FEDERALIST PAPERs

FEDERALIST PAPER 10
In Madison’s essay, he claims that factions are created because of human

nature and his tendency to join and organize communities. Moreover, as a
crucial cause of factions, the author sees the unequal distribution of property
in society, where there are creditors and debtors. Thus, he claims that
debtors, for instance, may unite in a faction to try to protect their interests
and solve their problems with the help of democracy, willing to redistribute
creditors’ money, which will oppress the minority. Therefore, Madison
suggests two ways of solving the problem of majoritarianism: either by
removing its causes or controlling the effects.
As for removing causes producing factions, Madison also suggests two ways:
either by denying the liberty of all the citizens or providing the same
interests and values for all the people. However, Madison claims that both
suggestions are impossible to be implemented because freedom and the
guarantee of rights are crucial to political life. Moreover, no one can provide
the same interests to a diverse society. Therefore, only controlling the effects
of majoritarianism caused by human nature can be counted as a way to
solve the problem of factions, which Madison sees possible only in a
representative republic.
To make it clear, James Madison denies democracy as a form of government

in which minorities are not oppressed. He sees democracy as a form of rule
in which citizens are voting for or against proposed laws. At the same time, a
republic for him is a government in which citizens, diverse in terms of their
interests, choose a few representatives who will accept or deny laws for
them. Therefore, in his essay Federalist 10, Madison argues that with the
help of a representative republic, governments will be divided into small
districts, avoiding factions.
FEDERALIST PAPER 48
Federalist No. 48 argued that the branches of government can be connected,
while remaining “separate and distinct”. The argument of No. 48 is that, in
order to practically maintain the branches as “separate and distinct”, they
must have “a constitutional control” over each other.
The paper begins by asserting that “power is of an encroaching nature”, i.e.

those with power will attempt to control everything they can. It then asks
how this tendency can be stopped, in order to preserve the "separate and
distinct" quality of the branches of government. It then makes the claim that
merely defining the boundaries of the branches is an insufficient safeguard.
It singles out the legislative branch as being particularly successful in taking
over power.
As an aside from the main argument, the paper notes that the danger of the
legislative branch taking over has not been thought about by the “founders
of our republics”, i.e. the people who wrote the thirteen state constitutions.
The paper offers a number of reasons why legislative over-reaching is more

likely in a “representative republic”, as distinct from other types of
government. These reasons include the claim that the legislature is
“sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet
not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions”
and that its powers are both “more extensive, and less susceptible of precise
limits”.
Then two examples of legislative over-reaching are given: Virginia and

Pennsylvania.
The Virginia example is primarily a long quote from Thomas Jefferson’s Notes
on the State of Virginia, in which he corroborates the claims of the paper,
explaining, for example, that “an elective despotism was not the government
we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles,
but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced
among several bodies of magistracy as that no one could transcend their
legal limits without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.”
PAPER 51
James Madison argues in his essay that the US Constitution requires a
separation of powers among government branches to prevent interference in
each other’s affairs. This division of power must be established to ensure a
balance of power and prevent any one branch from becoming too powerful.
Madison explains that the ideal division of power in the constitution involves
ensuring independence of government departments by limiting control over
appointments and tenure. This may require all branches of government to be
elected by citizens, with exceptions for the judiciary due to their specialized
qualifications and lifelong tenure. Each department should also have control
over its own remuneration and certain constitutional powers to prevent
encroachment by others. It is important for members to align their ambitions
with the independence of their departments, as human nature tends towards
seizing power. The principle of creating divisions to keep each other in check
applies to both public and private endeavors.
Madison explains that a perfectly equal division of power is not compatible

with the US Government’s Republican nature, as the legislature should be
the most powerful branch. However, checks and balances can prevent
misuse of power by dividing the legislature into separate branches. The
executive branch must be strong to counterbalance the legislature, but
giving it too much power to override legislative decisions could be harmful.
The Federal system of government in the US divides power between different
branches and departments to prevent tyranny and protect the rights of
minorities. A diverse society with various interests is essential for ensuring
justice and preventing oppression by the majority. The American
Government’s federal structure allows for power to be distributed in a way
that protects the rights of all citizens and ensures justice is upheld.

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FEDERALIST PAPER 10

In Madison’s essay, he claims that factions are created because of human

To make it clear, James Madison denies democracy as a form of government

The paper begins by asserting that “power is of an encroaching nature”, i.e.

The paper offers a number of reasons why legislative over-reaching is more

Then two examples of legislative over-reaching are given: Virginia and

Madison explains that a perfectly equal division of power is not compatible

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