Salibo

G.R. No. 197597. April 8, 2015.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG

SALIBO,
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, petitioner, vs. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX,
BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY and all other persons acting on
his behalf and/or having custody of DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Habeas Corpus; An application for a writ of habeas corpus
may be made through a petition filed before this court or any of its members, the Court of
Appeals (CA) or any of its members in instances authorized by law, or the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) or any of its presiding judges.—An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made
through a petition filed before this court or any of its members, the Court of Appeals or any of its
members in instances authorized by law, or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding
judges. The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the
person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ. A hearing on the return of the
writ is then conducted. The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which
issued the writ. Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is
made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue
of the designation, the lower court “acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of
the [petition for habeas corpus.]” Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable
to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.
Same; Same; Same; Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus
“shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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In The Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo vs. Warden, Quezon
City Jail Annex, BJMP Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.”—Called the “great writ of liberty[,]” the writ of habeas corpus “was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom.” The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and
summary in nature, consistent with the law’s “zealous regard for personal liberty.” Under Rule
102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus “shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” The primary purpose of the
writ “is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.” “Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient.”
Same; Same; Same; The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as
to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus.—The nature of the restraint of
liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of
habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when there is an alleged
violation of the liberty of abode. In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the
implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution. Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts
must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty
will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition
for the issuance of the writ.—This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for
failure to make a Return of the Writ. As to the legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor
Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had deported to Davao of their liberty,
specifically, of their privilege of domicile. It said that the women, “despite their being in a sense
lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens[.]” The women had the right “to change their
domicile from Manila to another locality.” The writ of habeas corpus is different
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands
the production of the body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other
hand, it is in the final decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint. Between the
issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the issuance of the
writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the
legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if
the petition for its issuance “on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]” Although the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the public safety
requires it, the writ itself may not be suspended.
Same; Same; Same; It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person
allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.—It is true
that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is
restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become legal, and
the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court provides: SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of
an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Moot and Academic; The filing of the Informations, according to the
Supreme Court (SC), rendered the Petitions for habeas corpus moot and academic.—This court
likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990).
Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty.
Domingo Anonuevo,
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Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested
without a warrant for their alleged membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People’s Army. During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however, Informations
against them were filed before this court. The filing of the Informations, according to this court,
rendered the Petitions for habeas corpus moot and academic, thus: It is to be noted that, in all the
petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the
petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of
habeas corpus will not be allowed.
Same; Same; Same; Instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for
habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the
orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies.—Instead of availing themselves of the
extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process
or order of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies. This
ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Motion to Quash; At any time before a plea is entered, the accused
may file a motion to quash complaint or information based on any of the grounds enumerated in
Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.—At any time before a plea is entered, the accused
may file a motion to quash complaint or information based on any of the grounds enumerated in
Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash
the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: (a) That the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged; (c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d)
That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) That it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form; (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a
single punishment for various offenses is
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prescribed by law; (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) That it
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) That
the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Same; Same; Same; If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused
“hypothetically admits the facts alleged in the information.”—In filing a motion to quash, the
accused “assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him [or her] for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information.” If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused
“hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the information.” “Evidence aliunde or matters
extrinsic from the information are not to be considered.”
Same; Same; Same; If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order the amendment of the
complaint or information. If the motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts alleged in
the complaint or information do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the
prosecution an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.—“If the motion to quash is
based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment,
the court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or information].” If the motion to quash
is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not constitute an
offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution “an opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment.” If after amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect,
the trial court shall quash the complaint or information.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
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LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In
such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally
detained.
This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals’ Decision2 reversing the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting
Datukan Malang Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) and other
Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage.4 “While in Saudi Arabia, . . .
Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah.”5 He returned
to the Philippines on December 20, 2009.6
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in
Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.7
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly
participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of
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1 Rollo, pp. 3-60.
2 Id., at pp. 65-82. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and
concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (Chair) and Samuel H. Gaerlan of the
Ninth Division.
3 Id., at pp. 129-138. The Decision was penned by Judge Briccio C. Ygaña of Branch 153 of the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City.
4 Id., at p. 183.
5 Id., at p. 184.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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302
arrest issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his
name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have
participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia
at that time.9
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police “pertinent portions of his passport,
boarding passes and other documents”10 tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo
was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19, 2009.11
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him because he was not
Butukan S. Malang.12
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his
passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained
Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days.13
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in
Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the
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8 Crim. Case Nos. Q-09-16214872, Q-09-162216-31, and Q-10-162662-66. The cases are
currently pending in the sala of Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes. See Re: Petition for Radio and
Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy
Ampatuan, et al., 667 Phil. 128, 131; 652 SCRA 1, 5 (2011) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].
9 Rollo, pp. 184-185.
10 Id., at p. 185.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on
documents.14
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently
detained.15
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Petition for Habeas
Corpus16 questioning the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty.17 He
maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.18
In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice).20 The Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the
Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and
produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010.21

Proceedings before the trial court
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex brought Salibo before the
trial court. The Warden, however, failed to file a Return one day before the hearing. He also
appeared without counsel during the hearing.22
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14 Id.
15 Id., at pp. 185-186.
16 Id., at pp. 182-197.
17 Id., at p. 190.
18 Id.
19 Id., at pp. 199-201.
20 Id., at p. 200.
21 Id.
22 Id., at p. 132.
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304
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010 at 2:00 p.m.23
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ. However, during the
September 29, 2010 hearing on the Return, the Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante,
Jr., Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.24
Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on behalf of the Warden and
argued that only the Office of the Solicitor General has the authority to appear on behalf of a
respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding.25
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial court reset the hearing on the
Return to October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.26
The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito
appeared on behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that Salibo’s
Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since Salibo was charged under a valid
Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was “no longer availing.”27
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest, and Alias
Warrant of Arrest referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang
Salibo, as accused. Reiterating that he was not Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi
Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded the trial court to order his
release from detention.28
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23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id., at pp. 132-133.
26 Id., at p. 133.
27 Id.
28 Id., at pp. 133-135.
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The trial court found that Salibo was not “judicially charged”29 under any resolution,
information, or amended information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended Information
presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly
arrested as there was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang
Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a
court.30
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang charged with
murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation
Clearance dated August 27, 2009 showed that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the
date of the certificate.31 A Philippine passport bearing Salibo’s picture showed the name
“Datukan Malang Salibo.”32
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo “established that [he] was out of the country”33 from
November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009. This fact was supported by a Certification34 from
Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo’s departure from and arrival in Manila onboard its
flights.35 A Flight Manifest issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines
Ticket No. 0652113 also showed this fact.36
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo’s Petition for Habeas
Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.
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29 Id., at p. 137.
30 Id., at pp. 137-138.

31 Id., at pp. 136-137 and 175.
32 Id., at pp. 136 and 164.
33 Id., at p. 135.
34 Id., at p. 140.
35 Id., at p. 136.
36 Id., at pp. 131 and 136.
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306
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial
court’s Decision.38 Through its Decision dated April 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo’s arrest and
subsequent detention were made under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest.39 Even
assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the
Court of Appeals said that “[t]he orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]”40 According to the Court of
Appeals, Salibo’s proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest.41
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42 which the Court of Appeals denied in the
Resolution43 dated July 6, 2011.

Proceedings before this Court
On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for Review (With
Urgent Application for a Writ of
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37 Id., at pp. 204-206.
38 Id., at p. 81.
39 Id., at pp. 76-77.
40 Id., at p. 79.
41 Id., at p. 77.
42 Id., at pp. 87-124.
43 Id., at pp. 84-86. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and
concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (Chair) and Samuel H. Gaerlan of the
Ninth Division.
44 Id., at p. 3.
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Preliminary Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,45 after which

petitioner Salibo filed a Reply.46
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with 57 counts of
murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of
Appeals’ finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was not duly charged in court. He is being
illegally deprived of his liberty and, therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas
Corpus.47
Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals
delegated to the trial court the authority to hear respondent Warden on the Return, the trial
court’s Decision should be deemed a Decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, respondent
Warden should have directly filed his appeal before this court.48
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even
assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, petitioner
Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to Quash Information, not a
Petition for Habeas Corpus.49
The issues for our resolution are:
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on petitioner
Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and
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45 Id., at pp. 277-298.
46 Id., at pp. 327-346.
47 Id., at pp. 16-42.
48 Id., at pp. 42-50.
49 Id., at pp. 291-292.
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308

Second, whether petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
We grant the Petition.
Contrary to petitioner Salibo’s claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed before the Court of
Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed before this court
or any of its members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by
law,51 or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding judges.52 The court or judge grants the
writ and requires the officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of
liberty to file a return of the writ.53 A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.54
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the writ.55 Should
the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower
court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the
lower court “acquire[s] the power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for
habeas corpus.]”56 Therefore, the decision on
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50 Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5(1); Rules of Court, Rule 102, Sec. 2.
51 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1981), Sec. 9(1); Rules of Court, Rule 102, Sec. 2.
52 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1981), Sec. 21(1); Rules of Court, Rule 102, Sec. 2.
53 Rules of Court, Rule 102, Sec. 6.
55 Rules of Court, Rule 102, Sec. 6; See Medina v. Yan, 158 Phil. 286, 296; 60 SCRA 72, 82
(1974) [Per J. Fernandez, En Banc]; See also Saulo v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 378, 382 (1960) [Per J.
J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
56 Medina v. Yan, id., at p. 298; p. 83.
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the petition is a decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of
the lower court.57
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc.,58 “a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court . . .
[o]n behalf of . . . Alfredo B. Saulo [(Saulo)].”59 This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and
ordered respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the
Writ. This court made the Writ returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.60
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First Instance denied Saulo’s
Petition for Habeas Corpus.61
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance heard the Petition for
Habeas Corpus “not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely delegation[.]”62
Consequently, “this Court should have the final say regarding the issues raised in the petition,
and only [this court’s decision] . . . should be regarded as operative.”63
This court rejected Saulo’s argument and stated that his “logic is more apparent than real.”64 It
ruled that when a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves
whether the respondent should be ordered to show cause why the petitioner or the person in
whose behalf the petition was filed was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty.65
However, once the superior court makes the writ
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57 Id., at pp. 298-299; p. 86. See also Saulo v. Cruz, supra note 55.
58 Saulo v. Cruz, id.
59 Id., at p. 379.
60 Id.
61 Id., at pp. 380-381.
62 Id., at p. 382.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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310
returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower court designated “does
not thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are
devoid of effect[.]”66 The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the lower
court, not of the superior court.
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court a Petition for
Habeas Corpus. This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance granted
Medina’s Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered that Medina be released from detention.68
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals.69
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals a “Motion for
Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court.” The Court of Appeals, however, denied the
Motion.70
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the “Motion for Certification of
Appeal to the Supreme Court,” citing Saulo as legal basis.71 The Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in deciding Medina’s Petition for Habeas Corpus, “acquired the power and authority to
determine the merits of the case[.]”72 Consequently, the decision of the Court of First In-
_______________
66 Id.
67 Medina v. Yan, supra note 55.
68 Id., at p. 290; p. 83.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id., at pp. 294-297; pp. 82-84.
72 Id., at p. 298; p. 83.
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stance of Rizal on Medina’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of
Appeals.73
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent Warden on his Return and
decided the Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court “acquired the power and authority to
determine the merits”74 of petitioner Salibo’s Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas
Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of Appeals. Since the
Court of Appeals is the court with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts,75
respondent Warden correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.

II
Called the “great writ of liberty[,]”76 the writ of habeas corpus “was devised and exists as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom.”77 The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary78 and
summary79 in nature,
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73 Id., at pp. 298-299; pp. 86-87.
74 Id., at p. 298; p. 83.
75 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1981), Sec. 9(3).
76 Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 206 Phil. 466, 495; 121 SCRA 538, 562 (1983) [Per J. Concepcion, Jr.,
En Banc].
77 Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 788 (1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
78 In Re: The Writ of Hebeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa, 485 Phil. 368, 381; 442 SCRA
706, 719 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc]; Calvan v. Court of Appeals, 396 Phil. 133,
144; 341 SCRA 806, 817 (2000) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].
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312
consistent with the law’s “zealous regard for personal liberty.”80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus “shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.”81 The
primary purpose of the writ “is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.”82 “Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.”83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to
the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy84 or
when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus
effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right
to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
constitu-
_______________
79 Mangila v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013, 701 SCRA 355, 360 [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division], citing Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 492 Phil. 410, 422; 452 SCRA
312, 325 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; Saulo v. Cruz, 105 Phil. 315, 320-321
(1959) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc], citing 25 Am. Jur., p. 245.
80 Supra note 77 at p. 789.
83 Id.
84 See Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, 147 Phil. 362; 37 SCRA 420 (1971) [Per
J. Fernando, En Banc]; Conde v. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650 (1924) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc], and
Ganaway v. Quillen, 42 Phil. 805 (1922) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
85 Villavicencio v. Lukban, supra note 77; Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660
(1919) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
86 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 1 provides:
313
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015
313
tional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the
substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.87
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario Gumabon (Gumabon), Blas
Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol), Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito), Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno
Palmares (Palmares) were convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. They
commenced serving their respective sentences of reclusion perpetua.89
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving their sentences, this
court promulgated People v. Hernandez90 in 1956, ruling that the complex crime of rebellion
with murder does not exist.91
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus. They prayed for their release from incarceration and argued that the
Hernandez doctrine must retroactively apply to them.92
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares properly availed of a
petition for habeas corpus.93 Citing Harris v. Nelson,94 this court said:
_______________
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
87 See Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, supra note 84.
88 Id.
89 Id., at p. 364; p. 421.
90 99 Phil. 515 (1956) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].

91 Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, supra note 84 at p. 364; p. 434.
92 Id., at pp. 364-365; p. 428.
93 Id., at p. 372; p. 433.
94 22 L Ed 2d 281 (1969).
314
314
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action. . . . The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity
to reach all manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and
lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and
flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected.95
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,96 the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued Resolution
No. 25, Series of 1917. The Resolution ordered the Mangyans removed from their native habitat
and compelled them to permanently settle in an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the
Resolution, Mangyans who refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao reservation were
imprisoned.97
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Rubi and all the other
Mangyans being held in the reservation.98 Since the application questioned the legality of
deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the other Mangyans, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus
and ordered the Provincial Board of Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ.99
_______________
95 Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, supra note 84 at pp. 367-368; p. 425.
96 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra note 85.
97 Id., at pp. 667-668.
98 Id., at p. 666.
99 Id., at p. 720. This court, however, denied the Petition for Habeas Corpus. It ruled that
Resolution No. 25 validly displaced the Mangyans from their native habitat in order to “begin the
process of civilization.” (Id., at p. 712).
315
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015
315
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban.100 “[T]o exterminate
vice,”101 Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila ordered the brothels in Manila closed. The female sex
workers previously employed by these brothels were rounded up and placed in ships bound for
Davao. The women were expelled from Manila and deported to Davao without their consent.102
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women, this court issued a Writ
of Habeas Corpus and ordered Mayor Justo Lukban, among others, to make a Return of the Writ.
Mayor Justo Lukban, however, failed to make a Return, arguing that he did not have custody of
the women.103
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a Return of the
Writ.104 As to the legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally
deprived the women he had deported to Davao of their liberty, specifically, of their privilege of
domicile.105 It said that the women, “despite their being in a sense lepers of society[,] are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties
as are other citizens[.]”106 The women had the right “to change their domicile from Manila to
another locality.”107
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for the issuance of
the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body of the person alleg-
_______________
101 Id., at p. 780.
102 Id., at pp. 780-781.
103 Id., at p. 782.
104 Id., at p. 799.
105 Id., at pp. 785-786.

106 Id., at p. 786.
107 Id.
316
316
edly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final decision where a court
determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its issuance, it is the
issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy judicial
inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas
corpus even if the petition for its issuance “on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]”108 Although the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when
the public safety requires it,109 the writ itself may not be suspended.110

III
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of
liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.111 The restraint
_______________
108 Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, supra note 84 at p. 367; p. 424, citing
Ganaway v. Quillen, supra note 84.
109 Const., Art. III, Sec. 15 provides:
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases
of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.
110 Supra note 76.
111 Villar v. Bugarin, 224 Phil. 161, 170; 140 SCRA 8, 10 (1985) [Per CJ. Makasiar, En Banc];
Celeste v. People, 142 Phil. 308, 312; 31 SCRA 391, 395 (1970) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc];
Santiago v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 927, 930-931 (1947) [Per J. Tuason, En Banc]; Quintos
v. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil. 304, 306 (1930) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc]; and Carrington v.
Peterson, 4 Phil. 134, 138 (1905) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
317
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015
317
then has become legal,112 and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.113
Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in
the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,114 elements of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National

Police arrested Atty. Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission Order allegedly
issued by then Minister of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of
Atty. Ilagan’s arrest, 15 from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao
_______________
112 Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago, 245 Phil. 809, 816; 162 SCRA 840, 847 (1988) [Per J.
Melencio-Herrera, Second Division], citing Cruz v. Montoya, 159 Phil. 601, 604-605; 62 SCRA
543, 546 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, Second Division].
113 Ilagan v. Enrile, 223 Phil. 561, 580; 139 SCRA 349, 381-382 (1985) [Per J. Melencio-
Herrera, En Banc]; Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago, id., at p. 816; p. 848, citing Beltran v. Garcia,
178 Phil. 590, 594; 89 SCRA 717, 721-722 (1979) [Per Acting CJ. Fernando, En Banc].
114 Ilagan v. Enrile, id.
318
318

Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where he was detained.115
Among Atty. Ilagan’s visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano). Atty. Arellano,
however, no longer left Camp Catitipan as the military detained and arrested him based on an
unsigned Mission Order.116
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military informed the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty.
Risonar). To verify his arrest papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano,
the military did not allow Atty. Risonar to leave. He was arrested based on a Mission Order
signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.117
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism filed before this court a Petition for Habeas
Corpus in behalf of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.118
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile, Armed Forces of the
Philippines Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos), and
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police Regional Commander Brigadier General
Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General Tan-Gatue) to make a Return of the Writ.119 This court set the
hearing on the Return on May 23, 1985.120
_______________
115 Id., at p. 573; p. 360.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id., at p. 572; p. 360.
119 Id., at pp. 561 and 573; p. 361.
120 Id., at p. 573; p. 361.
319
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015
319
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue contended that the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar
by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A.121 The lawyers, according to respondents, allegedly
“played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and
the National Democratic Front.”122
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the temporary release of Attys.
Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar on the recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and retired Associate Justice Jose B.L. Reyes.123
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however, Minister Enrile, General
Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue filed a Motion for Reconsideration.124 They filed an Urgent
Manifestation/Motion stating that Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan,
Arellano, and Risonar. They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus for
being moot and academic.125
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism opposed the motion. According to them,
no preliminary investigation was conducted before the filing of the Information. Attys. Ilagan,
Arellano, and Risonar were deprived of their right to due process. Consequently, the Information
was void.126
_______________
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id., at p. 574; p. 361.
124 Id.
125 Id., at p. 575; p. 362.
126 Id.
320
320

This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it became moot and academic
with the filing of the Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar in court:127
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue
of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of
the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention. Now
that the detained attorneys’ incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal
cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy
of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served its purpose.128 (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v. Ramos.129 Roberto
Umil, Rolando Dural, Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo
Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were
all arrested without a warrant for their alleged membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People’s Army.130
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however, Informations against them
were filed before this court. The filing of the Informations, according to this court, rendered the
Petitions for habeas corpus moot and academic, thus:131
_______________
127 Id., at p. 576; p. 363.
128 Id.
129 G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990, 187 SCRA 311 [Per Curiam, En Banc].
130 Id., at pp. 317-331.
131 Id., at p. 332.
321
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015
321
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the
proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged
before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a petition for habeas
corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly
course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to
quash the information or the warrant of arrest.134
At any time before a plea is entered,135 the accused may file a motion to quash complaint or
information based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of
the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
_______________
132 Id.
133 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, supra note 79.
134 Ilagan v. Enrile, supra note 113 at p. 577; p. 364; Bernarte v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil.
643, 657; 263 SCRA 323, 335 (1996) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
322
322
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the
case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused “assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
information filed against him [or her] for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
which are apparent in the face of the information.”136 If the accused avails himself or herself of
a motion to quash, the accused “hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the information.”137
“Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are not to be considered.”138
_______________
136 People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013, 701 SCRA 506, 512 [Per J. Peralta,
Third Division].
137 Id.
138 Id.
323
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015
323
“If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can
be cured by amendment, the court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or
information].”139 If the motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts alleged in the
complaint or information do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution
“an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.”140 If after amendment, the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint or
information.141

IV
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was not arrested by
virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or
an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed
himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221,
Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and
accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of murder in connection
with the Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:
_______________
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Ilagan v. Enrile, supra note 113.
324
324
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to
clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner
Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither
committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge
of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a
warrant. They deprived him
325
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015
325
of his right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be
issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the “disturbing”143 case
of Ilagan.144 Like petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan to verify and contest
any arrest papers against him. Then and there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In
his dissenting opinion in Ilagan,145 Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the lack of preliminary
investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of his right to due
process of law — a ground for the grant of a petition for habeas corpus:146
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without preliminary investigation
falls within the exceptions of Rule 112, Sec. 7 and Rule 113, Sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Again, this is erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the
cited rules. The petitioners are not persons “lawfully arrested without a warrant.” The fiscal
could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would
be rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one’s whim
and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its imperative urgency and
necessity as declared by the President himself. The majority decision then relies on Rule 113,
Sec. 5 which authorizes arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed
the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz., in the act of committing the offense. Quite obviously, the
arrest was not a citizen’s arrest nor were they caught in flagrante
_______________
143 Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, p. 292 (2007 ed.).
144 Ilagan v. Enrile, supra note 113.
145 Id.
146 J. Teehankee, Dissenting Opinion in Ilagan v. Enrile, id., at p. 622; p. 416.
326
326
delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure have tightened and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an
offense “has in fact just been committed.” This connotes immediacy in point of time and
excludes cases under the old rule where an offense “has in fact been committed” no matter how
long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must have “personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
[arrestee] has committed it” (instead of just “reasonable ground to believe that the [arrestee] has
committed it” under the old rule). Clearly, then, an information could not just be filed against the
petitioners without due process and preliminary investigation.147 (Emphasis in the original,
citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if
petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not have been cured by
mere amendment of the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused
appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from “Butukan S. Malang” to “Datukan
Malang Salibo” will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation. The
Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and
Datukan Malang Salibo are the same person. There is evidence, however, that the person
detained by virtue of these processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person named
Datukan Malang Salibo.
_______________
147 Id.

327
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015
327
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport,148 his identification card from
the Office on Muslim Affairs,149 his Tax Identification Number card,150 and clearance from the
National Bureau of Investigation151 all bearing his picture and indicating the name “Datukan
Malang Salibo.” None of these government-issued documents showed that petitioner Salibo used
the alias “Butukan S. Malang.”
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on November 23, 2009
when the Maguindanao Massacre occurred.
A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo departed for
Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A
Certification153 from Saudi Arabian Airlines attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi
Arabia on board Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he arrived
in the Philippines onboard Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December 20, 2009.

V

People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the most complex case
pending in our courts. The case involves 57 victims154 and 197 accused, two (2) of
_______________
148 Rollo, pp. 164-166.
149 Id., at p. 168.
150 Id., at p. 175.
151 Id.
152 Id., at p. 139.
153 Id., at p. 140.
154 Re: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., supra note 8 at p. 131; p. 13.
328
328
which have become state witnesses.155 As of November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been
arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions for bail of which 42 have already been resolved.156 To
require petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his liberty.
Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that he is not
Butukan S. Malang.
In ordering petitioner Salibo’s release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his innocence.
However, between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty without
due process of law and the government that has all the “manpower and the resources at [its]
command”157 to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the citizen.
Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper remedies
against him as provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally
deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’
Decision dated April 19, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon
City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa,
Taguig, is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Malang Salibo from
detention.
_______________
155 Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, SERENO SPEECH | On Maguindanao Massacre:
The culture of impunity and the counter-culture of hope <http://www.interaksyon.com/article/
99760/sereno-speech--on-maguindanao-massacre-the-culture-of impunity-and-the-counter-
culture-of-hope> (visited March 11, 2015).
156 Id.
157 J. Teehankee, Dissenting Opinion in Ilagan v. Enrile, supra note 113 at p. 616; p. 402.
329
VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015
329
The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court is hereby
NOTED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Under the rules on the writs, the act or omission or the threatened act or omission
complained of — confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to
violate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases — should be illegal or unlawful.
(So vs. Tacla, Jr., 633 SCRA 563 [2010])
In a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved
party. (Boac vs. Cadapan, 649 SCRA 618 [2011])
——o0o—— In The Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo vs.
Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, BJMP Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, 755 SCRA
296, G.R. No. 197597 April 8, 2015

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G.R. No. 197597. April 8, 2015.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG

VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015

1 Rollo, pp. 3-60.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

9 Rollo, pp. 184-185.

VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015

15 Id., at pp. 185-186.

16 Id., at pp. 182-197.

19 Id., at pp. 199-201.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

25 Id., at pp. 132-133.

28 Id., at pp. 133-135.

VOL. 755, APRIL 8, 2015

30 Id., at pp. 137-138.

32 Id., at pp. 136 and 164.

36 Id., at pp. 131 and 136.

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Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

37 Id., at pp. 204-206.

39 Id., at pp. 76-77.

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Preliminary Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,45 after which

The issues for our resolution are:

45 Id., at pp. 277-298.

46 Id., at pp. 327-346.

47 Id., at pp. 16-42.

48 Id., at pp. 42-50.

49 Id., at pp. 291-292.

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We grant the Petition.

53 Rules of Court, Rule 102, Sec. 6.

54 Rules of Court, Rule 102, Sec. 12.

56 Medina v. Yan, id., at p. 298; p. 83.

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58 Saulo v. Cruz, id.

61 Id., at pp. 380-381.

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67 Medina v. Yan, supra note 55.

68 Id., at p. 290; p. 83.

71 Id., at pp. 294-297; pp. 82-84.

72 Id., at p. 298; p. 83.

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73 Id., at pp. 298-299; pp. 86-87.

74 Id., at p. 298; p. 83.

75 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1981), Sec. 9(3).

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consistent with the law’s “zealous regard for personal liberty.”80

80 Supra note 77 at p. 789.

81 Rules of Court, Rule 102, Sec. 1.

82 Supra note 77 at p. 790.

86 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 1 provides: