Different Countries, Different Perspectives:

A Comparative Analysis of the South China

Sea Disputes Coverage by Malaysian and
Chinese Newspapers

Yang Lai Fong

Department of Journalism, Xiamen University, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
[email protected]

Ramachandran Ponnan
School of Communication, Taylor’s University, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
[email protected]

Antoon De Rycker
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Berjaya University College,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
[email protected]

The South China Sea disputes involve both island and maritime claims among several sovereign states
within the region, namely China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam and Taiwan. Framing an
analysis of international news and diplomatic relations allows researchers to examine how news organisa-
tions provide their audiences with context regarding news stories through content promotion and exclusion.
This study examined how the Malaysian and Chinese newspapers reported about the South China Sea
disputes and Malaysia–China bilateral relations. The findings indicated that the newspapers reported
the topics with different intensity and prominence, while different news sources were employed. It was
also found that conflict was a salient frame used by the various newspapers. In addition, this study found
that the Malaysian and Chinese newspapers exhibited different valence in reporting the South China
Sea disputes. Among the Malaysian newspapers under examination in this study, Sin Chew Daily
(a Chinese-language daily) employed the most similar frame to that of the Chinese newspapers, where
the coverage was pervasive with supportive valence towards China.

Keywords: South China Sea disputes, Malaysia-China relations, diplomacy, bilateral

relations, framing

CHINA REPORT 56 : 1 (2020): 39–59

Sage Publications Los Angeles/London/New Delhi/Singapore/Washington DC/
Melbourne
DOI: 10.1177/0009445519895627
40 Yang Lai Fong et al.

INTRODUCTION

The seabed of the South China Sea contains oil, gas and minerals, which would bring
great benefits to any country that can establish their claims to the region’s waters. In
addition, the South China Sea is also home to abundant fisheries, and it is teeming
with at least one-tenth of the world’s fishing stock. More importantly, the sea’s key
value is strategic – shipping lanes vital to about $US5 trillion worth of world trade
pass through it, carrying everything from raw materials to finished products, as well
as enormous quantities of oil (The Star 2016h).
China claims almost the entire South China Sea while Malaysia, the Philippines,
Brunei, Vietnam and Taiwan also have claims over it. At the heart of the South China
Sea disputes is the ‘nine-dash line’, Beijing’s claim that encircles as much as 90 per cent
of the contested waters. The line runs as far as 2,000 km from the Chinese mainland to
within a few hundred kms of Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Beijing maintains
it owns any land or features contained within the line, which confers defined ‘historical
maritime rights’ (The Star 2016k).
Under the then president Benigno Aquino, Manila filed an arbitration case in
2013 before the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), an arbitral tribunal under
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Philippines
brought the case before the tribunal to dispute China’s claim of ‘indisputable sovereignty’
over almost the entire South China Sea through its ‘nine-dash line’ claim (The Star
2016h). The Philippines claimed that it has sought to negotiate with China since
the Mischief Reef incident in 1995. It also said that it has had more than 50 bilateral
talks with China at various levels since the Scarborough Shoal stand-off in 2012, all
to no avail. Consequently, the Philippines proclaimed that after 17 years of negotia-
tions with China, it had exhausted all political and diplomatic avenues to settle the
dispute (The Star 2016b).
Spanning three years, two hearings and nearly 4,000 pages of evidence, the PCA in
The Hague, Netherlands finally issued its ruling on 12 July 2016. The tribunal ruled
against China and mentioned that China has no ‘historic title’ over the waters of the
South China Sea. Specifically, the PCA ruled that the 1982 UNCLOS supersedes
China’s ‘nine-dash line’. Therefore, the judgement means that China has interfered
with fishing rights of the Philippines, notably at Scarborough Shoal (The Star 2016i).
China denounced the tribunal ruling as ‘null and void and has no binding force’
(Global Times 2016a). China also declared that it would neither accept nor recognise
the verdict. It even warned its rivals against turning the South China Sea into a ‘cradle
of war’ and threatened an air defence zone there (The Star 2016l). Importantly, both
Chinese and Western analysts underscored that the ruling is not just about the ter-
ritorial claims in the South China Sea but speaks to broader Sino-US tensions over
China’s rise (The Star 2016f ).
Today, China is Malaysia’s biggest trading partner. Malaysia, on the other hand,
is China’s third-biggest trading partner in Asia and the biggest trading partner

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 Different Countries, Different Perspectives 41

among all the countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Malaysia’s trade ties with China have grown faster than that of countries from the
rest of the world, particularly since the financial crisis in 1997–98 (Devadason
2009). In October 2013, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Malaysia,
the two countries elevated their ties to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’. The
year 2014 was also designated as ‘Malaysia-China Friendship Year’ to commemo-
rate the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The
bilateral trade volume between Malaysia and China has reached $US100 billion by
July 2019 (The Star 2019g).
The press structure in Malaysia is strongly influenced by the multi-lingual nature
of the nation’s population and portrays its pluralistic nature. Newspapers are pub-
lished in different languages to cater to the respective major ethnic groups. While
championing the interests of their groups, the vernacular newspapers in Malaysia
also play a central role in shaping political and social reality because the editors and
journalists are usually members of the community elite (Lent 1990; Mohd Noor
2005). It is important to note that when the Barisan Nasional (National Front) was
in power in Malaysia, the structure of media ownership in the country was directly
and indirectly controlled by the government or government-linked individuals for
almost 61 years. Nevertheless, McDaniel (2002) found that the Chinese-language
newspapers in Malaysia were relatively more independent when compared to their
Malay- and English-language counterparts. In addition, online journalism has
been much celebrated in Malaysia by those who craved for alternative perspectives.
Among the various independent news sites, scholars regarded Malaysiakini as the
most interesting and successful one (Brown 2005; George 2005). It has also won
warm praise from around the world as well as a number of international awards for
journalism (Steele 2009). Meanwhile, media in China have also been controlled
by the state to represent the viewpoint of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
(Xu and Albert 2014).

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Considering the significance of Malaysia–China relations, the role of media in diplo-

macy as well as the different roles of vernacular and alternative newspapers in Malaysia,
this study aimed to examine the framing of the South China Sea disputes by Malaysian
and Chinese newspapers. Specifically, this study asked the following questions:

RQ1: What was the intensity of the newspapers coverage?

RQ2: What were the news sources used by the newspapers?
RQ3: What were the news frames employed by the newspapers?
RQ4: What was the valence of the news articles?

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42 Yang Lai Fong et al.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study drew upon framing as the theoretical framework. Scholars (Bosman and
d’Haenens 2008; McCombs 2005) pointed out that the most frequently cited defini-
tion of framing comes from Entman (1993):

Framing is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem defini-
tion, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation
for the item described. (Entman 1993: 52)

Other definitions for framing include ‘the process of calling attention to some aspects of
reality while obscuring others, which might lead to different reactions’ (Griffin 2003) and
‘the selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion in the
media agenda when a particular object is discussed’ (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).
According to Spratt et al. (2007), while previous research have exposed media frames that
support status quo positions on social and political issues, almost no attention has been paid
to how news-gathering practices (such as choice of sources) and journalistic norms differ
between types of news media, and how these differences affect framing. News is socially
constructed, and it reflects not just what happens but also the context within which it was
gathered and processed (Spratt et al. 2007). It was stressed that which events were covered
(or not) and how they were covered were influenced by many considerations, including
law, economics, political forces, power relations, culture, race, organisational structure of
media and work routines of journalists (Gan et al. 2005; Tankard 2008; Van Gorp 2007).
In addition, Manheim (1994) summarised that news framing analyses usually cover
three aspects: visibility, valence and frame genres. Visibility refers to both the amount
and the prominence level of an event/issue or a nation receives in news coverage.
Prominence is usually demonstrated by some typical elements such as the article’s
placement in the newspaper or websites, the headline, the visual tools associating
with the text and the mention on the evening television news. Valence or slant is the
tone of a news story or comment regarding certain frames. It is believed to have the
potential to generate behavioural effects. By indicating discourse valuations or carrying
positive and/or negative elements, valenced news frames present the extent to which
the coverage reflects favourably or unfavourably on the event/issue. Entman (2007)
also stressed that agenda setting, priming and framing fit together as tools of power,
and he connected them to explicit definitions of news slant and bias.

METHOD

Content analysis was used as the research method for this study. The Malaysian
newspapers chosen were Utusan Malaysia, a daily in Bahasa Malaysia or the national

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 Different Countries, Different Perspectives 43

language; The Star, an English-language daily; Sin Chew Daily, a Chinese-language

daily and Malaysiakini, an alternative newspaper. According to the Audit Bureau of
Circulations Malaysia, the 2015 average daily circulation of Utusan Malaysia, The
Star and Sin Chew Daily were 154,767, 247,661 and 384,391, respectively (www.
abcm.org.my). These three mainstream dailies have a national circulation, although
predominantly the circulation is within Peninsular Malaysia (Selva 2010).
Utusan is one of the top Malay-language newspapers in Malaysia. It is owned by
the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), a dominant Malay-based party
in the ruling coalition National Front (Barisan Nasional, BN). More importantly,
it has always been singled out for evoking racial tension between the Malays and
non-Malays (Kua 2010; Lee 2010; Lim and Har 2008). The Star enjoys the highest
circulation among the English-language newspapers in Malaysia. It is owned by the
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), a uni-racial component party in BN that
seeks to represent the Malaysian Chinese. SinChew also enjoys the highest circulation
among the Chinese-language newspapers in Malaysia. It is owned by a business and
media tycoon, Tiong Hiew King.
Since its inception, Malaysiakini has gone on to record average daily hits of approxi-
mately 200,000, which compares respectably with the circulation of mainstream news-
papers such as The Star and New Straits Times (Brown 2005). Although Malaysiakini
offers sections in English, Bahasa Malaysia, Chinese and Tamil, this study focussed
only on the English section because the other sections contain mainly translations of
major English-language stories.
In addition, the Chinese newspapers chosen were the People’s Daily (Renmin
Ribao) and Global Times (HuanqiuShibao). The People’s Daily is a leading newspaper
in China, and it enjoys a daily circulation of more than 2.4 million (Lin 2010). More
importantly, it is considered as the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) and has been the primary agenda-setter in China (Huang and Chen 2009;
Wang 2007). According to Zhou (2007), the People’s Daily acts as the chief conduit for
official interpretations of important political, economic, social and cultural events to
party members and ordinary people across the country. Furthermore, the Global Times
is a daily newspaper under the auspices of the People’s Daily, focussing on international
issues. With its daily circulation of over 2 million, Global Times is deemed as the link
between China and the world (Global Times 2013).

SAMPLING AND CODING PROCEDURES

The sample of this study was drawn from June 15 to July 19 2016 as these dates rep-
resent the peak period leading up to the final award by The Hague tribunal. The unit
of analysis was the articles, which included straight news, editorials, columns, opinions
and letters. The articles were pulled from the respective newspaper’s online database by

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44 Yang Lai Fong et al.

using ‘South China Sea disputes’, ‘The Hague tribunal’ and ‘The Hague arbitration’ as
the keywords. The sample consisted of 242 articles derived from the six newspapers.
The framing of the South China Sea disputes was examined from four different
dimensions: (a) intensity of coverage, (b) news sources, (c) news frames and (d) valence
of the articles. Specifically, the intensity of coverage was studied from two angles:
(a) number of articles and (b) type of articles.
The categories for news sources identified in this study were (a) Chinese officials,
(b) U.S. officials, (c) Malaysian officials, (d) Scholars and experts, (e) Other countries’
officials and (f ) Others.
This study employed the inductive approach for analysing the news frames. The cod-
ing categories were outlined after a preliminary examination of the data. As a result, four
categories of news frames were identified in this study: (a) Conflict, (b) Consequences,
(c) Peace resolution and (d) Others. The following are the operational definitions for
the news frames:

1. Conflict–emphasises disagreement and conflict between countries; a country

reproaches another; dichotomises or labels, the good and bad.
2. Consequences–reports an event, issue or problem in terms of the consequences
it has on individuals, groups, parties, institutions or the country; reports the
outcome of The Hague tribunal.
3. Peace and resolution–focusses on resolving disagreement; offers solution for
conflict among or between countries.
4. Others–any other frames that do not fit into the abovementioned categories.

Valence of the articles refers to the attitude expressed towards any individual, group,
party or institution by its user (Baumgartner and Wirth 2012; Entman 2010; Feeley
and Frederick 2007). It is also known as slant or tone. The categories of valence for
this study were divided into:

1. Supportive towards China–conveys a favourable impression towards China or its

government; supports or emphasises the stance of China in the South China Sea
disputes; contains quotes by individuals who approves of China’s standpoint.
2. Critical–conveys an unfavourable impression towards China or its government;
criticises or refutes the stance of China in the South China Sea disputes; contains
quotes by individuals who disapproves of China’s standpoint.
3. Neutral–neither favourably nor unfavourably portrays the issue.

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTER-CODER RELIABILITY

A total of 242 articles were collected from the six newspapers. To ensure the reliability
of this study, an undergraduate communication student was trained as the second

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coder. During the training session, the first author (who was also the first coder) and
the second coder coded 50 articles that were chosen randomly from the sample of this
study. Disagreements were analysed, and some additional explanations were included
to the coding instruction in the code book.
The inter-coder reliability for this study was established by randomly selecting
10 per cent of the news items, which was equivalent to 24 articles. Using Holsti’s formula
(cited in Wimmer and Dominick 2006), it was found that the inter-coder reliability
for number and types of articles was 1.0. In addition, news sources scored 0.99, while
new frames and valence obtained 0.96 and 0.98, respectively, for inter-coder reliability.

FINDINGS

The following are some basic information regarding the frequency and percentage
of the variables suggesting the importance of conceptual differentiation between the
Malaysian and Chinese newspapers.

EXTENT OF COVERAGE

The Star contributed the most number of news items (124 articles), followed by Sin
Chew (74 articles), Global Times (19 articles), Malaysiakini (10 articles), People Daily
(10 articles) and Utusan (5 articles). As indicated in Table 1, the majority of the articles
was straight news, and none of the newspapers published any editorial article on the
South China Sea disputes. A finding of interest was that only Malaysiakini and Global
Times published background articles, which are deemed as essential when an event’s
coverage was sustained over time. While Malaysiakini had the highest percentage of
columns (20.0 per cent), the six newspapers in this study did not publish any reader’s
letter or opinions in their coverage of the South China Sea disputes.

Table 1
Types of Articles
Utusan Malaysia The Star Sin Chew Daily Malaysia-kini People’s Daily Global Times
(n = 5) (n = 124) (n = 74) (n = 10) (n = 10) (n = 19)
% % % % % %
Straight news 100 93.6 100 70.0 90.0 93.9
Column 0 6.5 0 20.0 10.0 5.3
Background 0 0 0 10.0 0 5.3
article
Source: Types of Articles covering the South China Sea Disputes by Malaysian and Chinese newspapers
(in percentage).

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46 Yang Lai Fong et al.

NEWS SOURCES

Table 2 shows that Utusan and The Star relied on Chinese officials as their most domi-
nant news source, while Malaysiakini mainly cited Malaysian officials. The sourcing
practice of Sin Chew was similar to that of People’s Daily and Global Times, where schol-
ars and experts were given the most opportunities to voice their opinions on the issue.

NEWS FRAMES

UTUSAN MALAYSIA

Table 3 exhibits that Utusan was the only newspaper that allocated the strongest
emphasis on the consequences frame (60.0 per cent). It reported that a few countries
have tightened up their maritime security as a result of the South China Sea disputes.
For example, Indonesia sent its navy warship and F-16 jet fighter to the Natuna islands
after the altercation between Indonesian coastguard vessels and the Chinese coastguard
as well as fishing boats. It was also reported that the Indonesian President Joko Widodo
visited the Natuna Islands aboard a warship in June 2016, making a bold move to assert
sovereignty over the area in the southern reaches of the South China Sea. In addition,
Utusan reported that a Taiwanese warship was also sent to the South China Sea after the
PCA ruling, in orderto defend Taiwan’s maritime territory (Utusan Malaysia 2016b).
By employing the peace and resolution frame (20.0 per cent), Utusan reported
that Malaysia wanted China and all relevant parties involved in the South China
Seamaritime claims to find a constructive way to develop healthy dialogues, negotia-
tions and consultations. Wisma Putra said in a statement that Kuala Lumpur believes

Table 2
News Sources
Utusan
Malaysia The Star Sin Chew Daily Malaysia-kini People’s Daily Global Times
(n = 5) (n = 124) (n = 74) (n = 10) (n=10) (n = 19)
% % % % % %
Chinese officials 60.0 29.8 20.0 12.0 17.7 39.3
U.S. officials 0 17.6 7.4 20.0 0 0
Malaysian officials 40.0 2.7 5.3 52.0 0 0
Scholars and experts 0 9.6 26.3 4.0 82.4 53.6
Other countries’ 0 27.1 32.6 8.0 0 7.1
officials
Others 0 13.3 8.4 4.0 0 0
Source: News Sources used in Covering the South China Sea Disputes by Malaysian and Chinese newspapers
(in percentage).

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 Different Countries, Different Perspectives 47

Table 3
News Frames
Utusan
Malaysia The Star Sin Chew Daily Malaysia-kini People’s Daily Global Times
(n = 5) (n = 124) (n = 74) (n = 10) (n=10) (n = 19)
% % % % % %
Conflict 20.0 55.4 52.6 80.0 50.0 34.8
Consequences 60.0 26.6 28.9 20.0 16.7 13.0
Peace and 20.0 18.0 18.4 0 33.3 43.5
resolution
Others 0 0 0 0 0 8.7
Source: News Frames used in Covering the South China Sea Disputes by Malaysian and Chinese newspapers
(in percentage).

that all relevant parties can peacefully resolve disputes by giving full respect to dip-
lomatic and legal processes, relevant international law and 1982 UNCLOS. It was
also reported that Malaysia believes that it is important to maintain peace, security
and stability through the exercise of self-restraint in the conduct of activities that may
further complicate disputes or escalate tension, and the avoidance of threat or use of
force in the South China Sea (Utusan Malaysia 2016a).

THE STAR

Conflict was found to be the most salient frame in The Star (55.4 per cent). While
reporting China’s opinions, the conflict frame in The Star gave slightly more cover-
age to those voices that criticised or refuted the stance of China in the South China
Sea disputes. The Star also tended to portray a domineering image of China. For
example, it reported that Chinese President Xi Jinping declared that China will never
compromise on sovereignty as he celebrated the Communist Party’s 95th anniversary.
Xi also mentioned that the ruling party must maintain absolute power in the country,
strengthen its military and enhance its role on the world stage. Xi was quoted as saying:

No foreign country should expect us to swallow the bitter pill of harm to our national
sovereignty, security or development interests… We are not afraid of trouble… We
will not show up at other people’s front door to flex our muscles. That does not
show strength or scare anyone.
(The Star 2016d)

According to The Star, China said that more than 40 countries were supporting
its position on sovereignty of the South China Sea. These countries include Laos,
Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Niger, Zimbabwe and Hungary (The Star 2016c).

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48 Yang Lai Fong et al.

Meanwhile, it was also reported that the UK, France, Australia and Japan were among
countries that have joined Washington in stressing the importance of freedom of
navigation and respect for the rule of law (The Star 2016e). According to The Star, the
U.S. Navy’s Third Fleet will send more ships to East Asia to operate outside its normal
theatre alongside the Japan-based Seventh Fleet. Although China has been angered by
what it viewed as provocative U.S. military patrols close to islands that China controls
in the South China Sea, the U.S. said the patrols were to protect freedom of navigation
(The Star 2016a). In addition, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop warned China
that there would be ‘strong reputational costs’ for ignoring the tribunal ruling, as she
called for an end to Chinese island-building because it has caused severe harm to coral
reefs and endangered species in the South China Sea (The Star 2016m).
In its consequences frame (26.6 per cent), The Star reported that the European
governments were torn over how to respond to China’s defeat in the legal battle. The
European governments were fearful of alienating their second-largest trading partner
and also hampered by a maritime dispute among their own members. Despite U.S.
pressure on the European Union (EU) to take a stand on the issue, the bloc had so
far been unable to agree to a common statement, leaving diplomats to argue over
the wording acceptable to all 28 members. Nonetheless, it was reported that the EU
said it takes no position in the dispute between China and the Philippines (The Star
2016n). The Star also reported that the U.S. was using quiet diplomacy to persuade
the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and other Asian nations not to move aggressively
to capitalise on the international court ruling that denied China’s claims to the South
China Sea. It was reported that the U.S. wanted to address the issue rationally instead
of emotionally (The Star 2016o).

SIN CHEW DAILY

Conflict was also found to be the most prominent frame in Sin Chew (52.6 per cent).
Unlike The Star, the conflict frame in Sin Chew was inclined towards emphasising or
supporting the stance of China in the South China Sea disputes. For example, it was
reported that China has become the largest trading partner of ASEAN, and the latter
is now China’s third largest trading partner, next only to the EU and the US. In the
meantime, China became Asia’s biggest and the world’s second biggest economy in
2010. Therefore, according to China, these achievements have invited jealousy, and
hence the US launched the ‘Asia-Pacific rebalancing’ initiative, which emboldened
certain ASEAN countries (SinChew Daily, 16 July 2016a).
In addition, Sin Chew reported that China proclaimed that ‘sovereign territory
can in no way be less, even by a little bit’. It was reported that much attention in
the Western media coverage was about China’s construction on the islands and reefs.
However, China claimed that it only started such construction at the end of 2013, the
timing of which indicated that China was forced to react, given the changes in regional

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situation. The Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, Kong Xuanyou, pointed out that
some media reports have been blaming China’s construction work on the islands and
reefs for the rising tension in the South China Sea. He refuted it and argued that China
was actually the last one to carry out such construction work, after the Philippines
and other claimants. He added that a major difference was that the other claimants’
construction works has been on Chinese islands and reefs that they illegally occupied,
whereas China’s construction was on its own islands and reefs. Therefore, he stressed
that it was wrong of the US and Western media to name China the source of rising
tension in the South China Sea (Sin Chew Daily 2016b).
Through the adopting of the consequences frame (28.9 per cent), Sin Chew reported
that a senior analyst from the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS),
Shahriman Lockman, said that despite China’s action of pushing the ruling aside, the
decision of the tribunal is the law and it will definitely help Malaysia. He added that
it might take a long time for China to accept, but it would eventually have to comply
with the tribunal’s decision as China will not take any risk of tarnishing its image in
the eyes of the world.
In its peace and resolution frame (18.4 per cent), Sin Chew reported that the
President of the Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia, Pheng Yin Huah, empha-
sised that peace and stability in the region are very important because in the past few
decades, they were the main contributing factors for countries in the region to develop
rapidly. Pheng urged China and the Philippines to exercise self-restraint and continue
to negotiate for a win-win solution. In addition, Pheng asserted that China values its
close friendship with Malaysia because China has been strengthening its economic
relationship with Malaysia. For example, China has taken a number of initiatives
in support of Malaysia’s struggling economy through a mix of official statements of
confidence, highly publicised investments and significant sovereign bond purchases.
Considering the economic, political and other factors, Pheng felt that Malaysia should
not involve itself in the South China Sea disputes (Sin Chew Daily 2016a).

MALAYSIAKINI

The conflict frame was also very prevalent in Malaysiakini (80.0 per cent). It is note-
worthy that the alternative newspaper reported several news stories that were omitted
by its mainstream counterparts. For example, it was reported that corporations owned
by the Chinese government have paid billions of dollars in 2015 to buy assets from
debt-riddled state investment firm 1MDB, which has been a major embarrassment to
the Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak (Malaysiakini 2016a).
In addition, Malaysiakini reported that Malaysia has downplayed two naval exer-
cises conducted by China in 2013 and 2014 at James Shoal, less than 50 nautical
miles off Sarawak. And in 2015, concerns raised by Malaysian fishermen in Miri
about alleged bullying by armed men aboard Chinese coastguard vessels were largely

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50 Yang Lai Fong et al.

ignored too. In March 2016, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA)
was even intimidated by a large Chinese vessel around the South Luconia Shoals, off
the oil-rich town of Miri in Sarawak. Spurred by the incident and the appearance of
some 100 Chinese fishing vessels in the area around the time, some in Malaysia were
hardening the nation’s previously muted responses towards their powerful neighbour
China (Malaysiakini 2016b).
Subsequently, Malaysia sent its navy and uncharacteristically summoned the
Chinese Ambassador to explain the incidents. However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry
downplayed the matter and claimed that its trawlers were carrying out normal fish-
ing activities in relevant waters. Nonetheless, a couple of weeks after the incidents,
Malaysia announced plans to set up a naval forward operating base near Bintulu,
south of Miri. The Defense Minister of Malaysia, Hishammuddin Hussein, insisted
that the base, which would house helicopters, drones and a special task force, is to
protect the country’s rich oil and gas assets from potential attacks by Islamic State (IS)
sympathisers based in the southern Philippines. However, some officials and experts
claimed that China’s activities off the coast were a more important factor. In addition,
the Deputy Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Reezal Merican, reiterated in the Parliament
in May 2016 that, like other ASEAN countries, Malaysia does not recognise China’s
controversial ‘nine-dash line’ (Malaysiakini 2016c).

PEOPLE’S DAILY

Through placing the issue within the dominant conflict frame (50.0 per cent), People’s
Daily published the minutes of a meeting between the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister
Liu Zhenmin and the US media delegation on the South China Sea issue. The US
media delegation included representatives from Newsweek, Chicago Tribute and Los
Angeles Times. Liu told the delegates that China has no intention for frictions with the
US military vessels and aircrafts. Nonetheless, he stressed that the US should refrain
from making provocations too. He also added that the US should be friendlier towards
China as the world is changing and the China–US relations are deepening at the same
time (People’s Daily, 15 June 2016).
In addition, Liu reminded the US media delegation of a meeting between President
Xi and President Obama at the Annenberg Estate in 2013. The aim of the meeting was
to build a new model for the relationship between China and the US. Subsequently,
Liu told the delegates that China will not become another Soviet Union. He pointed
out that there were three elements in the new model proposed by President Xi: a)
non-conflict and non-confrontation, b) mutual respect and c) win-win cooperation.
Liu felt that the US recognises the first and third elements, but is somehow reluctant
on the second. He emphasised to the media delegation that China respects the US
and naturally hopes that this would be a reciprocal relationship. Liu further recalled
that President Xi said to President Obama that the Pacific Ocean is vast enough for

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two big countries like China and US, and the two countries can have sound coopera-
tions in the Asia-Pacific, the Pacific and beyond. Therefore, according to President Xi,
there is no need for the US to make provocations near the shores of China (People’s
Daily, 15 June 2016).
By undertaking the peace and resolution frame (33.3 per cent), People’s Daily
reported that China has a high stake in the South China Sea due to its status as the
largest coastal country of the sea and the world’s biggest trading nation in goods.
Therefore, the peace, stability as well as freedom of navigation and overflight in the
South China Sea are crucial to China. The newspaper also reported that China cares
about the peace and stability in the South China Sea more than all other countries, the
US included. It was emphasised that even for its own sake, China is firmly committed
to upholding regional peace (People’s Daily 2016).

GLOBAL TIMES

The peace and resolution frame made the strongest showing in Global Times
(43.5 per cent). It was reported that the former Minister of China’s State Council
Information Office, Zhao Qizheng, stated unequivocally that going back to negotia-
tions is the only way forward for the settlement of disputes in the South China Sea
and that an arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines would not impede the
progress of China-ASEAN cooperation (Global Times 2016c).
By engaging the conflict frame (34.8 per cent), Global Times reported that President
Xi said that the Chinese people do not make trouble, but they are not cowards when
involved in trouble. In addition, former Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo said
without China’s acknowledgement and support, the award of the arbitration is practi-
cally infeasible or ‘just a piece of paper’. He added that hopefully this ‘piece of paper’
can serve as a lesson to remind all parties involved that there is no shortcut to resolving
the South China Sea issue, and that the final solution to it can only be found at the
negotiation table (Global Times 2016a).
In its consequences frame (13.0 per cent), Global Times reported that the Vice
President of the China Center for International Economic Exchanges, Wei Jianguo,
underscored that the South China Sea arbitration award is a real test for China’s
neighboring countries. He asserted that whether these neighbouring countries
will pick the right side is the key to their future development. He observed that
the ASEAN nations have three different attitudes towards China: a) hoping to
sit between two stools, b) depending on the US politically while counting on
cooperation with Beijing economically and c) taking China’s side and believing
that only China can help them realise their long-term development. In addition,
Wei pointed out that there are a few nations, like the Philippines, Vietnam and
Malaysia, which hope to contain China in the South China Sea by using the lever-
age of the US (Global Times 2016b).

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52 Yang Lai Fong et al.

VALENCE

Table 4 reveals that Sin Chew is the most supportive newspaper (40.3 per cent) towards
China among its Malaysian counterparts. Not surprisingly, the two newspapers from
China were strongly supportive towards their home country. In addition, Malaysiakini
was the most critical (50.0 per cent) towards China in its coverage of the South China
Sea disputes, while Utusan was found to be the most neutral in its coverage.

DISCUSSION

The difference in the number of articles published by the six newspapers indicated that
they gave unequal weight of attention to the South China Sea disputes. The findings
demonstrated that The Star was most concern about the issue, followed by Sin Chew,
Global Times, People’s Daily, Malaysiakini and Utusan. It is noteworthy that The Star
carried 124 articles, while Utusan had only five articles, and this led to the difference
of 115 articles between the two.
The readers of Utusan are essentially the Malays in the country, whose major concern
is primarily domestic issues and not so much foreign policy unless it impacts directly the
inter-racial relationships. Nevertheless, it is well understood that the more coverage an issue
receives in the news media, the more the public will perceive the issue to be important.
While it is fair to assume that the readers of Utusan might naturally and consequently
perceive the South China Sea disputes as unimportant, the authors are more concerned
about the effect of such a gatekeeping practice. Significantly, media are expected to bring
about a greater understanding of an issue by providing an extensive coverage of it. The
South China Sea disputes reflect a complex and long-standing conflict involving several
countries as even the tribunal hearings took as long as three years to come to the final ruling.
Therefore, it is indeed shocking to find that Utusan published only five articles to inform its
readers about the whole episode. In addition, the obvious gatekeeping and agenda-setting
practices by Utusan raise two important questions: What are the consequences facing the

Table 4
Valence
Utusan Malaysia The Star Sin Chew Daily Malaysia-kini People’s Daily Global Times
(n = 5) (n = 124) (n = 74) (n = 10) (n=10) (n = 19)
% % % % % %
Supportive 20.0 32.0 40.3 20.0 100 94.7
Critical 20.0 36.7 18.2 50.0 0 0
Neutral 60.0 31.3 41.6 30.0 0 5.3
Source: Valance used in covering the South China Sea Disputes by Malaysian and Chinese newspapers
(in percentage).

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 Different Countries, Different Perspectives 53

ill-informed readers for such an important issue that has an impact on their own country?
Why did Utusan undertake such an approach in its reporting of the South China Sea
disputes? Although it is not the objective or scope of the current study to examine these
two questions, it is imperative that future studies look into them.
While straight news articles give facts or quote references on general information
like who, what, when, where, why and how, newspaper opinion pieces offer readers
subjective rather than objective news content. This study found that Malaysiakini
devoted the most space for columns. In its column articles, the alternative newspaper
provided a platform for various Malaysian members of parliament, political analysts,
military elites and others to articulate their views and analyses regarding the South
China Sea disputes, Malaysia-China relations as well as important political, economic
and social topics. The column articles added a diversity of viewpoints and in-depth
analyses from multiple perspectives, hence enhancing the marketplace of ideas and
educating public understanding of the issues. Importantly, Entman (2004) also asserted
that elite discourse of international affairs has great potential in influencing readers’
opinions due to their lack of familiarity with the subject’s matter.
In the process of constructing social realities, journalists rely on different news
sources to present news stories. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) stated that the news
sources give readers a diversity of views, and, more importantly, these sources also
reflect what journalists and news media value the most in their news coverage. Similarly,
Schudson (2000) pointed out that news media ‘reflect not a world out there but the
practices of those who have the power to determine the experience of others’ (p.178).
Schudson (2000) also argued that the only important tool of the reporter is his/her news
sources and how he/she uses them. As a major global power, China (and its officials)
was given the privilege as the main news source or opinion leader in the coverage by
Utusan and The Star. Interestingly, by citing Malaysian officials most frequently in its
coverage, Malaysiakini has adopted a rather different approach in its coverage of the
South China Sea disputes. This finding is consistent with Gamson’s (1988) remark that
news sources are ‘frame sponsor’ that cultivates and influences news frames (p. 239).
Furthermore, the sourcing practice of Sin Chew was similar to that of People’s Daily
and Global Times, where scholars and experts were given the most opportunities to
voice their opinions on the issue. While these scholars and experts were seen to be
more objective and neutral than the state officials, their opinions and analyses were
nonetheless rather supportive towards China. This finding again explicates the close
relation between news sources selection and frames as well as valence.
According to Bashir and Fedorova (2015), a key theoretical framework for hundreds
of mass communication research articles on media framing investigated the manner in
which news organisations provide their audiences with context regarding news stories.
They posited that framing was done through the promotion of certain ‘schemata of
interpretation’ or ‘interpretive packages’ that are presented through content promo-
tion and exclusion. Bashir and Fedorova (2015) also concluded that the majority of
international news coverage reflected the government’s official position towards an

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54 Yang Lai Fong et al.

issue. They argued that a government’s position can have a reciprocal influence on
the nature of media coverage of various events. However, the findings of the current
study are interestingly inconclusive from a few angles. First, the two pro-government
Malaysian newspapers – Utusan and The Star – employed different frames in their
coverage of the South China Sea disputes. On one hand, Utusan employed the conse-
quences frame, used neutral valence and downplayed (almost omitted) the important
international disputes. On the other hand, The Star devoted the most coverage to the
South China Sea disputes, undertook the conflict approach and slanted rather criti-
cally towards China. While the gatekeeping and agenda-setting practices by Utusan
raise two important questions as mentioned earlier, the framing practice by The Star
also leads to an imperative question: Since The Star is owned by a political party that
seeks to represent the Malaysian Chinese, and it has a track record of emphasising
consensus and moderation, why would it take on such vocal and critical approaches
in reporting the South China Sea disputes? This question deserves special attention as
news stories are not a random representation of the reality but a systematic construc-
tion of the social world by journalists and editors.
Although Malaysiakini was even more critical in its conflict frame, the finding is,
however, unsurprising if one refers to the previous studies on alternative media. For
example, many scholars (e.g., Brown 2005; George 2005; Rodan 2005; Steele 2009;
Tong 2004) commented that online media in Malaysia are widening the range of avail-
able news and commentary. While Tang (2009) found that the Malaysiakini website
features hard-hitting editorials, columns and letters, Kenyon (2010) recorded that one
of the routines in the Malaysiakini newsroom is to look out for political stories that
other media downplay or ignore. It was also found that the journalists of Malaysiakini
look at issues from a big picture point of view, such as, identifying what a particular
story had to do with the larger political circumstances (Kenyon 2010).
The framing of the South China Sea disputes by Sin Chew was closest to that of
People’s Daily and Global Times, where the coverage was pervasive with supportive
valence towards China. It is interesting to note that scholars (Lee 2011; Lim et al.
2014; Suryadinata 2007; Tan et al. 2012) recognised that there are still many Malaysian
Chinese that are proud of their links to China, where their forefathers originated.
Significantly, Ou (2009) explicated that there exists a symbiosis between the Chinese-
language press and the Chinese community in Southeast Asia. The Chinese press,
Chinese schools and Chinese associations and guilds form the triangulation supporting
the Chinese community. The Chinese-language newspapers have their own unique
mission as well as belief system. They represent a cultural expression of the community
and serves to articulate and even to help shape the aspirations of the community that
they represent. Nonetheless, in this case, it is imperative to note that there are many
pro-business Malaysian Chinese that have forged strong business interests in China
and would be critical of any potential loss of commercial opportunity resulting from
any political deterioration in the Sino-Malaysian relationship.

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 Different Countries, Different Perspectives 55

Interestingly, Finkbeiner (2013) analysed Malaysian policy towards the South China
Sea disputes and made the following conclusion:

Malaysia appears to take a different approach from its neighbors in the South China
Sea disputes in order to pursue what it perceives as more important interests…1)
Malaysia prefers to base its relationship with China on economic prosperity above
other interests, including the two countries’ sovereignty dispute; 2) Malaysia will
seek continued strong military ties with the U.S., in part to balance against China
given the latter’s ever increasing presence in Southeast Asia, and finally 3), Malaysia
will continue to promote strong bilateral relationships with both the U.S. and
China, promote both those countries’ ties to ASEAN, and continue to promote
resolution of the South China Sea dispute on a multilateral basis through ASEAN.
(Finkbeiner 2013: 15)

CONCLUSION

Framing analysis of international news and diplomatic relations allows researchers

to examine how news organisations provide their audiences with context regarding
news stories through content promotion and exclusion. This study examined how
the Malaysian and Chinese newspapers reported about the South China Sea disputes
and Malaysia-China bilateral relations. The findings indicated that the newspapers
reported the topics with different intensity and prominence, while different news
sources were employed. It was also found that conflict was a salient frame used
by the various newspapers. In addition, the study found that the Malaysian and
Chinese newspapers exhibited different valence in reporting the South China Sea
disputes. Among the Malaysian newspapers under examination in this study, Sin
Chew employed the most similar frame to that of the Chinese newspapers, where
the coverage was pervasive with supportive valence towards China. Nonetheless, for
future research, in order to investigate the impact of news frames on the people’s
perception of a foreign nation, it would be interesting to juxtapose the findings of
this study with public opinion data to measure Malaysians’ perceptions towards
China and the South China Sea disputes.

DECLARATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship and/or publication of this article.

China Report 56, 1 (2020): 39–59

56 Yang Lai Fong et al.

FUNDING

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article: The research reported in this article was
conducted as part of a grant from Taylor’s University, Malaysia. Grant No. TRGS/
MFS/2/2014/SOC/006.

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