does not occur, longer-term environmental trends often
act as stressors on rural livelihoods and increase the vulnerability of natural resource-dependent
communities to social, economic, or environmental shocks. In dryland zones, for example, climate
change and related climate variability, water scarcity and land degradation now frequently combine as
factors leading to involuntary mass migration.31

d) Environmental cooperation can increase capacity for conflict management, prevention, and
recovery.

Managing shared natural resources sustainably and equitably can motivate greater cooperation within
and among communities.32 It can also help build institutions that moderate and reduce the disruptive
impacts of conflict or aid post-conflict reconciliation and rebuilding.33 This occurs at:

• local levels, as in the interaction of farmers and herders who may share mutually dependent
and symbiotic relations, which can lead to cooperation during times of prolonged drought;34
• within countries at significant scale, such as the national movement of community-managed
forest institutions in Nepal that sustained ties of mutual support despite the breakdown of
state institutions during the period of civil war;35 and
• at the transboundary scale, as illustrated by the Indus Waters Treaty, which has moderated
competition between India and Pakistan for six decades, despite ongoing tension.36

In developing countries where access to, and use of, renewable resources essential to rural livelihoods
are highly contested, improving cooperation in their management is increasingly seen as an important
element in strategies for conflict prevention, confidence building, and longer-term social-ecological
resilience.37 Where traditional or customary institutions for resource tenure, management, and conflict
resolution enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of local resource users, efforts to recognize these and manage
their relationship to statutory institutions of the state are critical. This is especially the case in post-
conflict settings, where sources of legal authority may have eroded and reconstruction efforts often
disregard traditional institutions.38

For environmental challenges that are inherently transboundary, investing in capacity for conflict
management and mediation support is integral to long-term success.39 For example, this applies to:

• shared river basins, where the allocation of water flows, upstream watershed protection,
pollution control, and management of aquatic biodiversity all depend on joint action across
multiple jurisdictions, often with sharply competing economic interests;
• forest and other terrestrial conservation efforts, including transboundary parks, which now
number more than 250, spanning 460 million hectares;40 and

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 • climate change mitigation and adaptation, where the distribution of costs and benefits among
states and communities is a leading source of tension and an obstacle to accelerated progress.41

Moreover, coordinated efforts can yield massive efficiency gains, even accounting for the significant
transactions costs. A study of conservation planning in the Mediterranean Basin, for example, concluded
that a coordinated approach among states would cost 45% less than a collection of national plans and
save an estimated $67 billion over 10 years.42

3. Why is this important to the GEF?

Environmental security underpins the rationale for investment in global environmental benefits. It is
essential to maintain the earth's life-supporting ecosystems generating water, food, and clean air. The
environment is better protected when activities to generate global environmental benefits – as in the
GEF mandate – are analyzed to ensure that negative social and economic impacts are either minimized
or mitigated. Reducing environmental security risks also depends fundamentally on improving resource
governance and social resilience to natural resource shocks and stresses. The environment is better
protected in the absence of both domestic and cross-border conflicts and in the presence of stable,
effective governance. GEF investment to achieve global environmental benefits depends on effective
management of environmental security risks as an element of human security.

Environmental security is also relevant to all focal areas within the GEF mandate. The international
waters portfolio has given most explicit attention to investment in institutions for transboundary
cooperation, in international river basins as well as large marine ecosystems. The biodiversity portfolio
not only addresses direct threats to food security and well-being43 but also must grapple with the
indirect consequences of conservation efforts. These include the risks of “green militarization”—the
expansion of armed enforcement of conservation zones—which can raise the likelihood of conflict with
local communities.44 This is especially concerning, as studies indicate there is significant overlap
between biodiversity hotspots and areas of civil strife.45

GEF investments to address land degradation, including deforestation and desertification, offer some of
the most direct routes to support the food and livelihood security of populations living in marginal
environments. Critically, about 30 percent of total global land area is considered degraded, with
approximately 3 billion people residing in areas with land degradation hotspots.46 These have serious
implications for food and water security, aggravated by climate change.47 Both climate adaptation and
mitigation efforts, moreover, can inadvertently spur new conflicts—for example over land tenure,
access to benefits, or mining of green energy minerals—if these risks are not explicitly managed.48

Investments in chemicals and waste, similarly, require careful attention to the social distribution of costs
and benefits. Political scientists refer to ‘environmental racism’ to describe the disproportionate burden
of environmental harms carried by poor, often ethnic-minority, communities. For example, the export—
or dumping—of electronic waste from rich, industrialized countries into Africa has been justified as
legitimate recycling; yet the toxic dumps and burning of plastic coatings to copper wires is a major
health hazard both to humans and the environment.49 Newer areas of GEF engagement, such as
sustainable cities, require attention to the interplay between rapid urbanization and the shrinking land
base for food production, alongside other risks and opportunities for human security.50

Many GEF operations are exposed to conflict risk. An analysis commissioned by STAP51 indicates that
half of GEF recipients (77 countries) experienced armed conflict52 since the GEF’s inception in 1991, and
over one-third of GEF recipients (61 countries) proposed and implemented GEF projects while armed
conflict was ongoing somewhere in the country. Nearly one-third of all GEF funding has been invested in

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projects during years of active conflict somewhere in the recipient countries. Some projects are also
implemented in sub-national areas that have emerged from protracted violent conflicts or are
susceptible to relapse. In the case of land degradation projects, the situation is especially acute: an
estimated 73 percent of countries with GEF land degradation projects are conflict-affected, and 66
percent of individual GEF land degradation project sites in Africa were near, or directly in, the area of
one or more conflict events.53

For all of these reasons, addressing environmental security in an explicit, consistent and integrated
manner is essential to delivering global environmental benefits – including the long-term sustainability
of project investments.

4. How should the GEF Respond?

A review of the multi-agency Environment and Security initiative54 notes, “the environment and security
nexus has been evident in all post-conflict and transition countries” and “tackling the security risks that
stem from environmental factors . . . requires a multi-dimensional approach that is difficult for a single
organization to achieve.” There is scope for GEF investment in each of the four dimensions described
above in Figure 1, with particular emphasis on capability development in addressing ecosystem
degradation to reduce vulnerability, and in building environmental cooperation.

The STAP recommends that the GEF consider the following actions – some of which could be done in the
near term, while others may require additional time and effort.

a) Explicitly address environmental security

Making environmental security explicit can enable the GEF to do its job more effectively by expanding
both the scope of partnerships and the level of stakeholder commitment to programmatic success. If the
GEF’s investment were expressed in terms of environmental security (as a component of broader human
security) this would make a clearer link to the more immediate concerns of employment and livelihoods,
equity, social stability and effective governance. In the near term, this could be done by incorporating
conflict sensitivity, mitigation, and risk reduction into the project theory of change, in cases where
interventions aim to reduce social and economic vulnerabilities linked to environmental change. This is
additional to the consideration of generic conflict risk outside the scope of intervention. Doing so could
potentially leverage greater support for the GEF mission as well, particularly when donor governments,
development agencies, and foundations have sound evidence to link their environmental investments to
human well-being outcomes. Substantial guidance, including from GEF agencies, provides tools for
assessing and articulating these links.55 In the longer term, the GEF might consider developing
environmental security indicators to monitor progress.

b) Assess conflict risk routinely among investment risks beyond the scope of GEF interventions
Analysis of generic conflict risk, meaning the risk of conflict emanating from sources beyond the scope
of GEF interventions, should be integrated as a routine element of GEF project design and
implementation, preferably from the stage of project identification (PIF). If a project does not fully
appreciate the specific context of post-conflict or fragile states when it is designed, it is more likely to
fall short of achieving consistent results.56 GEF agencies, including UNDP, UN Environment, and the
World Bank, routinely carry out such analysis in their non-GEF financed portfolios. For example, UNDP’s
Bureau for Crisis Prevention & Recovery uses a Conflict-related Development Analysis (CDA) which
provides guidance on conducting conflict analysis and applying the findings of analysis for a range of
purposes. Similarly, the World Bank has developed a Pilot Toolkit for Measuring and Monitoring in

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Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) Environments, designed to assist World Bank Group teams—and
by extension support dialogue with partners and clients—to measure progress in affected countries.

In the near term, similar protocols could be adapted to the GEF project cycle. Recent years have seen a
significant expansion of effort, including World Bank measures to make country strategies more ‘fragility
focused,’ based on evidence that conflict prevention is a rational and cost-effective strategy for
countries at risk of violence and for the international community.57 Similarly, UNDP has consolidated
expertise in conflict prevention, governance and peacebuilding to respond to threats identified as
contributing to fragility and instability.58 Over the long term, the GEF Secretariat could work with the
agencies, in partnership with independent, specialized research bodies, such as the International Crisis
Group59, to develop methodologies for undertaking more detailed analyses of conflict risk for GEF
projects, drawing upon the pilot experiences of GEF agencies.

c) Strengthen analysis of factors linking environmental change and vulnerability within GEF
interventions
Beyond the more generic consideration of conflict risk addressed above, the GEF should develop and
apply a suite of tools (or adapt existing tools, such as the Resilience, Adaptation Pathways and
Transformation Assessment [RAPTA] framework – see Box 1) to mainstream project-level analysis on
how environmental change affects the vulnerabilities of different stakeholder groups, and how project
interventions may mitigate or reverse these trends. Given the importance of “mediating factors” in
determining exposure to risk, adaptive capacity and ultimate conflict risk, the GEF should strengthen
attention to these aspects. These include a focus on institutions governing access rights and
management authority in regard to land, water, forests and other natural resources; grievance and
dispute resolution mechanisms; access to policy processes and decision-making regarding the
distribution of environmental benefits and harms, including pollution; and cultural, legal, or political
factors affecting gender equity and the status of ethnic or religious minorities. This approach could be
tested in one or more of the GEF-7 Impact Programs.

Currently, many GEF projects identify competition for resources and the potential for conflict as
contextual factors at the project identification stage. Addressing these issues more directly could
improve the likelihood of projects meeting their long-term objectives. Specifically, the GEF should
consider how best to:

- Support the capacity of national and regional agencies to incorporate environmental security
considerations into existing procedures for environmental impact assessment, particularly with
regard to large-scale infrastructure or policy investments.60

- Tailor stakeholder analysis and multi-stakeholder dialogues to guide participatory processes in

project design and implementation. These should consider the differential impacts of project
interventions on key stakeholder groups and foster opportunities for social learning and
adaptive co-management.61 (See Box 1.)

- Integrate capacity building for disaster preparedness and contingency planning into project
investments where this offers opportunities to mitigate environmental damage, e.g. exploitation
of biodiversity hotspots or release of chemical pollution, and to build more resilient livelihoods
and reduce conflict risk.62

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 d) Contribute to conflict prevention through environmental cooperation

In all projects where conflict risk is salient (even if not immediate), there are opportunities for the GEF
to contribute actively to conflict prevention, not only by mitigating the vulnerabilities affecting particular
stakeholder groups but also by strengthening institutions of environmental cooperation and equitable
resource governance.63 The GEF has long been active in this domain, particularly in international waters,
addressing the shared interests of many states in both freshwater and marine resources.64 Similar
opportunities exist in areas such as international safeguards addressing chemicals and waste, land
restoration and biodiversity protection and in multi-focal area projects and programs addressing food
and livelihood security in marginal landscapes. Ultimately, projects where groups can come together to
address a shared environmental threat offer opportunities for dialogue and confidence building that can
reduce the risk of destructive social conflict (including the risk of violence) and potentially benefit other
areas of cooperation. For example, this type of cooperation is central to “peace parks,” transboundary
protected areas designed to support both conservation and conflict prevention. It is also emerging as a
core element of multi-focal area projects addressing food security through improved land and water
governance in conflict-sensitive environments.

Effective support requires understanding the regional political and economic drivers that influence
competition and cooperation and leveraging this understanding in the design and strengthening of
regional institutions.65 Similar principles may be applied to sub-national interventions in fragile states or
potential conflict hotspots, with a focus on areas where the protection or restoration of global
environmental benefits may also contribute to strengthened governance or adaptive capacity among
populations at risk.66 GEF investments in areas such as climate adaptation have seen increased emphasis
on capacity building.67

In the short term, the GEF could improve the collection, sharing, analysis, and visualization of
environmental security data generated by GEF projects to identify priorities for more systemic risk
monitoring. This could include opportunities for enhanced sharing of environmental security data
between neighboring countries. This type of information could potentially be incorporated into the
revised Project Management Information System (PMIS) to share data across the GEF Partnership.

In addition, there may be scope for GEF investment to address, through the work of GEF agencies or
external partners, gaps in existing systems of monitoring and foresight assessment, such as
“environmental security hotspots” specifically assessing the links between environmental resource
trends and conflict risk at global and regional scales.

Over the long term, investing in the capacity to monitor resource trends, to increase transparency and
access to environmental information, along with measures to enable proactive stakeholder engagement
in assessing risks and developing shared action plans, can build patterns of cooperation that may prove
critical when crises emerge. Where investments are planned in a post-conflict setting, they may be
explicitly designed to contribute to peacebuilding, leveraging the expertise of agencies with specialized
capabilities in this domain.

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Box 1: Addressing environmental security within the Resilience, Adaptation Pathways and Transformation
Assessment (RAPTA) framework
The RAPTA framework applies resilience thinking for sustainability goals amidst a “context of uncertainty,
plural values, and conflicting interests.” Its suitability as a foundation for incorporating environmental security
concerns stems from the approach to structuring analysis as well as the process of engagement. Regarding
the analysis, key elements include:
Theory of change. This considers the drivers of change and intended outcomes, which may include
variables that increase or mitigate conflict risk. Demands consideration of the need for incremental
adaptation versus transformational change.
System description. This recognizes "multiple conflicting perspectives," with an expectation to
"identify conflict resolution processes and assess levels of public trust in the governance system, its
openness to criticism and the ability to change laws if circumstances require it."
System assessment. This includes identification of risks, thresholds, and controlling variables, and can
integrate conflict risk assessment; intended to be regularly revisited and revised.
Options and pathways. These pursue the desired change, recognizing that transformational change is
"likely to generate conflict," that there may be conflicts between interventions, and that each will
require adaptation in implementation.
Regarding process, the framework emphasizes the role of multi-stakeholder engagement and governance
throughout the stages of project identification, design, implementation, evaluation and learning. Key
elements include:
Stakeholder analysis focused on entry points for change. This asks: Who are relevant stakeholders?
What are the potential barriers and opportunities for engagement (including gender power
dynamics)? How should each be engaged?
Project governance arrangements linked to the broader governance context. This recognizes that
"the greater the level of change to the social-ecological system, the more attention must be paid to
issues of power, decision-making and accountability.”
Attention to adaptive learning and ethics. This asks: How has the project team made the RAPTA
process transparent and conducive to learning? What mechanisms enable flexibility to deal with
uncertainty, and alternative ideas? What measures ensure ethical engagement?
Consideration of the requirements for dialogue. This includes the role and skill level of facilitator and
the potential need for specialized skills in conflict management, particularly where transformational
change entails disrupting existing relationships.
Focus on capacity for learning. This integrates monitoring, assessment and knowledge management
into processes of stakeholder engagement, with the intention of fostering self-assessment,
awareness, and capacity for implementation, including capacity to mobilize collective action in
support of project goals.
See: O’Connell et al. 2016. Designing projects in a rapidly changing world: Guidelines for embedding resilience,
adaptation and transformation into sustainable development projects. GEF: Washington, DC.
http://www.stapgef.org/rapta-guidelines

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REFERENCES

1 Scott, C.A. and Thapa, B. 2015. Environmental security. In Ellen Wohl (ed.) Oxford Bibliographies in Environmental Science,
Oxford University Press, New York.
2 World Economic Forum. 2018. Global Risks Report 2018.
3 GEF STAP. 2014. Delivering Global Environmental Benefits for Sustainable Development. Report of the Scientific and Technical

Advisory Panel (STAP) to the 5th GEF Assembly, México 2014. Global Environment Facility. Washington, DC. (See commentary on
environmental security, pp. 37 – 39). Observers have commented on the issue since the early days of the GEF; see, for example,
Payne, R. A. 1998. The Limits and Promise of Environmental Conflict Prevention: The Case of the GEF. Journal of Peace Research
35(3): 363 – 380.
4 United Nations Environment Programme. 2016. Environmental Cooperation for Peacebuilding Programme. Final Report and D.

E. Jensen, personal communication, April 10, 2018.

5 UNDP. 1994. Human Development Report 1994, New York: Oxford University Press; Inglehart, R.F. and Norris, P. 2012. The

Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: understanding human security. Scandinavian Political Studies, 35(1), 71-96.
6 Note, however, important exceptions where explicit links to security have been articulated, especially in the international

waters area, e.g., The Global Environment Facility. 2012. Contributing to Global Security: GEF Action on Water, Environment
and Sustainable Livelihoods. Washington, DC.
7 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. 2005. Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis. Island Press. Washington, DC.
8 Rockström, J. et al. 2009. A safe operating space for humanity. Nature 461: 472–475; Steffen, W. et al. 2015. Planetary

boundaries: guiding human development on a changing planet. Science 347: 1259855.

9 Raworth, K. 2012. A safe and just space for humanity: Can we live within the doughnut? Oxfam Discussion Paper. Oxfam,

Oxford.
10 O’Neill, D.W. et al. 2018. A good life for all within planetary boundaries. Nature Sustainability 1: 88 – 95; Gerst, M. et al. 2013.

Contours of a resilient global future. Sustainability 6: 123–135.

11 Adger, W.N. et al. 2014. Human security. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and

Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C.
Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (Eds.)]. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 755-791.
12 Cole, M. J. et al. 2014. Tracking sustainable development with a national barometer for South Africa using a downscaled “safe

and just space” framework. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 111: E4399–E4408.
13 Hoornweg, D. et al. 2016. An urban approach to planetary boundaries. Ambio 45: 567–580.
14 Butsic et al., 2015. Conservation and conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo: the impacts of warfare, mining, and

protected areas on deforestation. Biological Conservation 191: 266 – 273.

15 Gorsevski, V. et al. 2012. Analysis of the Impacts of armed conflict on the Eastern Afromontane forest region on the South

Sudan- Uganda border using multitemporal Landsat imagery. Remote Sensing of Environment 118: 10 – 20.
16 United Nations Environment Programme. 2009. From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the

Environment. Nairobi.
17 IFAW. 2013. Criminal Nature: the global security implications of the illegal wildlife trade. International Fund for Animal

Welfare., Inc.; World Wildlife Fund. 2012. Fighting illicit wildlife trafficking, A consultation with governments. World Wildlife
Fund. Washington, DC.
18 Ibid - United Nations Environment Programme, 2009; Rustad, S.A., and Binningsbø, H.M. 2012. A price worth fighting for?

Natural resources and conflict recurrence. Journal of Peace Research 49(4): 531-546.
19 Blundell, A.G. and Harwell, E.E. 2016. How Do Peace Agreements Treat Natural Resources? Forest Trends Report Series:

Forest Trade and Finance.

20 United Nations Department of Political Affairs and United Nations Environment Programme. 2016. Natural Resources and

Conflict: A Guide for Mediation Practitioners.

21 World Bank. 2011. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. World Bank. © World Bank;

Kharas, H. 2008. Measuring the Cost of Aid Volatility. Wolfensohn Center for Development at the Brookings Institution. Working
Paper 3, Washington DC.
22 International Fund for Agriculture Development. 2015. IFAD’s Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States and

Situations – corporate-level evaluation; African Development Bank. 2016. From Fragility to Resilience: Managing natural
resources in fragile situations in Africa.
23 Ratner, B.D. et al. 2017. Addressing conflict through collective action in natural resource management. International Journal

of the Commons 11(2): 877-906; Brottem, L. 2016. Environmental Change and Farmer-Herder Conflict in Agro-Pastoral West
Africa. Human Ecology.

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24 Rights and Resources Initiative. 2017. From Risk and Conflict to Peace and Prosperity: The Urgency of Securing Community
Land Rights in a Turbulent World. Washington, DC: Rights and Resources Initiative.
25 Akokpari, J. 2012. Environmental Degradation and Human Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Human Security 8 (1):

24-46; African Development Bank. 2016. From fragility to resilience – managing natural resources in fragile situations in Africa.
26 Ibid - Rustad, S.A., and H.M. Binningsbø, 2012.
27 United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women,

United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, and United Nations Development Programme. 2013. Women and Natural
Resources: Unlocking the Peacebuilding Potential.
28 Rüttinger, L. et al. 2015. A new Climate for Peace – Taking action on climate and fragility risks, Independent report

commissioned paper by G7 members; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 2016, States of
Fragility 2016 – Understanding Violence.
29 Kelley, C.P. et al. 2015. Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought. PNAS 112(11):

3241 – 3246.
30 UN, UNEP, EU, UNDESA, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, DPA and PBSO. 2012. Toolkit and guidance for preventing and managing land

and natural resources conflict. Renewable Resources and Conflict. United Nations Interagency Framework for Preventative
Action.
31 World Food Program. 2017. At the Root of Exodus: Food security, conflict and international migration.
32 Roulin, A. et al. 2017. Nature Knows no Boundaries: The Role of Nature Conservation in Peacebuilding. Trends in Ecology &

Evolution; UNEP. 2014. Relationships and Resources: Environmental governance for peacebuilding and resilient livelihoods in
Sudan.
33 Ibid – UNEP, 2009; Bruch, C., Muffett, C. and Nichols, S.S. Eds. 2016. Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-conflict

Peacebuilding. Routledge, London; Conca, K. and Wallace, J. 2012. Environment and peacebuilding in war-­­torn societies:
Lessons from the UN Environment Programme’s experience with post-­­conflict assessment. In Assessing and Restoring Natural
Resources in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Jensen, D. and Lonergan, S. Eds.
34 Tubi, A. and Feitelson, E. 2016. Drought and cooperation in a conflict prone area: Bedouin herders and Jewish farmers in

Israel’s northern Negev, 1957–1963. Political Geography 51: 30 – 42.

35 Sanio, T. and Chapagain, B. 2012. Local Peace Building and Conflict Transformation in Nepal Through Community Forestry and

Forest User Groups. In High-Value Natural Resources and Post-conflict Peacebuilding, Eds. Lujala, P. and Rustad, S.A. Routledge.
London.
36 Miner, M. et al. 2009. Water sharing between India and Pakistan: a critical evaluation of the Indus Water Treaty. Water

International 34(2): 204 – 216.

37 Ratner, B.D. et al. 2017. Addressing conflict through collective action in natural resource management. International Journal

of the Commons 11(2): 877-906.

38 Meinzen-Dick, R. and Pradhan, R. 2016. Property Rights and Legal Pluralism in Post- Conflict Environments: Problem or

Opportunity for Natural Resource Management? Governance, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Eds. Bruch,
C., Muffett, C. and Nichols, S.S. London: Earthscan.
39 Kark, S. et al., 2015. Cross-boundary collaboration: key to the conservation puzzle. Current Opinion in Environmental

Sustainability 12: 12 – 24.

40 Quinn M.S., Broberg, L., and Freimund, W. (Eds). 2012. Parks, Peace, and Partnership: Global Initiatives in Transboundary

Conservation. University of Calgary Press.

41 Rüttinger, L. et al. 2015. A new Climate for Peace – Taking action on climate and fragility risks (2015).
42 Kark S. et al. 2009. Between country collaboration and consideration of costs increase conservation planning efficiency in the

Mediterranean Basin. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2009, 106:15368-15373.

43 Díaz S. et al. 2006. Biodiversity Loss Threatens Human Well-Being. PLoS Biol 4(8): e277. 7
44 Duffy, R. 2014. Waging a war to save biodiversity: the rise of militarized conservation. International Affairs 90(4): 819-834.
45 Hanson, T. et al. 2009. Warfare in Biodiversity Hotspots. Conservation Biology 23(3): 578 – 587.
46 Nkonya E. et al. 2016. Economics of Land Degradation and Improvement: An Introduction and Overview. In: Nkonya E.,

Mirzabaev A., von Braun J. (Eds) Economics of Land Degradation and Improvement – A Global Assessment for Sustainable
Development. Springer, Cham.
47 Golam R. and Sharma, B. 2015. The nexus approach to water–energy–food security: an option for adaptation to climate

change. Climate Policy 16:6, 682-702.

48 Dabelko et al. 2013. Backdraft: Conflict Potential of Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation. The Wilson Center

Environmental Change and Security 14(2).

49 See case of Ghana: http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/burning-truth-behind-e-waste-dump-africa-

180957597/

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50 Hove, M., et al. 2013. The Urban Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Threat to Human Security and Sustainable Development.
Stability: International Journal of Security and Development. 2(1), p.Art. 7.
51 Morrow, N., 2018. Armed conflict and environmental protection: Global Environment Facility insights for security and

sustainability. Unpublished report.

52 Armed conflict defined as minimum 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. Based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data

Program (UCDP) within the Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research.
53 In contrast to the global-level analysis which used data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the land degradation

portion of the analysis utilized conflict data from The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), which has
collected geocoded conflict event data for Africa since 1997. The ACLED dataset includes event data on battles, violence against
civilians, riots/protests, and significant non-violent military action. Geocoded GEF project data was obtained through Aid Data,
which provides open data for international projects. GEF land degradation projects were geocoded as part of a ‘Value for
Money Analysis’ (VfM) that used spatial statistics to estimate project benefits to climate change mitigation and protection from
land degradation or rehabilitation of degraded land.
54Transforming Risks into Cooperation – the Environment and Security Initiative, 2003-2013. Since 2003, the Environment and

Security Initiative (ENVSEC) has developed into a unique multi-agency program aimed at identifying and reducing interlinked
environment and security risks through strengthened cooperation in four regions: Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe,
Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Partner organizations include the UN Environment, the Organization for Security and Co-
Operation in Europe (OSCE), the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), and the Regional Environment Centre for
Central and Eastern Europe (REC).
55 See for example: UNEP-WCMC with support from UNDP and UNEP. 2010. Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: A manual for

assessment practitioners; Conservation International Ecosystem Values and Accounting (EVA) system; Joint initiative with many
partners including UNEP, UNDP, IUCN, and Economics of Land Degradation (ELD).
56 GEF Independent Evaluation Office. GEF Country Portfolio Study: Timor-Leste (2004 – 2011). Evaluation Report No. 77. April

2012.
57 World Bank. 2018. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. World Bank, Washington DC.;

World Bank. 2011. Operationalizing the 2011 World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and Development. Washington,
DC: World Bank. See also: Asian Development Bank. 2012. Peacebuilding Tool for a Conflict-Sensitive Approach to
Development. Manila.
58 United Nations Development Programme. 2016. Building Inclusive Societies and Sustaining Peace through Democratic

Governance and Conflict Prevention: An Integrated Approach. New York: UN..

59 The International Crisis Group is an independent organization that works to prevent wars and shape policies that build a

more peaceful world through field research, analysis and high-level advocacy.
60 Li, J.C. 2008. Environmental Impact Assessments in Developing Countries: An Opportunity for Greater Environmental

Security? Working Paper No. 4, USAID and Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability.
61 Hermans, L.M. 2008. Exploring the Promise of Actor Analysis for Environmental Policy Analysis: Lessons from Four Cases in

Water Resources Management. Ecology and Society 13(1): 21.

62 See, for example: Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Labour Organization. 2009. The Livelihood

Assessment Tool-kit; UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme. Ecosystem-based Disaster Risk Reduction (Eco-DRR).
63 UN Environment, 2015. Natural Resources and Conflict – a Guide for Mediation Practitioners (UNEP and UN Department of

Political Affairs).
64 The GEF. 2015. Water for our Future: GEF Action on Water, Environment and Sustainable Livelihoods.
65 Söderbaum, F. and Granit, J. 2014. The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Relevance for Transboundary Waters and the

Global Environment Facility. Global Environment Facility, Washington, DC.

66 Conservation International. 2017. Environmental Peacebuilding Training Manual; IUCN. 2010. Negotiate: Reaching

agreements over water.

67 Biagini et al. 2014. A typology of adaptation actions: A global look at climate adaptation actions financed through the Global

Environment Facility. Global Environmental Change 25: 97 – 108; Bierbaum, R. et al. 2018. Integration to solve complex
environmental problems. Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel to the Global Environment Facility. Washington, DC.

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