Appellant Compendium Issue 2

SUB ISSUE A

1. S.P. Mittal v. Union of India

CITATION: (1983) 1 SCC 51.
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE: 08.11.1982
BENCH: Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., P.N. Bhagwati, O. Chinnappa Reddy, V. Balakrishna
Eradi and R.B. Misra.
FACTS
Sri Aurobindo was one of the India’s great sage and philosopher. After his career in
politics and administration, he decided to convert his life into yoga and meditation at
Pondicherry, Tamil Nadu. A French lady named Madam M. Alfassa, became his disciple
and also later she known as Mother. Soon after some time many people all over India
and also from the abroad joined Sri Aurobindo and formed a society named Sri
Aurobindo Society in 1960 under West Bengal Registration of Societies Act 1961.After
some years a new township was formed known as AUROVILLE where people were
taught he teachings of Sri Aurobindo .Seeing a unique work state and central government
decided to provide funds to the township .As a result of it the UNESCO also decided to
help this township in its development because it was helpful in international relation.
In year 1970,after the death of Mother Alfassa there were lots of cases registered against
the misappropriation of funds in the township .Seeing such a conflict Central government
decided to take over the power of administration in its hands, for which legislation
passwd a Presidential Ordinance . After some time by filing a writ, that ordinance was
converted into Auroville Emergency Provision Act 1980. The same was challenged
before Supreme Court of India.
REFERENCE TAKEN:
Para 20: It is obvious that religion, undefined by the Constitution, is incapable of precise
judicial definition either. In the background of the provisions of the Constitution and the
light shed by judicial precedent, we may say religion is a matter of faith. It is a matter of
belief and doctrine. It concerns the conscience i.e. the spirit of man. It must be capable of
 overt expression in word and deed, such as, worship or ritual. So, religion is a matter of
belief and doctrine, concerning the human spirit, expressed overtly in the form of ritual
and worship. Some religions are easily identifiable as religions; some are easily
identifiable as not religions. There are many in the penumbral region which instinctively
appear to some as religions and to others as not religions. There is no formula of general
application. There is no knife-edge test. Primarily, it is a question of the consciousness of
the community, how does the fraternity or sodality (if it is permissible to use the word
without confining it to Roman Catholic groups) regard itself, how do others regard the
fraternity or sodality. A host of other circumstances may have to be considered, such as,
the origin and the history of the community, the beliefs and the doctrines professed by the
community, the rituals observed by the community, what the founder, if any, taught, what
the founder was understood by his followers to have taught, etc. In origin, the founder
may not have intended to found any religion at all. He may have merely protested against
some rituals and observances, he may have disagreed with the interpretation of some
earlier religious tenets. What he said, what he preached and what he taught, his protest,
his dissent, his disagreement might have developed into a religion in the course of time,
even during his lifetime. He may be against religion itself, yet, history and the perception
of the community may make a religion out of what was not intended to be a religion and
he may be hailed as the founder of a new religion. There are the obvious examples of
Buddhism and Jainism and for that matter Christianity itself. Neither Buddha nor
Mahavira, nor Christ ever thought of founding a new religion, yet three great religions
bear their names.

2. Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.

CITATION: AIR 1963 SC 1638.
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE: 21.01.1963
BENCH: B.P. Sinha, C.J., J.C. Shah, K.C. Das Gupta, K.N. Wanchoo and P.B.
Gajendragadkar.
FACTS
The case involves a group of cross-appeals stemming from three writ petitions filed in the
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, challenging the Nathdwara Temple Act, 1959.
The primary petition, filed by Tilkayat Govindlalji on February 28, 1959, initially
contested the Nathdwara Ordinance, 1959, (The Act was passed to improve the
administration and governance of the Shri Shrinathji temple in Nathdwara) which was
later repealed and replaced by the Act. After the Act came into force on March 28, 1959,
Tilkayat amended his petition to challenge the validity of the Act itself, as it mirrored the
Ordinance's provisions.
A second writ petition, filed on August 17, 1959, by ten petitioners representing the
Pushtimargiya Vaishnava Sampradaya, also contested the Act, arguing that it violated
their denomination’s rights. A third petition, filed on November 3, 1960, was brought by
Goswami Shri Ghanshyamlalji, a descendant of Vallabha, who claimed a personal
interest in the Nathdwara Temple and challenged the Act’s validity.
The High Court addressed all three petitions together and upheld the Act’s validity but
struck down several of its provisions as ultra vires. This decision led to cross-appeals:
Tilkayat filed an appeal challenging the High Court’s judgment, the State of Rajasthan
filed appeals defending the Act, and the Denomination also appealed. Ghanshyamlalji’s
petition was dismissed on procedural grounds, and he filed an appeal as well.
In addition to these appeals, Tilkayat filed a separate writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution, raising additional challenges to the Act. The central issue for the Supreme
Court was the constitutional validity of the Nathdwara Temple Act.
REFERENCE TAKE
Para 60 : In deciding the question as to whether a given religious practice is an integral
part of the religion or not, the test always would be whether it is regarded as such by the
community following the religion or not. This formula may in some cases present
difficulties in its operation.
Take the case of a practice in relation to food or dress. If in a given proceeding, one
section of the community claims that while performing certain rites while dress is an
integral part of the religion itself, whereas another section contends that yellow dress and
not the white dress is the essential part of the religion, how is the Court going to decide
the question ? Similar disputes may arise in regard to food.
 In cases where conflicting evidence is produced in respect of rival contentions as to
competing religious practices the Court may not be able to resolve the dispute by a blind
application of the formula that the community decides which practice is an integral part
of its religion, because the community may speak with more than one voice and the
formula would, therefore, break down. This question will always have to be decided by
the Court
and in doing so, the Court may have to enquire whether the practice in question is
religious in character and if it is, whether it can be regarded as an integral or essential part
of the religion, and the finding of the Court on such an issue will always depend upon the
evidence adduced before it as to the conscience of the community and the tenets of its
religion.
It is in the light of this possible complication which may arise in some cases that this
Court struck a note of caution in the case of The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed
Hussain Ali , and observed that in order that the practices in question should be treated
as a part of religion they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral
part; otherwise even purely secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part
of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being
treated as religious practices within the meaning of Art. 25(1).

3. Javed and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Ors.

CITATION: AIR 2003 SC 3057.
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE: 30.07.2003
BENCH: R.C. Lahoti, Ashok Bhan and Arun Kumar, JJ.
FACTS
The case revolves around the constitutionality of specific provisions in the Haryana
Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. Sections 175(1)(q) and 177(1) of the Act disqualify individuals
from holding Panchayat positions if they have more than two living children. The Act
postpones this disqualification for one year from its commencement, allowing those with
more than two children at that time to continue holding office. However, if a person
holding office incurs this disqualification after the one-year period, their position
 becomes vacant. The Director decides on such cases and their decision can be appealed to
the Government, with safeguards ensuring natural justice.
Several individuals have challenged these provisions, claiming they are unconstitutional
on various grounds: they argue the provisions are arbitrary and violate equality before the
law (Article 14), do not effectively achieve their intended purpose, are discriminatory,
infringe upon personal liberty and reproductive freedom (Article 21), and interfere with
religious freedoms (Article 25).
REFERENCE TAKEN:
Para No 60. Looked at from any angle, the challenge to the constitutional validity of
Section 175(1)(q) and Section 177(1) must fail. The right to contest an election for any
office in Panchayat is neither fundamental nor a common law right. It is the creature of a
statute and is obviously subject to qualifications and disqualifications enacted by
legislation.
It may be permissible for Muslims to enter into four marriages with four women and for
anyone whether a Muslim or belonging to any other community or religion to procreate
as many children as he likes but no religion in India dictates or mandates as an obligation
to enter into bigamy or polygamy or to have children more than one. What is permitted or
not prohibited by a religion does not become a religious practise or a positive tenet of a
religion. A practice does not acquire the sanction of religion simply because it is
permitted. Assuming the practice of having more wives than one or procreating more
children than one is a practice followed by any community or group of people the same
can be regulated or prohibited by legislation in the interest of public order, morality and
health or by any law providing for social welfare and reform which the impugned
legislation clearly does.

4. Baijaynanda Giri and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors.

CITATION: Bihar, AIR 1954 Pat 266.
COURT: High Court of Patna
DATE: 05.10.1953
BENCH: Vaidynathier Ramaswami and Sinha, JJ.
FACTS
In these cases, the constitutionality of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act (Bihar Act 1 of 1951) is being
challenged. The key issue is whether the Act, which regulates the administration of Hindu religious trusts,
is valid under the Constitution of India.
Two main petitioners are involved: Mahanth Moti Das and Mahanth Sri Baijayananda Giri. Moti Das, who
leads a muth in Parbatta, argues that the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act is unconstitutional, asserting that
the muth's properties are private and not subject to the Act's regulations. He contends that the muth,
established by a sect founded by Shri Kabir Sahib, does not fall under Hindu religious trusts as defined by
the Act. He seeks to prevent the authorities from interfering with the management of his muth's properties.
Sri Baijayananda Giri, similarly, challenges the Act's constitutionality, arguing that the properties of his
muth should not be subject to the Act. He claims that the Act is not applicable even if it is constitutionally
valid.
The Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act aims to provide for the better administration of Hindu religious
trusts and the protection of their properties. It includes provisions for the constitution of a Board of
Religious Trusts, oversight of trust administration, and regulation of financial transactions involving trust
properties.
The petitioners argue that the Act violates several constitutional guarantees, including the right to equality
(Article 14), the right to property (Article 19(1)(f)), and freedom of religion (Articles 25, 26, and 27). They
assert that the Act is unconstitutional because it applies to properties of a sect not recognized as Hindu and
infringes upon their rights to manage their religious properties independently.
REFERENCE TAKEN
Para no 17 & 18: Applying this test in the present case it is obvious that there is no
violation of the guarantee under Article 25 of the Constitution. The impugned Act is not
legislation directly interfering with the practice and propagation of religion. On the
contrary, the object of the Act is to provide for the better administration of Hindu
religious trusts and for the protection and preservation of the properties appertaining to
such trusts. The preamble of the Act makes an express statement to this effect. Section 28
of the Act imposes a duty on the Board to do all things reasonable and necessary to
ensure that trusts are properly supervised and administered and that the income thereof is
duly appropriated and applied to the objects, of such trusts and in accordance with the
purposes for which such trusts were founded. Section 60 authorises the Board to alter or
modify the budget of a trust in such manner as it thinks fit; but Section 60(6) sets an
important limitation on the power. Section 60(6) provides that the Board is not authorised
to alter or modify the budget in a manner inconsistent with the wishes of the founder.
 Upon a consideration of these provisions it is clear that the impugned Act deals only with
administration of the properties of religious trust and that the impugned Act does not
directly relate to practice and propagation of religion. There is no violation of the
guarantee under Article 25 of the Constitution and the argument of the learned counsel
for the petitioners on this point must fail.
That the freedom of religion guaranteed does not prohibit legislation dealing with
administration of property is also clear from a consideration of the provisions of Article
26. Article 26 states: Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious
denomination or any section thereof shall have the right -- (a) to establish and maintain
institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters
of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to
administer such property in accordance with law. The article makes clear distinction
between right of a religious denomination to manage its own affairs in the matter of
religion and the right of such religious denomination to own and acquire movable and
immovable property and to administer such property. Article 26(d) expressly states that
the right of a religious denomination to administer property is not an unqualified right.
The right to administer the property is subject, in the first place, to the condition that
public order, morality and health are safeguarded. The right is also qualified by the
expression that the "administration should be in accordance with law." Article 26(d)
therefore contemplates the right of the State to make a law with respect to administration
of property owned and acquired by religious denominations or by any section thereof.

SUB ISSUE: B

5. Case name: The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society and Ors. v. State of
Gujarat and Ors.
CITATION: AIR 1974 SC 1389.
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE: 26.04.1974
BENCH: A.N. Ray, C.J., A. Alagiriswami, D.G. Palekar, H.R. Khanna, K.K. Mathew,
M. Hameedullah Beg, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, S.N. Dwivedi and Y.V. Chandrachud.
FACTS
 St. Xavier's College, established in 1955, is a prominent educational institution affiliated
with the University of Gujarat. It was founded by the Ahmedabad Jesuit Society, a
religious minority group, with the primary objective of providing quality education in the
state of Gujarat. The college has consistently upheld its identity as a linguistic minority
institution, with English as its medium of instruction.
In its quest for minority status, St. Xavier's College contended that it fulfilled the criteria
laid out in Article 30 of the Indian Constitution, which grants linguistic and religious
minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
The institution argued that it represented a linguistic minority, and its claim for minority
status was intrinsic to its cultural and educational identity.
Xavier's College's claim for linguistic minority status. The State argued that classifying
institutions as linguistic minorities might lead to the fragmentation of the educational
system along linguistic lines. The government expressed concerns that such
classifications could hinder national integration by encouraging educational institutions
to cater exclusively to specific linguistic communities.
REFERENCE TAKEN:
Para no 10: The object of Article 30 is to enable children of minorities to go out in the
world fully equipped. All persons whether in the majority or in the minority have the
right under Article 25 freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. Any section of
citizens which includes the majority as well as the minority shall have under Article 29
the right to conserve their distinct language, script or culture. That is why the minorities
are given a specific right in respect of educational institutions under Article 30. Article
30(1) gives the right to linguistic minorities as well where no question of- religion arises.
It is, therefore, not at all possible to exclude secular education from Article 30. Since the
Kerala Education Bill case (supra) hi 1959 this Court has consistently held that general
secular education is covered by Article 30.

6. T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka.

CITATION: (2002) 8 SCC 481.
Court: Supreme Court
Date: 31.10.2002
 BENCH: B.N. Kirpal, C.J., G.B. Pattanaik, S. Rajendra Babu, K.G. Balakrishnan, P.
Venkatarama Reddi, Dr. Arijit Pasayat, V.N. Khare, S.S.M. Quadri, Ruma Pal, S.N.
Variava and Ashok Bhan.
Facts: Dr. T.M.A Pai, the founder of ‘The Academy of General Education,’ established
the institution under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, initially located in Manipal
within the state of Madras. Subsequently, the region became part of the state of
Karnataka following state reorganisation. The governor enacted the Karnataka
Educational Institutions Ordinance, 1984, aiming to curb the unethical collection of
excessive fees.
A writ petition contested the legitimacy of the aforementioned law and the state
government’s directive dated 19.07.1984, which imposed restrictions on the total intake
of the college and designated 40% of the seats as government seats. During the pendency
of the petition, the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee)
Act, 1984, was enacted, specifying capitation and tuition fees for private unaided
educational institutions not receiving government assistance.
Reference Taken:
Para No 325: Apart from this incongruity, such an interpretation would be contrary
to Article 29(1) which contains within itself an indication of the 'unit' as far as
minorities are concerned when it says that any section of the citizens residing in the
territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of
its own shall have the right to conserve the same. Merely because persons having a
distinct language, script or culture are resident within the political and geographical limits
of a State within which they may be in a majority, would not take them out of the phrase
"section of citizens residing in the territory of India". It is a legally fortuitous
circumstances that states have been created along linguistic lines after the framing of the
Constitution.
7. Jagdev Singh Sidhanti v. Partap Singh
CITATION: AIR 1965 SC 183. (India).
COURT: Supreme Court
Date: 12.02.1964
BENCH: P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., K.C. Das Gupta, K.N. Wanchoo, N. Rajagopala
Ayyangar and J.C. Shah
FACTS: In the February 1962 general elections, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti was elected to
the House of the People from the Jhajjar parliamentary constituency. Pratap Singh
Daulta, one of his competitors, challenged Sidhanti's election, alleging corrupt practices.
Daulta claimed that Sidhanti, his agents, and associates engaged in activities aimed at
creating religious and linguistic enmity between Sikhs and Hindus to gain electoral
advantage. He cited specific instances where Sidhanti and his supporters allegedly used
religious symbols and made appeals based on religion and language.
Sidhanti denied these allegations. He argued that the six individuals named by Daulta as
his agents were not acting on his behalf but were instead affiliated with the Hariana Lok
Samiti, a political organization unrelated to the Arya Samaj. Sidhanti admitted attending
campaign meetings but denied responsibility for the content of speeches or for the use of
religious symbols. He contended that the election appeals were based on political and
administrative issues, not religious or linguistic grounds, and thus did not constitute
corrupt practices under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
REFERENCE TAKEN:
Para30: The Constitution has thereby conferred the right, among others, to conserve their
language upon the citizens of India. Right to conserve the language of the citizens
includes the right to agitate for the protection of the language. Political agitation for
conservation of the language of a section of the citizens cannot therefore be regarded as a
corrupt practice within the meaning of s. 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act.
That is clear from the phraseology used in s. 123(3) which appears to have been
deliberately and carefully chosen. Unlike Art. 19(1), Art. 29(1) is not subject to any
reasonable restrictions. The right conferred upon the section of the citizens residing in the
territory of India or any part thereof to conserve their language, script or culture is made
by the Constitution absolute and therefore the decision of this Court in Jumuna Prasad
Mukhariya and others v. Lachhi Ram and others on which reliance was placed by the
High Court is not of much use. In that case Sections 123(3) and 124(5) of the
Representation of the People Act as they then stood were challenged as infringing the
fundamental freedom under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, and the Court in negativing
the contention held that the provisions of the Representation of the People Act did not
stop a man from speaking : they merely prescribed conditions which must be observed if
a candidate wanted to enter Parliament. The right to stand for an election is, it was
observed, a special right created by statute and can only be exercised on the conditions
laid down by the statute, and if a person wants to stand for an election he must observe
the rules. These observations have no relevance to the protection of the fundamental right
to conserve language.
RESPONDENT:

1. Prakash and Ors. v. Phulavati and Ors.

CITATION: AIR 2016 SC 769.
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE: 16.10.2015
BENCH: Adarsh Kumar Goel and Anil R. Dave.
FACTS
The case concerns the challenge to the application of the Hindu Succession (Amendment)
Act, 2005, specifically in relation to its effect on the respondent-plaintiff's right to
inheritance. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for partition and separate possession of
1/7th share in certain properties, arguing that the properties were inherited from her late
father, who had acquired them from his adoptive mother.
The primary contention was that the plaintiff, having become a coparcener under the
Amendment Act, should be entitled to a share equal to her brothers in the coparcenary
property. The defendants contested this claim, asserting that the plaintiff could only claim
shares under the old provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and not under the
new amendment.
The trial court partially granted the plaintiff's claim, providing 1/28th share in certain
properties and 1/7th share in others, based on a notional partition. The plaintiff appealed
to the High Court, which ruled in her favor, granting her 1/7th share in most properties,
based on the Amendment Act's provisions. The defendants challenged this ruling, arguing
that the amendment did not apply retrospectively to the plaintiff's case since her father
had died before the amendment's enactment.
The Supreme Court held that the Amendment Act was prospective and did not apply
retroactively. The Court emphasized that the amendment was meant to take effect only
from its commencement date and only for those cases where the coparcener died after the
amendment. The Court also noted that while the amendment itself is prospective, it could
be applied to pending cases as it did not disturb past transactions. The Court rejected the
argument that the amendment should be considered retrospective or that it could affect
transactions before December 20, 2004.
 The ruling clarified that the amendment provided rights to daughters of living
coparceners from September 9, 2005, onward. The Court also acknowledged the broader
issue of gender discrimination in inheritance laws, particularly for Muslim women, and
suggested that this issue might warrant further examination as a public interest litigation
(PIL).
REFERENCE TAKEN
Para no 27: An important issue of gender discrimination which though not directly
involved in this appeal, has been raised by some of the learned Counsel for the parties
which concerns rights to muslim women. Discussions on gender discrimination led to this
issue also. It was pointed out that inspire of guarantee of the Constitution, muslim women
are subjected to discrimination. There is no safeguard against arbitrary divorce and
second marriage by her husband during currency of the first marriage, resulting in denial
of dignity and security to her. Although the issue was raised before this Court in
Ahmedabad Women Action Group this Court did not go into the merits of the
discrimination with the observation that the issue involved state policy to be dealt with by
the legislature1. It was observed that challenge to the Muslim Women (Protection of
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 was pending before the Constitution Bench and there was
no reason to multiply proceedings on such an issue.

2. Sarla Mudgal and Ors. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
CITATION: AIR 1995 SC 1531.
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE: 10.05.1995
BENCH: Kuldip Singh and R.M. Sahai.
FACTS
Petitions were filed in the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the Indian
Constitution. Sarla Mudgal is the president of an NGO named Kalyani which aims to
help women in distress. Meena Mathur, who was married to Jitender Mathur in 1978
found that her husband Jitender Mathur married another woman named Sunita Narula
alias Fathima. Petitioner also learned that both Jitender Mathur and Fathima were
converted to Islam before solemnizing their marriage. Fathima contended that the
purpose of converting themselves to Islam and adopting the Muslim religion is to marry
each other and circumvent the provision of section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
In another petition, Sunita Narula accused Jitender Mathur, who was influenced by his
Hindu wife Meena Mathur and her children. After marrying Sunita Narula, Jitender
Mathur converted back to Hinduism. Jitender Mathur agreed to maintain his first Hindu
wife and children born out of his first marriage. As a result, Jitender Mathur refuses to
maintain his second wife who continues to be Muslim and has no protection under either
of the personal law.
In another petition, petitioner Geeta Rani married respondent Pradeep Kumar according
to Hindu rites in 1988. The petitioner alleged that her husband assaulted her and in one of
the assaults her husband broke her jawbone. Petitioner's Husband elopes with another
woman named Deepa and married her after adopting Islam. The Petitioner also stated that
the objective of conversion to Islam is to bypass the provision of section 494 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860.
REFERENCE TAKEN
PARA NO 1: "The State shall endeavor to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code
through-out the territory of India" is an unequivocal mandate under Article 44 of the
Constitution of India which seeks to introduce a uniform personal law - a decisive step
towards national consolidation. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, while defending the
introduction of the Hindu Code Bill instead of a uniform civil code, in the Parliament in
1954, said "I do not think that at the present moment the time is ripe in India for me to try
to push it through". It appears that even 41 years thereafter, the Rulers of the day are not
in a mod to retrieve Article 44 from the cold storage where it is lying since 1949. The
Government - which have come and gone - have so far failed to make any effort towards
"unified personal law for all Indians". The reasons are too obvious to be stated. The
utmost that has been done is to codify the Hindu law in the form of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955, The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,
1956 and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 which have replaced the
traditional Hindu law based on different schools of thought and scriptural laws into one
unified code. When more than 80% of the citizens have already been brought under the
 codified personal law there is no justification whatsoever to keep in abeyance, any more,
the introduction of "uniform civil code" for all citizens in the territory of India.
3. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum
CITATION: AIR 1995 SC 1531.
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE: 10.05.1995
BENCH: Kuldip Singh and R.M. Sahai.
FACTS
This appeal centers on a maintenance dispute involving a divorced Muslim woman. The
appellant, an advocate, was married to the respondent in 1932, and they had three sons
and two daughters. In 1975, the appellant expelled the respondent from their home. The
respondent filed for maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC in April 1978, seeking
Rs. 500 per month. However, the appellant divorced her in November 1978 through an
irrevocable talaq and argued that he was not obligated to provide maintenance after the
divorce.
The appellant's defense was that he had already paid Rs. 200 per month for about two
years and deposited Rs. 3000 in dower during the iddat period. In August 1979, the
Magistrate granted maintenance of only Rs. 25 per month. The respondent claimed that
the appellant, who earns about Rs. 60,000 per year, should provide more substantial
support. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh later increased the maintenance to Rs.
179.20 per month in July 1980. The appellant challenged this decision, questioning
whether Muslim Personal Law requires him to provide ongoing maintenance after
divorce and whether he has fulfilled his financial obligations adequately.
REFFERENCE TAKEN
Para No 35: It is also a matter of regret that Article 44 of our Constitution has remained
a dead letter It provides that "The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a
uniform civil code throughout the territory of India". There is no evidence of any official
activity for framing a common civil code for the country. A belief seems to have gained
ground that it is for the Muslim community to take a lead in the matter of reforms of their
persona law. A common Civil Code will help the cause of national integration by
removing disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies. No community is
 likely to bell the cat by making gratuitous concessions on this issue. It is the State which
is charged with the duty of securing a uniform civil code for the citizens of the country
and, unquestionably, it has the legislative competence to do so. A counsel in the case
whispered, somewhat audibly, that legislative competence is one thing, the political
courage to use that competence is quite another. We understand the difficulties involved
in bringing persons of different faiths and persuasions on a common platform. But, a
beginning has to be made if the Constitution is to have any meaning. Inevitably, the role
of the reformer has to be assumed by the courts because, it is beyond the endurance of
sensitive minds to allow injustice to be suffered when it is so palpable. But piecemeal
attempts of courts to bridge the gap between personal laws cannot take the place of a
common Civil Code. Justice to all is a far more satisfactory way of dispensing justice
than justice from case to case.
4. National Textile Workers’ Union and Ors. Vs. P.R. Ramakrishnan and Ors
CITATION: AIR 1983 SC 75.
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE: 10.12.1982
BENCH: A.N. Sen, Baharul Islam, E.S. Venkataramiah, O. Chinnappa Reddy and
P.N. Bhagwati.
FACTS
The respondents were two groups of shareholders of a private limited company which
had a thousand persons under its employment. A group of shareholders filed a petition for
winding-up the company under cls. (e) and (f) of s. 433 of the Indian Companies Act,
1956 along with applications for an interim injunction and for appointment of a
provisional liquidator. The Company Judge passed an order of injunction restraining the
company from borrowing any moneys from banks, financial institutions or others without
the prior permission of the court. Three trade unions representing the employees of the
company filed applications for being impleaded as respondents/interveners in the winding
up petition claiming that the interests of the employees had been adversely affected by
the interim order. The Company Judge rejected these applications. A Division Bench of
the High Court turned down the appeal preferred by one of the unions and that union
sought special leave to appeal against the order of the Division Bench while the other two
unions sought special leave to appeal against the order of the Company Judge. The Court
granted special leave to all the three unions and permitted the Company Judge to pass
orders on the application pending before him for appointment of a provisional liquidator
with the direction that the liquidator shall not take any steps which would prejudicially
affect the employees.
It was contended on behalf of the appellants that since an order winding up a company
amounts to notice of termination of services of its employees under s. 445(3) and since
even an interim order freezing the resources of the company might affect the interest of
the employees by making it difficult for the company to pay their wages, etc., it would be
contrary to fair judicial procedure and violative of the rule audi alteram partem to deny
the employees the right to be heard before any order prejudicially affecting their interests
is made. The 923 employees who contribute materially to the working of a company and
enable it to effectively play its socio-economic role are equal, if not more important,
partners in the running of the company and they must be heard in a proceeding for
winding up of the company. It was further urged that under r.34 of the Companies
(Court) Rules, 1959 the employees have a right to appear at the hearing of a winding-up
petition either to support or to oppose it.
On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the employees of a company have no
locus standi in a winding-up petition as the Act does not contain any provision conferring
such a right on them; that since the Act is a self-contained Code exhaustive in regard to
all matters relating to a company, no such right could be spelt out in their favour outside
the provisions of the Act that r. 34 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 does not confer
such a right on them and that, under the various provisions of the Act including ss. 439
and 440, it is only the creditors and contributories and in certain specified contingencies,
the Registrar and the Central Government, who are entitled to participate in the
proceedings for winding up of a company.
It was further contended that in this case it was not even the employees, but the three
trade unions, who had applied for being heard, and since the trade unions had no right to
be heard, their applications had been rightly rejected.
REFFERENCE TAKEN
 PARA NO 50: There are several areas where it is necessary for the Legislature to make
law. A reading of the provisions in Part IV of the Constitution shows that many of them
are still to be implemented by the passing of appropriate legislation. Article 41 of the
Constitution dealing with the right to work, Article 43 dealing with living wages etc. for
workers, Article 44 which insists upon the introduction of a uniform civil code for all
citizens and Article 47 dealing with the duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and
the standard of living of the people are some of the articles which have to be
implemented either by the Legislature or by the Executive.
Would this Court compel the Executive by issuing a writ to implement the policy
underlying Article 41, Article 43 and Article 47 without being backed up by necessary
laws ? Would this Court enforce a uniform civil code in respect of all citizens, without
the aid of an appropriate legislation even though the concept of equality is enshrined in
the Constitution and Article 44 specifically requires the State to endeavour to secure for
all citizens a uniform civil code ? It may not do so The only solution for many of these
social problems is to appeal to the appropriate organs of the State to do their assigned job
in the best interests of the Community. It is wrong to think that by some strained
construction of law, the Court can find solution to all problems.
5. Javed and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Ors.
CITATION: AIR 2003 SC 3057.
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE: 30.07.2003
BENCH: R.C. Lahoti, Ashok Bhan and Arun Kumar, JJ.
FACTS
The case revolves around the constitutionality of specific provisions in the Haryana
Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. Sections 175(1)(q) and 177(1) of the Act disqualify individuals
from holding Panchayat positions if they have more than two living children. The Act
postpones this disqualification for one year from its commencement, allowing those with
more than two children at that time to continue holding office. However, if a person
holding office incurs this disqualification after the one-year period, their position
becomes vacant. The Director decides on such cases and their decision can be appealed to
the Government, with safeguards ensuring natural justice.
 Several individuals have challenged these provisions, claiming they are unconstitutional
on various grounds: they argue the provisions are arbitrary and violate equality before the
law (Article 14), do not effectively achieve their intended purpose, are discriminatory,
infringe upon personal liberty and reproductive freedom (Article 21), and interfere with
religious freedoms (Article 25).
REFERENCE TAKEN:
Para No 60: It may be permissible for Muslims to enter into four marriages with four
women and for anyone whether a Muslim or belonging to any other community or
religion to procreate as many children as he likes but no religion in India dictates or
mandates as an obligation to enter into bigamy or polygamy or to have children more
than one. What is permitted or not prohibited by a religion does not become a religious
practise or a positive tenet of a religion. A practice does not acquire the sanction of
religion simply because it is permitted. Assuming the practice of having more wives than
one or procreating more children than one is a practice followed by any community or
group of people the same can be regulated or prohibited by legislation in the interest of
public order, morality and health or by any law providing for social welfare and reform
which the impugned legislation clearly does.
6. State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali
CITATION: AIR 1952 Bom 84.
COURT: Bombay High Court
DATE: 24.07.1951
BENCH: M.C. Chagla, C.J. and P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.
FACTS:
Here the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946, which aims to
prevent bigamous marriages among Hindu has been challenged on the grounds that it
infringes upon fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution.
In appeal No. 331 of 1951, the Sessions Judge of South Satara declared the Act invalid
and acquitted the accused. This decision led the Government to appeal against the
acquittal. Similarly, in appeal No. 113 of 1951, the Magistrate, First Class, Kaira, also
found the Act invalid and acquitted the accused, prompting another Government appeal.
In an application for revision, the Resident Magistrate of Mehsana convicted an accused
under Section 5 of the Act, sentencing him to six months' rigorous imprisonment and a
fine of Rs. 100. This conviction was upheld by the Sessions Judge, Mehsana.
Additionally, in reference No. 16 of 1951, the Sessions Judge of South Satara referred a
case involving the conviction of certain accused under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act, with
minimal sentences imposed.
The Act seeks to prevent bigamous marriages among Hindus by making such marriages
void if contracted within the State or, under certain conditions, outside the State. It
imposes penalties on individuals who contract or participate in bigamous marriages.
The Act is challenged as violating fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 25 of the
Constitution. Article 25 guarantees the right to freedom of conscience and the practice of
religion but allows for state regulation to ensure public order, morality, and other
constitutional provisions. The challenge argues that Hindu marriage, being a sacrament
regulated by religious texts, inherently includes polygamy as a means to secure a son for
religious purposes, which the Act interferes with.
REFFERENCE TAKEN
PARA No 5: Now a sharp distinction must be drawn between religious faith and belief
and religious practices. What the State protects is religious faith and belief. If religions
practices run counter to public order, morality or health or a policy of social welfare upon
which the State has embarked, then the religious practices must give way before the good
of the people of the State as a whole.
A very interesting and instructive case is to be found in the American Reports, viz. Davis
v. Beason, (1889) 133 U.S. 637. In that case it was contended that polygamy was part of
the creed of the Mormon Church and any legislation which penalises polygamy to the
extent that it affected Mormons was contrary to the First Amendment of the Constitution
which provided that Congress shall not make any law respecting the establishment of
religion or forbidding the free exercise thereof. This argument was rejected, and Mr.
Justice Field delivering the opinion of the Court pointed out that (p. 640):
The term 'religion' has reference to one's visas of his relations to his Creator, and to the
obligations they impose of reference for his being and character, and of obedience to his
 will. It is often confounded with the cultus or form of worship of a particular sect, but is
distinguishable from the latter.
7. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowmnets, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha
Swamior of Shirur Mutt.
CITATION: AIR 1954 SC 282
DATE: 16.03.1954
COURT: Supreme Court
BENCH: M.C. Mahajan, C.J., B.K. Mukherjea, Ghulam Hasan, N.H. Bhagwati, Sudhi
Ranjan Das, T.L. Venkata
FACTS
Madhvacharya, a highly respected saint, established eight mathas for sanyasis and
swamis, with Shirur Math being one of them. An ex-officio position existed that was
meant to be held by the swamis from all eight mathas, responsible for managing Shri
Madhvacharya’s Shri Krishna Math. They celebrated the election of a new president with
a grand event known as “pranayam,” similar to a festival. During this event, the swami
hosted Brahmins from various mathas.
In 1946, Lakshmindar Thirtha was appointed as the head of Shirur Math and he followed
a tradition similar to the one in 1931. However, during both ceremonies in 1931 and
1946, a significant debt was accumulated.
In 1952, a Madras commissioner of Hindu religious endowment was appointed under an
act. He noticed the debt issue due to a mathematical error and began managing the
accounts according to the act’s guidelines. Conflict arose between the swami and the
commissioner as the commissioner frequently ignored the swami’s authority, leading to
legal action.
To address this interference, a petition was filed with the Madras High Court and the
matha’s surroundings became the centre of the court proceedings. The government,
having received a favourable judgment from the Madras High Court, appealed to the
Supreme Court.
REFFERNCE TAKEN
PARA No: 20. The contention formulated in such broad terms cannot, we think, be
supported. In the first place, what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to
 be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any
religious sect of the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at
particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain
way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or
oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere
fact that they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests and servants or the
use of marketable commodities would not make them secular activities partaking of a
commercial or economic character; all of them are religious practices and should be
regarded as matters of religion within the meaning of article 26(b).
8. Shayara Bano v. Union of India,
CITATION: AIR 2017 SC 4609
DATE: 22.08.2017
COURT: Supreme Court
BENCH: J.S. Khehar, C.J.I., Kurian Joseph, Rohinton Fali Nariman, U.U. Lalit and S.
Abdul Nazeer
FACTS
Ms. Shayara Bano and her husband, Mr. Rizwan Ahmed, got married in April 2002 in
Uttar Pradesh. Ms. Bano claimed that her husband ‘compelled’ her family to give dowry
for the marriage. She stated that her husband and his family drugged, abused, and
eventually abandoned her while she was sick when her family could not provide
additional dowry.
In October 2015 Mr. Ahmed divorced Ms. Bano through the practice of talaq-e-biddat,
also known as instantaneous triple talaq. Talaq-e-biddat is a religious practice that allows
a man to divorce his wife instantly by saying the word ‘talaq’ thrice. The practice does
not require the wife’s consent.
Ms. Bano filed a writ petition at the Supreme Court in February 2016 challenging the
constitutionality of talaq-e-biddat, polygamy, and nikah-halala. Polygamy as an Islamic
religious practice allows men to marry more than one woman at a time. If a Muslim
woman wants to remarry their first husband following a divorce, nikah-halala requires
them to first marry and subsequently divorce her second husband.
 Ms. Bano claimed that these practices violate the Right to Equality, the Right against
Discrimination, and the Right to Livelihood. She further argued that these practices were
not protected by the Right to Freedom of Religion—religious freedom is subject to other
fundamental rights, public order, morality, and health.
On February 16th, 2017, the SC directed the All India Muslim Personal Law Board
(AIMPLB), the Union Government, and women’s rights groups such as the Bebaak
Collective and the Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan, to give written submissions
addressing the matter. All of these groups, besides the AIMPLB, filed submissions in
support of Ms. Bano.
While the AIMPLB conceded that Shariat strongly condemns the practice of talaq-e-
biddat, they argued that the Court could not review uncodified Muslim personal law.
They further argued that these practices were essential to Islam and protected by the
Right to Freedom of Religion.
REFFERENCE TAKEN
Para No 251. Looked at from any angle, the challenge to the constitutional validity of
Section 175(1)(q) and Section 177(1) must fail. The right to contest an election for any
office in Panchayat is neither fundamental nor a common law right. It is the creature of a
statute and is obviously subject to qualifications and disqualifications enacted by
legislation. It may be permissible for Muslims to enter into four marriages with four
women and for anyone whether a Muslim or belonging to any other community or
religion to procreate as many children as he likes but no religion in India dictates or
mandates as an obligation to enter into bigamy or polygamy or to have children more
than one. What is permitted or not prohibited by a religion does not become a religious
practice or a positive tenet of a religion. A practice does not acquire the sanction of
religion simply because it is permitted. Assuming the practice of having more wives than
one or procreating more children than one is a practice followed by any community or
group of people, the same can be regulated or prohibited by legislation in the interest of
public order, morality and health or by any law providing for social welfare and reform
which the impugned legislation clearly does.
9. Seema vs. Ashwani Kumar
CITATION: (2006) 2 SCC 578.
DATE: 14.02.2006
COURT: Supreme Court
BENCH: Dr. Arijit Pasayat and S.H. Kapadia
FACTS
A case was filed at the District Court in Haryana by the petitioner, Seema, against the
respondent, Ashwani Kumar in the year 2005 because of the recurring conflicts and
arguments between the couple. During the proceeding, the case was moved to the Court
of Additional District Judge (ADJ) in Delhi. On April 15, 2005, an interim order was
issued that put the case proceedings on halt. Thereafter, the case was transferred to the
Supreme Court of India due to a broader concern that had emerged, i.e. the problem of
unregistered marriages.
The matter was transferred to the Supreme Court because of the fact that the absence of
official marriage records allowed many people to deny their marriages. This, however,
was particularly problematic because very few Indian states had marriage registration
requirements included in their laws, and inconsistency in such a requirement among
various states resulted in many legal ambiguities and complications in matrimonial
disputes.
Due to the wide-ranging ramifications, the Supreme Court issued notices to different
states and Union Territories to submit their stand on the matter. The court approached the
then Solicitor General and Mr. Ranjit Kumar, a learned senior counsel, to be appointed
as amicus curiae to assist the court on this matter.
In response to the notice issued by the court, all the states and Union Territories indicated
their intention regarding the high necessity of introducing a mechanism that resulted in
making the registration of marriages mandatory. This consensus highlighted the need for
marriage registration to eliminate the misuse of non-formalized marriages, where
vulnerable members of society were often exploited.
One of the main questions for which the Supreme Court was called upon to consider in
this case was whether mandatory marriage registration should be introduced and adopted
through out the Indian territory as a legal requirement. In view of the increase in the
matrimonial dispute leading to the denial of marriages in the absence of any uniform
provisions for the registration of marriage, the Supreme Court was approached to
 critically examine the legal framework in existence relating to the registration of marriage
among various states. In addition, the court was also called to fill the gap that was present
with regard to the inconsistent laws being prevalent among different states, impacting
individual rights within marriage.
The case was transferred to the Supreme Court with the expectation of determining the
course of mandatory marriage registration that would be useful to simplify matrimonial
disputes and provide legal clarity and protection to all of the involved parties.
REFFERENCE TAKEN
PARA NO 18: Accordingly, we direct the States and the Central Government to take the
following steps:
 The procedure for registration should be notified by respective States within three
months from today. This can be done by amending the existing Rules, if any, or by
framing new Rules. However, objections from members of the public shall be
invited before bringing the said Rules into force. In this connection, due publicity
shall be given by the States and the matter shall be kept open for objections for a
period of one month from the date of advertisement inviting objections. On the
expiry of the said period, the States shall issue appropriate notification bringing
the Rules into force.
 The officer appointed under the said Rules of the States shall be duly authorized
to register the marriages. The age, marital status (unmarried, divorcee) shall be
clearly stated. The consequence of non-registration of marriages or for filing
false declaration shall also be provided for in the said Rules. Needless to add that
the object of the said Rules shall be to carry out the directions of this Court.
 As and when the Central Government enacts a comprehensive statute, the same
shall be placed before this Court for scrutiny.
 Learned Counsel for various States and Union Territories shall ensure that the
directions given herein are carried out immediately.
10. Kanagavalli v. Saroja
CITATION: AIR 2002 Mad 73.
DATE: 23.07.2001
COURT: High Court of Madras
BENCH: Prabha Sridevan, J.
FACTS
In the present case substantial question of law that arises in the second appeal is with
regard to the application of Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to the appellants
2 to 5 herein and the construction of documents for deciding the paternity of these
appellants. The appellants' case is that they are the legal heirs of one Natarajan. This
Natarajan was originally married to the 1st respondent herein. The 2nd respondent is their
son. The 3rd respondent is the mother of Natarajan. The relationship between the said
Natarajan and the 1st respondent was not good and she was living separately and even
after Natarajan obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, there was no reunion
between the two. Subsequently, the 1st appellant claims to have married the said
Natarajan in 1976 and the appellants 2 to 5 were born to them. Natarajan was working in
Cholan Roadways Corporation when he died on 24.02.1993. Therefore, the suit was filed
for a declaration that the appellants are the legal heirs of the said Natarajan along with
respondents 1 to 3, entitled to the amounts due from Cholan Roadways Corporation and
consequential injunction restraining the respondent 4 from paying this amount to
respondents 1 to 3. The trial Court dismissed the suit as regards the claim of the 1st
appellant herein, but declared that the appellants 2 to 5 are the heirs of the said Natarajan.
Against this, the respondents 1 and 2 filed an appeal and the appeal was allowed.
Aggrieved by this, the present second appeal has been filed.
REFERENCE TAKEN
PARA NO 13 and 14: Steps can be taken to spread the importance of registration of
marriages. Panchayats can be empowered to register marriages, certificates issued by
temples and Kalyanamandapams where marriage takes place can be considered by the
registering authorities to issue certificates of registration. These are just suggestions, if
there is legislative will, modalities of implementation can be easily worked out.
14. These observations made in the aforesaid paragraphs are necessary in view of the
injustice that is caused to women because of non-registration of marriages. I have
already referred to how because of non-registration of marriage, woman, who has given
herself physically, emotionally and otherwise, gains nothing but stands to lose everything
if the marriage is denied by the man. The other compelling factor is the trauma that a
child may face going through his formative years with his paternity in doubt. This assault
on a child's sensibilities can be easily avoided if there is a certificate of registration of
marriage between his mother and father which though may not validate the marriage if
otherwise void, will atleast bear testimony to the identity of his biological parents. I hope,
the way shown by the States of Maharashtra, Karnataka and Himachal Pradesh will be
followed by all the other States in India.