ACA_Report_HypersonicWeapons_2021

Understanding Hypersonic Weapons:
Managing the Allure and the Risks

Shannon Bugos and Kingston Reif
An Arms Control Association Report September 2021

About the Authors
Shannon Bugos is a research associate at the Arms Control Association, where she focuses on nuclear
disarmament, U.S.-Russian arms control, and hypersonic weapons and emerging technologies.
Kingston Reif is the director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association, where
his work focuses on nuclear disarmament, deterrence, arms control, preventing nuclear terrorism, missile defense,
and the defense budget.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the Arms Control Association’s Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball for his
assistance in reviewing this report and Julia Masterson, research associate, for her copy edit. Special thanks to
Allen Harris for the report’s layout and design.
James Acton, Michael Klare, and Sam Wilson provided thoughtful feedback on this report. The authors would also
like to acknowledge the German Federal Foreign Office and the European Leadership Network for their support.
The authors are responsible for the content of the report, and the statements made and views expressed do not
necessarily represent the views of the Arms Control Association’s Board of Directors.
Cover Photo
Airmen from the 912th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron secure the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response
Weapon (ARRW) as it is loaded under the wing of a B-52H bomber during a test at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., on
Aug. 6, 2020. (Photo by U.S. Air Force)
© Arms Control Association, September 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Executive Summary
4 Section I: What are Hypersonic Weapons?
8 Section II: Who is Developing Hypersonic Weapons and Why?
• The United States

• Russia
• China
15 Section III: Hypersonic Weapons and Strategic Stability
• Hypersonic weapons can prompt an escalation of a

conflict due to target ambiguity.
conflict due to warhead ambiguity.
conflict due to their high speeds, which can lead to a
reduction in response time and the potential for more
successful strikes against time-critical targets.
• Hypersonic weapons risk further upsetting the already
tense offense-defense interrelationship and perpetuating
a competitive cycle of one-upmanship.
• Hypersonic weapons could exacerbate the stability risks
posed by other advancing technologies of concern, such
as counterspace and cyber capabilities.
20 Section IV: Hypersonic Arms Control Options
• Confidence-Building Measures
• Bans
• Limits
• Unilateral U.S. Measures
• Getting to the Negotiating Table
24 Section V: Recommended Action Items for Congress
28 Endnotes
Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks 1

Executive Summary
D
epending on who you talk to in Washington, DC, defense and national policy
circles, hypersonic weapons are “super-duper” missiles poised to revolutionize
warfare because they are impossible to defend against. Others say they are but
the latest in a long line of overhyped weapons systems and are relatively easy to defend
against because they actually fly more slowly as they near their target than ballistic missiles
with comparable ranges. Some claim that hypersonic weapons will strengthen conventional
deterrence by leveling the playing field with adversaries who are also developing—and have
already deployed—hypersonic weapons. Still others argue they will create instability between
nuclear-armed nations by increasing fears of a disarming attack and by fueling a dangerous
arms race.
This debate has gained increased attention in a clear concept of operations for the deployment
recent years as the United States has poured billions of the weapons or a detailed explanation for why
of dollars—and plans to pour billions more—into alternative military capabilities are not adequate to
accelerating the development of hypersonic weapons meet mission requirements. Other important details
and as China and Russia make headway in developing about the department’s plans for the weapons are yet
and deploying their own such weapons. The U.S. to be determined, including the projected costs of the
Department of Defense is funding no less than missile systems under development and production
eight prototype hypersonic weapons programs with quantities. Meanwhile, the Pentagon appears to be
the aim of fielding an initial capability of at least paying less attention to the ways in which hypersonic
some of those by 2022 amid a renewed emphasis on weapons could lead to new escalation dangers
competition with Beijing and Moscow. Russia fielded in a conflict, including to the nuclear level, and
the Avangard, a hypersonic glide vehicle, in 2019 and contribute to a burgeoning arms race with all sides
is developing an air-launched hypersonic missile (the rushing the deployment of the new weapons lest they
Kinzhal) and a sea-launched hypersonic cruise missile be perceived as falling behind the others in mastery of
(the Tsirkon). China displayed a ballistic missile the new technologies involved.
designed specifically to carry a hypersonic glide The Pentagon’s current pedal-through-the-floor
vehicle (the DF-17) during its 2019 military parade. development approach to hypersonic weapons
While Washington is only pursuing conventional enjoys strong bipartisan support in Congress. Most
hypersonic weapons at this time, Beijing and Moscow lawmakers seem convinced that the United States
appear to be seeking not only conventional but also must have hypersonic weapons simply because China
nuclear or dual-capable hypersonic capabilities. and Russia are pursuing them. For its part, the Biden
Thus far, the Defense Department has offered administration appears likely to continue many, if
varying and at times conflicting rationales for not all, of the prototyping efforts begun under the
pursuing hypersonic missiles. It has not offered Trump administration as part of its prioritization of
2 An Arms Control Association Report

The Defense Department has offered varying and at times conflicting rationales for the U.S. pursuit of hypersonic weapons.
(Photo by Staff/AFP via Getty Images)
long-range precision fires to strengthen conventional and the United States, along with a review of each
deterrence against China and Russia. country’s stated motivations—to the extent they can
But the U.S. rush to field hypersonic weapons be ascertained—for pursuing the weapons.
merits a more critical examination by the Biden Section III examines the possible risks hypersonic
administration and Congress given the many weapons pose to strategic stability. Such risks include
unanswered questions about their rationale, technical those emanating from target and warhead ambiguity,
viability, cost-effectiveness, and escalatory risks. a reduction in response time, the potential ability to
This report outlines the scope of these unanswered target mobile missiles, arms racing, and exacerbating
questions, details the underappreciated risks to threats posed by other emerging technologies.
stability posed by the weapons, assesses the viability Section IV outlines how arms control might be
of arms control as a tool to reduce the risks, and applied to hypersonic weapons to mitigate the risks
suggests recommended action items for Congress to they pose and to curb unconstrained competition.
better its understanding about the Pentagon’s plans Experts have begun to explore various options
for the weapons, eliminate potential redundancies in ranging from confidence-building measures to bans
weapons capabilities, and mitigate stability risks. or limits on certain types of weapons. There are also
Section I of the report describes the characteristics unilateral steps that the United States could take to
of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic minimize escalatory risks.
cruise missiles (HCMs), some of the technical Finally, Section V proposes six recommended
challenges the weapons have yet to overcome, and action items for Congress to scrutinize the Defense
how both proponents and skeptics view the benefits Department’s plans to develop and field new
and downsides of the weapons relative to existing hypersonic weapons, consider adjustments to the
missile capabilities. programs, and make better-informed decisions
Section II provides an overview of the current regarding hypersonic weapons program oversight
hypersonic weapons programs in China, Russia, and funding.

Section I:
What are Hypersonic Weapons?
A
hypersonic missile is a missile that travels at least five times the speed of sound
(Mach 5). Most traditional ballistic missiles fly at hypersonic speeds, whereas
most traditional cruise missiles fly at subsonic (less than Mach 1) and supersonic
(Mach 1 to 5) speeds. For example, the Minuteman III, the United States’ nuclear-armed
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), can hit Mach 23 at burnout and would reach Russia
from silos housed in the western United States within about 30 minutes after launching.1
In practice, the term “hypersonic weapons” has generally come to mean missiles that fly at
lower altitudes than ICBMs and greater altitudes than traditional cruise missiles and that are
largely intended for regional rather than intercontinental use.
The hypersonic weapons that are the main focus of characteristics are said to offer the potential to
this report are the two new types under development: enhance the probability of destroying high-value,
hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic heavily defended, and time-sensitive targets, such
cruise missiles (HCMs). as road-mobile missiles and surface-to-air missiles.
HGVs are launched by a rocket before gliding to “Hypersonic weapons are an evolution in technology
a target, fly at lower altitudes than ballistic missiles, that does present…very different, qualitatively
and feature significant maneuverability. HCMs are different, considerations for strategy, and therefore
powered by high-speed engines, called scramjets, it is a game-changer,” argues Rebeccah Heinrichs, a
during flight and are intended to fly at both greater senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.4
speed and greater altitudes than traditional cruise Yet, there exists significant debate among defense
missiles.2 Both types can carry conventional or nuclear officials and experts about whether hypersonic
payloads. Conventional variants may be able to rely weapons, in particular HGVs, will work as intended,
on the kinetic energy, or the energy derived from their prove cost-effective, and offer militarily relevant
high speed, to destroy their intended targets. advantages in their use as compared to alternatives
This fusion of speed, maneuverability, and unique such as already existing ballistic and cruise missiles.
altitudes, plus the suggestion by some U.S. defense Ballistic missiles follow a largely predictable, arched
officials that the weapons are more accurate,3 helps trajectory, flying high above the atmosphere before
to explain the attention that their development plummeting back towards Earth. This permits those
has garnered in recent years. In particular, these on the receiving end to more easily track the ballistic

Figure 1: Comparison of Ballistic and Hypersonic Flight Trajectories
Ballistic missiles follow a largely predictable, arched trajectory, flying high above the atmosphere before plummeting back
towards Earth. Hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles fly at lower altitudes within the atmosphere and follow different
flight paths. (Illustration by United States Government Accountability Office)
Note: Air and sea-launched variants of hypersonic missiles are not pictured.
missile in its midcourse stage of flight through radar final descent to Earth, assuming they are fitted with a
and to derive reasonable predictions onWeapon
where the system development often includes
special maneuvering science
reentry vehicleand technology
(MaRV).”
missile’s warhead(s) will land. (S&T) efforts aimed at But the flight of hypersonic weapons at a low We
developing and maturing key technologies.
have previously
HGVs, however, follow a different path and so are found that DOD
altitude does prioritizes
come with S&T investments
drawbacks, based on
according
near- and
said to be less detectable by adversary radars. “[R]adarfar-term adversarial threats, capability needs, and warfighter
to Tracy. “Drag from the surrounding air [in the
requirements. 4 Successful
will detect these vehicles relatively late in their mid-
technology development is a progression from
atmosphere] robs these missiles of much of their speed
less mature
course flight (that is, their glide phase) because they S&T research to
by the timeproduct development
they reach in the form
a distant target, ofthem
giving testable
prototypes.
fly at low altitudes compared to ballistic missiles,” First, technology development seeks to study or mature the
an average speed lower than that of ballistic missiles,”
writes Dean Wilkening, a former senior staff scientist he writes.8 Plus, during their atmospheric flight,
at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory.5 HGVs experience more extreme heating, which can
With HGVs reaching between 40km and 100km erode missile material and alter their aerodynamics.
in altitude and HCMs flying between 20km and The effects from such immense heat can also block
4GAO, Defense Science and Technology: Adopting Best Practices Can Improve
30km,6 these weapons can use aerodynamic forces to communication with satellites and other external
Innovation Investments and Management, GAO-17-499 (Washington, D.C.: June 29,
maneuver and adjust or course-correct their2017).trajectory sources of guidance, thereby weakening control.9
throughout the majority of their flight. Public details on U.S. progress toward overcoming
To be sure, ballistic missiles feature a degree of these challenges have been scarce. A September 2020
maneuverability. But as Cameron Tracy, the Kendall press release from the U.S. Defense Advanced Research
fellow for the global security program at the Union of Projects Agency (DARPA) stated vaguely that future
Page 4 GAO-21-378 Hypersonic Weapons
Concerned Scientists, notes “the maneuverability of testing will focus, in part, on “thermal management
hypersonic missiles is far superior to that of ballistic techniques.”10 Meanwhile, the Navy, in its fiscal
missiles.”7 year 2021 budget justification books, listed “unique
“Since hypersonic weapons fly through the challenges like extreme temperatures and air flow” as
atmosphere, they can take advantage of aerodynamic areas of continued hypersonic research.11
forces to course-correct over most of their flight The heating problem is not as concerning with
paths,” he writes. “Ballistic missiles, in contrast, can respect to HCMs, according to James Acton, co-
execute corrective maneuvers only for brief periods director of the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie
during their initial ascent out of the atmosphere and Endowment for International Peace. Since cruise

A missile carrying a common hypersonic glide body launches from the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii on March 19,
2020. (Photo by U.S. Department of Defense)
missiles fly slower than rocket-launched systems, air and missile defenses. This would allow them to
he writes, “their aerodynamic regime is better provide a higher probability of carrying out a successful
understood.”12 Challenges facing HCMs include strike. In the words of Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of
controlling the hypersonic flow of air through the the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “There is no defense against
scramjet engine to ensure stable combustion and hypersonic…You’re not going to defend against it…
managing the temperature of that air passing through Those things are going so fast, you’re not going to
the engine. get it.”16 Nonetheless, the United States has begun
In addition to overcoming the challenges to investing in defensive capabilities to defend against
flight, the accuracy demands for HGVs and HCMs, hypersonic payloads. U.S. defense officials say that
specifically conventional variants, could be greater doing so “will require the development of wholly
relative to existing missiles. If conventional HGVs and new intercept systems, supporting technologies, and
HCMs must rely on kinetic energy to destroy their a new sensor architecture.”17 At this time, only the
respective targets, they would have to hit their targets United States is known to be developing a defense
with extreme precision in order to ensure target system to defend against HGVs.18 Initial U.S. defensive
destruction.13 efforts against hypersonic weapons are focused on
Then-Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy said intercepting regional hypersonic threats during their
in October 2020 that “hypersonic missiles are hitting terminal phase.
their targets with a variance of only a mere six inches,” HGVs pose a particular problem for broad-area
referring to the test of a common hypersonic glide midcourse missile defenses, which form the backbone
body under development by the Army and Navy in of the U.S. missile defense architecture. Such defenses,
March of that year.14 But Tracy casts doubt on the meant to protect a large region, are designed to
assertion that hypersonic weapons can strike with intercept missiles in their midcourse phase outside
pinpoint accuracy, and he instead argues that the Earth’s atmosphere. Since an HGV maneuvers
guidance precision and atmospheric effects could during its midcourse phase and travels inside the
diminish accuracy.15 Earth’s atmosphere at lower altitudes, the defenses
The conventional wisdom holds that given their would be hard-pressed to successfully intercept the
unique flight altitude profile and high speed, HGVs vehicle. Furthermore, existing midcourse defenses rely
and HCMs pose challenges to many existing types of primarily upon land- and sea-based radars to detect

and track an incoming missile, and those radars would
likely be less effective against HGVs.19
Acton, however, posits that point defenses, which
protect particular targets, may prove more efficient
against HGVs. This is due to the fact that, once within
the atmosphere, the HGV will travel slower by the
time it reaches its target due to drag, thereby bettering
the chances of success for point defenses designed for
a terminal stage intercept.20
Another area of debate is whether hypersonic
weapons, and HGVs in particular, can be purchased at
a cost-effective price. Paul Schaare, the vice president
and director of studies at the Center for a New
American Security, and Ainikki Riikonen, a research
assistant at the Center for a New American Security,
warn that “Even once the technology is developed,
hypersonic missiles are unlikely to be affordable
enough to be anything other than an exquisite silver
bullet for the highest priority targets.”21
The Defense Department appears to be developing
HCMs in part to guard against the concern that HGVs
might be unaffordable. “The mission for the cruise
missile has to do with—or the value proposition,
let me put it in that term, the fact that the cruise
missile is smaller, so it—it’s more affordable, and it Michael White leads efforts on hypersonic weapons
fits on a wider range of platforms,” Michael White, development in the office of the undersecretary of
assistant director for hypersonic weapons in the office defense for research and engineering.
(Photo by U.S. Department of Defense)
of the undersecretary of defense for research and
engineering, told reporters in March 2020.22
Concerns about the potential limitations of HGVs
have also prompted questions about whether their not ballistic missiles deployed today,” he adds, “but
use provides distinct advantages over the use of other missiles that could be developed using lower-risk
existing types of missiles, especially ballistic missiles. technology, perhaps by modification of existing
“Most of the missions proposed for hypersonic weapons.”
gliders, such as a quick attack on a fleeting target, are Other alternatives such as stealth and forward
already met, or could be met, just as well by ballistic deployments could also provide military capabilities
missiles,” writes Ivan Oelrich, former vice president that could be more cost-effective than hypersonic
of the Federation of American Scientists.23 “Perhaps weapons at achieving a given military requirement.

Section II:
Who is Developing Hypersonic
Weapons and Why?
C
urrently, China, Russia, and the United States are the top pursuers of HGVs and
HCMs. While the United States is at present focused solely on a conventional
capability for the weapons, China and Russia are pursuing weapons that can also
carry nuclear warheads.

Meanwhile, Australia, India, France, Japan, and the Missile Defense Agency’s pursuit of a hypersonic
Germany are also developing hypersonic weapons weapons defense program.
technology, though these efforts are beyond the scope The main military rationale given for the U.S.
of this paper.24 pursuit of HGVs and HCMs by Pentagon officials
appears to be to ensure defeat of advancing adversary,
The United States particularly Chinese, air and missile defenses and
The Trump administration requested a total of to enable destruction of fleeting targets, including
$5.8 billion for all hypersonic-related research and adversary hypersonic weapons.
development for fiscal years 2020 and 2021. In May, “These capabilities help ensure that our warfighters
the Biden administration released its fiscal year 2022 will maintain the battlefield dominance necessary to
budget request, which asked for $3.8 billion for all deter, and if necessary, defeat any future adversary,”
hypersonic-related work at the Defense Department. said White in March 2020.26 Under this view, existing
The Biden administration appears intent on speeding U.S. conventional missile capabilities, which fly at
ahead with plans that began under the Trump subsonic speeds, lack the speed and maneuverability
administration for the development and deployment necessary to contend with advancing adversary
of offensive hypersonic weapons programs as part of threats. Existing subsonic cruise missiles, such as the
a continued emphasis on strengthening conventional Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile and the Joint
deterrence against China and Russia. Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), “will take on
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said June 10 that the order of 10 times longer to fly long-range strike
“This budget supports our efforts to…accelerate missions when compared to the adversary’s high-
investments in cutting-edge capabilities that will speed systems,” White added in May. “It presents a
define the future fight, such as hypersonics and long- battlefield asymmetry and timescale that we simply
range fires.”25 cannot allow to stand.”27
The $3.8 billion covers efforts within the Army, According to Gen. John Hyten, currently vice
Air Force, and Navy as they each pursue hypersonic chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hypersonic
weapon prototypes, some with ranges exceeding weapons will allow for “responsive, long-range, strike
3,000km. It also includes the Defense Advanced options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical
Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) research and threats when other forces are unavailable, denied
development work related to hypersonic weapons and access, or not preferred.”28

U.S. Hypersonic Weapons Programs
conventional, Range
Lead nuclear, Description Speed (in Schedule
dual-capable kilometers)
AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW)

an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle, using
Air Mach initial operating capability
conventional Tactical Boost Glide technology and with a tungsten 1,600
Force 6.5–8 in FY 2022
fragmentation warhead (which is limited to soft targets)
FY 2021 ($ thousands—enacted) 386,157 FY 2022 ($ thousands—requested) 399,112
Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM)

new start program in FY
Air a hypersonic cruise missile, using air-breathing Mach
conventional unknown* 2022; complete critical
Force technology 5+* design review in FY2023
FY 2021 ($ thousands—enacted) N/A FY 2022 ($ thousands—requested) 200,116
Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW, also called Dark Eagle)

the common hypersonic glide body paired with
the Navy’s booster system on mobile ground Mach initial operating
Army conventional 2,775
platforms; at least the first battery will feature a 5+* capability in FY 2023
tungsten fragmentation warhead
Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS)

the common hypersonic glide body paired initial operating
with a submarine-launched booster system capability on Zumwult-
on Zumwult-class destroyers and Virginia- Mach class destroyers in
Navy conventional unknown*
class submarines; this system may feature 5+* FY 2025 and on Virginia-
the tungsten fragmentation warhead or an class submarines in
alternative warhead FY 2028
FY 2021 ($ thousands—enacted) 767,637 FY 2022 ($ thousands—requested) 1,374,000
Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment II (OASuW-2)

new start program in
an air-launched, long-range hypersonic Mach
Navy conventional unknown* FY 2022; planned for
weapon system 5+* deployment in the 2030s
FY 2021 ($ thousands—enacted) N/A FY 2022 ($ thousands—requested) 56,964
Tactical Boost Glide (TBG)
a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle; capabilities Mach testing through

DARPA conventional tactical
planned for Air Force and Navy 7+ FY 2022
Operation Fires (OpFires)

complete critical
a ground-launched system with TBG technology; Mach
DARPA conventional intermediate design review in
capabilities planned for the Army 5+* FY 2022
Hypersonic Air-Breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC)

an air-launched hypersonic cruise missile that complete final
Mach
DARPA conventional could be compatible with a variety of launch unknown* program review in
5+*
platforms; capabilities planned for the Air Force FY 2022
*no estimate or information publicly available

U.S. Hypersonic Missile Defense
FY2021 FY2022
Program Lead Description Schedule ($ thousands− ($ thousands−
enacted) requested)
a layered defensive architecture to

Missile address regional hypersonic threats begin fielding GPIs
Hypersonic
Defense that uses the Aegis Weapon System and in the mid- to late- 272,632 247,931
Defense
Agency includes the development of a Glide 2020s
Phase Interceptor (GPI)
Hypersonic
and
a multilayered network of satellites in low
Ballistic Missile prototype satellites
Earth orbit, working alongside the Space
Tracking Defense to be launched in 130,000 256,222
Development Agency's National Defense
Space Agency FY 2023
Space Architecture
Sensor
(HBTSS)
But the motivations given by Pentagon officials David Zikusoka, a former research fellow at the
have varied. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, has
Other officials have focused less on the military called the U.S. development approach the “prototype-
benefits and more on the need to win the competition first approach.”33 “On one hand, this prototype-
with China and Russia on the development of the first approach could support the rapid operational
technology. Michael Griffin, a former undersecretary deployment of hypersonic capabilities,” he writes.
of defense for research and engineering, has “On the other, the United States is taking risk by
emphasized that the United States needs to develop developing these systems without comprehensive
the weapons in order “to allow us to match what our requirements (a defined set of attributes, functions,
adversaries are doing.”29 Griffin has also said that the and quantities) that could illuminate how these
United States will “raise them one, in both offensive weapons fit comparatively and complementarily into
and defensive capabilities.”30 the strike portfolio.”
Sam Wilson of the Aerospace Corporation has U.S. military officials do not claim that HGVs and
characterized the goals described by Griffin as the HCMs should necessarily replace existing missile
“Get Ahead” viewpoint. “The organizing principle and bomb inventories. Rather they argue that the
of Get Ahead is that by becoming the leader in hypersonic missiles would allow existing weapons to
hypersonic missile development, the United States can be more effective. “The actual purpose for all of our
achieve a strategic advantage over Russia and China,” investment is to supplement our existing theater strike
Wilson writes. “Such an advantage, according to the capability using traditional cruise missiles, as well as
approach, would offer warfighting and deterrence penetrating aircraft,” White said in February 2021.34
benefits.”31 Proponents also view hypersonic weapons as an
The different motivations put forward by defense option for strikes against challenging time-sensitive
officials raise questions about whether specific targets to destroy, such as mobile missiles. Given
military requirements are driving U.S. development their ability to relocate, this type of target has long
decisions, or if the main driver is to weaponize the been difficult to identify, track, and successfully
technology now and figure out specific roles and destroy before the missile launches. Subsonic missiles,
missions later. Zikusoka writes, “would struggle to strike mobile
Maj. Gen. Mark Weatherington, commander of the missiles in time to make a difference.” But while faster
8th Air Force and the Joint-Global Strike Operations flying HGVs and HCMs could in theory have a better
Center, said last year that the Air Force is still crafting chance of destroying relocatable targets than subsonic
its concept of operations for hypersonic weapons. alternatives, it is far from clear that they would be
He posited a handful of questions that the Air Force able to do so given persisting challenges such as
has yet to answer: “How are we going to employ determining the precise location of and delivering a
hypersonic weapons? What do they bring to the weapon to such a target in sufficient time.
battlefield? What are our considerations for planning The Defense Department’s desired production goals for
and executing and integrating them in a fight? How HGVs and/or HCMs is unclear. A smaller number, say in
do we understand the target, where it’s at, where it the dozens to low hundreds, would suggest a desire for a
may be going, and make sure we can close that kill niche capability, while higher numbers would point to
chain on a particular target?”32 a desire for a more robust war-fighting capability.

“If we talk about ballistic missile defense or Strike Missile, a mid-range missile capability, and
hypersonic offense and we talk about proliferating the LRHW—though whether the LRHW would have
architectures, we need many dozens, many hundreds, violated the letter of the treaty remains a subject
maybe thousands of assets,” said Griffin in 2019. of debate.42 Several Pentagon officials have made a
“This takes us back to the Cold War where at one strong push for the development of longer-range
point we had 30,000 nuclear warheads and missiles to ground-launched missiles to complement the long-
launch them.”35 A few months later, Griffin declined range air and sea capabilities already provided by
“to quote a number,” but said that “we are making the Air Force and Navy. “A wider base of long-range
a major investment in production of hypersonic precision fires…is critically important to stabilize
weaponry at scale” and “we’re going to be making a what is becoming a more unstable environment in
major investment of many billions of dollars.”36 the western Pacific,” Adm. Philip Davidson, then-head
There is debate within the expert community about of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told the Senate Armed
how many of these weapons the United States should Services Committee in March.43
buy and deploy. Wilkening has called for fielding Ray’s criticism of the Army’s plans suggests the
“enough forces to deter Chinese hypersonic attacks Pentagon is not unified on the best way forward
against our carriers and airfields and other critical for the long-range strike mission and highlights the
targets in the Western Pacific.” In this case, he says, funding challenges ahead, particularly amid projected
“I come up with numbers in the many hundreds if flat defense budgets in the coming years. “Why would
not several thousand such targets, and so to me, you we entertain a brutally expensive idea, when we
need inventories on that size.”37 Jill Hruby, currently don’t, as a department, have the money?” Ray asked
administrator of the National Nuclear Security in reference to the projected cost of the Army’s LRHW.
Administration, however, suggests that hypersonic Ray also raised questions about the ability of the
weapons could be used for “surgical strike capabilities,” Army to find basing options for the weapon. The
which would require “tens” of them.38 Army, he said, is trying to “skate right past that brutal
In addition to uncertainty about concepts of reality to check that some of those countries are never
operations for and desired numbers of hypersonic going to let you put…stuff like that in their theater…
weapons, the Defense Department has yet to establish Just go ask your allies.”
any official programs of record for the weapons. Some Army officials have also acknowledged the
According to the Congressional Research Service, this diplomatic challenge associated with basing. “It
suggests that the Pentagon “may not have approved may be that none of our allies and partners in the
either requirements for the systems or long-term Pacific want long-range fires” on their soil, Col. Jason
funding plans.”39 Nevertheless, the Pentagon has Charland, a senior Army strategist at the Pentagon,
adopted an “aggressive” schedule for flight tests, with told Breaking Defense in March.44 In the wake of
three HGV flight tests planned for 2021 and as many the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019,
as 40 hypersonic weapons tests over the next five years, U.S. allies and partners, including Australia, Japan,
according to a March 2021 report by the Government and South Korea, all rejected the prospect of hosting
Accountability Office (GAO). The GAO expressed missiles formerly banned under the accord.45
skepticism about the schedule due to “logistical
constraints” and the use of “immature technologies.”40
Despite significant U.S. investment in the
accelerated development of conventional hypersonic
weapons for each of the military services, an internal
debate within the department about the rationale for
the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW)
has spilled out into the open. “I genuinely struggle
with the credibility” of the Army’s plan to develop
the LRHW, Gen. Timothy M. Ray, chief of Air Force
Global Strike Command, said in April.41 “I just think
it’s a stupid idea to go and invest that kind of money
that recreates something that the service [Air Force]
has mastered and that we’re doing already right now.
Why in the world would you try that?”
The Army is developing a suite of ground-launched
missiles with a range exceeding the 500-kilometer Gen. Timothy M. Ray, commander of Air Force Global Strike
Command, has raised questions about the rationale for the
limit once prohibited by the 1987 Intermediate-Range Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW).
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, including the Precision (Photo by U.S. Air Force)

Russia
Russia has made no secret of its stated impetus for
its development and deployment of hypersonic
weapons, saying they are intended to ensure Moscow
has weapons capable of evading any future U.S.
anti-missile defenses. “I will speak about the newest
systems of Russian strategic weapons that we are
creating in response to the unilateral withdrawal of
the United States of America from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty,” Russian President Vladimir Putin
said in March 2018 when introducing a slate of
new nuclear weapons delivery systems, including
hypersonic weapons.46 These new systems, Putin said,
are intended to “neutralize the threats posed by the
deployment of the U.S. global missile defense system.”
He added in September 2020 that “the U.S withdrawal
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 forced
Russia to start designing hypersonic weapons.”47
One of the systems Putin highlighted in March 2018
was Avangard, an HGV which can be launched from
an ICBM and allegedly has “unlimited” range and the
Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced a slate of new
ability to render missile defense systems “useless.”48
nuclear weapons delivery systems during a March 2018
Avangard was tested49 and likely first deployed in address. (Photo by Mikhail Svetlov/Getty Images)
December 2019 on the SS-19 ICBM.50 However, the
system will probably be paired with the new Sarmat
heavy ICBM once the missile is deployed, which, START) due to its initial pairing with the SS-19 and
according to reports, will occur sometime in 2021.51 possible future pairing with the Sarmat.53 New START,
The Avangard is believed to carry a nuclear warhead, which entered into force in 2011 and will expire in
though some Russian reports indicate it may also be 2026, caps deployed ICBMs, submarine-launched
capable of carrying a conventional payload.52 Moscow ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers assigned to
has said that the HGV would be counted under the nuclear missions at 700, as well as deployed strategic
2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New nuclear warheads at 1,550.
A display of the warhead of the Avangard hypersonic boost-glide vehicle from a video produced by the Russian Defense
Ministry in 2018. (TASS\TASS via Getty Images)

Russian Hypersonic Weapons Programs
conventional,
Range
Program nuclear, Description Speed Schedule
(in kilometers)
dual-capable
nuclear, a hypersonic boost-glide

Avangard
possibly vehicle launched from an Mach 20+ 6,000 deployed in 2019
(Project 4202)
conventional ICBM (SS-19 or Sarmat)
a hypersonic air-launched,
short-range ballistic reportedly entered
Kinzhal missile; compatible with trial deployment in
dual-capable Mach 10 2,000
("Dagger") the MiG-31K interceptor jet 2017 and became
and the Tu-22M3 strategic operational in 2018
bomber
conventional,
though may a hypersonic cruise missile estimated
3M22 Tsirkon
possibly able to be launched from Mach 5–8 500–1,000 deployment in
(or Zircon)
become nuclear ship or sea 2023
capable
Russia, like the United States, is also developing China

hypersonic weapons intended primarily for use in a China has long shied away from publicly disclosing
regional context. It has fielded Kinzhal (“Dagger”), a information on its nuclear forces, and likewise,
hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM), and relatively little is known about Beijing’s development
is developing the Tsirkon (or Zircon), a hypersonic of hypersonic weapons. Overall, China’s motivations
sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). for pursuing these weapons appear to consist in part
It is not clear what novel threats Russia’s new of defeating U.S. missile defenses and overpowering
nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons pose to the United U.S. offensive weapons in the event of a major conflict
States. Russia’s existing arsenal of long-range ballistic in Asia.
missiles can already circumvent U.S. missile defenses. The U.S. Defense Department, in its 2020 report on
Russian reports state that Kinzhal is designed to target China’s military power, described Beijing’s pursuit of
U.S. or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) various technologies including HGVs as “necessary
ship-based missile defense systems or land-based to counter” U.S. and other countries’ ballistic
systems currently deployed in Romania and in the missile defenses; intelligence, surveillance, and
future in Poland.54 Tsirkon is believed to be designed reconnaissance; and precision strike systems.56 Tong
to help destroy carrier groups and land-based targets, Zhao, a senior fellow in the nuclear policy program at
such as command and control centers within a few the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, writes
kilometers of the coast.55 that, among the vast majority of Chinese experts, “the
Chinese Hypersonic Weapons Programs

conventional,
Range
Program nuclear, Description Speed Schedule
(in kilometers)
dual-capable
a hypersonic glide some reports
Dongfeng-17 dual-capable vehicle on a road-mobile, indicate a
Mach 5–10 1,800–2,500
(DF-17) most likely medium-range ballistic deployment in
missile 2020
a hypersonic vehicle some reports
Xing Kong-2 prototype; also described indicate a
nuclear Mach 6 unknown*
(Starry Sky-2) as a hypersonic waverider deployment in
vehicle 2025
*no estimate or information publicly available

The hypersonic glide vehicle system (DF-17) is seen during a military parade to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the founding
of the People’s Republic of China at Tiananmen Square on October 1, 2019, in Beijing. (Photo by Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)
ability to penetrate defensive systems is considered unconfirmed. According to February 2020 testimony
the most important feature of hypersonic weapons.”57 before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen.
Many U.S. officials, on the other hand, claim that Terrence O’Shaughnessy, then-commander of U.S.
China seeks these capabilities to destroy U.S. aircraft Northern Command and North American Aerospace
carriers and other offensive forces (and their bases in Defense Command, said that “China is testing is an
the western Pacific) in the event of a war in Asia. intercontinental range hypersonic glide vehicle—
The programs underway in China include the similar to the Russian Avangard—which is designed
Dongfeng-17 (DF-17), a medium-range ballistic to fly at high speeds and low altitudes.”62 But it is not
missile system featuring a hypersonic glide vehicle known whether this new system would use the HGV
that U.S. officials estimate has a range between 1,800 from the DF-17 or develop a new HGV.
and 2,500km and that is slated to be deployed in Some experts have questioned whether the DF-17
2020, according to some analysts.58 The system can system poses a new threat relative to China’s existing
potentially reach speeds between Mach 5 and 10.59 long-range ballistic missiles, which fly at hypersonic
China has not stated whether the system will be speeds and, in the case of the DF-21 and DF-26, can
conventional or nuclear, but the U.S. intelligence carry a maneuvering reentry vehicle.63
community has assessed that the DF-17 is dual- China is also developing Xing Kong-2, or Starry
capable.60 Sky-2, which is a nuclear-capable hypersonic vehicle
Some reports speculate that the HGV from the prototype.64 This style of vehicle is known as a
DF-17 could also be paired with the DF-21 nuclear- “waverider” for how it is able to derive lift from the
capable medium-range missile, the DF-26 dual- shockwaves generated by its own hypersonic flight.
capable intermediate-range missile, and the DF-41 The Xing Kong-2 reportedly was successfully flight
dual-capable ICBM.61 However, those reports are tested in 2018.65

Section III:
Hypersonic Weapons and
Strategic Stability
T
he accelerating race between China, Russia, and the United States to develop and
field new hypersonic weapons demonstrates that all three countries believe the
weapons hold great military promise. As the hypersonic weapons competition
continues to heat up, there has been significant debate about whether the weapons are poised
to be a military game-changer or an evolutionary development that will not fundamentally
alter the nature of conflict. But less attention is being paid to the ways in which the
weaponization of this new technology could lead to new escalation dangers in a conflict,
including to the nuclear level.
Sections I and II described the unique characteristics Heather Williams, a senior lecturer in the defense
of hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles, studies department and Centre for Science and
detailed how both proponents and skeptics view the Security Studies at Kings College London, helpfully
benefits and downsides of the weapons relative to expands the concept of strategic stability to also
existing missile capabilities, and surveyed the types include the idea that legally-binding, widely
of and the rationale for the capabilities being pursued practiced arms control agreements can help promote
by the three major powers. This section will examine cooperation over competition.67 Taken altogether
the possible risks the weapons, particularly HGVs, then, strategic stability translates to a decrease in
pose to strategic stability. Risks to stability include the chances of the outbreak of nuclear conflict or
those emanating from target and warhead ambiguity, confrontation, whether intended or inadvertent.
a reduction in response time, the potential ability to
target mobile missiles, arms racing, and exacerbating
threats posed by other emerging technologies. Hypersonic weapons can prompt an escalation
This report defines “strategic stability” as consisting of a conflict due to target ambiguity.
of crisis stability and arms race stability.66 Crisis Conventional hypersonic weapons may be able to
stability is defined as a condition in which nuclear hold at risk targets that in the past have been immune
powers are deterred from launching a nuclear first from attack by conventional weapons. Indeed, as
strike against one another. Arms race stability is mentioned in section II, a primary U.S. rationale for
defined as a condition in which two adversaries do acquiring these weapons is their perceived potential to
not have an incentive to build up their strategic increase the probability of destroying elusive targets
nuclear forces. such as road-mobile missiles.

A model of a hypersonic glide vehicle is tested in a wind tunnel at NASA’s Langley Research Center in Maryland on Dec. 10,
2009. (Photo by NASA’s Langley Research Center)
To the extent that hypersonic capabilities are “able to a country’s nuclear, as opposed to conventional,
hold at risk targets that other weapon systems cannot,” military forces,” which might trigger a nuclear
explains Acton, “it could create certain additional risks response.71
of escalation. In this regard, attacks on command and
control (which might be hard or buried), mobile non-
nuclear missiles, and ASAT [anti-satellite] weapons… Hypersonic weapons can prompt an escalation
could carry particular risks of escalation.”68 of a conflict due to warhead ambiguity.
This escalation risk is further exacerbated when Ambiguity about whether a hypersonic weapon is
the target is a site that houses both conventional and carrying a conventional or nuclear payload could
nuclear delivery systems or dual-use command-and- trigger a nuclear-armed country, targeted by a
control systems. “A state could mistakenly believe conventional attack, to launch its nuclear weapons
that its nuclear forces were under attack when its in response. Of course, this risk is not unique to
conventional forces were really the target (target hypersonic weapons—it is also a risk associated with
ambiguity),” Acton writes. “This situation could arise, dual-capable subsonic cruise missiles and dual-capable
for instance, if a state’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles. But the danger could be greater with
assets were ‘entangled’ because of dual-use command- hypersonic weapons due to their unique flight profile.
and-control systems.”69 The risk warhead ambiguity poses to stability is most
For instance, there is uncertainty about whether acute when a country fields nuclear and conventional
Moscow has deployed nuclear warheads to its variants of the same missile. China and Russia are
Kaliningrad enclave on the Baltic Sea, which is home deploying such dual-capable missiles, including HGVs.
to a variety of dual-use delivery systems including The use of such weapons in a great-power conflict
aircraft and short-range ballistic missiles.70 An could lead to inadvertent escalation. “Warhead
attack on sites like these that intermix nuclear and ambiguity will remain a feature of any future landscape
conventional capabilities “could blur the distinction involving the deployment of multiple hypersonic
between conventional and nuclear war,” writes weapons, as a defender will never be certain that an
Wilkening. “This increases the chance that the enemy’s assault is entirely non-nuclear,” writes Michael
attack will be misperceived as an attempt to degrade Klare, professor emeritus of peace and world-security

studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow Pershing II medium-range, nuclear-armed ballistic
at the Arms Control Association. “With as little as five missiles that the United States deployed in Europe in
minutes to assess an attack—the time it would take the 1980s. The missiles, which could strike Moscow
a hypersonic glide vehicle to traverse 2,000 miles—a in a matter of minutes, were viewed as uniquely
defender would be understandably hard pressed to destabilizing, and, following the ascension of Mikhail
avoid worst-case assumptions.”72 Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union and massive
Concerns about warhead ambiguity prompted anti-nuclear protests in the United States and Europe,
Congress in 2007 to block a request by the George were ultimately eliminated per the terms of the INF
W. Bush administration to modify some Trident Treaty. “If you don’t have essentially the type of
II submarine-launched ballistic missiles to carry almost artificial intelligence-like capabilities because of
conventional warheads. Lawmakers raised concerns the speed at which the munition can travel, you can’t
that Russia might interpret the launch of a find it, sense it, or shoot it because it’ll be there within
conventional Trident missile as a nuclear attack.73 a couple of minutes,” McCarthy said. “And it could
send a very strong message, or it can confuse people,
too. And you could end up in an escalatory type of
Hypersonic weapons can prompt an escalation
situation.” He added, “It’s going to change warfare.”76
of a conflict due to their high speeds, which can
An additional area of concern posed by the speed
lead to a reduction in response time and the
of conventional HGVs and HCMs— and related
potential for more successful strikes against
to the target ambiguity problem—are Chinese
time-critical targets.
and Russian perceptions of these fast weapons as
A risk to stability associated with the extreme speed of
capable of undermining the survivability of their
new hypersonic weapons is that they could reduce the
nuclear forces. As noted in section II, the Defense
amount of time a targeted country has to respond to a
Department has cited engaging mobile missiles in
strike involving the weapons. During this compressed
particular as a rationale for hypersonic weapons. Eric
timeline, a country must first detect a strike, try to
Gomez, director for defense policy studies at the Cato
fully assess the kinds of weapons involved, debate
Institute, has written that targeting these capabilities
the appropriate response, distribute any orders for a
“would…make China’s nuclear forces more vulnerable
retaliatory strike, and then see those orders carried
to attack.”77 Therefore, using hypersonic weapons to
out—an exceedingly difficult proposition.
target dual-capable Chinese mobile missiles and their
The time crunch will increase pressure on
decision-makers and heighten the risk of inadvertent
escalation. With less time to fully understand the
nature and the scope of the attack, decision-makers
may veer towards overestimating the attack, especially
if they view the very forces their country relies on for
retaliation against a first strike to be under imminent
threat. A reduction in decision time exacerbates
the target and warhead ambiguities problems. Less
response time translates to less time to determine
whether an incoming hypersonic weapon carries a
nuclear or conventional payload and less time to
attempt to pinpoint the weapon’s final destination.
The Rand Corporation has estimated that “for
adjacent enemies within a 1,000km range, a
hypersonic missile traveling at ten times the speed of
sound could cover that distance and reduce response
times to about six minutes.”74 Over intercontinental
ranges, the compressed timeline may be less of a
concern, for the time it takes for hypersonic weapons
to travel that greater distance is roughly comparable to
the time it takes for ballistic missiles to do the same, as
noted by Tracy and David Wright, a research affiliate
in the department of nuclear science and engineering
In a January 2020 interview, Ryan McCarthy, then-secretary
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.75
of the Army, warned of the speed of hypersonic weapons
Ryan McCarthy, then-secretary of the Army, in a and argued that they will “change warfare.”
2020 interview compared hypersonic weapons to the (Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

Hypersonic Weapon-related and Technology Development Total Reported Funding by
Type of Effort from Fiscal Years 2015 through 2024, in Billions of Then-Year Dollars
Figure 3: Hypersonic Weapon-related and Technology Development Total Reported Funding by Type of Effort from Fiscal
Years 2015 through 2024, in Billions of Then-Year Dollars
Note: The total funding does not include test and evaluation operations and modernization as these
(Graphic by United States Government Accountability Office)
are outside of hypersonic weapon-related and technology development efforts. Future year funding is
not yet authorized and subject to change. This information was collected in fiscal year 2020 before
fiscal year 2021 budget requests had been considered. For the purposes of this report, fiscal years
2015 through 2020 include reported past funding received, and fiscal years 2021 through 2024
include reported future funding planned.
supporting air-defense and command and control Meanwhile, the United States cites Chinese and
capabilities deep inside Chinese territory, though Russian development of HGVs and HCMs as a
perhaps appealing if the goal is to overwhelm China justification for building up its own hypersonic
As shown in figure 3, the focus of the hypersonic efforts is expected to
in a conventional conflict, runs the risk of inadvertent weapons and missile defenses to guard against these
shift toward product development. Most funding prior to fiscal year 2020
escalation to the nuclear level. weapons. The United States is “working on” deploying
was focused on technology development. However, product development
hypersonic
efforts total almost $9 capabilities,60
billion, representing “but we are
percent of behind
the totalChina and
funding
during
Hypersonic weapons risk further upsetting the these 10 Russia,”
fiscal years, said
and Sen.
for Jim
which Inhofe
most (R-Okla.),
is planned then-acting
for future
years.
already tense offense-defense interrelationship chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in
and perpetuating a competitive cycle of one- 2018.80 Lt. Gen. Duke Richardson, military deputy to
upmanship. DOD accounts for nearly all, or 98
the assistant percent,ofofthe
secretary theAir
total funding
Force for
for acquisition,
hypersonic
“Hypersonic weapons of all types will stimulate an weapon-related
technology,and and
technology development
logistics, echoed thisefforts
remarkfromin June
fiscal years
intense offense-defense competition—a classic form 2015 through 2024. Based
2021, saying that “weon are
surveys, Navy
catching upefforts account
very, very
for the
of arms-race instability,”78 writes Wilkening. Thismost within DOD for this
quickly” andperiod—approximately
“we are getting after it.” 4381percent of total
DOD hypersonic weapon and technology development funding.
But this raises the question of when is enough, Figure 4
competition occurs when the acquisition of offensive
weapons that pose a distinctive new threat to an enough? Do leaders in Washington, Beijing, and
adversary typically results in efforts by that state to Moscow have a clear picture of where the current race
Page 9 GAO-21-378 Hypersonic Weapons
acquire additional defenses against those weapons, to acquire hypersonic weapons is headed or should
leading to the introduction of ever-more capable end? Is there a rationale other than speeding ahead in
offensive weapons. order to come out on top?
This competition is arguably already underway. There is also a financial cost to the race. Congress
One of the main motivations behind Chinese and appropriated in fiscal year 2021 a total of about
Russian development and deployment of new $2.2 billion for the six existing hypersonic weapons
hypersonic weapons is to possess weaponry capable programs at that time and $130 million for hypersonic
of evading U.S. missile defenses. “Hypersonic missiles missile defense. The GAO estimates the cost of
are being developed to bypass perceived U.S. missile hypersonic weapons and technology development
defense capabilities,” Vice Adm. Jon Hill, director of efforts to be $15 billion from fiscal years 2015 through
the Missile Defense Agency, told the Senate Armed 2024. Funding has increased substantially across those
Services Committee in June 2021.79 years, “including an increase of approximately 740

percent between fiscal years 2015 and 2020.” These a marked edge over its competitors. In such a case,
expenditures are just for the prototype phase and do instability could arise as some countries view their
not include the cost to produce and sustain operational military capabilities as no longer sufficient and race to
weapons “because DOD has not yet budgeted for try to keep pace or get ahead in the competition.
them.” 82 Two programs in the prototype phase have “My real concern about arms racing right now is
already “experienced either formal cost increases or not a hypersonic arms race per say, but it’s the arms
have submitted budget estimates that exceed their race when all these technologies are kind of being
previous rough order-of-magnitude estimates.”83 developed at the same time, and we need to think
through the possible interconnectivity that could be
produced and what could be a pretty serious arms
Hypersonic weapons could exacerbate the race if we’re not careful,” notes Hruby, specifically
stability risks posed by other advancing mentioning the simultaneous weaponization of
technologies of concern, such as counterspace cyberspace, space, and AI.85
and cyber capabilities. For example, Klare has highlighted the risks that
The risks posed by the development and the may emerge in a world in which the nuclear powers
deployment of hypersonic weapons must be assessed possess hypersonic weapons and begin to depend
alongside the weaponization of other emerging on AI to assess incoming attacks and determine
technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), cyber, an appropriate counterattack. He warns that this
and autonomy. “Strategic stability no longer rests convergence of advanced technologies may lead
solely in the nuclear realm, and states will operate to the possibility of “a ‘flash war’ erupting when
in other domains where they have a perceived machines misinterpret radar signals and initiate
advantage,” writes Williams.84 To consider HGVs catastrophic, possibly nuclear, responses.”86
and HCMs in isolation fails to understand how Taken together, the weaponization of these
technological advancement across multiple areas advanced technologies could undermine—or appear
in the offensive and defensive weapons space can to undermine—the survivability of nuclear forces more
create an overall alarming picture of a nation gaining effectively than any one technology could alone.

Section IV:
Hypersonic Arms Control Options
G
iven the potential risks to stability posed by hypersonic weapons, arms control
is a viable tool that should be used to mitigate these risks. For the purposes
of this report, arms control is defined as a form of mutual agreement(s) or
commitment(s) through which states might reduce nuclear risks. The benefits of arms control
include avoiding an action-reaction arms race; reducing incentives to preemptively strike
adversary military forces, including nuclear forces; lowering the chances of inadvertent
escalation; and saving money.87
“There are no ready solutions” for mitigating the arms control before the weapons are fielded in larger
potential instabilities created by hypersonic weapons, numbers by the three major powers and present a
writes Wilkening. Though he argues for the United greater threat to strategic stability.
States to field large numbers of hypersonic weapons, In addition, two of those powers have already
Wilkening also states that it “behooves the major expressed interest in raising hypersonic weapons as a
nuclear powers to think carefully about how to topic in an established dialogue on strategic stability.
mitigate potential instabilities” presented by the The United States and Russia resumed this bilateral
weapons “before they become truly unmanageable.”88 dialogue in July 2021 in order to begin, in part,
Experts in recent years have begun to explore initial discussions on potential future arms control
various possible arms control options ranging from arrangements, and both countries have suggested an
confidence-building measures to bans or limits on intent to address hypersonic weapons in this setting.89
certain types of hypersonic weapons. Some of the Such an opportunity should not go to waste.
options would be applicable to China, Russia, and
the United States, while others may only be relevant Confidence-Building Measures
for two of the major powers. In addition, there are Confidence-building measures refer to “reciprocal
steps that the United States could take unilaterally actions taken to reduce the dangerous consequences
to minimize escalatory risks associated with these of particular weapons systems without formal
weapons. treaties.”90 These measures are meant to promote
The pursuit of hypersonic arms control is transparency and stability and can help to lay
increasingly important as these weapons transition the groundwork and foster a more conducive
from an “emerging technology” and are deployed environment for a binding agreement.
in greater numbers and on more diverse delivery Acton and Wilkening have each suggested
platforms. Chinese and Russian HGVs are already variations of basing restrictions for hypersonic
on the scene, and the United States plans to begin weapons. The latter has posited a confidence-building
deploying its own hypersonic capabilities starting measure in which conventional and nuclear forces are
next year. It therefore would be prudent to pursue not co-located at the same sites. Acton, meanwhile,

Members of the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) test team make final preparations prior to a captive-
carry test flight of the prototype hypersonic weapon at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., on Aug. 8, 2020.
(Photo by U.S. Department of Defense)
has suggested that Russia and the United States could missiles, would make sense.”94 In the absence of
agree, on a voluntary basis, to forbid the basing of any such weapons, conventional and nuclear attacks
heavy bombers not covered already by New START, would unfold at a slower pace, lowering the chances
such as the U.S. B-1B bomber which may carry ARRW, of miscalculation and unintended escalation. Yet,
outside of national territory.91 Wilkening has also Wilkening notes, this route seems highly unlikely
suggested not using systems previously associated to gain traction as eliminating ballistic missiles is
with nuclear weapons to launch conventional HGVs an unpalatable idea among all three countries given
and HCMs. This option would only be applicable Chinese and Russian reliance on ICBMs.
to Russia and China since the United States is only Pranay Vaddi, a former fellow in the nuclear policy
currently developing conventional hypersonic program at Carnegie, and Acton have suggested a
weapons. prohibition on the fielding of long-range, air-launched
In addition, there could be confidence-building ballistic and boost-glide vehicles, such as Russia’s
measures that aim to increase transparency through Kinzhal and the U.S. ARRW, except when fielded on
information sharing and demonstrations of the either New START treaty-accountable heavy bombers
systems. Acton has proposed data exchanges on or nonaccountable short-range tactical aircraft.95
acquisition and/or deployment of precision guided They also argue that nuclear-armed, long-range sea-
missiles, such as HGVs and HCMs, as well as the launched boost-glide vehicles should be labeled as a
exchange of observers at military exercises involving new kind of strategic offensive arm under New START
these weapons.92 Williams has similarly suggested that if deployed and should not be deployed on ships or
China, Russia, and the United States hold military- submarines that carry conventional variants of that
to-military talks on hypersonic weapons and conduct kind or long-range nonnuclear sea-launched cruise
mutual demonstrations of their systems.93 missiles.96
There is a robust debate among experts about the
Bans merits of a moratorium or a ban on the testing of
“If strategic stability is the paramount goal,” hypersonic weapons. “A hypersonic test ban would be
Wilkening writes, “then banning all short-time- strong arms control,” writes Mark Gubrud, a physicist
of-flight counterforce weapons, including ballistic at the University of North Carolina. “No nation would

base preemptive strategic attack plans on weapons be considered as a new kind include nuclear-armed
that have not been thoroughly tested, debugged, and submarine-launched boost-glide missiles and air-
proven reliable.”97 While Gubrud argues a hypersonic launched boost-glide missiles with ranges greater than
test ban would be verifiable, Acton has noted that 4,500km.
there is no clear dividing line between boost-glide Klare proposes commencing talks on a new
vehicles and terminally guided ballistic missiles, such agreement that, like the now defunct INF Treaty,
as the Chinese DF-21, which maneuvers to its target would set a limit on all deployed hypersonic
after re-entering the atmosphere. “If all maneuvering weapons, whether air, sea, or ground launched,
re-entry vehicles are banned,” Acton said, “China will or limit their deployed numbers below a certain
never sign up.”98 threshold so as to minimize fears of a disarming
first strike. Confidence-building measures such as
Limits “information-sharing on the range and capabilities
Mitigating the risks posed by hypersonic weapons of proposed weapons and protocols intended to
could also take the form of bilateral or trilateral differentiate conventionally armed hypersonic
agreements that limit the systems. weapons from nuclear-armed ones, so as to reduce
Williams has developed ideas for limiting HGVs the risk of warhead ambiguity” could help to pave
in particular, including an agreement that caps the the way for a formal agreement, he writes.104
number of such weapons in each country’s arsenal,
similar to the limits contained in New START.99 She Unilateral U.S. Measures
has also proposed adaptive asymmetric limits.100 Such There are also steps that the United States could take
an agreement between the United States and Russia, unilaterally to minimize escalatory risks. For example,
for example, might contain an overall limit of 1,000 the rationale for the Army’s LRHW program is
nuclear warheads on 600 delivery vehicles, to include arguably the weakest among current U.S. development
HGVs, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and strategic programs. The program faces difficult and potentially
delivery vehicles. If a country wanted to increase unanswerable questions such as where to base the
the number of HGVs such that it would exceed the missiles.105 The weapon is controversial within the
agreement’s limits, then it would need to further Pentagon. Plus, the weapon poses many of the
reduce its nuclear forces to compensate. stability risks identified in the previous section given
Vaddi and Acton have put forward suggestions on its range and speed and the fact that the United States
how to fold U.S. and Russian HGVs into a follow-on does not currently field any ground-launched missiles
treaty to New START, which expires in 2026. They with a range beyond 500km. One option would be
argue that a follow-on agreement should include for the United States to cancel the LRHW program.
a focus on “managing technological advances in The Biden administration has already proposed $226
delivery systems.”101 Vaddi and Acton suggest that million less for the program in fiscal year 2022 than
the central limits of a follow-on treaty to New START the Trump administration’s projection for it last year
should cover intercontinental-range, ground-launched, and relocated those funds in part towards supporting
boost-glide missiles (such as Russia’s already deployed the development of other shorter-range ground-
Avangard), whether nuclear or conventional, as they launched missile capabilities.
constitute new kinds of strategic offensive arms. The
United States “is focused on the development of Getting to the Negotiating Table
nonnuclear boost-glide weapons with shorter ranges, None of the above cooperative arms control concepts
but it has conducted flight tests of intercontinental- will gain traction, let alone become the basis for
range systems, which also may not be captured by agreements between nations with the capability
New START’s limits,” they write. Therefore, “Russia to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons, in the
is concerned that U.S. [intercontinental-range, absence of an active and productive dialogue and
ground-launched, boost-glide missiles], whether ultimately negotiation about hypersonic weapons.
nuclear or conventionally armed, could threaten its Consequently, it is vital for senior officials from
nuclear forces,” making limits on this kind of system Russia and the United States, as well as China, to
important for mitigating such concerns.102 engage in professional, regular exchanges of views on
Vaddi and Acton also encourage the inclusion of the nature of hypersonic weapons technologies, their
a stronger “new kinds of strategic offensive arms” purposes, and each country’s respective perceptions
provision that would cover nuclear and nonnuclear of the potential risks to stability and security these
weapons of strategic range that emerge after such a capabilities may pose.
treaty’s entry into force.103 Such a provision would be Hypersonic weapons—and potential arms control
important as research and development of long-range measures relating to them—should be one part of
HGVs march forward. Some of the arms they propose the U.S.-Russian strategic stability dialogue endorsed

During their June 16 summit in Geneva, U.S. President Joe Biden (L) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) agreed to
relaunch a strategic stability dialogue. (Photo by Peter Klaunzer—Pool/Keystone via Getty Images)
by Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin during “work on a mechanism that can lead to control of
their June 16 summit and restarted in July 2021. new and dangerous and sophisticated weapons that
According to officials from the two countries, these are coming on the scene now that reduce the times of
discussions may include the interrelated topics of response, that raise the prospects of accidental war.”108
strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons and their This dialogue, therefore, is a natural venue in which
delivery systems, advanced missile defense systems to hold initial discussions aimed at addressing new
that can negate each side’s retaliatory potential, hypersonic capabilities.
and conventional prompt strike weapons that can A similar bilateral strategic stability dialogue
potentially hold strategic targets, including military involving senior U.S. and Chinese diplomatic
command and control centers, at risk.106 officials, military officers, and technical experts could
According to Biden and Putin’s joint summit help to dispel misconceptions and improve mutual
communique, the talks are for “ensuring understandings about each nation’s strategic and
predictability,” reducing the risk of nuclear war, nonstrategic nuclear forces, their advanced missile
and setting the stage “for future arms control and defense systems, and hypersonic weapons, as well as
risk reduction measures.”107 Biden added at a press to exchange views about how they each perceive these
conference after the summit that the dialogue would weapons’ ability to affect mutual security.

Section V:
Recommended Action Items
for Congress
A
s the 117th Congress scrutinizes the Defense Department’s plans to develop and
field new hypersonic weapons and considers adjustments to the programs, there
are numerous steps lawmakers should take to improve their understanding of the
department’s motivations for acquiring the weapons, procurement plans and anticipated
costs, concept of operations for their deployment, potential alternatives, and plans to
mitigate the potential strategic stability risks the weapons pose. Below are six recommended
action items for Congress.
1. Hold in-depth hearings on the Defense • The risks to stability posed by hypersonic
Department’s plans for the development of weapons; and
hypersonic weapons. • The degree to which the Pentagon
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees considers the escalation risks the
should hold hearings on the Pentagon’s hypersonic weapons pose as a key input in decisions
weapon development plans in light of the many about acquiring the weapons.109
unanswered questions and concerns that have been
raised about these plans. The areas of focus should 2. Mandate an independent technical assessment of
include: the Pentagon’s rationale for developing offensive
• The rationale and specific mission and defensive hypersonic weapons, the technical
needs for acquiring HGVs and HCMs, feasibility of achieving the objectives set out for
to include a clearly defined concept of the weapons, and the feasibility of alternative
operations and the intended targets for capabilities to meet these objectives.
the weapons; U.S. defense officials have offered varying rationales
• The need for each service to have its own for the Pentagon’s pursuit of new hypersonic
hypersonic weapon; weapons, to include the need for a weapon capable
• The specific schedules for each of evading missile defenses and the desire to keep
development program, including flight pace with competitors. An independent technical
testing; assessment would prove valuable in ensuring
• The planned production quantities of the the Defense Department has a clear and specific
weapons; motivation for U.S. development and deployment
• Whether, and if so how, China’s and of HGVs and HCMs and avoids the acquisition
Russia’s hypersonic weapon development of redundant capabilities. In addition, Congress
programs pose threats that are additive to could request that the assessment evaluate whether
their existing missile capabilities; hypersonic weapons will be able to fulfill the mission

set identified by the Pentagon, whether other The Russian Embassy in the United States said
capabilities could do so more cost effectively and in in July 2021 Moscow plans to respond to any
a way that is less destabilizing, and to what extent “destabilizing” future potential deployment of U.S.
Chinese and Russian hypersonic capabilities increase hypersonic weapons in Europe. “Their short flight
the threat to the United States above their existing time would leave Russia [with] little to no decision
military capabilities. time and raise [the] likelihood of inadvertent
conflict” wrote the embassy on Twitter.113 Of course,
3. Mandate an assessment by the Congressional Russia is fielding its own hypersonic weapons and
Budget Office (CBO) on the financial costs of the other long-range missiles that threaten stability in
Pentagon’s new hypersonic weapon development Europe. But an action-reaction missile race would
plans and the costs of potential alternative make Europe less secure.
capabilities to fulfill the objectives set out for the The Defense Department “is keenly aware of
weapons. and takes seriously Congressional concerns that
The projected cost of hypersonic weapons is hypersonic strike systems may raise significant
highly uncertain. Two programs, ARRW and CPS, strategic stability and policy questions,” Melissa
have already seen steep costs increases: ARRW saw Dalton, acting assistant secretary of defense for
a nearly 40 percent increase in its total costs within strategy, plans, and capabilities, told the House
the first year, and CPS had a budget that nearly Armed Services Committee a few months previously
doubled between fiscal years 2019 and 2020.110 The in April 2021.114 But the department has yet to
GAO notes that current rapid hypersonic weapon explain how it views these concerns and the steps
prototyping programs are “not necessarily planning it is taking to mitigate them. Concerns about risks
for sustainment costs” and that “the structure of to stability have in the past prompted Congress to
these initial hypersonic weapon programs produces restrict funding for other previous prompt long-range
additional uncertainties in terms of expected costs strike programs.115
of full production of the resulting weapons.”111 In
addition to assessing the cost of existing programs 6. Engage officials from the State Department on
across a range of potential production quantities, possible avenues for future arms control on HGVs
CBO should also evaluate the costs of other and HCMs.
potential capabilities that would fulfill the objectives Congress—in particular the House and Senate
envisioned for HGVs and HCMs. Armed Services Committees, the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations
4. Condition funding for the Army’s LRHW Committee—should seek to hold dialogue with
program on the Pentagon addressing the rationale officials from the State Department on possible
and strategy for procuring, basing, and operating avenues for future arms control on HCMs and HGVs.
the weapon. This dialogue would help to inform Congressional
Given the concerns about the Army’s LRHW decision-making on funding for the weapons and the
program, Congress at a minimum should condition Executive Branch’s thinking about how to use arms
funding for the weapon on the Defense Department control to reduce the risks the weapons pose.
taking steps to address these concerns. Congress could
accomplish this by prohibiting the procurement or The Biden administration has signaled its intent to
deployment of (but not necessarily further research march forward with the development of hypersonic
and development on) the weapon until the Pentagon weapons capabilities. The first U.S. hypersonic
conducts an analysis of alternatives, details realistic weapon is scheduled to be fielded next year, while
basing options, and provides a plan for mitigating China and Russia have each deployed such weapons
risks to stability.112 Congress could also condition over the previous two years. Hypersonic weapons, in
procurement or deployment on a U.S. ally or partner particular HGVs, are on the field.
agreeing to host the weapons on their territory. Congress, however, should resist the pull to
rubber-stamp the Defense Department’s accelerated
5. Require a U.S. intelligence assessment to development approach. There remain numerous
assess how the ability to conduct prompt, long- questions concerning the rationale for, escalatory and
range strikes against high-value targets would instability risks of, costs of, and potential alternatives
be perceived by near-peer adversaries and rogue to hypersonic weapons that have thus far gone
states, how they would likely respond to such unasked or unanswered. It is time—in fact, past
deployments, how such strikes could lead to time—for Congress to demand these answers before
unintended escalation in a conflict, and options to the military begins fielding the weapons in possibly
mitigate crisis instability risks. great numbers.

Past U.S. Congressional Legislation
Requests a concept definition of a space-based ballistic missile intercept layer

Hypersonic
to add to the ballistic missile defense system that provides, among other things,
Missile Defense
additional defensive options against hypersonic glide vehicles (Sec. 1685)
FY 2016
Requires the development of a plan for integrating advanced technologies, such as
Hypersonic hypersonic strike systems, into broader war games to improve socialization with
Weapons the warfighter and the development and experimentation of various concepts for
employment by the armed forces (Sec. 240)
• Authorizes the Defense Department to conduct a pilot program for various

new capabilities, such as defense against hypersonic missiles, including
sensors (Sec. 884)
• Requires a review on U.S. missile defeat capability, to include the defeat of
hypersonic glide vehicles (Sec. 1684)
Hypersonic
FY 2017 Missile Defense • Directs the director of the Missile Defense Agency to serve as the lead for
the development of a capability to counter hypersonic boost-glide vehicle
capabilities and conventional prompt global strike capabilities; requires a
report on the architecture and sensors needed to detect hypersonic threats and
on the military capabilities and capability gaps related to the threat posed by
hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and maneuvering ballistic missiles (Sec. 1687)
Redesignates the joint technology office as the “Joint Hypersonics Transition

Hypersonic Office,” which is tasked with expediting the testing, evaluation, and acquisition of
FY 2018 Weapons hypersonic weapon systems and coordinating the development of such systems
(Sec. 214)
• Accelerates the hypersonic missile defense program of the Missile Defense

Agency; requires the deployment of the program in conjunction with a space-
based missile defense sensor program; requires a report covering the cost of
such an acceleration, the technical requirements and acquisition plan, and the
Hypersonic testing plan (Sec. 1689)
Missile Defense • Requires a validated requirement from the Pentagon for ground-, sea-, or air-
launched conventional prompt global strike hypersonic capabilities; requires a
FY 2019 report that describes the plan for a conventional prompt global strike weapon
system and details the level of ambiguity and misinterpretation risk relating to
this system (Sec. 1698)
Requires a report directly comparing the capabilities of the United States in

Hypersonic
emerging technology areas, including hypersonic weapons, to the capabilities of
Weapons
U.S. adversaries in such areas (Sec. 247)

• Requires the Defense Secretary to redesignate all strategies, policies,
programs, and systems to reflect that the missile defense programs of the
Hypersonic United States defend against ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles in all
Missile Defense phases of flight (Sec. 1681)
• Requires the development of a hypersonic and ballistic missile tracking space
sensor payload (Sec. 1683)
FY 2020
• Authorizes the Joint Hypersonics Transition Office to enter into agreements with
institutes of higher education to provide foundational and applied hypersonic
research, development, and workforce support (Sec. 216)
Hypersonic
Weapons • Expresses a Sense of Congress, in relation to hypersonic weapon systems,
prohibiting any FY 2020 funds for a submarine launched conventional prompt
global strike capability unless such capability is transferable to a surface-launched
platform (Sec. 1697)
• Requires a classified assessment on the threats posed by cruise, hypersonic,

and ballistic missiles to current and planned integrated air and missile
Hypersonic defense technologies and force structure (Sec. 155)
Missile Defense
• Requires the development and the procurement of a hypersonic and ballistic
missile tracking space sensor payload (Sec. 1645)
• Requires the improvement of ground-based test facilities used for hypersonic

capabilities and an increase of the rate at which hypersonic capabilities are
flight tested; requires from the Air Force a strategy and plan for fielding
air-launched and air-breathing hypersonic weapons capabilities (Sec. 222)
• Establishes a steering committee on emerging technology and emerging
FY 2021 threats, which includes hypersonic weapons, and tasks the commitee with
developing a strategy for the concept and capability development and the
technology investments in emerging technologies that are needed to maintain
Hypersonic the technological superiority of the United States military and assessing the
Weapons advances in emerging technology of U.S. adversaries (Sec. 236)
• Requires a report from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command on the resources, including
investments in hypersonic missiles, needed for the Pacific Defense Initiative to
achieve measurable progress towards its objectives in the region (Sec. 1251)
• Requires the integration of conventional prompt strike technologies on
Zumwult-class destroyers; requires a report on strategic hypersonic weapons,
to include an assessment of how escalation risks would be addressed,
potential target sets, and whether hypersonic weapons should be deployed on
both submarines and surface combatants (Sec. 1671)

ENDNOTES
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alert
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2. Kelley M. Sayler, “Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues
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6. Richard H. Speier, George Nacouzi, Carrie Lee, and Richard M.
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62. Terrence O’Shaughnessy, “Statement of General Terrence J.
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46. Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” 63. “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
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48. Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.” 64. Sayler, “Hypersonic Weapons,” pp. 15.
49. Jill Hruby, “Russia’s New Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems: An 65. Ibid.
Open-Source Technical Review,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 66. Wilkening, pp. 132.
13, 2019, pp. 21, https://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/russias-new-
67. Heather Williams, “Asymmetric arms control and strategic
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stability: Scenarios for limiting hypersonic glide vehicles,” Journal of
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68. Acton, “Silver Bullet,” pp. 127.
missile-a68768
69. Ibid., pp. xiv.
51. Franz-Stefan Gady, “First Serial-Produced RS-28 Sarmat ICBMs
to Enter Service in Russia in 2021,” The Diplomat, February 3, 2020, 70. James M. Acton, “Is It a Nuke? Pre-Launch Ambiguity and
https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/first-serial-produced-rs-28-sarmat- Inadvertent Escalation,” Carnegie Endowment for International
icbms-to-enter-service-in-russia-in-2021/ Peace, April 9, 2020, pp. 28, https://carnegieendowment.

org/2020/04/09/is-it-nuke-pre-launch-ambiguity-and-inadvertent- 91. Acton, “Silver Bullet,” pp. 13
escalation-pub-81446
92. Ibid., pp. 135–7.
71. Wilkening, pp. 140.
93. Williams, pp. 806.
72. Michael Klare, “An ‘Arms Race in Speed’: Hypersonic Weapons
and the Changing Calculus of Battle,” Arms Control Today, June 2019,
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-06/features/arms-race-speed- 95. Pranay Vaddi and James Acton, “A ReSTART for U.S.-Russian
hypersonic-weapons-changing-calculus-battle Nuclear Arms Control: Enhancing Security Through Cooperation,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2, 2020,
73. Amy F. Woolf, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-
pp. 12, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/02/restart-for-
Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,” Congressional
u.s.-russian-nuclear-arms-control-enhancing-security-through-
Research Service, December 16, 2020, pp. 20-1 and 24-7, https://fas.
cooperation-pub-82705
org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41464.pdf
96. Ibid., pp. 13.
74. Speier et al., pp. 16-7.
97. Mark Gubrud, “Just Say No,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
75. Cameron Tracy and David Wright, “Modeling the Performance
June 24, 2015, https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/test-ban-for-
of Hypersonic Boost-Glide Missiles,” Science & Global Security, January
hypersonic-missiles/
16, 2021, pp. 22-3, https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2020.1864945
98. Kingston Reif, “Hypersonic Advances Spark Concern,” Arms
76. “The Army’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific,” The Brookings
Control Today, January/February 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/
Institution, January 10, 2020, pp. 22-23, https://www.brookings.
act/2018-01/news/hypersonic-advances-spark-concern
edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/fp_20200110_army_indopacific_
transcript.pdf 99. Williams, pp. 802–3.
77. Eric Gomez, “U.S. Conventional Intermediate-Range Missiles 100. Ibid., pp. 803–4.
in East Asia: Can They Deter Without Being Destabilizing?” On the 101. Vaddi and Acton, pp. 1.
Horizon: A Collection of Papers from the Next Generation, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, February 2021, pp. 94, https:// 102. Ibid., pp. 9.
csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210223_ 103. Ibid., pp. 18.
PONI_Horizon_Vol.3.pdf
104. Klare.
105. Bugos, “Japan Downplays Possibility of Hosting INF-Range
79. Jon Hill, “Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, USN Director, Missile Defense Missiles.”
Agency Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Force
106. Kingston Reif and Shannon Bugos, “U.S., Russia Agree to
Subcommittee,” Senate Armed Services Committee, June 9, 2021, pp.
Strategic Stability Dialogue,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2021,
2, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hill%20
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-07/news/us-russia-agree-
Written%20Statement%20to%20SASC%206-09.pdf
strategic-stability-dialogue
80. “ICYMI: Inhofe: ‘The number one thing we should be doing
107. “U.S.-Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic Stability,”
around here is defending America,’” James M. Inhofe: U.S. Senator
The White House, June 16, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
for Oklahoma, August 1, 2018, https://www.inhofe.senate.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/16/u-s-russia-presidential-
newsroom/press-releases/icymi-inhofe-the-number-one-thing-we-
joint-statement-on-strategic-stability/
should-be-doing-around-here-is-defending-america
108. “Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference,” The White
81. “Modernization efforts of the Department of the Air Force in
House, June 16, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022
speeches-remarks/2021/06/16/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-
and the Future Years Defense Program,” Senate Armed Services
conference-4/
Committee, June 22, 2021, pp. 27, https://www.armed-services.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/21-56_06-22-21.pdf 109. Acton, “Silver Bullet,” pp. 143.
82. Ludwigson, pp. 8–9. 110. Ludwigson, pp. 21.
83. Ibid., pp. 21. 111. Ibid., pp. 21–2.
84. Williams, pp. 795. 112. John Isaacs, “Summary: House-Senate Conference Agreement
on FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Bill (S.1790),” Center
85. Aerospace Corporation, 3:19:20
for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, December 11, 2019, https://
86. Klare. armscontrolcenter.org/summary-house-senate-conference-agreement-
87. Linton F. Brooks, “The End of Arms Control?” Daedalus, Spring on-fy-2020-national-defense-authorization-bill-s-1790/
2020, pp. 85, https://www.amacad.org/publication/end-arms-control 113. Brendan Cole, “Russia Warns Pentagon That Hypersonic Missiles
88. Wilkening, pp. 143. in Europe Could Lead to Conflict,” Newsweek, July 20, 2021, https://
www.newsweek.com/russia-warns-pentagon-hypersonic-missiles-lead-
89. Antony Blinken, “On the Extension of the New START Treaty
conflict-1611307
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90. Wilkening, pp. 145. 115. Sayler, “Hypersonic Weapons,” pp. 20.

The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan
membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for
effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media programs and its magazine,
Arms Control Today (ACT), ACA provides policy-makers, the press and the interested public with
authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and
agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to the regular press briefings ACA holds
on major arms control developments, the Association’s staff provides commentary and analysis on a
broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad.
The debate concerning hypersonic weapons has gained increased attention in
recent years as the United States has poured billions of dollars—and plans to
pour billions more—into accelerating the development of hypersonic weapons
and as China and Russia make headway in developing and deploying their own
such weapons. The Pentagon is funding no less than eight prototype hypersonic
weapons programs with the aim of fielding an initial capability of at least some of
those by 2022.
This report outlines the scope of the unanswered questions about the case for
hypersonic weapons, details the underappreciated risks to stability posed by the
weapons, assesses the viability of arms control as a tool to reduce these risks, and
suggests recommended action items for Congress to better its understanding about
the Pentagon’s plans for the weapons, eliminate potential redundancies in weapons
capabilities, and mitigate stability risks.
1200 18th Street NW, Suite 1175

Washington, D.C. 20036
www.armscontrol.org

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Understanding Hypersonic Weapons:

Managing the Allure and the Risks

An Arms Control Association Report September 2021

© Arms Control Association, September 2021

4 Section I: What are Hypersonic Weapons?

8 Section II: Who is Developing Hypersonic Weapons and Why?

• The United States

15 Section III: Hypersonic Weapons and Strategic Stability

• Hypersonic weapons can prompt an escalation of a

20 Section IV: Hypersonic Arms Control Options

24 Section V: Recommended Action Items for Congress

Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks 1

circles, hypersonic weapons are “super-duper” missiles poised to revolutionize

nuclear-armed nations by increasing fears of a disarming attack and by fueling a dangerous

2 An Arms Control Association Report

Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks 3

largely intended for regional rather than intercontinental use.

4 An Arms Control Association Report

Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks 5

6 An Arms Control Association Report

Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks 7

HCMs. While the United States is at present focused solely on a conventional

carry nuclear warheads.

8 An Arms Control Association Report

AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW)

FY 2021 ($ thousands—enacted) 386,157 FY 2022 ($ thousands—requested) 399,112

Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM)

Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW, also called Dark Eagle)

Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS)

Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment II (OASuW-2)

Tactical Boost Glide (TBG)

a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle; capabilities Mach testing through

FY 2021 ($ thousands—enacted) 81,858 FY 2022 ($ thousands—requested) 50,043

Operation Fires (OpFires)

Hypersonic Air-Breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC)

FY 2021 ($ thousands—enacted) 30,880 FY 2022 ($ thousands—requested) 10,000

*no estimate or information publicly available

Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks 9

a layered defensive architecture to

10 An Arms Control Association Report

Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks 11

12 An Arms Control Association Report

nuclear, a hypersonic boost-glide

Russia, like the United States, is also developing China

Chinese Hypersonic Weapons Programs

*no estimate or information publicly available

Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks 13

14 An Arms Control Association Report

weapons hold great military promise. As the hypersonic weapons competition

to be a military game-changer or an evolutionary development that will not fundamentally

including to the nuclear level.

Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks 15

16 An Arms Control Association Report

Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks 17

18 An Arms Control Association Report

Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks 19

of this report, arms control is defined as a form of mutual agreement(s) or

include avoiding an action-reaction arms race; reducing incentives to preemptively strike

escalation; and saving money.87

20 An Arms Control Association Report