THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 251954, June 10, 2020 ]

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF INMATES RAYMUNDO
REYES AND VINCENT B. EVANGELISTA, DULY REPRESENTED BY ATTY. RUBEE RUTH C. CAGASCA-
EVANGELISTA, IN HER CAPACITY AS WIFE OF VINCENT B. EVANGELISTA AND COUNSEL OF BOTH
INMATES, PETITIONER, V. BUCOR CHIEF GERALD BANTAG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR GENERAL OF
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS OF NEW BILIBID PRISON, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS AND ALL THOSE
PERSONS IN CUSTODY OF THE INMATES RAYMUNDO REYES AND VINCENT B. EVANGELISTA,
RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

ZALAMEDA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus praying for: 1) the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus directing respondent Gerald Bantag, as Director General of the Bureau of
Corrections, to make a return thereon, showing legal authority to detain Raymundo Reyes (Reyes) and
Vincent B. Evangelista (Evangelista), persons deprived of liberty (PDLs), and to present them personally
before the Court; and 2) for the release of Reyes and Evangelista from incarceration at the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City.

Petitioner, Atty. Rubee Ruth C. Cagasca-Evangelista (petitioner), the wife of Evangelista, filed the instant
petition as counsel for her husband and Reyes. She alleges that Reyes and Evangelista were
convicted1 by Branch 103, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on 14 December 2001 for violation
of Section 15, Article III, Republic Act No. (RA) 6425,2 as amended, for the illegal sale of 974.12 grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, acting in conspiracy with one another, and were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amount of Php 500,000.00 each.
The penalty was made in accordance with the amendment introduced by RA 7659,3 which increased the
penalty of imprisonment for illegal sale of drugs from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years,
to reclusion pe1petua to death for 200 grams or more of shabu. The said conviction was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in a Decision4 dated 27 September 2007.

More than a decade after the affirmation of Reyes and Evangelista's conviction by the Supreme Court,
petitioner now claims that with the abolition of the death penalty,5 and the repeal of the death penalty
in RA 7659 as a consequence, the penalty for illegal sale of drugs should be reverted to that originally
imposed in RA 6425, or from reclusion perpetua in RA 7659 to six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years in RA 6425. According to her, "if the convicts will serve the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA[,] it is
as (sic) the same as punishing them to (sic) a crime that is not existing anymore. And said [penalty] will
[be] tantamount to deprivation of their life and liberty and will not be fair and just in the eyes of man
and law."6

Further, petitioner insists that both Reyes and Evangelista have already served 19 years and 2 months, or
more than 18 years if the benefit of Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) under RA 105927 was to be
considered. And, with the benefit of the GCTA, which may be applied retroactively,8 both Reyes and
Evangelista have already served more than the required sentence imposed by law.
The primary consideration is the propriety of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

We answer in the negative.

As a preliminary matter, we point out that petitioner disregarded the basic rules of procedure. There is
no verified declaration of electronic submission of the soft copy of the petition. The required written
explanation of service or filing under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court is also patently lacking.

Second, petitioner disregarded the hierarchy of courts.

The Rules of Court provide that "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto."9

An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this Court or any
of its members, the Court of Appeals (CA) or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the
RTC or any of its presiding judges.10 In the absence of all the RTC judges in a province or city, any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge may hear and decide
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the province or city where the absent RTC judges sit.11

Hence, this Court has concurrent jurisdiction, along with the CA and the trial courts, to issue a writ
of habeas corpus. However, mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to
choose the court with which the petition shall be filed.12 Petitioners should be directed by the hierarchy
of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts "serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs."13

In the landmark case of Gios-Samar, Inc., v. DOTC,14 the Supreme Court ruled that direct recourse to this
Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law, and not issues that depend on the
determination of questions of facts:

In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in the issuance
of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs),
direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law. Save for the single
specific instance provided by the Constitution under Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which
depends on the determination of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because
we arc not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate
evidence in the first instance; these are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory
agencies. This is the raison d'etre behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a
constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks
assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed aside by an invocation
of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or cause raised. (Emphasis
supplied)

At first blush, petitioner seeks to raise a question of law - whether or not the abolition of the death
penalty in RA 9346 reverted the penalty for illegal sale of shabu from RA 7659 to RA 6425 prior to its
amendment, thus placing the question within the jurisdiction of this Court. The real question, however,
is the release of Reyes and Evangelista from detention based on the alleged service of their sentences
pursuant to RA 10592, which requires a determination of facts, i.e., if said PDLs are entitled to the
benefit of GCTA. On this ground alone, the petition must be dismissed.

At any rate, it must be stressed that as a matter of policy, direct resort to this Court will not be
entertained unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as in cases involving national interest and those of
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of certiorari, calling for
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.15 Not one of these exceptional and compelling circumstances,
however, were even alleged or shown in order for the Court to disregard the sanctity of the hierarchy of
courts.

Procedural considerations aside, the Court still finds the petition wanting in merit.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
that will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.16 The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.17 Section 4, Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or
defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.

In this case, the confinement of Reyes and Evangelista at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City is
valid pursuant to a lawful judgment.1âшphi1 They were convicted for violation of Section 15, RA 6425,
as amended by RA 7659, and the affirmation of their conviction was decreed by no less than this very
Court.

We are aware that the writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of as a post-conviction remedy when,
as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: 1)
there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; 2) the court
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or 3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding
the sentence as to such excess.18 Here, petitioner invokes the third circumstance.

When the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially ordained, the range of
inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed.19 As a high prerogative writ which
furnishes an extraordinary remedy, the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked only under extraordinary
circumstances.20 Mere invocation that an extraordinary circumstance exists is not enough, as in this
case.
As claimed by petitioner, there is no dispute that death penalty has been abolished. This does not mean,
however, that the penalties imposed under RA 7956, apart from death, have likewise been repealed.
Section 1 of RA 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Death Penalty in the Philippines, provides:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No.
Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating
Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed, Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine
(R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and
decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Upon a reading of the law, only the imposition of the death penalty has been removed, and RA 7659, as
well as other laws, are repealed or amended insofar as they impose the death penalty. Section 2 of RA
9346 provides the appropriate penalty in lieu of death: reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes
use of the nomenclature of the Revised Penal Code; or life imprisonment, when the law violated does
not make use of the said nomenclature. Evidently, RA 9346 did not repeal the amendment introduced in
RA 7659 imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua in cases of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. As such,
the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua against Reyes and Evangelista is
valid.

On the issue of the applicability of RA 10592, Section 2, Rule IV of the 2019 Revised Implementing Rules
and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592, "An Act Amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98, and 99 of Act No.
3815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code," (2019 IRR), issued by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), provides:

Section 2. GCTA During Service of Sentence. - The good conduct of a PDL convicted by final judgment in
any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail shall entitle him to the
deductions described in Section 3 hereunder, as GCTA, from the period of his sentence, pursuant to
Section 3 of RA No. 10592.

The following shall not be entitled to any GCTA during service of sentence:

a. Recidivists;

b. Habitual Delinquents;

c. Escapees; and

d. PDL convicted of Heinous Crimes.

It is clear from the aforequoted provision that PDLs convicted of heinous crimes shall not be entitled to
GCTA. Section 1 of RA 10592, amending Article 29 of the RPC, supports this:

x x x Provided, finally, that recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous
crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)

Reyes and Evangelista, who were found guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs exceeding 200 grams,
have committed a heinous crime.1âшphi1 This is in consonance with RA 7659, which includes the
distribution or sale of dangerous drugs as heinous for being a grievous, odious and hateful offense and
which, by reason of its inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity is repugnant
and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society.21

Rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce, such as the 2019 IRR issued by the DOJ and the DILG, have the force of law, and are entitled to
great respect. Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a
presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this
case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no
option but to apply the same.22

Accordingly, the writ cannot be issued and the discharge of Reyes and Evangelista from imprisonment
should not be authorized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, (Chairperson), Gesmundo, Carandang, and Gaerlan,* JJ., concur.