LEGAL LANGUAGE ASSIGNMENT-B030

I. Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v/s Union Of India: AIR 2018 SC

1665
Bench:
Dipak Misra, Cji; Justice A.K. Sikri; Justice D.Y. Chnadrachud; Justice Ashok Bhushan &
Justice A.M. Khanwilkar.
CASE DESCRIPTION:
The right to life and personal liberty is one of the most significant fundamental rights that
helps in the exercise of other fundamental rights. It also acts as a facilitator of other
fundamental rights. It particularly includes their right not to be killed by another person. But
the question is whether a person’s right to life includes the right to die.In this case, the
petition was filed by a registered society named Common Cause. The society demanded that
the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India be extended to include the right to die
with dignity as a component of the right to live with dignity. It also requested guidelines for
the State to create suitable policies that would allow people with declining health or terminal
illnesses to execute living wills or advance medical directives.
ISSUES:
A total of 5 issues were framed in the case of Common Cause v. Union of India. These issues
are as follows –

1. Whether passive euthanasia and active euthanasia are different from each other?
2. Whether the right to die in dignity falls under the umbrella of the right to live with
dignity protected by Article 21 of the Constitution?
3. Whether in India, individuals are allowed to include passive euthanasia in their
living will?
4. Whether there exists any recommendation by the Law Commission of India
concerning the use of euthanasia as a means to end the sufferings of patients?
5. Whether there exists any right provided to the individual for stopping the medical
treatment of the person or for removing the life-supporting equipment from the
individual leading to death?

JUDGEMENT:
The Supreme Court of India, after carefully examining Indian and international laws and
precedents, notably the ruling in K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India and
others (2017), determined that the right to die with dignity is a fundamental right under
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Additionally, the Court approved the application of
advanced medical directives, emphasising that through this process, it can be ensured that the
individual had a dignified death as his or her individual autonomy is protected.

The Court went into great length about the evolution of the right to privacy, pointing out that
it is necessary for maintaining human dignity, without which freedom cannot be realised. The
 LEGAL LANGUAGE ASSIGNMENT-B030

right to privacy was also seen as being essential to maintaining one’s physical integrity,
freedom of choice, and individuality. Additionally, the decision of a court in the United
States of America in Re Quinlan (1976) was taken into consideration by the Supreme Court
of India in evaluating government interest and privacy protection. The case showed that as
physical integrity was increasingly damaged and possibilities of recovery decreased, the right
to privacy expanded and state interest diminished.

The Supreme Court of India further observed that along with violating the principle of
informed consent, it also violates the patient’s right to individual autonomy and integrity,
which the Apex Court has recognised as a component of their right to privacy. Treatment
should never be continued against the patient’s desires.

II. 377 IPC (Navtej Singh Johar vs. Union of India: AIR 2018 SC 4321
BENCH:
CJI Dipak Misra, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, Justice D.Y.
Chandrachud and Justice Indu Malhotra.
CASE DESCRIPTION:
Sec 377 of IPC categorized consensual sex between homosexuals as “unnatural offence” and
criminalized it. It discriminates a minority solely on the ground of their sexual orientation
which is analogous to prohibited ground of sex. The section was challenged in Suresh
Kaushal and Anr Vs. NAZ Foundation and Ors. Stating it violates Art 14,15 and 21 of the
Constitution. To which the SC passed a very vague judgement stating that the decision of
decriminalizing homosexuality should have been made by Parliament instead of courts. The
courts can only do so if it is proved beyond reasonable doubts that the law infringes
constitutional provisions.
Furthermore, the court also highlighted that since less than 200 cases have arisen in 150
years, therefore it's not a sound basis for declaring that section 377 IPC ultra vires the
provision of Art 14,15 and 21 of the Constitution. In conclusion, The SC said that Sec 377
does not suffers from the vice of unconstitutionality with no further elaboration. The same
judgement was challenged in Navtej Singh case through a petition made by five individuals
from the LGBTQ community for scrapping off Section 377 IPC in so far as it criminalized
consensual sex between homosexuals.
JUDGEMENT:
The SC struck down the 158 years old law on homosexuality that made carnal intercourse
against order of nature a criminal offence. The court overruled its previous judgement given
 LEGAL LANGUAGE ASSIGNMENT-B030

in Suresh Kaushal case and declared Sec 377 as unconstitutional as it violated Art 14,15,19
and 21 of the Constitution.
SUMMARY:
In 2018, the Supreme Court of India decriminalized consensual homosexual acts by reading
down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which had criminalized same-sex
relations. This historic judgment was a major step forward for LGBTQ+ rights in India.

III. Sabarimala Temple Entry Case (Indian Young Lawyers Association

vs. The State of Kerala): AIR 2018 SC 609

BENCH:

 Chief Justice Misra

 Justice Nariman
 Justice Chandrachud
 Justice Malhotra
 Justice Khanwilkar J

CASE DESCRIPTION

The Sabarimala Temple, considered the abode of Lord Ayyappa, is located in the Periyar
Tiger Reserve in the Western Ghat mountain ranges of Pathanamthitta District, Kerala. The
temple is known for its unique religious practices—devotees undertake a 41 day penance,
renouncing worldly pleasures, before they visit the temple. Devotees consider Lord Ayyappa
to be a celibate deity. Women in their ‘menstruating years’ (between the ages of 10 to 50)
were customarily prohibited from entering the temple to protect celibacy.

In 2006, Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a public interest litigation petition before
the Supreme Court challenging the Sabarimala Temple’s prohibition of women from the
temple premises. The Association argued that the custom violates the Right to Equality
under Article 14, as the practice is ‘derogatory to the dignity of women’. Freedom of religion
under Article 25 states that ‘all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the
right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion’. The exclusion of women devotees
violates that right.

The Travancore Devaswom Board, an autonomous body formed by the Travancore Cochin
Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 manages the Sabarimala Temple’s administration.
They argued that the exclusion of women was an essential practice in their religion. Further,
they argued that the exclusion was not against all women, but only women between 10-50
years of age. Considering the celibate nature of the deity, this exclusion was reasonable. They
emphasised that the Sabarimala is a religious denomination, and was protected under Article
26 of the Constitution. Article 26 of the Constitution guarantees a religious denomination the
right to manage its own internal religious affairs.
 LEGAL LANGUAGE ASSIGNMENT-B030

Further, the Sabarimala custom was protected by Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of
Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 (Public Worship Rules). It listed the
class of persons not entitled to worship in a public place, and included ‘Women at such time
during which they are not by custom and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship’.
The rule allowed the exclusion of women from public places of worship, if the exclusion was
based on ‘custom’. In contrast, section 4 of the parent Act, namely the Kerala Hindu Places
of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965, stated that regulations that
‘discriminate in any manner whatsoever, against any Hindu on the ground that he belongs to
a particular section or class’ cannot be made.

JUDGEMENT:

On September 28th 2018, a 4:1 majority held that the prohibition of women at the Sabarimala
Temple is unconstitutional. Justice Indu Malhotra dissented. Here are the four opinions:
 Chief Justice Misra (on behalf of himself and Khanwilkar J.)
 Justice Nariman (concurring opinion)
 Justice Chandrachud (concurring opinion)
 Justice Malhotra (dissenting opinion)
The majority ruled that Sabarimala’s exclusion of women violated the fundamental rights of
women between the ages of 10 to 50 years. They further held that the devotees of Lord
Ayyappa were not a separate religious denomination. Justices Misra, Khanwilkar and
Chandrachud held that the custom was not an essential religious practice. While the Judges in
the majority did not explicitly comment on whether the custom was against the right to
equality under article 14, they stated that the practice was discriminatory as per Article 15.
Justice Chandrachud stated that the right against untouchability is vast, and includes any kind
of social exclusion based on notions of ‘purity’. Further, Rule 3(b) of the Public Worship
Rules which allowed the custom of prohibition of women as unconstitutional. SCO breaks
down each judge’s decision on key questions in the case in the Judgment matrix.

SUMMARY:
In 2018, the Supreme Court of India ruled that women of all ages, including those of
menstruating age (10-50 years), must be allowed entry into the Sabarimala Temple in Kerala.
The decision was based on principles of gender equality and the protection of fundamental
rights.

IV. Rafale Deal Case (Review Petitions in Rafale Fighter Jet Deal):
Manohar Lal Sharma v Narendra Damodardas Modi:
Bench:
CJ Ranjan Gogoi and S.K. Kaul and K.M. Joseph, JJ.

CASE DESCRIPTION:
LEGAL LANGUAGE ASSIGNMENT-B030

In 2007, the Ministry of Defence issued tenders for the purchase of 126 fighter
aircraft, in line with the procedure set out in the Defence Procurement Procedure
(DPP). In particular, the Union would purchase 18 from abroad in ‘fly-away’
condition, while 108 would be manufactured in India by Hindustan Aeronautics
Limited (HAL) via a ‘tranfser of technology’ from a foreign company. After an
extensive selection process, the Union selected the French company Dassault.
Dassault manufactures the Rafale twin-engine fighter aircraft. By 2015, price
negotiations were in their final stage.
However, in March 2015 Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the President of
France announced a new deal for the purchase of only 36 Rafale fighter aircraft.
The Ministry of Defence subsequently announced that the tender for 126 aircraft
had been withdrawn. The new deal included a 50% offset clause, which required
Dassault (and the other foreign companies involved, such as Thales and Safran) to
invest 50% of the contract value back into India via the purchase of Indian goods
and services. In October 2016, Dassault and Anil Ambani’s Reliance Group
announced a joint venture – Dassault Reliance Aerospace Ltd (DRAL) –
with Dassault specifying that intends to invest $115 million to partially fullfil its
offset obligation.

ISSUES:
 Did Prime Minister Modi make a decision to go ahead with the deal
without the approval of the Cabinet Committee on Security?
 Was Reliance Defence made Dassault Aviation’s Indian Offset Partner
without the approval of Minister of Defence, as required by the Defence
Offset Guidelines? Further, was Hindustan Aeronautic Limited (HAL),
the previously proposed Offset partner, improperly removed?
 Is the deal in fact an inter-governmental deal between India and France?
And if it is, does this allow the Central government to forego disclosing
the details of the deal, in violation of the Comptroller and Auditor
General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act?
 Does the deal suffer from pricing irregularities? The price per aircraft
from the first deal to the second deal, approximately doubled.
JUDGEMENT:
On November 14th 2018, the court reserved judgment. One month later on
December 14th, the court dismissed the plea for a court monitored
investigation. The court observed that it found no irregularity in the
decision making process, pricing or selection of an off-set partner. The
court reached its conclusion on the basis of evidence produced by the
State in sealed covers.

SUMMARY:
The Rafale deal case involved allegations of corruption and favoritism in a
defense procurement deal between the Indian government and the French
LEGAL LANGUAGE ASSIGNMENT-B030

company Dassault Aviation for the purchase of Rafale fighter jets. The
case attracted significant political and public attention. The Supreme
Court conducted hearings related to the case, including requests for a
review of its earlier verdict.