15.2 What is security?Most writers agree that security is a ‘contested concept’.

There is a
consensus that it implies freedom from threats to core values (for both individuals and groups),
but there is a major disagreement about whether the main focus of inquiry should be on
‘individual’, ‘national’, ‘international’, or ‘global’ security. For much of the cold war period most
writing on the subject was dominated by the idea of national security, which was largely defined
in militarized terms. The main area of interest for both academics and statespeople tended to be
the military capabilities that their own states should develop to deal some hope for greater
international order. In contrast, during the cold war, which developed after 1945, realism
became the dominant school of thought. War and violent conflict were seen as perennial
features of interstate relations stretching back through human history. With the end of the cold
war in 1989, however, the debate began again. For some, the end of the intense ideological
confrontation between East and West was a major turning point in international history, ushering
in a new paradigm in which inter-state violence would gradually become a thing of the past and
new cosmopolitan values would bring greater cooperation between individuals and human
collectivities of various kinds (including states). This reflected more optimistic views about the
development of a peaceful global society. For others, however, realism remained the best
approach to thinking about international security. In their view, very little of substance had
changed as a result of the events of 1989. Although the end of the cold war initially ushered in a
new, more cooperative era between the superpowers, realists argued that this more harmonious
phase in international relations was only temporary. Some believe that contemporary events
confirm this view.This chapter focuses on this debate in an era of increasing challenges to
globalization, highlighting the different strands of thinking in these two optimistic and pessimistic
schools of thought, and discusses different views about the labels ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’.
Before this can be done, however, it is necessary to define what is meant by ‘security’ and to
probe the relationship between national security and global security.with the threats they faced.
More recently, however, this idea of security has been criticized for being ethnocentric (culturally
biased) and too narrowly defined. Instead, several writers have argued for an expanded
conception of security, outward from the limits of parochial national security, to include a range
of other considerations. Barry Buzan, in his study People, States and Fear (1983), argues for a
view of security that includes political, economic, societal, and environmental as well as military
aspects, and that is also defined in broader international terms. Buzan’s work raises interesting
and important questions about whether national and international security considerations can
be compatible, and whether states, given the nature of the international system, are capable of
thinking in more cooperative international and global terms (see Box 15.1). There has also been
a growing interest in the concept of ‘human security’, with writers like Kofi Annan and Amitav
Acharya emphasizing the individual as the main focus of security analysis (see Section
15.4.2).These ideas were taken a stage further by the global Covid-19 pandemic, with calls for a
rethink and new strategies to recognize that public health and national security should no longer
be regarded as separate and disconnected spheres of government responsibility (seeCh. 25).
This was recognized in April 2020 when UN Secretary-General António Guterres argued that
‘the pandemic . . . poses a significant threat to the maintenance of international peace and
security’ (UN SecretaryGeneral 2020). Like his predecessor, Kofi Annan, Guterres emphasized
the importance of ‘human security’ with the global death toll reaching many millions.Climate
change has also become a feature of globalization that is seen as having security implications
(see Ch. 24). In 2015 President Barack Obama called climate change ‘a serious threat to global
security’ (BBC 2015). Those like Joshua Goldstein (2016) who argue along these lines highlight
the opening up of the Arctic region to new shipping routes as the sea ice melts and the resulting
geopolitical rivalry emerging in the region (see Case Study 24.2). Another potential problem
arises from the attempts to rely less on coal and the switch to nuclear energy, with the risks of
increased nuclear proliferation. Water conflicts as a result of drought are also becoming more
common. Robert Keohane has argued that climate change poses a severe challenge to the
adequacy of political institutions. In his view, there has been a failure of global governance to
deal with the threats that climate change poses for humanity (Keohane 2015). For writers like
Paul Rogers, the era of pandemics and climate breakdown, together with growing inequality and
unsustainability, requires a completely different approach to thinking about ‘the real solutions to
global insecurity’ (Rogers 2021).Increasingly there is a recognition that the emphasis on state
and inter-state relations ignores the fundamental changes that are taking place in world politics.
This has led some writers to argue that the dual processes of integration and fragmentation
associated with globalization that characterize the contemporary world mean that much more
attention should be given to ‘societal security’ and ‘human security’. According to this view,
growing integration in regions such as Europe is undermining the classical political order based
on nation-states, leaving nations exposed within larger political frameworks (such as the
European Union, or EU). At the same time, the fragmentation of various states, such as the
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, has created new problems of boundaries, minorities, and
organizing ideologies that are causing increasing regional instability (Wæver et al. 1993: 196).
This has led to the argument that ethno-national groups, rather than states, should become the
centre of attention for security analysts.At the same time, other commentators argue that the
emergence of an embryonic global society in the post-cold war era renders the stress on
national and international security less appropriate. Like the ‘societal security’ theorists, they
point to the fragmentation of the nation-state; however, they argue that more attention should be
given, not to society at the ethno-national level, but to global society. These writers argue that
one of the most important contemporary trends is the broad and ongoing process of
globalization. They accept that this process brings new risks and dangers—including the risks
associated with international terrorism, a breakdown of the global monetary system, global
warming, cyber conflict, and the dangers of nuclear proliferation. These threats to security, on a
planetary level, are viewed as being largely outside the control of nation-states. Only the
development of a global community, they believe, can deal with this adequately.
Other writers on globalization stress the transformation of the state (rather than its demise) and
the new security agenda in the early years of the twenty-first century. In the aftermath of the
9/11 terrorist attacks in September 2001 and the new era of violence that followed it, Jonathan
Friedman argues that we are living in a world ‘where polarization, both vertical and horizontal,
both class and ethnic, has become rampant, and where violence has become more globalized
and fragmented at the same time, and is no longer a question of wars between states but of
sub-state conflicts, globally networked and financed, in which states have become one actor,
increasingly privatized, amongst others’ (J. Friedman 2003: ix). For many of those who feel like
this, the post-9/11 era ushered in a new and extremely dangerous period in world history.
Whether the world is so different today from in the past is a matter of much contemporary
discussion. To consider this issue we need to begin by looking at the way ‘security’ has been
traditionally conceived.

15.3 The traditional approach to national security15.3.1 RealismAs Chapter 3 shows, states
have been regarded as by far the most powerful actors in the international system for a very
long time. They have been ‘the universal standard of political legitimacy’, with no higher
authority to regulate their relations with each other. This has meant that security has been seen
as the priority obligation of state governments. States have taken the view that there is no
alternative but to seek their own protection in what has been described as a self-help world.In
the historical debate about how best to achieve national security, realist thinkers drew on figures
such as Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Rousseau to paint a pessimistic picture of the implications of
state sovereignty. They viewed the international system as a rather brutal arena in which states
would seek to achieve their own security at the expense of their neighbours. Inter-state relations
were seen as a struggle for power, as states constantly attempted to take advantage of each
other. According to this view, permanent peace was unlikely to be achieved. All that states could
do was to try to balance the power of other states to prevent any one from achieving overall
hegemony. This view was shared by writers such as E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, who
developed what became known as the realist (or ‘classical’ realist) school of thought in the
aftermath of the Second World War. More recent attempts to update these ideas can be seen in
the works of Alastair J. H. Murray, Thomas Christensen, Randall Schweller, William Wohlforth,
and Fareed Zakaria. Their work is sometimes referred to as neoclassical realism.The realist,
pessimistic view of international relations is shared by other writers, such as Kenneth Waltz and
John Mearsheimer. The pessimism of these neorealistsrests on a number of key assumptions
they make about the way the international system works and its inherent propensity for violence.
According to the neorealist view, national security, or insecurity, is largely the result of the
structure of the international system (this is why these writers are sometimes called ‘structural
realists’). The structure of anarchy is seen as highly durable. The implication of this is that
international politics in the future is likely to be as violent as international politics in the past. In
an important article entitled ‘Back to the Future’, John Mearsheimer (1990) argued that the end
of the cold war was likely to usher in a return to the traditional multipolar balance of power
politics of the past, in which extreme nationalism and ethnic rivalries would cause widespread
instability and conflict. Mearsheimer viewed the cold war as a period of peace and stability
brought about by its prevailing bipolar structure of power. With the collapse of this system, he
argued, there would be a return to the kind of great power rivalries that had blighted
international relations since the seventeenth century.15.3.2 Liberal institutionalismOne of the
main characteristics of the neorealist approach to international security is the belief that
international institutions do not have a very important 232 john baylispart to play in the
prevention of war. Institutions are seen as the product of state interests and the constraints
imposed by the international system itself. It is these interests and constraints that shape states’
decisions about whether to cooperate or compete, rather than the institutions to which they
belong. Neorealists point to the contemporary problems faced by several international
institutions (such as the UN and EU) to reinforce their view.Both statespeople and several
International Relations specialists challenge these neorealist views on institutions. For example,
former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd made the case in June 1992 that institutions
themselves had played a crucial role in enhancing security, particularly in Europe. He argued
that the West had developed ‘a set of international institutions which have proved their worth for
one set of problems’. He went on to argue that the great challenge of the postcold war era was
to adapt these institutions to deal with the new circumstances that prevailed (Hurd, quoted in
Mearsheimer 1994/5).Hurd’s view reflected a belief, widely shared among many statespeople,
that a framework of complementary, mutually reinforcing institutions—the European Union, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE)—could be developed to promote a more durable and stable
European and international security system. This view was also shared by a distinctive group of
academic writers that developed from the 1980s and early 1990s. These writers shared a
conviction that the developing pattern of 15.4 Alternative approaches15.4.1 Social
constructivismAnother group of writers who describe themselves as ‘constructivist theorists’
posit that international relations are affected not only by power politics but also by ideas and
identities. According to this view, the fundamental structures of international politics are social
rather than strictly material. This leads social constructivists to argue that changes in the nature
of social interaction among states can bring a fundamental shift towards greater international
security (see Ch. 13).At one level, many constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, share a
number of the major realist institutionalized cooperation among states opens up unprecedented
opportunities to achieve greater international security in the years ahead. Although the past may
have been characterized by constant wars and conflict, important changes were taking place in
international relations, they argued, creating the opportunity to mitigate the traditional security
competition between states.Liberal institutionalist writers suggest that in a world constrained by
state power and divergent interests, international institutions operating on the basis of
reciprocity will at least be a component of any lasting peace. In other words, international
institutions themselves are unlikely to eradicate war from the international system, but they can
play a part in helping to achieve greater cooperation among states.Key Points• Realists and
neorealists emphasize the perennial problem of insecurity.• Some writers see the ‘security
dilemma’ as the essential source of conflict among states.• Neorealists reject the significance of
international institutions in helping many states to achieve peace and security.• In contrast,
politicians and academics who write under the label of liberal institutionalism or neoliberalism
see institutions as an important mechanism for achieving international security.• Liberal
institutionalists accept many of realism’s assumptions about the continuing importance of
military power in international relations, but argue that institutions can provide a framework for
cooperation that can help to mitigate the dangers of security competition among
states.assumptions about international politics. For example, some accept that states are the
key referent in the study of international politics and international security; that international
politics is anarchic; that states often have offensive capabilities; that states cannot be absolutely
certain of the intentions of other states; that states have a fundamental wish to survive; and that
states attempt to behave rationally. Some, such as Wendt, also see themselves as
structuralists; that is, they believe that the interests of individual states are, in an important
sense, constructed by the structure of the international system.Chapter 15 International and
global security 233However, constructivists think about international politics in a very different
way from neorealists. The latter tend to view structure as comprising only a distribution of
material capabilities. Constructivists view structure as the product of social relationships. Social
structures are made possible by shared understandings, expectations, and knowledge. For
example, Wendt argues that the security dilemma is a social structure composed of inter-
subjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worstcase
assumptions about each other’s intentions and as a result define their interests in ‘self-help’
terms. In contrast, a security community (such as NATO) is a rather different social structure,
composed of shared knowledge and identity in which states trust one another to resolve
disputes without war.Emphasis on the structure of shared knowledge is important in
constructivist thinking. Social structures include material things, such as tanks and economic
resources, but these acquire meaning only through the shared knowledge in which they are
embedded. The idea of power politics, or realpolitik, has meaning to the extent that states
accept the idea as a basic rule of international politics. According to social constructivist writers,
power politics is an idea that affects the way states behave, but it does not describe all inter-
state behaviour. States are also influenced by other ideas, such as the rule of law and the
importance of institutional cooperation and restraint. In his study, ‘Anarchy is What States Make
of It’, Wendt (1992) argues that security dilemmas and wars can be seen, in part, as the
outcome of self-fulfilling prophecies. The ‘logic of reciprocity’ means that states acquire a shared
understanding about the meaning of power and act accordingly. Equally, he argues, policies of
reassurance can bring about a structure of shared knowledge that can help to move states
towards a more peaceful security community (Wendt 1999).Although constructivists argue that
security dilemmas are not acts of God, they differ over whether they can be escaped. For some,
the fact that structures are socially constructed does not necessarily mean that they can be
changed. This is reflected in Wendt’s (1995: 80) comment that ‘sometimes social structures so
constrain action that transformative strategies are impossible’. However, many constructivist
writers are more optimistic. They point to the changes in ideas introduced by Gorbachev during
the second half of the 1980s, which led to shared knowledge about the end of the cold war.
Once both sides accepted that the cold war was over, it really was over. According to this view,
understanding the crucial role of social structures is important in developing policies and
processes of interaction that will generate cooperation rather than conflict. For the optimists,
there is sufficient ‘slack’ in the international system to allow states to pursue policies of peaceful
social change rather than engage in a perpetual competitive struggle for power.15.4.2 Critical,
feminist, postcolonial, and discursive security studiesDespite the differences between
constructivists and realists about the relationship between ideas and material factors, they
agree on the central role of the state in debates about international security. Other theorists,
however, believe that the state has been given too much prominence. Keith Krause and Michael
Williams have defined critical security studies in the following terms: ‘Contemporary debates
over the nature of security often float on a sea of unvoiced assumptions and deeper theoretical
issues concerning to what and to whom the term security refers . . . What most contributions to
the debate thus share are two inter-related concerns: what security is and how we study it’
(Krause and Williams 1997: 34). What they also share is a wish to de-emphasize the role of the
state and the need to conceptualize security in a different way. Critical security studies,
however, includes a number of different approaches. These include critical theory, the concept
of human security, ‘feminist’ approaches, and ‘poststructuralist’ approaches (see Buzan and
Hansen 2009). Given that these are covered in other chapters, they are dealt with only briefly
here.Robert Cox draws a distinction between problemsolving theories and critical theories.
Problem-solving theorists work within the prevailing system. They take the existing social and
political relations and institutions as starting points for analysis, and then see how the problems
arising from these can be solved or ameliorated. In contrast, critical theorists focus their
attention on the way these existing relationships and institutions emerged and what might be
done to change them (see Ch. 12). For critical security theorists, states should not be the centre
of analysis because they are not only extremely diverse in character but are also often part of
the problem of insecurity in the international system. They can be providers of security, but they
can also be a source of threat to their own people.234 john baylisAccording to this view,
attention should be focused on the individual rather than on the state. This led to greater
attention being given from the 1970s and 1980s onwards to what has been called human
security, resulting in a further broadening of the conception of ‘security’ to include areas such as
poverty, disease, and environmental degradation. The concept was developed largely by non-
Western scholars such as Mahbub al Haq and Amartya Sen, who felt that traditional national
security approaches did not take sufficient account of conflicts that arise over cultural, ethnic,
and religious differences. According to Amitav Acharya, ‘the most pressing challenges to
security come not from great power rivalry or interstate wars, as in the past but from multiple
and complex forms of internal conflicts and transitional challenges that defy military action by
state actors and that demand economic, political and normative action by the international
community’. He argues that we are experiencing the emergence of a very different and much
more complex world than in the past, and this brings with it new challenges and approaches to
global stability and order. In light of this, he calls for a new Global International Politics approach
which focuses on the contemporary threats to peace given the challenges brought about by
globalization (Acharya 2014c).In many ways, human security is a contested concept. Some
critics argue that it widens the boundaries of the meaning of ‘security’ too much and that it is too
vague to have much conceptual value. Others believe that the focus on internal conflicts ignores
the very dangerous geopolitical changes that are currently taking place in international relations.
Detractors also argue that it is too moralistic, as well as being unattainable and unrealistic in
practice. Even among supporters of the concept there is disagreement between those who
focus on the need for greater ‘freedom from fear’ and those who emphasize the need for more
‘freedom from want’. Other supporters, however, argue that there is considerable overlap
between the two, and both are important in the search for greater human security. For all
supporters of the concept, human security provides an essential non-Western approach to
international security (neglected in the past) and is a vital concept in understanding the new
world order.Academics championing the human security approach argue that there is a close
relationship with feminist writers who study international conflict. Feminist writers also challenge
the traditional emphasis on the central role of the state in studies of international security. While
there are significant differences among feminist theorists, all share the view that works on
international politics in general, and international security in particular, have been written from a
‘masculine’ point of view (see Chs 10 and 17). In her work, J. Ann Tickner argues that women
have seldom been recognized by the security literature, despite the fact that conflicts affect
women as much as, if not more than, men. The vast majority of casualties and refugees in war
are women and children and, as the war in Bosnia confirmed, the rape of women is often used
as a tool of war (Tickner 1992).In a major feminist study of security, Bananas, Beaches and
Bases, Cynthia Enloe points to the patriarchal structure of privilege and control at all levels that,
in her view, effectively legitimizes all forms of violence (Enloe 2014 [1989]). She highlights the
traditional exclusion of women from international relations, suggesting ‘that they are in fact
crucial to it in practice and that nowhere is the state more gendered in the sense of how power
is dispersed than in the security apparatus’ (Terriff et al. 1999: 91). She also challenges the
concept of ‘national security’, arguing that the use of such terms is often designed to preserve
the prevailing male-dominated order rather than protect the state from external attack.Feminist
writers argue that if gender is brought more explicitly into the study of security, not only will new
issues and alternative perspectives be added to the security agenda, but the result will be a
fundamentally different view of the nature of international security. According to Jill Steans,
‘Rethinking security involves thinking about militarism and patriarchy, mal-development and
environmental degradation. It involves thinking about the relationship between poverty, debt and
population growth. It involves thinking about resources and how they are distributed’ (Steans
1998; S. Smith 2000).Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen highlight both the gendered character of
security in theory and practice and its Western-centrism in their major study, The Evolution of
International Security Studies (2009). Many other writers have also highlighted the Eurocentric
character of traditional security studies, which emphasizes the importance of great power
conflicts and often ignores the insecurities which affect people and social groups in different
parts of the world. In her work, Pinar Bilgin (2010) considers the impact and significance of
‘historical absences from security studies of non-Western insecurities and approaches’. She
calls for Chapter 15 International and global security 235these ‘silences’ to be remedied by
greater insights into those marginalized by a largely Western-dominated approach to security. A
similar point is made by Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, who call for a postcolonial approach to
security studies. They argue that the ‘historical geographies that underpin security studies
systematically misrepresent the role of the global South in security relations and lead to a
distorted view of Europe and the West in world politics’ (Barkawi and Laffey 2006: 329). In
particular, they point to the inadequate ‘understanding of the nature or legitimacy of the armed
resistance of the weak’ in the traditional Eurocentric approach to security (Barkawi and Laffey
2006: 329). This has led Bryony Vince to argue that ‘scholars should detach themselves from
the parochial boundaries of the Western academic discipline of IR and security studies, and look
to the international realm more broadly for approaches that may not necessarily look like
orthodox (Western) theory’ (Vince 2018, italics in original).The emergence of poststructuralist
approaches to international relations have produced a related but somewhat different
perspective towards international security (see Ch. 12). Poststructuralist writers share the view
that ideas, discourse, and ‘the logic of interpretation’ are crucial in understanding international
politics and security. Like other writers who adopt a ‘critical security studies’ approach,
poststructuralists see ‘realism’ as one of the central problems of international insecurity. This is
because realism is a discourse of power and rule that has been dominant in international politics
in the past and has encouraged security competition among states. Power politics is seen as an
image of the world that encourages behaviour that helps bring about war. As such, the attempt
to balance power is itself part of the very behaviour that leads to war. According to this view,
alliances do not produce peace, but lead to war. The aim for many poststructuralists, therefore,
is to replace the discourse of realism or power with a different discourse and alternative
interpretations of threats to ‘national security’. The idea is that once the ‘software program’ of
realism that people carry around in their heads has been replaced by a new ‘software program’
based on cooperative norms, then individuals, states, and regions will learn to work with each
other and global politics will become more peaceful.Key Points• Constructivist thinkers base
their ideas on two main assumptions: (1) that the fundamental structures of international politics
are socially constructed; and (2) that changing the way we think about international relations
can help to bring about greater international security.• Critical security theorists contend that
most approaches put too much emphasis on the state.• The concept of human security focuses
on the individual and the threats that arise from poverty, disease, and environmental
degradation.• Feminist writers argue that gender tends to be left out of the literature on
international security, despite the fact that war impacts men and women differently.•
Postcolonial approaches highlight the bias of Eurocentric approaches to security studies and
call for a broadening of the subject to include the voices and insights of those marginalized by
past colonialism.• Poststructuralist writers believe that the nature of international politics can be
changed by altering the way we think and talk about security.15.5 Globalization and the ‘return
of geopolitics’In recent years there has been a debate among scholars about whether
‘globalization’ and ‘geopolitics’ are compatible in the changing world in which we live (seeCase
Study 15.1). There have also been debates about whether the world is reverting to ‘traditional
power dynamics with untraditional players’ or whether a ‘new geopolitics’ can successfully
emerge based on the importance of soft power rather than traditional hard military power. This
section will consider these important contemporary debates.Some writers argue that
‘globalization’ and ‘geopolitics’ represent fundamentally different approaches to policy. Brian
Blouet argues that ‘Geopolitical policies seek to establish national or imperial control over space
and the resources, routeways, industrial capacity and population the territory contains.’ In
contrast, he sees globalization as ‘the opening of national space for the free flow of goods,
capital and ideas’. ‘Globalization’, he says, ‘removes obstructions to movement and creates
conditions in which international trade in goods and services can expand’ (Blouet 2001).
Another writer, Ellen Frost, contends that globalization is changing the world in a radical way.
We are moving, she argues, towards a much more ‘interconnected world system 236 john
baylisCase Study 15.1 Insecurity in the post-cold war world: the Nagorno-Karabakh WarThe
Turkish ‘Bayraktar TB2’ drone© Bayhaluk / Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0)The Second
Nagorno-Karabakh War from September to November 2020 provides a good illustration of some
of the complexities of contemporary conflict in terms of the role of history, identity politics,
external intervention, geopolitics, modern technology, and social media in warfare.Ottoman
Empire troops invaded the area in 1724 and it was absorbed into the Russian Empire in 1813.
In 1923, following the Russian Revolution, Joseph Stalin established the Armenian-majority
autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. With the break-up of the
Soviet Union, both Azerbaijan and Armenia declared their independence and Armenia
demanded jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh. This led to a period of guerrilla warfare between
1988 and 1991, and to the First Nagorno-Karabakh War between 1992 and 1994 (known as the
Artsakh Liberation War in Armenia). This was followed by a period of low-intensity conflict
between 1994 and 2020. During this period, the Christian Armenian majority in Nagorno-
Karabakh controlled the self-declared Republic of Artsakh and the Muslim Azerbaijani
government sought to bring the region back under its control. The period saw ethnic cleansing
and a widespread refugee problem.Becoming increasingly frustrated, Azerbaijan started
hostilities again in September 2020, supported militarily by Turkey, which was anxious to retain
and extend its influence in the region. The conflict which ensued saw the very effective use of
Turkish ‘Bayraktar TB2’ drones and sensors by the Azerbaijani forces, together with heavy
artillery and missiles. This affected how other states planned their future strategies. Social
media, state propaganda, and information warfare were also features of the conflict.Russia,
generally a supporter of Armenia, but also traditionally concerned to bring stability to a region
important to its own security, attempted to broker a series of ceasefire agreements, which
initially failed. However, with the capture of Shusha, the second largest settlement in the region,
by Azerbaijani forces, Russia managed to secure a ceasefire on 10 November 2020 signed by
the president of Azerbaijan and the prime minister of Armenia. Under this agreement, the
warring sides kept control of the areas they currently held within Nagorno-Karabakh, and
Armenia agreed to hand back the surrounding territories it had occupied since 1994. Azerbaijan
was also given control of land access to an enclave bordering Turkey and Iran. Russian soldiers
were to act as peacekeepers in a corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh for five
years. The agreement was highly unpopular in Armenia and was followed by several skirmishes
in the months that followed. Violence erupted again in September 2022.The Second Nagorno-
Karabakh War was an ethnic and territorial conflict, in which the geopolitical stakes were high. It
is a region located between the powerful regional forces of Russia, Turkey, and Iran, close to
strategic oil and gas pipelines.Question 1: Given its large Armenian majority, why did the
Republic of Artsakh fail to gain more international support between the 1990s and
2020?Question 2: Why was geopolitics an important feature of the conflict?in which
independent networks and flows surmount traditional boundaries (or make them irrelevant)’. For
Frost, ‘external threats have increasingly assumed transnational forms’, which renders
traditional geopolitics, with its emphasis on balance of power and interstate conflict, largely
irrelevant (Kugler and Frost 2001).Not all writers, however, accept that globalization and
geopolitics are incompatible (or that geopolitics is no longer important). Douglas E. Streusand
rejects the idea that there is opposition between the two concepts, ‘both as historical forces and
as policy alternatives’. He argues that ‘the era of globalization has not ended the need for
geopolitical analysis’ and ‘the policy imperatives that geopolitical analysis generates do not
contradict the principles of globalization’ (Streusand 2002).Those who take this position argue
that traditional ideas of geopolitics remain as important as ever in the twenty-first century,
indeed that they are becoming more important. Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro (1998)
argue that ‘the central issue for the United States and its Asian allies and friends is whether an
increasingly powerful China is going to dominate Asia, as its leaders intend, or whether the
United States, working primarily with Japan, can counterbalance China’s emergence to great
power, and eventually to super-power, status’. The outcome will be determined, they continue,
‘on Asia’s eastern rim—in the band of territory that begins in the Russian Far East and
continues through the Korean peninsula, Japan and Taiwan and probably the Philippines and
Indonesia as well’ (Bernstein and Munro 1998).Chapter 15 International and global security
237For writers like Bernstein and Munro, traditional geopolitics is just as important as ever, and
requires a significant shift in American grand strategy. For those who support this view, the shift
(or ‘pivot’) of US strategic priorities from the Middle East towards the Pacific under the Obama
presidency and the radical changes to US foreign policy under President Donald Trump, as well
as President Joe Biden’s support for Taiwan over growing contemporary pressure from China,
all indicate that such geopolitical analysis remains an important element in contemporary
strategic thinking in Washington. Equally, it is argued that the rise of China and Chinese policies
regarding islands in the disputed South and East China Seas indicate similar thinking in Beijing
(see Case Study 15.2). Graham Allison has argued that America and China are currently in a
‘Thucydides’ Trap’. This refers to the fifth-century bc clash between the rising power of Athens
(akin to modern China) and the established military hegemon Sparta (akin to modern America).
In Allison’s view, disaster is likely unless each shows more respect for the other (Allison
2017).Case Study 15.2 Growing tensions in the South and East China SeasAlthough the origins
of territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas go back centuries, there has been a
recent upsurge of tension between China and its neighbours (and among the neighbours
themselves). In the South China Sea the disputes centre on the ownership of the Paracel and
Spratly islands, together with various uninhabited atolls and reefs, especially the Scarborough
Shoal (see Fig. 15.1). In the East China Sea the dispute is largely between Japan, China, and
Taiwan over what the Chinese call the Diaoyu islands and what the Japanese call the Senkaku
islands (see Fig. 15.2). These disputes are leading to growing anxiety in the Pacific region.The
South China Sea disputesThe main dispute over the Paracel and Spratly islands is between
China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. China claims historical rights to the islands dating back
2,000 years; China’s claims are mirrored by those of Taiwan. Vietnam rejects these historical
claims and says it has ruled over both the island chains since the seventeenth century. The
Philippines also claims the Spratlys because geographically they are close to its territory. The
Philippines also has a further dispute with China over the Scarborough Shoal. These islands lie
100 miles from the Philippines and 500 miles from China. To complicate matters further,
Malaysia claims that some of the Spratlys fall within its economic exclusion zone.The most
serious conflicts, however, have been between China and Vietnam. In 1974 China seized the
Paracels from Vietnam, and in the late 1980s clashes took place in the Spratlys, with further
Vietnamese losses. Tensions have risen higher in recent years due to a belief that the region
contains vast quantities of natural gas and oil. Recent rumours suggest that China has plans for
an undersea base to exploit the natural resources near the Spratlys. In 2018 Vietnam became
increasingly alarmed by further Chinese reclamation work, the development of military airstrips
and munitions warehouses, and the reported deployment of missiles on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi
Reef, and Mischief Reef.Miles0 200MilesCHINANORTHKOREASea ofJapan0 200SouthChina
SeaSOUTHKOREAHAINANCHINAYellowSeaJAPANParacelsVIETNAMScarboroughShoalBou
ndaryclaimed by Japan ShanghaiSpratlysPHILIPPINESEast ChinaSeaBRUNEICHUNXIAOGAS
FIELDS(Approximate area)Boundaryclaimed by
ChinaMALAYSIAINDONESIAMALAYSIADISPUTEDAREAOKINAWA China’s claimed territorial
watersUNCLOS 200 nautical mileExclusive Economic ZoneDisputed islandsFigure 15.1
Disputed areas in the South China SeaSource: UNCLOS and CIATAIWANSENKAKU
ISLANDS(Administered by Japan,claimed by China and Taiwan)PacificOcean Figure 15.2
Disputed areas in the East China SeaSource: UNCLOS and CIA238 john baylisThe East China
Sea disputesJapan’s claims over eight uninhabited islands and rocks that it calls the Senkaku
islands date back to 1895, when they were incorporated into Japanese territory. It claims that
this right was recognized under the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. In contrast, China argues
that what it calls the Diaoyu islands have been part of its territory since ancient times. Taiwan
also claims the islands with a similar argument. Clashes have occurred in recent years between
Japanese patrol boats and Chinese and Taiwanese fishing vessels. A confrontation involving a
Chinese fishing vessel in 2010 prompted anti-Japanese protests in multiple Chinese cities and
diplomatic protests until the Chinese crew were released. In 2012, tensions re-emerged after
Chinese and Japanese activists landed on a number of the islands. These tensions escalated
after the Japanese government bought three of the islands from private owners. In recent years
new tensions have arisen over Chinese oil rigs near the disputed islands and in 2018 when
Japan dispatched a submarine to the disputed waters southwest of Scarborough Shoal as part
of an anti-submarine warfare exercise.In both cases, while major military conflict among the
states involved has been avoided in recent years, the renewed disputes have raised the level of
regional insecurity. In July 2016 the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague ruled against
China and its claims to rights in the South China Sea in a case brought by the Philippines. The
Court said that China’s ‘nine-dash line’, which it uses to demarcate its territorial claims, is
unlawful under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China declared that the
ruling was ‘unfounded’ and that it would not be bound by it. More recently, however, there has
been a rapprochement between China and the Philippines.China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ of
providing major investment in infrastructure projects in Pacific countries (as well as in Africa,
Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas) has caused fears in Australia, Japan, and India that
China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy was designed to establish a chain of air and naval bases from
the South China Sea to the Horn of Africa. This led Australia to reopen a major military base
(with US support) in Papua New Guinea in 2018, and to a US, Australian, and Japanese
initiative to establish ‘an alliance of friendly nations’ for joint overseas investment to counter
Chinese economic diplomacy in the region. A new trilateral Australian, UK, and US (AUKUS)
arrangement was also set up in 2021 by which the US and UK agreed to provide Australia with
a range of technology, including nuclear-powered submarines, to help counter China’s more
assertive role in the region.Question 1: What do you understand by the term ‘Thucydides’ Trap’
in relation to the rise of China?Question 2: What role does the ‘security dilemma’ play in the
territorial disputes between China and its neighbours?The crisis in Ukraine, with the Russian
annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the major invasion in February 2022, has also highlighted the
growing contemporary challenge posed by global geopolitical rivalries. Hybrid warfare, involving
disinformation, deception, and cyberattacks, together with the use of mass conventional forces,
threatens to destabilize the whole basis of European and global security, ushering in a new
epoch of cold war and geopolitical competition. For Russia, the expansion of NATO since the
end of the cold war and the increasing tendency of Ukraine to look west to Europe represented
a perceived threat to its own security, justifying ‘the raw use of power’. Some writers argue that
the conflict should be seen in a broader global context. According to this view, both Russia and
China saw the chaotic withdrawal of US and Western forces from Afghanistan as providing an
opportunity to develop a strategic partnership which challenges the post-cold war, liberal rules-
based international order (Lo 2020).A more critical view of geopolitics is provided by Richard
Falk. Falk contends that traditional geopolitics ‘was dominated by the United States, and
operationally administered from Washington, and continued despite the collapse of colonialism
to be West-centric when it came to the shaping of global security policy’. The problem, he
argues, is that this ‘Old Geopolitics’ has not registered the implications for the world order of the
collapse of the colonial order or the relative weakening of US primacy. However, he argues that
while the ‘Old Geopolitics’ remains embedded, especially in Western thinking, a ‘New
Geopolitics’ is emerging which rests less on the importance of military power and more on the
importance of soft power. This trend, enhanced by the processes of globalization, is exemplified
by the emergence of the BRIC countries and the rise in importance of a wide variety of non-
state actors. Falk also argues that the ‘winless withdrawals’ of the US from Iraq and Afghanistan
are evidence that superiority in hard military power ‘is no longer able to reach desired political
outcomes in violent conflicts’. The US should learn that depending on military power, the main
currency of the ‘Old Geopolitics’, will bring only ‘frustration and defeat’. The problem, he says, is
that the aged architects of the ‘Old Geopolitics’, for a variety of reasons, are unable to learn
from failure, and so the cycle of war and frustration goes on and on with disastrous human
results (Falk 2012).In summary, different views of globalization and geopolitics give rise to very
different conclusions about world order. For some, globalization can bring greater peace and
security, while for others it can lead to Chapter 15 International and global security
239Opposing Opinions 15.1 The US-led liberal world order is overForGlobal power is shifting
from the West to ‘the rest’. The rise of China and the other BRIC countries will reshape the
management of world order as they pursue globalization in a different form to the traditional US-
led approach to globalization.The US is no longer in a position to create the rules and dominate
the institutions of global governance and world order (Acharya). The Trump administration
pursued ‘America First’ policies that weakened the US alliances and global institutions that were
the basis of the Western liberal world order.There was never really a US-led liberal world order.
The socalled US-led ‘world order’ was always limited to a group of likeminded states and did not
include many other countries in the world (Nye).Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine has
brought ‘an end to the world order as we know it’. The use of significant force by one of the
major powers against a neighbouring sovereign state not only broke international law and
established international norms, but also threatened to undermine the whole basis of the
European security system.AgainstThe US remains the most powerful state in the world in terms
of military, economic, and soft power. Despite its decline, the order created by the US is so
deeply rooted and legitimate that it is likely to continue to shape world order for many years to
come.President Biden is committed to reconstituting US leadership and US-led world order. The
US return to multilateralism and support for alliances after the Trump era will help to reestablish
the predominance of the Western-led traditional liberal order.The formation of the D-10 provides
the basis for a revival of the Western-led world order. The D-10 brings together the top planning
officials and