Federalist Paper 1:

● Original Text (Opening Paragraph): "After an unequivocal experience of the

inefficacy of the subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate
on a new Constitution for the United States of America."
● Main Idea: The main purpose of Federalist Paper 1, written by Alexander
Hamilton, is to urge the people to consider the necessity of adopting a new
Constitution to replace the ineffective Articles of Confederation. Hamilton argues
that the current government is inadequate and incapable of addressing the
challenges facing the nation. He emphasizes the importance of establishing a
strong central government under the proposed Constitution to ensure national
security, economic stability, and the protection of individual rights.

Federalist Paper 10:

Original Text (Opening Paragraph): "Among the numerous advantages

promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more
accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence
of faction."

Main Idea: In Federalist Paper 10, James Madison addresses the problem of
factionalism and its threat to the stability of republican government. Madison
defines factions as groups of citizens united by common interests or passions
that are adverse to the rights of other citizens or to the public good. He argues
that factionalism is inherent in human nature but can be mitigated within a large
republic with a system of representative government. Madison advocates for the
Constitution's system of checks and balances and the separation of powers as
essential mechanisms for controlling the influence of factions and preserving
liberty.

The disadvantages of factionalism include:

Division: Factionalism can lead to division within a society or organization, as

different groups pursue their own interests and agendas, often at the expense of
unity and cooperation.
 Polarization: Factions can polarize society by emphasizing differences and
creating an "us versus them" mentality, making it difficult to find common ground
and compromise on important issues.

Gridlock: In political contexts, factionalism can result in gridlock and inefficiency,

as competing factions obstruct legislative processes and prevent the enactment
of necessary reforms or policies.

Instability: Factionalism can contribute to political instability and social unrest, as

conflicting interests and ideologies clash, potentially leading to protests,
demonstrations, or even violence.

Inequality: Factions may prioritize the interests of certain groups over others,
exacerbating social and economic inequalities and marginalizing those who are
not part of dominant factions.

Overall, factionalism can undermine the functioning of democratic institutions,

impede progress, and hinder social cohesion, posing significant challenges to
governance and collective decision-making.

Federalist Paper 39:

● Original Text (Opening Paragraph): "The last paper having concluded the
observations which were meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of
government reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that
part of our undertaking."
● Main Idea: Federalist Paper 39, also authored by James Madison, examines the
nature of the proposed government under the Constitution and its adherence to
republican principles. Madison addresses questions about whether the
government established by the Constitution is federal or national in character. He
 federalism

argues that it is a combination of both, with certain powers delegated to the

federal government and others reserved to the states. Madison emphasizes the
republican nature of the government, highlighting the principles of popular
sovereignty and the consent of the governed as fundamental to its legitimacy
and operation.

These Federalist Papers provide valuable insights into the framers' arguments in
support of the Constitution and their vision for the future of the United States.

why government is needed

Federalist 51

“It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices [checks and balances]
should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is
to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control
itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government;
but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
separation of power and check
and balance
Writing Federalist 51

In this Federalist Paper, James Madison explains and defends the checks and balances
system in the Constitution. Each branch of government is framed so that its power
checks the power of the other two branches; additionally, each branch of government is
dependent on the people, who are the source of legitimate authority.

Madison also discusses the way republican government can serve as a check on the
power of factions and the tyranny of the majority. “[I]n the federal republic of the United
States… all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society
itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights
 minority right

of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of

the majority.” All of the Constitution’s checks and balances, Madison concludes, serve to
preserve liberty by ensuring justice. Madison explained, “Justice is the end of
government. It is the end of civil society.”

Madison’s political theory as expressed in this Federalist Paper demonstrated the

influence of Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws on the Founders.

Writing Federalist 70

In this Federalist Paper, Alexander Hamilton argues for a strong executive leader, as provided

for by the Constitution, as opposed to the weak executive under the Articles of Confederation.

He asserts, “energy in the executive is the leading character in the definition of good

government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks…to the

steady administration of the laws, to the protection of property…to justice; [and] to the security

of liberty….”

Though some had called for an executive council, Hamilton defended a single executive as “far

more safe” because “wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common…pursuit,

there is always danger of difference of opinion…bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever

these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority.” Hamilton also argued that a

single executive would be watched “more narrowly” and vigilantly by the people than a group of

people would be.

In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton delves into the role and significance of the judiciary

within the proposed government framework. He stresses the importance of the tenure of judges
 about judicial brunch

in ensuring their independence and impartiality. Hamilton argues that "the standard of good

behavior for the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy" is crucial for maintaining the

integrity of the judiciary (Hamilton). He emphasizes the judiciary's role as the "bulwarks of a

limited Constitution against legislative encroachments" (Hamilton). Hamilton contends that while

the judiciary may lack the power to enforce its decisions like the executive or control the budget

like the legislature, it holds the vital responsibility of interpreting and safeguarding the

Constitution. He asserts, "the interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
judicial review
courts" and that "every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission

under which it is exercised, is void" (Hamilton). Hamilton warns against temporary appointments

to judicial offices, arguing that they could compromise the independence and integrity of the

judiciary. He concludes by advocating for the permanency of judicial offices to ensure the

appointment of qualified judges capable of upholding the rule of law. judges serve for lifetime
 To the People of the State of New York:

AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government, you
are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject
speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of
the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in
many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to
have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the
important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their
political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we
are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a
wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general
misfortune of mankind. This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to
heighten the solicitude which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if
our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and
unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to
be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many
particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a
variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the
discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter
may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all
changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices
they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who
will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves
with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies
than from its union under one government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it
would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because
their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candor will oblige
us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that
much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will
spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable--the honest errors of minds led astray by
preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes which
serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men
on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This
circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so
much persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this
respect, might be drawn from the reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the
truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity,
party opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well
upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even
these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which
has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to
aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.

And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we have already sufficient
indications that it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of
angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we
shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to
increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of
their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized
as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An
over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of
the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for
popularity at the expense of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the
usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit
of narrow and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten that the vigor of
government is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and
well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more
often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden
appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the
former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and
that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun
their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending
tyrants.

In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you
upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of
the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the
evidence of truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general scope of
them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I
own to you that, after having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion it is your
interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your
happiness. I affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance of
deliberation when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay
before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains
ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the
depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They
shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth.

I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following interesting particulars:

THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY THE INSUFFICIENCY OF

THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION TO PRESERVE THAT UNION THE NECESSITY OF A
GOVERNMENT AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE
ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO
THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN
STATE CONSTITUTION and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL
AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND
TO PROPERTY.

In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer to all the
objections which shall have made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your
attention.

It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to prove the utility of the UNION, a
point, no doubt, deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and
one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered
in the private circles of those who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too
great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies
of distinct portions of the whole.1 This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually propagated, till it
has votaries enough to countenance an open avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those
who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative of an adoption of the new
Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the
advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable dangers, to which every State will be
exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.

In this excerpt from Federalist Paper No. 1, several important terms are used, each with specific
meanings in the context of the text:

1. **Union**: Refers to the collective unity of the thirteen states that formed the United States of
America. It represents the cohesive bond between the states, which is central to the stability
and prosperity of the nation.

2. **Subsisting**: Means currently existing or continuing to exist. In this context, it refers to the
present state of the federal government under the Articles of Confederation.

3. **Constitution**: Refers to the proposed new framework of government for the United States,
which is the subject of deliberation and debate in the text.

4. **Empire**: Refers to the United States, emphasizing its vastness, importance, and influence
in the world.

5. **Government**: The system or body responsible for governing and administering a state or
nation. In this context, it refers to the proposed new government structure outlined in the
Constitution.

6. **Philanthropy**: The desire to promote the welfare of others, often expressed through
charitable acts or endeavors. Here, it refers to the concern for the well-being and future of the
nation.
7. **Patriotism**: Strong devotion and loyalty to one's country, its principles, and its ideals. It
involves a deep love for one's nation and a willingness to serve and sacrifice for its betterment.

8. **Public Good**: Refers to the welfare or well-being of the general public. It encompasses the
collective interests and benefits of society as a whole.

9. **Moderation**: Refers to the quality of being balanced, restrained, and temperate in one's
actions, opinions, and behavior. It involves avoiding extremes and finding a middle ground.

10. **Ambition**: Refers to a strong desire for success, achievement, or power. In this context, it
can refer to both positive aspirations for the betterment of society and negative desires for
personal gain or advancement.

11. **Despotism**: A form of government characterized by absolute power and control exercised
by a single ruler or authority, often with little regard for individual rights or freedoms.

12. **Heresies**: Refers to beliefs or opinions that deviate from established doctrines or
principles, particularly in the context of religion or ideology.

13. **Persecution**: Refers to the mistreatment or harassment of individuals or groups, often

based on their beliefs, ethnicity, or other characteristics.

These terms are central to understanding the themes and arguments presented in Federalist
Paper No. 1, which focuses on the importance of adopting the proposed Constitution for the
United States.