Rand Rra2312-1

Dahlia Anne Goldfeld ■ Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga ■ Shawn Cochran
Alexis Dale-Huang ■ David R. Frelinger ■ Edward Geist ■ Jeff Hagen

Elliot Ji ■ William Kim ■ Nina Miller ■ Cindy Zheng
WITHOUT DISASTER
Keeping a U.S.-China
Conflict over Taiwan Under
the Nuclear Threshold
VO L U M E 1
AN OVERVIEW OF IDEAS FOR U.S. CONVENTIONAL

JOINT LONG-RANGE STRIKE IN SUPPORT
OF ESCALATION MANAGEMENT
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About This Report
As the United States considers the prospect of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, the U.S. military must be
prepared for the risks of nuclear escalation inherent in great-power conflict. Our assessment that China has
successfully achieved a secure second-strike nuclear capability requires a new U.S. approach to escalation
management. This report summarizes a series of reports on how U.S. joint long-range strike, especially the
U.S. Air Force’s bomber force, could adapt to better balance military operational effectiveness, force surviv-
ability, and escalation management to achieve desired military and political objectives without triggering
catastrophic escalation, specifically Chinese nuclear first use. The other reports in this series are as follows:
• Shawn Cochran, William Kim, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Dahlia Anne Goldfeld, Edward Geist,
Jeff Hagen, David R. Frelinger, and Nina Miller, Denial Without Disaster—Keeping a U.S.-China Con-
flict over Taiwan Under the Nuclear Threshold: Vol. 2, Surveying U.S. Conventional Joint Long-Range
Strike Capabilities, Operational Objectives, and Employment Decisions, RR-A2312-2, 2024
• Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Elliot Ji, Alexis Dale-Huang, Cindy Zheng, Gregory Graff, and Dahlia
Anne Goldfeld, Denial Without Disaster—Keeping a U.S.-China Conflict over Taiwan Under the Nuclear
Threshold: Vol. 3, China’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Use Threshold(s)—and Their Future
Risk Factors, RR-A2312-3, 2024
• Edward Geist, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Dahlia Anne Goldfeld, Nina Miller, Shawn Cochran, Jeff
Hagen, David R. Frelinger, Cindy Zheng, William Kim, Elliot Ji, and Alexis Dale-Huang, Denial With-
out Disaster—Keeping a U.S.-China Conflict over Taiwan Under the Nuclear Threshold: Vol. 4, Imagin-
ing Escalation Pathways to Chinese Nuclear First Use via Analytic Strategic Theory, Historical Case Stud-
ies, and an Original Analytic Framework, RR-A2312-4, 2024.
Note that these closely related volumes share some material, including descriptions, figures, and tables.
The research reported here was commissioned by Air Force Global Strike Command and conducted
within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of a fiscal year 2023 project,
“Long-Range Strike Options to Stay Below the Nuclear Threshold.”
RAND Project AIR FORCE

RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF), a division of RAND, is the Department of the Air Force’s (DAF’s) feder-
ally funded research and development center for studies and analyses, supporting both the United States Air
Force and the United States Space Force. PAF provides the DAF with independent analyses of policy alterna-
tives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air, space,
and cyber forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Strategy and Doctrine; Force Modernization and
Employment; Resource Management; and Workforce, Development, and Health. The research reported here
was prepared under contract FA7014-22-D-0001.
Additional information about PAF is available on our website:
www.rand.org/paf/
This report documents work originally shared with the DAF on September 14, 2023. The draft report,
dated September 2023, was reviewed by formal peer reviewers and DAF subject-matter experts.
iii
Denial Without Disaster: Vol. 1, An Overview of Ideas for U.S. Conventional Joint Long-Range Strike
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Maj Gen Jason Armagost and Maj Gen Ty Neuman at Air Force Global Strike Com-
mand for their consistent support of our research and ensuring this project’s success. Col William Hersch,
Lt Col Seth Hoffman, Lt Col Garret Glover, and the rest of the Air Force Global Strike Command A5/8 team
were especially helpful in facilitating our research. We benefited from many conversations with RAND
colleagues Ed Burke, Kristen Gunness, Jacob Heim, and David Shlapak. We appreciated the thoughtful
feedback from PAF Strategy and Doctrine Program Director Raphael Cohen and Associate Director Bryan
Frederick on earlier drafts. We also appreciate very helpful reviews by Frank Klotz and Jacob Heim that
improved this report, as well as excellent editing by Jaron Feldman.
iv
Summary
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s reported order to the Chinese military to be pre-
pared to invade Taiwan by 2027 and China’s ongoing nuclear buildup have raised U.S. concerns over the
prospect of a U.S.-China conflict. Furthermore, our assessment that Beijing recently secured a second-strike
nuclear capability means that a conflict with China would be distinct from the wars the United States has
fought in the post–Cold War period against regional powers without nuclear weapons. In this report, we
explore how U.S. joint long-range strike, especially the U.S. Air Force’s bomber force, could adapt to better
balance operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management to achieve desired military
and political objectives without triggering catastrophic escalation, specifically Chinese nuclear first use.
Issue
Given Beijing’s secure second-strike capability, the United States must reconsider its approach to a conflict
with China. And given the likely key role of U.S. joint long-range strike in a conflict over Taiwan, our core
research question was “How could the technical or employment characteristics of U.S. long-range strike be
adjusted to reduce the likelihood of Chinese nuclear first use?” This research should be of interest to U.S.
strategists, force development analysts, planners, and broader audiences interested in escalation management
in a great-power conflict.
Approach
This report is the product of a mixed-methods research approach that combined regional studies, analytic
strategic theory, and historical case studies, all informed by operational analysis. First, to understand China’s
nuclear strategy, escalation red lines, and potential nuclear use, we conducted original Chinese-language
research leveraging open-source Chinese military writings on these topics. Second, we supplemented the
limited information available from open-source Chinese military writings with historical case studies and a
broad review of analytic strategic theory dating back to early RAND work from the 1950s, along with a lit-
erature review of Western scholarship on China. Third, to understand which types of operations U.S. joint
long-range strike might be able to undertake and what missions U.S. civilian leadership might ask of it,
we reviewed publicly available U.S. Department of Defense documents and recent non-U.S. government
wargames. Fourth, and finally, to identify how joint long-range strike might be adjusted to better manage
escalation dynamics, we developed an analytic framework that linked Chinese nuclear escalation with spe-
cific technical or employment characteristics of U.S. joint long-range strike.
v
Key Findings
We identified several important considerations for U.S. joint long-range strike as the United States seeks to
better manage escalation dynamics in a hypothetical future U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan:
• If fully committed to fighting and winning a war with China, the United States must be prepared for
nuclear escalation and place more emphasis on managing these risks.
• China’s nuclear threshold is unclear but also likely movable, meaning that the United States has an
opportunity to make the threshold better (but also risks making it worse).
• There will likely be trade-offs among military operational utility, force survivability, and escalation
management.
• The single most influential factor under U.S. military control for managing escalation is target selection.
• Munitions can have a direct impact on the U.S. military’s ability to manage escalation.
Recommendations
We offer the following options to reduce the nuclear escalation risk of joint long-range strike:
• Evolve long-range strike to be effective under a variety of rules of engagement and strike authorities in
support of escalation management.
– Prioritize development of a robust denial capability to minimize the need for kinetic strikes on main-
land China and to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation.
– Build a portfolio of U.S. joint long-range strike force structures, postures, and capabilities to execute
war plans across various possible mainland strike authorizations.
– Ensure the ability to prosecute a variety of targeting plans that can help balance operational effective-
ness, force survivability, and escalation management.
• Reduce risk of misperceptions and dangerous perspectives.
– Shape Chinese perceptions of long-range strike before and during a war.
– Incorporate considerations of escalation risk into the acquisition process, especially for systems that
are likely to appear highly escalatory to Chinese leadership.
– Establish an Escalation Management Center of Excellence at the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Com-
mand both to train senior and junior personnel and to have a dedicated organizational structure
through which escalation risks can be weighed during peacetime force development.
• Avoid actions that could heighten the risk of nuclear escalation.
– Avoid making U.S. long-range strike capabilities an attractive target for a limited Chinese nuclear
strike.
– Avoid long-range strike missions that could accidentally or inadvertently engage a nuclear armed
third-party, such as Russia or North Korea.
– Avoid extemporaneous responses to dangerous moments by preparing communication strategies and
responses to Chinese nuclear signaling or use.
– Avoid peacetime training of conventional missions that appear most likely to trigger Chinese nuclear
first use, such as large-scale cost-imposition, leadership decapitation, or counterforce.
vi
Contents
About This Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Figures and Tables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
CHAPTER 1
Introduction, Research Themes, and Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
China Is Expanding Its Nuclear Force Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Evolving U.S. Conventional Long-Range Strike Capabilities and Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Our Research Approach.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
History Appears Only Somewhat Representative of Today’s U.S.-China Escalation Dynamics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
CHAPTER 2
Framework for Identifying Plausible Catalysts of Chinese Nuclear First Use and Implications for
Long-Range Strike.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Identifying Escalation Logics for Nuclear Use. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Identifying Escalation Pathways to Chinese Nuclear First Use and Implications for Long-Range Strike. . . . . 17
Key Takeaways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
CHAPTER 3
Findings, Recommendations, and Concluding Thoughts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Caveats and Opportunities for Future Research.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Concluding Thoughts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Abbreviations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
vii
Figures and Tables
Figures
1.1. The Evolution of Select Chinese Nuclear Capabilities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Analytic Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3. Operational, Survivability, and Escalation Trade Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Tables
2.1. Escalation Logics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2. Escalation Pathways to Chinese Nuclear First Use.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
ix
CHAPTER 1
Introduction, Research Themes, and Methodology

U.S. President Joseph Biden and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping have twice
publicly pledged that “nuclear war should never be fought and can never be won.”1 As nice as this may sound,
if a war between the two countries ever comes to pass, this pledge will be put to the test. Passing that test
could be harder than anticipated, and the United States should plan today to avoid disaster tomorrow. How
to pass the test would vary across differing war scenarios, so, to focus our work, we consider what the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) describes as its “pacing scenario”: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.2 For this
scenario, we assume that the Chinese government’s decision to invade Taiwan would come after some unam-
biguous strategic warning, allowing the United States to prepare and mobilize forces.3 The United States has
a long-standing policy to maintain “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait”—including “oppos[ing]
any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side”—and specifically promises to “uphold . . . commit-
ments under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense and to maintain . . . capacity to resist
any resort to force or coercion against Taiwan.”4 Thus, for this scenario, we assume that the United States will
militarily intervene to seek to stop the invasion and end the conflict.
What are the options to do so? To answer this question, we turn to the concept of theories of victory,
defined in recent RAND research as “causal [stories] about how to defeat an adversary.”5 There are “five
potential theories of victory that are universal to all decisionmakers and to any conflict: (1) dominance,
1 White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China,”
press release, November 14, 2022. China’s readout of this meeting is slightly different; then–Foreign Minister Wang Yi later
rephrased the statement as “nuclear weapons should not be used, and nuclear wars should not be fought” (Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [外交部], “Wang Yi Briefs the Media on the China-US Presidents’ Meeting and
Answers Questions” [“王毅就中美元首会晤向媒体介绍情况并答问”], November 15, 2022). For the second pledge, see White
House, “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms
Races,” press release, January 3, 2023.
This type of pledge dates to a Cold War statement in 1985 between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secre-
tary Mikhail Gorbachev. See Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, “Joint Soviet–United States Statement on the
Summit Meeting in Geneva,” November 21, 1985.
2 Terri Moon Cronk, “Testimony: DoD Is Laser Focused on China Pacing Challenge, Meeting Our Commitments Under the
Taiwan Relations Act,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 8, 2021. For a historical review of DoD defense planning sce-
narios, see Eric V. Larson, Force Planning Scenarios, 1945–2016: Their Origins and Use in Defense Strategic Planning, RAND
Corporation, RR-2173/1-A, 2019.
3 For the most comprehensive U.S. government assessment of Chinese considerations for an invasion, see U.S. National Intel-
ligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: China-Taiwan: Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations, September 1999. For an
excellent consideration of the question of strategic warning, see John Culver, “How We Would Know When China Is Prepar-
ing to Invade Taiwan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 3, 2022.
4 White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022, p. 24.
5 Jacob L. Heim, Zachary Burdette, and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, U.S. Military Theories of Victory for a War with
China, RAND Corporation, PE-A1743-1, 2024, p. 1.
1
(2) denial, (3) devaluing, (4) brinkmanship, and (5) military cost-imposition.”6 For a U.S.-China conflict, the
recent RAND research finds that only denial and cost-imposition are plausible paths for U.S. decisionmak-
ers.7 This research also finds, however, that cost-imposition is likely not viable because of the challenges of
fulfilling the three conditions it requires for success: (1) identifying the right pressure points, (2) being able to
prosecute these targets, and (3) being able to provide credible assurances that the punishment will stop once
China accedes to U.S. demands.8
This leaves denial as the preferred theory of victory. According to the recent RAND research, denial
offers the best balance between the desire to maximize the chances of U.S. success and the imperative to
manage escalation. Denial focuses on attriting the power-projection capabilities the PRC [People’s Republic
of China] needs to seize Taiwan in order to persuade PRC decisionmakers that they are unlikely to accom-
plish their objectives and that further fighting will not change the eventual outcome.9
For this report, we consider U.S. long-range strike’s role primarily in a denial theory of victory.10
China Is Expanding Its Nuclear Force Structure

Planning U.S. prosecution of a war with China in a Taiwan scenario with an eye toward escalation manage-
ment is critical because the probable consequences of failing to do so are quickly worsening. Historically,
China’s nuclear strategy had been to build a nuclear force that was “lean and effective,” whereby Beijing
sought enough nuclear capability to give itself an assured retaliatory capability while avoiding a costly arms
race.11 With its slow yet consistent nuclear modernization efforts, China’s nuclear posture remained limited
through the mid-2010s, and we assess that China did not yet have a secure second-strike capability. Had
there been a war between China and the United States in the past, the United States could have theoretically
adopted a coercive strategy similar to the elective wars it fought against regional powers without nuclear
weapons because the risks of catastrophic counterattacks to the U.S. homeland or allies and partners would
have been relatively low (although case studies reveal conservatism on the part of nuclear-armed powers
6 Heim, Burdette, and Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2024, p. 6.

7 Heim, Burdette, and Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2024.
9 Heim, Burdette, and Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2024, p. 32.
10 In Volume 2 of this series, we expand these two broader theories of victory into five distinct operational objectives or
campaign types in a defense of Taiwan to provide more nuance to our analysis. See Shawn Cochran, William Kim, Nathan
Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Dahlia Anne Goldfeld, Edward Geist, Jeff Hagen, David R. Frelinger, and Nina Miller, Denial With-
out Disaster—Keeping a U.S.-China Conflict over Taiwan Under the Nuclear Threshold: Vol. 2, Surveying U.S. Conventional
Joint Long-Range Strike Capabilities, Operational Objectives, and Employment Decisions, RR-A2312-2, 2024.
11 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2010, March 2011. For some
good overviews of China’s nuclear strategy, see John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1988; M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese
Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2, Fall 2010; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor
Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security,
Vol. 40, No. 2, Fall 2015; and M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949, Princeton University Press,
2019, Chapter 8.
2
fighting proxy wars).12 Some U.S. researchers have argued that China’s nuclear posture was so weak that the
United States may have been able to undertake an exquisite counterforce campaign in this era.13
Everything changed, however, in the early 2020s, when China began a dramatic nuclear buildup, enhanced
its survivability with the DF-41 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and near-continuous
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) patrols, and improved its ability to penetrate U.S. missile
defenses with a nuclear-capable fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS).14 Although a full determina-
tion of China’s secure second-strike capability would require a classified assessment of U.S. versus Chinese
capabilities, we argue here that recent qualitative and quantitative advances in China’s nuclear capabilities
mean that the United States must treat Beijing as if it already has a secure second strike capability—especially
by 2030. Under General Secretary Xi, who came to power in 2012, there has been a flurry of nuclear-related
improvements, including a rapid expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal starting in at least 2019.15 DoD publicly
projects that Beijing will have 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035, a stark increase from the
estimated “low-200s” warheads that it had in 2019.16 Figure 1.1 displays some key points of China’s nuclear
progress from 1964, when it tested its first nuclear weapon, to 2035. Although much of this activity, including
efforts to develop a robust nuclear triad, looks to predate Xi’s authority, the dramatic increase in the number
of nuclear warheads appears to clearly be Xi’s decision.17 This suggests that Xi may have more in mind for
China’s nuclear forces beyond merely assured retaliation.
12 Heim, Burdette, and Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2024. For a non-DoD example from this era that explicitly ignores nuclear
escalation risks, see Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-
Departure Operational Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 18, 2010. For contemporary concerns
over escalation risks, see Joshua Rovner, AirSea Battle and Escalation Risks, University of California Institute on Global Con-
flict and Cooperation, Policy Brief 12, January 2012; and John Speed Meyers, “Will a President Approve Air-Sea Battle? Learn-
ing from the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis,” Infinity Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4, Summer 2015. For a review of initial Chinese views
of the concept, see Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot,” China Leadership
Monitor, No. 38, Summer 2012.
13 See for example Keir A. Lieber, and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” Interna-
tional Security, Vol. 30, No. 4, April 2006.
14 For a recent review of these capabilities, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023, U.S. Department of Defense, 2023.
15
For the first U.S. government statement on China’s nuclear buildup, see Robert P. Ashley, Jr., “Russian and Chinese Nuclear
Modernization Trends,” remarks at the Hudson Institute, May 29, 2019.
16 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2020, U.S. Department of Defense, 2020, p. 87; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Con-
gress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2022, U.S. Department of Defense, 2022,
p. 98.
17 David C. Logan and Phillip C. Saunders, Discerning the Drivers of China’s Nuclear Force Development: Models, Indicators,
and Data, National Defense University Press, China Strategic Perspectives 18, July 2023; Henrik Stålhane Hiim, M. Taylor
Fravel, and Magnus Langset Trøan; “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma: China’s Changing Nuclear Posture,”
International Security, Vol. 47, No. 4, Spring 2023; Tong Zhao, “The Real Motives for China’s Nuclear Expansion: Beijing Seeks
Geopolitical Leverage More Than Military Advantage,” Foreign Affairs, May 3, 2024.
3
FIGURE 1.1
The Evolution of Select Chinese Nuclear Capabilities
China can Xi takes Secure

strike CONUS power second-strike
1,600
Nuclear-capable
FOBS tested
1,400
H-20
publicly H-6N
announced unveiled
1,200
H-20
Old H-6 used for H-20 program projected
some early PRC estimated to start PLAAF IOC 1,000
Warhead count
nuclear tests reassigned
nuclear
mission
800
SSBNs begin
near-continuous
deterrence
patrols 600
JL-1 deployed on JL-2 deployed on JL-3 added
Type 092 SSBN Type 094 SSBN to Type 094
SSBN
400
Silo 200
China’s DF-5 DF-31 DF-41 construction
nuclear deployed deployed unveiled begins
stockpile
0
1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019 2024 2029 2034
Domain: Ground Maritime Air Space
SOURCES: Authors’ analysis of information from Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories,
1945–2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 5, September–October 2013; Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese
Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71, No. 4, 2015; Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear
Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 72, No. 4, 2016; Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces,
2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74, No. 4, 2018; Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 75, No. 4, 2019; Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Vol. 76, No. 6, 2020; Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2021,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
Vol. 77, No. 6, 2021; Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Reynolds, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Vol. 79, No. 2, 2023; Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2024,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 80, No. 1, 2024; Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2022.
NOTE: CONUS = continental United States; IOC = initial operational capability; PLAAF = People’s Liberation Army Air Force.
What the recent evolution in China’s nuclear forces means for China’s nuclear strategy is unclear, but it
is generating significant concern among DoD leadership.18 China famously has a No First Use (NFU) policy,
which says that “the Chinese government solemnly declares that China will not use nuclear weapons first in
18 Corey Dickstein, “Air Force Secretary Labels China’s Rapid Nuclear Expansion Most ‘Disturbing’ Threat He Has Seen,”
Stars and Stripes, March 28, 2023.
4
any time under any circumstances.”19 China further promises not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against nonnuclear countries and nuclear-free areas.20 If this Chinese declaratory policy were to hold true
even under the most severe situations, then the United States could conduct any desired conventional attack
without concern for nuclear retaliation, as long as there were no U.S. nuclear first use. However, as we will
unpack in this report and further in Volumes 3 and 4 of this report series,21 there are plenty of reasons to
be concerned that China’s NFU policy will not hold in a conflict, and thus, the United States should be con-
cerned about Chinese nuclear first use in response to U.S. conventional operations. In the rest of this report,
we explore how best to mitigate this risk of Chinese nuclear first use.
Evolving U.S. Conventional Long-Range Strike Capabilities and Planning

Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) aspires to update its conventional long-
range strike force structure, although significant technical and funding challenges remain. The U.S. Army
and Navy are also developing new long-range strike systems. We define the total long-range strike force as
the joint set of conventional kinetic weapons systems and platforms with a range of over 500 km. When we
refer to long-range strike, we are talking about this set of U.S. joint assets. We exclude cyber, space-based, and
nuclear weapons from this definition.22
The push for new conventional long-range strike capabilities stems from at least five concurrent trends in
the global security and geopolitical environment. The first is adversary development of advanced anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that decrease the utility and effectiveness of legacy U.S. long-range strike sys-
tems.23 The second is the emergence of China as a central focus of U.S. defense planning.24 Given the expan-
sive geography and limited basing options in the Indo-Pacific, long-range strike plays a distinctly critical role
19 “Our Country’s First Atomic Bomb Detonated Successfully [“我国第一颗原子弹爆炸成功”], People’s Daily [人民日报],
October 16, 1964, emphasis added. This was most recently authoritatively reaffirmed in China’s 2019 defense white paper. See
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era, July 24, 2019.
20 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2019.
21 See Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Elliot Ji, Alexis Dale-Huang, Cindy Zheng, Gregory Graff, and Dahlia Anne Gold-
feld, Denial Without Disaster—Keeping a U.S.-China Conflict over Taiwan Under the Nuclear Threshold: Vol. 3, Evolving
Chinese Nuclear Strategy, Nuclear Use Threshold(s), and Future Risk Factors, RR-A2312-3, 2024; and Edward Geist, Nathan
Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Dahlia Anne Goldfeld, Nina Miller, Shawn Cochran, Jeff Hagen, David R. Frelinger, Cindy Zheng,
William Kim, Elliot Ji, and Alexis Dale-Huang, Denial Without Disaster—Keeping a U.S.-China Conflict over Taiwan Under
the Nuclear Threshold: Vol. 4, Imagining Escalation Pathways to Chinese Nuclear First Use via Analytic Strategic Theory, His-
torical Case Studies, and an Original Analytic Framework, RR-A2312-4, 2024.
22 For a recent consideration of the role of the cyber domain in U.S.-China escalation, see Ben Buchanan and Fiona S. Cun-
ningham, “Preparing the Cyber Battlefield: Assessing a Novel Escalation Risk in a Sino-American Crisis,” Texas National
Security Review, Vol. 3, No. 4, Fall 2020. For the best consideration of the operational implications of space-based weapons, see
Bob Preston, Dana J. Johnson, Sean J. A. Edwards, Michael Miller, and Calvin Shipbaugh, Space Weapons Earth Wars, RAND
Corporation, MR-1209-AF, 2002. For consideration on the role of nuclear weapons, see Glenn C. Buchan, David Matonick,
Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic, Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces: Implications for U.S. Strategy, RAND Corporation,
MR-1231-AF, 2003.
23For example, see Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s
Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States, RAND Corporation, MG-524-AF, 2007; Eric
Heginbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki,
Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris, The U.S.-China Military
Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017, RAND Corporation, RR-392-AF, 2015.
24DoD, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s
Competitive Edge, 2018a; DoD, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, October 27, 2022a.
5
in this theater.25 The third trend is the accelerated development of adversary long-range strike capabilities,
particularly hypersonic weapons, along with a perception that the United States is falling behind, which has
motivated the United States to improve its own long-range and hypersonic strike capability (although U.S.
analysts sometimes overestimate the suitability of hypersonics for the United States).26 The fourth is the 2019
U.S. abrogation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty stemming from Russia’s history
of treaty violations. The treaty had banned nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise
missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km, and its cancelation opened the door to U.S. Army develop-
ment of new land-based systems.27 Finally, there is an element of military service bureaucratic politics at play:
Various departments jockey to claim a central role in the future fight, which can, in turn, translate to leverage
in interservice budgetary debates.28
On December 2, 2022, the Department of the Air Force (DAF) revealed a photograph of the USAF’s
newest long-range strike platform: the B-21 Raider, a dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) penetrating
strike stealth bomber that can employ a mix of standoff and direct-attack munitions.29 AFGSC is the lead
command for the B-21, and there is a plan to buy a minimum of 100 of the new bomber aircraft.30 With its
legacy and publicly planned conventional long-range strike capabilities, the United States can hold almost
any target in China at risk and pursue a variety of military objectives. Perhaps it should not be surprising that
China appears to hold an acute perception that long-range strike is central to the U.S. way of war and that the
United States would likely use long-range strike for expansive, cost-imposing mainland strikes—and even
potentially decapitation strikes to eliminate key Chinese leadership.31
Although long-range strike is not the only U.S. military capability whose employment could lead to
Chinese nuclear first use, this capability does pose a considerable risk to China. For this reason, U.S. deci-
sionmakers, including the National Command Authority (NCA) and U.S. military commanders, should be
concerned about the role of long-range strike in potentially driving U.S.-China escalation dynamics to a dan-
gerous tipping point. History suggests that the U.S. NCA will be highly involved in decisions around long-
25 For more on U.S. basing challenges, see Jeffrey W. Hornung, Ground-Based Intermediate-Range Missiles in the Indo-Pacific:
Assessing the Positions of U.S. Allies, RAND Corporation, RR-A393-3, 2022; Michael J. Mazarr, Derek Grossman, Jeffrey W.
Hornung, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Shawn Cochran, Ashley L. Rhoades, and Andrew Stravers, U.S. Major Combat Operations
in the Indo-Pacific: Partner and Ally Views, RAND Corporation, RR-A967-2, 2023.
26 U.S. House Armed Services Committee, “U.S. and Adversary Hypersonic Programs,” hearing before the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee, March 10, 2023; Geoff Ziezulewicz, “Pentagon: Yes, We Are Still Lagging Behind China’s Hypersonics,” Navy
Times, April 18, 2023; David Ignatius, “America Led in Hypersonic Technology. Then Other Countries Sped Past,” Washing-
ton Post, February 3, 2022; Jacob Heim, “Opinion: U.S. Hypersonic Missile Investments Overlook Key Path,” Aviation Week,
December 22, 2023.
27U.S. Air Force (USAF) capabilities were unaffected by the INF treaty because they are air-launched, but the USAF still did
not pursue many INF-range (over 500 km) weapons.
28Jon Harper, “Sibling Rivalry: Military Services in High-Stakes Tussle Over Long-Range Fires,” National Defense, June 1,
2021; Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Army Long-Range Precision Fires: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research
Service, R46721, March 16, 2021.
29USAF, “B-21 Raider,” fact sheet, undated. Additionally, the B-21 is a component of a larger family of systems that will
enable conventional long-range strike, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); electronic attack; and
communications.
30Chris Gordon, “B-21 Will Be ‘Backbone’ of Bomber Fleet, AFGSC Boss Says as New Images Are Released,” Air and Space
Forces, March 10, 2023.
31 For further details, see Volumes 3 and 4 of this report series (Beauchamp-Mustafaga et al., 2024; Geist et al., 2024).
6
range strike, especially regarding strikes on Chinese mainland targets.32 History also suggests that mainland
strike authority may very well not be granted, as was the case during the Korean War and the 1958 Second
Taiwan Strait Crisis, before China even had nuclear weapons.33 Volume 2 of this series contains a full treat-
ment of how the United States could plausibly employ long-range strike in support of multiple campaign
objectives within a Taiwan scenario.34
Although long-range strike could theoretically be used for deep penetrating attacks within China, the
overwhelming priority for long-range strike would much more likely be to attack Chinese maritime assets
involved in an amphibious invasion of Taiwan—and thus to support a denial theory of victory. This prefer-
ence for using long-range strike purely for maritime denial was evident in our survey of recent wargames
conducted by nongovernment researchers, most prominently a series of 24 publicly available Taiwan scenario
wargames that were set in 2027, facilitated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and
played by current and former senior U.S. policymakers.35 However, the wargames also revealed that when
there was a lack of appropriate U.S. munitions to use against Chinese maritime targets, an impetus to shift
to Chinese mainland targeting occurred in order to keep fighting. In these situations, the Blue (U.S.) players
tended to prioritize such targets as People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval facilities and airbases over muni-
tions stores or integrated air defense systems (IADS) deep inside China. U.S. long-range strike assets were
typically employed from a standoff posture with limited use of penetrating bombers.36 Despite the attempted
restraint, long-range strike was still linked to multiple instances of unintentional escalation. On the whole,
the wargames drew attention to Chinese mainland targeting as an important decisional threshold for U.S.
decisionmakers based on assumptions about Chinese escalation thresholds.
Our Research Approach

It is in this context of rapid Chinese nuclear expansion, unclear Chinese nuclear use policy, and U.S. con-
ventional long-range strike development that we assessed the role of conventional joint long-range strike on
escalatory dynamics in a 2030 Taiwan scenario. We sought to answer the following questions:
1. What might compel China to cross its nuclear threshold?

2. How could U.S. long-range strike be involved?
3. What, if anything, could be done to reduce the risk of U.S. long-range strike driving or even precipi-
tating nuclear escalation?
Our goal was to formulate options for the employment of long-range strike—as well as its force structure,
posture, and technical and employment characteristics—to reduce its probability of becoming a causal agent
of nuclear war. Even though there could be highly variable NCA authorities regarding long-range strike
employment during a war in 2030, the long-range strike force structure and its associated technical capabili-
32For relevant research, see John Speed Meyers, “The Real Problem with Strikes on Mainland China,” War on the Rocks,
August 4, 2015; Meyers, 2015; John Speed Meyers, Mainland Strikes and U.S. Military Strategy Towards China: Historical
Cases, Interviews, and a Scenario-Based Survey of American National Security Elites, RAND Corporation, RGSD-430, 2019.
33 For more on these historical case studies, see Volumes 2 and Volume 4 of this series (Cochran et al., 2024; Geist et al., 2024).
34 See Cochran et al., 2024.
35 Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham, The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Inva-
sion of Taiwan, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2023.
36 The CSIS wargames did not include the B-21.
7
ties that AFGSC and its counterparts in the U.S. Navy and Army are building and investing in during peace-
time can have an enduring impact on the options that the NCA might have in a future crisis or conflict. We
focused our research on generating options for AFGSC and the DAF to consider, as sponsor, but have also
included some broader considerations for DoD and the National Security Council.
The AFGSC plays two roles that can help manage wartime escalation. These roles serve as levers that
AFGSC can control, or at least strongly influence, to help manage wartime escalation. First, as a major com-
mand, AFGSC is directly responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the USAF with long-range
strike capabilities, elaborated on below:
• Organize: Ensure force presentation and the available force packages that AFGSC provides to the joint
commander—in this case, mainly U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) or U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM)—can robustly support a variety of operational objectives under a denial
theory of victory.
• Train: Prepare forces for a future crisis or conflict to operate in a broad set of environments, including
those radiologically contaminated by a limited nuclear attack.
• Equip: Construct forces that can support a large breadth of NCA targeting options, which must include
technical aspects of weapon systems that enable (or render impossible) a variety of missions. Even indi-
rect roles can be highly influential, such as by providing the right personnel who have the right expertise
(including escalation management) to the Joint Forces Commander and to such organizations as the
various Air Operations Centers (AOCs), especially the 608th AOC under 8th Air Force.
Second, AFGSC can indirectly advocate and provide expertise during planning discussions and inform
targeting during a conflict. AFGSC’s centrality for expertise on force development and force employment, as
well as its close connection to USSTRATCOM, provides an opportunity to serve as the USAF’s hub for incul-
cating a focus on escalation management.
As we argue throughout this report, managing escalation and navigating wartime dynamics are really
about perception management. AFGSC operations are particularly important for managing adversary per-
ceptions during a war because of the qualitative nature of AFGSC platforms and weapons, including those
involving long-range strike. Modern combat aircraft can be stealthy, but they are still far more visible than
a submarine and can fly deep into adversary territory (unlike a submarine, which must remain offshore).
The nature of manned bombers also bestows on AFGSC personnel, including flight crews, an unusual and
perhaps unique degree of individual responsibility for escalation management. During a conflict, bomber
pilots can be called on to make choices that can have immensely consequential cascading effects, including
the outbreak of nuclear war. Senior civilian leaders may deem the very existence of AFGSC operations and
personnel to be just as important as—if not more important than—the military objectives that long-range
strike bombers (or other long-range strike systems) can attain.
There is certainly a tension that must be carefully balanced between, on the one hand, cultivating China’s
perception of U.S. long-range strike effectiveness for the purpose of deterrence before a potential conflict
against, on the other hand, not exaggerating U.S. capabilities that could be used for cost-imposition during
a conflict. We argue that there are ways to optimize U.S. efforts to support deterrence by denial, and we
identify those in the report but acknowledge that, given the multitude of considerations and U.S. interests at
stake, more work needs to be done to fine-tune this balance.
Research Scope
To bound our assessment of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan in the 2030 time frame, we focus on the D+
phase, after war has started and deterrence has failed. We do not consider changes to long-range strike for
8
peacetime or crisis deterrence but rather for escalation management during the war.37 For a joint perspective,
we include all service contributions to long-range strike, although our focus is on the DAF’s role.
What constitutes, for our purposes, China’s crossing of its nuclear threshold? We include Chinese use of
nuclear weapons, including high-altitude electromagnetic pulse weapons against any of the following targets:
• CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, other U.S. territory

• U.S. allied or partner territory (Japan, Australia, Philippines, Thailand, Diego Garcia, etc.)
• U.S., allied, or partnered armed forces, including aircraft and ships at sea
• U.S., allied, or partnered objects in space.
We do not include Chinese nuclear tests (ground or atmospheric) or Chinese nuclear atmospheric
demonstrations—such as live ICBM launches in the Pacific Ocean—in our definition of crossing the nuclear
threshold. We consider such a demonstration to be signaling, as opposed to an action that causes physical
damage to the United States or its allies or partners.38
In our analysis, we contemplate scenarios only in which China uses a nuclear weapons first; we exclude
cases in which the United States elects to use nuclear weapons first. This scoping assumption pushes bound-
aries by running contrary to both China’s NFU policy and the U.S. policy that permits the President to
use nuclear weapons first in defense of the United States or its allies and partners.39 We take this approach
because, in cases in which the United States uses nuclear weapons first, it is definitionally comfortable cross-
ing the nuclear threshold and risking a nuclear response from China.
We define the U.S. mainland as the 50 states and the District of Columbia. We define the Chinese main-
land as continental China plus Hainan Island. This definition excludes Chinese-built features in the South
China Sea and other Chinese-claimed territory beyond the coastline (e.g., the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands, Matsu and Kinmen Islands in the Taiwan Strait).
Research Methodologies
We broke our research into four primary lines of effort. For the first line of effort, we focused on China’s
nuclear use threshold. This topic encompassed China’s evolving nuclear strategy and posture, nuclear use
considerations, potential redlines, and nuclear signaling. We gave special attention to Chinese discussion
of nuclear redlines and ongoing changes in the nuclear arsenal, as well as potential adjustments of C hina’s
nuclear policy in a conflict scenario. We conducted original Chinese-language research by leveraging open-
source Chinese military writings on these topics and augmented this with English-language secondary
research.40
37 For a recent report on managing escalation with China during peacetime competition, see Bryan Frederick, Kristen
unness, Bonny Lin, Cortez A. Cooper III, Bryan Rooney, James Benkowski, Nathan Chandler, Cristina L. Garafola, Jeffrey
G
W. Hornung, Karl P. Mueller, Paul Orner, Timothy R. Heath, Christian Curriden, and Emily Ellinger, Managing Escalation
While Competing Effectively in the Indo-Pacific, RAND Corporation, RR-A972-1, 2022.
38 For consideration of the implication of Chinese nuclear demonstration on U.S.-China escalation dynamics, see Stacie
ettyjohn and Hannah Dennis, Avoiding the Brink: Escalation Management in a War to Defend Taiwan, Center for a New
P
American Security, February 2023.
39 DoD, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, October 27, 2022b.
40We focused our Chinese-language research on authoritative Chinese military textbooks, as well as academic articles by
Chinese military officers and technical experts. We focused our English-language secondary literature review on key aca-
demic journals, such as International Security and Journal of Strategic Studies, as well as publications from key think tanks,
such as RAND, the U.S. National Defense University, and Pacific Forum. See Volume 3 for more details.
9
For the second line of effort, we documented the current and planned U.S. joint conventional long-range
strike capabilities and identified the range of conventional military effects that long-range strike could have
in a Taiwan scenario. We also wanted to understand how senior U.S. military and civilian defense offi-
cials might employ long-range strike. For this line of effort, we reviewed publicly available literature, includ-
ing historical archives; assessed the potential effectiveness of U.S. long-range strike systems given different
launch points and Chinese defenses; evaluated open-source, non–U.S. government wargame results; and
leveraged conversations with subject-matter experts.41
For the third line of effort, we sought to supplement the general lack of available information on Chinese
nuclear use considerations by turning to historical case study analysis and the abundant literature on ana-
lytic strategic theory. We wondered whether we could find any historical crises that could suggest how China
might react and make nuclear-related decisions in a war over Taiwan. However, we were concerned a priori
that historical case studies would not be useful analogies because of how much has changed from decades
ago. Thus, absent China clearly and publicly stating what it would do under different situations, we faced a
dilemma that nuclear defense analysts have confronted since the dawn of the atomic age: We can theorize
about what might erode nuclear restraint, but we cannot know for sure. We consulted the strategic literature
to explore these ideas and to serve as a sanity check on our own thinking.42 To the extent possible, we wanted
to ground our hypotheses of how a Taiwan scenario could “go nuclear,” based on Chinese primary sources,
history, the strategic literature, or other sources.
For the fourth and most substantial line of effort, we sought to tie together the first three lines by con-
structing a framework that links Chinese nuclear escalation with U.S. joint long-range strike and by con-
ducting original analysis on the technical or employment characteristics of long-range strike that could be
changed to better manage escalation. Figure 1.2 shows the steps in our framework (blue boxes) and how the
different lines of effort (yellow boxes) informed each step. Our first step was to identify universal logics—that
is, motivations or causes—for nuclear use that should encompass every conceivable type of scenario that
could lead to nuclear first use by any nuclear power. We came up with nine logics. Second, we selected 17
escalation pathways (out of a larger set) that represent a diverse set of examples of these logics to reveal a wide
(though certainly not comprehensive) range of implications for long-range strike. We derived these pathways
from the strategic literature and from the research on China (if China has publicly expressed grave concern
about certain U.S. actions, then clearly these actions should be represented as potential pathways to Chinese
nuclear first use). We were agnostic as to the likelihood of each escalation pathway; intuition could be a poor
predictor of future conflict.
Third, we instantiated the escalation pathways with vignettes of how China could end up using a nuclear
weapon. Because our Taiwan scenario is not highly specified, we were able to consider a variety of pathways
and vignettes, not all of which could plausibly occur during any one wartime trajectory. Fourth, we identi-
fied the roles of long-range strike in the vignettes (the “long-range strike touchpoints”), as substantiated by
our second line of effort. Fifth, given these roles, we analyzed how a change in long-range strike employment,
technical specifications, or force structure might exit the pathway to Chinese nuclear first use while main-
taining, if possible, the U.S. operational objective of the vignette. There were occasions in which the opera-
tional objective was inherently escalatory, in which case the risks may simply be too high to justify taking
41 Key sources included declassified historical U.S. planning documents; recent wargames by think tanks, such as the Center
for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Security; publicly available DoD documents; and
reports by the Congressional Budget Office, among others. See Volume 2 for more details.
42 Key sources included previous RAND research; classic works by Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn, among others; and
historical research. See Volume 4 for more details. For an analogous RAND effort in 1988, see James Digby, Marc Dean Millot,
and William Schwabe, How Nuclear War Might Start: Scenarios from the Early 21st Century, RAND Corporation, N-2614-NA,
1988.
10
FIGURE 1.2
Analytic Framework
LOE 3 LOEs 1, 3 LOEs 1, 3 LOE 2 LOEs 1, 2, 3, and 4
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6

Escalation Pathways that Illustrative Long-range Implications Broader
logic hypothetically vignette of strike for long- escalation
instantiate pathways touchpoint range strike consider-
logic with vignette ations
Findings Recommendations Conclusions
NOTE: LOE = line of effort.
them at all. However, often there were implications for long-range strike that involved reasonable options
to de-escalate the vignette. Lastly, we drew overarching takeaways for broader escalation management con-
siderations. We derived most of the project findings, recommendations, and conclusions by following this
framework and detail our work in Chapter 2.
Limits of Predicting China’s Wartime Decisionmaking

There is much we do not know about China’s nuclear decisionmaking, and Xi Jinping (or whoever is ruling
China) can change his mind at any time. It is also important to acknowledge that U.S. military actions would
almost certainly be merely one part of the Chinese leadership’s calculus on nuclear use (other considerations
include, for example, economic sanctions, domestic responses, and, perhaps, international public opinion).
Throughout our work, we use China, Beijing, Xi Jinping, and Chinese leadership or decisionmakers inter-
changeably; we did not seek to psychologically profile Xi. On the U.S. side, we recognize that numerous State
Department, DoD, and National Security Council personnel will be involved with escalation management
during a Taiwan scenario. AFGSC and even USAF operations writ large will often be secondary, though still
critical, in shaping Chinese perceptions. Our analysis is bounded by what Chinese open-source materials we
could find (some of which is dated as far back as 2004, and all the most authoritative texts predate China’s
nuclear buildup) and the inherent uncertainty of strategic theory. Nonetheless, within this scope, we make
every effort to inform the reader on which U.S. actions seem more probable than not to drive Chinese nuclear
first use.
History Appears Only Somewhat Representative of Today’s U.S.-China

Escalation Dynamics
The scenario invoked in this report—a high-intensity, kinetic conflict between two great powers armed with
nuclear weapons—thrusts two countervailing historical trends together: Great-power conflicts are histori-
cally long, brutish affairs, but there has never been one fought between nuclear-armed adversaries. It is worth
considering the weight of this premise and thus the importance of getting the correct questions asked and
research conducted.
11
The history of modern great-power wars suggests that they are long, drawn-out contests of national will
and industrial might.43 A 2023 RAND report found that the median length of ten key great-power conflicts
since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, across conflicts in Europe and Asia, was roughly two years, from the
brief Austro-Prussian War of 1866 (seven weeks) to World War II in Asia (14 years).44 The historical record
revealed “how difficult it is to forecast the timing, complexity, and consequences of large-scale interstate
warfare. In the years prior to each of the conflicts surveyed, politicians and military planners held flawed
assumptions and made inaccurate predictions about critical aspects of the war that would follow.”45
At the same time, two nuclear powers have never directly fought each other. In fact, the record of inter-
state competition in the nuclear age since 1949—when the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon and
thus created the possibility of a conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries—shows that states have gone to
extreme lengths to avoid nuclear war. When the Soviet Union deployed its forces in the Korean War, making
this risk tangible, Moscow and Washington both took steps to minimize the risk of escalation.46 The 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis put the two countries to the test again, and once again, both sides exercised restraint to
resolve the crisis.47 This crisis served as a pivotal moment for both sides to reckon with the risks of nuclear
war and helped set the tone for much of the Cold War: Both countries sought proxies and covert deployments
rather than direct, public confrontation, even though severe crises persisted intermittently. Overall, crises
between nuclear powers have been marked by less-than-perfect escalation management on all sides, but so
far none has led directly to kinetic conflict.48
If China invades Taiwan and the United States decides to intervene, it would be a moment fraught with
risk.49 By 2030, China should have the means to hold the U.S. homeland at risk with not just nuclear weapons
but also conventional intercontinental strike and strategic cyber weapons.50 As the 2018 National Defense
Strategy solemnly emphasized, “It is undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary.”51 A war with
China would differ dramatically from the regional conflicts fought by the United States in the post–Cold
War era because such countries as the former Yugoslavia and Iraq lacked both nuclear and conventional
43Alexandra T. Evans, Alternative Futures Following a Great Power War: Vol. 2, Supporting Material on Historical Great
Power Wars, RAND Corporation, RR-A591-2, 2023.
44 Evans, 2023.
45 Evans, 2023, p. 126.
46 For example, the Soviet Union painted its fighter jets to resemble Korean or Chinese aircraft, avoided flying the jets in areas
in which they might fall into U.S. hands if shot down, and even ordered its pilots to wear foreign uniforms and avoid speak-
ing Russian in the air. The United States in return downplayed Soviet involvement. See William Stueck, The Korean War: An
International History, Princeton University Press, 1995; Mark O’Neill, “Soviet Involvement in the Korean War: A New View
from the Soviet-Era Archives,” OAH Magazine of History, Vol. 14, No. 3, Spring 2000; Kathryn Weathersby, “The Soviet Role
in the Korean War: The State of Historical Knowledge,” in William Stueck, ed., The Korean War in World History, University
Press of Kentucky, 2004; Odd Arne Westad, The Cold War: A World History, Basic Books, 2017.
47 For example, Moscow agreed to remove its nuclear weapons and missiles from Cuba while Washington chose to not retali-
ate against the downing of the U2 aircraft during the crisis. See Alexandra T. Evans, Emily Ellinger, Jacob L. Heim, Nathan
Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Zachary Burdette, and Lydia Grek, Managing Escalation: Lessons and Challenges from Three Histori-
cal Crises Between Nuclear-Armed Powers, RAND Corporation, RR-A1743-2, 2024.
48We exempt the 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis, which some define as a conflict because of the number of casualties. See
Evans et al., 2024.
50Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2023; Roderick Lee, “A Case for China’s Pursuit of Conventionally Armed ICBMs,” The
Diplomat, November 17, 2021; Julian E. Barnes, “China Could Threaten Critical Infrastructure in a Conflict, N.S.A. Chief
Says,” New York Times, April 17, 2024.
51 DoD, 2018, p. 3, emphasis in original.
12
capabilities to retaliate against U.S. or allied homelands. This allowed the United States to pursue theories
of victory—including dominance (regime change) against Iraq in 2003—that were relatively unconstrained.
The United States would not have this luxury if it found itself in a war with China.
Instead, the U.S. joint force would have to balance military operational effectiveness, force survivability,
and escalation management in a future conflict with China (see Figure 1.3). In recent U.S. wars, the balance
was placed toward the top of the graphic, because DoD and especially the USAF could prioritize operational
effectiveness over almost everything else, with little threat to USAF bomber survivability and little concern
for escalation. At the other two extremes, maximizing escalation management would likely mean not even
fighting a war, and maximizing force survivability during war would entail operating a highly survivable
bomber from standoff distances, to the potential neglect of both operational effectiveness and escalation
management. A future NCA would have to decide where a future U.S. military campaign to defend Taiwan
would fall in the trade space.
We argue that AFGSC, the DAF, and the broader DoD leadership should be prepared for an NCA to pri-
oritize escalation management above other considerations during a conflict. This prioritization could have
several downstream effects, ranging from a ban on strikes on the Chinese mainland to strict rules governing
such strikes. NCA decisionmaking could also change over time. The NCA’s approach to the war would have
immense consequences for the numbers and types of U.S. forces required, concepts of operation, and how
forces are employed. Because nobody can definitively predict how a war would evolve, there are also impli-
cations for force design and training. For example, an NCA decision to execute the campaign at a slower
pace—to reduce the likelihood of China perceiving the United States to be pursuing a rapid cost-imposition
theory of victory—would affect the U.S. campaign in multiple important ways, including the requirement to
be able to fly sorties over a protracted period and risking more attrition as the fight drags on. To obey such a
future command, the DAF would need to build a larger force today during peacetime. The NCA could also
allow U.S. strikes on the Chinese mainland with strict rules of engagement that require exquisite intelligence
on mobile targets in hopes of minimizing escalation risks. The effects on the joint force would be numerous,
such as requiring missiles that could prosecute those targets and ideally be long-range enough to be employed
on standoff platforms. However, it is also possible that U.S. strike aircraft, such as bombers, would be forced
to spend more time within the Chinese threat ring, and thus attrition rates could go up.
FIGURE 1.3
Operational, Survivability, and Escalation Trade Space
Military
operational
effectiveness
Force Escalation
survivability management
13
As undesirable as the trade-offs might seem, there are historical precedents for them. President Richard
Nixon ended the U.S. military’s biological weapons program in 1969 because it had “massive, unpredictable,
and potentially uncontrollable consequences.”52 The George W. Bush administration and Congress demurred
on developing Prompt Global Strike in the mid-2000s in part because of Russia’s concerns about its inability
to distinguish between a conventionally armed and a nuclear-armed U.S. missile.53 The Bush administration
acknowledged that this strategic escalation risk outweighed the hypothetical military operational benefit.54
The return of great-power competition and the risk of potential conflicts with China and Russia have reig-
nited interest in keeping conventional long-range strike below the nuclear threshold.55 Therein lies the topic
explored in our research, which is documented in four reports. This report summarizes the full series, focus-
ing on U.S. joint long-range strike characteristics, Chinese views on nuclear use, history, strategic theory,
and how the United States can balance its military operational objectives and force survivability with the
constant threat of nuclear escalation. The report concludes with our most important findings, recommenda-
tions, and final thoughts.
52Richard Nixon, “Remarks Announcing Decisions on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs,” American
Presidency Project, November 25, 1969.
53For some history on this topic, see Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles,
Congressional Research Service, R41464, 2021. For one contemporary consideration of the issues, see James M. Acton, Silver
Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2013.
54 David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Faces Choice on New Weapons for Fast Strikes,” New York Times, April 22, 2010.
55For a recent RAND report that considers escalation pathways for the Ukraine war, see Bryan Frederick, Mark Cozad, and
Alexandra Stark, Escalation in the War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and Risks for the Future, RAND Corporation, RR-A2807-1,
2023.
14
CHAPTER 2
Framework for Identifying Plausible Catalysts of

Chinese Nuclear First Use and Implications for
Long-Range Strike
What could plausibly occur during a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan that would provoke Chinese nuclear
first use? Answering this question lies at the core of understanding how long-range strike fits into U.S. escala-
tion management and what to do about it. Open-source Chinese writing provides some insights for answer-
ing the question, as detailed in Volume 3 of this series.1 A few points are worth highlighting here because they
were important sources of evidence for our framework.
First, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns—a highly authoritative, classified, Chinese military
textbook—reveals that four types of adversary (U.S.) conventional strikes against Chinese targets could lead
to “lowering the nuclear threshold.”2 Although the PLA text indicates that “lowering the nuclear threshold”
means nuclear signaling, we argue that these four conditions are equally the best direct evidence available for
what has the greatest potential to drive Chinese nuclear first use:
1. conventional attacks on critical infrastructure, especially those that generate large-scale civilian
casualties
2. conventional attacks on civilian nuclear infrastructure
3. medium- or high-intensity conventional attacks on major cities and other political or economic centers
4. any conventional attack that turns the “overall strategic situation” disadvantageous to the regime,
specifically making the CCP leadership fear for regime or personal survival.
Using a large body of other authoritative Chinese military writings and our analysis, we identified two
additional types of strikes that could drive Chinese nuclear first use:
5. conventional attacks on nuclear forces, including dual-capable assets and nuclear-related command
and control elements
6. conventional attacks on the CCP leadership (decapitation).
Taken together, these six conditions all revolve around CCP regime security. These criteria reflect Chi-
na’s concerns about potential U.S. large-scale cost imposition that would do so much damage to China and
its economy that it might undermine CCP control of the population and/or concerns about U.S. efforts to
directly overthrow the CCP regime by denuding its nuclear protection or killing its leadership. It is impor-
1 Beauchamp-Mustafaga et al., 2024.

2 Yu Jixun [于际训], ed., The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学], PLA Press [解放军出版社], 2004,
p. 294. This book was somehow leaked into the open-source record and is publicly available to foreign analysts.
15
tant to acknowledge that, in one interpretation, any U.S. success in the conflict—and thus Chinese failure to
achieve its political objective of unifying Taiwan—might jeopardize CCP regime security, perhaps closest to
condition 4, and thus drive Chinese nuclear first use.3 However, this scenario is fundamentally an unavoid-
able risk of U.S. intervention and is possible under any theory of victory, although past RAND research
has found that denial offers the best chances to successfully navigate this dilemma.4 Although crossing the
nuclear threshold is the focus of this report, we think that it is critical to remember that any of these types of
strikes could also lead to Chinese conventional or cyber retaliation, even if China decides not to use nuclear
weapons.
Beyond this basic list, we were unable to confidently identify more-specific redlines for Chinese nuclear
first use. We were also unable to identify, based on extensive additional Chinese-language research, any spe-
cific number of U.S. strikes or target locations by U.S. conventional kinetic strikes that might directly drive
Chinese nuclear first use. Although one could theorize reasonable assumptions about what types of U.S.
strikes might fall below China’s nuclear use thresholds—for example, attacking the military assets and facili-
ties on China’s man-made features in the South China Sea or limited strikes against Chinese military targets
far from populated areas—there is no PLA or CCP primary source literature to support these assumptions.
The common geographic delineation of not conducting mainland strikes makes intuitive sense and also
would provide the Chinese leadership with a specific signal—by U.S. restraint—of U.S. intent to keep the
conflict limited, although we lack the Chinese primary source basis to confirm this assessment.
Complicating matters, as described in Volume 4 of this series,5 history suggests that today’s U.S. military
planners and decisionmakers should be humble about anticipating—from the relative safety of peacetime
competition—future escalation risks, Chinese nuclear red lines, and Chinese perceptions of U.S. actions.
China’s nuclear force structure is changing, and its leadership is dynamic. The actual size of the nuclear
arsenal over time will likely vary from the predictions shown previously in Figure 1.1. China’s defense indus-
trial base capacity, natural resources, and other trends will limit what China can actually build over the next
decade. The evolving PLA and CCP leadership could update China’s nuclear use policy (including NFU).
Such leaders could change their views on important issues, such as the significance of U.S. attacks on dual
nuclear-conventional (i.e., entangled) systems (such as the DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile), the
Chinese policies for launch authorization delegation, or the Chinese procedures for launch on warning. Even
if the NFU policy remains stable, there still exists significant risk that the policy will not hold up during a
Taiwan scenario. And even if it did, Chinese thinking is also likely to evolve over the course of a conflict. As
an analogy, consider Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, in which Western responses at the outset of the con-
flict were far more restrained than later on, in large part because of the belief that President Vladimir Putin’s
nuclear use redlines had shifted over the course of the conflict.6 Whereas the idea of providing Ukraine with
the Army Tactical Missile System had seemed extraordinarily provocative in February 2022, these systems
arrived in Ukraine around October 2023.7 With respect to a U.S.-China war, U.S. actions, signaling, and
3 See for example, Dennis Blair, “Letter to the Editor: Would China Go Nuclear?” Foreign Affairs, December 11, 2018; Markus
Garlauskas, The United States and Its Allies Must Be Ready to Deter a Two-Front War and Nuclear Attacks in East Asia, Atlan-
tic Council, August 16, 2023. For broader consideration, see Heim, Burdette, and Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2024.
5 Geist et al., 2024.
6 Austin Carson, “The Missing Escalation in Ukraine: In Defense of the West’s Go-Slow Approach,” Foreign Affairs, Sep-
tember 14, 2023; Janice Gross Stein, “Escalation Management in Ukraine: ‘Learning by Doing’ in Response to the ‘Threat that
Leaves Something to Chance,’” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 6, No. 3. Summer 2023.
7 Isabelle Khurshudyan, Karen DeYoung, Alex Horton, and Karoun Demirjian, “Ukraine Wants More ‘Game-Changer’
HIMARS. The U.S. Says It’s Complicated,” Washington Post, July 24, 2022; Mike Stone, “US-Supplied ATACMS Enter the
16
Framework for Identifying Plausible Catalysts of Chinese Nuclear First Use and Implications for Long-Range Strike
communication throughout could guide or even accelerate this evolution, at least to some extent, but it would
be dangerous to assume that the United States would always increase China’s nuclear threshold; Washington
could also decrease it.
We also turned to the analytic strategic theory formulated during the Cold War to investigate what could
lead to Chinese nuclear first use. The strategic theory relied on reducing extremely complex military and
strategic problems to tractable models containing just the minimum amount of essential detail to provide
usable insights. Only in rare instances were these models the highly formal exercises in mathematical game
theory that outsiders had imagined them to be.8 Instead, these civilian strategists drew from an eclectic tool-
kit encompassing such methods as scenarios, tabletop exercises, and thought experiments.
The body of work built by theorists, such as Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn, delineated a broad
spectrum of alternative ways in which a nuclear war might begin. Kahn imagined numerous reasons why
states might intentionally escalate to nuclear use, whereas Schelling outlined reasons why crises could result
in inadvertent nuclear escalation. Some of their contemporaries tackled the problems of accidental nuclear
use and catalytic nuclear escalation (scenarios in which a third party intentionally or unintentionally sparks a
nuclear war between the first two).9 We used this taxonomy to enumerate the nine universal logics for nuclear
first use (framework Step 1), as summarized in Table 2.1, which is followed by summaries of the outcomes of
the rest of our analytic framework.
Identifying Escalation Logics for Nuclear Use

The nine escalation logics we identify aim to represent all conceivable ways in which nuclear use might occur,
including ways that are counterintuitive, improbable, or bizarre. Each logic has three distinct characteristics:
(1) who or what is causing the nuclear detonation, (2) why that actor is causing it, and (3) how the first two
characteristics are represented or misrepresented to outside audiences. The escalation logics are not mutually
exclusive; distinguishing them in practice might be difficult or impossible. Table 2.1 lists the nine logics and
briefly describes them and their sources.
With the logics identified, we used them to generate a large number of potential pathways to Chinese
nuclear first use, including relatively esoteric but plausible pathways that we might not have identified had we
not first identified the logics. We then consolidated the pathways into 17 distinct ones that we used to com-
plete the remainder of the framework (see Figure 1.2).
Identifying Escalation Pathways to Chinese Nuclear First Use and

Implications for Long-Range Strike
The 17 pathways represent high-level chains of events that result in Chinese nuclear first use. We catego-
rized the pathways into six groups. Many of the pathways also fall under the broader concept of tit-for-tat
Ukraine War,” Reuters, October 19, 2023.

8 A 1965 book review complained about “the absurd notion that strategists in general have been seduced by game theory—
when most of them do not even know anything about it” (D. G. Brennan, Review of Strategy and Conscience by Anatol Rapo-
port, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 21, No. 10, October 1965, p. 30).
9 For the seminal RAND study on nuclear accidents, see Fred Charles Iklé, Gerald J. Aronson, and Albert Madansky, On the
Risk of an Accidental or Unauthorized Nuclear Detonation, RAND Corporation, RM-2251, 1958. For a description of early
theorizing about catalytic nuclear war, see Amrom H. Katz, “Some Things to Think and Some to Do,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Vol. 17, No. 4, April 1961.
17
warfare, whereby the United States and China would respond to each other’s actions with what either side
perceives to be an equivalent level of retaliation. All it takes is slight differences in perception for a tit-for-tat
mindset to become a tit-for-tat escalation spiral that cannot be stopped and results in a nuclear exchange. In
Step 3 of the framework (see Figure 1.2), we attempted to bring each pathway to life by creating vignettes that
offered more-concrete examples of how the pathways could plausibly occur within the bounds of a defense-
of-Taiwan scenario. Table 2.2 presents the pathway names, overviews, vignettes, long-range strike touch-
points, and long-range strike implications within the six pathway categories, summarizing Steps 2 through 5
in our framework.
TABLE 2.1
Escalation Logics
Logic Description
1. Intentional nuclear usea A human decides to use a nuclear weapon. There are numerous
rationales for why a leader would employ a nuclear weapon, including
military effects.
2. Inadvertent nuclear use because of Technical failure (i.e., a degraded radar) leads to misinterpretation of
technical errorb conventional U.S. attack as nuclear, leading to a nuclear response.
3. Inadvertent nuclear use resulting from Responsible decisionmakers make choices that permit nuclear use that
human decisionsb national leaders did not explicitly authorize. This scenario would require
a breakdown of “supreme command” either by predelegated nuclear
authorities or a rogue actor.
4. Accidental nuclear use because of A nuclear weapon is detonated outside of all human agency, perhaps
technical malfunctionc because of a faulty computer chip or other technical malfunction.
5. Accidental nuclear use because of Nuclear use results from human actions (e.g., pressing the wrong button)
human errorc that did not reflect intent.
6. Intentional or inadvertent nuclear use A nuclear weapon is intentionally employed for perceived utility or
presented as an “accident”a inadvertently employed without leadership authorization but presented
to the world as accidental detonation in hopes of limiting adversary
retaliation.
7. Accidental or inadvertent nuclear use Although a bizarre concept, a government could be so embarrassed that
presented as intentional it permitted accidental or inadvertent nuclear use that it pretends it was
intentional.
8. Catalytic war started intentionally by A third-party national government or nonstate actor intentionally sparks
third partyd nuclear war between two countries.
9. Catalytic war started inadvertently by A third-party national government inadvertently sparks nuclear conflict
third partye between two countries.
SOURCES: Features information from the sources cited below.
a Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, Praeger, 1965.
b Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks, Cornell University Press, 1991.
c Iklé, Aronson, and Madansky, 1958.
d Katz, 1961.
e Henry S. Rowen, “Catalytic Nuclear War,” in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds. Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An
Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War, Norton, 1985.
18
TABLE 2.2
Escalation Pathways to Chinese Nuclear First Use
Long-Range Strike Long-Range Strike
Pathway Name Overview Vignette Touchpoints Implications
Pathway Category: Operational Use
1. Operational This pathway encompasses those cases in which Seeking to degrade U.S. air This pathway highlights the The key mitigation is to reduce
use for specific Chinese military decisionmakers advocate for the use operations out of Guam, the fact that U.S. long-range strike the perceived operational
military effect of nuclear weapons as the best or only way to attain Chinese military assesses that might not always be the driver utility for the PLA of attacking
a specific military effect.a Decisionmakers perceive a nuclear attack will be the of Chinese nuclear use but long-range strike assets with
nuclear weapons as either suitable for addressing most effective military option could instead become a target. nuclear weapons—for example,
a military operational problem that could otherwise to overcome Andersen Air Force by ensuring that bomber
not be solved or better than conventional weapons Base (AFB) defenses, take out airframes and maintenance
for attaining a desired military effect. This pathway aircraft on the ground, and crews, as well as other ground
excludes scenarios in which nuclear use is perceived render the base inoperable for crews, are equipped and trained
as an undesirable or unavoidable expedient or as a an extended period. to operate in the aftermath of
means of signaling to foreign or domestic audiences a limited nuclear attack. It is
(such scenarios are covered by other pathways). also important to avoid massing
long-range strike platforms and
enabling assets to make them
appealing targets.
2. Strategic This pathway assumes that Chinese military officials After expending all its Long-range strike’s enduring Consider tailoring public
19
offset for advocate for nuclear weapons use after having failed conventional intermediate U.S. military advantage discussion of U.S. capabilities to
conventional to achieve military objectives without them. Pathway 2 range ballistic missiles against represents a key operational avoid leading Beijing to believe
inferiority differs from Pathway 1 in assuming that Chinese military Guam to moderate effect, the threat to Chinese military the only military solution is using
leaders perceive that nuclear use is a necessary but PLA decides it must completely success and thus a motivator nuclear weapons.
regrettable expedient to attain a military objective that shut down Andersen AFB, and for nuclear use.
they originally attempted to attain through nonnuclear its only remaining strike option
means.b Because of this element of desperation, is a nuclear attack.
Pathway 2 could be more difficult to deter than
Pathway 1.
Table 2.2—Continued
Pathway Category: Desperation and Retaliation
3. Gambling for This pathway reflects the tendency of rational actors to In the context of a failing Chinese nuclear use against Because the United States
resurrection make increasingly high-payoff, low-probability wagers invasion of Taiwan, Chinese U.S. forces, including cannot eliminate this risk (it
to recoup past losses.c For political leadership, loss in officials might decide to long-range strike, can happen seeks Chinese military failure),
a major war could portend a challenge to their political gamble on nuclear use against at any time—even on the cusp the most robust alternative is
future and even personal survival. Political leadership the defending forces in the of a U.S. victory. to create and signal to Beijing
might take risky actions to stave off defeat even if belief that this action offers a the limited benefits of nuclear
doing so seems irrational from the perspective of the slim chance of victory. escalation.
collective state. (For example, for China as a country,
giving up on a war to seize Taiwan might be better
than seizing the island but suffering the devastation of
a nuclear exchange.) Nuclear first use in this pathway
represents whatever is perceived as the best way
to avoid military failure while knowing full well that
the results could be—and are even likely to be—very
costly. This would be a different decision calculus from
Pathway 1, in which PLA military planners calculated
that a nuclear weapon would deliver the optimal effect,
or from Pathway 2, in which PLA military planners
20
decided that nuclear weapons would serve at least some

operational utility.
4. Damage This pathway envisions that China would use nuclear Chinese officials interpret Long-range strike is the U.S. It is important to understand
limitation weapons first to reduce expected damage to its U.S. actions as the opening military capability most likely and incorporate Chinese
homeland from a large-scale U.S. conventional or move of a cost-imposition to present such a threat that perspectives and potential
nuclear strike that its leaders judge to be imminent. A campaign and employ nuclear Beijing decides it needs to use red lines into U.S. operational
Chinese strike to limit damage might target U.S. offensive weapons against key U.S. nuclear weapons to avert U.S. planning.
forces, command and control assets, leadership, or all military enablers with the attacks.
three. Historically, this pathway was of considerable aim of limiting damage to the
interest for prospective U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchanges, Chinese mainland.
but it seems less significant for possible U.S.-China
conflicts because of the difficulty of U.S. conventional
forces achieving such a dramatic effect and the relatively
invulnerable basing of U.S. nuclear forces.d Future
changes in U.S. and Chinese nuclear forces might
increase China’s incentives to limit damage.
5. Use it or This pathway is related to damage limitation (Pathway China’s ability to command and Most potential Chinese U.S. planners should
lose it 4), albeit with the logic reversed. Whereas a damage control its strategic nuclear targets that could trigger this understand and account
limitation strike seeks to reduce the costs of possible forces becomes degraded pathway are located on the for Chinese analysis that is
adversary attack, a use-it-or-lose-it strike can occur over the course of a protracted Chinese mainland and thus looking for worst-case or
when officials believe they will face the same costs U.S.-China conventional are most likely to be struck most-dangerous U.S. courses
whether or not they attack while they will lose the conflict because of U.S. strikes by U.S. long-range systems. of action instead of what actual
ability to impose costs on the adversary unless they on dual-use command and U.S. long-range strike is a U.S. intentions are, to avoid
strike immediately.e control nodes, and so Chinese significant source of Chinese driving Chinese nuclear use.
leaders order the use of their concern.
remaining nuclear capability
in the belief that they will soon
lose it.
6. Shaping In this pathway, the motivation for employing nuclear Facing a likely defeat, Chinese The direct linkage is minimal, Mitigations follow previous
postwar weapons is to shape the anticipated contours of the officials seek to ensure their but long-range strike may be a logics that seek to decrease the
dynamics postwar world, including in cases in which China is long-term regional influence target. attractiveness of long-range
losing the war. Under extreme circumstances, a nuclear and intimidate regional strike as a target.
state might use nuclear weapons with the primary governments by destroying
intention of reducing its opponent’s strength after the U.S. bases in the region with
war ends. However extreme this strategic philosophy nuclear strikes.
21
might seem, it played an influential role in U.S. nuclear

employment policy at one time.
7. Seeking Thanks to this pathway’s association with the alleged To signal resolve and to The direct linkage is minimal, To the extent long-range strike
war termination Russian “escalate to de-escalate” policy, limited nuclear shock the United States into but long-range strike may be a drives the rationale behind a
use as a gambit intended to signal an advantage withdrawing from its defense target. nuclear detonation, mitigations
in resolve and bring an ongoing conflict to a swift of Taiwan, China detonates a follow previous logics that seek
conclusion is, at present, in Western policy circles, low-yield nuclear weapon at to decrease the attractiveness
perhaps the most widely discussed escalation pathway the edge of Andersen AFB. of long-range strike as a target.
to limited nuclear use.f The key difference between
this pathway and the previous ones lies in the theory
underlying the employment of nuclear weapons: Rather
than to attain some specific military objective, such
as depriving the adversary of specific capabilities,
nuclear use would be aimed at shocking enemy leaders
into quickly ending the war on acceptable terms.g We
posit this pathway as the quasi-opposite of Pathway
3: Whereas that pathway has China losing the war and
seeking to use nuclear weapons to avoid military failure,
this pathway has China winning the war and seeking to
use nuclear weapons to coerce the United States to stop
fighting.
8. Domestic At some point in a conventional conflict, the leaders After months of casualties The direct linkage is minimal, Mitigations follow previous
political of a nuclear-armed state might feel themselves under cause unprecedented but long-range strike may be a logics that seek to decrease the
signaling considerable domestic pressure to demonstrate that discontent among Chinese target. attractiveness of long-range
they are willing to use all means available to them, elite and foment growing strike as a target. This pathway
including nuclear weapons, to salvage the situation opposition to the current CCP also highlights preplanning
and emerge victorious.h This pathway differs from leadership, a nuclear strike is responses to a wide variety of
Pathways 3 and 7 in that this nuclear use would not be conducted against a U.S. air potential Chinese nuclear use
expected to change the military situation or to bring the base to signal the leadership’s cases, including ones that might
adversary to terms. Instead, the goal would be to signal commitment to the war. seem rare. One response could
resolve to domestic audiences. be not responding to Chinese
nuclear use.
Pathway Category: Perceiving and Misperceiving
9. Divergent Belligerents in an ongoing conflict have mental U.S. conventional strikes around Joint long-range strike, and All U.S. operations should take
view of U.S. models of their opponents’ intentions. Each side Beijing that are intended to specifically USAF bombers, into consideration Chinese
theory of victory attributes to the other a “theory of victory” that might degrade Chinese conventional are the most likely to prompt perceptions, and the U.S.
not be accurate.i In the event that Chinese officials operations are interpreted by Chinese concerns about military should consider multiple
misperceive the U.S. theory of victory to be overly Chinese officials as an attempt leadership decapitation strikes, targeting options for any desired
coercive or cost-imposing during a conventional to decapitate their leadership, whether driven by U.S. actions operational effect.
22
conflict, they might elect to escalate to nuclear use. leading them to escalate to or Chinese misinterpretations of
nuclear use. those actions.
10. Divergent This pathway envisions Chinese leaders engaging Reasoning that the United Chinese perceptions of U.S. Consider casting the B-21
perceptions in nuclear first strike based on misperceptions of States would commit the long-range strike alone could as a multi-role platform and
of U.S. forces U.S. forces committed to the conflict. For example, a expensive, nuclear-capable drive Chinese nuclear use, downplaying its strategic role
involved faulty Chinese radar can issue warnings of ongoing B-21 bomber only if it were even absent any potentially as part of managing Chinese
U.S. attacks that are not actually occurring. Technical committed to maximalist provocative U.S. military perceptions of U.S. long-range
limitations of a radar overwhelmed by decoys can objectives, Chinese leaders actions. strike.
also present an incorrect picture to leadership. This escalate to nuclear use because
misperception can result from misunderstanding on they perceive a threat to regime
the part of Chinese officials, technical or human error, survival.
or the actions of third parties.j
Pathway Category: Entanglement
11. This pathway involves the entanglement of conventional After PLAAF dual-capable Given the likely location of The United States could
Technological and nuclear forces by China, resulting in U.S. strikes H-6Ns score major operational many technologically entangled try to avoid targeting any
entanglement against ostensibly conventional targets resulting in successes against USAF assets, PLA assets, long-range strike dual-capable PLA systems,
the destruction of China’s nuclear capabilities. In this Chinese officials misinterpret is the most likely U.S. military but perhaps a more practical
pathway, the entanglement is caused by technological a U.S. conventional attack on capability to strike them. solution would be to consider
factors, defined as “when the delivery systems of the H-6Ns as the opening of nonkinetic approaches or public
conventional and nuclear forces are identical or a counterforce campaign and statements clarifying that the
indistinguishable.”k U.S. strikes intended for Chinese escalate to nuclear use. United States would conduct
conventional targets that accidently hit Chinese nuclear kinetic conventional strikes
forces could, in turn, cause nuclear retaliation by China on dual-capable PLA systems
to signal that the U.S. strikes will not be tolerated or to if they were being used for
halt the strikes through destruction of the U.S. forces conventional attacks on U.S.
involved. forces.
12. Geographic Geographic entanglement is “when a state positions The United States attacks Given the likely location of This risk could be mitigated with
entanglement its conventional and nuclear forces within the same Chinese military bases hosting many geographically entangled high-quality ISR and targeting
geographic spaces.”k In this pathway, similar to H-6K and H-6N bombers, and PLA assets, long-range strike information and might require
Pathway 11, U.S. strikes of geographically entangled several H-6Ns are destroyed. is the most likely U.S. military longer-duration bomber sorties.
23
assets lead to nuclear retaliation by China. Fearing the beginning of a capability to strike them.
counterforce operation, China
responds with nuclear strikes.
13. Operational Operational entanglement is “when conventional and After three U.S. strikes on Given the likely location of This pathway highlights the
entanglement nuclear forces are operated by, or rely on, the same Chinese command and control many operationally entangled need for exquisite intelligence
military institutions or practices.”k As in Pathways 11 facilities that also serve as PLA assets, long-range strike about the specifics of China’s
and 12, escalation could occur if there are U.S. strikes secondary nuclear command is the most likely U.S. military nuclear command and
on Chinese systems that support both conventional and control nodes, China fears capability to strike them. control and the need to weigh
and nuclear systems. the beginning of a counterforce escalation risk trade-offs.
operation and responds with
nuclear use.
Pathway Category: Accidents
14. Human error This pathway envisions that China detonates a nuclear Because of a combination An accidental Chinese launch Long-range strike leadership
weapon as a result of human error (e.g., pushing the of rushed efforts to convert might target a U.S. airbase should consider ways in which
wrong button by mistake) without any human being conventionally armed ballistic supporting long-range strike U.S. actions could drive Chinese
intending this outcome. missiles to carry nuclear operations. delegation of nuclear authorities
warheads and a confluence of or other operational procedures
chance errors, a Chinese field that make these edge cases
commander launches a nuclear even slightly more likely.
missile by mistake.
15. Technical This pathway envisions that China detonates a nuclear After degradation of its regular Accidental detonation could As in Pathway 14, consider
malfunction weapon because of some kind of technical malfunction airbases, the PLAAF relocates create collateral impacts, ways in which long-range strike
(e.g., a short circuit) without any human being intending H-6Ns and their associated such as radioactive fallout, for actions could make this pathway
this outcome. weapons to dispersal airfields which U.S. long-range strike less likely by, for example,
lacking essential maintenance operations would need to not destroying systems key to
equipment. A subsequent account. China’s nuclear command and
accident results in a nuclear control.
detonation.
Pathway Category: Third-Party Actors
24
16. Intentional This pathway envisions that a third party, which might A fanatical cult infiltrates the As the only dual-capable U.S. Robust safety and surety
catalytic war be a national government or a nonstate actor, attempts military of a traditional U.S. military systems, long-range processes for dual-capable
to intentionally spark a nuclear war between the United security partner, Country X, and strike is more likely than platforms are critical to avoid
States and China.l flies what appears to be a U.S. other U.S. capabilities to these assets from being blamed
aircraft into China and bombs be involved in this pathway, or even employed by a third
a nuclear power plant. Enraged and USAF bombers are the party.
by the “U.S.’s audacity,” China most at risk because of their
responds with a nuclear attack forward-deployed nature.
on Anderson AFB.
17. Inadvertent This pathway is equivalent to Pathway 16 except that North Korean leaders interpret In this pathway, third-party Long-range strike planning and
catalytic war the third party would not be seeking to intentionally U.S. moves during a U.S.-China adversary misperceptions about operations should consider the
spark a U.S.-China nuclear war. Instead, the third conflict as a feint to mask a plan long-range strike trigger an range of possibilities that could
party would take actions with some other goal, to end the Kim regime, and escalation spiral that ends in spark third-party involvement,
but the actions would result in inadvertent nuclear so North Korea conducts an Chinese nuclear use. especially overflight.
escalation by China in an ongoing U.S.-China atmospheric nuclear test in the
conventional conflict.m Pacific. In response, the United
States increases its nuclear
readiness, which Chinese
leaders misinterpret as a cover
to attack China and resort to
nuclear use.
SOURCES: Our escalation pathways are inspired by a wide variety of previous scholarship, including those listed below; for the complete list, see Volume 4 of this series (Geist et al., 2024).
a Andrew J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The US Army Between Korea and Vietnam, National Defense University Press, 1986.
b Fiona S. Cunningham, “Strategic Substitution: China’s Search for Coercive Leverage in the Information Age,” International Security, Vol. 47, No. 1, Summer 2022; Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear?
Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4, Spring 2017; Fravel, 2019, Chapter 8.
c George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, “Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 2, May 1994; Shawn
T. Cochran, “Gambling for Resurrection Versus Bleeding the Army: Explaining Risky Behavior in Failing Wars,” Security Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2018.
d Charles L. Glaser and Brian Radzinsky, “Basics of Deterrence and U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Forces,” in Charles Glaser, Austin Long, and Brain Radzinsky, eds., Managing U.S. Nuclear Operations in the 21st
25
Century, Brookings Institution Press, 2022.

e Alexander Lanoszka and Thomas Leo Scherer, “Nuclear Ambiguity, No-First-Use, and Crisis Stability in Asymmetric Crises,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 24, Nos. 3–4, 2017.
f The attribution of what some U.S. analysts dubbed an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy to Moscow is controversial among experts on Russia’s nuclear strategy. See Michael Kofman, Anya Fink, and Jeffrey
Edmonds, Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts, Center for Naval Analyses, DRM-2019-U-022455-1Rev, April 2020.
g DoD, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018.
h James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, September 1994.
i Brad Roberts, On Theories of Victory, Red and Blue, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research, Livermore Papers on Global Security No. 7, June 2020.
j Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 188–89.
k David C. Logan, “Are They Reading Schelling in Beijing? The Dimensions, Drivers, and Risks of Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement in China,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2020, p. 10.
l Katz, 1961.
m Rowen, 1985.
Key Takeaways
Clarifying U.S. Joint Long-Range Strike Touchpoints to the Illustrative Vignettes
Although there appears to exist a wide variety of plausible series of events that can lead to Chinese nuclear
first use, there are two dominant ways in which U.S. long-range strike can play a role, intentionally or not, in
triggering such use. The first way involves cases of long-range strike either directly prosecuting an escalatory
target or being perceived to be doing so. Examples of escalatory actions (whether real or perceived) include
targeting entangled systems, targeting the Chinese leadership, or attacking targets tied to assessed Chinese
redlines, such as population centers or nuclear forces. Although it is natural to imagine that some geographic
or target type-specific criteria could be developed to identify and rank the escalatory risk involved in any
given U.S. kinetic strike on the Chinese mainland, our research did not result in that level of fidelity. There
is no guarantee that such nuanced guidance would accurately reflect Chinese escalation thresholds, which
themselves are likely to evolve as a conflict goes on. This reality highlights the importance of understand-
ing general Chinese perspectives and also drives some of our recommendations. We acknowledge that the
recommendations we identify for adjusting long-range strike are likely to only address one part of broader
U.S.-China wartime escalation dynamics, but that is the focus of our research.
Actions by long-range strike platforms in CONUS (particularly USAF bombers because of their visibility)
could be escalatory even before they conduct any strikes. For example, any massive intra-war mobilization of
bombers, which the DAF could lead for many conceivable reasons, could be perceived by China as a prelude
to large-scale cost-imposition attacks, prompting China to use nuclear weapons, regardless of U.S. intent.
Long-range strike missions could also contribute to the general fog of war and increase the likelihood of a
variety of accidents or inadvertent escalations. Finally, although we fortunately do not have an example of it,
long-range strike could be used (intentionally, accidentally, or inadvertently) in such a way that it could dis-
able safety features or China’s nuclear command and control systems and directly lead to a nuclear accident.
Pathway 17 highlights a touch point in which long-range strike triggers a third-party action that causes the
United States to raise its nuclear alert level, which in turn provokes China to suspect that the United States
is actually escalating against it and to increase its nuclear readiness, setting off a spiral toward nuclear use.
The second way in which U.S. long-range strike often appears in the pathways of prospective nuclear esca-
lation is when China attacks long-range strike itself with nuclear weapons. In these cases, long-range strike
is not driving Chinese nuclear use but rather is the recipient of it. Both long-range strike systems (such as
bombers or weapons) and support elements (such as equipment, ground crews, and communication nodes)
could be potential targets. China might choose to target long-range strike given its high tactical and strategic
value. China might also do so out of desperation, or, while hard to quantify, there might be a “prestige” ele-
ment gained by successfully degrading expensive and operationally critical assets. These reasons would be
especially determinative the more vulnerable the long-range strike is to strategic attacks. Ensuring that USAF
flight crews and ground personnel are trained to fight through a limited nuclear attack, as well as technically
equipping long-range strike platforms and their enabling infrastructure to be more survivable, could shift
Chinese thinking on nuclear use. We conjecture that nuclear resilience or long-range strike could potentially
deter China from targeting U.S. joint long-range strike in the first place because degradation would require
more than “just” a limited nuclear strike.
Analyzing Implications for U.S. Joint Long-Range Strike

The three key takeaways include two major implications for U.S. joint long-range strike and one broader set
of nuclear escalation trade-offs. The first major implication, similar to what history and recent wargaming
have shown, is that what is being targeted likely matters more than which asset is doing the targeting. In many
26
of the pathways, long-range strike appears escalatory simply by attacking the “wrong” targets (how many
wrong targets can be struck before a real redline is crossed is uncertain).
A counterexample could be the exceptionally high escalation risks tied to the use of hypersonic missiles
at the outset of a war, given that these missiles are extremely fast and precise, hard to track, and likely lim-
ited in number, potentially leading the Chinese leadership to assume that they will be used for decapitation
attacks.10 However, over time, China could gain new information about the United States’ actual intended use
of hypersonic missiles (assuming that the United States does not use them in this way), and their escalatory
nature could decrease relative to that of any other weapon.
The second key takeaway pertains to escalation out of desperation. While long-range strike likely plays an
indirect role in triggering escalatory pressures borne of general desperation, there are particular uses of U.S.
long-range strike under such conditions that could lead to mass damage and loss of human life in China or
to heightened levels of fear. These uses include shock-and-awe and high-velocity attacks (measured by targets
struck per day) that require less-exquisite intelligence and targeting and that provide fewer off-ramps from
nuclear escalation than do slower-tempo operations. Perceptions here are key: Even if the United States is
not intending to prosecute a high-velocity campaign, if China perceives one as occurring, escalation might
very well ensue. For example, if the United States repeats the pace of strikes from previous wars it conducted
against nonnuclear regional powers, such as Iraq, then Chinese military analysts might extrapolate U.S.
intent as similar to the U.S. political objectives seen during those conflicts, including overthrowing adversary
regimes.11
Finally, regarding the broader set of nuclear escalation trade-offs, all U.S. attempts to minimize escala-
tion risks—which includes avoiding mainland strikes—could come with decreased operational utility and
force survivability. Ensuring a force structure that can operate under a range of potentially severe constraints
appears critical for a successful denial strategy. At the very least, the DAF needs to be able to prosecute Chi-
nese amphibious ships from a standoff posture to alleviate the threat of Chinese integrated air defenses and
other elements of A2/AD.
10Evan B. Montgomery and Toshi Yoshihara, Speeding Toward Instability? Hypersonic Weapons and the Risks of Nuclear Use,
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 1, 2023.
11For example, the United States conducted roughly 1,200 strikes in the first 24 hours of the Gulf War in 1991. See Thomas A.
Keaney and Elliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report, Department of the Air Force, 1993, p. 13.
27
CHAPTER 3
Findings, Recommendations, and Concluding

Thoughts
Our work resulted in eight major findings, each of which motivates one or more recommendations. We
divide the recommendations into three categories: long-range strike force development, managing percep-
tions, and things to avoid. For each recommendation, we specify the relevant U.S. organization(s) that can
act on it.
Findings
If fully committed to fighting and winning a war with China over Taiwan, the United States must be
prepared for nuclear escalation. There is nothing that the United States can do to drive this risk to zero.
Furthermore, the United States can “win” the war as desired (denying China’s invasion of Taiwan without
protracted war that avoids strikes on either homeland) and still find itself a victim of nuclear attack.
China’s nuclear threshold is unclear but also unlikely to be fixed. U.S. actions could influence this
threshold positively or negatively. Target selection appears to be the most influential factor under U.S. mili-
tary control.
Conducting kinetic strikes against mainland China represents an important escalation threshold.
Forgoing mainland strikes does not guarantee against Chinese nuclear escalation, but crossing the threshold
introduces additional escalation pathways.
U.S. joint long-range strike is likely to be either a causal agent of nuclear escalation or a target of
nuclear attack. Employing long-range strike assets judiciously, hardening them against nuclear attack, and
protecting them from conventional attack should reduce escalation risks. Long-range strike can also have
secondary effects—such as increasing the fog of war or inadvertently striking a system key to China’s nuclear
command and control—that drive nuclear escalation. Long-range strike could also be involved in causing a
third-party actor to mobilize, setting off a spiral toward nuclear war.
It is impossible to predict the rules of engagement that the NCA will impose on DoD and the DAF
during a war with China over Taiwan. History suggests that there could very well be immense restrictions
on mainland strikes, including not even allowing for any mainland strikes. Furthermore, such rules could
change over the course of a conflict.
Perceptions and misperceptions play a vital role in wartime escalation. Misperceptions can be driven
by a lack of timely and accurate information, ambiguous signaling, human biases, and inaccurate preexisting
beliefs and expectations of intent.
There will likely be a trade-off between military operational utility, force survivability, and escalation
management. All three can also have simultaneously suboptimal outcomes. The United States will have to
deviate from its past reliance on cost-imposition theories of victories pursued against regional adversaries
that were incapable of launching catastrophic attacks on the U.S. homeland. The United States might also
have to adopt a slower war tempo, strike less ideal targets, and operate farther from the fight than desired
29
to manage escalation dynamics. As has occurred historically, the United States might also have to trade its
most-effective and most-lethal weapons for nuclear escalation risk reduction.
DoD must learn to live with Chinese nuclear signaling. Authoritative Chinese texts identify several U.S.
actions that might drive Chinese nuclear signaling. During a Taiwan scenario, it might be nearly impossible
to avoid such signaling. In addition, Chinese leadership will likely look for ways to deter feared U.S. nuclear
use. Setting aside the U.S. political question of officially recognizing mutual vulnerability with China, DoD
planning must accept China’s secure second-strike capability (thereby pursuing a limited victory) and focus
escalation management efforts on reducing Chinese incentives to escalation.
Recommendations
Evolve Long-Range Strike to Be Effective Under a Variety of Rules of
Engagement and Strike Authorities in Support of Escalation Management
Prioritize development of a robust denial capability to minimize the need for strikes on mainland China
and to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation. It is unclear whether existing munitions inventories are suf-
ficient to deny an invasion across the Taiwan Strait, particularly by amphibious forces. Thus, for the DAF,
acquiring long-range standoff attack weapons that can reliably strike amphibious ships in a highly contested
environment is pivotal to supporting a denial strategy. However, this recommendation goes beyond any one
munition: There must be a balance of numbers, munitions capabilities, and delivery platforms that can stop
an invasion by a variety of Chinese forces—including amphibious ships, aircraft, and special forces. Investing
in passive and active defense against Chinese conventional attack in theater is also useful, in that the more
the United States can generate air power and conduct desired missions, the better its chance to do so under
the guidance of escalation management considerations.
Responsible Organizations: DoD, DAF, AFGSC.
Build a portfolio of U.S. joint long-range strike force structures, postures, and capabilities to execute war
plans across various possible mainland strike authorizations. A force structure that is premised on assum-
ing one type of authorization (ranging from no mainland strikes to extensive mainland strikes) would rep-
resent a failure to provide U.S. civilian leadership with the force it might need to successfully defend Taiwan
while minimizing nuclear escalation risks. A force structure that allows accurate strikes of chosen targets
(mainland or otherwise) and minimizes collateral damage is highly desirable. There must be enough long-
range strike capacity to continue with the least-escalatory missions and least-escalatory theory of victory in
the face of attrition.
Responsible Organizations: DoD, USINDOPACOM, USSTRATCOM, AFGSC.
Ensure the ability to prosecute a variety of targeting plans that can help balance operational effective-
ness, force survivability, and escalation management. As an example, consider using other methods for
mainland targets that might be less escalatory, such as some nonkinetic attacks. If H-6Ns are going to be
targeted, attack them in the air as opposed to on the ground. Not only does this eliminate attacking the Chi-
nese mainland, but it also helps lower entanglement concerns because the flying bombers are presumably
armed conventionally. Another approach is a public or private U.S. government statement that Washington
will target PLA dual-capable systems if they are conducting conventional attacks on U.S. forces. Exquisite
targeting intelligence is helpful to avoid both collateral damage and entangled systems. Similarly, target-
ing ships in motion in the Taiwan Strait is likely less escalatory than attacking ships docked at naval bases
on the Chinese coast. Avoiding strategic attacks as well as attacks on command posts of known exclusively
nuclear units altogether would be wise. (This avoidance could become problematic if the PLA Rocket Force
30
Findings, Recommendations, and Concluding Thoughts
tries to present all command and control infrastructure as potentially nuclear to avoid being targeted). DoD
should consider whether it is feasible to confidently assess the nuanced escalatory differences between vari-
ous potential mainland targets, such as coastal IADS versus inland dual-use infrastructure. Although this is
logical, we have no concrete evidence that Beijing will respond differently to these attacks.
Reduce Risk of Misperceptions and Dangerous Perspectives

Shape Chinese perceptions of long-range strike before and during a war. Chinese perceptions of long-
range strike could be particularly tricky to manage given both the historic U.S. propensity to use long-range
strike for extensive coercive bombing campaigns and its visibility (people may see bombers flying; they will
not see submarines). Bombers are also manned platforms, so there is individual responsibility to execute mis-
sions as planned. During a conflict, bomber pilots might have to make choices that could have immensely
consequential cascading effects. Long-range strike could be a driver of PLA nuclear delegation, which in and
of itself would raise nuclear risks (particularly of accidental or inadvertent nuclear use). Actions that could
help with perception management include the following:
• Rebrand the B-21 as a multi-role platform, not a strategic platform (although this decision would need
to be balanced with other U.S. national priorities, such as assurance of regional allies and partners, as
well as deterrence against U.S. adversaries).
• Carefully weigh deception techniques that could improve long-range strike survivability without over-
whelming China’s technical capacity to detect what is real versus what might be spoofed or be a decoy.
For example, avoid presenting to Chinese air defenses the appearance of several dozen incoming U.S.
bombers or hundreds of incoming U.S. cruise missiles that are not real. Although this tactic may be
useful to the United States for force survivability and other reasons, it could precipitate nuclear use.
• Across all phases of conflict, consider Chinese perceptions of U.S. mobilization and deployments of
bombers and long-range strike munitions. Parameters, including the timing and frequency of long-
range strike and movement, are important. Note that this is a nuanced calculation to make because
long-range strike mobilization and deployment can also serve intra-war deterrence, and the deterrence
effects versus the escalation effects of long-range strike are unlikely to be perfectly clear.
Incorporate considerations of escalation risk into the acquisition process, especially for systems that are
likely to appear highly escalatory to Chinese leadership. This is especially important for acquisitions that
could have a high likelihood of being perceived by China as designed for first-strike advantage, decapitation,
or conventional counterforce. Munitions that have limited military application should be purchased in small
numbers, and aircraft that are not highly survivable are at high risk of being perceived as designed for first
strike. Hypersonic weapons appear primed to stoke Chinese fears about decapitation strikes early in a con-
flict, even if the United States intends to use them for other targets. To help avoid the perception of preparing
a conventional counterforce campaign, DoD should consider not procuring for its long-range strike force
any long-range, high-speed, “bunker buster” munitions that appear matched with Chinese silo construction.
These procurement decisions must consider DoD’s global mission requirements, not just China-specific sce-
narios, so if the decision is made that the global operational benefits outweigh the strategic escalation risks in
a China-specific context, then DoD should work to mitigate the impacts on Chinese perceptions. Moreover,
measures that might increase munition survivability, such as decoys, might also increase the risks of both
31
inadvertent and intentional nuclear escalation by creating the appearance that a larger-than-actual strike is
coming (particularly if Chinese radars do not discriminate well between decoys and real munitions).
Responsible Organizations: DoD, AFGSC (requirements-setting for the acquisition process).
Establish an Escalation Management Center of Excellence at AFGSC both to train senior and junior per-
sonnel and to have a dedicated organizational structure through which escalation risks can be weighed
during peacetime force development. Managing escalation dynamics in wartime starts by preparing the
joint force during peacetime competition through a collective, collaborative effort across all stakeholders,
including both direct players and secondary supporting organizations. DoD could benefit from having a
dedicated organization in the lead. Therefore, we argue that AFGSC can play a unique role in providing this
expertise as a de facto center of excellence, possibly modeled on the 8th Air Force’s Standoff Munitions Appli-
cation Center.1 We advocate for this center to take advantage of the existing expertise as much as possible by
coordinating with individuals from, for example, the 608th AOC, USSTRATCOM, and USINDOPACOM.
The center would support a variety of activities that would take Chinese perspectives into account, including
target development, training exercises (see recommendation below), requirements-setting, and the above-
mentioned acquisition process.
Responsible Organizations: DoD, DAF, AFGSC, USSTRATCOM.
Avoid Actions That Could Heighten the Risk of Nuclear Escalation

Avoid making long-range strike an attractive target for a limited Chinese nuclear strike. Avoid mass-
ing not just long-range strike platforms (bombers) but also enabling assets, such as munitions, specialized
maintenance (e.g., low-observability features), crews, refueling aircraft and trucks, and fuel. Hardening long-
range strike so that it could operate through a limited nuclear strike would decrease its attractiveness as a
target and possibly aid in deterring Chinese nuclear use. In addition to equipping personnel with protective
gear and being able to decontaminate aircraft (either aircraft that have been on strip alert and have survived
an attack or new aircraft that are flown in), personnel must also be trained to operate in a degraded nuclear
environment.
Responsible Organizations: AFGSC.
Avoid long-range strike missions that could accidentally or inadvertently engage a nuclear armed third-
party, such as Russia or North Korea. Third-party perspectives and misperceptions could precipitate a dan-
gerous spiral to nuclear war. As an example of what seems like a poor concept of operation: Do not fly bomb-
ers over North Korea, even if they are intended for strikes against China.
Responsible Organizations: DoD, USINDOPACOM, USSTRATCOM.
Avoid extemporaneous responses to dangerous moments by preparing communication strategies and
responses to Chinese nuclear signaling or use ahead of time. In general, develop communication strate-
gies today to have a plan during moments of heightened tension, during episodes of Chinese misperceptions
about U.S. intent, and during other dangerous situations that could cause China’s nuclear threshold to go
down. Neither Track 1.5 diplomacy nor Track 2 diplomacy might prove possible in a war with China, and so
other tactics to communicate, even unilaterally, should be considered.2 In addition to verbal communication
(including presidential addresses or other government public announcements, as well as private channels),
1 8th Air Force and the Joint-Global Strike Operations Center, “U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet: Standoff Munitions Application
Center, Barksdale AFB, LA,” U.S. Air Force, December 2021.
2 Track 1.5 dialogues include nongovernmental researchers, along with some government officials (in an unofficial capacity).
Track 2 dialogues involve only unofficial country representatives, without government officials present.
32
Findings, Recommendations, and Concluding Thoughts
there are meaningful actions that can be taken (such as not mobilizing bombers with nuclear weapons versus
putting them on strip alert with nuclear weapons). Treaties or other confidence-building measures developed
in the near future could prove enormously valuable during conflict. It is vital to keep diplomatic and other
communication channels open during a conflict, even if there is little initial prospect for successfully nego-
tiating an end to the fighting.
Responsible Organizations: U.S. government, DoD, DAF.
Avoid peacetime training of conventional missions that appear most likely to trigger Chinese nuclear
first use. An example of incorporating Chinese perspectives and potential redlines into planning consid-
erations is avoiding training activities that could be perceived as preparation for leadership decapitation
strikes, large-scale cost-imposition, or strikes on major population centers. There is certainly some inherent
tension between leveraging peacetime training for deterrence versus shaping Chinese perceptions in war-
time, but we argue that focusing U.S. training specifically on denial can help mitigate some of this tension.
Responsible Organizations: DoD, AFGSC.
Caveats and Opportunities for Future Research

As with all research, there were some topics that we explored in depth and others that we treated with relative
superficiality or not at all. Here we highlight a few for consideration.
We focused on the question of how to reduce the chance of China using a nuclear weapon first during
a war over Taiwan. We did not consider how the United States should respond if China employs a nuclear
weapon or how to deescalate from that point.
A Taiwan scenario is DoD’s “pacing scenario,” but AFGSC has to prepare forces for scenarios world-
wide and must consider situations in which the United States fights more than one adversary at a time.
Long-range strike investments that might be very effective in another theater could be perceived by China as
aimed at it for purposes that cross its redlines (such as regime change). Managing Chinese perspectives may
be fundamentally at odds with making investments in more lethal and survivable long-range strike, but at
the very least, the potential risks of Chinese misperception should be acknowledged. (Similarly, long-range
strike investment choices tailored to China could be viewed problematically by other adversaries, and those
risks must also be taken into account).
Our research was scoped to consider the escalation risks of long-range strike after a war has started.
However, there is very likely a tension between the roles played by an asset that can be both a highly effec-
tive prewar deterrent but also a highly escalatory weapon during a conflict. The “correct” balance of prewar
deterrence and intra-war escalation management for any given asset is likely highly subjective and hard to
quantify and should be explored in follow-on research.
The United States is not the only country that is contemplating investment in long-range strike: Sev-
eral potential U.S. coalition partners are developing or improving their own long-range strike capabili-
ties, most notably Japan.3 Understanding how these countries might employ their own long-range strike,
understanding how this would be perceived by China, and considering how to coordinate operations is criti-
cal to escalation management.
Operating in the Indo-Pacific theater relies on U.S. allies and partners (to provide access, basing,
overflight, forces and support resources, diplomacy, and so on). If U.S. allies or partners perceive U.S.
actions to be unnecessarily escalatory or to be driving unacceptable Chinese responses, their support during
a conflict might abate. If this perception predates a conflict, then they may be inclined to offer no support at
3 “China Military Body May Be Target of Japan Counterstrike Capability,” Kyodo News, May 15, 2022.
33
all, which could potentially cripple a U.S. war effort a priori. Detailed, country-by-country assessments of the
perceptions of important allies and partners would be valuable.
Concluding Thoughts
Our work suggests a variety of options for using U.S. joint long-range strike during a defense-of-Taiwan sce-
nario in ways that should help decrease escalation risks. Some of these options might entail some decrease
in operational utility or force survivability but still enable a denial theory of victory. There are also several
organize-, train-, and equip-related levers and decisions that AFGSC controls during peacetime to influence
wartime escalation. The lag in time from pulling these levers to the actual warfighting makes the connec-
tions to wartime escalation less obvious. However, controlling how the forces are presented, how crews are
trained and equipped, and how technical decisions are made when acquiring weapon systems offer addi-
tional wartime options to leaders ranging from field commanders to the President of the United States. It is
possible to tilt the force thoughtfully in one direction or another to reflect AFGSC’s unique understanding of
the possibilities and perils of long-range strike while helping shape directions of the total force in ways that
can enhance stability and manage escalation and still achieve wartime military objectives.
34
Abbreviations
A2/AD anti-access/area denial
AFB Air Force Base
AFGSC Air Force Global Strike Command
AOC Air Operations Center
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CONUS continental United States
DAF Department of the Air Force
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
FOBS fractional orbital bombardment system
IADS integrated air defense systems
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
NCA National Command Authority
NFU No First Use
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PRC People’s Republic of China
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
USAF U.S. Air Force
USINDOPACOM U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command
35
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Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s reported order to the Chinese military to be prepared
to invade Taiwan by 2027 and China’s ongoing nuclear buildup have raised U.S. concerns over the prospect of a
U.S.-China conflict. A conflict with China would be distinct from the wars the United States has fought in the post–
Cold War period against regional powers without nuclear weapons. This report summarizes a series of reports
on how U.S. joint long-range strike, especially the U.S. Air Force’s bomber force, could adapt to better balance
military operational effectiveness, force survivability, and escalation management to achieve desired military and
political objectives without triggering catastrophic escalation, specifically Chinese nuclear use.
This report is the product of a mixed-methods research approach that combined regional studies, analytic
strategic theory, and historical case studies, all informed by operational analysis. The authors (1) conducted
original Chinese-language research leveraging open-source Chinese military writings; (2) supplemented the limited
information available from open-source Chinese military writings with historical case studies and a broad review
of analytic strategic theory dating back to early RAND work in the 1950s, along with a literature review of Western
scholarship on China; (3) reviewed publicly available U.S. Department of Defense documents and recent
non-U.S. government wargames; and (4) developed an analytic framework that linked China’s nuclear escalation
with specific technical or employment characteristics of U.S. joint long-range strike.
$23.00
ISBN-10 1-9774-1354-4
ISBN-13 978-1-9774-1354-3
P R O J E C T A I R FO R C E 52300
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Dahlia Anne Goldfeld ■ Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga ■ Shawn Cochran

Alexis Dale-Huang ■ David R. Frelinger ■ Edward Geist ■ Jeff Hagen

AN OVERVIEW OF IDEAS FOR U.S. CONVENTIONAL

RAND Project AIR FORCE

Introduction, Research Themes, and Methodology

China Is Expanding Its Nuclear Force Structure

6 Heim, Burdette, and Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2024, p. 6.

China can Xi takes Secure

Domain: Ground Maritime Air Space

Evolving U.S. Conventional Long-Range Strike Capabilities and Planning

Our Research Approach

1. What might compel China to cross its nuclear threshold?

• CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, other U.S. territory

LOE 3 LOEs 1, 3 LOEs 1, 3 LOE 2 LOEs 1, 2, 3, and 4

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6

Findings Recommendations Conclusions

NOTE: LOE = line of effort.

Limits of Predicting China’s Wartime Decisionmaking

History Appears Only Somewhat Representative of Today’s U.S.-China

Framework for Identifying Plausible Catalysts of

1 Beauchamp-Mustafaga et al., 2024.

Identifying Escalation Logics for Nuclear Use

Identifying Escalation Pathways to Chinese Nuclear First Use and

Ukraine War,” Reuters, October 19, 2023.

decided that nuclear weapons would serve at least some

might seem, it played an influential role in U.S. nuclear

Century, Brookings Institution Press, 2022.

Analyzing Implications for U.S. Joint Long-Range Strike

Findings, Recommendations, and Concluding

Reduce Risk of Misperceptions and Dangerous Perspectives

Avoid Actions That Could Heighten the Risk of Nuclear Escalation

Caveats and Opportunities for Future Research

www.rand.org 9 781977 413543

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