Muslim Law Notes

Class –.LL.B (HONS.) II SEM.
Subject – Muslim Law
Muslim Law
Unit-I
Introduction
The Muslim Law or Islam Law (or the Law of Allah) is a part of Family Law. It is a personal law and a
branch of civil law that is applied by courts in regard to family matters when the parties are Muslims.
 Muslim Law is called Sharia (Shariah or Syariah) in Arabic.
 Fiqh = understanding of details and refers to the inferences drawn by scholars
 Sharia = Refers to the principles that lie behind the fiqh.
 The word 'Muslim' is derived from the word 'Islam' and signifies a person who adopts the faith of
Islam.
 Muslim Law in general draws no distinction between religious life and secular life
Origin of Muslim Law
Muslim Law or the Islamic Law is believed to have been originated from the divine. The Divine
communicated it to Prophet Muhammad who prescribed them in Quran. In the later days, the disciples
of Prophet Muhammad (or Muslim jurists) have refined and polished these principles. The provisions
of Quran are vast and dealt with almost all aspects of human life.
Scholars describe the word sharia as an archaic Arabic word denoting "pathway to be followed", or
"path to the water hole". The latter definition comes from the fact that the path to water is the whole
way of life in an arid desert environment.
Sharīah, also spelled Sharia, the fundamental religious concept of Islam, namely its law, systematized
during the 2nd and 3rd centuries of the Muslim era (8th–9th centuries).
Total and unqualified submission to the will of Allah (God) is the fundamental tenet of Islam: Islamic
law is therefore the expression of Allah’s command for Muslim society and, in application, constitutes
a system of duties that are incumbent upon a Muslim by virtue of his religious belief. Known as the
Sharīʿah (literally, “the path leading to the watering place”), the law constitutes a divinely ordained
path of conduct that guides Muslims toward a practical expression of religious conviction in this world
and the goal of divine favour in the world to come.
Who is Muslim?
By birth Who is Muslim? By conversion
A Muslim is a person who follows the religion of Islam. From the point of law, the Court is interested if
the person.
There are two ways in which a person can be regarded a Muslim.
1. Muslim by Birth – 2. Muslim by Conversion –

a. Believes in one God and a. Converts by profession of Islam.
b. Prophet-hood of Muhammad b. Converts by formal ceremony.
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Class –.LL.B (HONS.) II SEM. Subject – Muslim Law
These two points are the minimum and fundamental rules for a person to be called a Muslim.
Sources of Muslim law
The Islamic law is referred to as “Sharia”. Islam has given the most comprehensive legal system to
mankind. Islam has its own personal, civil, criminal, evidence and international law. There are two
types of sources under Muslim law, they are:-
1. Ancient sources
2. Customary sources
3. Modern sources.
The Quran
Ancient sources
The Sunnah Ijma' (consensus)
Qiyas (analogy)
The Quran
Muslims believe the Quran to be the direct words of Allah, as

revealed to and transmitted by the Prophet Muhammad. All sources
of Islamic law must be in essential agreement with the Quran, the
most fundamental source of Islamic knowledge. When the Quran
itself does not speak directly or in detail about a certain subject,
Muslims only then turn to alternative sources of Islamic law
I.) The Quran:

Since the text of the Quran is held to be the very word of Almighty God Himself, it almost goes without
saying that the Quran is not only a source of Sharia but the primary material source.
It is criticised that Quran is not a code of law because of two main reasons. Firstly, it is argued that
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Quran is rather a moral code determining ones way of life. Secondly, it is also said that Quran is not a
code of law as out of its 6219 verses, no more than about 600 deal with specifically legal matters.
However, one must remember that, unlike western legal systems, the Sharia makes no distinction
between religious and civil matters; it is the codification of God's Law, and it concerns itself with every
aspect of legal, social, political and religious life. Secondly, information is judged by its quality not
quantity. It is the Quran that identifies six specific crimes against religion i.e.“hadd punishments”.
The Quranic legislation also covers a range of other topics, e.g. homicide, marriage, divorce and
inheritance. There is an authentic hadith of the Prophet that “he who knows the law of inheritance
is possessed of half the knowledge of the world”. But if we look at the Quran, the complete outline
of the law of inheritance is encapsulated within only three verses (11, 12 and 176) of Surah Al-
Nisa and Ijma and Qiyas, which give the details of succession, derive their authority from these three
verses only.
No description, however, can fully capture the great importance of the Quran to Muslims. Objectively,
it is the foundation and framework of Islamic law, and its primary material source.
The Sunnah
Sunnah is the traditions or known practices of the Prophet Muhammad,

many of which have been recorded in the volumes of Hadith literature. The
resources include many things that he said, did, or agreed to and he lived
his life according to the Quran, putting the Quran into practice in his own
life. During his lifetime, the Prophet's family and companions observed him
and shared with others exactly what they had seen in his words and
behaviors i.e. how he performed ablutions, how he prayed, and how he
performed many other acts of worship. People also asked the Prophet
directly for rulings on various matters, and he would pronounce his
judgment. All of these details were passed on and recorded, to be referred to
in future legal rulings. Many issues concerning personal conduct,
community and family relations, political matters, etc. were addressed
during the time of the Prophet, decided by him, and recorded. The Sunnah
can thus clarify details of what is stated generally in the Quran.
II.) The Sunna:

The Sunna is the second most important source of Islamic law. It comprises the practices and
precedents set by the Prophet Muhammad himself. The authority of the Sunna is derived from the text
of the Quran. Because the circumstances of each revelation were thought necessary to correct
interpretation, it was imperative to gather as many traditions as possible about the actions of the
Prophet to fully understand the Quran.
The Sunna clarifies the ambiguities of the Quran. The Quranic injunction is sometimes implicit; the
Sunnah makes it explicit by providing essential ingredients and details. The details of the acts of
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prayer, fasting, alms-giving and pilgrimage were all illustrated by the Sunna of the Prophet. Again, it
was established by the Sunna that a killer cannot inherit from the property of his victim. Thus, for
answers to many problems to which the Quran offers no solution jurists turn to the second source of
Islamic Law. For, according to the Quran itself, Prophet Muhammad was not only in possessions of the
Book; he was also endowed with Wisdom.
But the wide legislative role of the Sunna cannot overcome that of the Quran because it lacks
originality in itself; rather it is just the elaborations of the Quran put into the practice by the Prophet.
The Words of the “Quran” are of “divine” origin while the words of the “Hadith” are words of the
“Prophet” reported by people. And it is obvious that divine words have the utmost precedence.
Secondly, after the death of the Prophet, it was not earlier than two and a half centuries that the
written hadith compilation from religious scholars came onto the scene and a lot of fabrication took
place into that period. But Quran is the only book of Allah which has not been distorted and thus it is
the only reliable source of Islamic law. There is an authentic tradition of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h) in
which he is reported to have said that if you find any tradition of mine contrary to the instructions of
Quran, then leave my tradition and follow the Quran.
Ijma' (consensus)
In situations when Muslims have not been able to find a

specific legal ruling in the Quran or Sunnah, the consensus
of the community is sought (or at least the consensus of the
legal scholars within the community). The Prophet
Muhammad once said that his community (i.e. the Muslim
community) would never agree on an error.
III.) Ijma:
Ijma represents the third source of Islamic law which is more like delegated legislation. It is defined as
the consensus of the jurists of a certain period over a religious matter. It is considered a sufficient
means for action because the Prophet of Islam said, “My community will not agree on an error”.
A good illustration for the principle of Ijma occurred right after the death of the Prophet: no guidance
was available on who would now be the political leader. The election of Abu Bakr to the post of caliph
by the votes of the people was the first manifestation of Ijma. Today there are many schools of law in
the Muslim community. For them the doctrine of consensus was a source of harmony.
However, the formation of different schools of law also had an adverse effect on the instrument of
Ijma. In the course of time, it became impossible to obtain a consensus on a given problem just by
asking all those learned in Islamic law. There was no organisation that represented all jurists, and as a
result Ijma has come to be determined by looking into the past. Thus, unlike Quran, the authority of
Ijma for legal innovation is very limited and that is why it ranks lower than the Holy Quran.
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Qiyas (analogy)
In cases when something needs a legal ruling, but has not been
clearly addressed in the other sources, judges may use analogy,
reasoning, and legal precedent to decide new case law. This is
often the case when a general principle can be applied to new
situations.
IV.) Qiyas:
Qiyas is essentially a tool of interpretation and is not a mean to alter the existing law but can only be
used to find a legal principle in conformity with Quran and Sunna for a new factual situation. Ijtihad
means “individual reasoning”. It involves both the knowledge of the rules of Islamic law and the
exercise of one’s judgment; even Qiyas would be impossible if jurists were not allowed to apply their
own reasoning.
An example of this procedure can be found in the prohibition of alcohol. The drinking of wine is one of
the Quranic crimes against religion. With the appearances of other alcoholic drinks unknown to early
Islam the jurists extended the prohibition of wine to include such drinks by analogical deduction from
the Quranic ruling.
However, this source of law also has its weaknesses. Firstly, it ranks below because it derives its
authority from the Quran. Human reason was not to be exercised independently but rather in
accordance with the Divine Will as manifested in the Quran. Secondly, Ijtihad has been a controversial
subject in Islamic history. Once the schools of Islamic law had been firmly established, the prevailing
opinion was that that the privilege of Ijtihad was restricted to the great scholars of Islamic law, like for
instance the founders of the schools of Islamic law. Thus, there is a strong opinion law that by the 10th
century all main principles of Islamic law had been settled and therefore “the gates of Ijtihad” had
been closed. Thus, it is noticeable that it is subordinate to Quran because Quran is an ever illuminating
source of Islamic law but Qiyas/Ijtihad is just a matter of past now.
2. Customary source
In its early stage, Islamic jurisprudence was heavily inspired from prevailing customary law e.g. the
practices of the Caliphs, the decisions of the judges and the traditions of the people. But even then,
Quran acted as a mentor guiding the people. For instance, Caliph Abu Bakr made alms payment
compulsory in the light of the Quran; the Qazis i.e. judges did equity by seeking guidance from Quranic
verses; and it was under Verse 3 of Surah Al-Nisa that the customary right of unlimited polygamy was
curtailed only to a maximum of four wives. Thus, the supremacy of Quran as a primary Islamic source
got fully established in that epoch.
3. Modern sources
In addition to the above main Sources of Law, we find that the law is occasionally supplemented
by other principles also. The following can be summarized.
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1. Isti Hasan - 2. Isti Salah - 3. Ijtehad - Exercising

Juristic Public interest one's own reasoning to
preference - deduce rule of law
Equity (Shariat)
4. Taqlid - Law of 5. Fatwa's -
Precedents Decisions of Muslim
Judges.
(a) Isti Hasan - Juristic preference - Equity

Imam Abu Hanifa adopted the principle of Isti Hasan for the relief from absolute dependence on
analogical reasoning. Isti Hasan literally means liberal construction or juristic preference or what we
call today as law of equity. This term was used to express liberty of laying down such rule as may be
necessary and the special circumstances may require. The objection taken against it is that it left an
almost uncontrolled discretion in the exposition of the law.
(b) Isti Salah- Public interest

Imam Malik, who will be presently mentioned as the founder of a school of Sunni law, also felt the
necessity of surer test for the development of law on right lines than the use of analogy. He approved
the introduction of Isti Salah (public interest) in preference to Isti Hasan. He laid down that ordinarily,
analogy was used to expand law but if it appears that a rule indicated by analogy is opposed to general
utility then Isti Salah (principles of public interest) should be resorted to. Under this system, rule of
law pointed out by analogy could not be set aside either: (i) on the opinion of the individual expert of
the law of (ii) with reference merely to the circumstances of particular case: it could be disregarded
only if it would be harmful to the public in general.
(c) Ijtehad - Exercising one's own reasoning to deduce rule of law (Shariat)
When Quran and Hadis did not disclose the precise line to follow, Ijtehad came to be born. Ijtehad
means independent judgement or considered opinions of individuals or exercising one's own
reasoning to deduce a rule of Shariat. As a method of reasoning in law, Ijtehad of prophet tersely has
gained almost equal footing with the first four founders of the law. In deducing Ijtehad, Quran and
Hadis cannot be over looked but exigency of time and public interest were also to be borne in mind.
Where a legal principle is silent, Ijtehad can be used with advantage.
But Ijtehad was the privilege of great scholars or Mujtahids. The authority of the Mujtahids (great
scholars) based not on his holding any office in the State but is derived purely from the learning and
reputation of the individuals. The qualifications of the Mujtahids consists of a complete knowledge of
Quran i.e., he should know the sacred text by heart and should be able to say when and where each
verse was revealed and he should also have a perfect knowledge of all the traditions (Sunna-Hadis)
and all the branches of the science of law. He should, besides, be a man of austere piety. In short, the
qualifications required are such that as far as the Sunni Law is concerned, after the death of Ibne
Hanbal (856 after Christ) there have been no recognised Mujtahids. With the end of Mujtahids, the
doors of Ijtehad no longer remained open. This is known as the closure of the golden gate of Ijtehad
- Bab-al ijtehad.
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(d) Taqlid - Law of Precedents

After Ijtehad or rather on the closure of the Gates of Ijtehad, a parallel doctrine of Taqlid (Law of
precedents) came to be in existence. Under Taqlid (literally, imitation) means following opinions of
another person without knowledge o the Authority or the authority for such opinion, a Muslim had to
follow the Law; every Muslim in the street could not be learned in the rules of Shariat, being ignorant,
he was asked to follow the opinions of those who knew better. Those who knew better (Ulemas) were
denied independence of judgement in any vital matter. Hence, the vicious circle of Taqlid (imitation -
Law of Precedents).
(e) Fatwas - Decisions of Muslim Judges

As already aforesaid, the Law sent down by Allah by direct revelations is recorded in Quran and what
is sent down by him is recorded in Sunna/Sunnat of Prophet of Islam. Even the King has no authority
to make law and therefore, the Muslim Kings called upon the Muslim scholars to guide them in the
matter of Law. The opinions tendered by Muslim Jurists to King were accepted by King of enforce the
Law in the territory of his kingdom. Therefore, the opinions of Muslim Jurists were always held in high
regard. With the advent of time, even the ordinary Muslims would turn to such jurist and ask for his
opinion. Such opinion of Muslim Jurist is referred to as Fatwas. In India, during the Seventeenth
Century A.D. when Mughal Emperor Aurangazeb came in power, he appointed Shaykh Nizam
Burhanpuri and four others to prepare a compilation of Fatwas. Accordingly, they sent questionnaire
various juris-consults and Muftis. Their Replies are the collection of Fatwas, popularly known as
Fatwa-e-Alamigir. However, Fatwas are not source of law.
THE SUNNI SCHOOLS

During the third stage of the development of Muslim Law (661-900 AD.), the rulers contributed nothing to
the development of law. Those ambitious kings were interested in the expansion of their empire rather than
the development of Muslim Law. But the individual jurists did not sit idle. On their personal level they
concentrated themselves to the further expansion of Muslim Law by giving juridical interpretations to Quran
and the traditions. This personal study by the jurists gave rise to different opinions about any given rule of
law because of the differences in their approach as to the source of the Law.
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In this manner, the Sunni sect was divided further into four important schools. But, the principles of these
four schools are substantially the same and they differ from each other merely in matters of detail. Besides
these four schools, there had been certain other ‘personal schools’ of the Sunni Muslims.
The Hanifi School

This school of the Sunni Muslims is named after its founder Abu Hanifa and is the most popular school of
Muslim Law. Abu Hanifa was an eminent scholar of his time and was widely known for his outstanding
logical reasoning and technical legal thought. He was appointed as Qazi but he refused to accept the post in
the fear that he would be required to give judgments against his conscience. As a punishment for his refusal
to accept the post, he was imprisoned.
Abu Hanifa’s main contribution was that instead of accepting each and every tradition as law, he tried to find
out the law in the texts of Quran itself through analogical deductions.
According to him the law must be formulated in accordance with the changing needs of the society. In the
absence of a law in Quran it may also be obtained by the unanimous decision of the jurists. He further
suggested that if justice could not be done under the law then the principle of juristic equity (Istihsan) may
be applied in interpreting that law.
Characteristics of this school may now be summarized in the following lines. Out of a large number of
traditions, the Hanafi School recognizes only those traditions which have passed through the severe test
regarding their originality. Those traditions which are not authentic are not to be accepted as law.
This school has been popular since its very beginning and large number of Muslim are its followers. From
Iraq, the home of this school, it spread over to other countries inhabited by Muslims such as, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Turkey, Afghanistan China and India etc. Majority of the Muslims in India and Pakistan belong to
this school.
The Maliki School

This School was established by Malik-ibn-Anas of Median. He was a great scholar and is regarded to be an
authority on traditions. Unlike Hanafis this school emphasizes the importance of traditions as a ‘source of
law’. It recognizes the traditions of the Companions, and of successors of the Companions. According to
Maliki School, as far as possible, the new rules should be obtained exclusively from the traditions. If it is not
possible then only Qiyas and Ijma may be taken into consideration.
Malik and the subsequent jurists of this school had the privilege of being judges and as such they had to
solve day-to-day problems of the public. This made their approach to law more practical than that of the
Hanafis. Because of this fact, in interpreting a rule of law, a new element called Istidlal inferring a thing
from another thing for public welfare), was introduced by the Maliki jurists. Another point which is peculiar
to the Maliki doctrine is that it recognizes the importance of customs (of Median more than any other school.
In addition to Quaran, Traditions, Ijma and Qiyas. A noticeable feature of this school is that it is the only
school in which a married woman and her properties are always supposed to be under the control of her
husband. A Maliki woman cannot deal with her own properties without the consent of her husband. The
principles of this school spread over to the Central and West Africa, Spain, Kuwait, and Bahrain, There are
no Malikis in India.
The Shafei School

Ash Shafei also relied upon the traditions of the Prophet. He examined the traditions in the light of legal
reasoning and logic in order in order to get a very balanced and systematic the traditions. According to Ash
Shafei, there was not a single problem of human life which could not be solved by Quran or the traditions of
the Prophet. Such solutions may be obtained either directly in these texts or from analogical deductions. He
made the greatest use of ‘Qiyas’ and had fully established it as a source of law. But according to him Qiyas
is to be considered only after considering Quran, Traditions and Ijma. The Shafei jurists recognize also the
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custom and the Malik’s principle of Istadlal (public welfare). But Abu Hanifa’s principle of juristic equity
(Istihsan) is not acceptable to this school. One of the important characteristics of the Shafei School is that a
woman is never regarded to be a free agent in her marriage. Even if she is adult, the consent of her guardian
is necessary to validate the marriage.
The Hanbali School

The fourth and the latest school of the Sunni sect was established by Ibn Hanbal He studied under several
scholars of eminence, including Ash Shafei. His peculiar feature was that he rigidly adhered to the traditions
of the Prophet. It is therefore said that Hanbal was traditionist rather than a jurist. He relied so much upon
the traditions that other sources of law namely Ijma and Quiyas were neglected by him. He recognized Ijma
only of the Companions of the Prophet. Under this school therefore, there is no scope for private judgments
and human reasoning. The result is that the doctrines of this school are rigid and uncompromising. Because
of this, Ibn Hanbal and his followers were always regarded as reactionaries and were harassed by the
authorities from time to time.
At present very few Muslims are the followers of this school. Generally the Hanbails are in Saudi Arabia and
Qatar.
THE SHIA SCHOOLS

Ali was acknowledged to be the first Imam by the Shia community. He was accepted as the temporal as well
as the spiritual head of the community. After the death of Ali, his two sons Hasan and Hussain became the
second and the third Imam respectively. After Hussain's death, his son Zain-ul Abdeen succeeded as the
fourth Imam. Upto this stage the Shia community remained united but afterwards there had been divisions
and sub-divisions of this sect. Zain-ul Abdeen had two sons, Zyad and Muhammad Baqir. First split took
place after the death of Zain-ul-Abdeen when some of the Shias acknowledged Zyad as their Imam but the
majority followed Muhammad Baqir. The followers of Zyad formed a separate sect called Zaydis whereas
Muhammad Baqir was accepted as the fifth Imam by the majority. This was the first division of the Shia
sect. After Mohammad Baqir's death his son Jafar Sadiq became the sixth Imam of this majority group. Upon
the death of Jafar Sadiq there took place the second split in the Shia community. He had two sons Ismail and
Musa Kazim. Here again, one group recognized Ismail (the elder son) as the seventh Imam but to the
majority of them the younger son Musa Kazim was the seventh Imam. Followers of Ismail were called
Ismailis and constituted the second school of Shia sect. In the other section of Shia community headed by
Musa Kazim, there had been other Imams through succession. The twelfth Imam in this line of succession
was Askari's son who is said to have disappeared from the world and is awaited in the near future. The
twelfth Imam called Muhammad-al-Muntazar is the last Imam. It. was the dispute over leadership of the Shia
community in various stages of its development which caused the formation of the three schools. There is no
appreciable difference between these schools in so far as the law is concerned. Qadri observes that, "the main
reason of the differences among the Shia sect and sub-sects lies not so much on the interpretation of the law
as upon the doctrinal points”.
The Ithna Asharia School

This school is also called as Imamia school. Majority of Shias are Ithna Asharia. The followers of this school
believe that starting from Ali there had been twelve Imams who possessed spiritual powers. Everything that
comes from the Imam is taken to be a law. It is believed that the twelfth Imam who disappeared when was
still a child, would reappear in future. A characteristic feature of Ithna Asharia School is that this is the only
school in the Muslim world which recognizes "Muta" or a temporary marriage. This school is further divided
into two sub-sects, (1) Akhbari and the (2) Usuli. Akhbans are very orthodox because they follow rigidly
traditions of Imams. Usulis, on the other hand, interpret the texts of Quran with reference to the practical
problems of day to day life. The Ithna Asharias are found in Iran, Iraq, Lebnon, Pakistan and India. Shari-ul-
Islam is an authoritative book of this school.
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The Ismailia School

For some reasons Jafar Sadiq disinherited his eldest son Ismail. The majority of Shias therefore did not
accept him as their Imam. But there were some Shias, although in minority, who acknowledge Ismail as the
seventh Imam. The followers of Ismail are called Ismailias or the Seveners because according to them there
had been only seven Imams the Seventh being Ismail. They believe that from him (Ismail) descended a
series of concealed Imams whose secret emissaries were constantly on the watch for a chance of striking at
some weak point in the large ill-cemented empire of orthodox Islam. The Ismailias therefore, hold that
Imams subsequent to Ismail are still alive but they have concealed their existence. In India, they consist of
two main gruops (i) Khojas and Bohras. Khojas were originally Hindus. Bohras are also Ismailias and they
separated from the other groups during the Fatimid regime. Both of them are commercial communities from
the very beginning. Ismailias are found in the Central Asia, Syria, India and Pakistan etc. Ismailias of
Bombay are either Khojas or Bohras. Daimul-Islam is an authoritative work on Ismailias doctrines.
The Zyadis School

The founder of this school was Zyad, one of the sons of the fourth Imam. The Zyadis were the first to defect
from the general body of Shia Muslims. One of the peculiar features of this school is that its doctrines
incorporate some of the Sunni principles as well. The followers of this school are not found in India: they are
mostly in Yemen.
The Motazila Sect

The Motazila emerged as a separate sect of Islam around 9th Century A.D. This school was established by
Ata-al-Ghazzal during the reign of Mamun. The followers of this school believe that Quran is the only basis
for their doctrines. Most of the traditions have been rejected by the Motazilas. One of the characteristic
features of the Motazilas is that this is the only school in Islam which practices strict monogamy. Marriage
with more than one wife at a time is unlawful under the Motazila principles. Another peculiarity is that there
cannot be any divorce without interference of a Judge. Divorce by Talaq is not recognised under this School.
At present the followers of Motazila sect are comparatively very less in number.
Textualist
approach
Athari Kalām Ash'ari Maturidi Murji'ah Mu'tazili
Athari
The Athari school derives its name from the Arabic word Athar, meaning "narrations". The Athari
creed is to avoid delving into extensive theological speculation. They use the Qur'an, the Sunnah, and
sayings of the Sahaba - seeing this as the middle path where the attributes of Allah are accepted
without questioning 'how' they are. Ahmad bin Hanbal is regarded as the leader of the Athari school of
creed. Athari is generally synonymous with Salafi. The central aspect of Athari theology is its definition
of Tawhid, meaning literally unification or asserting the oneness of Allah.
Kalām
Kalām is the Islamic philosophy of seeking theological principles through dialectic. In Arabic, the word
literally means "speech/words". A scholar of kalām is referred to as amutakallim (Muslim theologian;
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plural mutakallimūn). There are many schools of Kalam, the main ones being
the Ash'ari and Maturidi schools in Sunni Islam.
Ash'ari
Ash'ari is a school of early Islamic philosophy founded in the 10th century by Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari.
It was instrumental in drastically changing the direction of Islam and laid the groundwork to "shut the
door of ijtihad" centuries later in the Ottoman Empire.[citation needed] The Asharite view was that
comprehension of the unique nature and characteristics of God were beyond human capability.
Maturidi
A Maturidi is one who follows Abu Mansur Al Maturidi's theology, which is a close variant of the
Ash'ari school. Points which differ are the nature of belief and the place of human reason. The
Maturidis state that belief (iman) does not increase nor decrease but remains static; it is piety (taqwa)
which increases and decreases. The Ash'aris say that belief does in fact increase and decrease. The
Maturidis say that the unaided human mind is able to find out that some of the more major sins such
as alcohol or murder are evil without the help of revelation. The Ash'aris say that the unaided human
mind is unable to know if something is good or evil, lawful or unlawful, without divine revelation.
Murji'ah
Murji'ah (Arabic: ‫ )المرجئة‬is an early Islamic school whose followers are known in English as
"Murjites" or "Murji'ites" (‫)المرجئون‬. During the early centuries of Islam, Muslim thought encountered
a multitude of influences from various ethnic and philosophical groups that it absorbed. Murji'ah
emerged as a theological school that was opposed to the Kharijiteson questions related to early
controversies regarding sin and definitions of what is a true Muslim.
They advocated the idea of "delayed judgement". Only God can judge who is a true Muslim and who is
not, and no one else can judge another as an infidel (kafir). Therefore, all Muslims should consider all
other Muslims as true and faithful believers, and look to Allah to judge everyone during the last
judgment. This theology promoted tolerance ofUmayyads and converts to Islam who appeared half-
hearted in their obedience. The Murjite opinion would eventually dominate that of the Kharijites.
The Murjites exited the way of the Sunnis when they declared that no Muslim would enter the hellfire,
no matter what his sins. This contradicts the traditional Sunni belief that some Muslims will enter the
hellfire temporarily. Therefore the Murjites are classified as Ahlul Bid'ah or "People of Innovation"
by Sunnis, particularly Salafis.
Mu'tazili
Mu'tazili theology originated in the 8th century in al-Basrah when Wasil ibn Ata left the teaching
lessons of Hasan al-Basri after a theological dispute. He and his followers expanded on the logic and
rationalism of Greek philosophy, seeking to combine them with Islamic doctrines and show that the
two were inherently compatible. The Mu'tazili debated philosophical questions such as whether the
Qur'an was created or eternal, whether evil was created by God, the issue of predestination versus free
will, whether God's attributes in the Qur'an were to be interpreted allegorically or literally, and
whether sinning believers would have eternal punishment in hell.
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UNIT-II
MARRIAGE
Marriage is a civil contract between a man and a woman who is lawfully eligible to be his wife with the
objective of joint life and breeding.
Requirement of the valid

marriage
Offer & Presence of Capacity of the Free consent No legal

Acceptance Witnesses Parties dissability
1. Offer & Acceptance
Marriage in Islamic law is a contract that is concluded by an offer made by one party and an
acceptance given by the other. No particular form of words is required so long as the intention to
conclude of marriage is clear. Under the Muslim law for the validity of a marriage there must be a
proposal and acceptance at the same meeting. The proposal and acceptance must both be expressed at
one meeting; a proposal made at one meeting and acceptance made at another meeting does not make
a valid Muslim marriage. Neither writing nor any religious ceremony is essential.
Under the Sunni law, the proposal and acceptance must be made in the presence of two male Muslims
who are of sound mind and have attained puberty or one male and two female witnesses who are
sane, adult and Muslim. Absence of witnesses does not render marriage void but make it void able.
Under the Shia law witnesses are not necessary at the time of marriage. The proposal and acceptance
need not be made in writing. Where the offer and acceptance are reduced into writing, the document is
called ‘Nikah nama or Kabin-nama.
The proposal made by or on behalf of one of the parties to the marriage, and an acceptance of the
proposal by or on behalf of female witnesses, who must be sane and adult Muslim.
2. Presence of Witnesses
Hanafi, Shafi and Hanbali schools require two adult male witnesses or one male plus two females.
However, in Maliki and Ithna Ashari’s law the presence of witnesses is recommended but not
mandatory, provided that in Maliki law sufficient publicity is given to the marriage.
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3. Capacity of the Parties
Every Muslim of sound mind who has attained puberty, may enter into a contract of marriage. Puberty
means the age at which a person becomes adult (capable of performing sexual intercourse and
procreation of children). A person is presumed to have attained the age of puberty on the completion
of 15 years. So the boy and girl who has attained puberty can validly contract a marriage .A marriage
under Muslim law is perfectly valid if the parties have attained puberty and satisfied all other
conditions specified by the law.
According to the child marriage restraint act 1929, a marriage of male below 21years of age and
female below 18 years of age is child marriage. The act prohibits such marriage. The Act prescribes
that for a valid marriage the minimum age for male is 21 and female is 18. The parties who are
violating the provisions of Child Marriage Restraint Act are liable to be punished. Thus if two Muslims
marry before attaining the age prescribed under the child marriage restraint Act they are liable to be
punished. However the marriage between two Muslims who have attained puberty is valid though
they have violated the provisions of Child Marriage Restraint Act.
4. Free Consent
Free consent of the parties is absolutely necessary for a valid marriage .If there is no free consent a
Muslim marriage is void. Under the Muslim Law, a marriage of a Mohammedan who is of sound mind
and has attained puberty is void; if it is brought about without his consent The marriage of a girl who
has attained puberty and is of sound mind would be void if her consent is not obtained. When the
consent to the marriage has been obtained by force or fraud, the marriage will be invalid, unless it is
ratified. When a marriage was consummated against the will of the women, the marriage is void. The
person who has been defrauded can repudiate the marriage.
Lunatics and minors who has not attained puberty may be validly contracted by their respective
guardians. A minor is incompetent to give valid consent. The right to contract a minor in marriage
belongs successively to the following persons:
i) Father
ii) Paternal Grand Father (h.h.s-How high soever)
iii) Brother and other male relations on the fathers side
iv) Mother
v) The maternal uncle or aunt and other maternal relations.
Under the Shia law only the father and the paternal grand father are recognized as guardian for
contracting marriage of a minor.
If a minor, whether male or female, be contracted in marriage by a remoter guardian, while a nearer
guardian is present and available and such nearer guardian does not give consent to the marriage, the
marriage is void. But if the parties ratify it after attaining puberty, it will be valid. However if the
nearer guardian be absent at such a distance as precludes him from acting, the marriage contracted by
the remoter is also lawful.
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5. No Legal disability
Under Muslim Law, marriage under certain circumstances is prohibited or not permitted. The
prohibitions can be classified into two classes:
Absolute prohibition Prohibition Relative prohibition

Relative prohibition
Relative prohibition
Unlawful conjunction
i) Prohibited degrees of relationship ii) Polyandry
Marrying a fifth wife
Absence of proper witnesses

Consanguinity Affinity Fosterage
Differences of religion
Marriage during Iddat
a. Absolute Prohibition
1) Prohibited degrees of relationship
Under the Muslim law marriage between persons who come within the blood relationship, or certain
other relationship is prohibited. The prohibited relationships are the following:
(a) Consanguinity - Consanguinity means blood relationship and a prohibits a man from marrying the
following females
1. His mother or grandmother (however high so ever)
2. His daughter or granddaughter (how low so ever)
3. His sister whether full blood half blood or uterine blood
4. His niece or great niece (how low so ever)
5. His aunt (father’s sister or mother’s sister)or great aunt (how high so ever)
A marriage with a woman who comes within the relationship of consanguity is absolutely
void.Children born out of that wed-lock are illegitimate.
(b) Affinity- A man is prohibited from marrying certain female relatives due to nearness of
relationship. A man is prohibited from marrying
1. His wife's mother grandmother (however high so ever)
2. His wife's daughter or granddaughter (how low so ever)
3. His father's wife or paternal grandfather's wife (how high so ever)
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4. Wife of one's own son or son's son or daughter's son (how low so ever)
A marriage with a woman comes within the relationship by affinity is void.
(c) Fosterage- It means the milk relationship. When a child is breast-fed/suckled by a woman other
than its own mother, she becomes the foster mother of the child. A man is prohibited from marrying
certain persons having foster relationship. According to Shia jurists fosterage includes the same limits
of relationship prohibitive to marriage as consanguinity. A man may not marry the following females:
1.His foster-mother or grandmother (however high so ever)
2.His foster-sister (daughter of foster mother)
However Sunnis do not follow the same. Under the Sunni law, there are certain exceptions to the
general rule of prohibition on the ground of fosterage and a valid marriage may be contracted with:
1.Sister's foster mother, or

2.Foster'-sister’s mother, or
3.Foster-son’s sister, or
4.Foster-brother's sister.
The Shia jurists refuse to recognize the exception permitted by the Sunnis. The above mentioned
prohibitions on account of 'consanguinity', 'affinity' or 'Fosterage' are absolute and the marriages
contracted in contravention of these rules are void.
2) Polyandry
Polyandry means marrying more than one husband. Polyandry is a form of polygamy in which a
woman is having more than one husband at the same time. Under Muslim law Polyandry is prohibited
and a married woman cannot marry second time so long as the first marriage subsists and the
husband is alive.If a woman violated this prohibition and contracted a second marriage ,the marriage
is void and the woman is liable to be punished for bigamy under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code.
B) Relative prohibition
Under Muslim Law, there are certain prohibitions, which are not absolute but only relative, and
marriage in violation of such relative prohibitions will only be irregular and not void and at the
moment when the irregularity is removed the prohibition ends and the marriage becomes valid. The
following are the relative prohibitions.
1) Unlawful conjunction
A man is prohibited from marrying two wives at the same time if they are related to each other by
consanguinity, affinity or fosterage, which they could not have lawfully intermarried with each other if
they had been of different sexes. Thus a Muslim cannot marry his wife’s sister while the wife is alive.
But he can make the marriage valid by marrying his wife’s sister after the death or divorce of his first
wife. Marriage with two such wives is an Unlawful conjunction. Under sunni law a marriage in
violation of the rule of unlawful conjunction is not void but only irregular. However under Shia law, a
marriage in violation of the rule of unlawful conjunction is void. Under the Shia Law, a Muslim may
marry his wife's aunt, but he cannot marry his wife's niece without her permission.
2) Marrying a fifth wife (Polygamy)
Muslim law permits polygamy (Marrying more than one wife ) with a restriction of maximum four
wives. So a Musalman can have four wives at the same time. If he marries a fifth wife when he has
already four, the marriage is not void, but merely irregular. But the fifth marriage can be made valid
after the death or divorce of any one of the four wives of his earlier marriages. Under the shia law
marriage with the fifth wife is void.
In India no Muslim marrying under or getting his marriage registered under The Special Marriage Act,
1954,can marry a second wife during the lifetime of his spouse.
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3) Absence of proper witnesses

A marriage must be contracted within the presence of proper and competent witnesses. Under the
Sunni law at least two male or one male and two female witnesses must be present to testify that the
contract was properly entered into between the parties. The witnesses must be of sound mind, adult
and Muslim. A marriage without witnesses is irregular.
Under the Shia law the presence of witnesses is not necessary. The marriage is contracted by the
spouses themselves or their guardians in private are held valid. The absence of witnesses does not
render the marriage void but only invalid.
4) Differences of religion (Marriage with non-muslim)

The law with regard to marriage with a non-Muslim is different under Sunni law and Shia law. Under
Sunni law a male can marry a Muslim female or a Kitabia (a person who believes in a revealed religion
possessing a Divine Book viz Christianity and Judaism). A Sunni muslim male can validly marry a jews
or christian female. But he cannot marry an idolatress or a fire-worshiper. A marriage, with an
idolatress or a fire worshiper is merely irregular and not void.
A Muslim woman cannot marry a Kitabia /non-Muslim man. A marriage of a Muslim female with a
non-Muslim male, whether he is a Christian, or a Jew or an idolator or a Fire-Worshiper is not void but
irregular. According to Mulla, a marriage between a Muslim woman and Non-Muslim male is irregular.
But according to Fyzee, such a marriage is totally void.
Under Shia Law a marriage with a non-muslim is void. Both the spouses are required to be Muslims.
The marriage of Sunni male with a Shia female is void. A marriage of a Muslim female with a non-
Muslim male, whether he be a Christian, or a Jew or an idolator or a Fire-Worshiper is void under Shia
Law.
In India a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim can only take place under The Special
Marriage Act, 1954.If a muslim male marries and registers under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, he
cannot marry a second wife during the subsistence of the first marriage.
A marriage of a Muslim female with a non-Muslim male, whether he be a Christian, or a Jew or an
idolator or a Fire-Worshiper is void under Shia Law.
5) Marriage during Iddat

Under Muslim law, a woman who is undergoing iddat is prohibited from marrying during that period.
Iddat is the period during which it is incumbent upon a woman, whose marriage has been dissolved by
divorce or death of her husband to remain in seculasion, and to abstain from marrying another
husband. The purpose behind that is to ascertain whether she is pregnant by earlier husband , so as to
avoid confusion of the parentage of the child.
The period of Iddat is prescribed as under:
1.In case termination marriage by divorce- three lunar months or three menstrual courses.
2.In case of widow- 4 months and 10 days.
3.In case the woman is pregnant - till the delivery.
Under Sunni Law a marriage with a woman undergoing Iddat is irregular and not void. Under Shia law
a marriage with a woman who is undergoing Iddat is void.
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Khair-ul-Balgh (Option of Puberty)
In traditional law no minimum age is laid down for marriage. However, in Hanafi law, a girl who is
contracted in marriage during her infancy may on attaining puberty repudiate the marriage.
This“option of puberty” is found neither in the Quran nor in the Sunna, but is based on juristic
opinions in the various schools. A woman retains this right until she becomes aware of the marriage
and assents to it. However, the woman does not possess this option if the guardian who contracted her
marriage was her father or paternal grandfather.
When a minor has been contracted in marriage by the father or father’s father, the contract of
marriage is valid and binding and it cannot be annulled by the minor on attaining puberty. But if a
marriage is contracted for a minor by any guardian other than the father or father’s father, the minor
has the right to repudiate such marriage on majority. This right is called Khair-ul-Balgh which means
Option of Puberty.
When a minor wife’s right of repudiation should be exercised within a reasonable time after attaining
puberty and failing which would result in the loss of such right. The right is lost if she after having
attained puberty permits the marriage to be consummated .If the consummation was without her
consent the right of repudiation will not be lost.
The dissolution of Muslim marriage act 1939 has considerably modified the law of option of puberty.
Prior to the Act the marriage is contracted for a minor girl by the father or grandfather, the minor has
no right to repudiate such marriage on majority. But according to sec2(7) of the act if the marriage is
contracted for a minor girl by the father or grandfather can also obtain a decree for divorce from the
court if the following conditions are satisfied.
 The marriage took place before the age of fifteen years
 She repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years.
 The marriage has not been consummated
The other Sunni schools recognize this option of “Khiyar” in the area of jest and duress. A person
who was induced into performing the marriage, for instance through threat, can rescind the
contract by this option.
According to Hanafi law, guardian has no power when the child reaches the age of puberty. In “Saima
Waheed’s case”, a major woman married a man of her own choice. His father filed a suit to secure his
daughter’s custody. It was held, in accordance with the Hanafi law, that a marriage, of a major girl,
without the guardian’s consent is not invalid.
The same decision was reached in the Indian case of “Abdul Ahad v. Shah Begum”. Here, a wife
claimed to have repudiated her marriage. The girl’s Wali was her uncle who happened to be the
groom’s father. The court held that this is a settled principle of law in Islamic law that once the girl
becomes major, she has the absolute right to contract the marriage and this right cannot be exercised
by anyone else including the father of the girl.
In the Indian subcontinent, Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929 is used to restrain child marriages. This
Act is still in operation in all three countries, with a variety of different amendments. In India, the Child
Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act 1978 sets the minimum age to 18 and 21 years for females and
males respectively. In Pakistan, the 1929 Act was amended by S.12(1)(a) MFLO 1961 and the
minimum age are now 16 years old for the woman and 18 years old for the man. In Bangladesh, the
minimum ages stipulated have been 18 years old for the woman and 21 years old for the man since the
Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Ordinance 1984.
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Guardianship in marriage
According to Sunni schools, marriage guardian shall be agnates. In the absence of agnates,
guardianship shall be vested in relatives according to proximity; otherwise it will be vested in the
Head of the State. In the Ithna Ashari, the guardian is indispensable in order for the marriage of minors
and majors of defective or no legal capacity to be valid. Guardianship in marriage falls under two
categories:
Guardianship “With” Guardianship in marriage Guardianship “Without”

the right of compulsion the right of compulsion
• Guardianship “With” the right of compulsion, which is exercised over a person of no or limited
legal capacity wherein the guardian may conclude a marriage contract which is valid and takes effect
without the consent or acceptance of the ward;
• Guardianship “Without” the right of compulsion, which is exercised when the woman possess the
full legal capacity but delegates the conclusion of her marriage to a guardian.
Islamic law also requires the parties to a marriage contract to have the capacity to enter into the
contract. According to Hanafi and Ithna Ashari's any sane adult, whether male or female, has the
capacity to conclude his or her own contract of marriage. According to traditional Islamic law, majority
is attained at the onset of physical puberty. There is an irrefutable presumption of law that no female
below the age of nine and no male below the age of 12 has attained majority and an equally irrefutable
presumption that by the age of 15, majority has been reached by both sexes.
The right of a female to contract her own marriage is, however, not absolute according to Hanafi
doctrine. Her guardian may seek dissolution of the marriage if she marries a man who is not her equal
according to the law. Equality is determined with regard to piety, lineage, wealth and occupation.
However, the right of the guardian to dissolve the marriage lapses if the woman becomes pregnant.
In Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali law a virgin woman may never conclude her own marriage contract. In
Maliki law the hierarchy of marriage guardians follows strictly the order of succession. Accordingly,
the son of the woman ranks before her father. In Hanbali law the guardian having first priority is the
father, followed as in Maliki law by the paternal grandfather and the other agnatic kinsman. The
woman only becomes capable of contracting herself in marriage when she ceases to be a virgin by
reason of a consummated marriage or an illicit sexual relationship.
Classification of Marriages
Sahih Fasid
Batil
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There are three types of marriages in Sunni schools:-

1. Sahih - Firstly, there is “Sahih” marriage which is fully valid and effective. Under such a
marriage, sexual intercourse is lawful and the woman is entitled to both dower and
maintenance.
2. Batil Secondly, there is a “Batil” (void) marriage. Under such a marriage, no rights or
obligations exist between the parties. Parties would be guilty of zina, save where the parties
were unaware of the fact that the marriage was void. If a marriage is affected by a permanent
impediment, then the marriage is declared void. The permanent impediments arise:
• Under the bar arising from relationship of blood, a man may not marry any ascendant or descendant,
any descendant of his father or mother, or the immediate child of any ascendant, nor may a woman
marry any corresponding male.
• Under the bar of fosterage, two persons who were suckled by the same foster-mother are
permanently barred from marrying each other.
• The bar of affinity arises from marriage, so a man may not marry the former wife of any ascendant or
descendant, or any ascendant or descendant of a former wife with whom he actually had
consummated his marriage.
• Under the bar of polyandry, i.e. when a woman contracts a second marriage during the subsistence of
her first marriage.
3. Fasid - Thirdly, there is a “Fasid” (irregular) marriage, which is middle way out. This is also no
marriage, but can be regularized in certain conditions. Under such a marriage, no zina is
committed and a dower is payable. An irregular marriage arises from temporary impediments,
which occur when:
• There is an absence of witnesses.
• A woman who is already married.
• A woman who is still observing the idda period.
• A woman whom he has triply repudiated, unless she has married another man and that marriage has
been terminated.
• A man may not marry at the same time two sisters or a mother and her daughter.
• A man who already has four wives may not validly marry a fifth.
• A Muslim man may contract marriage with a non-Muslim woman provided she is a khitabiyah.
 A Muslim woman, on the other hand, may only validly contract marriage with a Muslim man.
 According to the non-Hanafi schools of Sunni law, a marriage concluded by a woman herself
without a guardian is also invalid as is a marriage concluded by a person performing haj.
 According to Maliki law, a person who is in a state of death sickness is prohibited from marriage.
The Effects of Impediments

to Marriage
The presence of an impediment to marriage may render the marriage either void or irregular. The
impediments that have the potential to render a marriage void are those that are permanent and those
where the impediment, although of a temporary nature, is one that the parties themselves have no
power to remove such as if the woman is married to another man. Where any other impediment exists,
the marriage is not void but irregular. If the marriage is irregular certain effects flow from it:
• The parties may not be found guilty of zina.
• Any children born out of the union will be held to be legitimate.
• When the parties separate, and separate they must, the woman must observe an idda period.
A marriage, which may be held to be potentially void, will be regarded as irregular if the parties have
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acted in good faith, i.e. they were unaware of the existence of the impediment. This is the only instance
where Islamic law recognises ignorance of the law as a defence.
Incidents of a Muslim
Marriage
Marriage has its own specific incidents and effects. The law defines the rights and duties of husband
and wife, some of which are mutual and some of which are peculiar to one or the other of the parties:
• Mutual Rights – Legitimacy of children, inheritance, sexual intercourse.
• Rights of the Wife (Maintenance).
• Rights of the Husband (Polygamy).
Muta marriage
The Shia Law recognizes two kinds of marriage, namely (1) permanent, and (2) muta (literally means
enjoyment or use) or temporary. The fundamental difference between the two is that in former the
term is not specified while in the later it is. Sunnis do not recognize such marriage. ‘Muta Marriage is
an ancient Arabian custom.
A shia male may contract a muta marriage with kitabia woman (professing Muslim, Christian or Jewish
religion) or even with a woman who is fire-worshipper but not with a woman following any other
religion. But a shia woman may not contract a muta marriage with a non-Muslim.
A Shia male can contract any number of muta marriages. All the requisite formalities of marriage, such
as of offer and acceptance, have to be observed in the muta marriage. It is essential to the validity of
muta marriage that:-
(1) the period of cohabitation should be fixed ( a day, a month, year , years) and that
(2) some dower should be specified otherwise marriage will be void. If the period is not specified ,
though dower is specified, it should be considered as a permanent union, even if the parties call it a
muta.
That main incidents of muta marriage are:

1. No mutual rights of inheritance created between the spouses, but children considered
legitimate and capable of inheriting from both parents. Thus, a muta marriage is different from
prostitution and it is not a marriage for pleasure or a marriage of convenience.
2. Wife is not entitled to maintenance (unless specified). However, she is entitled to maintenance
as a wife under the Cr. P.C.
3. If marriage is not consummated, the wife is entitled to only half of the dower. If consummated,
then full dower.
4. On the expiry of the term of marriage, if the marriage has been consummated, the wife is
required to undergo iddat to three courses.
5. Husband has the right to refuse procreation i.e. izl.
6. Marriage come to end ipso facto on the expiry the term, unless extended. Husband and wife do
not have a right of divorce, but he can terminate the union earlier by making a “gift of the
term”(hiba-i-muddat). In that case, the wife is entitled to full dower. The wife has a right to
leave the husband before the expiry of the term of the muta marriage; if she does so, the
husband has a right to deduct the proportionate part of the dower for the unexpired period.
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7. If there is evidence of the term for which the muta marriage was fixed and cohabitation
continues after that term, muta marriage stands extended for the whole period of cohabitation.
And, the children conceived during the extended period shall be legitimate.
DOWER
Dower & Quantity of Types of Entitlement to Legal Disputes over

Bride-Price Dower Dower Dower the Payment of
Dower
Dower is a sum of money or property which becomes payable by the husband to the wife as an effect
of marriage. In Surah Al-Nisa, Verse 4, the Quran says: “And give the women (on marriage) their dower
as a free gift”.
According to both Sunnis and Shias, the dower may consist of anything that can be valued in money, is
useful and ritually clean. Therefore, the dower may be land, building, cattle, crops, chattels etc. The
property given as dower must be reasonably specified. A vague dower, e.g. “an animal” or “a house”
shall not be valid, without however invalidating the marriage contract itself.
i. Dower & Bride-

Price
Dower is a unique feature of a Muslim marriage. But contrary to a widely held misconception in the
West, it is not a bride-price. Although, in the pre-Islamic period a bride price was paid to the bride’s
father, but the requirement of dower itself is one of the most significant reforms affected by the Quran.
According to the Hanafi Jurist Al Kamal, dower is there to underline the prestige of the marriage, it is
not a consideration like a price, and otherwise it would have been set as a prior condition.
Dower is not a precondition to marriage. It is mentioned in Surah Baqara, Verse 236, that: “It is no sin
for you if ye divorce woman while yet ye have not touched them nor appointed unto them a
portion (dower)”. This means that there is no sin if no dower is paid and the woman is divorced,
before consummation. Since divorce can only occur after a valid marriage contract, this shows that
dower is not a precondition to marriage.
It is also different from a bride price because a bride price was paid to the father of the bride, but
dower, on the other hand, is an inalienable and imprescriptible right of the wife. It is inalienable in that
it is taken for granted even if it is not expressly stated in the contract. If the husband makes a condition
in the marriage contract that no dower will be paid, this shall be void but not the remaining contract. It
is imprescriptible in that the wife shall not lose her entitlement to it through prescription alone.
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ii. Quantity of Dower
Classical jurists set no higher limit for the dower. But there is no such unanimity on the minimum
dower. The Shafis, Hanbalis and the Shias maintain that there is no such limit. However, the Malikis set
a quarter dinar of gold or three dirhams of silver as the minimal dower, by analogy with the Sharia
limit for punishable theft. A dirham weighs 2.97 grammes. The Hanafi doctrine maintains that the
minimal dower shall be 10 dirhams, citing the authority of a tradition of the Prophet to that effect, a
tradition whose authenticity is disputed by other schools. The Shia’s say that what was given to Bibi
Ayesha should be the minimum limit.
iii. Types of Dower
The parties may stipulate an amount to be paid as dower in the marriage itself. This is called specified
dower, and it may be reduced or increased by mutual consultation. Provided that the husband is sane
and major, the addition shall be binding on him under three conditions:
• It has to be determinate, i.e. if a husband says to his wife, “I have added to your dower” without
further specification, no addition shall be valid.
• It occurs while they still live together, i.e. no divorce or separation.
• That it is accepted, at the same sitting where it has been offered.
Likewise, a wife possessing full legal capacity may discharge her husband, subsequent to the marriage
contract, of all or any part of her specified dower. It shall be valid if the husband accepts it or keeps
silent, and void if rejected. However, if waiving off occurred due to pressure, i.e. threat or on husband’s
death bed, then it will not be valid. Unlike increase, no guardian of the minor wife has the power to
reduce her specified dower.
But if no dower is specified or if the contract expressly states that there shall be no dower payable, the
wife is nevertheless entitled to receive dower, i.e. the proper dower. The Sunni and Shias agree that
the proper dower is to be calculated by taking into account the amount of dower received by
comparable members of the wife’s family such as her sisters or cousins. Her personal attributes are
also relevant: her virginity, age, education, beauty and so on.
The specified dower is further sub-classified into “prompt” or “deferred” dower. The parties may
agree between themselves when the dower shall be paid. If it is payable immediately at the conclusion
of the marriage contract marriage it is called prompt dower. Dower will be deferred if it is payable
some time later, otherwise it shall become payable immediately on the earlier of two events: death or
divorce. If the marriage contract is silent on the type of dower it is presumed that it will be prompt.
iv. Entitlement to Dower
Entitlement to Whole Dower

Entitlement to Half Dower & Mutat
Entitlement to no Dower
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a. Entitlement to Whole Dower:

It is unanimously agreed by the Sunnis that the whole dower shall become due to the wife on the
occurrence of either of two events:
• The actual consummation of marriage;
• The death of either spouse before consummation.
If it is the wife who dies, her heirs can claim it from the husband. All the jurists agree that the whole
dower shall be due to the wife if the husband dies by natural causes or murder by a third party, or if
the husband himself kills the wife. With the exception of Hanafis, all the other schools agree that the
wife shall lose her entitlement to any dower if she killed her husband before consummation.
The Shias have a different view. According to them, if the husband dies before consummation without
having specified a dower then nothing is payable to the wife.
b. Entitlement to Half Dower & Mutat:

Jurists deduce the following conditions for half the dower to be paid:
• That marriage is under a valid contract and the dower is specified;
• That divorce occurs before consummation and due to an act of husband, other than his exercising the
option of puberty or recovery from insanity.
It should be remembered that only the stipulated dower shall be halved and any additions which were
made to it after the marriage contract shall be dropped altogether.
However, if no dower has been fixed in the contract, then the wife is entitled to a mut’at, i.e. a gift of
consideration. Under Hanafi law, it consists of three articles of dress or of their value provided that the
value shall not be less than 5 dirhams. The Sunnis in general hold that the mut'a is regulated by the
circumstances of both husband and wife. The Shias stick to the Quranic text and consider the
circumstances of the husband only.
c. Entitlement to no Dower:
No dower, whether specified or proper, shall be due to the wife if:
• The marriage is dissolved by the husband before consummation through exercising his option of
puberty or recovery from insanity, as in such a case, the very contract of marriage is declared null and
void.
• If the marriage is dissolved before actual consummation by a lawful/ unlawful act of the wife. Lawful
acts include option of puberty, recovering from insanity, or taking khula. Unlawful acts include
apostasy.
v. Legal Disputes over the Payment of Dower:
There are a number of legal disputes which relate to the payment of dower. The first relates to the
amount of dower. Recently, there has been a trend for very large Maher sums to be announced. There
are probably three reasons for this trend:
1.) The brides’ family often demand high Mehar sums for status purpose.
2.) In many cases the bridegrooms themselves encourage the insertion of large Maher sums for their
own aggrandisement.
3.) A large dower sum can be viewed as insurance for the wife against the possibility of an unjustified
divorce by the husband or his early death.
However, in certain cases, apart from that publicity agreement, there is also a private agreement for a
lesser sum agreed between the parties. The same dispute arose in “Nasir Ahmad v. Asmat Jehan”,
and it was held that the real dower payable would be that agreed in private because this is the only
agreement really intended to be enforced by both the parties.
The second dispute relates to the refusal of conjugal relations. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, under S.10
MFLO 1961, if no details of the mode of payment of dower are specified, then the dower would be
presumed prompt and payable on demand. Therefore, can a Muslim wife whose prompt dower has not
been paid is entitled to refuse consummation of the marriage?\
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This question was answered in “Abdul Kadir v. Salima”, where a Muslim wife refused conjugal
relations on non-payment of dower after consummation had earlier occurred. The court found that the
wife has lost her right to refusal once consummation had earlier occurred. The decision was based on
the views of Hanafi Disciples rather than on the view of Abu Hanifa.
The same issue arose in a recent Indian case of “Rabia Khatoon v. Muhammad Ahmad”. The court did
acknowledge that under the classical Hanafi law, the wife may refuse to live with her husband on non-
payment of dower even after consummation. However, due to policy and social grounds, the court still
stuck to their old position of Hanafi Disciples. Thus, the husband was granted his claim of restitution of
conjugal relations in addition to the order of paying his wife the outstanding dower.
However, the position in Pakistan changed with the case of “Rahim Jan v. Muhammad”. Here, the
High Court had to decide whether, in Hanafi law, the wife is entitled, even after consummation, to
refuse to live with her husband when her prompt dower has not been paid. It was said that “Abdul
Kadir’s case” comments are obiter. It was, therefore, firmly held that even after consummation the
wife retains the right to refuse the performance of marital obligations till the prompt dower is paid.
The third dispute relates to the remission of dower by the wife. It is obvious that remission would only
be valid if it is made by free consent and not due to coercion. In “Shah Banu Begum v. Iftikhar
Muhammad”, the wife had remitted the dower so as to prevent the husband form taking a lover. It was
held that the waiver was void and of no effect.
The fourth dispute relates to unpaid dower. Generally, an unpaid dower represents an unpaid debt
and the wife may sue to enforce payment. The widow has a right to retain possession of the deceased
husband’s property until the dower debt is paid to her. In “Maina Bibi v. Chaudhri Vakil”, a widow
remained in possession of certain property that was claimed by the deceased’s heirs. The wife
defended on the ground of her unpaid dower. The judge found that the wife has the right to possession
unless the heirs pay her the unpaid dower.
Iddat
In Islam, iddah or iddat is the period a woman must observe after the death of her spouse or after
adivorce, during which she may not marry another man. Its purpose is to ensure that the male parent
of any offspring produced after the cessation of a nikah (marriage) would be known. The length
of iddah varies according to a number of circumstances.
The iddah of a woman divorced by her husband is three monthly periods, unless she is pregnant in
which case the ‘iddah lasts until she gives birth, or unless the marriage was not consummated in which
case there is no `iddah, or unless she does not menstruate, in which case "the scholars say that she
should observe an ‘iddah of a full year, nine months for pregnancy and three months for ‘iddah."
For a woman whose husband has died, the `iddah is four lunar months and ten days after the death of
their husbands, whether or not the marriage was consummated. The period, four months and ten days
after the death of a spouse, is calculated on the number of menses that a woman has.
Islamic scholars consider this directive to be a balance between mourning of husband's death and
protecting the widow from criticism that she might be subjected to from remarrying too quickly after
her husband’s death. This is also to ascertain whether a woman is pregnant or not, since four and a
half months is half the length of a normal pregnancy.
Husbands should make a will in favor of their wives for the provision of one year’s residence and
maintenance, unless the wives themselves leave the house or take any other similar step.
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Divorce
The Concept of Divorce under Muslim Law

Firm union of the husband and wife is a necessary condition for a happy family life. Islam therefore,
insists upon the subsistence of a marriage and prescribes that breach of marriage contract should be
avoided. Initially no marriage is contracted to be dissolved but in unfortunate circumstances the
matrimonial contract is broken. One of the ways of such dissolution is by way of divorce. Under
Muslim law the divorce may take place by the act of the parties themselves or by a decree of the court
of law. However in whatever manner the divorce is effected it has not been regarded as a rule of life. In
Islam, divorce is considered as an exception to the status of marriage. The Prophet declared that
among the things which have been permitted by law, divorce is the worst. Divorce being an evil, it
must be avoided as far as possible. But in some occasions this evil becomes a necessity, because when
it is impossible for the parties to the marriage to carry on their union with mutual affection and love
then it is better to allow them to get separated than compel them to live together in an atmosphere of
hatred and disaffection. The basis of divorce in Islamic law is the inability of the spouses to live
together rather than any specific cause (or guilt of a party) on account of which the parties cannot live
together. A divorce may be either by the act of the husband or by the act of the wife. There are several
modes of divorce under the Muslim law, which will be discussed hereafter.
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Modes of Divorce
Extra judicial divorce Judicial divorce
By husband By wife Mutual consent
Talaaq Ila Zehar

Talaaq-e-taweez Lian Khula Mubarat
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939
Talaaq-e-sunnat Talaaq-e-biddat
Talaaq-e-ahsaan Talaaq-e-hasaan
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Modes of Divorce: A husband may divorce his wife by repudiating the marriage
without giving any reason. Pronouncement of such words which signify his
intention to disown the wife is sufficient. Generally this is done by talaaq. But he
may also divorce by Ila, and Zihar which differ from talaaq only in form, not in
substance. A wife cannot divorce her husband of her own accord. She can divorce
the husband only when the husband has delegated such a right to her or under an
agreement. Under an agreement the wife may divorce her husband either by Khula
or Mubarat. Before 1939, a Muslim wife had no right to seek divorce except on the
ground of false charges of adultery, insanity or impotency of the husband. But the
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 lays down several other grounds on the
basis of which a Muslim wife may get her divorce decree passed by the order of
There are two categories of divorce under the Muslim law:

1.) Extra judicial divorce, and
2.) Judicial divorce
1) Extra judicial divorce -The category of extra judicial divorce can be further subdivided into three
types, namely:-
a. By husband- talaaq, ila, and zihar.
b. By wife- talaaq-i-tafweez, lian.
c. By mutual agreement- khula and mubarat.
The second category is the right of the wife to give divorce under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages
Act 1939.
1. Talaaq: Talaaq in its primitive sense means dismission. In its literal meaning, it means “setting
free”, “letting loose”, or taking off any “ties or restraint”. In Muslim Law it means freedom from
the bondage of marriage and not from any other bondage. In legal sense it means dissolution of
marriage by husband using appropriate words. In other words talaaq is repudiation of
marriage by the husband in accordance with the procedure laid down by the law. The
following verse is in support of the husband’s authority to pronounce unilateral divorce is
often cited: “Men are maintainers of women, because Allah has made some of them to excel
others and because they spend out of their property (on their maintenance and dower). When
the husband exercises his right to pronounce divorce, technically this is known as talaaq. The
most remarkable feature of Muslim law of talaaq is that all the schools of the Sunnis and the
Shias recognize it differing only in some details. In Muslim world, so widespread has been the
talaaq that even the Imams practiced it. The absolute power of a Muslim husband of divorcing
his wife unilaterally, without assigning any reason, literally at his whim, even in a jest or in a
state of intoxication, and without recourse to the court, and even in the absence of the wife, is
recognized in modern India. All that is necessary is that the husband should pronounce talaaq;
how he does it, when he does it, or in what he does it is not very essential. In Hannefa v.
Pathummal, Khalid, J., termed this as “monstrosity”. Among the Sunnis, talaaq may be express,
implied, contingent constructive or even delegated. The Shias recognize only the express and
the delegated forms of talaaq.
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Conditions for a valid talaaq
Free Formalities Express

Capacity
Consent words
1.) Capacity: Every Muslim husband of sound mind, who has attained the age of puberty, is competent
to pronounce talaaq. It is not necessary for him to give any reason for his pronouncement. A husband
who is minor or of unsound mind cannot pronounce it. Talaaq by a minor or of a person of unsound
mind is void and ineffective. However, if a husband is lunatic then talaaq pronounced by him during
“lucid interval” is valid. The guardian cannot pronounce talaaq on behalf of a minor husband. When
insane husband has no guardian, the Qazi or a judge has the right to dissolve the marriage in the
interest of such a husband.
2.) Free Consent: Except under Hanafi law, the consent of the husband in pronouncing talaaq must be
a free consent. Under Hanafi law, a talaaq, pronounced under compulsion, coercion, undue influence,
fraud and voluntary intoxication etc., is valid and dissolves the marriage.
Involuntary intoxication: Talaaq pronounced under forced or involuntary intoxication is void even
under the Hanafi law.
Shia law: Under the Shia law (and also under other schools of Sunnis) a talaaq pronounced under
compulsion, coercion, undue influence, fraud, or voluntary intoxication is void and ineffective.
3.) Formalities: According to Sunni law, a talaaq, may be oral or in writing. It may be simply uttered
by the husband or he may write a Talaaqnama. No specific formula or use of any particular word is
required to constitute a valid talaaq. Any expression which clearly indicates the husband’s desire to
break the marriage is sufficient. It need not be made in the presence of the witnesses.
According to Shias, talaaq, must be pronounced orally, except where the husband is unable to speak. If
the husband can speak but gives it in writing, the talaaq, is void under Shia law. Here talaaq must be
pronounced in the presence of two witnesses.
4.) Express words: The words of talaaq must clearly indicate the husband’s intention to dissolve the
marriage. If the pronouncement is not express and is ambiguous then it is absolutely necessary to
prove that the husband clearly intends to dissolve the marriage.
Express Talaaq (by husband):
When clear and unequivocal words, such as “I have divorced thee” are uttered, the divorce is express.
The express talaaq, falls into two categories:
a.Talaaq-e-sunnat,
b. Talaaq-e-biddat.
Talaaq-e-sunnat has two forms:
i) Talaaq-e-ahasan (Most approved)
ii)Talaaq-e-hasan (Less approved).
a.Talaaq-e-sunnat is considered to be in accordance with the dictates of Prophet Mohammad.
i)The ahasan talaaq: consists of a single pronouncement of divorce made in the period of tuhr
(purity, between two menstruations), or at any time, if the wife is free from menstruation, followed by
abstinence from sexual intercourse during the period if iddat. The requirement that the
pronouncement be made during a period of tuhr applies only to oral divorce and does not apply to
talaaq in writing. Similarly, this requirement is not applicable when the wife has passed the age of
menstruation or the parties have been away from each other for a long time, or when the marriage has
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not been consummated. The advantage of this form is that divorce can revoked at any time before the
completion of the period of iddat, thus hasty, thoughtless divorce can be prevented. The revocation
may effected expressly or impliedly. Thus, if before the completion of iddat, the husband resumes
cohabitation with his wife or says “I have retained thee” the divorce is revoked. Resumption of sexual
intercourse before the completion of period of iddat also results in the revocation of divorce. The
Raad-ul-Muhtar puts it thus: “It is proper and right to observe this form, for human nature is apt to be
mislead and to lead astray the mind far to perceive faults which may not exist and to commit mistakes
of which one is certain to feel ashamed afterwards”
ii)The hasan talaaq: In this the husband is required to pronounce the formula of talaaq three time
during three successive tuhrs. If the wife has crossed the age of menstruation, the pronouncement of it
may be made after the interval of a month or thirty days between the successive pronouncements.
When the last pronouncement is made, the talaaq, becomes final and irrevocable. It is necessary that
each of the three pronouncements should be made at a time when no intercourse has taken place
during the period of tuhr. Example: W, a wife, is having her period of purity and no sexual intercourse
has taken place. At this time, her husband, H, pronounces talaaq, on her. This is the first
pronouncement by express words. Then again, when she enters the next period of purity, and before
he indulges in sexual intercourse, he makes the second pronouncement. He again revokes it. Again
when the wife enters her third period of purity and before any intercourse takes place H pronounces
the third pronouncement. The moment H makes this third pronouncement, the marriage stands
dissolved irrevocably, irrespective of iddat.
b. Talaaq-i-Biddat: It came into vogue during the second century of Islam. It has two forms:
(i) the triple declaration of talaaq made in a period of purity, either in one sentence or in three, (ii) the
other form constitutes a single irrevocable pronouncement of divorce made in a period of tuhr or even
otherwise. This type of talaaq is not recognized by the Shias. This form of divorce is condemned. It is
considered heretical, because of its irrevocability.
2. Ila: Besides talaaq, a Muslim husband can repudiate his marriage by two other modes, that are, Ila
and Zihar. They are called constructive divorce. In Ila, the husband takes an oath not to have sexual
intercourse with his wife. Followed by this oath, there is no consummation for a period of four months.
After the expiry of the fourth month, the marriage dissolves irrevocably. But if the husband resumes
cohabitation within four months, Ila is cancelled and the marriage does not dissolve. Under Ithna
Asharia (Shia) School, Ila, does not operate as divorce without order of the court of law. After the
expiry of the fourth month, the wife is simply entitled for a judicial divorce. If there is no cohabitation,
even after expiry of four months, the wife may file a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against the
husband.
3. Zihar: In this mode the husband compares his wife with a woman within his prohibited relationship
e.g., mother or sister etc. The husband would say that from today the wife is like his mother or sister.
After such a comparison the husband does not cohabit with his wife for a period of four months. Upon
the expiry of the said period Zihar is complete. After the expiry of fourth month the wife has following
rights:
(i) She may go to the court to get a decree of judicial divorce
(ii) She may ask the court to grant the decree of restitution of conjugal rights.
Where the husband wants to revoke Zihar by resuming cohabitation within the said period, the wife
cannot seek judicial divorce. It can be revoked if:
(i) The husband observes fast for a period of two months, or,
(ii) He provides food at least sixty people, or,
(iii) He frees a slave.
According to Shia law Zihar must be performed in the presence of two witnesses.
Divorce by mutual agreement:
They are two forms of divorce by mutual consent but in either of them, the wife has to part with her
dower or a part of some other property. A verse in the Holy Quran runs as: “And it not lawful for you
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that ye take from women out of that which ye have given them: except (in the case) when both fear
that they may not be able to keep within the limits (imposed by Allah), in that case it is no sin for
either of them if the woman ransom herself.”
1. Khula- The word khula, in its original sense means “to draw” or “dig up” or “to take off” such
as taking off one’s clothes or garments. It is said that the spouses are like clothes to each other
and when they take khula each takes off his or her clothes, i.e., they get rid of each other. In law
it is said is said to signify an agreement between the spouses for dissolving a connubial union
in lieu of compensation paid by the wife to her husband out of her property. Although
consideration for Khula is essential, the actual release of the dower or delivery of property
constituting the consideration is not a condition precedent for the validity of the khula. Once
the husband gives his consent, it results in an irrevocable divorce. The husband has no power
of cancelling the ‘khul’ on the ground that the consideration has not been paid. The
consideration can be anything, usually it is mahr, the whole or part of it. But it may be any
property though not illusory. In mubarat, the outstanding feature is that both the parties
desire divorce. Thus, the proposal may emanate from either side.
2. Mubarat - In mubarat both, the husband and the wife, are happy to get rid of each other.
Among the Sunnis when the parties to marriage enter into a mubarat all mutual rights and
obligations come to an end. The Shia law is stringent though. It requires that both the parties
must bona fide find the marital relationship to be irksome and cumbersome. Among the Sunnis
no specific form is laid down, but the Shias insist on a proper form. The Shias insist that the
word mubarat should be followed by the word talaaq, otherwise no divorce would result. They
also insist that the pronouncement must be in Arabic unless the parties are incapable of
pronouncing the Arabic words. Intention to dissolve the marriage should be clearly expressed.
Among both, Shias and Sunnis, mubarat is irrevocable. Other requirements are the same as in
khula and the wife must undergo the period of iddat and in both the divorce is essentially an
act of the parties, and no intervention by the court is required.
Divorce by wife:
The divorce by wife can be categorized under three categories:
(i) Talaaq-i-tafweez
(ii) Lian
(iii) By Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939.
1. Talaaq-i-tafweez - Talaaq-i-tafweez or delegated divorce is recognized among both, the Shias
and the Sunnis. The Muslim husband is free to delegate his power of pronouncing divorce to
his wife or any other person. He may delegate the power absolutely or conditionally,
temporarily or permanently. A permanent delegation of power is revocable but a temporary
delegation of power is not. This delegation must be made distinctly in favour of the person to
whom the power is delegated, and the purpose of delegation must be clearly stated. The power
of talaaq may be delegated to his wife and as Faizee observes, “this form of delegated divorce is
perhaps the most potent weapon in the hands of a Muslim wife to obtain freedom without the
intervention of any court and is now beginning to be fairly common in India”. This form of
delegated divorce is usually stipulated in prenuptial agreements. In Md. Khan v. Shahmai,
under a prenuptial agreement, a husband, who was a Khana Damad, undertook to pay certain
amount of marriage expenses incurred by the father-in-law in the event of his leaving the
house and conferred a power to pronounce divorce on his wife. The husband left his father-in-
law’s house without paying the amount. The wife exercised the right and divorced herself. It
was held that it was a valid divorce in the exercise of the power delegated to her. Delegation of
power may be made even in the post marriage agreements. Thus where under an agreement it
is stipulated that in the event of the husband failing to pay her maintenance or taking a second
wife, the will have a right of pronouncing divorce on herself, such an agreement is valid, and
30
such conditions are reasonable and not against public policy . It should be noted that even in
the event of contingency, whether or not the power is to be exercised, depend upon the wife
she may choose to exercise it or she may not. The happening of the event of contingency does
not result in automatic divorce.
2. Lian: If the husband levels false charges of unchastity or adultery against his wife then this
amounts to character assassination and the wife has got the right to ask for divorce on these
grounds. Such a mode of divorce is called Lian. However, it is only a voluntary and aggressive
charge of adultery made by the husband which, if false, would entitle the wife to get the wife to
get the decree of divorce on the ground of Lian. Where a wife hurts the feelings of her husband
with her behaviour and the husband hits back an allegation of infidelity against her, then what
the husband says in response to the bad behaviour of the wife, cannot be used by the wife as a
false charge of adultery and no divorce is to be granted under Lian. This was held in the case of
Nurjahan v. Kazim Ali by the Calcutta High Court.
3. Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939:
Qazi Mohammad Ahmad Kazmi had introduced a bill in the Legislature regarding the issue on 17th April
1936. It however became law on 17th March 1939 and thus stood the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act
1939.
Section 2 of the Act runs there under:
A woman married under Muslim law shall be entitled to obtain a decree for divorce for the dissolution
of her marriage on any one or more of the following grounds, namely:-
i) That the whereabouts of the husband have not been known for a period of four years: if the husband is
missing for a period of four years the wife may file a petition for the dissolution of her marriage. The
husband is deemed to be missing if the wife or any such person, who is expected to have knowledge of the
husband, is unable to locate the husband. Section 3 provides that where a wife files petition for divorce
under this ground, she is required to give the names and addresses of all such persons who would have
been the legal heirs of the husband upon his death. The court issues notices to all such persons appear
before it and to state if they have any knowledge about the missing husband. If nobody knows then the
court passes a decree to this effect which becomes effective only after the expiry of six months. If before the
expiry, the husband reappears, the court shall set aside the decree and the marriage is not dissolved.
ii)That the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a period of two years: it
is a legal obligation of every husband to maintain his wife, and if he fails to do so, the wife may seek divorce
on this ground. A husband may not maintain his wife either because he neglects her or because he has no
means to provide her maintenance. In both the cases the result would be the same. The husband’s
obligation to maintain his wife is subject to wife’s own performance of matrimonial obligations. Therefore,
if the wife lives separately without any reasonable excuse, she is not entitled to get a judicial divorce on the
ground of husband’s failure to maintain her because her own conduct disentitles her from maintenance
under Muslim law.
iii) That the husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of seven years or upwards: the
wife’s right of judicial divorce on this ground begins from the date on which the sentence becomes final.
Therefore, the decree can be passed in her favour only after the expiry of the date for appeal by the
husband or after the appeal by the husband has been dismissed by the final court.
iv) That the husband has failed to perform, without reasonable cause, his marital obligations for a period of
three years: the Act does define ‘marital obligations of the husband’. There are several marital obligations
of the husband under Muslim law. But for the purpose of this clause husband’s failure to perform only those
conjugal obligations may be taken into account which are not included in any of the clauses of Section 2 of
this Act.
v) That the husband was impotent at the time of the marriage and continues to be so: for getting a decree of
divorce on this ground, the wife has to prove that the husband was impotent at the time of the marriage
and continues to be impotent till the filing of the suit. Before passing a decree of divorce of divorce on this
ground, the court is bound to give to the husband one year to improve his potency provided he makes an
application for it. If the husband does not give such application, the court shall pass the decree without
delay. In Gul Mohd. Khan v. Hasina the wife filed a suit for dissolution of marriage on the ground of
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impotency. The husband made an application before the court seeking an order for proving his potency.
The court allowed him to prove his potency.
vi) If the husband has been insane for a period of two years or is suffering from leprosy or a virulent
veneral disease: the husband’s insanity must be for two or more years immediately preceding the
presentation of the suit. But this act does not specify that the unsoundness of mind must be curable or
incurable. Leprosy may be white or black or cause the skin to wither away. It may be curable or incurable.
Veneral disease is a disease of the sex organs. The Act provides that this disease must be of incurable
nature. It may be of any duration. Moreover even if this disease has been infected to the husband by the
wife herself, she is entitled to get divorce on this ground.
•vii)That she, having been given in marriage by her father or other guardian before she attained the age of
fifteen years, repudiated the marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years, provided that the
marriage has not been consummated;
viii)That the husband treats her with cruelty, that is to say,-
(a) Habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruelty of conduct even if such conduct does not
amount to physical ill treatment, or
(b) Associates with women of ill-repute or leads an infamous life, or
(c) Attempts to force her to lead an immoral life, or
(d) Disposes of her property or prevents her exercising her legal rights over it, or
(e) Obstructs her in the observance of her religious profession or practice, or
(f) If he has more than one wives, does not treat her equitably in accordance with the injunctions of the
Holy Quran.
In Syed Ziauddin v. Parvez Sultana, Parvez Sultana was a science graduate and she wanted to take
admission in a college for medical studies. She needed money for her studies. Syed Ziaudddin promised to
give her money provided she married him. She did. Later she filed for divorce for non-fulfillment of promise
on the part of the husband. The court granted her divorce on the ground of cruelty. Thus we see the court’s
attitude of attributing a wider meaning to the expression cruelty. In Zubaida Begum v. Sardar Shah, a case
from Lahore High Court, the husband sold the ornaments of the wife with her consent. It was submitted
that the husband’s conduct does not amount to cruelty.
In Aboobacker v. Mamu koya , the husband used to compel his wife to put on a sari and see pictures in
cinema. The wife refused to do so because according to her beliefs this was against the Islamic way of life.
She sought divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. The Kerela High Court held that the conduct of the
husband cannot be regarded as cruelty because mere departure from the standards of suffocating
orthodoxy does not constitute un-Islamic behaviour.
In Itwari v. Asghari, the Allahabad High Court observed that Indian Law does not recognize various types
of cruelty such as ‘Muslim cruelty’, ‘Hindu cruelty’ and so on, and that the test of cruelty is based on
universal and humanitarian standards; that is to say, conduct of the husband which would cause such
bodily or mental pain as to endanger the wife’s safety or health.
Irretrievable Breakdown: Divorce on the basis of irretrievable breakdown of marriage has come into
existence in Muslim Law through the judicial interpretation of certain provisions of Muslim law. In 1945
in Umar Bibi v. Md. Din , it was argued that the wife hated her husband so much that she could not
possibly live with him and there was total incompatibility of temperaments. On these grounds the court
refused to grant a decree of divorce. But twenty five years later in Neorbibi v. Pir Bux , again an attempt
was made to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. This time the court
granted the divorce. Thus in Muslim law of modern India, there are two breakdown grounds for divorce:
(a) non-payment of maintenance by the husband even if the failure has resulted due to the conduct of the
wife,
(b) where there is total irreconcilability between the spouses.
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Unit III
Guardianship
The source of law of guardianship and custody are certain verses in the Koran and a few ahadis. The
Koran, the alladis and other authorities on Muslim law emphatically speak of the guardianship of the
property of the minor; the guardianship of the person is a mere inference. We would discuss the law of
guardianship of custody as under:
Natural Testamentary De facto

Guardian Guardian Gaurdian
To this list, we may add the de facto guardian who has been discussed by the Muslim authorities under
the head, fizuli, and who has practically no position in the Muslim law of modern India.
1. Natural Guardians:
The Muslim law-givers and jurists do not use the expression “natural guardian”, but it seems to be
clear that in all schools of both the Sunnis and the Shias, the father is recognized as guardian which
term in the context is equivalent to natural guardian, and the mother in all schools of Muslim law is not
recognized as a guardian, natural or otherwise, even after the death of the father. Since the mother is
not the legal guardian of her minor children, she has no right to enter into a contract to alienate the
minor’s property.
The question of her being the natural guardian during the life time of the father does not arise. The
father’s right of guardianship exists even when the mother, or any other female, is entitled to the
custody of the minor.
The father’s right to control the education and religion of minor children is recognized. He also has the
right to control the upbringing and the movement of his minor children. So long as the father is alive,
he is the sole and supreme guardian of his minor children.
The father’s right of guardianship extends only over his minor legitimate children. He is neither
entitled to guardianship nor to custody of his minor illegitimate children at any time, even after the
death of the mother, though it is a different matter that he may be appointed as guardian by the court.
In Muslim law, the mother is not a natural guardian even of her minor illegitimate children, but she is
entitled to their custody.
Among the Sunnis, the father is the only natural guardian of the minor children. After the death of the
father, the guardianship passes on to his executor. Among the Shias, after the father, the guardianship
belongs to the grandfather, even if the father has appointed an executor; the executor of the father
becomes the guardian only in the absence of the grandfather.
It appears that the Shias consider the father as a natural guardian, and in his absence the grandfather
is considered to be the natural guardian. No other person can be a natural guardian, not even the
33
brother. In the absence of the grandfather, the guardianship belongs to the grandfather’s executor, if
any.
A minor cannot be represented by the grandfather when father is alive.
2. Testamentary Guardian:
Among the Sunnis, the father has full power of making a testamentary appointment of guardian. In the
absence of the father and his executor, the grandfather has the power of appointing a testamentary
guardian.
Among the Shias, the father’s appointment of testamentary guardian is valid only if the grandfather is
not alive. The grandfather, too, has the power of appointing a testamentary guardian. No other person
has any power of making an appointment of a testamentary guardian.
Among both the Shias and the Sunnis, the mother has no power of appointing a testamentary guardian
of her children. It is only in two cases in which the mother can appoint a testamentary guardian of the
property of her minor children, both legitimate and illegitimate viz., first when she has been appointed
a general executrix by the Will of the child’s father, she can appoint an executor by her Will, and
secondly, she can appoint an executor in respect of her own property which will devolve after her
death on her children.
The first exception is more apparent than real: any executor of the father has the power to appoint an
executor by his Will: this provision applies to all executors. The latter exception, too, has little
significance, since every person is free to appoint an executor of his or her own property.
The mother can be appointed a testamentary guardian or executor by the father, or by the grandfather,
whenever he can exercise this power. Among the Sunnis, the appointment of a non-Muslim mother as
testamentary guardian is valid, but among the Shias such as appointment is not valid, as they hold the
view that a non -Muslim cannot be a guardian of the person as well as the property of a minor.
According to all Muslim authorities, a non-Muslim alien cannot be appointed as a testamentary
guardian; if such an appointment is made it is null and void. It seems that the appointment of non-
Muslim fellow-subject (zimmi) is valid, though it may be set aside by the kazi According to the Malikis
and the Shafii law, a zimmi can be validly appointed testamentary guardian of the property of the
minor, but not of the person of the minor. The Shias also take the same view.
The Durr-ul-Muhtar states that’ if a minor, a bondman, non-Muslim or a fasik (reprobate), is appointed
as ‘a testamentary guardian, and then he should be replaced by the Kazi. But any act done by them
before their removal, will be valid.
Further, if disability ceases to exist before their removal, they cannot be removed. The Fatwai Alamgiri
also takes this view, but holds that the appointment of a minor or insane person as guardian is void,
and, therefore, any act done by them before or after his removal will be void and non-effective.
There is some controversy among the Muslim jurists on the point whether a person, who was a minor
at the time of his appointment but who ceased to be so before his removal, can be removed on the
ground that when his appointment was made, he was unqualified. It appears that when two persons
are appointed as guardians, and one of them is disqualified, the other can act as guardian.
The Muslim jurists of all schools agree that a profligate, i.e., a person who bears in public walk of life a
notoriously bad character, cannot be appointed as guardian. However, all acts done by such a person
before his removal are valid and binding unless found to be contrary to the interest of the minor.
Acceptance of the appointment of testamentary guardianship is necessary, though acceptance may be
express or implied. But once the guardianship is accepted, it cannot be renounced save with the
permission of the court.
Muslim law does not lay down any specific formalities for the appointment of testamentary guardians.
Appointment may be made in writing or orally. In every case the intention to appoint a testamentary
guardian must be clear and unequivocal.
34
A testamentary deposition made by a testator may be invalid, but appointment of the testamentary
guardian of minor children will be valid. The appointment of the executor may be general or
particular.
The testator must have the capacity to make the Will at the time when it was executed. This means
that the testator should be major, of sound mind, i.e., at the time of execution of the Will he should be
in full possession of his senses.
The executor of the testamentary guardian is designated variously by Muslim law-givers, indicating his
position and powers. He is commonly called, wasi or guardian. He is also called amin, i.e., a trustee. He
is also termed as kaim-mukam, i.e., the personal representative of the testator.
As in other systems of law, it is the duty of the executor under Muslim law to administer the estate and
assets of the testator, to carry out the wishes of the testator with utmost fidelity, and to act as guardian
of the minor children whenever he is appointed as a testamentary guardian.
3. Guardian appointed by the Court( De Facto guardian):
On the failure of the natural guardians and testamentary guardians, the kazi was entrusted with the
power of appointment of guardian of a Muslim minor. In modern India, the Muslim law of appointment
of guardians by the Kazi stands abrogated.
Now the matter is governed by the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. This Act applies to the
appointment of guardians of all minors belonging to any community. The High Court’s also have
inherent powers of appointment of guardians, though the power is exercised sparingly.
Under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, the power of appointing or declaring any person as
guardian is conferred on the District Court. The District Court may appoint or declare any person as
guardian of a minor child’s person as well as property whenever it considers it necessary for the
welfare of the minor, taking into consideration the age, sex, wishes, of the child as well as the wishes of
the parents and the personal law of the minor.
In Rahima v. Sabuijaness, the Gauhati High Court said that when mother had remarried after the death
of her husband, she should not be appointed a guardian of her minor daughter. The paternal
grandmother would be a preferable guardian and the court appointed her accordingly, M. Sharma, J.
said:
The disqualification to be a guardian is, if the mother married second time. As regards the mother or a
female guardian, marriage to a person not related to the child within the prohibited degrees is a bar to
guardianship.
It is further provided that the mother does not lose the custody of her infant children merely because
she is no longer the wife of her former husband, but where she marries a second husband, the custody
of such children normally belongs to her former husband.
In that case other relations failing the mother, by absence or disqualification, the following female
relations are entitled to custody in order of priority—
(i) Mother’s mother, how high so ever,
(ii) Father’s mother, how high so ever and
(iii) Full sister and other female relations including aunts.
35
MAINTENANCE
Assessment of MaintenanceEntitlement & Loss of Maintenance:

Termination of Wife’s Maintenance
Maintenance consists of the provisions of accommodation, food, and clothing. It is a lawful right of the
wife under a valid marriage irrespective of her means or religion. The entitlement of the wife to
maintenance derives its authority from the Quran, Prophet’s tradition and consensus. In Surah Al-
Nisa, Verse 34, The Quran says: “Men are the protectors and maintainers of women because God has
given the one more (strength) that the other, and because they support them from their means”.
I.) Assessment of Maintenance:

The scale of maintenance was not discussed in The Holy Quran or the Sunna, but it was rather left to
juristic opinions. It is calculated in Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali law as the mean between the
resources of the husband and the previous living standard of the wife. However, Shafis and Shia’s fix
it according to the means of the husband alone.
The husband is required to provide the wife with a house that is safe both structurally and in location
and is free from any other members of his families, including other co–wives. The only exception is
that the husband can require his wife to live with infant children of his previous marriage, although
Shia school differs.
The right to be maintained belongs to the wife even if she is wealthy and her husband poor. When the
husband has no means at all, this is a misfortune that has to be shared by the wife.
II.) Entitlement & Loss of Maintenance:

Maintenance shall be due to the wife during the subsistence of a marriage if all the following
conditions are fulfilled:
2. Lack
of access
1. Valid 3.
marriag obidienc
e e
Condition
s
36
1. A Valid Marriage – In a Batil (void) or Fasid (irregular) marriage, the wife shall not be entitled to
maintenance, since the husband has no lawful right of access to her. The wife shall also lose her right
to maintenance if she apostasies because apostasy renders the marriage contract void.
2. Lack of Access – It is tamkeen, i.e. availability of the wife for her husband, and not the marriage
itself, that makes maintenance the right of the wife, this right shall be lost if the husband is denied
access to the wife at all lawful times. Thus, a woman in jail is not entitled to maintenance, even if she is
innocent and consummation has occurred. The same rule applies for a kidnapped wife.
3. Obedience – A disobedient wife has no right to maintenance. The husband’s duty to maintain
begins when the wife submits her to husband. If the wife declares herself ready to start cohabiting
with the husband, he is to maintain her even if she is living in the house of her guardian, as she has
done everything she could. Even a minor husband is obliged to maintain his wife, if he is of an age
where consummation is possible.
Sharia defines a disobedient wife as a woman who leaves the matrimonial home without a lawful
excuse. The Shias consider as a lawful excuse, wife visiting her sick father who needs her to stay with
him, having nobody else to look after him, even if the husband denied permission. Both Sunnis and
Shias agree that there will be no maintenance for a wife who goes to work without the husband's
permission. The disobedient wife’s lost right to maintenance shall be revived on the removal of the
cause.
Similarly, the wife’s maintenance shall be suspended if she travels, unaccompanied by her husband.
The wife is bound to travel with her husband to whatever he wishes, provided that she is safe and
unless otherwise stipulated in the marriage contract.
However, if the wife disobeys her husband for some lawful reason, then the right to maintenance does
not extinguish. Non-payment of prompt dower is a reasonable ground for a wife to refuse to live with
her husband e.g. “Rahim Jan v. Muhammad”.
III.) Termination of Wife’s Maintenance:
Wife’s maintenance terminates
Death Divorc
e
Regarding divorce, all schools agree that if the divorce is “revocable”, the wife is entitled to
maintenance throughout the idda, because repudiation is a matter in the husband’s hands and wife
still remains under his control.
If, however, the divorce is “irrevocable”, then only Hanafis allow maintenance during idda. The Malikis
states that such a woman is entitled to full maintenance only when she is actually pregnant. If she is
non-pregnant, then the wife is entitled to lodging only during the idda.
All schools agree that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to no maintenance after the idda period,
the rationale being that these women would normally return to their natural family or would remarry.
However, if a man wants to provide maintenance for the rest of her life is not preventing from doing so
by any provision of Muslim law. This area has been a subject of considerable reforms.
Surah Al-Baqara, Verse 236 provides that Mutat is payable in deserving cases as a matter of goodwill
and of custom. However, this remedy is not a general entitlement. Various Muslim states have
incorporated the Mutat payments in their statutes. In Syria, Jordan and Egypt, the law agree on the
principles in general but they differ on the amount payable. Generally, the wife will be entitled to
37
Mutat, on repudiation by the husband after consummation, as compensation for an arbitrary talaq i.e.
if it is proven to a qadi that the husband exercised talaq without a lawful justification. In Syria, the
amount payable should not be in excess of the amount of maintenance for her equals for three years.
In Jordan, the amount is equivalent of the maintenance due to her for a year. In Egypt, the amount is
equivalent of the maintenance due to her for two years.
In South Asia, rather on Mutat, reforms have taken place on the wife’s right of maintenance itself. In
India, S.2(2) DMMA 1939 allows Muslim women to seek divorce if her husband fails to maintain her
for two years. However, in India, the reforms started with the coming of S.125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure 1973 in which the definition of a wife, entitled to maintenance, also included an
unmarried “divorcee”.
In the controversial case of “Shah Banu”, a Muslim husband drove his wife, an old lady, out of the
house after contracting a second marriage. She filed a petition for maintenance under the 1973 Code.
The husband gave the respondent an irrevocable talaq and his defence to the lady’s claim for
maintenance was that she had ceased to be his wife. The Supreme Court confirmed the High Court’s
decision that she was entitled to maintenance.
The Supreme Court stated that that there is inadequate proof to support the proposition that a Muslim
husband is not under an obligation to provide for the maintenance of his divorced wife, “who is unable
to maintain herself”. The court said that the true position is that the classical Islamic law provides no
maintenance, with the expiration of idda, for a divorcee who “can” maintain herself. However, if she
“cannot” maintain herself, then she can take recourse to S.125. The court supported this proposition
with the Surah Baqara, Verse 236 and 241-42 which provided that for divorced woman,
maintenance should be provided on a reasonable scale and this was a duty on the righteous Muslim.
The decision in this case was opposed by various Muslim scholars. Mahmood argued that once the
idda period is over, it is the duty of the wife’s natural parents to maintain her. In his view women were
being treated too favourably by the law and that the basic principles of Muslim law were being
violated in the process.
However, I disagree with his views. The Supreme Court did nothing than to reflect the true Islamic
position. Though one may say that it’s unfair to force an ex-husband to maintain his ex-wife till death,
but conversely it is equally unfair to a let a woman die on the streets that has on other means of
survival. It is not correct to say that Muslim law is being violated, because the above mentioned
Quranic verses themselves say that divorced women should be provided maintenance on a reasonable
scale and it is not unfair to the husband because the scale of reasonable payment is judged according
to the means of the husband alone, i.e. a poor ex-husband should pay less for maintenance and a rich
ex-husband should pay more. It is very harsh to say that this decision favours women heavily just
because of the fact that the decision hits the pockets of many Muslim husbands.
In explicit reaction to this case, the Muslim Woman (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 was
promulgated. This has done precisely what its name suggests and has proved rather beneficial to
divorced Muslim wives who were unable to maintain themselves appropriately after the idda.
S.3 of 1986 Act offers a more or less instant remedy today to any divorced Muslim wife in India who,
at the end of the idda period, finds that her ex-husband has not made reasonable provisions for her
future maintenance. After this Act, there are a number of High Court cases which supports the view
that the divorcing husband remains liable for his former wife’s welfare. Only the very few cases go the
other way.
In Ali v. Sufaira, the judge again turned to the Quranic text and said that Surah 2, verse 236-37 and
241-42 makes it clear that any Muslim must give a reasonable amount by way of gift or maintenance
to the divorced lady and they are not limited to the period of idda. It was therefore held that under
S.3(1)(a) of the Act a divorcee is entitled to maintenance for the period of idda as well as a reasonable
and fair provision for her future.
Contrastingly, in Usman Khan v. Fathimunnisa Begum, the judge examined the precise wording of
S.3(1)(a) in particular the phrase “within the idda period” and concluded that the husband is not liable
38
to make reasonable and fair provisions beyond idda period. However, the decision in this case seemed
faulty ignoring the intention behind the 1986 Act and the idealistic spirit of the Quranic provisions.
Under the Quranic law Mutat is payable in deserving cases only and not unconditionally to every
female divorcee. The cloak under the 1986 Act gives an absolute right to all divorcees irrespective of
the circumstances.
In Pakistan and Bangladesh S.9 MFLO 1961 places an obligation on the Muslim husband to maintain
his wife(s) during marriage. The socio religious problems of maintenance are same, but in Pakistani
law a divorcee is no longer a wife and therefore gets no maintenance beyond idda. Neither the
Pakistani law makers nor the Pakistani courts had considered the matter in any depth and the current
situation is that the burden of maintaining divorced women is normally borne by the natural family,
rather than the divorcing husband or his family.
However, Bangladesh also seems to follow India. In Md. Hefzur Rahman v. Shamsun Nahar, it was
held that a person after divorcing his wife is bound to maintain her on a reasonable scale beyond the
idda till she remarries.
39
UNIT IV
WILL
Will is the Anglo Mohammedan word for Wasiyat. Generally, Wasiyat means will, but also has other
meanings. It may signify a moral exhortation, a specific legacy, or the capacity of the executor. In
general, a will means a document containing the desire, regarding how a person wants to utilize or
divide his property, after he is dead. According to section 2(h) of Indian Succession Act 1925, Will is
the legal declaration of the intention of a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be
carried into effect after his death.
For a Muslim, Wasiyat is a divine institution because it is regulated by Quran. It offers to the testator a
means to change the course of inheritance to certain extent and to recognize the value of those
relatives who are excluded from inheritance or strangers who might have helped him in life or in last
moments. Prophet Mohammad has declared that this power is not unrestricted and should not be
exercised to the injury of the lawful heirs.
1. 1. Competency of
Competency the testator (who can
of
the testator make the will)
Any Muslim,
including a man or a
woman, who is major
4. Extent of Essentials 2.
of a valid and is of sound mind
power of Competency can make a will.
will Muslim of the legatee
will Regarding wills, the
age of majority is
governed by Indian
Majority Act. A will
3. Validity of made by a minor is
the subject of
will invalid but it can be
validated by
ratification after he
attains majority. A person of unsound mind is not competent to make a will and a will made by
such a person is invalid. A will made by a person while of sound mind, who later becomes
of unsound mind, becomes invalid.
In Abdul Manan Khan vs Mirtuza Khan AIR 1991, Patna HC held that any Mohammadan
having a sound mind and not a minor may make a valid will to dispose off the property. So far
as a deed is concerned, no formality or a particular form is required in law for the purpose of
creating a valid will. An unequivocal expression by the testator serves the purpose.
Will of a person committing suicide - Under Sunni Law the will of a person committing
suicide is valid. Under Shia law, a will made by the person who has done any act towards
committing suicide is invalid but if the will is made before doing of any act towards committing
suicide, it is valid.
40
2. Competency of the legatee

Any person capable of holding property may be the legatee under a will. Thus, sex, age, creed,
or religion are no bar. However, no one can be made the beneficial owner of the shares against
his will, therefore, to complete the transfer, the legatee must give his express or implied
consent to accepting the legacy.
An institution can be a legatee. A non-muslim can be a legatee if he is not an enemy of Islam
and is not hostile towards Islam. In Sunni law, a testator's murderer cannot be a legatee. In
Shia law, if the act of the murderer was an accident, he can be a legatee otherwise not.
Unborn person - In Sunni Law, a child born within 6 months of the date of making of the will
is considered to be in existence and is a valid legatee. In Shia law, the period is 10 months,
which is the maximum period of gestation.
Bequest for a charitable object is valid.
3. Validity of the subject of will - To be able to will a property, it must be -
a. capable of being transferred.
b. in existence at the time of testator's death even if it is not in existence at the time of
making will. Thus, a bequest cannot be made of anything that is to be performed or
produced in future.
c. in the ownership of the testator.
A bequest that is to take effect only upon any uncertain event happening is a contingent bequest, and
is void. However, a bequest with a condition that derogates from its completeness is valid and will
take effect as if the condition did not exist. For example, a grant is made to X for his life and then it is
stipulated to go to Y after death of X. In this case, X will get the grant completely and Y will get nothing.
Thus, a bequest of life estate is not valid either under Shia or Sunni Law.
4. Extent of power of will - The testamentary power of a muslim is limited in two ways –
a. Limitations as regards to person - The general rule is laid down in Ghulam Mohammad
vs Ghulam Hussain 1932 by Allahbad HC, that a bequest in favour of a heir is not valid
unless the other heirs consent to the bequest after the death of the testator. Whether a person
is a heir or not is determined at the time of testator's death.
Under Shia law, a testator may bequest a heir as long as it does not exceed one third of his
property and no consent of other heirs is required. In Hussaini Begam vs Mohammad Mehdi
1927, it was held that if all the property was bequested to one heir and other were not given
anything, the bequest was void in its entirety.
b. Limitations as regard to the amount - The general principle is that a muslim is not
allowed to will more than 1/3rd of his property after taking out funeral charges and debt.
However, under Hanafi law, it may be valid if heirs give the consent after the death of the
testator. In Shia law, such consent can be taken either before or after the death. Another
exception is that if the testator has no heir, he can will any amount. The govt. cannot act as an
heir to the heirless person.
Differences between Shia and Sunni Law on Will
Sunni Law Shia Law

Bequest to an heir without consent of other Bequest up to 1/3 of the property is valid even
heirs is invalid. without consent.
Bequest to unborn child is valid if the child is Valid if the child is born within 10 months of
born within 6 months of making the will. making the will.
Bequest to unborn child is valid if the child is Valid if the child is born within 10 months of
born within 6 months of making the will. making the will.
Legatee who causes death even by accident is Legatee who causes death by accident is
incapable of receiving. capable.
41
For a bequest of more than 1/3 to a non-heir,

Heir's consent may be obtained before or after
the consent of heir must be obtained after the
death.
death of testator.
Valid only if the will is made before the person
Will of a person committing suicide is valid.
does any act towards committing suicide.
Recognizes rate able distribution. Does not recognize rate able distribution.
If the legatee dies before testator, the legacy The legacy lapses only if the legatee dies without
lapses and goes back to the testator. heirs otherwise, it goes to legatee's heirs.
Legatee must accept the legacy after the death of Legatee can accept the legacy even before the
the testator. death of the testator.
Differences between Will and Gift

Gift Will
It is an immediate transfer of right or interest. It is a transfer after death.
Delivery of possession is necessary. Delivery of possession is not necessary.
Subject of gift must exist at the time of making Subject of will must exist at the time of death
gift. of the testator.
Right of donor is unrestricted. It is limited up to 1/3rd of the property.
Cannot be revoked. Can be revoked by making another will.
Gift
Gift is a generic term that includes all transfers of property without consideration. In India, Gift is
considered equivalent to Hiba but technically, Gift has a much wider scope than Hiba. The word Hiba
literally means, the donation of a thing from which the donee may derive a benefit. It must be
immediate and complete. The most essential element of Hiba is the declaration, "I have given".
As per Hedaya, Hiba is defined technically as, "unconditional transfer of property, made immediately
and without any exchange or consideration, by one person to another and accepted by or on behalf of
the latter".
According to Fyzee, Hiba is the immediate and unqualified transfer of the corpus of the property
without any return.
The gift of the corpus of a thing is called Hiba and the gift of only the usufructs of a property is called
Ariya.
Essential
Elements of
a Gift
A declaration Delivery of
by the donor possesion
Acceptance by
the Donee
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Since muslim law views the law of Gift as a part of law of contract, there must be an offer (izab), an
acceptance (qabul), and transfer (qabza). In Smt Hussenabi vs Husensab Hasan AIR 1989 Kar, a
grandfather made an offer of gift to his grandchildren. He also accepted the offer on behalf of minor
grandchildren. However, no express of implied acceptance was made by a major grandson. Karnataka
HC held that since the three elements of the gift were not present in the case of the major grandchild,
the gift was not valid. It was valid in regards to the minor grandchildren.
Thus, the following are the essentials of a valid gift –

1. A declaration by the donor - There must be a clear and unambiguous intention of the donor
to make a gift.
2. Acceptance by the donee - A gift is void if the donee has not given his acceptance. Legal
guardian may accept on behalf of a minor.
3. Delivery of possession by the donor and taking of the possession by the done- In Muslim
law the term possession means only such possession as the nature of the subject is capable of.
Thus, the real test of the delivery of possession is to see who - whether the donor or the donee
- reaps the benefits of the property. If the donor is reaping the benefit then the delivery is not
done and the gift is invalid.
Conditions of valid gift
Parties Conditions Subject of Extent of

for Gift Gift Donors
right to
gift
The following are the conditions which must be satisfied for a valid gift.
1. Parties - There must be two parties to a gift transaction - the donor and the done:-
a. Conditions for Donor - (Who can give)
i) Must have attained the age of majority - Governed by Indian Majority Act 1875.
ii) Must be of sound mind and have understanding of the transaction.
iii) Must be free of any fraudulent or coercive advice as well as undue influence.
iv) Must have ownership over the property to be transferred by way of gift.
A gift by a married woman is valid and is subjected to same legal rules and consequences. A gift by
a pardanashin woman is also valid but in case of a dispute the burden of proof that the transaction was
not conducted by coercion or undue influence is on the donee.
Gift by a person in insolvent circumstances is valid provided that it is bona fide and not merely
intended to defraud the creditors.
b. Conditions for Donee (who can receive)
i) Any person capable of holding property, which includes a juristic person,
may be the donee of a gift. A muslim may also make a lawful gift to a non-
muslim.
ii) Donee must be in existence at the time of giving the gift. In case of a minor
or lunatic, the possession must be given to the legal guardian otherwise the
gift is void.
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iii) Gift to an unborn person is void. However, gift of future usufructs to an

unborn person is valid provided that the donee is in being when the
interest opens out for heirs.
2. Conditions for Gift (What can be gifted) –
a. It must be designable under the term mal.
b. It must be in existence at the time when the gift is made. Thus, gift of anything that is to
be made in future is void.
c. The donor must possess the gift.
Muslim law recognizes the difference between the corpus and the usufructs of a property. Corpus, or
Ayn, means the absolute right of ownership of the property which is heritable and is unlimited in point
of time, while, usufructs, or Manafi, means the right to use and enjoy the property. It is limited and is
not heritable. The gift of the corpus of a thing is called Hiba and the gift of only the usufructs of a
property is called Ariya.
In Nawazish Ali Khan vs Ali Raza Khan AIR 1984, it was held that gift of usufructs is valid in Muslim
law and that the gift of corpus is subject to any such limitations imposed due to usufructs being gifted
to someone else. It further held that gift of life interest is valid and it doesn't automatically enlarge into
gift of corpus. This ruling is applicable to both Shia and Sunni.
3. Subject of Gift - The general principle is that the subject of a gift can be –
a. anything over which dominion or right of property may be exercised.
b. anything which may be reduced to possession.
c. anything which exists either as a specific entity or as an enforceable right.
d. anything which comes within the meaning of the word mal.
In Rahim Bux vs Mohd. Hasen 1883, it was held that gift of services is not valid because it does not
exist at the time of making the gift.
Gift of an indivisible property can be made to more than one persons.
4. Extent of Donors right to gift - General rule is that a donors right to gift is unrestricted.
In Ranee Khajoorunissa vs Mst Roushan Jahan 1876, it was recognized by the privy council
that a donor may gift all or any portion of his property even if it adversely affects the expectant
heirs. However, there is one exception that the right of gift of a person on death bed (Marz ul
maut) is restricted in following ways - He cannot gift more than one third of his property and
he cannot gift it to any of his heirs.
Kinds of
Gift
Hiba Hiba ba
Shart ul
bil Iwaz Iwaz
Ariat Sadaqah
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Kinds of Gift
There are several variations of Hiba. For example, Hiba bil Iwaz, Hiba ba Shart ul Iwaz, Sadaqah, and
Ariat.
Hiba Bil Iwaz - Hiba means gift and Iwaz means consideration. Hiba Bil Iwaz means gift for
consideration already received. It is thus a transaction made up of two mutual or reciprocal gifts
between two persons. One gift from donor to donee and one from donee to donor. The gift and return
gift are independent transactions which together make up Hiba bil Iwaz.
In India, it was introduced as a device for affecting a gift of Mushaa in a property capable of division. So
a Hiba Bil Iwaz is a gift for consideration and in reality it is a sale. Thus, registration of the gift is
necessary and the delivery of possession is not essential and prohibition against Mushaa does not
exist. The following are requisites of Hiba bil Iwaz –
1. Actual payment of consideration on the part of the donee is necessary.

In Khajoorunissa vs Raushan Begam 1876, held that adequacy of the consideration is not the
question. As long is the consideration is bona fide, it is valid no matter even if it is insufficient.
2. A bona fide intention on the part of the donor to divest himself of the property is essential.
Gift in lieu of dower debt - In Gulam Abbas vs Razia AIR 1951, All HC held that an oral transfer of
immovable property worth more than 100/- cannot be validly made by a muslim husband to his wife
by way of gift in lieu of dower debt which is also more than 100/-. It is neither Hiba nor Hiba bil Iwaz.
It is a sale and must done through a registered instrument.
Hiba ba Shartul Iwaz - Shart means stipulation and Hiba ba Shart ul Iwaz means a gift made with a
stipulation for return. Unlike in Hiba bil Iwaz, the payment of consideration is postponed. Since the
payment of consideration is not immediate the delivery of possession is essential. The transaction
becomes final immediately upon delivery. When the consideration is paid, it assumes the character of
a sale and is subject to presumption (Shufa). As in sale, either party can return the subject of the sale in
case of a defect. It has the following requisites –
1. Delivery of possession is necessary.
2. It is revocable until the Iwaz is paid.
3. It becomes irrevocable after the payment of Iwaz.
4. Transaction when completed by payment of Iwaz, assumes the character of a sale.
In general, Hiba bil Iwaz and Hiba ba Shart ul Iwaz are similar in the sense that they are both gifts for a
return and the gifts must be made in compliance with all the rules relating to simple gifts.
Ariat - An ariat, the grant of some limited interest in respect of the use or usufruct of some property
or right.
Where a gift of any property or right is made without consideration with the object of acquiring
religious merit, it is called sadaqah.
Sadaqah or Saddka- It is an Islamic term that means "voluntary charity". This concept encompasses
any act of giving out of compassion, love, friendship (fraternity), religious duty or generosity. Sadaqah
is not restricted to giving part of our wealth or material possessions or any special deed of
righteousness. Islam considers all good deeds as sadaqah that increase our eeman.
To be able to enjoy Allah’s tremendous rewards for every sadaqah that we give, we need to observe
the following teachings:
1. Sadaqah must be done sincerely for the pleasure of Allah and not out of riya‘ (show off) to gain
praise or recognition from others.
2. It is better to conceal what we give or do as sadaqah.
3. Sadaqah must be from halal (lawful) source.
4. Begin charity with your dependents.
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5. Not to delay giving of sadaqah nor show lethargy or negligence in giving sadaqah.
6. Do not count the sadaqah you give.
7. Seek only the desire to see Allah, which is the supreme success in Paradise. Do not expect
favor or reward from any person for the sadaqah you give.
Differences between Hiba, Hiba bil Iwaz, and Hiba ba Shart ul Iwaz –
Hiba Hiba bil Iwaz Hiba ba Shart ul Iwaz
Ownership in property is
Ownership in property is
Ownership in property is transferred for consideration
transferred for consideration
transferred without called iwaz. But there is no
called iwaz, with an express
consideration. express agreement for a return.
agreement for a return.
Iwaz is voluntary.
Delivery of possession is Delivery of possession is NOT Delivery of possession is
essential. essential. essential.
Gift of mushaa where a Gift of mushaa even where a Gift of mushaa where a
property is divisible is invalid. property is divisible is valid. property is divisible is invalid.
Barring a few exceptions it is It is revocable until the iwaz is

It is irrevocable.
revocable. paid. Irrevocable after that.
In its inception it is a gift but
It is a pure gift. It is like a contract of sale. becomes a sale after the iwaz is
paid.
Exceptions in delivery of possession

The following are the cases where deliver of possession by the donor to the donee is not required –
Gift by a father to his minor or lunatic son. In Mohd Hesabuddin vs Mohd. Hesaruddin AIR 1984,
the donee was looking after the donor, his mother while other sons were neglecting her. The donor
gifted the land to the donee and the donee subsequently changed the name on the land records. It was
held that it was a valid gift even though there was no delivery of land.
1. When the donor and the donee reside in the same house which is to be gifted. In such a case,
departure of the donor from the house is not required.
2. Gift by husband to wife or vice versa. The delivery of possession is not required if the donor
had a real and bona fide intention of making the gift.
3. Gift by one co-sharer to other. Bona fide intention to gift is required.
4. Part delivery - Where there is evidence that some of the properties in a gift were delivered, the
delivery of the rest may be inferred.
5. Zamindari villages - Delivery is not required where the gift includes parcels of land in
zamindari if the physical possession is immpossible. Such gift may be completed by mutation
of names and transfer of rents and incomes.
6. Subject matter in occupation of tenant - If a tenant is occupying the property the gift may be
affected by change in ownership records and by a request to the tenant to attorn the donee.
7. Incorporeal rights - The gift may be completed by any appropriate method of transfering all
the control that the nature of the gift admits from the donor to the donee. Thus, a gift of govt.
promissory note may be affected by endorsement and delivery to the donee.
8. Where the donee is in possession - Where the donee is already in possession of the property,
delivery is not required. However, if the property is in adverse possession of the donee, the gift
is not valid unless either the donor recovers the possession and delivers it to donee or does
all that is in his power to let the donee take the possession.
46
Gift to Void
unborn Gift Continge
person nt gift
Gift in
future
Void Gifts
The following gifts are void:-
1. Gift to unborn person. But a gift of life interest in favor on an unborn person is valid if he
comes into existence when such interest opens out.
2. Gifts in future - A thing that is to come into existence in future cannot be made. Thus, a gift of
a crop that will come up in future is void.
3. Contingent gift - A gift that takes affect after the happening of a contingency is void. Thus a gift
by A to B if A does not get a male heir is void.
Gift with a condition

A gift must always be unconditional. When a gift is made with a condition that obstructs its
completeness, the gift is valid but the condition becomes void. Thus, if A gifts B his house on a
condition that B will not sell it or B will sell it only to C, the condition is void and B takes full rights of
the house.
Mushaa (Hiba bil mushaa)

Mushaa means undivided share in a property. The gift of undivided share in an indivisible property is
valid under all schools but there is no unanimity of opinion amongst different schools about gift of
undivided share in a property that is divisible. In Shafai and Ithna Asharia laws it is valid if the donor
withdraws his control over the property in favor of the donee. But under Hanafi law, such a gift is
invalid unless it is separated and delivered to the donee.
Illustration -
A, B, and C are the co-owners of a house. Since a house cannot be divided, A can give his undivided
share of the house to D in gift.
A, B, and C are the co-owners of 3 Tons of Wheat, under Shafai and Ithna Ahsharia law, A can give his
undivided share of the wheat to D if he withdraws control over it but under Hanafi law, A cannot do so
unless the wheat is divided and the A delivers the possession of 1 ton of wheat to D.
In case of Kashim Hussain vs Sharif Unnisa 1883, A gifted his house to B along with the right to use
a staircase, which was being used by C as well. This gift was held valid because staircase is indivisible.
Revocation of a Gift
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Under muslim law, all volutary transactions are revocable and so under Hanafi law a gift is also
generally revocable, though it is held to be abominable. In Shia law, a gift can be revoked by mere
declaration while in Sunni law, it can be revoked only by the intervention of the court of law or by the
consent of the donee.
The following gifts, however, are absolutely irrevocable –
1. When the donor is dead.
2. When the donee is dead.
3. When the donee is related to the donor in prohibited degrees on consanguinity. However, in
Shia law, a gift to any blood relative is irrevocable.
4. When donor and the donee stand in marital relationship. However, in Shia law, a gift to
husband by wife or vice versa is revocable.
5. when the subject of the gift has been transfered by the donee through a sale or gift.
6. when the subject of the gift is lost or destroyed, or so changed as to lose its identity.
7. when the subject of the gift has increased in value and the increment is inseparable.
8. when the gift is a sadqa.
9. when anything as been accepted in return.
Wakf
Literal meaning of Wakf is detention, stoppage, or tying up as observed in M Kazim vs A Asghar Ali
AIR 1932. Technically, it means a dedication of some specific property for a pious purpose or
secession of pious purposes. As defined by Muslim jurists such as Abu Hanifa, Wakf is the detention of
a specific thing that is in the ownership of the waqif or appropriator, and the devotion of its profits or
usufructs to charity, the poor, or other good objects, in the manner of aerate or commodity loan.
Wakf Act 1954 defines Wakf as, "Wakf means the permanent dedication by a person professing the
Islam, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognized by Muslim Law as religious,
pious, or charitable."
Essentials of valid
wakf
1. Permanent 3. By any purpose

Dedication of any recognized by a
property Muslim law
2. By a Muslim
Essentials of a valid Wakf

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1. Permanent Dedication of any property - There are actually three aspects in this
requirement. There must be a dedication, the dedication must be permanent, and
the dedication can be of the property. There is no prescribed form of dedication. It can be
written or oral but it must be clear to convey the intention of dedication. According to Abu
Yusuf, whose word is followed in India, mere declaration of dedication is sufficient for
completion of Wakf. Neither delivery of possession or appointment of Mutawalli is necessary.
The dedication must be permanent. A temporary dedication such as for a period of 10 years or
until death of someone is invalid.
The subject of Wakf can be any tangible property (mal) which can used without being
consumed. In Abdul Sakur vs Abu Bakkar 1930, it was held that there are no restrictions as
long as the property can be used without being consumed and thus, a valid Wakf can be
created not only of immovable property but also of movable property such as shares of a
company or even money. Some subjects that Hanafi law recognizes are immovable property,
accessories to immovable property, or books.
The subject of the Wakf must be in the ownership of the dedicator, wakif. One cannot dedicate
someone else's property.
2. By a Muslim - A Wakf can only be created by a Muslim. Further, the person must have
attained the age of majority as per Indian Majority Act and should be of sound mind.
3. For any purpose recognized by Muslim Law - The purpose is also called the object of
Wakf and it can be any purpose recognized as religious, pious, or charitable, as per Muslim
Law. It is not necessary that a person must name a specific purpose. He can also declare that
the property may be used for any welfare works permitted by Shariat.
In Zulfiqar Ali vs Nabi Bux, the settlers of a Wakf provided that the income of certain shops
was to be applied firstly to the upkeep of the mosque and then the residue, if any, to the
remuneration of the mutawalli. It was held to be valid however, it was also pointed out that if
a provision of remuneration was created before the upkeep of the mosque, it would have been
invalid.
The following are some of the objects that have been held valid in several cases - Mosques and
provisions of Imam to conduct worship, celebrating birth of Ali Murtaza, repairs of
Imambaras, maintenance of Khanqahs, burning lamps in mosques, payment of money to
fakirs, grant to an idgah, grant to colleges and professors to teach in colleges, bridges and
caravan sarais.
In Kunhamutty vs Ahman Musaliar AIR 1935, Madras HC held that if there are no alms, the
performing of ceremonies for the benefit of the departed soul is not a valid object.
Some other invalid objects are - building or maintaining temple or church, providing for the
rich exclusively, objects which is uncertain.
Shia Law related to

Wakf
Shia Law - Besides the above requirements, Shia law imposes some more requirements for a
valid Wakf. There are –
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1. Delivery of possession to the first person in whose favour the Wakf has been created is
essential.
2. Dedication must be absolute and unconditional.
3. The property must be completely taken away from the wakif. It means that the wakif cannot
keep or reserve any benefit or interest, or even the usufructs of the dedicated property.
Creatio
n of
1.By an act of a wakf
living person 3. By usage
2. By will
Creation of Wakf
Muslim law does not prescribe any specific way of creating a Wakf. If the essential elements as
described above are fulfilled, a Wakf is created. Though it can be said that a Wakf is usually created in
the following ways –
1. By an act of a living person (inter vivos) - when a person declares his dedication of his
property for Wakf. This can also be done while the person is on death bed (marj ul maut), in
which case, he cannot dedicate more than 1/3 of his property for Wakf.
2. By will - when a person leaves a will in which he dedicates his property after his death. Earlier
it was thought that Shia cannot create Wakf by will but now it has been approved.
3. By Usage - when a property has been in use for charitable or religious purpose for time
immemorial, it is deemed to belong to Wakf. No declaration is necessary and Wakf is inferred.
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1.
Public
2.
Privat
e
Kinds
of
Wakf
a. Public -As the name suggests, a public Wakf is for the general religious and charitable purposes
while a private Wakf is for the creators own family and descendants and is technically calledWakf alal
aulad. It was earlier considered that to constitute a valid wakf there must be a complete dedication of
the property to God and thus private wakf was not at all possible.
b. Private - However, this view is not tenable now and a private wakf can be created subject to certain
limitation after Wakf Validating Act 1913. This acts allows a private wakf to be created for one's
descendants provided that the ultimate benefits are reserved for charity. Muslim Law treats both
public and private wakfs alike. Both types of wakf are created in perpetuity and the property becomes
inalienable.
Wakf alal aulad
can a wakf be created for one's family?

Wakf on one's children and thereafter on the poor is a valid wakf according to all the Muslim Schools
of Jurisprudence. This is because, under the Mohammedan Law, the word charity has a much wider
meaning and includes provisions made for one's own children and descendants. Charity to one's kith
and kin is a high act of merit and a provision for one's family or descendants, to prevent their falling
into indigence, is also an act of charity. The special features of wakf-alal-aulad is that only the
members of the wakif’s family should be supported out of the income and revenue of the wakf
property. Like other wakfs, wakf alal-aulad is governed by Muhammadan Law, which makes no
distinction between the wakfs either in point of sanctity or the legal incidents that follow on their
creation. Wakf alal aulad is, in the eye of the law, Divine property and when the rights of the wakif are
extinguished, it becomes the property of God and the advantage accrues to His creatures. Like the
public wakf, a wakf-alal-aulad can under no circumstances fail, and when the line of descendant
becomes extinct, the entire corpus goes to charity.
The institution of private wakf is traced to the prophet himself who created a benefaction for the
support of his daughter and her descendants and, in fact, placed it in the same category as a dedication
to a mosque.
Thus, it is clear that a wakf can be created for one's own family. However, the ultimate benefit must be
for some purpose which is recognized as pious, religious or charitable by Islam.
Quasi public Wakf

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Sometimes a third kind of wakf is also identified. In a Quasi public wakf, the primary object of which is
partly to provide for the benefit of particular individuals or class of individuals which may be the
settler's family, and partly to public, so they are partly public and partly private.
Contingent Wakf
A wakf, the creation of which depends on some event happening is called a contingent wakf and is
invalid. For example, if a person creates a wakf saying that his property should be dedicated to god if
he dies childless is an invalid wakf. Under shia law also, a wakf depending on certain contingencies is
invalid.
In Khaliluddin vs Shri Ram 1934, a muslim executed a deed for creating a wakf, which contained a
direction that until payment of specified debt by him, no proceeding under the wakfnama shall be
enforceable. It was held that it does not impose any condition on the creation of the wakf and so it is
valid.
Conditional Wakf
If a condition is imposed that when the property dedicated is mismanaged, it should be divided
amongst the heirs of the wakf, or that the wakif has a right to revoke the wakf in future, such a wakf
would be invalid. But a direction to pay debts, or to pay for improvements, repairs or expansion of the
wakf property or conditions relating to the appointment of Mutawalli would not invalidate the wakf.
In case of a conditional wakf, it depends upon the wakif to revoke the illegal condition and to make the
wakf valid, otherwise it would remain invalid.
Completion of wakf
The formation of a wakf is complete when a mutawalli is first appointed for the wakf. The mutalwalli
can be a third person or the wakif himself. When a third person is appointed as mutawalli, mere
declaration of the appointment and endowment by the wakif is enough. If the wakif appoints himself
as the first mutawalli, the only requirement is that the transaction should be bona fide. There is no
need for physical possession or transfer of property from his name as owner to his name as mutawalli.
In both the cases, however, mere intention of setting aside the property for wakf is not enough. A
declaration to that effect is also required.
In Garib Das vs M A Hamid AIR 1970, it was held that in cases where founder of the wakf himself is
the first mutawalli, it is not necessary that the property should be transferred from the name of the
donor as the owner in his own name as mutawalli.
52
Shia law –
1. Delivery of possession to the mutawalli is required for completion when the first mutawalli is a
third person.
2. Even when the owner himself is the first mutawalli, the character of the ownership must be
changed from owner to mutawalli in public register.
Legal Consequences (Legal Incidents) of Wakf

Once a wakf is complete, the following are the consequences –
1. Dedication to God - The property vests in God in the sense that no body can claim ownership
of it. In Md. Ismail vs Thakur Sabir Ali AIR 1962, SC held that even in wakf alal aulad, the
property is dedicated to God and only the usufructs are used by the descendants.
2. Irrevocable - In India, a wakf once declared and complete, cannot be revoked. The wakif
cannot get his property back in his name or in any other's name.
3. Permanent or Perpetual - Perpetuality is an essential element of wakf. Once the property is
given to wakf, it remains for the wakf for ever. Wakf cannot be of a specified time duration.
In Mst Peeran vs Hafiz Mohammad, it was held by Allahbad HC that the wakf of a house built
on a land leased for a fixed term was invalid.
4. Inalienable - Since Wakf property belongs to God, no human being can alienate it for himself
or any other person. It cannot be sold or given away to anybody.
5. Pious or charitable use - The usufructs of the wakf property can only be used for pious and
charitable purpose. It can also be used for descendants in case of a private wakf.
6. Extinction of the right of wakif - The wakif loses all rights, even to the usufructs, of the
property. He cannot claim any benefits from that property.
7. Power of court's inspection - The courts have the power to inspect the functioning or
management of the wakf property. Misuse of the property of usufructs is a criminal offence as
per Wakf Act.1995.
Revocation of Wakf
In India, once a valid wakf is created it cannot be revoked because nobody has the power to divest God
of His ownership of a property. It can neither be given back to the wakif nor can it be sold to someone
else, without court's permission.
A wakf created inter vivos is irrevocable. If the wakif puts a condition of revocability, the wakf is
invalid. However, if the wakf has not yet come into existence, it can be canceled. Thus, a testamentary
wakf can be canceled by the owner himself before his death by making a new will. Further, wakf
created on death bed is valid only up till 1/3 of the wakif's property. Beyond that, it is invalid and the
property does not go to wakf but goes to heirs instead.
Mutawalli
Mutawalli is nothing but the manager of a wakf. He is not the owner or even a trustee of the property.
He is only a superintendent whose job is the see that the usufructs of the property are being utilized
for valid purpose as desired by the wakif. He has to see that the intended beneficiaries are indeed
getting the benefits. Thus, he only has a limited control over the usufructs.
In Ahmad Arif vs Wealth Tax Commissioner AIR 1971, SC held that a mutawalli has no power to
sell, mortgage, or lease wakf property without prior permission of the court or unless that power is
explicitly provided to the mutawalli in wakfnama.
53
Who can be a mutawalli
A person who is a major, of sound mind, and who is capable of performing the functions of the wakf as
desired by the wakif can be appointed as a mutawalli. A male or female of any religion can be
appointed. If religious duties are a part of the wakf, then a female or a non-muslim cannot be
appointed.
In Shahar Bano vs Aga Mohammad 1907, Privy council held that there is no legal restriction on a
woman becoming a mutawalli if the duties of the wakf do not involve religious activities.
Who can appoint a

mutawalli
Generally, the wakif appoints a mutawalli. He can also appoint himself as a mutawalli. If a wakf is
created without appointing a mutawalli, in India, the wakf is considered valid and the wakif becomes
the first mutawalli in Sunni law but according to Shia law, even though the wakf remains valid, it has
to be administered by the beneficiaries. The wakif also has the power to lay down the rules to appoint
a mutawalli. The following is the order in which the power to nominate the mutawalli transfers if the
earlier one fails –
1. founder
2. executor of founder
3. mutawalli on his death bed
4. the court, which should follow the guidelines -
1. it should not disregard the directions of the settler but public interest must be given
more importance.
2. preference should be given to the family member of the wakif instead of utter stranger.
Powers of a mutawalli
Being the manager of the wakf, he is in charge of the usufructs of the property. He has the following
rights –
1. He has the power to utilize the usufructs as he may deem fit in the best interest of the purpose
of the wakf. He can take all reasonable actions in good faith to ensure that the intended
beneficiaries are benefited by the wakf. Unlike a trustee, he is not an owner of the property so
he cannot sell the property. However, the wakif may give such rights to the mutawalli by
explicitly mentioning them in wakfnama.
2. He can get a right to sell or borrow money by taking permission from the court upon
appropriate grounds or if there is an urgent necessity.
3. He is competent to file a suit to protect the interests of the wakf.
4. He can lease the property for agricultural purpose for less than three years and for non-
agricultural purpose for less than one year. He can exceed the term by permission of the court.
5. He is entitled to remuneration as provided by the wakif. If the remuneration is too small, he
can apply to the court to get an increase.
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Removal of a
Mutawali
1. By
Court 3. By
wakif
2. By
Wakf
board
Generally, once a mutawalli is duly appointed, he cannot be removed by the wakif. However, a
mutawalli can be removed in the following situations –
1. By court -
1. if he misappropriates wakf property.
2. even after having sufficient funds, does not repair wakf premises and wakf falls into
disrepair.
3. knowingly or intentionally causes damage or loss to wakf property. In Bibi Sadique
Fatima vs Mahmood Hasan AIR 1978, SC held that using wakf money to buy property
in wife's name is such breach of trust as is sufficient ground for removal of mutawalli.
4. he becomes insolvent.
2. By wakf board - Under section 64 of Wakf Act 1995, the Wakf board can remove mutawalli
from his office under the conditions mentioned therein.
3. By the wakif - As per Abu Yusuf, whose view is followed in India, even if the wakif has not
reserved the right to remove the mutawalli in wakf deed, he can still remove the mutawalli.
Gift of Mushaa: The Hanafi

Doctrine of Mushaa
The word Mushaa has been derived from the Arabic word Shuyua which literally means ‘confusion’.
Under Muslim law, Mushaa signifies an undivided share in a joint property. Mushaa is therefore, a co-
owned or joint property.
If one of the several owners of this property makes a gift of his own share, there may be a confusion as
to which portion or part of the property is to be given to the donee In other words, there may be a
practical difficulty in the delivery of possession if gift of a joint property is made by a donor without
partition of the gifted share.
To avoid any such confusion and difficulty at the stage of delivery of possession, the Hanafi jurists have
evolved the principle of Mushaa. Where the subject-matter of a gift is co-owned or joint property, the
doctrine of Mushaa is applied for examining the validity of the gift.
Under the Hanafi doctrine of Mushaa, gift of a share in the co-owned property is invalid (irregular)
without partition and actual delivery of that part of the property to the donee. However, if the co-
owned property is not capable of partition or division, the doctrine of Mushaa is inapplicable. Hedaya
lays down this doctrine in the following words:
“A gift of part of thing which is capable of division is not valid unless they said part be divided off and
separated from the property of the donor; but a gift of part of an indivisible thing is valid…………………”
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Mushaa
1.Mushaa 2. Mushaa
divisible indivisible
Law relating to both the kinds of Mushaa properties is given below:-

Mushaa Indivisible:
Gift of Mushaa indivisible is valid. There are certain properties which are by nature indivisible. The
physical partition or division of such properties is not practical. Moreover, if against the nature of such
properties, their partition or division is affected at all, their identity is lost; they do not remain the
same properties which they were before the partition. For example, a bathing ghat, a stair case or a
cinema house etc. are indivisible Mushaa properties.
If, on the bank of a river or tank, there is bathing ghat which is in the co-ownership of two or more
persons, then each owner has right to deal with his share as he likes including the right to make a gift
of his share.
But, if a sharer attempts to separate his share, the utility of the ghat would be finished. Where a stair
case is co-owned by, say two persons, then each being the owner of half of the stair-case, is entitled to
make a Hiba of his share.
But, if the stair-case is divided into two parts, it would either be too narrow to be used by any one, or
the upper half may come in the share of one and the remaining lower half in the other’s share. In both
the cases the stair case would become useless for both of them and also for the donee.
The doctrine of Mushaa is not applicable where the subject-matter of gift is indivisible. According to all
the schools of Muslim law, a gift of Mushaa indivisible is valid without any partition and actual delivery
of possession.
Thus, a gift of a share in the business of a Turkish-bath, or a gift of an undivided share in the banks of a
tank (or river) are valid gifts even if made without separating the specific shares.
Mushaa-Divisible:
Under Hanafi law, gift of Mushaa-divisible property is irregular (fasid) if made without partition. A co-
owned piece of land, house or a garden, is Mushaa-divisible. The land may be divided and the specific
share may be separated by a visible mark of identification.
56
Similarly, a co-owned house may be divided by a partition wall without changing its identity. In other
words, a Mushaa-divisible may be divided easily without changing the nature and without affecting the
utility of the property.
Where the subject-matter of a Hiba is Mushaa-divisible, the Hanafi doctrine of Mushaa is applicable
and the gift is not valid unless the specific share, which has been gifted, is separated by the donor and
is actually given to the donee. However, under the Hanafi doctrine of Mushaa, the gift without partition
and actual delivery of possession is not void ab initio, it is merely irregular (fasid).
The result is that where such a gift has been made, it may be regularised by a subsequent partition and
by giving to the donee the actual possession of the specified share of the property. It is evident,
therefore, that the doctrine of Mushaa is limited, both in its application as well as in its effects. The
operation of the rule is subject to following limitations:
(i) The rule of Mushaa is not applicable where the property is indivisible.
(ii) Where the property is divisible, the doctrine is applicable but only under the Hanafi School. In
other words, the doctrine of Mushaa is applicable only where the donor is a Hanafi-Sunni.
(iii) Even under the Hanafi school, if a gift is made against the rule of Mushaa the gift is not void, it is
merely irregular (Fasid).
(iv) Hanafi law recognises certain exceptions to this doctrine and in those exceptional cases the gift is
valid, though made in violation of this doctrine.
1. Gift of Mushaa to
Co- heirs
2. Gift of share in Exceptions to 3. Gift of a share in

Zamindari the Doctrine Landed company
of Mushaa
Gift of Share in
Freehold Property in
Commercial Town
Exceptions to the Doctrine of Mushaa:

The doctrine of Mushaa is limited in its application and is subject to certain exceptions where the
doctrine is not applicable. Exceptions to the doctrine of Mushaa are given below:
(1) Gift of Mushaa to Co-heir:

Donor and the donee are co-heirs, if they are entitled to inherit simultaneously the properties of a
person. Gift of undivided property is valid even if made without partition where donor and donee are
co-heirs. If a person dies leaving behind a son, a daughter and the mother, then the son, daughter and
mother are all co-heirs as they all are entitled to inherit the properties of the deceased.
Thus, after the death of a Muslim male, his widow and his daughter are the co-heirs; therefore, the
widow (i.e. mother of the daughter) can make a lawful gift of her undivided share in the lands to her
daughter without separating her share physically. In Mahomed Buksh v. Hosseini Bibi, a Hanafi
woman died leaving her mother, son and a daughter, as her only heirs.
57
The mother of the deceased made a gift of her share to the son, without separating her 1/6 share in the
properties of the deceased. It was held by the Privy Council that the gift of the undivided 1/6 share by
grandmother to her grandson or to the granddaughter or to both jointly, was valid even without
partition.
(2) Gift of Share in Zamindari:
Where a part of the erstwhile Zamindari or Taluka was gifted away by one of its co-sharers, the
doctrine of Mushaa was not applicable. In the Zamindari systems, it was possible that two or more
persons were the co-sharers having their definite shares of which they used to be respective owners.
If any of them made a gift of his share, the gift was valid without actual delivery of possession and
without physical partition of the gifted share from the rest of the property. Similarly, a gift of Kaimi
raiyati land (undivided share) was held valid although there was no actual division of the share before
the gift was made.
Note:
This exception is only of academic interest because the Zamindari system has now been abolished in
India.
(3) Gift of a Share in Landed Company:
The Hanafi doctrine of Mushaa originated with an object of avoiding confusion at the stage of taking
the possession by donee. In the landed companies or big commercial establishments where the
ownership consists of several definite shares, gift of a share by separating the share physically from
the rest, would create confusion and inconvenience and this would be against the very purpose of this
doctrine. Therefore, in such cases, the doctrine is inapplicable.
In Ibrahim Goolam Ariffv. Saiboo, the donor owned a large number of shares in six limited liability
companies together with several pieces of freehold land and some buildings thereon in Rangoon. He
notionally divided the whole property into one thousand shares and made a gift of 100 such shares
each to four donees and also 25 such shares each to the two other donees.
The whole property could be, inconveniently though, physically partitioned from the rest. But no such
partition was made by the donor. It was held by the Court that the gift was valid without actual
division because the property was not conveniently divisible.
The Court further observed that it would be inconsistent to apply the doctrine of Mushaa to shares in
the companies because the doctrine originated for very different kinds of properties.
(4) Gift of Share in Freehold Property in Commercial Town:
Where a freehold landed property situates in commercial towns or in big cities, its frequent partition
is disfavoured. In big cities the houses are well planned and the partition may require approval of a
fresh map which may take considerable time. Therefore, where a part of such property is gifted, the
gift is complete without any prior partition.
Gift of a part of a house situated in Rangoon was held valid without prior partition because the house
was situated in a large commercial town. Similarly, it has been held that the doctrine of Mushaa has no
application in commercial towns like Lahore, Bombay or Calcutta.
Device to Overcome the Doctrine of Mushaa:
The Hanafi doctrine of Mushaa is applicable only to gifts. It is not applicable to any other kind of
transfer e.g. sale, exchange etc. We have already seen that the strict application of the doctrine
invalidates the gifts of co-owned properties and operates disadvantageously in most of such cases.
Because of this reason, the Hanafi jurists themselves have evolved a method by which the mischief of
the doctrine is avoided.
The device to overcome the doctrine of Mushaa is simple. The donor may sell the undivided share
without any prior partition and may return the consideration (price) immediately to the donee.
Legally, this transaction would be as sale in which the doctrine is not applicable; but, in effect it would
mean a gift. According to Ameer Ali:
58
“A gift of a moiety of a house (which otherwise would be bad for Mushaa), may validly be effected in
this way… the donor should sell it first at a fixed price and then absolve the debtor of the debt, that is,
the price”.
Doctrine of Mushaa in the
Present Society
In the present Indian society, the doctrine of Mushaa is neither legally required nor has any practical
significance. As mentioned earlier, the doctrine of Mushaa originated for avoiding confusion in the
simple cases of gifts of small undivided properties. In the old days, no such technical formalities were
needed in making divisions of the joint properties as are required to-day.
But, at present, instead of avoiding the confusion the application of this doctrine may create
inconvenience and complications. In the present commercially advanced society, the Mushaa doctrine
may operate as a restriction upon the right of a person to deal with his properties.
Gifts are not trade oriented transactions; they are voluntary and gratuitous transfers. Therefore, the
gifts should be free from as much restrictions as possible. Moreover, where a constructive delivery of
possession is sufficient to complete the gift, there is no need of making actual division; a symbolic
possession by the donee of the gifted share in property validates the gift.
In Masoom Sab v. Madan Sab, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a gift of Mushaa is not invalid if
the donor makes a constructive delivery of possession therefore; there is no legal difficulty if the
Mushaa doctrine is not applied to a gift of an undivided property.
The devices to avoid the Mushaa rule have been favoured by the courts. In Sheikh Muhammad Mumtaz
v. Zubaida Jan the Privy Council too had observed that the doctrine of Mushaa is unadaptable to
progressive state of society and would be confined within strictest limits. It is submitted, therefore,
that the Hanafi doctrine of Mushaa is neither legally necessary nor practically meaningful for the
present society.
Shia Law:
Shia law does not recognise the doctrine of Mushaa. Under the Shia law, a gift of a share of divisible
joint property is valid even if made without partition.
Doctrine of Pre-Emption
The Nature of Pre-Emption:

The right of pre-emption is in the nature of an easement, and is annexed to the land under Muslim law.
The right comes into existence on the sale of the adjacent property. The right to pre-emption is not a
right to a re-purchase, either from the vendor or from the vendee, but is simply a right of substitution,
entitling the pre-emptor, by reason of a legal incident to which the sale itself was subject, to stand in
the shoes of the vendee in respect of the rights and obligations arising from the sale.
It is rather anomalous that the right of pre-emption is not recognised in Madras. The reason given by
the Madras High Court for refusing to recognise the right of pre-emption amongst Muslims is that it
places a restriction on the liberty of a person to transfer property, and is, therefore, opposed to justice,
equity and good conscience. (Ibrahim v. Muni Mir Uddin, (1870) 6 M.H.C. 26)
Object of Pre-Emption:
59
The object of the rule of pre-emption is to prevent the inconvenience which may result to families and
communities from the introduction of a disagreeable stranger as a coparcener or near neighbour.
Pre-Emption by Contract
The right of pre-emption may also be created by contract. In construing the terms of such a contract,
the Court will give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed therein. In the absence of a
contract to the contrary, it will be presumed that a contract for preemption will be governed by the
Hanafi law, and all the formalities are to be observed before a valid claim for pre-emption can be
made. Where a right of pre-emption is based on a contract, a Muslim cosharer is entitled to pre-
emption even against a Hindu purchaser. [Sitaram v. Jiaul Hasan, (1921) 48 I.A. 475]
To whom Applied
The doctrine of pre-emption is applicable to all Muslims in general. Applicability to Hindus as well.
The law of pre-emption is applied to Hindus also:-
(i) by legislation, as in the Punjab and Oudh, where there are general territorial enactments;
(ii) by custom, as in Bihar and certain parts of Gujarat; or
(iii) when there is a contract between the parties that the law should apply.
In the Mofussil of Bombay, under regulation IV of 1827, (which does not mention pre-emption or any
other topic of Muslim law as expressly applicable to the Muslims), the law of pre-emption can be
applicable on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, or on the ground of custom.
But it has been held in Mahomed Beg Amni Beg. & Anr. v. Narayan Meghaji Patil & Ors., (1916) I.L.R. 40
Bom. 358, that pre-emption is opposed to justice, equity and good conscience. So, it can apply only on
the ground of custom.
Who can claim

Pre-emption?
1. A 2. A
Shafii-i- Shafii-i-
sharik khalit
3. A
Shafi-i-
jar
Who can Claim Pre-Emption?

According to the Muhammadan law, the right of pre-emption appertains to the following persons:
1. A Shafii-i-sharik, i.e., co-sharer or partner in the property sold.
2. A Shafii-i-khalit, i.e., a partner in the amenities and appendages of the property (such as the right to
water and roads, or common access). These are persons connected with the property sold either as
holders of dominant or servient heritages, or as sharing a common right.
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3. A Shafi-i-jar, i.e., an owner of neighbouring immovable property. This right of pre-emption on the
ground of vicinage does not extend to estates of large magnitude such as villages and zamindaris, but
is confined to houses, gardens and small parcels of land.
Shia Law
By Shia law, the only persons entitled to the right of pre-emption are co-sharers and that too, if the
number of co-sharers does not exceed two.
Sect of Either Party how Far

Material
If both the vendor and the pre-emptor belong to the same school, being either Sunnis or Shias, the law
of that school applies, the law of the vendee being always immaterial. According to the Allahabad High
Court, when one of them is a Shia, the Shia law will apply. According to the Calcutta High Court, the law
of the pre-emptor prevails, in case the vendor and the pre-emptor do not belong to the same school of
Muslim law.
Thus, if the vendor is a Sunni and the pre-emptor is a Shia, then according to the Allahabad High Court,
the right of pre-emption is to be determined by the Shia law. If the vendor is a Shia and the pre-
emptor is a Sunni, then also, according to the Allahabad High Court, the point is to be decided
according to the Shia law, but according to the High Court of Calcutta, in such cases, the rights are to be
determined by the Sunni law. The personal law of the purchaser is immaterial in such cases.
It would not, therefore, be quite correct to say that the law of preemption in force in india is the pure
Sunni law of pre-emption.
Constitutional Validity of Pre-

Emption
It has been held by the High Courts of Rajasthan, Madhya Bharat and Hyderabad that pre-emption on
the ground of vicinage (see 3 above) is void after 26th January, 1950, as it imposes an unreasonable
restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed under Artical 19(1) (f) of the Constitution. However,
pre-emption as between co-sharers (see 1 above) and owners of dominant and servient heritages (see
2 above) is saved by Article 19(5) of the Constitution.
The Bombay, Allahabad and Patna High Courts have, however, taken a different view and upheld the
constitutional validity of preemption by all the three classes of persons mentioned above. However,
the Supreme Court has now approved the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court (above).
The Supreme Court has observed that “the right of pre-emption is an incident of property and attaches
to the land itself. (Audh Singh v. Gajadhar Jaipuria, AIR 1954 S. C., 417)
In the above case, the Supreme Court held that where the right of pre-emption rests upon custom, it
becomes the lex loci or the law of the place, and the right of pre-emption attaches to the properties
situated in that place.
The Allahabad High Court has also observed in Jagmohan Prasad v. В. B. Singh,
“Where we have the existence of a right of pre-emption without specifying how that right is to be
enforced or exercised, or without laying down the full particulars of that custom, the presumption is
that the right of pre-emption is in accordance with the rights allowed by Muhammadan Law. This view
has been laid down in a number of cases. These cases have also been followed in subsequent cases.”
61
A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has also observed that the law of pre-emption continued
to be valid law even after the enactment of the Constitution, and that it had not been rendered void by
Art. 13 read with Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution of India. (Bhimrao Eknath v. P. Ramkrishan, AIR
1960 Bom. 552)
Formalities
3. The suit for
pre-emption
1.Talab-i-
mowasibat
2. Talab-i-
ishhad
In order that a claim for pre-emption should be held to be valid, no particular formula is necessary,
provided the claim is unequivocally asserted.
But, under the Sunni law, certain formalities are strictly to be observed. No person is entitled to a right
of pre-emption, unless he or his manager, or any other person previously authorised by him in his
behalf, has made the following three demands, viz.
1. Talab-i-mowasibat, i.e., immediate demand (or demand of jumping), which is not effective unless it
is followed by a formal claim by talab-i-ishhad (-below-). Talab-i-mowasibat is an announcement by
one entitled to pre-empt, of his intention of making the claim. This announcement is to be made
immediately on his receiving information of the sale, but after (and not before) the sale is completed.
2. Talab-i-ishhad, i.e., demand with invocation of witnesses. The talab-i-mowasibat (demand of
jumping) is of no effect, unless it is followed by a formal claim, which is called talab-i-ishhad (demand
with invocation of witnesses), in which the pre-emptor must:-
(1) affirm his intention to assert his right of pre-emption, referring expressly to his having made the
‘demand of jumping’ and
(2) make a formal demand —
(i) either in the presence of the buyer or the seller, or on the premises which are the subject of sale,
and
(ii) in the presence of at least two witnesses, specially called to bear witness to this demand. Any
unreasonable delay in making this second demand will defeat the pre-emptor’s right.
The Muhammadan law relating to demand before filing a suit for pre-emption is of a highly technical
nature.
The suit for pre-emption- Thus, talab-i-mowasibat is the first demand and talab-i-ishhad is the
second demand.The third formality consists of the institution of the suit for pre-emption. Both the
talabs are conditions precedem to the exercise of the right of pre-emption.
The talab-i-mowasibat (or first demand) should be made as soon as the fact of the sale is known to the
claimant. Any unreasonable or unnecessary delay will be construed as an election not to pre-empt.
(Shaikh Mohammad Rafiq v. Khalilur Rahman and anr. (1972) 11 S.C. W.R. 102)
Tender of Price not Essential:
62
It is not necessary to the validity of a claim of pre-emption that the pre-emptor should tender the price
at the time of talab-i-ishhad.
3. Suit: The third formality is the institution of a suit for pre-emption.
63
UNIT V
Parentage and
Acknowledgement
Where the paternity of a child, i.e., its legitimate descent from its father, cannot be proved by
establishing a marriage between its parents at the time of its conception or birth, such marriage and
legitimate descent may be established by “acknowledgement”.
An acknowledgement of paternity need not be express. Such an acknowledgement may be presumed
from the fact that one person has habitually and openly treated another as his legitimate child. As
observed by the Privy Council, “It has been decided in several cases that there need not be proof of an
express acknowledgement, but that an acknowledgement of children by a Muhammadan as his sons
may be inferred from his having openly treated them as such.” (Muhammad Azmat v. Lalli Begum 1881
9 I.A. 8)
Paternity of a child is established if the child is born during continuance of a valid marriage or within
280 days of its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried.
Maternity of a child is established in the woman who gives birth to the child; it is immaterial whether
the child is an offspring of a valid or irregular marriage, or even of a fornication or adultery.
Principle of the Doctrine of Legitimacy by

Acknowledgement
This is a special mode prescribed by Muhammadan law for establishing the legitimacy of a child and
the marriage of its mother. Since a marriage among Muslims may be constituted without any
ceremony, the existence of a marriage in a particular case may be an open question. If no direct proof
of such marriage is available, indirect proof may be relied upon. Acknowledgment of legitimacy of a
child is one of the kinds of indirect proof.
Thus, under certain conditions, if a Muslim acknowledges a child to be his legitimate child, the
paternity of that child is established in him. But the doctrine applies only to cases where the fact of an
alleged marriage is an uncertainty.
It cannot be availed of to legitimise a child who is known to be illegitimate. The doctrine of legitimacy
by acknowledgement proceeds entirely upon an assumption of legitimacy and establishment of
legitimacy by the force of such acknowledgement.
Conditions of a Valid
Acknowledgement of Legitimacy
Muhammadan law prescribes a special mode of establishing the legitimacy of a child. When a man
either expressly acknowledges, or treats in a manner tantamount to acknowledgement of, another as
his lawful child, the paternity of that child will be established in the man, provided that the following
seven conditions are fulfilled:
1. The acknowledger must possess the legal capacity for entering into a valid contract.
2. The acknowledgement must not be merely of sonship, but of legitimate sonship.
64
3. The ages of the acknowledger and the acknowledged must be such as to admit of the relation of
parentage, i.e., the acknowledger must be at least twelve-and-a-half years older than the person
acknowledged.
4. The person to be acknowledged must not be the offspring of intercourse which would be punishable
under Muhammadan law, e.g., adultery, incest or fornication.
5. The parentage of the person to be acknowledged must not be unknown, i.e., the child to be
acknowledged must be known to be the child of some other person.
6. The acknowledged person must believe himself (or herself) to be the acknowledger’s child, and the
child must verify (or at least must not repudiate) the acknowledgement.
7. The acknowledger should be one who could have lawfully been the husband of the mother of the
child, when it was begotten. Thus, where there is direct proof that there was no marriage between the
man and the mother of the child, or that if there was such a marriage between them, it would have
been void, and then the presumption of legitimacy cannot be raised by acknowledgement, however
strong such presumption may be. (Rashid Ahmed v. Anisa Khatun, (1932) 34 Bom L.R. 475 PC. 59 I.A.
21)
In Rashid Ahmed’s case, A, a Muslim, divorced his wife B, by three pronouncements of talak, but
afterwards, continued to cohabit with her, and to treat her as his wife for fifteen years. During this
period, five children were born to them, all of whom he treated as his legitimate children.
However, the Privy Council held that the children were illegitimate. In this case of divorce by three
pronouncements, before A and В could remarry, В should have been married to another man in the
interval and divorced by that man.
As there was no proof of such marriage with another man and a divorce by him, a presumption of
remarriage between A and В could not be raised, and hence, the children were held to be illegitimate,
and could not inherit from their father.
The observations of the Allahabad High Court on acknowledgement of paternity in Muhammad
Allahabad v. Muhammad Ismail (1888-10- All. 289) are relevant. In that case, the Court observed:
“The Muhammadan law of acknowledgement of parentage, with its legitimating effect, has no
reference whatsoever to cases in which the illegitimacy of the child is proved and established, either
by reason of a lawful union between the parents of the child being impossible (as in the case of an
incestuous intercourse or an adulterous connection), or by reason of a marriage, necessary to render
the child legitimate, being disproved.
The doctrine relates only to cases where either the fact of the marriage itself or the exact time of its
occurrence with reference to the legitimacy of the acknowledged child is not proved in the sense of
law, as distinguished from disproved. In other words, the doctrine applies only to cases of uncertainty
as to legitimacy, and in such cases, acknowledgement has its effect, but that effect always proceeds
upon the assumption of a lawful union between the parents of the acknowledged child.”
Inheritance and
succession
Nature of the
Heritable
Property
Heritable property is that property which is available to the legal heirs for inheritance. After the death
of a Muslim, his properties are utilised for the payment of funeral expenses, debts and the legacies i.e.
65
wills, if any. After these payments, the remaining property is called heritable property. Under Muslim
law, every kind of property may be a heritable property.
For purposes of inheritance, Muslim law does not make any distinction between corpus and usufruct
or, between movable and immovable, or, corporeal and incorporeal property. Under English law, there
is some difference in the inheritance of movable and immovable property.
But, under Muslim law there is no such distinction; any property, which was in the ownership of the
deceased at the moment of his death, may be the subject-matter of inheritance.
Shia Law:
Under the Shia law, a childless widow is entitled to get her share (1/4) in the inheritance only from the
movable property left by her deceased husband.
Joint or Ancestral
Property
The concept of a joint family or of coparcenaries property (as is recognised under Hindu law) is not
known to Muslims. Whenever a Muslim dies, his properties devolve on his heirs in definite share of
which each heir becomes an absolute owner. Subsequently, upon the death of such heir, his properties
are again inherited by his legal heirs, and this process continues.
Thus, unlike Hindu law, there is no provision for any ancestral or joint-family property. Accordingly,
under Muslim law of inheritance, no distinction has been made between self-acquired and ancestral
property. All properties, whether acquired by a Muslim himself or inherited by his ancestors, are
regarded as an individual property and, may be inherited by his legal heirs.
No Birth-Right
Inheritance opens only after the death of a Muslim. No person may be an heir of a living person
(Nemoest haeres viventis). Therefore, unless a person dies, his heirs have no interest in his properties.
Unlike Hindu law, the Muslim law of inheritance does not recognise the concept of ‘right by birth’
(Janmaswatvavad).
Under Muslim law, an heir does not possess any right at all before the death of an ancestor. It is only
the death of a Muslim which gives the right of inheritance to his legal heirs.
As a matter of fact, unless a person dies, his relatives are not his legal heirs; they are simply his heir-
apparent and have merely a ‘chance of succession, (spes successions). If such an heir-apparent
survives a Muslim, he becomes his legal heir and the right of inheritance accrues to him. If the heir-
apparent does not survive a Muslim, he cannot be regarded an heir and has no right to inherit the
property.
Doctrine of
Representation
Doctrine of representation is a well known principle recognised by the Roman, English and Hindu laws
of inheritance. Under the principle of representation, as is recognised by these systems of laws, the son
of a predeceased son represents his father for purposes of inheritance. The doctrine of representation
may be explained with the help of the diagram given below. P has two sons A and B. A has got two sons
С and D and В has a son E.
66
During the life of P, his family members are his two sons (A and B), and three grandsons (C, D and E).
Unfortunately, В pre-deceases P, i.e. В dies before the death of P. Subsequently, when P also dies, the
sole surviving members of the family of P are A and three grandsons, C, D and E.
Under the doctrine of representation, E will represent his pre-deceased father В and would be entitled
to inherit the properties of P in the same manner as В would have inherited had he been alive at the
time of P’s death.
But, Muslim law does not recognise the doctrine of representation. Under Muslim law, the nearer
excludes the remoter. Accordingly, in the illustration given above, E will be totally excluded from
inheriting the properties of P. Both, under Shia as well as under Sunni law, E has no right to inherit the
properties of P. The result is that E cannot take the plea that he represents his pre-deceased father ( В)
and should be substituted in his place.
Under Muslim law, the nearer heir totally excludes a remoter heir from inheritance. That is to say, if
there are two heirs who claim inheritance from a common ancestor, the heir who is nearer (in degree)
to the deceased, would exclude the heir who is remoter. Thus, between A and E, A will totally exclude E
because A is nearer to P in degree whereas, E belongs to the second degree of generation. The Muslim
jurists justify the reason for denying the right of representation on the ground that a person has not
even an inchoate right to the property of his ancestor until the death of that ancestor.
Accordingly, they argue that there can be no claim through a deceased person in whom no right could
have been vested by any possibility. But, it may be submitted that non-recognition of principles of
representation under the Muslim law of inheritance, seems to be unreasonable and harsh. It is cruel
that a son, whose father is dead, is unable to inherit the properties of his grandfather together with his
uncle.
Per-Capita and Per-

Strip Distribution
Succession among the heirs of the same class but belonging to different branches may either be per-
capita or per-strips. In a per-capita distribution, the succession is according to the ‘number of heirs’
(i.e. heads). Among them the estate is equally divided; therefore, each heir gets equal quantity of
property from the heritable assets of the deceased.
On the other hand, in a per strip distribution, the several heirs who belong to different branches, get
their share only from that property which is available to the branch to which they belong. In other
words, in the stripital succession, the quantum of property available to each heir depends on the
property available to his branch rather than the number of all the heirs.
Under Sunni law, the distribution of the assets is per-capita. That is to say an heir does not in any
respect represent the branch from which he inherits. The per-capita distribution may be illustrated by
the following diagram.
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M has got two sons A and B. A has three sons, S 1, S2 and S3. В has two sons S4 and S5. When M dies there
are two branches of succession, one of A and the other of B. Suppose, A and В both die before the
death of M so that the sole surviving heirs of M are his five grandsons.
Now, under the per-capita scheme of distribution (as recognised under Sunni law) the total number of
claimants (heirs) is five and the heritable property would be equally divided among all of them
irrespective of the branch to which an heir belongs.
Therefore, each of them would get 1/5 of the total assets of M. It may be noted that under Sunni law
the principle of representation is recognised neither in the matter of determining the claim of an heir,
nor in determining the quantum of share of each heir.
Shia Law:
Under the Shia law, if there are several heirs of the same class but they descend from different
branches, the distribution among them is per strip. That is to say, the quantum of property inherited
by each of them depends upon the property available to that particular branch to which they belong.
In the above-mentioned illustration, A and В constitute two branches, each having 1/2 of M’s
property. Both, A and В pre-decease M.
But, the quantum of property available to each of their branch would remain the same. Therefore, the
surviving heirs of A namely, S1, S2, 53 would get equal shares out of 1/2 which is quantum of property
available to the branch of A. Thus S1, S2 and S3 would get 1/6 each. Similarly, the quantum of property
available to the branch of В is also 1/2 but the descendants from this branch are only two.
Accordingly, the 1/2 property of В would be equally shared by S4and S5.
Therefore, 54 and S5 would get 1/4 each. It is significant to note that for a limited purpose of
calculating the share of each heir, the Shia law accepts the principle of representation. Moreover,
under the Shia law this rule is applicable for determining the quantum of share also of the descendants
of a pre-deceased daughter, pre-deceased brother, pre-deceased sister or that of a pre-deceased aunt.
Female’s Right of
Inheritance
Males and females have equal rights of inheritance. Upon the death of a Muslim, if his heirs include
also the females then, male and female heirs inherit the properties simultaneously. Males have no
preferential right of inheritance over the females, but normally the share of a male is double the share
of a female.
In other words, although there is no difference between male and female heir in so far as their
respective rights of inheritance is concerned but generally the quantum of property inherited by a
female heir is half of the property given to a male of equal status (degree).
The principle that normally the share of a male is double the share of a female has some justification.
Under Muslim law, while a female heir gets (or hopes to get in future) an additional money or property
as her Mehr and maintenance from her husband, her male counterpart gets none of the two benefits.
Moreover, the male heir is primarily liable for the maintenance of his children whereas, the female
heir may have this liability only in an extraordinary case.
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A Child in the
Womb
A child in the womb of its mother is competent to inherit provided it is born alive. A child in embryo is
regarded as a living person and, as such, the property vests immediately in that child. But, if such a
child in the womb is not born alive, the share already vested in it is divested and, it is presumed as if
there was no such heir (in the womb) at all.
(8) Primogeniture:
Primogeniture is a principle of inheritance under which the eldest son of the deceased enjoys certain
special privileges. Muslim law does not recognise the rule of primogeniture and all sons are treated
equally.
However, under the Shia law, the eldest son has an exclusive right to inherit his father’s garments,
sword, ring and the copy of Quran, provided that such eldest son is of sound mind and the father has
left certain other properties besides these articles.
Step-Children
The step-children are not entitled to inherit the properties of their step-parents. Similarly, the step-
parents too do not inherit from step-children. For example, where a Muslim H marries a widow W
having a son from her previous husband, the son is a stepson of H, who is step-father of this son.
The step-father and step-son (or daughter) cannot inherit each other’s properties. That step-child is
competent to inherit from its natural father or natural mother. Similarly, the natural father and natural
mother can inherit from their natural sons or daughters.
However, the step-brothers (or sisters) can inherit each other’s properties. Thus, in the illustration
given above, if a son (or daughter) is bom out of the marriage of H and W, the newly born child would
be a step-brother (or sister) of the son from wife’s previous husband.
These sons or daughters are competent to inherit each other’s property. The step-brothers or sisters
may either be, uterine or consanguine. Muslim law provides for mutual rights of inheritance between
uterine and consanguine brothers or sisters.
Simultaneous Death of two

Heirs
When two or more persons die in such a circumstance that it is not ascertainable as to who died first
(i.e. who survived whom) then, both of them cease to be an heir for each other. In other words, where
two or more heirs die simultaneously and, it is not possible to establish as to who died first then under
Muslim law, all the heirs are presumed to have died just at one moment. The result is that such heirs
are regarded as if they did not exist at all; the inheritance opens omitting these heirs.
For example, A and В are each other’s legal heirs in such a manner that after the death of any one of
them, the surviving person would inherit the property of the deceased one. But, both A and В die
simultaneously say, in an aero plane crash, and it could not be established as to who survived whom.
Under Muslim law, neither A would inherit В nor В would inherit A.
69
Thus, the legal heirs of A would inherit A’s property as if there was no В at all. Similarly, the heirs of В
would inherit B’s property as if A did not exist at all?
Missing Persons
According to the texts of Hanafi law, a missing person was supposed to have been dead only after
ninety years from the date of his birth; till then the inheritance of his properties did not open. But, now
this rule has been superseded by Sec. 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which provides as under:
“When the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is proved that he has not been heard of for
seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive, the burden of
proving that he is alive is shifted to the person who affirms it”.
Accordingly, where a Muslim is missing for at least seven years and if it could not be proved that he (or
she) was alive then, that person is legally presumed to be dead and the inheritance of his (or her)
properties opens.
It has been held by the courts that Hanafi rule of ninety years of life of a missing person was only a rule
of evidence and not any rule of succession; therefore, this Hanafi rule must be taken as superseded by
the provisions of Indian Evidence Act 1872.
Escheat
Where a deceased Muslim has no legal heir under Muslim law, his properties are inherited by
Government through the process of escheat. State is regarded as the ultimate heir of every deceased.
Marriage under the Special

Marriage Act, 1954
Where a Muslim contracts his marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954, he ceases to be a
Muslim for purposes of inheritance. Accordingly, after the death of such a Muslim his (or her)
properties do not devolve under Muslim law of inheritance. The inheritance of the properties of such
Muslims is governed by the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Muslim law of
inheritance is not applicable.
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Class –.LL.B (HONS.) II SEM.

Subject – Muslim Law

Origin of Muslim Law

By birth Who is Muslim? By conversion

1. Muslim by Birth – 2. Muslim by Conversion –

Sources of Muslim law

The Sunnah Ijma' (consensus)

Muslims believe the Quran to be the direct words of Allah, as

I.) The Quran:

Sunnah is the traditions or known practices of the Prophet Muhammad,

II.) The Sunna:

In situations when Muslims have not been able to find a

1. Isti Hasan - 2. Isti Salah - 3. Ijtehad - Exercising

(a) Isti Hasan - Juristic preference - Equity

(b) Isti Salah- Public interest

(d) Taqlid - Law of Precedents

(e) Fatwas - Decisions of Muslim Judges

THE SUNNI SCHOOLS

The Hanifi School

The Maliki School

The Shafei School

The Hanbali School

THE SHIA SCHOOLS

The Ithna Asharia School

The Ismailia School

The Zyadis School

The Motazila Sect

Athari Kalām Ash'ari Maturidi Murji'ah Mu'tazili

Requirement of the valid

Offer & Presence of Capacity of the Free consent No legal

1. Offer & Acceptance

3. Capacity of the Parties

Absolute prohibition Prohibition Relative prohibition

Marrying a fifth wife

Absence of proper witnesses

Marriage during Iddat

1.Sister's foster mother, or

3) Absence of proper witnesses

4) Differences of religion (Marriage with non-muslim)

5) Marriage during Iddat

Khair-ul-Balgh (Option of Puberty)

Guardianship “With” Guardianship in marriage Guardianship “Without”

There are three types of marriages in Sunni schools:-

The Effects of Impediments

That main incidents of muta marriage are:

Dower & Quantity of Types of Entitlement to Legal Disputes over

i. Dower & Bride-

ii. Quantity of Dower

iii. Types of Dower

iv. Entitlement to Dower

Entitlement to Whole Dower

a. Entitlement to Whole Dower:

b. Entitlement to Half Dower & Mutat:

The Concept of Divorce under Muslim Law

Extra judicial divorce Judicial divorce

By husband By wife Mutual consent

Talaaq Ila Zehar

Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939

There are two categories of divorce under the Muslim law:

Conditions for a valid talaaq