Scarborough_Shoal_Dispute,_Chi

International Journal of China Studies
Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2014, pp. 153-178

__________________________________________________________
Scarborough Shoal Dispute, China’s Assertiveness,

and Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy
Shawn Shaw-fawn Kao*
Tunghai University
Abstract
With the emergence of China’s rapid economic and military power,
broad discussions of China and East Asia’s political relationship
surfaced. Although China’s attitude towards neighbouring countries has
been continuously amiable, conflictual incidents were occasionally
reported. Among them, the South China Sea with overlapping
sovereignty claim by many countries is an area that is prone to constant
conflicts for China and its neighbour countries. In April, 2012, although
the confrontation between China and the Philippines in the Scarborough
Shoal was eventually resolved without leading to any direct conflicts,
China’s strong message claiming sovereignty right in the significant
dispute nevertheless indicates China’s growing assertiveness in South
China Sea.
This study provides an analytical review on two interrelated issues.
First, it attempts to review and analyze the Scarborough Shoal dispute
and its impact on China’s South China Sea Policy. This paper argues that
China’s assertive approach toward South China Sea will be a non-
military proactive effort in the near future, although Beijing’s attitude
and actions has been stronger and military forces have become an
option.
Second, the paper reviews China’s assertiveness in South China Sea,
and its implication for Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy. Taiwan’s South
153
154 Shawn Shawfawn Kao
China Sea Policy approach has been more restrained comparatively than
other claimants in the area. It calls for an open, regional or multilateral
approach toward cooperation, and has until now maintained a cautious
approaches toward cooperation with China, exclusively on terrirtorial
sovereignty contentions or joint development in the disputed islands,
particularly the Spratlys. And thus, the policy will largely remain subtle
and ambiguous in the years ahead, as Taiwan does not want to provoke
either China or the ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea.
Keywords: South China Sea, ASEAN, China Rise, Taiwan
JEL classification: F51, F52, F59, H56
1. China’s Evolving Position in South China Sea

With the rising of China’s power, discussion around the world on China
and East Asia’s political relationship surfaced. Although China’s attitude
towards neighbouring countries has been continuing amiable, conflictual
incidents were occasionally reported. Among them, the South China Sea
(SCS) with overlapping sovereignty claims by many countries in an area
that is prone to constant conflict for China and its neighbour countries.
The flare-up between China and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal
(Huangyan Island, ) in April 2012 was a typical case in this
particular regard. Although the confrontation between China and the
Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal was eventually resolved without
leading to any direct conflicts, China’s strong message claiming
sovereignty right in the significant dispute nevertheless indicate China’s
growing assertive attitude, and even a more proactive efforts than ever in
its South China Sea policy.
China’s growing assertive behaviour in the South China Sea has
been examined and reviewed in recent discussion and publication in the
academic circle. 1 Media across the regions have also focused on China’s
possible motivations. And the publications of an article in the Global
Times, op-ed on September 29th, 2011 with the title “Time to teach those
around the South China Sea a lesson”, was picked up in particular by
International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy 155
numerous news outlets in both China and around the world.

Since the beginning of the Post-Cold War era, China’s strategy of
self-constraint has been based on Deng Xiaoping’s “24-Characters
guidance” of “observe calmly; secure own position on; cope with affairs
calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a
low profile; and never claim leadership”. 2 China’s peaceful rise narrative
was meant to keep a low profile and to reassure neighbours and the
world of peaceful intentions. The narrative now is that the more power
China gets, the more challenges it encounters. As China’s status on the
international stage increases, it brings more attention and has made
China more suspicious of the outside world. The central theme of the
low profile strategy was never to take a global lead as it was actually
more disadvantages in terms of trouble and cost then being the world’s
leader would provide. 3
The Global Times op-ed, going further by saying “A good time to
take military action in the South China Sea”, seems to break with Deng
Xiaoping’s strategic guidance. The op-ed was penned by Long Tao
, a pseudonym that means “wave of the dragon”. He wrote, “Do
not worry about small-scale wars; it is the best way to release the
potential of war. Play a few small battles and big battles can be
avoided.” Long added further that military action should be focused on
striking the Philippines and Vietnam, “the two noisiest troublemakers to
achieve the effect of killing one chicken to scare the monkeys.” Through
military action, he went on, China could transform the South China Sea
into “a sea of fire”, an act made possible by the fact that “of the more
than 1,000 oilrigs and four airfield on the Spratly Islands, none belongs
to China.”4 Long asked in his writing, “Who’ll suffer most when
Western oil giants withdraw?” Such sabre-rattling would seem unwise
and counter-productive from a strategic and military point of view, as it
is likely to push Vietnam and the Philippines towards the US, as well as
towards India or Japan, to form a coalition against China. But the op-ed
may have the one more immediate goal: to scare Western oil companies
always from Vietnam and the Philippines and to deter them from
concluding deals with them.
IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

A new cache of US diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks on

September 1, 2011, highlighted efforts going back to at least 2006, to
pressure oil companies such as Exxon Mobil, BP, Chevron and Petronas
after they cut deals with Hanoi. US and other international companies
with interests in China were convinced to leave. The world’s largest oil
firm, Exxon Mobil, was threatened repeatedly by Chinese diplomats to
end activities in Vietnam but still went forward with their joint-ventures
projects in Vietnam.
However, according to one of Beijing’s think tanks, China Institute
of International Studies (CIIS), China’s image has been distorted
concerning the South China Sea issue. As Su Xiaohui (Deputy Director
of the Department for International and Strategic Studies, CIIS) claims,
the way that China has been becoming more assertive in dealing with
disputes with weak neighbours has been distorted. 5 In fact, Su Xiaohui
asserts, China’s policies concerning the South China Sea are consistent.
China is seeking a balance between defending national interests and
maintaining an agreeable regional environment. 6 Based on such
rationale, China is firm in defending territorial sovereignty and
legitimate rights, and at the same time, persists in peaceful development
and is willing to solve the disputes with concerned parties through
bilateral dialogue and negotiation. China will continue to manage good-
neighbour relationships and partnerships, as she put it. 7
In any case, Li Mingjiang, a long-time observer on South China Sea
issues from S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang
Technological University of Singapore, suggests that the high tensions
and conflicts in the South China Sea have sparked a serious policy
debate in China ever since, with a diverse and wide range of views and
policy proposals being put forward by Chinese analysts. 8 Li contends
that the majority of Chinese analysts seem to share the consensus that
the conflicts in the South China Sea should be blamed on regional states
for failing to respect Chinese interests and for colluding with external
powers. He said, “this is perhaps an indication that China is unlikely to
make significant amendments to its policy on the South China Sea. The
logic behind this is that a major policy overhaul is not necessary if there
is nothing seriously wrong with Chinese behavior. ”

However, as Li continues, the pressure for a tougher policy does not

come from the mainstream scholarly community, but from the popular
nationalists. New developments in China, including the growth of
nationalism, the growth of China’s comprehensive capabilities, and the
compartmentalization of administrative duties among different agencies,
will very likely prompt China to speed up its efforts to further
consolidate its economic and military presence in the South China Sea.
In this regard, Beijing is unlikely to reduce its current level of law
enforcement activities in the South China Sea. Moreover, it is becoming
more difficult to coordinate the actions of the different Chinese agencies
that are involved in maritime affairs.
While facing with the development in the South China Sea and the
compartmentalization of administrative duties among different agencies,
China adjusted existing administration policies and strengthened its
maritime management for the sake of cooperating with China’s good-
neighbour diplomacy toward its neighbouring countries. For example, in
June 2013, China’s State Council approved the establishment of Sansha
, a city to administer the Xisha , Zhongsha and Nansha
islands and their surrounding waters. In July of the same year, the
Central Military Commission authorized the Guangzhou Military
Command to form a garrison command in the Sansha City. In
November, a map of Sansha city was issued. And China’s Hainan
Province passed a regulation related to ocean security underlining
China’s determination to preserve its maritime security. Under this
regulation, several measures can be taken against foreign ships that
illegally enter China’s territory.
In addition, China also strengthens the surveillance in related
waters. According to China’s State Oceanic Administration, Chinese
marine surveillance ships carried out 58 patrol missions in the South
China Sea in 2012. In early 2013, a China marine surveillance
detachment accomplished an airborne and seaborne patrol of the Xisha
Islands in the South China Sea. 9 As Li Mingjiang contends, while
Beijing would propose much tougher policies to better protect its
interests on the one hand, China’s concerns about its relations with
Southeast Asia, its strategic rivalry with the United State, and its priority

for domestic economic development, on the other hand, are likely to

constrain Beijing from becoming openly confrontational vis-à-vis the
neighbouring states. These concerns will serve as significant constraints
to China’s maritime law enforcement, and even the use of the military
forces to solve the conflicts. Against such backdrop, Beijing is likely to
practise, as Li asserts, a non-confrontational assertiveness in the South
China Sea dispute in the near future. 10
2. The Scarborough Shoal Dispute and Its Implications

The flare-up between China and the Philippines over the cluster of rock
formations in South China Sea known as “Scarborough Shoal” in April
2012 has tested the region’s tenuous calm. The Scarborough Shoal is
marked by a triangular-shaped chain of reefs and rocks, enclosing an
area of the lagoon with 150 square kilometers width in its nature. The
tallest of the rocks projects 3 meters above water at high tide. The
surrounding water is rich in fisheries and marine life which have been
exploited by fishing vessels from China and the Philippines for decades.
Scarborough Shoal is located 124 nautical miles (nm) from Zambalies
province in the Philippines and 472 nm from the coast of China. It is
within the 200 nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claimed by the
Philippines from its main archipelago. However, the fact that the Shoal
is within the EEZ of the Philippines does not give the Philippines
sovereignty over it or make it part of its territory. How the dispute is
resolved holds broader implication for the region wary of a rising China.
The standoff began April 8 of 2012 when a Philippine
reconnaissance aircraft spotted 5 Chinese fishing vessels in the lagoon.
The Philippine navy dispatched a frigate CBRP (Gregorio del Pilar, the
largest ship of Philippine Naval Forces), to investigate the Chinese
vessels, and two days later, two China Marine surveillance ships soon
arrived, interposing themselves between the frigate and the fishing
vessels. China and the Philippines formally protested against the other’s
actions. To lower tensions, the Philippines withdrew the navy frigate,
replacing it with a Coast Guard Cutter. And China reinforced its
presence by dispatching its newest Fishery Law Enforcement Command

Ship, Yuzheng 310. The standoff went on more than a month ever since.
Under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
an island is defined as a naturally formed feature that can support human
habitation or has an economic function, and entitled to a 200nm EEZ. If
a feature does not meet these criteria, it’s classified as a rock, entitled to
12 nm of territorial waters, but not an EEZ. Because five or so rocks on
the shoal and reportedly above water at high tide, it meets the definition
of an “island” under the UNCLOS. Therefore, it is subject to a claim of
sovereignty in its own right and is entitled to a 12nm territorial sea of its
own. Scarborough Shoal is a classic case of a territorial sovereignty
dispute. And UNCLOS, however, lacks authority to decide on
sovereignty disputes over land features such as islands and rocks. The
law applies only in cases of disputes arising from maritime jurisdiction.
Both China and the Philippines claim that Scarborough Shoal is an
integral part of their national territory. The Philippines, referring to
Scarborough Shoal as Panatag Shoal, asserts that it has exercised
effective occupation and effective jurisdiction over the Shoal since
independence in 1946. To reinforce this claim it points out that it built a
light house on the Shoal in 1965 and that it has conducted surveys and
research in the waters surrounding the Shoal. Manila also argues that the
Shoal falls within its 200 nm EEZ.
China, referring to Scarborough Shoal as Huangyan Island, asserts
that Scarborough Shoal and its adjacent waters have been Chinese
territory for generations and that it discovered the Shoal, incorporated it
with its territory and exercised jurisdiction over it. Further, the Shoal is
included in the Zhongsha islands ( , also known as
Macclesfield Bank), one of the four archipelagoes inside China’s
infamous nine-dashed line map to which it has historic claims to
sovereignty. China also argues that the Philippines never disputed
Chinese jurisdiction until 1979.
The dispute continued for more than a month. Both sides used
political posturing to accompany bilateral diplomacy to advance their
claims. The Philippines has adopted a three-pronged strategy – legal,
political and diplomatic – threatening to take the dispute unilaterally to
the international tribunal; seeking support from fellow members of the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the international

community, and in the meantime continuing negotiations with China.
China, on the other hand, has resorted to a variety of measures to
pressure the Philippines: such as issuing a travel advisory that led to the
cancellation of 80 scheduled Chinese tour group and chartered flights to
the Philippines; temporarily halting imports of Filipino bananas to China
and orchestrating a hostile press campaign. In 2011, the Philippines
exported $60 million worth of bananas to China, its 3rd largest banana
exports market. Losses of banana inputs in May of that year were
estimated at round $34 million. China is also the source of the 4th largest
number tourists to the Philippines. In May, 1,500 Chinese tourists’
cancellation of their trips to the Philippines resulted in a loss of nearly
$1 million to the Philippines tourist industry.
However, just as relations between the Philippines and China were
becoming increasingly intense, both sides made concessions. On May
13, almost after a month of the standoff, China announced imposition of
a unilateral fishery ban for two and a half months in the South China Sea
covering the area that includes the Shoal, warning that action would be
taken against foreign fishing vessels that violate the ban.
By the same token, on May 16th, the Philippines also issued its own
fishing ban around the shoal. The announcement of the fishing ban by
both sides was definitely offering a way to alleviate the tension of the
conflict over the shoal. Although the reciprocal fishing bans did offer a
way to de-escalation, these expectations were short-lived. In late May,
China dispatched three additional marine surveillance ships to
Scarborough Shoal accompanied by 10 Chinese fishing boats according
to Philippines sources. China admitted that 20 fishing boats were at the
shoal, and the Chinese civilian authorities took no steps to prevent these
craft from fishing while China’s ban remained in force.
The significance of the Scarborough Shoal dispute presented clear
evidence on China’s assertive conduct in South China Sea. Furthermore,
the standoff served to further highlight the shifting, to some extent, of
China’s policy of “shelving dispute and seeking joint development”
toward a more pro-active behaviour in the South China Sea compared to
the past. In short, this study observes that China’s attitude and actions,

including its diplomatic position, has been stronger, and more proactive,
and military force has become an option while economic power has been
utilized.
3. Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy Dilemma in the PostCold War

Era
While the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) claims sovereignty over
all the islands within the South China Sea as China does, it only has
effective control over the entire area within the U-shaped line to be its
historical waters in which it has preferential rights but this boundary line
has been challenged by other ASEAN claimants. Taiwan has built an
airstrip on the Pratas Island (Tungsha Dao ) and maintains a
garrison of marines. So far, it has not been seriously challenged by either
the PRC or any ASEAN states. The ROC on Taiwan was also the first
claimant to occupy Taiping (Itu Aba) Island in the Spratlys with
troops. The island has a garrison of marines (approximately 112 troops),
a radar station, a meteorological centre, a power plant, and a strip. 11
Although the Spratly Islands are traditional fishing grounds for
small Taiwan vessels and are potentially rich in oil and gas deposits, they
are some 800 nautical miles southwest of Taiwan and beyond Taipei’s
power projection. Nevertheless, Taipei has given the South China Sea
issue quite high priority in the Post-Cold War era. In 1990 Taipei
government approved the placing of the Paratas Island and Taiping
Island under the temporary jurisdiction of the municipal government of
Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s southernmost city. In 1992 an interministerial
South China Sea Task Force was established to review and revise the
ROC’s South China Sea policy. In 1993 the ROC government further
adopted a South China Sea Policy Guideline (hereafter the Policy
Guideline) whose goals were to: (1) safeguard ROC sovereignty over the
island in the South China Sea, (2) strengthen development and
management of the South China Sea, (3) promote cooperation among the
littoral states of the South China Sea, (4) resolve disputes peacefully, and
(5) protect the area’s ecological environment. 12 Obviously Taipei’s
policy is to seek peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the South

China Sea, particularly in the Spratly Islands. As the policy guideline

indicates, Taiwan is willing to cooperate with other claimants in
technical areas such as navigation safety, pollution control disaster relief,
seaborne rescue, oceanographic research, and ecological conservation.
Such a position follows the principle contained in the 1992 ASEAN
Declaration on the South China Sea, which called on all claimants to
settle disputes by peaceful means and resolved to “explore the possibility
of cooperation in the South China Sea relating to the safety of maritime
navigation and communication, protection against pollution of the
marine environment coordination of search and rescue operation, efforts
towards combating piracy and armed robbery as well as collaboration in
the campaign against illicit trafficking in drugs.”13
After the Mischief Reef incident between the PRC and the
Philippines, Taipei echoed the call of ASEAN to refrain from taking
action that might destabilize the South China Sea and endanger the
peaceful settlement of the Spratly dispute. Taipei also reiterated its own
five principles regarding the South China Sea which was mentioned
earlier. However due to the absence of diplomatic relations with any of
the region’s countries, Taiwan has found it difficult to conduct any kind
of negotiation on the disputed islands. Taiwan’s ambiguous international
status further weakens its bargaining position. One Malaysian scholar
has ever argued that Taiwan has “no juridical standing to make any claim
to any territory.”14 Taiwan also stands alone in its military posture vis-à-
vis other claimants in the South China Sea, having neither a bilateral
security pact nor a multilateral mechanism through which it can obtain
outside assistance. Furthermore, under pressure from Beijing, the
ASEAN states have excluded Taiwan from the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF). Although Taiwan’s scholars have been invited to participate in
the working group meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in
the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) since April 1996, Taiwan is not a member of
CSCAP and is not allowed to raise the issue of cross-Strait relations in
this track-two regional security forum.
With the exception of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict
in the South China Sea (hereafter, the South China Sea workshop series),
Taiwan has no access to any multilateral forum in which the Spratly

Islands dispute could be resolved. Even though, Taiwan’s participation in

the South China Sea workshop series has been far from smooth. For one
thing its delegation has been variously designated “Taiwan, China” and
“Taipei, China”. In addition to the main workshop, Taiwan has actively
participated in five offshoot technical working group meetings on legal
matters, marine scientific research, the marine environmental protection,
resource assessment and ways of development, and safety of navigation,
shipping, and communication. According to Taipei’s policy guideline,
Taiwan also intends to seek opportunities to host international
conferences on the South China Sea issue. However, under pressure
from Beijing, Taiwan has been prevented from sponsoring the technical
working group meeting on safety of navigation, shipping, and
communication. Since 1993, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia
has urged that the workshop would be upgraded to a more formal
government-to-government dialogue. Taipei prefers the existing informal
setup, as it fears that it would be excluded from any formal talks, but if
its participation could be guaranteed, it would have no objection to
upgrading.
Although the ROC government was the first claimant to send troops
to the Spratly Islands, it took no action when other claimants occupied
other islets in the region. After the Mischief Reef incident, the
Philippines and Vietnam began to reinforce their garrisons on the
disputed islands, but Defense Minister Chiang Chung-lin of the ROC has
stated that Taiwan has no plan to send more troops to the Spratly. 15
Vietnam and the Philippines also plan to build more lighthouses on the
islands they occupy in order to strengthen their sovereignty claims but
Taiwan has refrained from taking similar action. It is clear that Taipei
has adopted a policy of self-restraint with regard to the South China Sea,
and its historical claim. For Taipei policy makers, the real security is in
the Taiwan Strait, and Taiwan’s ability to project and sustain military
force declines with the distance of the Spratly Islands relative to the
constant military threat from the PRC.
Confrontations among Taiwan’s political parties over China
reunification and Taiwan independence have weakened Taipei’s united
stand on policy toward the South China Sea issues as well. Whether

Taipei should cooperate with Beijing in these territorial claims is a

constant point of dispute inside Taiwan. Those who regard China as real
threat say Taiwan should not cooperate with the PRC because such
action could put Taiwan into a subordinate role and justify other
claimants’ rejection of negotiating directly with Taipei. The Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan’s main opposing party, rejected the
idea of cooperation with Beijing in the South China Sea, preferring that
Taiwan have rooms to maneuver between the PRC and other claimant.
However, former Interior Minister Huang Kun-Huei argued that the lack
of diplomatic tie make it impossible for Taiwan to establish a military
alliance with other claimants to counter the PRC’s military presence. 16
Any collaboration between Taiwan and the Southeast Asian countries
would certainly be regarded by China as a betrayal of Chinese national
interests and therefore invite harsh criticism.
Those who deem a better cross-Strait relationship a prerequisite for
Taiwan’s security say Taipei should cooperate with Beijing in the South
China Sea as a way to build confidence in the Taiwan Strait. For
nationalistic reason, some people in Taiwan would rather see the
Spratlys occupied by the PRC than by members of ASEAN. Political
figures of the New Party, for example, are inclined to urge the
government to form an alliance with the PRC to counterbalance other
claimants. These people also believe talks with China on the
development of resources in the area could strengthen Taiwan claims to
sovereignty and improve mutual trust between Taipei and Beijing. While
Taiwan and China are rivals in other areas, in the South China Sea, they
have neither challenged each other’s claims nor been involved in any
military conflict with each other. Taiwan has adopted a broadly neutral
but more pro-China inclination in the China-Vietnam military clashes in
1988 and the China-Philippines conflict in 1995, and one scholar has
argued that “should mainland China and Taiwan stand shoulder-to-
shoulder in the negotiation process, they will make a stronger case vis-à-
vis other claimants.”17 Taipei would invite a backlash from several
quarters if it chose to collaborate with Beijing in the South China Sea.
First, such a move might damage Taiwan’s policy of encouraging
stronger economic ties with Southeast Asia. Furthermore, it could

jeopardize Taiwan’s status as an independent political entity, as “big

brother” China would always have the final say in any solution of the
Spratly Island disputes.
Others in the government would prefer cooperation with the PRC to
take place within a multilateral context. Former Foreign Minister
Fredrick Chien, for instance, hinted in 1993 that it was a least likely
prospect for Taipei and Beijing officially to conduct joint development
of natural resources in the South China Sea, and that Taipei might
actually side with other Asia-Pacific countries to counterbalance the
PRC’s assertive in the region. 18 Even though President Lee Teng-Hui of
the ROC seems to prefer maintain the status quo over an apparent tilt
either toward or away from Beijing, he has suggested that Japan and the
U.S. could help in stabilizing the South China Sea. 19 It is obvious that
Taiwan itself is divided as to the strategy it should adopt on the South
China Sea. The policy, however, will largely remain subtle and
ambiguous in the years ahead, as Taiwan does not want to provoke either
China or the ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea because it is
trying to improve its relations with both.
4. President Ma and CrossStrait Relations in Taiwan’s South China

Sea Policy
When the KMT returned to power in Taiwan, there was scarcely any
coordination between Taiwan and China in their South China Sea policy.
While tensions over the region have grown steadily since 2009, after
China, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted their respective claims under
the UNCLOS, relations across the Taiwan Strait were moving into a
more cooperative rather than confrontation, direction after President Ma
Ying-jeou took the office in May 2008. On the basis of the so-called
“1992 Consensus”, Taipei and Beijing revived institutional dialogue
through the official designated Strait Exchange Foundation (Taiwan) and
Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (China). This provides
a new impetus for cross-Strait cooperation in the South China Sea.
Several senior members of China’s PLA-Navy began to call for joint
defense of sovereignty or joint patrol of law enforcement between the

two sides in the South China Sea. It was suggested cross-Strait military
confidence-building could start by defending China’s sovereignty
together in the South China Sea. For example, Taiwan that controls the
Taiping Island – the largest island with fresh water in the Spratlys –
could provide logistic supply to China in case of a conflict. Should
China and Taiwan cooperate in this way, China’s leverage in the Spratly
Islands will increase significantly. Within Taiwan, the idea of joint
defense seems to be welcomed by some Veterans and re-unification
advocates. It has been suggested that Taiwan could probably take
advantage of the similar claims made by China as a tactic to express its
own legal stance over the disputed islands and waters to highlight
Taiwan, as one of the claimants and to refute all the other claims.
However, Taipei’s position in this regard appears to be more cautious
instead.
Taiwan’s position on the South China Sea under President Ma’s
administration has been clearly expressed in a press statement issued by
the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In short, it reaffirms Republic of
China or Taiwan has the sovereign right over all of islands and their
surrounding waters, and reiterates that it upholds the basic principles of
“safeguarding sovereignty, shelving disputes, peace and reciprocity and
joint exploration”. Furthermore, Taiwan supports for an open, regional,
or multilateral approach toward cooperation in this area. 20
Ma’s government has been steadfastly reiterating Taiwan’s
territorial claims toward South China Sea islands, and has tried to
demonstrate the determination in defending them through a combination
of hard and soft power approaches. For example, on February 2, 2009,
Taiwan protested against the Philippines regarding the latter’s enactment
to incorporate the Scarborough Shoal in the Macclesfield Bank, and part
of the Spratly Islands into Philippines territory. 21 Also in May 2009,
Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published statements opposing the
submission by Vietnam: as well as that submitted by Vietnam and
Malaysia jointly to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, extending the outer limits of their respective continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles beyond their baselines. 22 In addition to taking
diplomatic stances, President Ma visited the Pratas Islands on September

10, 2008, where he stressed that Taiwan should continue to strengthen its
defense capability, so that Taiwan could conduct negotiation with China
from a position of strength. 23
In April 2011, the government announced that the coastguard
personnel stationed on the Taiping Island would be trained by the
country’s Marine Corps to carry out sea combat, giving Taiwan combat –
ready troops in the region for the first time since 2000. 24 As to the cross-
Strait cooperation, President Ma has made cross-Strait energy
cooperation a priority. Cross-Strait cooperation in the development of
offshore hydrocarbon resources had begun in 1993, but was suspended
in 2004 as a result of serious political stalemate in cross-Strait relations.
As soon as President Ma took office, he instructed the administration to
study how Taiwan and China could resume cooperation. In December
2008, Taiwan’s China Petroleum Corporation (CPC Taiwan) and the
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed four
agreements, whereby the two companies will conduct joint exploration
in the Taiwan Strait and off the southern Guangdong coast of China in
undisputed areas within northern South China Sea. 25 The business model
created by the two companies for hydrocarbon joint development might
be applied in the future to joint hydrocarbon exploratory efforts in the
Spratlys under appropriate conditions resume cooperation.
Moreover, since mid-2008, Taiwan and China have negotiated and
concluded 16 agreements. Some of those agreements, including the
Cross-Strait Sea Transportation agreement, Agreement on Cooperation
in respect in Joint Crime Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance, and
Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation in respect of Fishing Crew
Affairs, offer possible legal foundation for future cross-Strait
cooperation in the South China Sea on humanitarian assistance,
anti–piracy, combating illegal trafficking, and other related areas. In
November 2009, the two sides also successfully initiated a joint project
entitled “Southeast Asia Network for Education and Training” at the
19th Indonesian Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the
South China Sea. This was the first cross-Strait joint initiative since the
inception of the workshop in 1990. 26 And in July 2011, experts from
Taiwan and China jointly published a very first report on South China

Sea. The report assessed the situation in South China Sea throughout
2010 and provided a comprehensive review of the increasing complexity
of the regional situation. It was worth-nothing that the final chapter,
entitled “Prospects of Cooperation in the South China Sea”, calls for the
creation of cross-Strait mechanisms to deal with South China Sea issues
together. In particular, it suggests that a cross-Strait military coordinator
mechanism be established to defend their territorial claims together, and
if necessary, the two sides should create positive conditions for joint
patrol of the South China Sea. The report received mixed reactions
within Taiwan as well as abroad, and Taiwan officials have reacted by
dismissing the possibility of cooperation in this particular regard. 27
Nevertheless, the report still represented a serious effort by academics
and policy thinkers across the Taiwan Strait in helping build cross-Strait
confidence.
With the progresses of functional cooperation in certain aspects
across the Strait, one could find that Beijing seems do not mind, perhaps
even welcomes, Taiwan’s claims to the South China Sea. That is because
both Taipei and Beijing have re-embraced the so-called “1992
Consensus” since May 2008, when President Ma came to office.
President Ma accepts that there is only one China and cross-Strait
relations are not state-to-state relations, but rather “special relations”,
even though he maintains that “One China” is “the Republic of China”.
Since Taiwan is basically excluded from all of the multilateral
mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN-Plus
where the South China Sea disputes could be discussed officially, China
remains the one that dictates the interpretation of “One China”, the
Chinese position, and influences the relevant agenda in those forums.
Furthermore, China and Taiwan have both used the so-called U-
shaped line to claim a substantial portion of the South China Sea. And
that would to some extent give China an advantage, in that Taiwan’s
territorial claims, as well as its uninterrupted occupation of Pratas or
Taiping islands since 1956, form an indispensable component of the
Chinese claims.
From Beijing’s perspective, as long as Taiwan continues to be an
integral part of the state of China, Beijing will have a stronger legal

ground to assert and enforce its own claims, and Taiwan’s sovereignty
claims toward the South China Sea may well be tolerated as a concerted
effort in defending the Chinese position against others.
All this suggest a strong linkage between Beijing’s insistence on the
“One China” principle in cross-Strait relations and the South China Sea
dispute, and under such circumstances Taiwan’s sovereignty claims
toward South China Sea could be served as a linchpin to China’s
expanding national interests as a maritime power and PLA-N’s defensive
missions. Moreover, because of such a linkage, Taiwan has much to
consider when evaluating its cooperation with China in the South China
Sea. First, cross-Strait relations remain a highly sensitive and divisive
issue in Taiwan’s domestic politics. The two main political parties – the
National Party KMT and the DPP disagree on their cross-Strait policies.
For example, former DPP chairperson and candidate for the 2012
presidential election – Tsai Ing-wen accused the incumbent Ma of
undermining Taiwan’s political and economic independence by
conducting negotiation and cooperation with China on the basis of “One
China”, even though Ma’s definition for “One China” is different from
that of Beijing’s. It is to say that in a vibrant democracy like Taiwan, no
political leader can freely conduct is relations with China without some
forms of scrutiny from the people. Secondly, Taiwan and China continue
to face the challenge in building more mutual trust. China’s missile
deployment toward Taiwan and its refusal to renounce the possibility of
using force against Taiwan makes China the primary threat to Taiwan’s
national security. In addition, Taipei and Beijing still have to overcome
considerable political differences to enable Taiwan to deepen and widen
its international space in its own right. In July 20, 2011, immediately
after ASEAN and China had agreed on the Guidelines for Implementing
the 2002 Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (The
Guideline), Taiwan has formally expressed its discontent and reiterated
its basic South China Sea principles of “safeguarding sovereignty,
shelving disputes, promoting peace and reciprocity, and encouraging
joint exploration”. At the same time, it stressed that: “As the government
should be included in the dispute dialogue mechanism, it will not
recognize any resolution reached without its participation.”28

Thirdly, Taiwan’s military cooperation with China in the South

China Sea could also touch US nerves. The US has become more
actively involved in the disputes since 2010, and has been in loggerheads
with China over issues of freedom of navigation, the appropriate legal
bases for territorial and maritime claims, as well as approach for
resolving disputes. Although the US has long claimed to maintain a
neutral position on the competing territorial claims,29 the Obama
administration clearly disagrees with China’s legal claims, particularly
the nine-dotted line. Moreover, the US joint military exercises with
Vietnam and the Philippines are perceived as attempt to balance PRC’s
growing over in the region. The concern over a potential conflict
between PRC and US in the South China Sea region presents a strategic
dilemma for China. If Taiwan allies itself closely with PRC in the South
China Sea territorial disputes, the US might face more domestic calls for
re-considering its role in defending Taiwan against a PRC use of force. 30
However, if Taiwan openly supports an increased US presence in the
South China Sea, it could rekindle Beijing’s suspicion toward Taiwan’s
intentions and possibly lead to setback in the furtherance of cross-Strait
economic and functional cooperation.
In addition, military cooperation with China in the South China Sea
risks Taiwan from Southeast Asian claimants’ perspective. Some
Southeast Asian countries have pointed out that, while Taiwan has been
objecting to the Southeast Asian countries unilateral acts during recent
controversies, it has made no challenge towards PRC’s claims. This,
together with an identical legal claim, has been interpreted as a sign that
Taiwan has decided to side with Beijing and the two has at least reached
a tacit understanding toward a “common Chinese front”.
5. Conclusion
China’s assertiveness in South China Sea, particularly its approach
toward the Scarborough Shoal dispute has significant implications and
impact on Taiwan’s South China Sea policy. First, the significance of the
standoff represent a clear evidence on a shifting, to some extent, of
China’s policy of “shelving dispute and seeking joint development”

toward a more pro-active behaviour in the South China Sea, and yet a
non-military one in its nature. Moreover, it is more likely that this has
become a type of pattern and approach for handling the maritime and
territorial disputes in the South China Sea in the near future. However,
such act and approach certainly does not apply to territorial disputes
with other conflicts over sovereignty that may occur in other places,
such as the East Sea. In addition, after the standoff, the status quo of
entire South China Sea remains intact. Neither has there been any
change in ASEAN’s approach toward the South China Sea, nor has it
any tilting to a closer relations with the US for its implicit, if not
explicit, counter-balance of China’s power expansion.
Meanwhile, although China shifts its low-profile policy to a more
pro-active one in South China Sea, it, however, still expressed a wish to
come up with the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC) as a platform to solve the problems with the concerned
parties in South China Sea, and even did not rule out a possibility of
working toward a establishment of the Code of Conduct (COC) in the
near future. Assertions such as this perhaps also represent a shifting by
China towards the use of multilateral mechanisms to solve sovereignty
disputes in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, the adoption of a
multilateral approach by China is, at least in the short term, a form of
hedging policy in its nature, in that it plays a balancing role in response
to America’s global and regional dominance and political wrangling
among the ASEAN nations.
Against such circumstances, Taiwan’s policy toward the South
China Sea dispute since the beginning of the Post-Cold War era and
early 21st century has been more restrained than other claimants
particularly China, Vietnam and the Philippines. And it has until now
maintained a cautious approach toward cooperating with China
exclusively on territorial sovereignty contentions or joint development in
the disputed islands particularly the Spratlys, and appears to support the
principle of freedom of navigation advocated by the US. 31 More
significantly, Taiwan has consistently been calling for “putting aside
disputes” for joint cooperation and development in the South China Sea.
Specifically, the parties concerned should shelve their different claims

and cooperate in the research, development and management of marine

resources. This direction should be pursued with a view to promote
peace and sustainable development of the region, without prejudice to
their respective claims and the eventual solution to disputes. The various
proposals expounded by Taiwan’s top leaders show Taiwan’s support for
an open, regional, and multilateral approach toward cooperation.
However, when counting on the domestic politics, it is obvious that
Taiwan itself is divided as to the strategy it should adopt on the South
China Sea. The policy, in any case, will largely remain subtle and
ambiguous in the years ahead, as Taiwan does not want to provoke either
China or the ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea because it is
trying to improve its relations with both. And more importantly,
Taiwan‘s South China Sea policy, to a large extent, serves as a pivotal
part of the US grand strategy toward Asia-Pacific.
Notes
* Dr Shawn Shaw-fawn Kao (Ph.D. in International Relations,
University of Virginia) is Associate Professor at the Department of
Political Science, and Dean of OIEP (Office of International Education &
Programs), Tunghai University (THU), Taiwan, Republic of China. He has
been working in various capacities, such as Dean of International College,
Director of Graduate School of International Affairs, Director of Research
and Development, Dean of Student Affairs, Director of International
Education and Exchanges at Ming Chuan University; Deputy Secretary
General, People-to-People International (PTPI/ROC,
); Senior Staff Officer, Taipei Office on Education Forum, Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); editing board for the Academic
Journal of Politics and Policies, Vice-president of International Trade and
Marketing, Soletek Inc. (U.S.A.). His research and study interests include
China’s Southeast Asia policy, Southeast Asia regional studies,
international relations and East Asia regional security, and theories of
international politics. His current research papers and publications include:
“China Rise and The Myth of ASEAN/East Asian Regional Integration”
(2010); Shawn S.F Kao (co-author), “ Governing a Globalizing World:
Using Military Adversary Regime and Non-military Adversary Regimes as
a Tool” (2010); “Taiwan: A Key to China’s Peaceful Rise”(2010); “China

Rise and Its Impact on the Changing of East Asian International

System”(2011); Shawn S.F. Kao (co-author), “Marketing X as a University
of Governance: A One-dot Theory and Modified SWOT Model
Application” (2011); “China Rise and Its Impact on ASEAN’s Community
Building” (2012); Shawn S.F. Kao (co-author), “Taipei’s Strategy: Seeking
More Diplomatic Ties or Involving in More International Regimes?”
(2012). <Email: [email protected]. net>
1. For example, Carlyle A. Thayer, “China-ASEAN and the South China Sea:
Chinese Assertiveness and Southeast Asian Responses”, conference paper,
Academic Sinica, October 2011; Michael Swaine and Taylov Fravel,
“China’s Assertive Behavior, Part Two: The Maritime Periphery”, China
Leadership Monitor, No. 35, Summer <http://www. hoover.org/publications
/Chinaleadershipmonitor>.
2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DengXiaoping
3. Theresa Fallon, “Jockeying for Position in the South China Sea: Coopera-
tion Strategy or Managed Conflict Morning”, conference paper, Academia
Sinica, Taipei, October 2011. Also please see Jonathan Pearlman, “The
Time for waiting is Over: China Has Taken Its Great Political Leap
Forward”, The Sydney Morning Herald, 2009/9/23. <http://www.smh.com.
au/world/thetimeforwaitingisoverchinahastakenitsgreatpolitical
leapforforw20091221la21.html>.
4. For original article in Chinese, http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2011
09/2038709.html This article was also linked to the homepage of People’s
Daily.
5. Su Xiaohui, “China’s Vision in Resolving South China Sea Dispute and
Energy Sharing Mechanism among Claimant States”, International
Conference on ASEAN Unity and Maritime Challenges in SCS & Asia-
Pacific, Center for Asian Strategic Studies – India, Bangkok, Thailand,
June 20, 2013.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Li Mingjiang, “China Debates South China Sea Policy: Implications for
Future Developments of the Dispute”, Workshop on the South China Sea
Dispute: Political and Security Implications for the Region’s Future,
Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, RCHSS, Academia Sinica, Taipei,
Taiwan, January 12-13, 2012.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

11. Ministry of National Defense (Republic of China), 1996 National Defense

Report, The Republic of China, Taipei; Li Ming Co., 1996.
12. Kuan-Ming Sun, “Policy of the Republic of China towards the South China
Sea”, Marine Policy, Vol. 18, No. 5, 1995, p. 402.
13. Supplementary ed., ASEAN Document Series 19921994, Jakarta: The
Secretariat, 1994, p. 90.
14. The Star (Kuala Lumpur), January 21, 1992, p. 1.
15. China News, April 11, 1995, p. 1.
16. China News, May 18, 1995, p. 1.
17. Zhiguo Gao, “The South China Sea Disputes: From Conflict to
Cooperation?”, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 25, No. 3,
July-September 1994, p. 354.
18. Zhougguo Shibao (China Times), December 9, 1993, p. 6.
19. Tenghui Lee, “Asian-Pacific and American”, SinoAmerican Relations
(Taipei), Vol. 19, No. 3, Autumn 1993, p. 12.
20. Press Release No. 143, 29 July, 2011, English Version. <http://www.mofa.
gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem45948&ctNode=1903&mp=6>
21. “Solemn Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
China Concerning the Philippines Senate Bill 2699 and House Bill 3216”,
statement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan),
2009/2/6. <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=36914&ctNode
=1902&mp06>.
22. Statement No. 002, May 11, 2009. <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webaps/ct.asp
?xItem=38046&ctNode=15088mp=)>.
23. Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), News Release, 2008/
9/10. <http://ww.presidennt.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=1418
&rmid=514&word1>
24. Cindy Sui, “Taiwan to Boost Forces in Disputed Spratly Islands”, BBC ,
2011/4/12. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldasiapacific13130208>
25. Yuanming Alvin Yao, “Energy Cooperation Beyond the Taiwan Strait”,
2009/5/12. <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public//Attachment/04115571725.pdf>
26. Yann-Hui Song, “The South China Sea Workshop Process and Taiwan’s
Participation”, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 41, 2010,
pp. 260-263.
27. “Assessment Report of the South China Sea Regional Situation in 2010”,
Taipei: Institute of International Relations and National Institute for South
China Sea Studies, 2011, pp 101-102; Shih Hsuchuan, “Academics
Suggest Cross-Strait Effort on Sea Dispute”, Taipei Times, 2011/8/6.
<http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/front/print/2011/08/06/2003510050>

28. MOFA Press Release No. 232 of July 20, 2011, English translation.
<http://www.boca.gov.tw/content.asp?cultem=4736&mp=1>.
29. Yann-huei Song, United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China
Sea: A Study of Ocean Law and Politics, Baltimore: School of Law,
University of Maryland, 2002.
30. A summary of various arguments for why the US should abandon its
defense commitment for Taiwan can be viewed in Shelley Rigger, “Why
Giving Up Taiwan Will Not Help Us with China”, Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, November 29,
2011. <http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreignanddefensepolicy/regional/
asia/whygivinguptaiwanwillnothelpuswithchina/>
31. Press Release No. 186, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 6, 2011. <http://
www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=52800&ctNode=1547&mp=1>
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Contributors vii
and security policy, cross-Strait relations, Chinese identity politics, and

US-China relations. He is the lecturer of the Masters course Chinese
security and foreign policy, as well as the deputy coordinator of the
M.Sc. (Asian Studies) programme at RSIS. He is the author of several
publications on China, cross-Strait relations and US-China relations, and
is currently completing a book manuscript on China’s proclaimed
identity as a responsible great power. He has reviewed for the
publications Global Governance, the Royal United Services Institute
(RUSI) Journal and the Journal of Asian Politics and History. He has
been involved in Track Two diplomatic initiatives, such as the Korea-
Singapore Forum as well as the Network of ASEAN Defence and
Security Institutions. Dr Hoo was formerly a visiting scholar at the
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and a visiting researcher at the
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. In 2014, he will be a
visiting fellow at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing.
<Email: [email protected]>
Dr Eric Rong-yang Huang is Associate Professor at the
Department of Public Administration and Management, Chinese Culture
University, Taiwan. He was awarded Ph.D. degree in Government at the
University of Essex in 2004. His areas of research focus on public
management, performance management in public sector, European
Union and UK government. Huang’s recent publications and researches
include Taiwanese local government governance, EU regions and cross-
regional cooperation. <Email: [email protected]>
Dr Shawn Shaw-fawn Kao (Ph.D. in International Relations,
University of Virginia) is Associate Professor at the Department of
Political Science, and Dean of OIEP (Office of International Education
& Programs), Tunghai University (THU), Taiwan, Republic of China.
He has been working in various capacities, such as Dean of International
College, Director of Graduate School of International Affairs, Director
of Research and Development, Dean of Student Affairs, Director of
International Education and Exchanges at Ming Chuan University;
Deputy Secretary General, People-to-People International (PTPI/ROC,

viii Contributors
); Senior Staff Officer, Taipei Office on

Education Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); editing
board for the Academic Journal of Politics and Policies, Vice-president
of International Trade and Marketing, Soletek Inc. (U.S.A.). His research
and study interests include China’s Southeast Asia policy, Southeast Asia
regional studies, international relations and East Asia regional security,
and theories of international politics. His current research papers and
publications include: “China Rise and The Myth of ASEAN/East Asian
Regional Integration” (2010); Shawn S.F Kao (co-author), “ Governing
a Globalizing World: Using Military Adversary Regime and Non-
military Adversary Regimes as a Tool” (2010); “Taiwan: A Key to
China’s Peaceful Rise”(2010); “China Rise and Its Impact on the
Changing of East Asian International System”(2011); Shawn S.F. Kao
(co-author), “Marketing X as a University of Governance: A One-dot
Theory and Modified SWOT Model Application” (2011); “China Rise
and Its Impact on ASEAN’s Community Building” (2012); Shawn S.F.
Kao (co-author), “Taipei’s Strategy: Seeking More Diplomatic Ties or
Involving in More International Regimes?” (2012). <Email:
[email protected]>
Dr Chiung-chu Lin is Associate Professor in the Department of

Political Science at Soochow University, Taiwan. She received her Ph.D.
in Government from University of Essex. Her research interests include
party politics, voting behaviour, and public opinion. <Email:
[email protected]>
Dr Huo-yan Shyu is Research Fellow of the Institute of Political

Science at Academia Sinica (IPSAS) in Taiwan, a joint-appointed
Professor of National Taipei University and an Adjunct Professor of
Soochow University. He is a co-founder of the Taiwanese Political
Association (TPSA) and served as its president in 2007-2008. Professor
Shyu’s areas of specialization include comparative politics, elections and
voting behaviour, and political culture and psychology. Professor Shyu
has been actively involved in most of Taiwan’s major nation-wide social
and/or post-electoral surveys since 1983, served as either PI, co-PI or

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International Journal of China Studies

Vol. 5, No. 1, April 2014, pp. 153-178

Scarborough Shoal Dispute, China’s Assertiveness,

JEL classification: F51, F52, F59, H56

1. China’s Evolving Position in South China Sea

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

numerous news outlets in both China and around the world.

IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

A new cache of US diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks on

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

However, as Li continues, the pressure for a tougher policy does not

IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

for domestic economic development, on the other hand, are likely to

2. The Scarborough Shoal Dispute and Its Implications

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the international

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

3. Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy Dilemma in the Post­Cold War

IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

China Sea, particularly in the Spratly Islands. As the policy guideline

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

Islands dispute could be resolved. Even though, Taiwan’s participation in

IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

Taipei should cooperate with Beijing in these territorial claims is a

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

jeopardize Taiwan’s status as an independent political entity, as “big

4. President Ma and Cross­Strait Relations in Taiwan’s South China

IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

Thirdly, Taiwan’s military cooperation with China in the South

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

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and cooperate in the research, development and management of marine

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

Rise and Its Impact on the Changing of East Asian International

IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

11. Ministry of National Defense (Republic of China), 1996 National Defense

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

and security policy, cross-Strait relations, Chinese identity politics, and

IJCS Vol. 5 No. 1 (April 2014)

); Senior Staff Officer, Taipei Office on

Dr Chiung-chu Lin is Associate Professor in the Department of

Dr Huo-yan Shyu is Research Fellow of the Institute of Political

International Journal of China Studies 5(1) ♦ 2014

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3. Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy Dilemma in the PostCold War

4. President Ma and CrossStrait Relations in Taiwan’s South China